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dc.titleDo Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?
dc.contributor.authorCalderón, César
dc.contributor.authorChong, Alberto E.
dc.contributor.orgunitDepartment of Research and Chief Economist
dc.coverageUruguay
dc.date.available2011-02-07T00:00:00
dc.date.issue2005-06-01T00:00:00
dc.description.abstractUsing objective institutional historical data we test the link between extent, duration, and transparency in democracies and rent-seeking behavior using time-series and panel data approaches. In this paper we focus on the case of Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous country. We find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent-seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent-seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent-seeking behavior. Our results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010844
dc.identifier.urlhttps://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Do-Democracies-Breed-Rent-Seeking-Behavior.pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.mediumAdobe PDF
dc.publisherInter-American Development Bank
dc.subjectTransparency and Anticorruption
dc.subjectDemocracy
dc.subjectPoverty
dc.subject.keywordsWP-534
dc.typeWorking Papers
idb.identifier.pubnumberWorking Papers
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