Inter-American Development Bank

The Political Economy of Citizen Security:

A Conceptual Framework

Hernán Flom

Department of Research and Chief Economist

TECHNICAL NOTE Nº IDB-TN-1382

August 2018

The Political Economy of Citizen Security:

A Conceptual Framework

Hernán Flom

Institute for Joint Strategic Leadership, National Ministry of Security, Argentina

August 2018

Inter-American Development Bank

Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Inter-American Development Bank
Felipe Herrera Library

Flom, Hernán.
The political economy of citizen security: a conceptual framework / Hernán Flom; editor, John Dunn Smith.
p. cm. — (IDB Technical Note ; 1382)
Includes bibliographic references.
1. Crime-Government policy-Latin America. 2. Crime prevention-Latin America. 3. Policy sciences-Latin America. I. Smith, John D., editor. II. Inter-American Development Bank. Department of Research and Chief Economist. III. Title. IV. Series.
IDB-TN-1382

Abstract

Most Latin American countries face a systemic challenge in providing citizen security. In other words, the region's current insecurity is not only the responsibility of state actors in isolation, but also a product of the entire policymaking process (PMP) to understand policy outcomes. Many problems in this area spring from the lack of coordination among state actors—or from coordination in the service of their own interests rather than those of the wider population. Addressing citizen security thus requires considering the incentives of all actors involved in the policymaking process and the arenas in which they make decisions. This paper first reviews evidence-based studies, then presents a condensed theoretical framework of the political economy of citizen insecurity. The paper concludes with recommendations for implementing this theoretical framework and evaluates the methodological and logistical challenges it presents.

JEL classifications: D02, D73, D78, K14, L14, L38
Keywords: Policymaking process, Crime, Citizen security, Latin America

1. Introduction

Citizen security is one of the most important problems facing Latin America today. The region presents the highest average in homicide rates in the world. Despite having 9 percent of the world's population, it accounts for more than a third of global homicides.[1] Homicides have increased substantially in various Latin American countries during the last decade, whereas they have fallen in most other parts of the world. The number of deaths from criminal violence in many countries in the region surpasses the casualties in most civil wars around the world.

This increase in violence in Latin America is puzzling since it coincided with unprecedented economic growth and reduction in poverty due to the commodity boom of the early 2000s. While poverty, inequality and unemployment are typically considered the main drivers of criminality, the last decades show that socioeconomic factors do not exclusively determine the evolution of criminal violence.

While it is its most visible form, criminal violence is not limited to homicides.[2] Latin American countries also exhibit high levels of other non-lethal crimes against individuals, such as kidnapping, rapes, assault, and extortion. Six out of 10 robberies in the region are violent.[3] In many countries, approximately one in every two citizens has been the victim of at least one crime in a given year.

This growth in violence coincided with a dramatic expansion of organized criminal groups in several countries in the region. Organized crime often generates violence. The illegal contraband of drugs, weapons, persons, and other goods triggers market disputes between armed criminal groups and clashes with the state's security forces, while civilians are frequently caught in the crossfire. These organized criminal activities thrive in part due to the lack of resources and coordination between different state agencies as well as their complicity with these criminal actors. In some situations, the state's absence or corruption favors the formation of civilian vigilante

[1] *The Guardian*, May 6, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/murder-map-latin-america-leads-world-key-cities-buck-deadly-trend

[2] We follow the definition of violence as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation" (WHO). Although we recognize that many violent actions are not necessarily classified as crimes, in this paper we use the terms "violence" and "criminal violence" interchangeably. In this paper, we focus on the physical consequences of violence, especially that which results in death, although such acts may simultaneously affect both an individual's psychological health and a community's development. For more on these areas, see http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en/

[3] Jaitman and Guerrero Compeán (2015: viii).

groups, armed militias and self-defense forces to protect citizens from the predation of organized criminal networks.

Organized crime is not the only reason behind most homicides in Latin America. Many of these crimes derive from interpersonal conflicts between individuals unaffiliated with local gangs or transnational criminal syndicates. The region exhibits disturbing levels of domestic, sexual and spousal violence, particularly by men against women. These crimes also reveal the failure and bias of state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary, which typically do not address the problem of domestic violence until it is too late.

Furthermore, in many cases the state exacerbates the problem of criminal violence. Police and military forces are responsible for an alarming volume of lethal interventions. To highlight one example, the Military Police in the Brazilian State of São Paulo has killed more than 1,000 people per year, more than the 19,000 police forces in the United States combined. Most of these cases were labeled as "deaths while resisting authority," in fact exonerating the police and blaming the victim for his own death.[4] This situation is not exclusive to the Brazilian police force: According to the 2009 LAPOP survey, more than 7 percent of citizens in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and El Salvador reported abuses by police forces.[5] Furthermore, citizens in most Latin American countries consider the police to be deeply involved in crime.[6] This institutional fragility contributes to the proliferation of criminality and violence in the region.

Of course, there is a substantial variation in citizen security both across and within Latin American countries. Nations like El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Venezuela exhibit the highest murder rates in the world while those of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, and Argentina compare with the figures from Western Europe (see Figure 1). A similar contrast applies within countries.

[4] Denyer-Willis (2015).
[5] Cruz (2009).
[6] Cruz (2010a).

Figure 1. Homicide Rates in Latin America (2016, or last available year)



Source: Various sources compiled by InsightCrime.

Despite the overall worsening of citizen insecurity in the region during the last two decades, violence has increased in some countries while decreasing in others. The same applies when looking within countries. In Brazil, for example, during the last two decades, homicides have shifted within the country, spreading from the southeast to the northeast, which, ironically, has experienced increasing social inclusion.[7] In short, violence and citizen insecurity remain a major social problem in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which requires an integrated political response.

Albeit differences across countries, state agencies responsible for providing citizen security in Latin America face daunting challenges, not just in their police or security forces but in their entire criminal justice systems. Judiciary systems are typically overburdened, archaic and marginally effective: on average, only 10 percent of homicides in the region are solved and this percentage is much lower for other crimes. A great proportion of crimes are never reported to the

[7] Brazil now contains more than 20 of the world's 50 most violent cities, most of which are in the Americas. See http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/daily-chart-3. For another insight on the murder rates of Brazilian cities, see: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/01/29/months-before-rio-olympics-murder-rate-rises-in-brazil/#5459a0b52790

authorities, often due to distrust in state officials and legal cynicism by most citizens. Moreover, the enforcement of justice is highly unequal. The justice system especially penalizes the poor and racial minorities, who make up the bulk of prison populations, while powerful, white-collar criminals largely benefit from impunity. Similarly, the courts rarely punish state agents who violate the law, even those who exact lethal force against civilians.[8] This context undermines the legitimacy of the judicial process and motivates individuals to resort to popular justice, from lynching to the organization of self-defense groups, to find "justice" and prevent crime.

