

IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES N° IDB-WP-1255

Trusting Covid-19 Recommendations:

The Role of Experts, Markets and Governments

Facundo Albornoz
Guillermo Cruces
María Lombardi

Inter-American Development Bank
Department of Research and Chief Economist

August 2023

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Facundo Albornoz*

Guillermo Cruces**

María Lombardi***

* University of Nottingham

** CEDLAS-UNLP and University of Nottingham

*** Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Inter-American Development Bank
Felipe Herrera Library

Albornoz-Crespo, Facundo.

Trusting Covid-19 recommendations: the role of experts, markets and governments /
Facundo Albornoz, Guillermo Cruces, María Lombardi.

p. cm. — (IDB Working Paper Series ; 1255)

Includes bibliographic references.

1. Coronavirus infections-Latin America-Prevention-Public opinion. 2. Coronavirus
infections-Vaccination-Latin America-Public opinion. 3. Trust-Latin America-Public
opinion. I. Cruces, Guillermo. II. Lombardi, María. III. Inter-American Development
Bank. Department of Research and Chief Economist. IV. Title. V. Series.
IDB-WP-1255

<http://www.iadb.org>

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Abstract

Do individuals trust experts' advice? Does the sector represented by these experts matter for trust and compliance? Do individuals prefer the public or the private sector for large-scale responses to events such as the pandemic? We answer these questions by means of a large-scale survey on a representative sample of 9,444 respondents from Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. We study if opinions on risk-mitigating actions against Covid-19 are shaped by expert recommendations and the sectors they represent. We identify an backlash against experts' recommendations that is robust across expert sectors and countries, and more pronounced for recommendations that require more effort to implement. We also find that, even for individuals with a low level of trust in the public sector, there is widespread agreement that governments should be preferred over the private sector to lead the production and distribution of vaccines. Most respondents, even those expressing distrust in governments, believe that governments should get involved in producing the vaccine for Covid-19, either exclusively or in a partnership with the private sector. This result is stronger for the distribution of the vaccine than for its production.

JEL Codes: I1, I3, H4

Keywords: Experts, Trust, Public Health, Covid-19

1 Introduction

Do individuals trust experts' advice? Does the sector represented by these experts matter for trust and compliance? Do individuals prefer the public or the private sector for large-scale responses to events such as the pandemic? A key aspect of behavioral change in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic depends on how individuals accept and follow experts' recommendations. These recommendations vary in their level of involvement and required effort. Some are disruptive and emotionally costly, while others are the continuation of pre-Covid-19 recommendations and relatively easy to implement. As recommendations are generally based on expert knowledge, understanding how individuals trust experts becomes fundamental. Trust in experts could also reflect trust in the sectors they represent. Are all expert recommendations equally trusted? Is a government expert more or less trusted than an expert from the private sector? Does this matter for the trust associated with recommendations or opinions on what sector should lead the fight against Covid-19? Most importantly, do individuals exhibit different levels of trust and support for the public and the private sectors for large-scale responses to events such as the pandemic and in regard to the production and distribution of vaccines? In this paper, we investigate trust in the context of Covid-19 recommendations in several Latin American countries.

We answer these questions by means of a large-scale survey of a representative sample of 9,444 respondents from Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. To examine if opinions are shaped by expert recommendations, we provide respondents with expert recommendations about actions to reduce exposure to Covid-19, and we ask about their agreement with these recommendations. We randomize the type of expert, which gives us four treatment groups according to who gave the recommendation: government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or an unspecified expert. Individuals in the control group are asked about their agreement on the importance of the actions to reduce exposure to Covid-19, without any mention to an expert recommendation. We hypothesize that the impact of expert recommendations depends on how difficult or costly it is to follow these recommendations. To test this hypothesis, we ask individuals whether they agree with recommendations to fight Covid-19 that differ in their required effort: "avoiding social gatherings" as an example of costly recommendations, and "doing exercise" or "spending time outside to absorb vitamin D" as examples of less costly recommendations. For the case of the costly recommendation, we find that respondents tend to disagree more with the recommendation when attributed to experts. This expert backlash is common to all types of experts. However, consistent with our hypothesis, the expert backlash is less prevalent when considering softer recommendations. Moreover, we find that the expert backlash is confined to government experts for relatively less involved recommendations.

In the second part of the paper, we explore whether trust in different sectors affects pref-

erences over which sector should lead the fight against Covid-19. While we observe a general distrust for governments, most individuals consider that the government should be involved in the production and distribution of the vaccine, either alone or as part of a public-private partnership. Moreover, we find that this preference is also present in individuals with high levels of distrust. This finding might be emphasizing the public good nature of manufacturing and distributing a vaccine. To explore this question further, we ask individuals to allocate funds for generic programs for fighting Covid-19. In this case, individuals no longer express preference for the government, but rather support donations to universities and research centers. Finally, we also examine whether the impact of expert recommendations depends on the level of trust the respondent has in the sector to which the expert belongs. We find that the expert backlash is attenuated for individuals who expressed high levels of trust in the expert's sector.

Our results are robust across the countries involved in the survey. In this sense, our paper highlights relevant common features of trust in Covid-19 recommendations. Yet it is interesting to highlight some country differences. For example, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador are the countries exhibiting the lowest levels of trust in government. Argentina is the country with the strongest resistance to government intervention in producing and distributing the vaccine. The highest levels of trust in government are found in Mexico and Uruguay.

Our paper is related to an incipient literature on trust and Covid-19. In a pandemic crisis, adopting mitigating actions is influenced by choices about who to trust or distrust. Trust is fundamental for cooperation, coordination, and to reduce the need for coercive state measures, which characterized responses to Covid-19 in most of the selected countries. In a recent paper, [Bargain and Aminjonov \(2020\)](#) emphasize the role of trust in political leaders. The success of anti-Covid-19 policies depends on the levels of compliance, which in turn is a function of the confidence citizens have in their leaders. More specifically, they study how long-term levels of trust in politicians affect human mobility (as reported by Google Covid-19 mobility reports) during March and April of 2020. In this analysis, trust is a cultural (long-term) characteristic. In our paper, our focus is on trust levels reported during the pandemic, which could be reflecting (or not) cultural differences, but have a clear impact on how individuals receive recommendations and subsequently follow them. We also extend the sector of trust to the private and academic sectors. [Bicchieri \(2020\)](#), in turn, carries out a series of vignette questionnaire experiments and highlights the role of expectations on others' behavior for compliance with experts' recommendations. [Martinez et al. \(2020\)](#) show evidence that social norms matter for compliance with COVID-19 preventive measures: in a survey experiment in Mexico, their results indicate that both coverage of compliance with preventive measures and normative views about them matter for compliance.

The importance of using measures of trust at the moment of the pandemic is reinforced by recent evidence suggesting that Covid-19 affects levels of trust. [Daniele et al. \(2020\)](#) show how

the government requirement to stay at home becomes increasingly unacceptable to citizens who express distrust towards authorities and challenge their management of the crisis. The authors conduct a large survey in Italy, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands at the time of the first wave of the epidemic (June 2020). After eliciting institutional and social trust, political preferences, identities, values, and demand for policies and taxation, they find a heterogeneous impact of Covid-19 on trust in institutions: trust increased for the police, experts, and scientists and remains stable for governments.

