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| dc.title | Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected?: A Model of Strategic Populists |
| dc.contributor.author | Miller, Sebastián J. |
| dc.contributor.orgunit | Department of Research and Chief Economist |
| dc.coverage | Ecuador |
| dc.coverage | Italy |
| dc.coverage | Peru |
| dc.coverage | Venezuela |
| dc.coverage | Bolivia |
| dc.coverage | Central America |
| dc.coverage | South America |
| dc.date.available | 2011-08-23T00:00:00 |
| dc.date.issue | 2011-05-01T00:00:00 |
| dc.description.abstract | The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office. |
| dc.format.extent | 32 |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011203 |
| dc.identifier.url | https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Why-Do-Populist-Outsiders-Get-Elected-A-Model-of-Strategic-Populists.pdf |
| dc.language.iso | en |
| dc.medium | Adobe PDF |
| dc.publisher | Inter-American Development Bank |
| dc.subject | Democracy |
| dc.subject.jelcode | D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions |
| dc.subject.jelcode | D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| dc.subject.keywords | IDB-WP-248, Outsiders, Populism, Campaign contributions, Inequality |
| dc.type | Working Papers |
| idb.identifier.pubnumber | Working Papers |
| idb.operation | RG-K1113 |