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dc.titleU.S. Free Trade Agreements and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America
dc.contributor.authorDewan, Sabina
dc.contributor.authorRonconi, Lucas
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageLatin America
dc.coverageNorth America
dc.date.available2014-12-01T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2014-11-26T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes whether Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed between the United States and Latin American countries during the last decade produced higher enforcement of labor regulations. The paper computes before-after estimates of the effect of FTAs on labor inspections and exploits variation across countries using non-signers as a comparison group. The empirical strategy benefits from the fact that about half of Latin American countries have signed a trade agreement with the United States. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that signing an FTA produced a 20 percent increase in the number of labor inspectors and a 60 percent increase in the number of inspections. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), however, does not appear to have the same positive impacts on Mexico. The paper concludes with a discussion of these results.
dc.format.extent23
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011663
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/US-Free-Trade-Agreements-and-Enforcement-of-Labor-Law-in-Latin-America.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectLabor Policy
dc.subjectTrade Agreement
dc.subject.jelcodeF11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade
dc.subject.jelcodeK31 - Labor Law
dc.subject.keywordsFree trade agreements;Labor inspections;Labor law;Labor inspectors;Latin America;Labor regulations;Trade;Enforcement;Labor;Labor provisions
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
idb.operationRG-X1128
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