Leaders can indeed affect trust on experts and their recommendations. For example, in 2020 U.S. President Trump questioned the validity of public health experts' recommendations. His mistrust in experts is considered a factor that undermined the effectiveness of key federal agencies' responses (Cairney and Wellstead, 2020). Evidence of how distrust in experts has an impact on compliance is provided by Ajzenman et al. (2020) for the case of Brazil. They show how compliance with social distancing dropped in pro-government cities following President Bolsonaro's public rejection of experts' recommendations. In our sample, we do not have the example of a country where the expert backlash was induced by the government, but we show how trust in governments does have an impact on how individuals agree with experts. We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the survey and describe the data. In Section 3, we study the impact of experts on agreement with recommendation and future plans. We also explore in this section the existence heterogeneous effects according to previous behaviours and economic prospects. In Section 4, we focus on preferences on what sector should lead the production and distribution of the vaccine, and we explore how these opinions are shaped by trust in the government or the private sector. We also study in this section whether agreement with different recommendations is affected by trust in the sectors the experts represent. In Section 5 we conclude.

2 Survey Design and Descriptive Statistics

We conducted an online survey in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Between October 23rd and November 1st, we recruited participants using Facebook ads. Our ad mentioned the possibility of winning a cash prize in exchange for completing a survey, without any reference to the topic of the survey. We targeted the ads by demographic cells in order to obtain a sample that was representative in terms of age, gender, and educational attainment. The ad was shown to a total of 1,899,845 users, of whom 78,982 clicked on it. Of the 11,419 users who started the survey, 9,444 completed it (83%).

Respondents were initially asked a few demographic questions, and they were also asked how frequently they attended social gatherings, exercised, or spent time outside in the last week. They were then randomly divided into five groups. In the first four groups, respondents were shown

three recommendations on actions to avoid the exposure to Covid-19. These recommendations were framed as coming from an expert, of which we randomized the type of expert: government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or an unspecified expert. The recommendations were the following:

- Always taking into account the rules in your locality, [experts] recommend avoiding social gatherings, as they could lead to the propagation of Covid-19.
- [Experts] recommend exercising regularly to improve the immune system's response to Covid-19.
- [Experts] recommend spending a few minutes outside frequently (maintaining social distancing), so as to increase vitamin D levels and thus improve the body's response to Covid-19.

After showing respondents this recommendation, we asked them whether they agreed with the recommendation or not (on a scale from 1 to 5). People in the control group were simply asked whether they agreed with the importance of each of these actions, which were not framed as expert recommendations.¹ Of the 11,419 persons who started the survey, 10,394 completed this portion.

In the final part of the survey, we asked all respondents how much they trusted different actors in their actions against Covid-19, including the national government and the private sector. We also asked whether they believed the Covid-19 vaccine should be produced or distributed by the government, the private sector, or a private-public partnership, and whether they would rather donate to a government organization, private organization, or academic organization dedicated to fighting Covid-19. Finally, we asked them about their plans for the following week in terms of attending social gatherings, exercising, and spending time outside. A total of 9,444 respondents completed the final part of the survey. While there are differences in the rate of completion between individuals in the treatment and control group, these differences are small (those in the control are 1.7 percentage points less likely to finish the survey). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our final sample.

Although all of the countries in our sample were under some form of lockdown during this period (Appendix Figure A.1), the epidemiological situation varied by country. To understand the context in which the survey was conducted, we analyze the deaths per million people in the countries in our sample. As shown in the top graph of Appendix Figure A.2, except for Uruguay, most countries had been hit in a similar way up to that point, with Peru experiencing the highest cumulative number of deaths. With regards to the spread of Covid-19 at the moment of the survey, Argentina was the hardest hit country during this period, as shown in the bottom graph of Appendix Figure A.2.

¹For example, respondents in the control group were asked how much they agreed with the following statement: "It is important to exercise regularly to improve the immune system's response to Covid-19."

3 Impact of Experts on Agreement with Recommendations

In order to estimate the impact of expert recommendations on opinions, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Government expert}_i + \beta_2 \textit{Private sector expert}_i + \beta_3 \textit{Academic expert}_i + \beta_4 \textit{Unspecified expert}_i + X_i\rho + \epsilon_i,$$

where Y_i is a set of dummy variables measuring whether the respondent strongly agrees, agrees/strongly agrees, or disagrees/strongly disagrees with statements about the importance of not participating in social gatherings, exercising, and spending time outside. In some regressions, Y_i is a variable measuring the number of times the respondent plans to participate in social gatherings, exercise, or spend time outside in the following week. *Government expert_i* is a dummy =1 if the respondent was shown a statement by a government expert recommending that people not participate in social gatherings, exercise and spend time outside. The analogous definition applied to the other expert variables. The omitted category is a control group, which was not shown any recommendation. As can be seen in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2, there is a slight imbalance across treatment arms in terms of country, economic situation of the household, and number of days spent outside in the previous week. While our main specification does not include any controls, we also present our results with these controls.² Our vector of controls X_i includes age, gender, country dummies, educational achievement dummies, dummies for the current economic situation of the household, and number of times in the last week that the respondent participated in social gatherings, exercised, or spent time outside.

Table 2 reports the results. The first three columns display the results for the recommendation of avoiding social gathering. In regressions where the dependent variable is strongly agreeing or agreeing/strongly agreeing with the recommendation (columns 1 and 2), the coefficients associated with all types of experts are negative and statistically significant. This implies that respondents tend to agree less with the recommendation when attributed to experts. This expert backlash is common to all types of experts, and consistent across countries, as seen in Appendix Tables A.3-A.9. We interpret this as an indication of the expert backlash being a general sentiment across

²The respondents that received recommendations from the government expert and private sector expert are 2-3 percentage points less likely to live in Peru than those in the control group. Furthermore, respondents from the academic expert or unspecified expert group are almost 3 percentage points less likely to have cut back on non-basic expenses. Finally, respondents from the unspecified expert group spent fewer days outside and exercised less in the previous week. There are also some small differences across groups in their trust of the private sector and their preference for donating to a university or research center in the fight against Covid-19. As these questions were asked after showing individuals the experts' recommendations, these small imbalances are likely a consequence of the treatment.

countries. The backlash is weaker for less controversial and demanding recommendations. The coefficients associated with government experts have similar signs as in the case of “avoiding social gatherings” and are generally significant, but they are substantially smaller. In the case of private sector, academic or generic experts, their inclusion in the question has no influence on the level of agreement. In Figure 1, we report the distributions of agreement for the control and the pool of treatments. In the case of “avoiding social gatherings”, the expert backlash appears to be driven by a reticence to strongly agree with that recommendation. Consistent with results reported in Table 2, we do not observe any other relevant difference for softer recommendations between the control and the treatments.

Our results are almost unchanged if we include the control variables, as seen in Appendix Table A.10, and they are robust to using a probit regression, as shown in Appendix Table A.11. Reassuringly, the agreement with the recommendation is consistent with reported behavior. For example, participants reporting a greater number of social gatherings last week tend to agree less about the importance of reducing them. Similarly, those who then exercise more and go outside more often agree more on the importance of these activities to reduce the risk of Covid-19.