Finally, penitentiary systems in Latin America are rarely capable of rehabilitating inmates and facilitating their reentry into society. Most Latin American prisons are overpopulated, which leads inmates to suffer grave deprivations and human rights abuses by both guards and fellow inmates.[9] Prison guards extort prisoners and their families to provide them with anything from food to drugs. Many prisons in Latin America are under the control of gangs who establish and enforce their own rules of governance and order. In some cases, prisoners are temporarily allowed to exit the compound to commit crimes at the behest of prison guards. Rather than deterring criminality, Latin American prisons often exacerbate it, effectively becoming "schools of crime." Predictably, recidivism is high in most Latin American countries, despite large prison populations and economic costs of imprisonment.

These problems are familiar to any scholar, policy analyst or policymaker delving into citizen security in the region. However, in this paper we argue that many of these problems originate in the design and implementation of citizen security policies by state actors, from elected politicians to the police and the judiciary. As we have noted, there are fundamental problems in coordination between agencies and in whether and how policies are enforced, which ultimately affects citizen security outcomes such as homicide and crime rates. This perspective does not exonerate criminal justice operatives' misconduct, but focuses on the entire policymaking process (PMP) to understand policy outcomes. Moreover, we focus on the interactions of different actors who intervene in citizen security, guided by their respective incentives and expectations of others' behaviors, i.e., the industrial organization of security politics.[10] Our intention is to construct an analytical framework that facilitates an integrated response to citizen security.

[8] Brinks (2007).
[9] Dammert and Zuñiga (2008); Ungar and Magaloni (2009); IDB (2012).
[10] Weingast and Marshall (1988).

1.1 Academic and Policy Evaluation Studies

This paper implies a theoretical and methodological shift in the analysis of citizen security policies. During the previous decade, several studies have evaluated the impact of various policy initiatives through experimental or quasi-experimental designs. These designs are well suited to establish the causal impact of a given treatment on a specific outcome and, hence, provide a highly useful tool for policy evaluation. The IDB has especially promoted these types of interventions, focusing on four critical areas.[11]

1. **Social prevention of crime and violence**. This includes the mitigation of factors that increase the risk of youth to suffer or commit crimes; the prevention of domestic violence, whether by parents against children or by men against women; and situational prevention strategies, which aim to constrain individuals' engagement in certain types of crimes through interventions in the environmental design of urban areas.
2. **Police strategies to prevent crime**, including various initiatives that seek to allocate police resources more efficiently, tackle specific crimes in the locations where they are most prominent, or strengthen the relations between the police and the community
3. **Efficient and timely criminal justice**, which aims to enhance the performance—effectiveness, celerity and efficiency—of both the judiciary and penitentiary systems.
4. **Institutional coordination for citizen security governance**, which supports building institutional capacity, increasing policymaking capabilities and promoting evidence-based policies for policy design and implementation.

This paper offers a different perspective on citizen security policies. It shifts the focus from the *impact* of policies to the *process* by which they are designed and implemented. Instead of focusing on specific policy initiatives, we shed light on the actors that make policies, the institutions that constrain their behavior, and how these affect citizen security policy outcomes.

[11] See IDB (2012: 1-2).

This paper argues that the incentives of different political and state actors shape the policymaking process, and the features of the emergent policies. This constitutes a central premise of a political economy theoretical framework. At the same time, we will highlight how political and institutional factors shape such incentives, constraints and interactions. This paper describes the problems in the policymaking process from the stage of design by presidents and legislators to that of implementation on the ground by different state agencies, including the police, the courts or the prison system.

This paper builds on the diagnosis that most Latin American countries face a *systemic* challenge in providing citizen security. In other words, the region's current insecurity is not the responsibility of politicians, police chiefs and officers, judges, prosecutors, or prison guards in isolation. Rather, many problems spring from the lack of coordination among state actors—or from coordination in the service of their own interests, as opposed to those of the broader population.

The lack of positive coordination between political actors implies another challenge. Not only do the multidimensional causes of crime and violence require an integrated response on behalf of policymakers—including the entire criminal justice system, the state's social welfare agencies and those in charge of formulating macroeconomic policies—criminal activities are increasingly complex, especially those related to transnational organized crime. Many of them transcend international borders, not to mention administrative regions within a single country. While state coordination might not be sufficient to uproot these criminal enterprises, or criminal violence in general, it is nearly impossible to achieve this goal without it.

Addressing citizen security requires considering the incentives of all **actors** involved in the policymaking process and the main **arenas** in which they make decisions. We provide a framework that integrates these elements into a theory of the political economy of citizen security. We begin by describing the *incentives* and *constraints* of various actors who participate in the security policymaking process (PMP), their interactions, and how the context in which these exchanges take place affect the features of citizen security policies and their ultimate outcomes. The premise behind this inquiry is that getting the policy process right is necessary to produce effective public policies.[12]

[12] Tommasi (2011).

1.2 Roadmap

This paper has two parts following this introduction. The first part, consisting of Section 2, presents a brief review of evidence-based studies, which rely primarily on experimental or quasi-experimental designs, on citizen security and summarizes the main empirical findings with respect to citizen security in Latin America. This section aims not only to summarize our current findings on what works in citizen security but also to highlight certain theoretical gaps and methodological limitations that a political economy framework could address.

The second part of the paper, consisting of the remaining sections, presents a condensed theoretical framework of the political economy of citizen security that provides the title of this document. Section 3 describe the main features of this analytical framework, in general and with respect to citizen security. Section 4 introduces the main *actors* involved in the design and implementation of citizen security policies and the arenas in which the policymaking process takes place. Section 5 explains how this theoretical framework helps us understand citizen security outcomes in Latin America, serving as both a review of existing research and an indication of the gaps for future studies to fill. Section 6 section provides recommendations for country teams to implement this theoretical framework and evaluates the methodological and logistical challenges it presents.

