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dc.titleWhen can lotteries improve public procurement processes?
dc.contributor.authorEstache, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorFoucart, Renaud
dc.contributor.authorSerebrisky, Tomás
dc.contributor.orgunitInfrastructure and Energy Sector
dc.coverageLatin America and the Caribbean
dc.date.available2022-10-31T02:10:00
dc.date.issue2022-10-31T00:10:00
dc.description.abstractWe study the potential benefits of adding a lottery component to cut the main risks associated with standard negotiated and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first negotiate with a small number of bidders to assess their eligibility and, next, rely on a lottery to award the contract reduces corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a “third-price lottery” in which the two highest bidders are selected with equal probability and the project is contracted at a price corresponding to the third highest bid can reduce limited liability, renegotiation, bid rigging and collusion risks.
dc.format.extent40
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004522
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/When-can-lotteries-improve-public-procurement-processes.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectProcurement
dc.subjectAuction
dc.subjectSmall Business
dc.subjectPublic Procurement
dc.subjectAuditing
dc.subjectProcurement Management
dc.subjectKnowledge
dc.subjectEconomy
dc.subjectEducational Institution
dc.subject.jelcodeD44 - Auctions
dc.subject.jelcodeD73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption
dc.subject.jelcodeH57 - Procurement
dc.subject.keywordsrules;discretion;lotteries
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-WP-01364
idb.operationRG-T3784
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