We wonder whether recommendations affect plans of behavior. To look into this question, we run regressions where the outcome variable is the number of times individuals plan to attend social gatherings (column 1), exercise (column 2) and go outside (column 3) during the next week. Results are reported in Table 3. When looking at actions, we find no expert backlash, which would confine this attitude to opinions with no clear impact on actions. We should note, however, that our results on plans for exercising and social gatherings change when we include our controls, as shown in Appendix Table A.12.³ In particular, we find some evidence of positive influence of experts on the least costly actions: we observe a higher intention to engage in exercise and go outside as ways to reduce the risk of Covid-19 in the treatment group where individuals receive recommendations from generic experts.

In Table 4 we explore whether the impact of expert recommendations differs by whether the respondent engaged in the recommended activities in the previous week. In columns 1-3, we interact our treatment variables with a dummy for whether the number of social gatherings attended by the respondent in the previous week is above the median (with the median being attending zero social gatherings). We find that, although respondents who attended more social gatherings are less likely to agree with the expert recommendation, the rejection of expert recommendation does not vary according to this dimension.

In Table 5, we examine whether the reaction to receiving an expert recommendation differs

³This change is due to the fact that, as previously discussed, there is a slight imbalance across treatment arms in terms of the number of days spent outside in the previous week. Respondents from the unspecified expert group spent less days outside and exercised less in the previous week.

according to the respondent's economic expectations about the future.⁴ For all recommendations, we find a higher rejection of government experts for individuals who have a worse outlook on the future of the economy. We also test for heterogeneous effects by whether the respondent is somewhat or very pleased with the national government. As shown in Table 6, respondents who approve of the government are more likely to agree with the expert recommendation about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. Similarly to our findings in Table 5, the backlash against government experts is mitigated for individuals who approve of the government's actions.

4 Trust in the Public and the Private Sectors for Pandemic Response

4.1 Responding to the Pandemic

In this section, we explore the connection between trust and opinions about what sector should lead the process of manufacturing and distributing the Covid-19 vaccine. We start by asking individuals how much they trust the actions of the government and private sector in fighting Covid-19. Figure 2 reports the average responses in each country for the control group. The level of trust is quite low for both sectors in all countries, as the average lies between the mistrust and indifference range. Trust in both sectors is relatively higher in Mexico and Uruguay. We observe differences across countries with respect to whether individuals trust the government more or less than the private sector. In the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, the private sector is trusted more on average than the government. The opposite is true for Peru and Uruguay, where individuals report higher trust in the government.

Trust, however, is not necessarily associated with preferences regarding which sector should be in charge of producing and distributing the Covid-19 vaccine. In Figure 3, we report participants' preferences in each of the countries in our sample. In all cases, individuals are more likely to prefer the government to be involved in producing and distributing vaccines, either as the sole sector or in a public-private partnership. Except for the cases of Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, the majority of respondents in the remaining countries prefer the government to be solely responsible for producing the vaccine. In all countries, respondents are more likely to prefer the government to be solely in charge of distributing the vaccine. These results highlight a public good aspect associated with the fight against the pandemic. Irrespective of the level of trust, governments are perceived as better placed to produce the vaccine, and more importantly, distribute it.

In Figure 4, we plot the share of respondents who answered that the Covid-19 vaccine should

⁴The sample for which we perform this analysis is slightly smaller (8,133 observation instead of 9,444), as some respondents abandoned the survey after the previous set of questions.

be distributed by the government, private sector, or a public-private partnership, for each category of self-reported trust for the government and the private sector. As can be seen in the first figure, although trust in the government is positively associated with whether the respondent believes the government should distribute the Covid-19 vaccine, almost half of the respondents who have high distrust for the government still believe it should be solely in charge of distributing the vaccine. This is different in the case of the private sector, where very few individuals who report high levels of trust for this sector believe it should be solely responsible for distributing the vaccine. These findings suggest that citizens view certain actions as being better performed by the government, even if they have low overall trust in it. We should note, however, that respondents with lower educational attainment are more likely to prefer that the production and distribution of the vaccine be carried out by the government as opposed to a public-private partnership (Figure 5). It is possible that respondents believe that if the government is in charge of this process, the vaccines will be free.

Finally, we want to elicit preferences on donations to generic programs to respond to Covid-19. In all countries, we observe a substantially stronger preferences for programs of research institutions. If we compare the government with the private sector, we do not observe noticeable differences. This difference with respect to preferences on manufacturing and distribution of the Covid-19 vaccine could be due to the specificities of the vaccine production and distribution process. This could also be due to research centers being associated with the government, as research institutions are mostly public, at least in the case for our selected countries. In any case, we observe that individuals prefer allocating funds to the private sector more than to the government in the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, which are countries where governments are less trusted than the private sector. In Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, we observe a preference for donations to the government over the private sector.

4.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Levels of Trust

In this final section, we explore how the expert backlash is affected by the reported trust in the sectors they represent. To explore the influence of trust in governments on the agreement with expert recommendations, we add to our baseline estimation the level of trust in the government and its interaction with the type of expert. In particular, we use a dummy for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the government, with 31% of individuals falling into this category. Results are reported in Table 7, and are shown graphically in Appendix Figures A.3-A.5. We observe that trust in government is positively correlated with the agreement on the importance of “avoiding social gatherings.” More importantly, we also note that the expert backlash associated with government experts is mitigated for individuals with high levels of trust in the government.

As opposed to respondents who do not trust the government, individuals who trust the government are more likely to strongly agree/agree with the importance of avoiding social gatherings, and less likely to strongly disagree/disagree.

We then focus on trust in the private sector and repeat the exercise. We include the level of trust in the private sector and its interaction with the type of expert. We display the results in Table 8 and the Appendix Figures; the results are shown graphically in Appendix Figures A.6-A.8. Trust in the private sector is positively correlated with agreement with less costly recommendations (doing exercise and going outside). We also observe that trusting markets generally reduces the expert backlash for the costly recommendation: the coefficients associated with the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant, except for the case of academic expert. These last results should be taken with some caution, however, as individuals who received a recommendation by a government or private sector expert reported trusting the private sector more, as shown in Appendix Table A.2. This is not due to a problem in randomization, but rather a result of receiving the expert recommendation, as questions about trust were asked in the last portion of the survey.

Taken together, these findings highlight that the impact of expert recommendations depends on the levels of trust individuals have in the sectors these experts represent.

5 Concluding Remarks

Our findings indicate the presence of a backlash against experts' advice in the context of Covid-19 for a sample of Latin American countries. Our findings also qualify the importance of this backlash. We find that expert backlash emerges for recommendations that are relatively costly to implement for individuals, or that are more controversial. Economic prospects and approval of the government matter as well: rejection of government experts is higher for individuals who have worse expectations about the future of the economy and have a low level of approval of the government. We also find that the expert backlash associated with government experts is mitigated by trust in the government, which suggests that trust in experts matters for deciding the validity of their recommendations.

Our findings also emphasize that trust cannot fully explain preferences on the sector that should lead the battle for finding a solution to Covid-19. The majority of individuals indicate that the government, even if it is distrusted, should be involved in producing and distributing a vaccine, either exclusively or in partnership with the private sector. We conjecture that this apparent contradiction may be reflecting the public good nature attributed to the vaccine. Clearly, this finding requires further research.