2. What We Know: Evaluating Policy Impact on Citizen Security

This section summarizes the findings of various studies regarding the effect of different policy initiatives on citizen security. The section is organized along three central areas of citizen security: social and situational prevention strategies, police strategies to prevent crime, and programs by judiciary and penitentiary systems—also referred to as "tertiary prevention." The fourth area, institutional capacity building, is excluded because it will be an integral part of the next section. Most of these studies rely on an experimental design that randomly assigns the policy (treatment) to a group of individuals or collective units (youth, prisoners, neighborhoods, precinct areas, etc.) and withhold them from another (control group). Some studies rely on natural experiments, in which the assignment occurs through an exogenous shock unrelated to the policy in question.[13] In

[13] While not a "real experiment," in the sense that the researcher does not manipulate the assignment to treatment or control groups, natural experiments can display as-if random assignment, but it behooves the researcher to show the plausibility of this assumption. See Dunning (2012).

other instances, they are based on a quasi-experimental design,[14] in which the policy is distributed differently to randomly selected groups considered to be as similar as possible in most characteristics except the one pertinent to the treatment. These types of design enable causal inference, i.e., establishing the isolated impact of one factor with respect to another while controlling for potential confounders.[15] However, certain citizen security issues are harder to elucidate with such designs and require alternative methodological approaches. We should clarify that, for purposes of brevity, this review only mentions some of those studies within a much broader universe of research.[16] In each area, we reference the types of policies that have had greater impact on citizen security, be it through their reduction of homicides, overall crime, or recidivism.

2.1 Social and Situational Prevention Strategies

The social prevention of crime recognizes that some individuals are more likely to be involved in criminal activities than others, either as victims or as perpetrators, often due to circumstances beyond their personal control. Societal prevention policies attempt to reduce individuals' propensity and exposure to crime; that is, the inclination to see crime as a profitable alternative at a given point, and the probability of finding oneself in a situation where one is likely to commit a crime.[17] These types of policies are often referred to as "primary prevention" responses, in the sense that they try to prevent crimes from happening before they take place.

There is a consensus that poverty and inequality are strong drivers of crime,[18] and that states should seek to remedy these social deficits to enhance security. A subsequent question is what policies are likely to generate faster, and larger, results. For instance, concerning the role of education, studies in developed economies have found that a one-year increase in average education reduces the probability of incarceration between 15 and 20 percent.[19] Skill programs and

[14] Typical quasi-experimental designs include regression discontinuity designs and designs based on instrumental variables (IV).
[15] Many experimental research designs rely on the Neyman-Rubin-Holland model of causation, which adopts a manipulationist and counterfactual conception of causality. In other words, the researcher must be able to manipulate a factor in order to establish its causal property, and ascertaining that the outcome would not have been the same in the absence of the manipulated factor.
[16] For comprehensive reviews, see IDB (2012), CAF (2014), Jaitman and Guerrero Compeán (2015) and Muggah et al. (2016).
[17] CAF (2014: 39).
[18] On the relationship between inequality and crime, see Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002).
[19] Lochner (2004); Machin, Marie and Vujic (2011); Hjalmarsson, Holmlund and Lindquist (2015).

job-related interventions targeting disadvantaged youth in the United States, especially short-term, low cost summer jobs programs, have obtained similar outcomes.[20]

These results are not restricted to developed countries. In Latin America, several studies find that mentoring programs aimed at youth-at-risk or schoolchildren in violent areas can reduce adolescents' entry into crime and their recourse to violence as a mechanism to resolve conflicts.[21] Illustrative examples are the Aulas en Paz program in Colombia[22] and the Paz Activa program in Chile.[23] Other scholars have found that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs reduce crime and violence by mitigating income shocks.[24] However, further research is necessary to disentangle CCTs' income effect—individuals have greater income and less need to commit crimes—from its educational effect—lower perceived benefit of criminal activity, decreased opportunities to engage in these activities, and/or the socialization effect arising from additional education. Like summer job programs, CCTs are relatively inexpensive when compared to other social policy programs, and are likely to produce results faster than major social transformations, such as improving educational retention and quality, increasing employment or upgrading peripheral neighborhoods. However, implementing these kinds of programs does not depend strictly on security departments since they are under the purview of social development and welfare agencies. This policymaking process contains its own politics, as shown by the variation in their content and coverage in Latin American countries during the decades of left-leaning governments.[25]

While the individual choice theories that inspire these policies are particularly attuned to property crimes, other types of aggression, such as *domestic, sexual and spousal violence* do not fit into the classic model of economic theories of crime.[26] These violent acts are often rooted in entrenched patriarchal relationships in most countries. Latin America is particularly noted for its persistent machismo.[27] Every day, on average, 12 women are killed as a result of gender-based violence in the region.[28] Some studies have found that programs increasing women's

[20] Heller (2014); Gelber, Isen, and Kessler (2014).
[21] Klevens et al. (2009).
[22] Ramos, Nieto and Chaux (2009).
[23] Munizaga (2009); Blanco and Varela (2011).
[24] Chioda, De Mello and Soares (2012); Camacho and Mejía (2014).
[25] See Pribble (2013) and Garay (2016).
[26] For the foundational individual-choice analysis of the economics of crime, see Becker (1968).
[27] As noted by Ricardo, Eads and Barker (2011), programs to prevent gender violence should address the cultural norms that lead individuals to normalize it.
[28] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37828573

empowerment,[29] and assistance of victims decrease recurrent sexual violence.[30] Unfortunately, programs that target male perpetrators do not display significant effects.[31] So far, the literature has not established whether increasing the costs of committing sexual violence—either by changing legislation[32] or increasing enforcement—impacts potential perpetrators' predispositions to carry out this behavior.

Situational prevention consists of spatial or environmental interventions intended to deter crime. In rational choice terms, these interventions increase the cost of criminal activities for potential perpetrators.[33] Within this set, urban renewal and neighborhood improvement programs, as well as the physical and social integration of informal urban neighborhoods have shown promising results in reducing criminality and the perception of insecurity, both in developed countries and in Latin America.[34] Other studies find significant positive effects on the restriction of alcohol sales on crime and, conversely, an expansion of crime following policies increasing alcohol availability.[35]

However, not all situational prevention strategies are effective. Interventions such as street lighting, closed circuit television (CCTV), public space surveillance or security guards, among others, show at best weak effects in preventing violent crimes, although they have greater impact in deterring property crimes such as car thefts.[36] Also, an evaluation of a gun buyback program in Argentina—an area not supported by the IDB—shows that this initiative fails to reduce crimes, including homicides and firearm-related auto-thefts,[37] probably because of the large proportion of guns available on the black market that are then used in violent crimes.

Finally, it should be noted that different crimes are often interconnected, either because they are committed by the same individual or within the same geographical area or social network. In a profound ethnographic study of a poor neighborhood in Greater Buenos Aires, Auyero and

[29] Sarnquist et al. (2014).
[30] Hidrobo, Peterman and Heise (2016).
[31] Ellsberg et al. (2014). For challenges in the implementation and evaluation of local strategies to prevent gender-based violence, see Muggah et al. (2016: 3-5).
[32] Fifteen countries in the region have introduced legislation specifically addressing the murder of women based on their gender.
[33] Although these interventions are at the neighborhood or community level, the underlying theoretical framework also focuses on how these affect individual opportunities and propensities to engage in criminal behavior.
[34] Heaton (2012); Cerdá et al. (2012); Galiani et al. (2014).
[35] Biderman, De Mello and Schneider (2010); De Mello, Mejía and Suárez (2013).
[36] Jaitman and Guerro Compeán (2015: 21).
[37] Ronconi, Lenis and Schargrodsky (2011).

