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Preliminary Findings

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Jobs and Support for Trade: Preliminary Findings*

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Abstract

International trade increases aggregate welfare but also creates winners and losers, which makes free trade a contentious political issue. Recent research has established that individuals are more sensitive to anti-trade information about the prospect of employment loss than to pro-trade information regarding lower product prices and increased variety. This means that we know what works to *decrease* support for trade, but it is still unclear what works to *increase* it. In this paper, we fill this gap by studying how individual attitudes and beliefs change in response to information regarding employment losses (in import-competing sectors), to information regarding employment gains (in export-oriented sectors), and to information regarding the possibility of compensation to those displaced by trade. To this end, we conducted a large-scale survey experiment in eighteen Latin American countries using nationally representative samples. Results indicate that anti-trade information reduces support for trade even if compensation to losers is mentioned and that pro-trade messages increase support only if they are worded so that a job gain is perceived. Belief updating about the consequences of increased trade on employment seems to be a relevant mechanism. Our findings have important implications on what types of messaging work to increase support for trade.

Keywords: International trade, attitudes, employment, survey experiment, Latin America
JEL Classification: F13, D72

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1 Introduction

Trade is a contentious political issue. Although freer trade increases welfare in the aggregate, welfare gains can only be materialized if the economy reallocates physical and human capital across sectors, which is a costly process that inevitably creates winners and losers at least in the short- to medium-term (Murphy and Topel, 1987; Neal, 1995; Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Yi et al., 2017). At the individual level, the gains from trade stem from higher product variety and lower prices. Gains may also relate to increase in employment in exporting sectors, while the losses can materialize as unemployment spells.[1]

How are individual attitudes towards trade shaped by rhetoric and messaging, both in favor and against increased trade with other countries? Recent research has established that, when forming their trade preferences, individuals are more sensitive to negative information about the prospect of employment loss than positive information regarding product prices and variety (Hiscox (2006); Ardanaz et al. (2013); Rodríguez Chatruc et al. (2021); Alfaro et al. (2023); Stantcheva (2022)). This is, we know what works to *decrease* support for trade but we still do not know what works to *increase* it.

However, there are still promising avenues to increase support for trade (or mitigate a reduction in support) that have yet to be fully explored. A first one is to assess how individuals would react to positive information regarding trade's impact on the increase in employment in exporting firms. If individuals care about employment, then, it is reasonable to expect that a pro-trade, job-gain treatment would increase support for trade. A second one is to look into whether *loss aversion* plays a role—this is, if individuals react more strongly to losses than to gains—by stating pro-trade arguments in terms of losses, for example, by highlighting that jobs may be lost in some sectors due to decreased trade.[2] Lastly, a third one is to investigate how individuals would react to the possibility of government compensation to those who lose their jobs because of trade. If individuals tend to care about employment loss, mentioning the possibility of compensation may dampen the negative effect of information about job losses.

In this paper, we fill this gap by studying how people's attitudes and beliefs change in response to information that highlights potential employment losses (in import-competing sectors), to information that highlights employment gains (in export-oriented sectors), and to information mentioning the possibility of compensation to those displaced by trade. To this end, we conducted a large-scale survey experiment in nationally representative samples of eighteen Latin American countries. We exposed a random subset of the respondents to one of four information treatments before asking them if they support increasing or restricting trade (a control group was not given any information). The treatments were: *Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)* in which we mentioned that ***expanding*** foreign trade may ***reduce*** jobs at firms that compete with imported products; *Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)* in which we mentioned that ***expanding*** foreign trade may ***reduce*** jobs at firms that compete with imported products and mentioned the possibility of ***compensating*** the affected workers; *Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)* in which we mentioned that ***expanding*** foreign trade may ***increase*** jobs at firms that sell products to other countries; and *Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)* in which we told respondents that ***restricting*** foreign trade may ***reduce*** jobs at firms that sell products to other countries. To explore belief updating as a potential mechanism, immediately post-treatment we asked respondents if they believed increased trade led to higher or lower employment and to higher or lower product variety at affordable prices. We also elicited respondents' prior beliefs (i.e. pre-treatment) about trade that may be correlated with trade support: their knowledge of

[1] Individual gains (losses) from trade can also materialize as higher (lower) wages or higher (lower) returns on capital. We focus here on employment and product variety for simplicity.

[2] We borrow from Hiscox (2006) ideas here.

what experts think are the consequences of trade and their opinions on the effect on domestic culture of the interaction with other countries.

Our main finding is that anti-trade information reduces support for trade even if compensation to losers is mentioned and that pro-trade messages increase support only if the messages are cast in terms of job gains in response to increases in trade, but not if they are cast in terms of job losses as a result of restricting trade. In line with previous literature, the first treatment *Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)* significantly reduces support for trade by 6.7 percentage points (p.p.) compared to the control group. Contrary to our expectations, mentioning the possibility of compensating the workers displaced by foreign competition (*Anti-Trade/Compensate*, T_2) significantly increases the negative effect of T_1, with support for trade being 8.5 p.p. lower than the control group. Although we cannot test why, we suspect that promising compensation for displaced workers increases the salience of the adverse consequences of trade and that compensations may require increasing taxes or scaling down other social programs with perceived negative consequences for the respondent. *Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)*, which mentions the positive effects of trade on exporters' employment increases support for trade in around 3.6 p.p compared to the control group. But, casting a similar pro-trade argument in terms of avoiding job losses instead of creating job gains does not yield any discernible impact: *Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)*, which emphasizes the consequences of restricting trade for exporters' employment does not affect support (the coefficients are close to zero and imprecise). Note that focusing on exporters' gains from increased trade has a more muted effect than focusing on domestic firms' losses of increasing import competition.