We use measures of trust reported during the pandemic. While this a conscious research choice, we should understand better the extent to which trust during the pandemic is associated

with culture and other characteristics. We consider this another interesting line of future research.

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
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
Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Distribution of Agreement with Expert Recommendation




Notes: These figures show the distribution of respondents' agreement with statements on the importance of avoiding social gatherings, exercising regularly, and going outside frequently. We separately plot the distribution for individuals in the treatment group (shown recommendation by any expert) and the control group (not shown any recommendation).

Figure 2: Average Trust in Government and Private Sector by Country



Notes: This figure shows country averages for self-reported trust in the government and private sector's actions in fighting Covid-19 for the control group.


Figure 3: Who Should Produce/Distribute the Covid-19 Vaccine by Country



Notes: These figures show the share of respondents from the control group in each country who answered that the Covid-19 vaccine should be produced or distributed by the government, private sector, or a public-private partnership.


Figure 4: Preference on Who Should Distribute the Covid-19 Vaccine by Trust in Government and Private Sector

15




Notes: The figure in the left shows the share of respondents from the control group who answered that the Covid-19 vaccine should be distributed by the government, private sector, or a public-private partnership, for each category of self-reported trust for the government (on a scale from 1 to 5). The figure to the right shows the share of respondents who answered that the Covid-19 vaccine should be distributed by the government, private sector, or a public-private partnership, for each category of self-reported trust for the private sector.

Figure 5: Who Should Produce/Distribute the Covid-19 Vaccine by Educational Attainment



Notes: These figures show the share of respondents from the control group by level of educational attainment who answered that the Covid-19 vaccine should be produced or distributed by the government, private sector, or a public-private partnership.

Figure 6: Who Should Receive Donation for Fighting Covid-19 by Country



Notes: These figures show the share of respondents from the control group in each country who answered that a hypothetical donation for the fight against Covid-19 vaccine should be given to a government institute, a private sector entity, or a university/research center.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Age	44.884	17.455	16.000	100.000	9444
Female	0.591	0.492	0.000	1.000	9444
Argentina	0.194	0.396	0.000	1.000	9444
Colombia	0.148	0.355	0.000	1.000	9444
Peru	0.109	0.312	0.000	1.000	9444
Uruguay	0.159	0.366	0.000	1.000	9444
Bolivia	0.133	0.339	0.000	1.000	9444
Mexico	0.128	0.335	0.000	1.000	9444
Ecuador	0.128	0.334	0.000	1.000	9444
Less than primary school	0.025	0.157	0.000	1.000	9444
Primary school	0.157	0.364	0.000	1.000	9444
Secondary school	0.337	0.473	0.000	1.000	9444
Incomplete tertiary education	0.213	0.410	0.000	1.000	9444
Tertiary education	0.223	0.416	0.000	1.000	9444
Postgraduate education	0.044	0.206	0.000	1.000	9444
Currently saving	0.231	0.421	0.000	1.000	9444
Making ends meet but not saving	0.411	0.492	0.000	1.000	9444
Had to cut on non-basic expenses	0.176	0.381	0.000	1.000	9444
Had to cut on basic expenses	0.109	0.312	0.000	1.000	9444
Num. social gatherings last week	0.616	1.043	0.000	5.000	9444
Num. days exercised last week	2.118	2.314	0.000	7.000	9443
Num. days outside last week	3.150	2.588	0.000	7.000	9443
Trust in actions of president against pandemic (1-5)	2.601	1.320	1.000	5.000	9442
Trust in actions of private sector against pandemic (1-5)	2.830	1.020	1.000	5.000	9441
Should produce vaccine - Government	0.462	0.499	0.000	1.000	9444
Should produce vaccine - Private sector	0.113	0.317	0.000	1.000	9444
Should produce vaccine - Public-private partnership	0.425	0.494	0.000	1.000	9444
Should distribute vaccine - Government	0.564	0.496	0.000	1.000	9444
Should distribute vaccine - Private sector	0.081	0.273	0.000	1.000	9444
Should distribute vaccine - Public-private partnership	0.355	0.479	0.000	1.000	9444
Donation to government organization	0.203	0.402	0.000	1.000	9444
Donation to private sector organization	0.224	0.417	0.000	1.000	9444
Donation to university/research center	0.573	0.495	0.000	1.000	9444
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Agree on importance of avoiding social gatherings (1-5)	4.230	0.973	1.000	5.000	9444
Agree on importance of exercise (1-5)	4.217	0.808	1.000	5.000	9444
Agree on importance of being outside (1-5)	4.264	0.770	1.000	5.000	9444
Num. social gatherings next week (planned)	0.576	0.985	0.000	5.000	9444
Num. day exercise next week (planned)	3.048	2.390	0.000	7.000	9444
Num. days outside next week (planned)	3.665	2.511	0.000	7.000	9441

Table 2: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.150*** (0.016)	-0.106*** (0.012)	0.059*** (0.009)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.018*** (0.006)	-0.061*** (0.016)	-0.019* (0.011)	0.020*** (0.006)
Private sector expert	-0.151*** (0.016)	-0.095*** (0.012)	0.016** (0.008)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.012)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.001 (0.005)
Academic expert	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.059*** (0.012)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.016 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.009 (0.016)	0.016 (0.011)	0.001 (0.005)
Unspecified expert	-0.090*** (0.016)	-0.050*** (0.012)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.034*** (0.012)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.030* (0.016)	0.022** (0.011)	0.001 (0.005)
Observations	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444
R ²	0.012	0.009	0.007	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.604	0.872	0.048	0.432	0.830	0.025	0.450	0.864	0.020

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 3: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Plans for Next Week

	Social gatherings	Exercising	Spending time outside
Government expert	0.045 (0.032)	0.011 (0.079)	0.022 (0.082)
Private sector expert	0.030 (0.032)	0.003 (0.078)	0.094 (0.083)
Academic expert	0.047 (0.032)	-0.052 (0.077)	0.020 (0.081)
Unspecified expert	0.030 (0.031)	-0.030 (0.077)	-0.130 (0.082)
Observations	9,444	9,444	9,441
R ²	0.000	0.000	0.001
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.546	3.062	3.664

Notes: The dependent variable measures the number of times the respondent plans to perform the activity specified in the column header in the next week. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 4: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Whether Baseline Frequency of the Activity Is above the Median

