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dc.titleResearch Insights: How Do Messages Affect Taxpayers’ Behavior?
dc.contributor.authorCastro, Lucio
dc.contributor.authorScartascini, Carlos
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageLatin America and the Caribbean
dc.date.available2023-08-11T00:08:00
dc.date.issue2023-08-11T00:08:00
dc.description.abstractThe results of a field experiment in Argentina indicate that taxpayers who received a deterrent message (describing the penalties for non-compliance) are more likely to comply with payment of taxes than taxpayers in the control group. After receiving reciprocity and peer effects messages, the probability of compliance increased for some contributors but decreased for others according to their underlying distribution of beliefs. The use of messages on tax bills influences taxpayers depending on their prior beliefs, the location of their residence, and whether or not they live in the city where they have to pay the tax.
dc.format.extent4
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0005060
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Research-Insights-How-Do-Messages-Affect-Taxpayers-Behavior.pdf
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/spanish/document/Perspectivas-de-investigacion-Como-influyen-los-mensajes-en-la-conducta-de-los-contribuyentes.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectTax Compliance
dc.subjectTaxpayer
dc.subjectTaxation
dc.subjectTax Evasion
dc.subjectPublic Expenditure
dc.subjectMunicipal Government
dc.subjectTrust
dc.subjectProperty Tax
dc.subjectEconomy
dc.subjectRandomized Controlled Trial
dc.subjectBehavioral Economics
dc.subject.jelcodeH26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
dc.subject.jelcodeC93 - Field Experiments
dc.subject.jelcodeD03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
dc.subject.jelcodeH41 - Public Goods
dc.typeCatalogs and Brochures
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-CB-00794
idb.operationBK-C1102
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