Do these positive and negative messages really change individual's minds? Or do they just contribute to "cement" previously held views, reflecting that we are "preaching to the converted" (Fiske, 1998)? To address this issue, we explore heterogeneous effects across the two prior beliefs mentioned in the previous paragraph. We find for treatment T_1 that the effect is not statistically different for individuals with more positive priors. For T_2, the effects are larger for those holding more positive ex-ante views. In contrast, for T_3, the effects are smaller among those who held positive prior views, in particular with respect to expert opinions on trade. This last result suggests that positive messages on the employment impact of trade tend to affect the attitudes of those who were predisposed against trade in the first place. That is, positive messages can "convert the doubtful," rather than just "preach to the converted."

Finally, we explore the role of belief updating as a potential mechanism mediating attitudinal change. To this end, we conduct a formal mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2010; Celli, 2022). We decompose the total effect of the treatment of support for trade in its direct effect and the effect mediated through belief updating. We find that the belief that trade increases employment (significantly) explains 31.6% of the effect of T_1, 21.8% of T_2, and 33.6% of T_3. This suggests that belief updating plays an important role in explaining the changes in trade support.

This paper relates to the literature studying the determinants of individual attitudes toward international trade. Early studies focused on economic determinants, such as the level of education, either using national survey data (Canada: Balistreri (1997), Beaulieu (2002), the US: Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Blonigen (2011)) or international surveys (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Beaulieu et al., 2005; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Mayda, 2008; Jäkel and Smolka, 2017) and found evidence supportive of the predictions of the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem, this is, that high-skilled individuals are more supportive of freer trade in skill abundant countries. A related strand of research found that economic interests explain only part of the variation in trade attitudes and that individual characteristics such as gender and ideology (Kuo and Naoi, 2015), exposure to knowledge (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), or certain cultural values, such as nationalism or isolationism (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Margalit, 2012), also play a role.

Given the limitations of observational studies, a strand of research has focused on conduct-

ing survey experiments to generate exogenous variation in the support for trade. The pioneering work by Hiscox (2006) found for the US that anti-trade information, linking trade to job losses, significantly reduced support for trade while pro-trade information linking trade to lower prices for consumers, did not increase support. These findings replicate for Argentina (Ardanaz et al., 2013) and for a sample of eighteen Latin American countries (Rodríguez Chatruc et al., 2021). Regarding mechanisms, positive framing shifts upward respondent beliefs that trade reduces consumption prices, but also raises concerns about low wages. Negative framing substantially weakens the prevailing belief that trade brings higher employment (Rodríguez Chatruc et al., 2021). As we mentioned earlier, we contribute to this literature by exploring two ways to increase support for trade (or mitigate a reduction in support): to provide positive information regarding trade's impact on the increase in employment in exporting firms and to provide information about the possibility of government compensation to those who lose their jobs because of trade.

Two recent studies using US data are closely related to ours and, therefore, deserve a separate mention. Alfaro et al. (2023) also replicates the finding that anti-trade information regarding job losses linked to trade reduces trade support but, contrary to previous evidence, finds that pro-trade information about the effects of trade on prices induces a strong protectionist response. In addition, surprisingly, the study finds that information about the positive effects of trade on employment also reduces support for trade (although less than information regarding job losses). Although this treatment is similar to our *Pro-Trade/Job-Gain* treatment, it is worth noting that their treatment is a narrative about the job creation effect in non-manufacturing US sectors brought about by China's accession to the WTO. We think that by mentioning China, this narrative may increase the salience of import competition so that the effect the authors find compounds also that of an anti-trade narrative. We believe that our treatment is cleaner in that it only mentions job gains without evoking import competition. Stantcheva (2022) replicates the findings in the previous paragraph and, in addition, finds that individuals exposed to information about adverse distributional consequences of trade and ways to compensate losers do not change their support for trade. In this case, this treatment is similar to our *Anti-Trade/Compensate* treatment, however, it is worth noting that the treatment in that study also includes information about consumer-side effects of trade (i.e. goods become cheaper and the variety of goods increases). Therefore, results may conflate the impact of pro-trade messaging. We believe that our treatment is cleaner in that it only mentions job losses and compensation without evoking consumer gains.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the experimental design, the data used in the analysis, and our empirical approach. Section 3 presents our main results on the effects of the treatments on the support for trade and beliefs. Section 4 explores the mechanisms behind our results and describes our mediation analysis. Section 5 concludes.

2 Empirical strategy

2.1 Data and experimental design

We use data from the LAPOP's AmericasBarometer for the year 2021.[3] The AmericasBarometer is a nationally representative survey of voting-age adults in up to 34 countries in North, Central, and South America. The survey measures attitudes, evaluations, experiences, and behavior for the respondents using a common methodology and core questionnaire, which ensures comparability across countries and, in some cases, over time. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, data collection for

[3]Because of technical issues, the survey for Nicaragua was repeated in the summer of 2022. All our results are robust to excluding this country from the sample (results available upon request).

the 2021 round was carried out using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). Consistent with this change, the sampling design transitioned from probability sampling of geographic areas to Random-Digit Dialing (RDD). The sampling frame corresponded to all possible phone numbers in a given country (excluding business-only phones) and the statistical unit of interest was the individual. In 2021, the total sample size was 53,590 individuals in 18 countries.

