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| dc.title | Fiscal Discipline and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime |
| dc.contributor.author | Tomell, Aaron |
| dc.contributor.author | Velasco, Andrés |
| dc.contributor.orgunit | Department of Research and Chief Economist |
| dc.coverage | The Caribbean |
| dc.coverage | Central America |
| dc.coverage | South America |
| dc.date.available | 2010-12-06T00:00:00 |
| dc.date.issue | 1994-11-01T00:00:00 |
| dc.description.abstract | Conventional wisdom claims that fixed exchange rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates, but the recent experiences in Europe, the record of Sub-Saharan countries in the 1980s, and the history of stabilization attempts in Latin America cast empirical doubts on this wisdom. To explore this puzzle we present a standard intertemporal model with perfect capital mobility and price flexibility, in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority. |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010747 |
| dc.identifier.url | https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Fiscal-Discipline-and-the-Choice-of-Exchange-Rate-Regime.pdf |
| dc.language.iso | en |
| dc.medium | Adobe PDF |
| dc.publisher | Inter-American Development Bank |
| dc.subject | Fiscal Policy |
| dc.subject | Productivity |
| dc.subject.keywords | WP-303 |
| dc.type | Working Papers |
| idb.identifier.pubnumber | Working Papers |