Berti show how different types of violence—domestic, sexual, school, drug-related, etc.—are interlinked.[38] Children can hurt their classmates at school because their parents beat them out of frustration because they (or their siblings) are consuming drugs. Analogously, preventing or treating one type of crime could have potentially positive externalities regarding other types of criminal behavior.

2.2 Police Strategies to Prevent Crime

The police are an integral part of crime prevention. They are the main state agency in charge of implementing citizen security public policies on the street. Studies analyzing what works in policing can be grouped between those that focus on increasing police presence and those that highlight different policing strategies.[39] Most studies of either variant analyze police forces from developed democracies, such as the United States and Western Europe, which, notwithstanding their problems, face an entirely different reality than those in Latin America with respect to their resources, preparation, and societal legitimacy, among other factors.[40]

The first set of this research corpus focuses on the effect of more police in the streets. Increased *police presence* has a positive effect on the reduction of crime, as evidenced by several experimental and quasi-experimental studies. Exploiting a natural experiment, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) find that, after a terrorist attack relocated police officers to guard the buildings of Jewish institutions, property crime significantly decreased in those areas.[41] However, they also found that this effect was predominantly local and did not carry over to other neighborhoods where police presence did not increase. At the same time, governments can increase the number of the police officers to carry out saturation strategies only to a certain extent, given the limited number of police personnel and other resources that can be allocated to security.[42] Increasing the number of police requires heightened budgetary expenses, such as paying additional salaries, building new training facilities, or obtaining supplementary infrastructure, vehicles,

[38] Auyero and Berti (2015).
[39] For a comprehensive review of the impact of different policing approaches, see Braga and Weisburd (2010).
[40] The amount of police killings in Western European countries is negligible compared to the United States (see Miller, 2016), not to mention Latin American countries.
[41] Klick and Tabarrok 2005 and Draca, Machin and Witt (2011) find a similar effect after the 9/11 and London 2005 terrorist attacks, respectively.
[42] Some governments have attempted to remedy this deficit—and the inefficiency or corruption of police—by deploying other security forces, such as the national military police or the army.

weapons and accessories. Cost effectiveness and efficiency is a necessary consideration for policymakers and advisors.

Notwithstanding the actual impact of police presence, politicians are known to increase police deployment to show greater government activity, especially around elections.[43] However, these actions are not without costs. New police recruits are put on the streets after a shorter training period, are often sent to the most dangerous neighborhoods, and generally lack fundamental skills to perform their work. Police saturation strategies are often not strategic at all; they often target vulnerable neighborhoods indiscriminately and fail to provide police with clear, precise objectives—as well as ensure police respect for human rights. Politicians can allocate police forces to aligned districts or those were they are most electorally vulnerable, despite the actual magnitude of crime. Further research is required regarding the political motivations behind the increased presence and geographical allocation of police, questions that a political economy framework could address.

A second series of studies emphasizes *how* the police intervene to control crime. While there are various policing strategies with successful experiences in crime prevention, we focus on the two that exhibit the most consistent results. The first is "hot spot policing," which focuses on small areas with high concentration of crimes, and has been shown to be much more effective than random patrols.[44] This policing tactic recognizes the geographical concentration of crime and relies on geo-referencing technologies. Again, policymakers may redirect enforcement resources to areas where crimes are more resounding, while not necessarily more frequent. This is particularly the case in Latin America, where crimes against middle or high-class individuals typically receive more attention than those against people of lower incomes, even though the latter are much more common.[45] Crimes against more influential individuals, in part because of the coverage they receive in the media and subsequent societal mobilizations, can tilt political decisions regarding the design and implementation of criminal justice policies. Our political economy framework incorporates these actors (media and social movements, among others) as potential claimants on the state that can, under certain circumstances, condition the policymaking process.

[43] Steven Levitt (1997) has used elections as an instrumental variable to measure the effect of police on crime, noting that police hiring is likely to increase in electoral years. Police hiring in weak institutional contexts might increase not just to display proactivity in security but also to fill patronage jobs.
[44] Braga (2001) summarizes the findings of experimental and quasi-experimental studies, and finds that they decrease crime without substantial displacement effects. See also review in Braga, Papachristos and Hureau (2012).
[45] On the "private" logic of public security, see Frühling (2009).

The second approach is problem-oriented policing (POP), in which the police and other state agencies focus on specific crimes or illicit actors, such as street gangs or cartels. Originating in the United States during the 1980s, it converges on three main themes: increased effectiveness by attacking underlying problems, reliance on the expertise and creativity of line officers, and a closer involvement with the public. In other words, instead of targeting broadly defined criminal offenses, police officers—in consultation with the public—should address specific problems.[46]

While this strategy has proven effective in certain cities of developed countries,[47] applying these insights to developing contexts presents a different challenge. For one, the definition of what constitutes a "problem," narrow or broad, is a decision by politicians, police and other social and economic actors and thus is context-specific. Knowing the conditions under which actors negotiate the formulation of problems is vital to understanding which situations are more likely to be problematized. Second, there are many ways in which this strategy can be implemented, according to which agencies participate. Each of these agencies is bound to have its own internal politics and have problems coordinating with the other state bureaucracies involved. A further problem is how to get state agencies to collaborate not only with each other but also with the community—which is fundamental to obtaining information. This interaction is particularly strained in the case of police forces, which often have at best tense relationships with the populations in the neighborhoods they patrol.

