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dc.titleTo Redistribute or Not: A Politician`s Dilemma
dc.contributor.authorVelasques de Paula Machado, Fabiana
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageBrazil
dc.date.available2012-10-03T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2012-09-06T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractA prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies in a democracy is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. To evaluate the prospects of such an outcome, this paper develops a theory exploring two fundamental factors at play during elections - the critical political stage where citizens choose their representatives. The first is the lack of information about the policy inclinations of candidates. The second refers to two motivations compelling candidates into politics (and possibly at odds with each other): the opportunity to implement one's favored policies or to extract rents. Results indicate the existence of an equilibrium where high inequality and low redistribution can coexist. The theory's assumptions and outcomes are explored empirically using individual-level data collected in presidential election years in Brazil.
dc.format.extent51
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011413
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/To-Redistribute-or-Not-A-Politician`s-Dilemma.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectFiscal Policy
dc.subjectPublic Administration
dc.subject.jelcodeC70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
dc.subject.jelcodeD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
dc.subject.keywordsVoting behavior, Uncertainty, Political ideology, Redistribution
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
idb.operationRG-K1231
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