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dc.titleWhy Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected?: A Model of Strategic Populists
dc.contributor.authorMiller, Sebastián J.
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageEcuador
dc.coverageItaly
dc.coveragePeru
dc.coverageVenezuela
dc.coverageBolivia
dc.coverageCentral America
dc.coverageSouth America
dc.date.available2011-08-23T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2011-05-01T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractThe existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.
dc.format.extent32
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011203
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Why-Do-Populist-Outsiders-Get-Elected-A-Model-of-Strategic-Populists.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectDemocracy
dc.subject.jelcodeD31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
dc.subject.jelcodeD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
dc.subject.keywordsIDB-WP-248, Outsiders, Populism, Campaign contributions, Inequality
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
idb.operationRG-K1113
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