View metadata

dc.titleThe Market Design Approach to Teacher Assignment: Evidence from Ecuador
dc.contributor.authorElacqua, Gregory
dc.contributor.authorWesth Olsen, Anne Sofie
dc.contributor.authorVelez-Ferro, Santiago
dc.contributor.orgunitEducation Division
dc.date.available2021-12-06T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2021-09-30T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractWe study the advantages, trade-offs, and challenges of employing a centralized rule to determine the allocation of teachers to schools. Data come from the centralized teacher assignment program in Ecuador, "Quiero ser Maestro," conducted by the Ministry of Education. Notably, in 2019 the program transitioned from a priority based algorithm to a strategy proof mechanism, similar to the change introduced in Boston in 2005 to assign students to schools. Using the reported preferences, we conduct a counterfactual analysis and nd substantive evidence that the adjustment in algorithm resulted in greater efficiency for the school system. However, in contrast to the Boston case, we nd the benefits stem from increasing the competition for positions among teachers, rather than by the introduction of a strategy-proof mechanism.
dc.format.extent33
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003824
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The-Market-Design-Approach-to-Teacher-Assignment-Evidence-from-Ecuador.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectEducation
dc.subjectEducational Institution
dc.subjectTeacher
dc.subjectTeacher Distribution
dc.subject.jelcodeI28 - Government Policy
dc.subject.jelcodeH39 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Other
dc.subject.jelcodeH41 - Public Goods
dc.subject.jelcodeM51 - Firm Employment Decisions • Promotions
dc.subject.keywordsEducation;Educational Institution;Teacher Distribution
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberIDB-WP-01294
idb.operationRG-E1672
Return to Publication