Latin American police-oriented prevention strategies do not necessarily conform to the standards of either hot spot or problem-oriented policing, but mix elements of these and other policing approaches. Two of the most recognized police-oriented crime prevention strategies in Latin America are the Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes (Plan Cuadrantes) in Colombia and the Police Pacification Units (UPP, Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora) program in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Notwithstanding their implementation, it is necessary to trace the political origin of both projects. In Colombia, the Plan Cuadrantes, targeted to the country's eight main cities, benefited from the national decentralization process, particularly engrained in the 1991 Constitution, to endow more autonomy to local police units, providing them with "a new patrolling protocol incentivizing more community contact and holding officers accountable for crime in their

[46] Spelman and Eck (1987).
[47] See Braga et al. (1999) for a randomized controlled experiment assessing the effects of POP. The paradigmatic case of this policing strategy was the Boston Ceasefire program (see Braga et al., 2001), also referred to as an example of "pulling levers."

area."[48] An experimental impact assessment in 2010 took advantage of the staggered training schedules of three different randomly selected police cohorts and detected a significant reduction in crime when comparing the four months following training with the same months in the previous year.[49]

The UPP program drew on the Plan Cuadrantes and other policing initiatives in the United States for inspiration.[50] Since 2008, the state government has deployed more than 9,000 officers to 38 newly installed police stations—UPPs—located in favelas (slums) in the city of Rio de Janeiro.[51] The effectiveness of the UPP, which can be characterized as a proximity-policing initiative, in reducing violence by police and criminals has also been confirmed by a quasi-experimental assessment, which benefits from the installation of each unit in a different neighborhood.[52] Nonetheless, this analysis should also consider the political aspects behind the intervention. Unlike previous reform initiatives, which floundered due to turnover in the state administration and the Security department and subsequent policy instability, the UPPs persisted in part because the PMDB has been in office for three consecutive terms (2006-current) and maintained the same security secretary, José Mariano Beltrame, for 10 years. Policy stability and coordination are essential for citizen security policies to realize their intended impact. However, the program is currently facing several political and implementation problems, such as a lack of coordination between the state and mayor's office and the need to install new units as the international events held in the city (Soccer World Cup 2014 and 2016 Olympics) approached, and it is suffering from the economic and fiscal crisis in which the state of Rio de Janeiro currently finds itself.

More generally, the implementation of police-centered crime prevention strategies suffers from the lack of coordination between politicians and police or among different police forces within a given jurisdiction. Many Latin American countries have multiple levels of policing, as well as several police forces within a single government tier, e.g., military and judiciary police divisions.[53] Given their diverse cultural legacies (and sometimes competing protection rackets),

[48] Muggah et al. (2016: 21).
[49] García, Mejía and Ortega (2013).
[50] See Beltrame (2014) for the security secretary's personal perspective on the origin of the UPP.
[51] Muggah et al. (2016: 11).
[52] Magaloni, Franco and Melo (2015).
[53] While military police are in charge for crime prevention through street patrols, judiciary police are typically responsible for investigating crimes.

these security forces are often reluctant to share information and collectively execute their operations. This segmentation multiplies coordination problems with governing politicians and those within each police organization.

A final issue concerns the use of technology as a supplement for policing strategies. While there are multiple software tools that aid police officers in performance of their duties, as well as politicians monitoring the police, the impact of technology ultimately depends on its assigned use by policymakers. So far, studies are cautious regarding the effect of various technological innovations in reducing crime.[54] Evaluations of predictive policing also need to factor in the costs derived from different instruments, as machine-learning algorithms can reproduce existing biases in the criminal justice system by targeting "problematic" individuals.[55]

2.3 Judiciary and Penitentiary Systems

The final stage of prevention encapsulates policies involving the judiciary and penitentiary systems. Criminal justice interventions are rooted on multiple interpretations of the social role of penitentiary systems. These functions include those listed below.

1. Deterrence: the prospect of punishment or incarceration is meant to dissuade individuals from engaging in criminal behavior.
2. Incapacitation: incarceration is meant to reduce crime by "removing" from the general population those individuals who have committed such acts and are, presumably, likely to commit them again.
3. Discipline: sanctions or imprisonment instill self-control and restraint in the individual, preventing future commission of violent acts.
4. Surveillance: under greater supervision, the individual has fewer opportunities to engage in criminal activities, as the probability of getting caught increases.
5. Diversion: this principle involves channeling offenders through alternative judicial procedures, such as "drug courts," to alleviate saturated judicial systems and reduce the stigmatization of individuals charged and convicted for relatively minor offenses.[56]

[54] Byrne and Marx (2011).
[55] http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crime-it-happens
[56] See definition and examples in https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html.

6. Rehabilitation: the function of the criminal justice system is to instill a new set of values and abilities in the individual, which will favor her reentry into society and make him or her less inclined to resort to crime in the future.

Prevention initiatives geared to the judicial and penitentiary system fit into one or more of these interpretative frameworks. Evaluating the incapacitation effect of prisons, Owens (2009) relies on a quasi-experimental design to evaluate a change in policy in the state of Maryland in 2001, which lowered the age for which crimes committed as a minor featured on a detainee's record and were evaluated as grounds for imprisonment as an adult. She finds that the treated population engaged in up to three crimes during the subsequent period, which would have been avoided, had they been in prison.

The literature, in contrast, agrees on the failure of discipline or fear-driven approaches, such as military conscription, as a policy response. Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) exploit a natural experiment (the Argentine draft lottery) and find that military conscription *increases* criminogenic propensities due to, among other things, extensive firearm training and delayed market entry.

While there are a variety of surveillance mechanisms, one in particular—electronic tagging—has been found to reduce criminal recidivism. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013) exploit the random assignment of detainees to harsh or lenient judges to show that electronic tagging—as opposed to incarceration—produces lower rates of recidivism, while also being more cost effective and less abusive than incarceration.

Studies find positive results for certain correctional rehabilitation initiatives, particularly multi-systemic therapy, family therapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and treatment for sex offenders. There are fewer studies on the impact of reentry programs on recidivism, but existing ones seem to be effective. Other initiatives such as rehabilitation justice conferences merit consideration, despite lack of systematic evidence corroborating their impact, at least given their considerable cost advantage vis-à-vis imprisonment. However, these studies are predominantly from developed countries, which raises questions regarding their validity in the Latin American context.

There are often insurmountable difficulties to implement these types of policies in most Latin American prisons. As mentioned above, in many penitentiary establishments, prison authorities are unable to control the entire prison population, let alone implement rehabilitation

programs.[57] Relatedly, prisoners suffer from abuse by both fellow inmates and prison guards, who, in turn, are overworked, undercompensated, and undertrained, and subsequently often engage in corruption or delegation of order to prison gangs. These problems complicate researchers' attempts to gain access to the prison and/or obtain reliable data on the functioning of rehabilitation programs. More generally, despite wide-ranging reforms in Latin American judicial systems,[58] there is a dearth of research on the consequences of these changes with respect to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the judicial system, as well as for overall crime rates.[59]

Finally, as in developed countries with punitive regimes, politics also contributes to the perpetuation of suboptimal prison conditions. Politicians are hardly motivated to improve prisoners' living conditions, even if this were to increase their prospects for rehabilitation, or to promote alternative judicial procedures that may result in the release of apprehended criminals. On the contrary, political incumbents in various contexts turn to punitive measures that increase incarceration rates, without the corresponding resources to cope with that demographic surge.

