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dc.titleThe Political Economy of Productivity: The Case of Chile
dc.contributor.authorNavia, Patricio
dc.contributor.authorEyzaguirre, Nicolás
dc.contributor.authorOlivari, Jocelyn
dc.contributor.authorBriones, Ignacio
dc.contributor.authorBenavente, José Miguel
dc.contributor.authorAninat, Cristóbal
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageChile
dc.date.available2010-12-01T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2010-04-02T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the political economy of productivity-related policymaking in Chile following a political transaction cost model (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003; Murillo et al., 2008). The main findings indicate that i) the Chilean policymaking process (PMP) was successful in the 1990s in implementing productivityenhancing policies, but as the country moved to a higher stage of development, the PMP grew less adept at generating the more complex set of policies needed to increase productivity at this stage; and ii) the Chilean PMP is less transparent than previously thought (Aninat et al., 2008), thus allowing political actors to favor private interests without being punished by the electorate. This has become apparent as the more sophisticated reforms needed at this stage of development require a deeper and more consolidated democracy.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010739
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The-Political-Economy-of-Productivity-The-Case-of-Chile.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectProductivity
dc.subjectFinancial Policy
dc.subjectE-Government
dc.subjectPublic Administration
dc.subject.jelcodeL52 - Industrial Policy • Sectoral Planning Methods
dc.subject.jelcodeO25 - Industrial Policy
dc.subject.jelcodeO40 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General
dc.subject.keywordsIDB-WP-105
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
idb.operationRG-K1095
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