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dc.titleWhen Women Win: Can Female Representation Decrease Gender-Based Violence?
dc.contributor.authorFrisancho, Verónica
dc.contributor.authorPappa, Evi
dc.contributor.authorSantantonio, Chiara
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.date.available2022-10-20T00:10:00
dc.date.issue2022-10-20T00:10:00
dc.description.abstractEvery day, three women are murdered in the United States by a current or former partner. Yet policy action to prevent gender-based violence has been limited. Previous studies have highlighted the effect of female political representation on crimes against women in the developing world. This paper investigates whether the election of a female politician reduces the incidence of gender-based violence in the United States. Using a regression discontinuity design on mixed-gender races, we find that the election of a female House Representative leads to a short-lived decline in the prevalence of femicides in her electoral district. The drop in femicides is mainly driven by a deterrence effect that results from higher police responsiveness and effort in solving gender-related crimes.
dc.format.extent56
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004513
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/When-Women-Win-Female-Representation-And-Violence-Against-Women.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectWomen
dc.subjectGender
dc.subjectElections
dc.subjectFemicide
dc.subjectEconomic Impact
dc.subjectCrime and Violence
dc.subjectRace
dc.subjectPolice Force
dc.subjectHomicide
dc.subject.jelcodeD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
dc.subject.jelcodeJ12 - Marriage • Marital Dissolution • Family Structure • Domestic Abuse
dc.subject.jelcodeJ16 - Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-WP-01379
idb.operationRG-K1415
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