2.4 Theoretical and Methodological Limitations

Most of these studies rely on an experimental or quasi-experimental research design to evaluate the impact of citizen security policies. This paper does not intend to dispute the design or findings of specific articles. Our intention is first to present an overview of the general shortcomings and trade-offs of experimental research designs and, second, to highlight some of the limitations in applying this framework to understanding citizen security policies.

With respect to the first point, experimental designs typically raise questions of *external validity* and *substantive relevance*.[60] The first point refers to whether the sample that received the treatment is representative of the entire population to which the broader intervention would be targeted. For example, a natural experiment based on a draft lottery applies to a specific population group, filtered by age (and sometimes gender). Those based on a prize lottery might only be relevant for individuals who play the lottery, who are not necessarily representative of the entire

[57] This phenomenon is not unique to Latin America. Skarbek has described how prison gangs in the United States develop a governance role both inside and outside of the establishment. See Skarbek (2011, 2012).
[58] These reforms put in place accusatorial, as opposed to inquisitorial, systems, which resort to oral trials, criminal investigation by prosecutors (instead of judges), and special flagrancy courts to carry out speed trials. See Lorenzo, Riego and Duce (2011) for a summary of these reforms.
[59] As exceptions, see Blanco (2012) and Soares and Sviatschi (2010).
[60] These paragraphs build on the critique of natural experiments in Dunning (2012), although his points are extensible to experimental and quasi-experimental designs more broadly.

population. The issue at stake is whether the intervention that produced the intended effect is replicable in other contexts outside of the original setting; in other words, whether policies can travel across geographic and political contexts. Another dimension of this issue is in terms of *scope*: at what scale can the intervention produce the intended effects? Are interventions that operate at the neighborhood level potentially reproducible for an entire city, province or country?

The second issue is whether the intervention is substantively relevant for a real-life setting. The intervention might be so idiosyncratic that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce. This is typically a problem with natural experiments, which often rely on non-replicable events such as earthquakes, drawing of international borders or terrorist attacks. Additionally, researchers might be unable to unbundle different effects operating in the same treatment. As discussed above with conditional cash transfers, oftentimes experiments are unable to distinguish between the "income effect" and the "education effect" of the treatment in producing the intended outcome of reduced criminality. Doing so requires specifying a theory of how the data are generated—i.e., the data-generating process—as well as the mechanisms linking the treatment with the outcome. This requires substantive knowledge of the subject matter and "shoe leather research,"[61] i.e., on-site fieldwork that produces insights on mechanisms, timing and sequence, as well as on how the participants themselves interpret the impact of the intervention.

More specifically, these research designs carry certain problems and limitations for the analysis—and production—of citizen security policies. Experimental designs are certainly necessary to know whether certain policy initiatives have the intended effect and to estimate their magnitude. This is fundamental given the need, especially for politicians, to find short-term solutions to concrete problems, and focus on the policies that have the greatest impact at, hopefully, the lowest implementation cost. Scholars and policy analysts have a shared responsibility to provide these inputs to policymakers and stakeholders.

However, these designs can reveal little about how the policy came into being, i.e., how it emerged as the outcome of a series of negotiations between different actors with vested interests in a context that presents a given distribution of power. Going back to the issue of external validity mentioned above, researchers who exploit or create experimental designs typically do not specify under what political conditions these programs are likely to be replicated in the future. Different institutional arrangements and distributions of political power might obstruct or substantially

[61] Freedman et al. (2010).

modify theoretically "positive" interventions; this information is also necessary to calculate the probability that policy initiatives survive in the future, extending beyond the term of the politicians who initially implemented them.

In addition, experimental studies might be insufficient to produce and assess an integrated approach to citizen security. Approaching this problem requires a multi-pronged and coordinated intervention by several state agencies; it is necessary to consider the incentives of these agencies, or at least of the actors in charge of them, to ensure the maximum degree of policy coordination and enforcement. Furthermore, policy initiatives are not a single-shot game but a repeated interaction that triggers a set of intended (and unintended) consequences, in terms of the diffusion of outcomes, the extent to which they realign individuals' perceptions, and the effect on the distribution of power. Finally, there is a political, and ethical, question of scale. Policy changes often aim to modify the state's performance over an entire subnational or even national jurisdiction, making it hard to randomize its deployment to a specific local population. In the next section, we build a political economy approach to citizen security to provide a framework for such an integrated approach to this crucial issue.

3. What Is the Political Economy of Citizen Security?

In this section and those that follow, we define a political economy framework and analyze its applicability to the study of citizen security in Latin America. The concept of *citizen security* gained traction in the 1990s, replacing the concept of public security as a central policy goal for countries to achieve. It implies that "all members of a society are entitled [to] as little threat as possible to their personal security, their civic rights and their right to the use and enjoyment of their property."[62] This contrasts with the prior notion of *public security*, which centered on the maintenance of order and the suppression of behavior deemed dangerous by the state or society, or at least by certain social sectors. This concept was understandably perceived as guarding the state against civil society and not the other way around, as well as preserving the interests of elites while disregarding—if not attacking—individuals from lower social sectors. In contrast, citizen security addresses "the interrelated issues of reducing crime and violence, improving citizen safety, and increasing a sense of citizenship."[63]

[62] ICHR (2009).
[63] IDB (2012: 6).

A *political economy framework* approach explains policy outcomes building on the incentives and constraints faced by the individual or collective actors that formulate and implement such policies, the arenas in which they operate and their respective interactions.[64] The concept of political economy underscores that public policies are rarely driven by solely economic considerations, e.g., which policy is least costly or has greater probability of success, however defined. Policies are seldom simply a reflex response to an external shock such as an increase in commodity prices or interest rates. On the contrary, the distribution of political power—whether present or prospective (that which politicians anticipate they will have in the future)—shapes policymakers' available strategies and their respective costs and benefits. National governments might find it harder to pass legislation when they do not have a legislative majority, or when they need to broker agreements with subnational actors, such as governors in a federal system. Public policies in democracies result from repeated exchanges in which policymakers negotiate, conduct deals and exchange favors, which imply positive (i.e., larger than zero) transaction costs to reach agreements and enforce compliance.

These interactions constitute a *repeated game* because, although politicians, bureaucrats, civil society organizations, and private interest groups expect collective decisions to be binding, they also recognize that they will have future interactions, perhaps under a different distribution of power. The degree to which each player expects to be in a relevant position in the future affects her *discount factor*—the appeal or shadow of the future—and the likelihood that she will cooperate in supporting long-term policies or try to reap short-term benefits.[65] For instance, in the United States, senators from the Republican Party decided to stall the selection of a Supreme Court judge in hopes that, with a Republican President in office, the nominee would be closer to their preferences than with Democrat Barack Obama. Additionally, these political transactions are *incomplete contracts*: policymakers cannot contemplate all potential ramifications of the policy under discussion, or all the possible circumstances in which the policy might be applied. The original U.S. Constitution, for example, obviously did not foresee the changes that would occur in the country over the subsequent two centuries. This means that they are likely to be the subject of new rounds of debate in the future.

