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dc.titleJob Security and the Age-Composition of Employment: Evidence from Chile
dc.contributor.authorPagés, Carmen
dc.contributor.authorMontenegro, Claudio E.
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageChile
dc.date.available2010-10-28T00:00:00
dc.date.issue1999-09-01T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a simple model to analyze the impact of tenure-based severance payments on firms' hiring and firing decisions. The findings are that under certain conditions, this feature leads to a Last-in First-out firing policy. Also, reforms that increase the slope of the severance-tenure profile tend to increase the probabilities of dismissal of low tenure workers.
dc.format.extent37
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010721
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Job-Security-and-the-Age-Composition-of-Employment-Evidence-from-Chile.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectProductivity
dc.subject.jelcodeE24 - Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity
dc.subject.jelcodeJ23 - Labor Demand
dc.subject.jelcodeJ65 - Unemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings
dc.subject.keywordsWP-398
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
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