Research Insights: Can Voter Preferences Explain Why Governments Underinvest in Public Goods?

Peer Reviewed icon Peer Reviewed
Date issued
April 2022
Subject
Trust;
Public Expenditure;
Investment;
Public Employment;
Political Trust;
Voting Behavior
JEL code
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior;
H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General;
H50 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General;
O10 - Economic Development: General
Category
Catalogs and Brochures
A new survey of 6,040 voting-age individuals conducted in seven Latin American metropolitan areas reveals that political and interpersonal mistrust, risk aversion and time impatience are strong predictors of voter preferences for public spending. Respondents with higher mistrust or impatience are more likely to choose transfers over public goods; more impatient respondents are also more likely to choose current spending over public investment. Randomized experiments providing information about the benefits of public investment have the expected average demand impacts. Respondents with high political mistrust or impatience increase their demand for public investment significantly less than others.