View metadata
| dc.title | Peer Effects in the Decision to Apply for a Professional Excellence Award |
| dc.contributor.author | Berlinski, Samuel |
| dc.contributor.author | Ramos, Alejandra |
| dc.contributor.orgunit | Department of Research and Chief Economist |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-24T17:00:00 |
| dc.date.issue | 2020-08-24T17:00:00 |
| dc.description.abstract | We study the role social interactions at the workplace play in the decision to apply for a professional recognition program. In Chile, teachers can apply to a pedagogical excellence award. Successful applicants receive a wage increase and are publicly recognized. We exploit the quasi-random variation in the allocation of awards generated by a sharp assignment rule. We document that the success of an applicant increases her school colleagues' application rate to the program by almost 75 percent. The impact is higher for colleagues with closer interaction with a successful applicant. We speculate on social learning as a driver of this result. |
| dc.format.extent | 38 |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002600 |
| dc.identifier.url | https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Peer-Effects-in-the-Decision-to-Apply-for-a-Professional-Excellence-Award.pdf |
| dc.language.iso | en |
| dc.medium | Adobe PDF |
| dc.publisher | Inter-American Development Bank |
| dc.subject | Education Quality |
| dc.subject | Primary Education |
| dc.subject | Wage Growth |
| dc.subject | Public School |
| dc.subject | Merit Pay |
| dc.subject | Private School |
| dc.subject.jelcode | M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects |
| dc.subject.jelcode | J58 - Public Policy |
| dc.subject.jelcode | J33 - Compensation Packages • Payment Methods |
| dc.subject.keywords | Merit award;Public recognition;Peer effects;Social learning |
| dc.type | Working Papers |
| idb.identifier.pubnumber | IDB-WP-01148 |
| idb.operation | RG-K1415 |