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dc.titleOverborrowing, Underborrowing, and Macroprudential Policy
dc.contributor.authorArce, Fernando
dc.contributor.authorBengui, Julien
dc.contributor.authorBianchi, Javier
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.date.available2025-10-29T00:10:00
dc.date.issue2025-10-29T00:10:00
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with pecuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained-efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on the production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macroprudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In our quantitative analysis, macroprudential taxes on borrowing turn out to be larger when the government has access to ex-post stabilization policies.
dc.format.extent36
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013775
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Overborrowing-Underborrowing-and-Macroprudential-Policy.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectTaxation
dc.subjectCredit Constraint
dc.subjectLabor
dc.subjectCompetitiveness
dc.subjectSmall Business
dc.subjectFinancial Stability
dc.subjectProductivity Shock
dc.subject.jelcodeE58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
dc.subject.jelcodeF31 - Foreign Exchange
dc.subject.jelcodeF32 - Current Account Adjustment • Short-Term Capital Movements
dc.subject.jelcodeF34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
dc.subject.keywordsMacroprudential policy;Overborrowing;Underborrowing
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-WP-01716
idb.operationRG-K1098
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