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dc.titleWhen the Victor Cannot Claim the Spoils: Institutional Incentives for Professionalizing Patronage States
dc.contributor.authorSchuster, Christian
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageDominican Republic
dc.coverageUnited States
dc.coverageParaguay
dc.coverageLatin America
dc.coverageThe Caribbean
dc.date.available2016-04-20T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2016-04-01T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractMerit-based selection of bureaucrats is central to state capacity building, yet rare in developing countries. Most executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory to explain when executives forsake patronage for merit. The theory exploits exogenous variation in the institutional design of patronage states. In some, constitutions and budget laws monopolize patronage powers in the executive; in others, patronage benefits accrue to the legislature and public employees. When institutions fragment patronage powers and challengers control other government branches, merit becomes more incentive-compatible: it enables executives to deprive challengers of patronage while enhancing public goods provision to court electoral support. Drawing on 130 face-to-face elite interviews, a comparison of reforms in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and the United States validates the theory. How patronage states are institutionally designed thus shapes their reform prospects: fragmented control over bad government can incentivize good government reforms.
dc.format.extent46
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011729
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/When-the-Victor-Cannot-Claim-the-Spoils-Institutional-Incentives-for-Professionalizing-Patronage-States.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectPatronage
dc.subjectProfessionalization
dc.subjectMerit-Based Recruitment
dc.subjectPublic Employment
dc.subjectElections
dc.subjectLegislature
dc.subjectConstitution
dc.subjectPublic Service
dc.subjectGovernance
dc.subject.jelcodeD73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption
dc.subject.jelcodeH11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
dc.subject.jelcodeM51 - Firm Employment Decisions • Promotions
dc.subject.jelcodeN46 - Latin America • Caribbean
dc.subject.jelcodeO17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements
dc.subject.keywordsbureaucratic professionalization;public employees;merit-based recruitment;public service
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
idb.operationRG-X1128
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