We embedded a survey experiment in a random sample of the 2021 AmericasBarometer. In particular, half of the individuals interviewed in 18 countries were randomly assigned to five groups differing in their trade support questions. The randomization was at the individual level, with respondents being assigned to different groups with equal probability (i.e., 20% chance each). The trade support questions have the following wording:[4]

- *Control group (C)*: [Country] buys and sells products to other countries. What is your opinion about foreign trade between [country] and other countries?
- *Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)*: [Country] buys and sells products to other countries. Expanding foreign trade may reduce jobs at firms that compete with imported products. What is your opinion about foreign trade between [country] and other countries?
- *Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)*: [Country] buys and sells products to other countries. Expanding foreign trade may reduce jobs at firms that compete with imported products. What would be your view on foreign trade between [country] and other countries if the government compensated the affected workers?
- *Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)*: [Country] buys and sells products to other countries. Expanding foreign trade may increase jobs at firms that sell products to other countries. What is your view on foreign trade between [country] and other countries?
- *Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)*: [Country] buys and sells products to other countries. Restricting foreign trade may reduce jobs at firms that sell products to other countries. What is your opinion about foreign trade between [country] and other countries?

The answer options were "You support expanding trade" and "You support restricting trade", with the order of the possible answers being also randomized between respondents. The surveyors were instructed to read the options to the respondents. In total, there are 27,310 observations in the experiment with each of the five experimental groups having around one-fifth of the sample. The number of observations by treatment arm and country is available in Table B.1 in the Appendix. As can be seen there, the sample size for each of the treatment groups differs slightly by country, which is explained by the randomization being implemented for each interview/call individually.

Notice that as in Rodríguez Chatruc et al. (2021), our questions on support for trade do not mention specific policies such as trade agreements or tariffs, but instead focus on policy outcomes. The main reason for this is that we wanted to maintain a high degree of accessibility to as many respondents as possible. Our questions do not differentiate between exports and imports either, which follows from the fact that in practice most policy instruments affect both flows at the same time and, in many cases, in similar directions. Not forcing the respondents to think about a specific trade flow may also increase the salience of the topic and improve data quality.

Immediately after the question on support for trade and independent of the experimental group, the respondents were asked about their beliefs regarding the consequences of expanding

[4]The original questions in Spanish for the survey experiment are available in the Appendix. In countries where the official language is not Spanish, we translated the questions with the help of the implementation partners.

trade on employment, as well as on the variety and prices of products available in their countries. For the case of employment, the answer options were "More jobs," "Fewer jobs," and "No change in jobs." For variety/prices, they were "More variety of products at affordable prices," "Less variety of products at affordable prices," and "No changes in the products available." Using these questions, we test if the individuals in the treatment groups update differently their beliefs on the effect of trade, especially when compared with the control group.

In addition to the questions about support for trade and beliefs, we asked respondents about knowledge of what experts think are the consequences of trade, with the answer options being "Most believe trade is beneficial for a country's economy," "Some believe trade is beneficial, others that trade is detrimental," and "You don't know or have not thought much about this." We also elicited their opinions about the effect on domestic culture of the interaction with ideas, people, and products from other countries, with the answers being "Positive influence," "Negative influence," and "No influence.". Given that these two questions were placed in the questionnaire *before* the survey experiment, we use them as indicators for prior knowledge and opinions of the respondents about trade-related issues.

To give a sense of the support for trade and the characteristics of the respondents, Table B.2 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of key variables for the control group. As can be seen, the support for trade is relatively high for the countries in our sample, with around 81% of the respondents supporting increases in trade. It is also the case that most respondents believe that trade leads to increases in employment (72%) and in product variety (65%). We also see positive views on the influence of foreign countries on domestic culture (62%). Overall, the individuals in our sample view trade favorably, which is consistent with previous evidence for Latin American countries (Rodríguez Chatruc et al., 2021).

2.2 Empirical specification

Given the random assignment of the treatments, we estimate the effects of information on the support for trade with the following specification:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_1 T_{1ij} + \beta_2 T_{2ij} + \beta_3 T_{3ij} + \beta_4 T_{4ij} + \mathbf{x}_{ij}^{'}\gamma + \alpha_j + \epsilon_{ij}, \tag{2.1}$$

where y_{ij} is an indicator variable for a favorable trade support or for agreeing with a given consequence of trade for individual i in country j, T_{nij} is a dummy for respondents in the treatment group n, $\mathbf{x}_{ij}$ is a vector of individual characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education, employment status, and order effects), α_j are country fixed effects, and ϵ_{ij} are the unobservables, that we allow to be heteroskedastic.[5] The coefficients of interest are the β's, that measure the conditional difference between the treatment group under consideration and the control group.

As was mentioned before, we collected information on the respondent's knowledge and opinions on trade-related issues before the treatments took place. Leveraging this variation, we estimate specifications with the following form:

$$y_{ij} = \sum_n \left(\beta_n T_{nij} + \beta_{n,v} T_{nij} v_{ij}\right) + \theta v_{ij} + \mathbf{x}_{ij}^{'}\gamma + \alpha_j + \epsilon_{ij}, \tag{2.2}$$

where v_{ij} is an indicator variable for the ex-ante opinion on trade and the rest of variables were described before. We define v_{ij} in two alternative ways. First, we use the information on the

[5] Given that the randomization was at the individual level and that the survey corresponds to a simple random sampling, we do not need to cluster the standard errors at any level (Abadie et al., 2023). We still use robust standard errors though.

expert's opinions and create a dummy equal to one if the respondent states that experts view trade as having positive consequences on the economy. Second, with the question about the effects on culture of interacting with foreign countries, we define an indicator for individuals with mostly positive views on this matter. The coefficient of interest now is the $\beta_{n,v}$, which measures the differential effect of T_n when the ex-ante opinion on trade is positive.