[64] These paragraphs draw primarily on Spiller and Tommasi (2007).
[65] The prospect of repeated interaction leads players to cooperate when they would benefit from shirking in the short-term. See Axelrod (1984).

In short, policymakers' decisions to cooperate or not in a negotiation with other actors will depend on their any *external shock* that affects the policy, the relative *costs* and *benefits*, the *discount factor*, the level (and type) of *information* they possess, and whether the game is repeated or not. For instance, opposition legislators might have an incentive to comply with the incumbent in their proposed security policy if the costs of potentially alienating their constituency is lower than the benefit of appearing as a responsible opposition. They might have greater incentive to comply when the next election is further away; when elections approach, they need to differentiate themselves from the government to effectively compete with it. A variation of this type of calculus can be said to drive the interactions between most actors involved in the citizen security policymaking process.

A **political economy approach to citizen security** is a systemic perspective that highlights the role of institutional and political factors in determining the features of the policymaking process (PMP) and, subsequently, the outcomes of citizen security policies. By systemic, we imply that it considers all the relevant actors involved in the design and implementation of a specific policy or set of policies. It attempts to describe policy outcomes as a general equilibrium, resulting from the various interactions and negotiations between different political and societal actors.

Figure 1 presents a simplified model of this framework. In general terms, the outcomes of interest are the effects of one or various policies (Y), which emerge not only due to certain institutional and political factors (X), but also due to a set of conditions relating to the policymaking process (PMP, Z in our diagram). These occur within certain antecedent conditions (A), such as history and major institutions, such as the type of regime and political system, i.e., whether it is a presidential or parliamentary design.

Figure 1. A Simplified Model of a Political Economy Theoretical Framework



In terms of *citizen security policies*, the main outcomes of interest (Y) could be homicide rates or crime rates in general, given that the government's priority should be to ensure the safety of its population. However, these outcomes could also include other variables relating to the intervention of different state institutions, such as the police or the judiciary, i.e., their efficacy, integrity, adherence to the rule of law, etc. Different components of the citizen security system will present different outcomes of interest for researchers and policymakers, such as recidivism with respect to penitentiary systems; nonetheless, this general framework can apply to better understand how the process of policy design and implementation affect its capacity to deliver its ultimate goals.

In this approach, we highlight the role that institutional and political factors (X) play in determining the characteristics of the policy making process (Z) and subsequent policy outcomes (Y). The features of the PMP result in part from preexisting institutions, i.e., the ground rules that define how the political game is played, following the conception of institutions as "the rules of the [political] game." These constrain individuals' behavior by specifying how inter-temporal transactions are likely to take place and what types of agreements policymakers can make.[66] Inter-temporal agreements imply that actors make decisions whose consequences or payoffs are not immediate, which may bind them and future generations, and affect how future exchanges are likely to occur. Although the diagram above might appear as a singular and unidirectional process, it is iterative and highly complex. Present policy outcomes (Y in T_1) can shape future distributions of political power, for example, by empowering some groups over others, and alter subsequent institutional arrangements (X in T_2). Furthermore, policies can produce positive feedback, making the deviation from a given policy path change harder as time passes.[67]

Within a given institutional framework, **political factors** are also relevant in that they influence who will be involved in the PMP and how important their role will be. For instance, whether a president has a legislative majority, in conjunction with the degree of party fragmentation,[68] nationalization,[69] polarization[70] and internal discipline,[71] among other factors, will determine the likelihood—and the costs—of implementing her preferred policy agenda. Another

[66] North (1990: 3).
[67] Pierson (2000); Thelen (1999).
[68] The number of effective parties in the legislature.
[69] The extent to which parties are present and coordinate their actions across the entire national territory.
[70] The ideological distance between parties in a political system.
[71] The degree to which party members vote as a single, cohesive unit.

example: countries may be either federal, with separate spheres of political power, or unitary, in which power is *de jure* concentrated at the central government. This feature is typically engrained in countries' constitutions. However, policy outcomes might differ according to whether subnational governments are politically aligned with the national (federal) government or not. Unitary systems may in fact be decentralized while federal systems can exhibit high *de facto* concentration of political power. These factors do not only affect exchanges between political actors in the narrow sense—i.e., presidents, legislators, and governors—but also the relationship between elected politicians and the state agencies in charge of implementing citizen security policies, as well as with civil society organizations.

Before turning to specific political and institutional factors that influence policy, we should define which characteristics of the PMP are relevant. Following previous works that developed this framework, we specify six main features of the PMP: stability (or instability), adaptability (rigidity), coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and public regardedness, and describe their relevance for citizen security policies. In Section 5, we will focus on two features, which, following the literature, constitute particularly troubling aspects of policymaking in citizen security in Latin America: **coordination** and **enforcement,** although the other features are crucial as well**.**

Policy instability. Policy instability implies that decisions are reversed or radically modified within a reduced time frame. Not only does this prove costly in terms of the implementation costs of each decision, but it also reduces the credibility of the decision: those affected by it are less likely to comply or invest in it, given their expectation that it will soon be modified. In part, instability is driven by the fact that politicians' short-term electoral goals are often incompatible with the need to implement policies whose effects are likely to materialize in the long term. This is especially the case for more fundamental legislation concerning how the state responds to citizen security, such as the criminal justice code, laws on police organization and functions, or when politicians create new police forces, collapse different existing structures, or place them under different political jurisdictions. In turn, driven by electoral urgency, these policies often exhibit sloppy designs and poor implementation. As we will see, a clear case where instability affects policy outcomes is that of police reform processes and subsequent police performance. Since democratization, many Latin American national and subnational governments have fluctuated between iron-fisted ("mano dura") and pro-human rights ("garantistas") models of

police governance. Ultimately, even police who favor reform are reluctant to invest themselves in it, given their perception that politicians are likely to modify or reverse it as the winds change.

Policy rigidity. This problem is the flip side of policy instability: the inability to modify policies to adapt to shocks and face increasingly complex challenges.[72] In many cases, this can be the result of policies getting stuck at different veto points through the system, whether these are driven by institutional (e.g., Congress, subnational governments, or the courts) or corporate players (e.g., unions or big business groups) or both. In Latin America, this rigidity is patent in the difficulties state bureaucracies, such as the police or the courts, face in keeping up with constantly evolving criminal organizations and markets. For instance, penal process code or policing protocols do not often contemplate procedures to deal with the growing specter of cybercrimes, from seizing evidence to redefining what constitutes a "crime scene." Another example is the impossibility of legislation of contemplating all substance and precursors that might be used for making drugs.

