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dc.titleUnemployment Insurance and Search Effort in Chile
dc.contributor.authorHuneeus, Cristóbal
dc.contributor.authorLeiva, Silvia
dc.contributor.authorMicco, Alejandro
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageChile
dc.date.available2012-07-13T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2012-06-28T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractUnemployment is a pressing problem in many countries in Latin America. Financial crises and increased globalization increase job turnover and therefore the risk of unemployment. To protect workers, Chile implemented an innovative unemployment insurance (UI) system. UI protects workers but creates moral hazard and self-selection issues. Using administrative data for the period 2007 to 2010, the effect of the 2009 reform of UI on job search behavior was studied. The results revealed different job search behavior between workers who use unemployment benefits and those who do not. Search efforts were found to fall as long as unemployment benefits are in place. There is strong evidence that workers who decide not to take UI despite having the right to do so have a higher probability of finding a new job.
dc.format.extent45
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011390
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Unemployment-Insurance-and-Search-Effort-in-Chile.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectUnemployment Insurance
dc.subjectLabor Market Policy
dc.subject.jelcodeE24 - Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity
dc.subject.jelcodeJ64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
dc.subject.jelcodeJ65 - Unemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings
dc.subject.keywordsUnemployment, Job search behavior
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
idb.operationRG-K1113
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