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.154*** (0.020)	-0.116*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.010)	-0.035* (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.014** (0.007)
Private sector expert	-0.158*** (0.020)	-0.103*** (0.014)	0.027*** (0.009)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.017)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.002 (0.007)
Academic expert	-0.100*** (0.020)	-0.060*** (0.013)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.020)	0.023 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.020)	0.005 (0.015)	0.002 (0.006)
Unspecified expert	-0.104*** (0.020)	-0.053*** (0.013)	0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.039** (0.016)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.038* (0.020)	0.013 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.006)
Government expert x Above median freq. activity	0.020 (0.033)	0.032 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.033)	-0.040* (0.024)	0.018 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.016 (0.011)
Private sector expert x Above median freq. activity	0.027 (0.033)	0.027 (0.027)	-0.033** (0.017)	-0.019 (0.033)	0.007 (0.023)	0.001 (0.010)	0.064* (0.033)	0.017 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.009)
Academic expert x Above median freq. activity	0.023 (0.033)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.022)	0.016* (0.009)	0.036 (0.033)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.009)
Unspecified expert x Above median freq. activity	0.045 (0.034)	0.013 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.033)	-0.011 (0.022)	0.008 (0.009)	0.045 (0.034)	0.034 (0.021)	0.000 (0.009)
Above median freq. activity	-0.156*** (0.024)	-0.088*** (0.017)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.201*** (0.023)	0.122*** (0.016)	-0.021*** (0.007)	0.131*** (0.024)	0.047*** (0.016)	-0.014** (0.006)
Observations	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444
R ²	0.029	0.017	0.010	0.035	0.023	0.005	0.027	0.010	0.004
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.604	0.872	0.048	0.432	0.830	0.025	0.450	0.864	0.020
P-Value (Gov. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.016	0.029	0.001	0.022	0.126	0.000
P-Value (Priv. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.001	0.677	0.272	0.872	0.740	0.871	0.707	0.971
P-Value (Acad. expert + Interaction=0)	0.004	0.015	0.934	0.730	0.660	0.283	0.214	0.014	0.993
P-Value (Unsp. expert + Interaction=0)	0.030	0.069	0.689	0.693	0.055	0.846	0.793	0.002	0.990

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, and interactions with a dummy for whether the respondent engaged in the activity specified in the column header at an above-median frequency in the previous week. We also control for whether the respondent engaged in the activity in the column header at an above-median frequency. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 5: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Views on the Economy

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.116*** (0.023)	-0.059*** (0.014)	0.024*** (0.008)	-0.026 (0.023)	0.028* (0.016)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.028* (0.016)	0.008 (0.007)
Private sector expert	-0.158*** (0.023)	-0.096*** (0.015)	0.011 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.029* (0.016)	0.001 (0.006)
Academic expert	-0.095*** (0.022)	-0.054*** (0.014)	0.007 (0.007)	0.014 (0.023)	0.034** (0.016)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.010 (0.023)	0.040** (0.016)	0.007 (0.007)
Unspecified expert	-0.063*** (0.023)	-0.033** (0.014)	0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.023)	0.041** (0.016)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.053*** (0.016)	-0.007 (0.005)
Government expert x Economy will worsen	-0.088** (0.035)	-0.102*** (0.028)	0.081*** (0.020)	-0.070** (0.035)	-0.104*** (0.027)	0.053*** (0.014)	-0.130*** (0.035)	-0.104*** (0.025)	0.025** (0.012)
Private sector expert x Economy will worsen	-0.013 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.028)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.048 (0.035)	-0.077*** (0.025)	0.002 (0.010)
Academic expert x Economy will worsen	-0.007 (0.035)	0.006 (0.026)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.051 (0.035)	-0.049* (0.026)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.041 (0.035)	-0.053** (0.024)	-0.015 (0.010)
Unspecified expert x Economy will worsen	-0.055 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.026 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.062* (0.035)	-0.065*** (0.023)	0.008 (0.010)
Economy will worsen	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.121*** (0.017)	0.073*** (0.012)	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.019)	0.012 (0.008)	0.048* (0.025)	0.037** (0.017)	0.006 (0.007)
Observations	8,129	8,129	8,129	8,129	8,129	8,129	8,129	8,129	8,129
R ²	0.032	0.045	0.044	0.004	0.008	0.013	0.004	0.005	0.005
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.609	0.871	0.050	0.442	0.837	0.022	0.458	0.862	0.020
P-Value (Gov. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002
P-Value (Priv. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.000	0.124	0.116	0.127	0.736	0.012	0.009	0.713
P-Value (Acad. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.030	0.434	0.152	0.438	0.958	0.247	0.461	0.292
P-Value (Unsp. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.037	0.893	0.166	0.443	0.195	0.018	0.466	0.912

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, and interactions with a dummy for whether the respondent believes the economic situation of the country will worsen. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent believes the economic situation of the country will worsen. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 6: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Approval on National Government

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.163*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.019)	0.088*** (0.014)	-0.091*** (0.022)	-0.060*** (0.017)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.103*** (0.022)	-0.055*** (0.016)	0.030*** (0.008)
Private sector expert	-0.153*** (0.022)	-0.106*** (0.018)	0.022* (0.012)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.024 (0.017)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.058*** (0.022)	-0.031** (0.015)	0.011* (0.006)
Academic expert	-0.103*** (0.022)	-0.065*** (0.018)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.015)	0.004 (0.006)
Unspecified expert	-0.100*** (0.022)	-0.054*** (0.018)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.054** (0.022)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.061*** (0.022)	0.000 (0.015)	0.003 (0.006)
Government expert x Pleased with gov.	0.036 (0.036)	0.096*** (0.025)	-0.073*** (0.016)	0.123*** (0.038)	0.127*** (0.028)	-0.049*** (0.012)	0.121*** (0.038)	0.111*** (0.026)	-0.033*** (0.013)
Private sector expert x Pleased with gov.	-0.032 (0.037)	0.026 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.014)	0.044 (0.038)	0.019 (0.029)	0.014 (0.012)	0.066* (0.038)	0.076*** (0.026)	-0.025** (0.011)
Academic expert x Pleased with gov.	0.003 (0.036)	0.039* (0.023)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.092** (0.037)	0.065** (0.027)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.041 (0.038)	0.073*** (0.025)	-0.011 (0.011)
Unspecified expert x Pleased with gov.	0.022 (0.036)	0.037 (0.023)	0.008 (0.013)	0.115*** (0.038)	0.059** (0.027)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.095** (0.038)	0.056** (0.025)	-0.019* (0.011)
Pleased with government	0.174*** (0.025)	0.114*** (0.015)	-0.063*** (0.009)	-0.022 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.019)	0.014* (0.008)
Observations	7,691	7,691	7,691	7,691	7,691	7,691	7,691	7,691	7,691
R ²	0.043	0.046	0.034	0.006	0.008	0.009	0.007	0.006	0.004
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.606	0.869	0.050	0.440	0.838	0.021	0.456	0.866	0.019
P-Value (Gov. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.015	0.050	0.302	0.002	0.173	0.568	0.006	0.774
P-Value (Priv. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.000	0.046	0.872	0.832	0.135	0.787	0.034	0.131
P-Value (Acad. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.090	0.836	0.120	0.017	0.366	0.590	0.002	0.421
P-Value (Unsp. expert + Interaction=0)	0.006	0.272	0.254	0.047	0.001	0.302	0.270	0.007	0.080

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, and interactions with a dummy for whether the respondent is somewhat or very pleased with the national government. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent is somewhat or very pleased with the national government. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 7: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in Government