We also explore treatment-effect heterogeneity by country characteristics. In particular, we estimate the following expression:

$$y_{ij} = \sum_n \left(\beta_n T_{nij} + \beta_{n,z} T_{nij} Z_j\right) + \mathbf{x}_{ij}^{'}\gamma + \alpha_j + \epsilon_{ij}, \tag{2.3}$$

with Z_j being a variable at the country level. We report results for two sets of indicators of interest. First, we test if the treatment effects vary depending on recent imports and overall trade accelerations, which we measured as the difference between the changes in 2016-2019 and 2013-2016 for the respective flow. Second, we estimate heterogeneous effects based on changes in unemployment between 2016 and 2019. We obtained the trade and unemployment information from the World Development Indicators.

Even though we were able to assign the different treatments at random and, therefore, the respondents in the different experimental groups are expected to have similar characteristics on average (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), it is still useful to show that there is balance in observables. Table B.3 in the Appendix reports the comparison between the treatment and control groups along several dimensions relevant to the analysis. In particular, we compare the groups in terms of basic socioeconomic characteristics (gender, age, education, etc.) and several attitudes and opinions, including trust in the government and ex-ante views on trade (v_{ij} in (2.2)). As can be seen in the table, the differences between the individuals in each of the treatment arms and the control group are small and, in almost all cases, statistically insignificant. Even though these results lend credibility to our experimental design, we show that our results are robust to adding socioeconomic characteristics as controls.

3 Results

This section presents our estimates of the effect of the information treatments on trade support and the beliefs on the consequences of trade. We also discuss the heterogeneity of the treatment effects using our indicators for individuals' prior (i.e. pre-treatment) knowledge and opinions on trade and variation at the country level.

3.1 Treatment effects on trade support

We start our empirical analysis by estimating equation (2.1) via OLS. Table 1 reports a series of estimates for β_1-β_4 for different specifications: column (1) shows the results without controls, (2)-(4) add country fixed effects, basic socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.), and order effects, respectively, and (5) includes all the controls at the same time. Given that the randomization was at the individual level, we use robust standard errors.

The main message that emerges from Table 1 is that anti-trade information reduces support for trade and that pro-trade messages increase support only if they are worded as job gains. In line with Rodríguez Chatruc et al. (2021), the treatment stressing employment losses from import competition (Anti-Trade/Job Loss, T_1) significantly reduces support for trade by 6.7 percentage points in comparison to the control group. Interestingly, mentioning the possibility of compen-

Table 1: Treatment effects and support for trade

Variables	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support	(5) Support
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.064***	-0.063***	-0.065***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.084***	-0.083***	-0.085***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.038***	0.037***	0.036***	0.037***	0.035***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	-0.003	-0.005	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Observations	27,310	27,310	27,310	27,310	27,310
R-squared	0.011	0.022	0.043	0.013	0.059
$\beta_1 = \beta_2$ (p-value)	0.019	0.019	0.016	0.019	0.016
$\beta_1 = \beta_3$ (p-value)	0.054	0.046	0.032	0.051	0.022
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$ (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Country fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Individual controls	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
Order effects	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. All columns report the estimates for equation (2.1). Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status. Order effects correspond to a dummy if the first answer option for the support-for-trade question was "increasing trade". Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

sating the workers displaced by foreign competition (Anti-Trade/Compensate, T_2) actually significantly *strengthens* this negative effect, with support for trade being 8.5 percentage points lower for this treatment with respect to the control group. One potential explanation is that promising compensation for displaced workers increases the salience of the adverse consequences of trade. Another possibility is that compensations may require other policy changes (for example, increasing taxes or scaling down other social programs) with perceived negative consequences for the respondent.

Regarding pro-trade treatments, *Pro-Trade/Job-Gain* (T_3) tests how respondents react to highlighting the positive effects of trade on exporters' employment. Our results suggest that this treatment increases the support for trade by around 3.6 percentage points. The last treatment —which emphasizes the consequences of restricting trade for exporters' employment (Pro-trade/Job-Loss, T_4)— does not affect support for trade: the point estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is the only one of our treatments that is ineffective in switching respondents' trade support. The contrast between the two pro-trade treatments (i.e., comparing T_3 with T_4) suggests that the exact wording of these messages, and whether they stress gains or losses, is very important when trying to elicit attitude changes.

The comparison of the effects of T_1 and T_3 suggests that focusing on exporters' gains from increased trade has a more muted effect than focusing on domestic firms' losses of increasing import competition, which is consistent with individuals responding more to potential negative consequences than they do to positive consequences. A potential explanation for this is loss aversion.

Another explanation is that losses of jobs are more tangible, since they affect workers who currently have those jobs, whereas in the case of gains from potential new jobs it is uncertain who will benefit. Also, the losses and gains to which the treatments refer are in different sectors of the economy (i.e. import-competing vs. export-oriented) and people may care more about one sector than the other.

3.2 Treatment effects on trade beliefs

In the previous section, we established that anti-trade messages reduce support for trade and that pro-trade messages increase support only if they are cast in terms of job gains. In this section, we further explore if the treatments affect individual beliefs about the consequences of increased trade on employment and product variety at affordable prices. The idea is that if the treatments are successful in shaping attitudes, they should shift beliefs about the employment losses or gains from trade. Regarding product variety, although the treatments do not explicitly mention variety and prices, the fact that they mention effects on employment may lead respondents to update their beliefs about variety availability as well.

We explore this by estimating equation (2.1) using as the outcomes of interest the respondents' beliefs about the consequences of trade on employment and variety availability. Table 2 reports the results for this exercise, with each column corresponding to a different belief: (1) for higher employment, (2) lower employment, (3) more variety at affordable prices, and (3) less variety. As can be seen, we find that the treatments emphasizing negative effects on employment (T_2 and T_3) reduce the share of respondents believing that trade leads to higher employment (column (1)) and, conversely, increase beliefs for lower employment (column (2)). We also find that these treatments affect negatively the beliefs about more product variety (column (3)), which suggests that respondents may be associating the decreases in employment mentioned in the narrative with domestic firms exiting the market.

