https://9p7pzq3jbl.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ProdStage Skip to main content
Publications
Advanced Search

View metadata

dc.titleWeak Parties and the Inequality Trap in Latin America
dc.contributor.authorLupu, Noam
dc.contributor.orgunitVice Presidency for Sectors and Knowledge
dc.coverageLatin America
dc.date.available2024-04-08T00:04:00
dc.date.issue2024-04-08T00:04:00
dc.description.abstractLatin America is widely acknowledged as one of the most unequal regions of the world (Sánchez-Ancochea 2021). But it is also one of the most democratic, certainly as compared to other developing regions. These two facts seem difficult to reconcile. Both folk theories of democratic representation to borrow a phrase from (Achen and Bartels 2016) and canonical models in political economy would have us believe that democracies ought to reduce inequality through redistribution (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Romer 1975). As inequality increases, the proportion of the population that would benefit materially from redistribution also increases, making it more likely that a pro-redistribution political coalition would win elections and deliver social policy. And yet, despite several decades of uninterrupted electoral democracy in most of the region, Latin American governments have consistently and with but few exceptions failed to reduce inequality substantially. This paper begins by discussing why contemporary Latin American party systems are weak, focusing on both structural/institutional factors that pull party systems toward less institutionalization and recent changes to the regions political economy that undermined the more institutionalized systems. Then links the regions low levels of party-system institutionalization with lower levels of redistribution, both theoretically and empirically through cross-national comparisons. Finally, the mass and elite surveys show that legislatures in the region fail to reflect the pro-redistribution preferences of voters, further demonstrating how weak parties undermine the representation necessary for successful redistribution.
dc.format.extent31
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0012891
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Weak-Parties-and-the-Inequality-Trap-in-Latin-America.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectEquality
dc.subjectEconomy
dc.subjectEquality of Opportunity
dc.subjectPolitical Party
dc.subjectDemocracy
dc.subjectEducational Institution
dc.subjectPolitical Economy
dc.subject.jelcodeD30 - Distribution: General
dc.subject.jelcodeD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
dc.subject.jelcodeH50 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
dc.subject.jelcodeP00 - Economic Systems: General: General
dc.subject.keywordsInequality;Political Processes;National Government
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-WP-01591
idb.operationRG-T3609
Return to Publication