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.172*** (0.019)	-0.150*** (0.016)	0.093*** (0.012)	-0.085*** (0.019)	-0.050*** (0.016)	0.034*** (0.008)	-0.095*** (0.019)	-0.042*** (0.014)	0.029*** (0.007)
Private sector expert	-0.145*** (0.019)	-0.109*** (0.016)	0.023** (0.010)	-0.033* (0.019)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.006)
Academic expert	-0.086*** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.015)	0.025** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.010 (0.019)	0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.006)
Unspecified expert	-0.089*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.015)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.037* (0.019)	0.024 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.047** (0.019)	0.010 (0.013)	0.004 (0.006)
Government expert x Trusts gov.	0.054 (0.033)	0.127*** (0.021)	-0.105*** (0.014)	0.121*** (0.035)	0.115*** (0.025)	-0.051*** (0.011)	0.104*** (0.035)	0.070*** (0.023)	-0.027** (0.011)
Private sector expert x Trusts gov.	-0.026 (0.034)	0.044* (0.022)	-0.021 (0.014)	0.044 (0.035)	0.004 (0.027)	0.009 (0.012)	0.048 (0.035)	0.034 (0.024)	0.000 (0.010)
Academic expert x Trusts gov.	-0.037 (0.033)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.032** (0.013)	0.046 (0.035)	0.032 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.033 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.009)
Unspecified expert x Trusts gov.	-0.010 (0.033)	0.040* (0.021)	-0.025** (0.012)	0.087** (0.035)	0.033 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.058 (0.035)	0.039* (0.022)	-0.012 (0.009)
Trusts government	0.207*** (0.023)	0.118*** (0.013)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.003 (0.025)	0.018 (0.019)	0.000 (0.008)	0.032 (0.025)	0.015 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.007)
Observations	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442
R ²	0.048	0.049	0.030	0.005	0.010	0.007	0.009	0.008	0.005
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.604	0.872	0.048	0.432	0.830	0.025	0.450	0.864	0.020
P-Value (Gov. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.088	0.129	0.217	0.001	0.026	0.744	0.132	0.810
P-Value (Priv. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.000	0.886	0.709	0.793	0.408	0.991	0.294	0.861
P-Value (Acad. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.001	0.398	0.305	0.059	0.531	0.824	0.032	0.838
P-Value (Unsp. expert + Interaction=0)	0.000	0.092	0.094	0.092	0.004	0.062	0.727	0.006	0.288

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, and interactions with a dummy for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the government. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or lot of trust in the government. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.


Table 8: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in Private Sector

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.175*** (0.019)	-0.126*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.010)	-0.052*** (0.019)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.020*** (0.007)	-0.052*** (0.019)	-0.020 (0.014)	0.025*** (0.007)
Private sector expert	-0.175*** (0.019)	-0.119*** (0.015)	0.022** (0.009)	-0.038** (0.019)	-0.024 (0.016)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.047** (0.019)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.004 (0.006)
Academic expert	-0.110*** (0.019)	-0.069*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.019)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.015 (0.019)	0.016 (0.013)	0.006 (0.006)
Unspecified expert	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.014)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.019)	0.030** (0.014)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.029 (0.019)	0.020 (0.013)	0.006 (0.006)
Government expert x Trusts priv.	0.086** (0.036)	0.064** (0.026)	-0.019 (0.019)	0.018 (0.036)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.038 (0.036)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.012)
Private sector expert x Trusts priv.	0.076** (0.035)	0.072*** (0.026)	-0.019 (0.017)	0.052 (0.036)	0.041* (0.025)	-0.005 (0.011)	0.030 (0.036)	0.032 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.010)
Academic expert x Trusts priv.	0.055 (0.036)	0.037 (0.025)	0.007 (0.017)	0.047 (0.036)	-0.005 (0.025)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.023 (0.036)	0.000 (0.022)	-0.016* (0.009)
Unspecified expert x Trusts priv.	0.057 (0.036)	0.058** (0.025)	-0.028* (0.016)	0.040 (0.036)	0.012 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.036)	0.004 (0.022)	-0.018* (0.009)
Trusts private sector	-0.002 (0.025)	0.017 (0.017)	0.008 (0.012)	0.045* (0.026)	0.052*** (0.018)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.100*** (0.026)	0.053*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.007)
Observations	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441
R ²	0.015	0.016	0.007	0.006	0.009	0.003	0.010	0.009	0.004
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.604	0.872	0.048	0.432	0.830	0.025	0.450	0.864	0.020
P-Value (Gov. expert + Interaction=0)	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.249	0.845	0.175	0.003	0.252	0.273
P-Value (Priv. expert + Interaction=0)	0.001	0.022	0.869	0.634	0.388	0.873	0.563	0.368	0.573
P-Value (Acad. expert + Interaction=0)	0.074	0.116	0.202	0.293	0.537	0.782	0.804	0.355	0.163
P-Value (Unsp. expert + Interaction=0)	0.108	0.666	0.224	0.567	0.030	0.108	0.277	0.170	0.089

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, and interactions with a dummy for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the private sector. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the private sector. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

A Appendix Tables and Figures


Figure A.1: Covid-19 Stringency of Measures Index




Notes: The figure shows a composite measure of stringency of Covid-19 measures for the countries in our sample, based on nine response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). If policies vary at the subnational level, the index is shown as the response level of the strictest sub-region. The section marked with a gray bar corresponds to the survey period. The source of these data is Our World in Data.

Figure A.2: Covid-19 Deaths per Million People

(a) Cumulative confirmed Covid-19 deaths per million people




(b) Daily New Confirmed Covid-19 Deaths per Million People




Notes: The figure in Panel A shows the cumulative number of confirmed deaths over the previous two weeks for the countries in our survey. The figure in Panel B shows the daily number of confirmed deaths per million people (rolling 7-day average) for the countries in our survey. The section marked with a gray bar corresponds to the survey period. The source of these data is Our World in Data.

Figure A.3: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in the Government




Notes: These figures show the results of different regressions where the dependent variable, specified in the graph header, is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees, and strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, interacted with dummies for whether the respondent has high trust in the government (some or a lot) or low trust in the government. The figures report the estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the government.

Figure A.4: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in the Government



Notes: These figures show the results of different regressions where the dependent variable, specified in the graph header, is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees, and strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of spending time outside. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, interacted with dummies for whether the respondent has high trust in the government (some or a lot) or low trust in the government. The figures report the estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the government.


Figure A.5: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in the Government



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
Notes: These figures show the results of different regressions where the dependent variable, specified in the graph header, is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees, and strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of regularly exercising. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, interacted with dummies for whether the respondent has high trust in the government (some or a lot) or low trust in the government. The figures report the estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the government.

Figure A.6: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in the Private Sector




Notes: These figures show the results of different regressions where the dependent variable, specified in the graph header, is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees, and strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, interacted with dummies for whether the respondent has high trust in the private sector (some or a lot) or low trust in the private sector. The figures report the estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the private sector.

Figure A.7: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in the Private Sector



Notes: These figures show the results of different regressions where the dependent variable, specified in the graph header, is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees, and strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of spending time outside. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, interacted with dummies for whether the respondent has high trust in the private sector (some or a lot) or low trust in the private sector. The figures report the estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the private sector.

Figure A.8: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in the Private Sector



Notes: These figures show the results of different regressions where the dependent variable, specified in the graph header, is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees, and strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of regularly exercising. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert, interacted with dummies for whether the respondent has high trust in the private sector (some or a lot) or low trust in the private sector. The figures report the estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for whether the respondent has some or a lot of trust in the private sector.

