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dc.titleResearch Insights: Why Do Politicians Get Away with Corruption in Good Economic Times?
dc.contributor.authorBarinas-Forero, Andrés Felipe
dc.contributor.authorScartascini, Carlos
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageLatin America
dc.coverageThe Caribbean
dc.date.available2025-08-26T00:08:00
dc.date.issue2025-08-26T00:08:00
dc.description.abstractPoliticians are more likely to engage in corruption during economic booms than during downturns. Citizens willingness to punish corruption remains stable across economic cycles, but their ability to detect wrongdoing weakens during good times. Improved economic conditions can obscure accountability, allowing corrupt behavior to go unnoticed or unpunished.
dc.format.extent4
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013667
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Research-Insights-Why-Do-Politicians-Get-Away-with-Corruption-in-Good-Economic-Times.pdf
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/spanish/document/Perspectivas-de-investigacion-por-que-los-politicos-no-son-sancionados-por-la-corrupcion-en-tiempos-de-bonanza-economica.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectPublic Good
dc.subjectCorporate Corruption
dc.subjectPolitical Corruption
dc.subjectGovernment Accountability
dc.subjectTransparency and Anticorruption
dc.subjectPublic Finance
dc.subjectTrust
dc.subjectEconomic Recession
dc.subject.jelcodeD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
dc.subject.jelcodeD73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption
dc.subject.jelcodeH41 - Public Goods
dc.subject.jelcodeC91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
dc.subject.keywordsRent Seeking;Economic Booms;Punishment;Laboratory Experiment;Downturns
dc.typeCatalogs and Brochures
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-CB-01088
idb.operationRG-K1199
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