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dc.titleInstitutional Enforcement, Labor-Market Rigidities, and Economic Performance
dc.contributor.authorCalderón, César
dc.contributor.authorLeón, Gianmarco
dc.contributor.authorChong, Alberto E.
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageThe Caribbean
dc.coverageCentral America
dc.coverageSouth America
dc.date.available2011-02-07T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2006-10-26T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractThis paper study the issue of institutional enforcement of regulations by focusing on labor-market policies and their potential link to economic performance. It test the different impacts of enforceable and non-enforceable labor regulations by proxying non-enforceable labor rigidity measures using data on conventions from the International Labor Organization (ILO). It has been argued that non-enforceable conventions -that is, those that exist on paper and are simply de jure regulations -appear to be more distortionary and tend to be the least enforced in practice (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997). According to Freeman (1993), these conventions reflect the ideal regulatory framework from an institutionalist perspective and cover a variety of labor market issues, from child labor to placement agencies. Whereas in theory, a country's ratification of ILO conventions gives the country legal status and thus supersedes domestic regulations relating to those issues, in practice the degree of labor-market rigidity depends on how the conventions are enforced. It is the outcome of the regulations that matters, rather than their number.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010966
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Institutional-Enforcement-Labor-Market-Rigidities-and-Economic-Performance.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectLabor
dc.subjectEconomy
dc.subject.keywordsWP-589
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
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