Table A.1: Balance across Treatment Arms

	Government expert	Private sector expert	Academic expert	Unspecified expert	P-value (joint significance)
Age	0.091 (0.566)	-0.489 (0.569)	-0.089 (0.567)	-0.658 (0.573)	0.622
Female	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.016)	0.007 (0.016)	0.526
Argentina	0.003 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.824
Colombia	0.012 (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.670
Peru	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.067
Uruguay	0.014 (0.012)	0.013 (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.012)	0.233
Bolivia	-0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)	0.459
Mexico	0.004 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.000 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.539
Ecuador	-0.008 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.239
Primary school	0.000 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.012)	0.786
Secondary school	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.009 (0.015)	0.914
Incomplete tertiary education	0.005 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.021 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.520
Tertiary education	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.668
Postgraduate education	0.001 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.610
Currently saving	0.004 (0.013)	0.025* (0.014)	0.017 (0.013)	0.028** (0.014)	0.159
Making ends meet but not saving	0.003 (0.016)	0.003 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.895
Had to cut on non-basic expenses	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.029** (0.013)	0.096
Had to cut on basic expenses	0.003 (0.010)	0.007 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.908

Notes: This table reports the results of different regressions where the dependent variable is specified in the row header and the independent variables are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. The final column shows the p-value of a joint significance test for all regressors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.2: Balance across Treatment Arms

	Government expert	Private sector expert	Academic expert	Unspecified expert	P-value (joint significance)
Num. social gatherings last week	0.024 (0.034)	0.048 (0.035)	0.013 (0.033)	0.013 (0.034)	0.708
Num. days exercised last week	-0.078 (0.077)	-0.096 (0.076)	-0.097 (0.076)	-0.165** (0.075)	0.295
Num. days outside last week	-0.007 (0.085)	0.032 (0.085)	-0.081 (0.084)	-0.343*** (0.083)	0.000
Trust in actions of president against pandemic (1-5)	0.032 (0.043)	0.026 (0.043)	0.012 (0.043)	0.010 (0.043)	0.949
Trust in actions of private sector against pandemic (1-5)	0.056* (0.033)	0.130*** (0.033)	0.011 (0.033)	0.028 (0.033)	0.001
Should produce vaccine - Government	0.008 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)	0.009 (0.016)	0.233
Should produce vaccine - Private sector	-0.005 (0.010)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.277
Should produce vaccine - Public-private partnership	-0.003 (0.016)	0.005 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	0.900
Should distribute vaccine - Government	0.014 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)	0.009 (0.016)	0.208
Should distribute vaccine - Private sector	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.408
Should distribute vaccine - Public-private partnership	0.003 (0.016)	0.026 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.228
Donation to government organization	-0.014 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.203
Donation to private sector organization	0.021 (0.014)	0.030** (0.014)	0.004 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.159
Donation to university/research center	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.044*** (0.016)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.057

Notes: This table reports the results of different regressions where the dependent variable is specified in the row header and the independent variables are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. The final column shows the p-value of a joint significance test for all regressors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.3: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Argentina

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.098*** (0.035)	-0.165*** (0.035)	0.143*** (0.030)	-0.030 (0.035)	-0.029 (0.031)	0.045*** (0.016)	-0.083** (0.036)	-0.030 (0.026)	0.029** (0.013)
Private sector expert	-0.159*** (0.035)	-0.122*** (0.036)	0.038 (0.028)	0.007 (0.036)	0.008 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.009)
Academic expert	-0.097*** (0.035)	-0.100*** (0.035)	0.034 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.035)	0.020 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.013 (0.036)	0.009 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.010)
Unspecified expert	-0.103*** (0.036)	-0.096*** (0.035)	0.042 (0.028)	0.039 (0.036)	0.062** (0.029)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.037 (0.037)	0.025 (0.024)	0.009 (0.011)
Observations	1,834	1,834	1,834	1,834	1,834	1,834	1,834	1,834	1,834
R ²	0.012	0.012	0.015	0.002	0.005	0.012	0.005	0.003	0.007
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.414	0.696	0.145	0.367	0.781	0.027	0.463	0.866	0.019

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Argentina. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.4: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Bolivia

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.046 (0.046)	-0.069** (0.034)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.030 (0.045)	-0.019 (0.031)	0.017 (0.013)	0.036 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.028)	0.029** (0.012)
Private sector expert	-0.118*** (0.045)	-0.091*** (0.034)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.040 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.031)	0.016 (0.013)	0.002 (0.044)	-0.051* (0.028)	0.012 (0.009)
Academic expert	-0.046 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.032)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.045)	0.008 (0.029)	0.015 (0.013)	0.077* (0.045)	-0.037 (0.027)	0.012 (0.009)
Unspecified expert	-0.048 (0.044)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.042 (0.044)	0.010 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.043)	-0.016 (0.026)	0.014 (0.009)
Observations	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255
R ²	0.006	0.007	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.005
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.523	0.872	0.041	0.465	0.881	0.012	0.403	0.914	0.004

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Bolivia. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.5: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Colombia

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.137*** (0.041)	-0.058** (0.024)	0.024* (0.013)	-0.057 (0.042)	0.011 (0.033)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.070* (0.042)	0.024 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.014)
Private sector expert	-0.126*** (0.041)	-0.074*** (0.024)	0.002 (0.009)	0.026 (0.042)	0.045 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.016 (0.042)	0.043 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.015)
Academic expert	-0.112*** (0.041)	-0.059** (0.024)	0.006 (0.010)	0.020 (0.043)	0.010 (0.033)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.043)	0.047 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.015)
Unspecified expert	-0.087** (0.041)	-0.039* (0.023)	0.011 (0.011)	0.013 (0.043)	0.053* (0.031)	-0.000 (0.011)	0.020 (0.043)	0.060** (0.029)	-0.019 (0.013)
Observations	1,395	1,395	1,395	1,395	1,395	1,395	1,395	1,395	1,395
R ²	0.010	0.007	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.002
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.700	0.943	0.011	0.445	0.817	0.015	0.441	0.837	0.034

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Colombia. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.6: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Ecuador

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.191*** (0.045)	-0.135*** (0.031)	0.091*** (0.021)	-0.103** (0.046)	-0.043 (0.030)	0.032** (0.015)	-0.112** (0.046)	-0.081** (0.034)	0.033* (0.017)
Private sector expert	-0.168*** (0.042)	-0.085*** (0.026)	0.044*** (0.015)	-0.138*** (0.044)	-0.047* (0.028)	0.026** (0.013)	-0.150*** (0.044)	-0.018 (0.030)	0.017 (0.014)
Academic expert	-0.034 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.024)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.004 (0.027)	0.008 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.046)	0.021 (0.029)	0.004 (0.013)
Unspecified expert	-0.050 (0.042)	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.090** (0.045)	-0.001 (0.026)	0.008 (0.010)	-0.047 (0.045)	-0.016 (0.031)	0.003 (0.012)
Observations	1,210	1,210	1,210	1,210	1,210	1,210	1,210	1,210	1,210
R ²	0.025	0.020	0.032	0.010	0.005	0.006	0.014	0.009	0.005
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.718	0.941	0.008	0.576	0.908	0.008	0.513	0.878	0.017

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Ecuador. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.7: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Mexico