Moving to the pro-trade treatments, we find that the one worded in terms of trade restrictions (T_1) does not lead to any belief updating, which is consistent with the muted effects on trade support previously documented (see Table 1). The treatment highlighting gains for exporters (T_4), however, affects positively the beliefs on increases in employment (column (1)) and negatively the one on decreases in employment (column (2)). We do not find any effects of this last treatment on beliefs associated with product variety. The fact that the pro-trade treatments have null or smaller effects on beliefs helps explain why they modestly change the support for trade.

3.3 Heterogeneous effects

3.3.1 Individual priors

To what extent do these treatment effects depend on pre-treatment views held by individuals? Are these effects larger when the new information contradicts previously held beliefs? To analyze these issues, we explore heterogeneous effects across two prior views that could influence support for trade, namely (1) if the individual believes experts have a positive view of trade and (2) if she thinks relations with foreign countries have a positive effect on her country's culture. As shown in Table 3, in the case of the treatment T_1 (Anti-Trade/Job Loss) the effect is not statistically different for individuals with more positive priors. In the case of the treatment T_2 (Anti-Trade/Compensate), the negative effects are even greater among those holding positive priors. It is possible that those who held positive ex-ante views are not just swayed by the job loss framing; the combination of job losses and the need for compensation in the framing may reinforce the feeling that their optimistic priors were misguided. In the case of T_3 (Pro-Trade/Job Gain), the

Table 2: Treatment effects on trade beliefs

Variables	(1) High Emp.	(2) Low Emp.	(3) More var.	(4) Fewer var.
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.071***	0.043***	-0.026***	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.068***	0.037***	-0.028***	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.041***	-0.024***	-0.016*	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	0.010	-0.003	-0.004	-0.000
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Observations	27,310	27,310	27,310	27,310
R-squared	0.047	0.026	0.053	0.008
$\beta_1 = \beta_2$ (p-value)	0.727	0.369	0.817	0.962
$\beta_1 = \beta_3$ (p-value)	0.034	0.062	0.007	0.254
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$ (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.159	0.546
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual reports the belief at the top of the column (for example, that trade leads to higher employment in (1)). All columns report the estimates for equation (2.1). Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

effects are smaller for those holding more positive ex-ante views, in particular when the priors refer to experts' views on the impact of trade. This suggests that the positive framing is particularly effective when it applies to trade skeptics. As we mentioned in the Introduction, this exercise suggests that positive messages can indeed shift the views of skeptics and are not just "preach to the converted" (Fiske, 1998).[6]

3.3.2 Country characteristics

Since we are working with a multi-country sample, it is natural to explore if treatment effects vary across countries and if they are influenced by countries' circumstances. Figure 1 shows baseline support and treatment effects for each of the 18 countries in our sample. Baseline support in the control group ranges from 71% in Colombia to 89% in Uruguay. The anti-trade treatments (T_1 and T_2) have a negative impact in almost all the countries, except for Ecuador (for the case of T_1) and Honduras (for the case of T_2). The point estimates, however, are not in all cases statistically significant. In most cases, the impact of T_2 is similar or more negative than the impact of T_1, except for Honduras, Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica, where the possibility of compensation ameliorates the negative impact of job losses. Regarding the pro-trade treatments, T_3 increases

[6] In Table B.4 in the Appendix, we estimate heterogeneous effects with respect to the age and education of the respondent. As can be seen, we find that age attenuates the effect of T_2 (Anti-Trade/Compensate) and that individuals with a college education react more strongly to the negative treatments (T_1 and T_2). We do not find effects for other characteristics such as gender or employment status (results available upon request).

Table 3: Heterogeneity in treatment effects

Variables	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support
Positive influence (v)	0.170***	0.143***	0.161***	0.132***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.051***	-0.052***	-0.075***	-0.074***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
$T_1 \times v$	-0.025	-0.024	0.017	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.062***	-0.065***	-0.058***	-0.059***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
$T_2 \times v$	-0.043***	-0.041***	-0.042**	-0.042**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.053***	0.054***	0.045***	0.046***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$T_3 \times v$	-0.034**	-0.039***	-0.015	-0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	-0.004	-0.004	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$T_4 \times v$	0.001	-0.001	0.007	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Observations	27,310	27,310	27,310	27,310
R-squared	0.045	0.079	0.045	0.079
Country fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	YES
Individual controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
Order effects	NO	YES	NO	YES
Positive view by/on	Experts	Experts	Int. rltns	Int. rltns

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. All columns report the estimates for equation (2.2). Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status. Order effects correspond to a dummy if the first answer option for the support-for-trade question was "increasing trade". Columns (1)-(2) add level and interaction effects for a dummy if the individual believes experts have a positive view of trade (label "Experts" in the table) and (3)-(4) if she thinks relations with foreign countries have a positive effect on her country's culture ("Int. rltns"). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

support for trade in almost all countries except for Jamaica and Mexico, where support remains relatively stable. The point estimates, however, are not in all cases statistically significant. Lastly, T_4 increases support for trade in a few countries (Colombia, Brazil, Jamaica, and Honduras) but decreases or does not change it in most countries.

How do countries' circumstances influence the impact of the treatments? We explore this issue in Table B.5 in the Appendix by interacting the treatment indicators with variables measuring recent accelerations in imports and total trade and recent changes in unemployment. On the one hand, recent trade accelerations seem to partially offset the negative impact of the *Anti-Trade/Job-*

Figure 1: Trade support by experimental group and country



Note: The figure plots the average support for trade by country for each of the five experimental groups: Control (C), Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1), Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2), Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3), and Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4). Ranges around the conditional means correspond to the 95% confidence intervals.

