When Interoperability Increases Market Power: Evidence from Peru's Instant Payment Systems

Peer Reviewed icon Peer Reviewed
Author
Cerón, Marcos ;
Quispe, Isaí
Date issued
December 2025
Subject
Fintech;
Interoperability;
Digital Technology;
Competitiveness;
Digital Payment;
Payment System;
Rating;
Financial Inclusion
JEL code
E42 - Monetary Systems • Standards • Regimes • Government and the Monetary System • Payment Systems;
J31 - Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials;
O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes
Country
Peru
Category
Working Papers
Instant payment systems have rapidly gained global traction by enhancing transaction efficiency, yet evidence remains limited on how their designparticularly interoperabilityshapes market structure. We exploit Perus 2023 interoperability mandate as a quasi-natural experiment using a difference-in-differences design. Mandated interoperability increased deposit market concentration by approximately 2%. Incumbent banks linked to the dominant digital wallet expanded their deposit market share by nearly 10% and reduced deposit interest rates by 5080 basis points. We also observe more branch closures in high-adoption areas and declining microcredit. A model explains these results through an “amenity shock,” boosting digital wallet convenience for all adopters. Due to network externalities, the largest incumbent wallet captures a disproportionate share of new users in dual-platform markets an “amenity effect” that ultimately increases concentration. By contrast, in single-platform regions, interoperability lowers barriers for new providers an “entry effect” that spurs competition and erodes incumbent dominance. Our results show that this amenity effect in dual-platform cities outweighs the entry effect elsewhere. Overall, our findings show competitive effects of interoperability mandates critically depend on initial market structure and distribution of platform market shares.
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