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.136*** (0.043)	-0.097*** (0.027)	0.031** (0.016)	-0.050 (0.044)	-0.011 (0.032)	0.007 (0.018)	-0.089** (0.044)	-0.063* (0.033)	0.039** (0.017)
Private sector expert	-0.171*** (0.045)	-0.112*** (0.029)	0.016 (0.014)	-0.039 (0.046)	-0.027 (0.034)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.072 (0.046)	-0.054 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.013)
Academic expert	-0.102** (0.043)	-0.018 (0.022)	0.007 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.045)	0.020 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.031)	0.007 (0.014)
Unspecified expert	-0.073* (0.043)	-0.030 (0.023)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.040 (0.045)	0.034 (0.030)	-0.028* (0.015)	-0.065 (0.045)	0.034 (0.030)	0.021 (0.016)
Observations	1,213	1,213	1,213	1,213	1,213	1,213	1,213	1,213	1,213
R ²	0.014	0.020	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.010	0.007
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.691	0.943	0.016	0.459	0.858	0.041	0.451	0.862	0.020

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Mexico. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.8: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Peru

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.279*** (0.047)	-0.107*** (0.030)	0.028 (0.020)	-0.133*** (0.047)	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.117** (0.047)	0.005 (0.035)	0.015 (0.017)
Private sector expert	-0.199*** (0.048)	-0.131*** (0.032)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.133*** (0.048)	-0.089** (0.037)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.112** (0.047)	0.003 (0.036)	0.001 (0.014)
Academic expert	-0.173*** (0.046)	-0.084*** (0.027)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.033 (0.047)	0.004 (0.030)	-0.030** (0.013)	-0.032 (0.047)	0.042 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.013)
Unspecified expert	-0.130*** (0.046)	-0.044* (0.025)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.058 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.034 (0.047)	0.044 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.011)
Observations	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031
R ²	0.035	0.021	0.005	0.012	0.009	0.006	0.009	0.003	0.005
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.679	0.949	0.030	0.470	0.885	0.034	0.427	0.842	0.021

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Peru. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.9: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Uruguay

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.193*** (0.040)	-0.082*** (0.031)	0.044** (0.019)	0.047 (0.038)	0.050 (0.035)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.040)	0.031 (0.027)	0.008 (0.012)
Private sector expert	-0.143*** (0.040)	-0.066** (0.031)	0.007 (0.017)	0.103*** (0.039)	0.044 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.013)	0.029 (0.041)	0.032 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.011)
Academic expert	-0.087** (0.041)	-0.049 (0.031)	0.018 (0.018)	0.049 (0.038)	0.057 (0.035)	-0.011 (0.014)	0.027 (0.041)	0.036 (0.027)	0.006 (0.012)
Unspecified expert	-0.132*** (0.042)	-0.055* (0.032)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.048 (0.040)	0.057 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.037 (0.042)	0.015 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.010)
Observations	1,506	1,506	1,506	1,506	1,506	1,506	1,506	1,506	1,506
R ²	0.017	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.597	0.853	0.041	0.304	0.730	0.034	0.447	0.853	0.020

Notes: The sample is composed of respondents from Uruguay. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.10: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Including Controls

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.148*** (0.016)	-0.104*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.008)	-0.042*** (0.016)	-0.009 (0.012)	0.017*** (0.006)	-0.061*** (0.016)	-0.019* (0.011)	0.020*** (0.006)
Private sector expert	-0.152*** (0.016)	-0.095*** (0.012)	0.016** (0.007)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.037** (0.016)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.002 (0.005)
Academic expert	-0.092*** (0.015)	-0.057*** (0.011)	0.013* (0.007)	0.001 (0.015)	0.018 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.011 (0.016)	0.016 (0.011)	0.001 (0.005)
Unspecified expert	-0.090*** (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.011)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.036*** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.018 (0.016)	0.026** (0.011)	-0.000 (0.005)
Num. social gatherings last week	-0.050*** (0.005)	-0.037*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)
Num. days exercised last week	0.011*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.043*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Num. days outside last week	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001* (0.001)	0.029*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Observations	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442	9,442
R ²	0.083	0.107	0.089	0.061	0.046	0.011	0.046	0.033	0.008
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.604	0.872	0.048	0.432	0.830	0.025	0.450	0.864	0.020

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for age, gender, country, maximum educational achievement, dummies for the current economic situation of the household, and number of times in the last week that the respondent participated in social gatherings, exercised, or spent time outside. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.11: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Agreement with Recommendation – Probit Regression

	Avoiding social gatherings			Exercising			Spending time outside		
	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree or agree	Strongly disagree or disagree
Government expert	-0.378*** (0.041)	-0.410*** (0.049)	0.418*** (0.063)	-0.120*** (0.041)	-0.048 (0.048)	0.238*** (0.080)	-0.156*** (0.041)	-0.084* (0.050)	0.309*** (0.085)
Private sector expert	-0.382*** (0.041)	-0.375*** (0.049)	0.141** (0.067)	-0.051 (0.041)	-0.034 (0.048)	0.030 (0.086)	-0.085** (0.041)	-0.017 (0.051)	0.025 (0.094)
Academic expert	-0.240*** (0.041)	-0.248*** (0.049)	0.130** (0.066)	-0.005 (0.041)	0.067 (0.049)	-0.050 (0.088)	0.023 (0.041)	0.078 (0.052)	0.030 (0.093)
Unspecified expert	-0.228*** (0.041)	-0.212*** (0.050)	0.043 (0.069)	-0.028 (0.041)	0.144*** (0.050)	-0.121 (0.092)	-0.075* (0.041)	0.106** (0.053)	0.013 (0.094)
Observations	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444	9,444
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.604	0.872	0.048	0.432	0.830	0.025	0.450	0.864	0.020

Notes: This table presents probit regressions where the dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy for whether the respondent strongly agrees, strongly agrees/agrees or strongly disagrees/disagrees with a statement about the importance of avoiding social gatherings. In columns 4-6 (7-9), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual presents the analogous levels of agreement with a recommendation about the importance of frequently exercising (spending time outside). The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.12: Impact of Expert Recommendation on Plans for Next Week – Including Controls

	Social gatherings	Exercising	Spending time outside
Government expert	0.033 (0.027)	0.073 (0.056)	0.024 (0.050)
Private sector expert	0.002 (0.027)	0.066 (0.055)	0.068 (0.051)
Academic expert	0.037 (0.027)	0.027 (0.055)	0.081 (0.050)
Unspecified expert	0.026 (0.027)	0.113** (0.056)	0.132** (0.052)
Num. social gatherings last week	0.435*** (0.015)	-0.035* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.017)
Num. days exercised last week	0.003 (0.004)	0.682*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)
Num. days outside last week	0.018*** (0.004)	0.108*** (0.008)	0.738*** (0.007)
Observations	9,442	9,442	9,440
R ²	0.265	0.504	0.612
Dep. variable mean (control)	0.546	3.062	3.664

Notes: The dependent variable measures the number of times the respondent plans to perform the activity specified in the column header in the next week. The regressors of interest are dummies for whether the respondent was presented with a recommendation from a government expert, private sector expert, academic expert, or unspecified expert. The omitted category is the control group, which was not shown any recommendation. We also control for age, gender, country, maximum educational achievement, dummies for the current economic situation of the household, and number of times in the last week that the respondent participated in social gatherings, exercised, or spent time outside. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.