Loss treatment (T_1) and they have a close to zero influence on the effect of the other treatments. On the other hand, recent increases in unemployment are associated with a more negative impact of T_1, which suggests that information stressing the negative effect of trade on employment can be more effective in countries with increasing unemployment.

3.4 Robustness of baseline estimates

Our results are robust to a series of robustness checks. First, we checked that our baseline estimates in Table 1 are not driven by a single country. To show this we run the same specification (2.1) but excluding one country at a time. Figure B.1 shows that the effects remain qualitatively similar and that the point estimates of T_1, T_2, and T_3 remain statistically significant.

Second, we checked our results are robust to estimating our baseline specification using a Probit model instead of a linear model. Table B.6 shows that the marginal effects of the Probit model are similar in magnitude (and statistical significance) to our baseline estimates.

Finally, we checked our results are robust to how we treat non-responses. In our baseline specification, we recode non-responses in the dependent variable as zeroes (i.e., no support for increasing trade). In Table B.7, we show the results of the baseline specification when excluding non-responses from the sample. Point estimates are somewhat smaller in magnitude but qualitatively similar.

4 Mechanisms

Above we established that our treatments affect both attitudes towards trade as well as beliefs about the consequences of trade in terms of employment and product variety. Our interpretation of these results was that (part of) the change in trade support following the treatments came from belief updating by the respondents, that is, that beliefs mediated the effect of the treatments. Here, we formally explore this idea.

As a first attempt to understand the role of beliefs in the support for trade, we estimate a specification in which we explain the trade support with our beliefs indicators. The results for this exercise are in Table 4, with columns (1)-(2) using information for all the respondents irrespective of their experimental group and (3)-(4) restricting the sample to the control group. Odd columns do not add controls and the even ones add country fixed effects, socioeconomic control, and order effects. As can be seen, beliefs are strongly correlated with support for trade, with the coefficients for the beliefs associated with employment being the largest, for example, the average trade support for those believing that trade increases employment is 15.6 percentage points higher than for those that do not have that belief (see column 4). Importantly, these results are robust to using only the control group and, therefore, they are not driven by the treatments. The fact that coefficients are larger for beliefs on employment, rather than product variety, suggests that, in forming their attitudes towards trade, individuals care more about employment than product variety. This justifies the emphasis of this paper on the impact of trade policy on labor market outcomes, in contrast to Rodríguez Chatruc et al. (2021), which focused on both dimensions.

Taking together the estimates in Tables 1, 2, and 4, suggest that beliefs may be mediating the effects of the treatment on trade support. But by how much? To answer this question, we implement a mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2010; Celli, 2022) in which we quantify the role of beliefs in the observed effect of the treatments. The mediation analysis we use relies on the sequential ignorability assumption (Imai et al., 2010): First, the treatment should be independent of the potential outcomes and mediators conditional on the control variables. Second, the mediator should be independent of the potential outcomes conditional on the control variables and treatment. This is, after accounting for the individual characteristics and the treatment, the mediator should be as good as random with respect to the outcome. In our application, the first ignorability assumption follows from the randomization. The second one is stronger and, therefore, we implement the mediation analysis using the full set of controls to mitigate the possibility of omitted variable bias. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the three treatments with significant effects on trade support, this is, T_1, T_2, and T_3. We also only add as mediator the belief that trade leads to higher employment, which turned out to be the strongest predictor of trade support in Table 4.

The results of the mediation analysis are in Table 5, with Panel A showing the results for T_1 (Anti-Trade/Job-Loss), B for T_2 (Anti-Trade/Compensate), and C for T_3 (Pro-Trade/Job Gain). The Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) in the first row of each panel measures the effect of the treatment operating through the mediator, which in this case is the belief that trade increases employment. The direct effect corresponds to the effect that goes directly from the treatment to trade support. The ACME and direct effect add up to the total effect, which is comparable to the estimates in Table 1, column (4). The last row in each panel shows how much of the total effect of the treatment can be attributed to the mediator. As can be seen, we find that changes in the belief that trade increases employment explain 32.1% of the effect of T_1, 21.8% of T_2, and 32.2% of T_3, with all these shares being statistically significant at conventional levels. In sum, we find that belief updating plays an important role in explaining the changes in trade support following the different treatments.

Table 4: Support for trade and beliefs

Variables	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support
Higher employment	0.191***	0.187***	0.173***	0.169***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Low employment	-0.161***	-0.158***	-0.135***	-0.126***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.025)
More varieties	0.123***	0.114***	0.127***	0.113***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Fewer varieties	0.021**	0.015	0.013	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Positive influence	0.082***	0.066***	0.089***	0.069***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Positive view experts	0.075***	0.062***	0.094***	0.080***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	27,310	27,310	5,502	5,502
R-squared	0.175	0.189	0.178	0.202
Higher versus lower empl.	0.075	0.071	0.294	0.238
More versus fewer varieties	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Country fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	YES
Individual controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
Order effects	NO	YES	NO	YES
Sample	All	All	Ctrl Grp	Ctrl Grp

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. All columns report the results of a linear regression where the support for trade dummy is explained by the beliefs indicators. Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status. Order effects correspond to a dummy if the first answer option for the support-for-trade question was "increasing trade". Columns (1)-(2) use data for all experimental groups and (3)-(4) only the ones in the control group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5 Conclusions

Economic theory holds that international trade generates welfare gains for the economy as a whole. By allowing countries to specialize in what they produce most efficiently, trade raises aggregate production. However, the view that trade increases welfare is not always reflected in trade policy. In Latin America, for example, while tariffs and other trade barriers have declined significantly over the last 30 years, significant trade barriers remain (Moreira et al., 2019). One reason is that, while trade liberalization leads to aggregate welfare gains, it generates winners and losers. Those who stand to lose from trade liberalization may oppose it, and lobby for continued protection. Conflicting preferences for trade policy are then resolved through the political process.

In this paper, we conducted a large-scale survey experiment in nationally representative samples of eighteen Latin American countries to study how people's attitudes and beliefs change

Table 5: Mediation analysis

Effect	Mean	95% CI	
Panel A. Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)			
Causal Mediation Effect	-0.021	-0.026	-0.016
Direct Effect	-0.044	-0.057	-0.030
Total Effect	-0.065	-0.079	-0.048
Percent mediated	0.321	0.268	0.438
Panel B. Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)			
Causal Mediation Effect	-0.019	-0.023	-0.014
Direct Effect	-0.066	-0.079	-0.050
Total Effect	-0.085	-0.099	-0.068
Percent mediated	0.218	0.200	0.276
Panel C. Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)			
Causal Mediation Effect	0.011	0.007	0.015
Direct Effect	0.024	0.012	0.038
Total Effect	0.035	0.022	0.049
Percent mediated	0.322	0.225	0.505

Note: The table shows the results of individual mediation analysis for T_1, T_2, and T_3 in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. The mediator in all the cases is the belief that trade leads to higher employment. In all the cases, we add the full set of controls that includes country fixed effects, individual controls (age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status), and order effects (dummy if the first answer option for the support-for-trade question was "increasing trade").

in response to information that highlights potential employment losses, to information that highlights employment gains, and to information that stresses the possibility of compensation to those displaced by trade. We found that anti-trade information reduces support for trade even if compensation to losers is mentioned and that pro-trade messages increase support only if they are worded in terms of job gains. Information about the negative consequences of restricting trade for exporters' employment does not affect support. In line with previous literature, information about the negative employment consequences for import-competing sectors significantly reduces support for trade. Contrary to our expectations, mentioning the possibility of compensating the workers displaced by foreign competition significantly increases the negative effect of the previous treatment. Finally, information about the positive effects of trade on exporters' employment increases support for trade but to a smaller degree than the negative effect of information regarding domestic firms' losses from import competition.

Our results underline the importance of understanding how individual trade preferences are formed. This knowledge can guide communication by policy-makers during trade-liberalization

processes. Although information about employment gains in exporting sectors is not as effective (in magnitude) as information about employment losses, its impact is still positive in increasing support, particularly among the pre-treatment skeptics. This is useful, since we know from previous literature that positive information about prices and product variety does not have the desired effect. Our results suggest free-trade advocates should also be cautious not to mention the possibility of compensating displaced workers since this can backfire.

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A Details

A.1 Wording of questions of interest

The exact wording in Spanish for the trade support questions was:

- *Control group (C)*: [País] compra y vende productos a otros países. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el comercio exterior entre [país] y otros países?
- *Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)*: [País] compra y vende productos a otros países. Expandir el comercio exterior podría reducir los empleos en las empresas que compiten con productos importados. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el comercio exterior entre [país] y otros países?
- *Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)*: [País] compra y vende productos a otros países. Expandir el comercio exterior podría reducir los empleos en las empresas que compiten con productos importados. ¿Cuál sería su opinión del comercio exterior entre [país] y otros países si el gobierno compensara a los trabajadores afectados?
- *Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)*: [País] compra y vende productos a otros países. Expandir el comercio exterior podría aumentar los empleos en las empresas que venden sus productos a otros países ¿Cuál es su opinión del comercio exterior entre [país] y otros países?
- *Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)*: [País] compra y vende productos a otros países. Restringir el comercio exterior podría reducir los empleos en las empresas que venden productos a otros países ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el comercio exterior entre [País] y otros países?

The answer options were in all cases "Apoya expandir el comercio" and "Apoya restringir el comercio," with their order being randomized.

B Additional results

Table B.1: Sample size by treatment arm and country

	C	T_1	T_2	T_3	T_4	All
Argentina	324	316	291	288	305	1524
Bolivia	292	308	356	291	265	1512
Brazil	314	296	279	284	297	1470
Chile	308	293	287	302	285	1475
Colombia	320	319	319	299	269	1526
Costa Rica	287	283	282	303	333	1488
Ecuador	294	282	309	268	289	1442
El Salvador	322	343	313	322	339	1639
Guatemala	304	276	301	269	308	1458
Guyana	275	288	276	300	311	1450
Honduras	292	296	276	285	311	1460
Jamaica	288	285	296	306	291	1466
Nicaragua	386	394	379	396	405	1960
Mexico	296	267	299	288	299	1449
Panama	297	300	311	277	315	1500
Paraguay	304	263	313	287	277	1444
Peru	300	304	313	272	322	1511
Uruguay	299	311	295	309	322	1536
Total	5502	5424	5495	5346	5543	27310

Note: The table shows the number of observations for each of the experimental group and country. The experimental groups are: Control (C), Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1), Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2), Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3), and Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4).

Table B.2: Descriptive statistics for the control group

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Panel A: Trade supports and beliefs					
Support for trade	5502	0.81	0.40	0.00	1.00
Higher employment	5502	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00
Low employment	5502	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
More varieties	5502	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00
Fewer varieties	5502	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Panel B: Socioeconomic characteristics					
Male	5502	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
Age	5502	39.0	14.8	16.0	99.0
Married	5502	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
Education: Primary	5502	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0
Education: Secondary	5502	0.4	0.5	0.0	1.0
Education: Tertiary	5502	0.4	0.5	0.0	1.0
Employed	5502	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
Panel C: Trust and views on trade					
Trust in national government	5364	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Trust in community	5502	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00
Positive influence	5502	0.62	0.48	0.00	1.00
Positive view experts	5502	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00

Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of several key variables for the control group.

Table B.3: Balance test

Variable	(1) C	(2) T_1	(3) T_2	(4) T_3	(5) T_4
Male	0.478	0.491	0.472	0.484	0.475
Age	39.0	39.5*	38.8	38.7	39.2
Married	0.514	0.521	0.502	0.499	0.523
Education: Primary	0.171	0.171	0.165	0.169	0.182
Education: Secondary	0.413	0.411	0.401	0.41	0.395*
Education: Tertiary	0.390	0.393	0.407*	0.397	0.397
Employed	0.508	0.524*	0.51	0.51	0.507
Trust in national government	0.457	0.477**	0.465	0.46	0.472*
Trust in community	0.555	0.567	0.576**	0.558	0.556
Positive influence on culture	0.622	0.628	0.633	0.633	0.622
Positive view of trade by experts	0.486	0.485	0.489	0.493	0.49

Note: The table shows the conditional mean for each of the experimental groups, obtained using a linear model with country fixed effects and fitted for each variable separately. The experimental groups are: Control (C), Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1), Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2), Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3), and Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4). The p-values for the difference between the means for each of the treatment groups and the control group are computed using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of observations ranges from 27,168 to 27,881.

Table B.4: Heterogeneity in treatment effects: Individual characteristics

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.056***	-0.052***
	(0.022)	(0.011)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.132***	-0.073***
	(0.022)	(0.011)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.016	0.040***
	(0.019)	(0.010)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	-0.015	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.010)
T_1 x age	-0.000	
	(0.001)	
T_2 x age	0.001**	
	(0.001)	
T_3 x age	0.001	
	(0.000)	
T_4 x age	0.000	
	(0.001)	
T_1 x higher education		-0.033**
		(0.015)
T_2 x higher education		-0.030*
		(0.016)
T_3 x higher education		-0.012
		(0.014)
T_4 x higher education		0.006
		(0.014)
Observations	27,310	27,310
R-squared	0.059	0.059
Country FE	YES	YES
Individual controls	YES	YES
Order effects	YES	YES

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. All columns include as controls individual characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status), order effects, and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.5: Heterogeneity in treatment effects: Country characteristics

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.065***	-0.065***	-0.064***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.085***	-0.085***	-0.084***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.035***	0.035***	0.035***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
T_1 x imports acceleration	0.015*		
	(0.008)		
T_2 x imports acceleration	-0.004		
	(0.009)		
T_3 x imports acceleration	-0.006		
	(0.008)		
T_4 x imports acceleration	-0.005		
	(0.008)		
T_1 x trade openness acceleration		0.016**	
		(0.008)	
T_2 x trade openness acceleration		-0.002	
		(0.008)	
T_3 x trade openness acceleration		-0.004	
		(0.007)	
T_4 x trade openness acceleration		-0.004	
		(0.008)	
T_1 x change unemployment			-0.022***
			(0.008)
T_2 x change unemployment			-0.011
			(0.008)
T_3 x change unemployment			0.007
			(0.008)
T_4 x change unemployment			-0.014*
			(0.008)
Observations	27,310	27,310	27,310
R-squared	0.059	0.059	0.059

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. All columns include as controls individual characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status), order effects, and country fixed effects. Imports (trade openness) correspond(s) to the ratio between merchandise imports (trade) and GDP. Acceleration is the difference between the periods 2016-2019 and 2013-2016. Change is the difference between 2016 and 2019. The country-level covariates are standardized. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure B.1: Treatment effects excluding one country at a time



Note: The figure plots the effect for each of the treatment groups excluding a country at a time as specified in the horizontal axis. Ranges around the effects correspond to the 95% confidence intervals.

Table B.6: Treatment effects and support for trade (Probit)

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support	(5) Support
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.061***	-0.062***	-0.063***	-0.061***	-0.064***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.078***	-0.079***	-0.081***	-0.079***	-0.082***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.042***	0.042***	0.041***	0.042***	0.040***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	-0.003	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	27,310	27,310	27,310	27,310	27,310
$\beta_1 = \beta_2$ (p-value)	0.019	0.018	0.012	0.019	0.011
$\beta_1 = \beta_3$ (p-value)	0.177	0.147	0.104	0.170	0.076
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$ (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Country fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Individual controls	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
Order effects	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. All columns report the marginal effects of estimating equation (2.1) using a Probit model. Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status. Order effects correspond to a dummy if the first answer option for the support-for-trade question was "increasing trade". Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.7: Treatment effects and support for trade, excluding no response

VARIABLES	(1) Support*	(2) Support*	(3) Support*	(4) Support*	(5) Support*
Anti-Trade/Job-Loss (T_1)	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.052***	-0.052***	-0.052***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Anti-Trade/Compensate (T_2)	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.064***	-0.063***	-0.064***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pro-Trade/Job-Gain (T_3)	0.030***	0.029***	0.029***	0.030***	0.028***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Pro-Trade/Job-Loss (T_4)	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	25,191	25,191	25,191	25,191	25,191
R-squared	0.009	0.023	0.023	0.011	0.043
$\beta_1 = \beta_2$ (p-value)	0.140	0.144	0.143	0.134	0.143
$\beta_1 = \beta_3$ (p-value)	0.067	0.056	0.048	0.063	0.035
$\beta_3 = \beta_4$ (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Country FE	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Individual controls	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
Order effects	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual supports increasing trade. Cases with "Do not know" or "No answers" are excluded from the sample. All columns report the estimates of equation (2.1). Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status. Order effects correspond to a dummy if the first answer option for the support-for-trade question was "increasing trade". Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.