Policy coordination. The implementation of citizen security policies requires the coordinated action by several actors, including other government agencies outside the citizen security sector, e.g., teachers, doctors and social workers. However, personal or political interests often inhibit cooperation with other actors, rendering the policy outcomes suboptimal. Policy coordination might fail in at least three different sets of interactions. The first is between politicians of different tiers of government and/or partisan inclinations. Politicians often allocate resources strategically, targeting them to their allied districts and withholding them from those governed by their rivals. A second coordination problem occurs between politicians as principals and appointed officials and bureaucrats as their agents. This principal-agent problem arises from the informational asymmetry between politicians and bureaucracies, which are prone to moral hazard and regulatory capture. The final coordination issue is among different state bureaucracies in charge of policy implementation. This problem is more pronounced in federal countries, which combine federal and subnational police forces. We will analyze the origins and consequences of these different types of coordination problems in the following section. Coordination problems can also change the way in which organized criminal groups interact with the state, which can also lead to greater levels of violence.

[72] Spiller and Tommasi (2007: 41).

Policy enforcement. Often, the main problem regarding citizen security policies in Latin America is not their faulty design but their low (or uneven) enforcement. While the formal provisions for the policy might be in place, state agents might not have incentives to implement it in the field. Institutional and political factors affect the level and quality of enforcement of citizen security policies, placing the responsible actors in the terrain of informality or illegality. Enforcement problems can manifest as either partial or selective enforcement, on the one hand, and excessive enforcement, on the other. State actors may intentionally choose to enforce the law in some situations and not others, a process referred to as forbearance, such as when full enforcement would imply hurting their constituencies' livelihood.[73] Security forces may also tolerate certain illicit activities, from the sale of contraband goods to that of stolen vehicles or illegal drugs, if they occur within a given territory, established times, or without extreme violence. Police, judges or prosecutors might also decide to strategically pursue some crimes and not others to focus their attention and (generally thin) resources on major criminals. In other circumstances, police and/or judicial agents exchange tolerance, or even protection, of criminal activities for material benefits, typically bribes.

On the other hand, state agencies often carry out actions that violate the rule of law. The most blatant examples are summary executions of alleged criminal actors by members of security forces, while less extreme expressions include different types of human rights abuses and police violence. These types of actions combine two problematic aspects. First, they generally involve state agents abusing their authority to enforce the law, for example, applying immediately what is a last resort measure, i.e., use of lethal force. Second, they are usually directed against specific social sectors, differentiated by markers such as race or residential area. In Brazil, for instance, police killings are overwhelmingly of young black males from poor neighborhoods, although similar patterns are visible in most Latin American countries.

Unequal or selective law enforcement is one of the main problems facing Latin American citizen security policies, particularly when this relates to corrupt practices, as it implies that criminal actors are dictating the course of policies to their benefit. In such cases, there can be little hope that whatever policies are implemented will be beneficial to a considerable sector of society.

[73] Holland (2015).

The *efficiency* of a given public policy relates to the marginal effect of increased expenditures or budget assigned to it.[74] One basic question regarding the efficiency of citizen security policies is how much does the increase in police budgets decrease crime. In this sense, while increased police presence (stemming from larger recruitment and expenditure) or more security cameras tends to decrease criminal activity, these initiatives might be less efficient than returns from investing in education or social prevention.

The final dimension concerns the *public regardedness* of policies, that is, the degree to which they benefit specific societal groups or society in general (Bonvecchi, Johannsen and Scartascini, 2015: 18).[75] As we mentioned with respect to their enforcement, public policies in the realm of citizen security are often designed and implemented with marked social biases. While the state's protection from crime often centers on more privileged social sectors, its repressive initiatives, correspondingly, target more socially vulnerable populations—independently of their actual participation in crime. This problem is undoubtedly present in Latin America, one of the most unequal regions in the world. We should highlight that, while policies might take the entire public into account in their design, they might become more selective during their implementation.

Table 1. Summary of Features of PMP and How They Manifest in Citizen Security

Policy feature	Main problem
Instability	Lack of credibility reduces actors' incentives to invest in policy, e.g., police reform
Rigidity	Incapacity to respond to shocks, such as evolution of organized crime or the development of cyber-crime
Lack of coordination	Politicians' instructions are not implemented in subnational areas or politicians distribute resources according to partisan criteria
Unequal or selective enforcement	Politicians, police and/or judicial agents prosecute or tolerate crimes according to their relative convenience
Efficiency	Whether increases in expenditure in citizen security (e.g., police presence, surveillance cameras) have a significant impact in reducing crime
Public regardedness	Whether the state's protection or repression centers on the whole population or specific sectors

[74] Bonvecchi, Johannsen and Scartascini (2015: 18–22).
[75] Bonvecchi, Johannsen and Scartascini (2015: 22).

In Section 4, we will outline the main actors who participate in the citizen security PMP, their respective incentives, roles and interactions, and the main arenas in which their exchanges take place. In Section 5, we summarize the findings of studies that implicitly utilize this framework when looking at citizen security, focusing on the main areas of interest described above. This will allow us to analyze the applicability of this framework to the study of citizen security policies. We conclude in Section 6 with some guidelines for country teams to implement (and refine) this framework. We suggest different types of research designs as well as some of their potential methodological tradeoffs.

4. Who, What and Where: Actors, Exchanges and Arenas[76]

The policymaking process involves various groups of actors, which we combine into three main categories. The first encompasses **political actors**, including elected politicians and appointed officials, such as cabinet members, the judiciary branch and various state bureaucracies, such as the police, the courts, and the prison system. The second group includes **civil society actors**, such as business groups, social movements, and the media. The third and final group is specific to this policy domain: **criminal actors**—particularly organized criminal groups such as drug trafficking cartels, street and prison gangs, and paramilitary forces or militias—may also influence the policymaking process. This section highlights their main incentives and the potential determinants of their performance.

Table 2. Three Main Categories of Actors in the Theoretical Framework

Category	Actors
Political	Elected politicians State bureaucracies: police, courts, prison system
Civil society	Business groups Social movements Media
Criminal	Drug trafficking organizations Street gangs Prison gangs Paramilitaries and militias

[76] This section draws heavily from IDB reports on different political actors (Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, editors, 2010) and the policymaking process in different Latin American countries (Stein and Tommasi, editors, 2008). Specific sections from these works, as well as those from other authors, are expressly cited.

4.1 Political Actors

Political actors include professional politicians, elected for office in either the executive or the legislative branch, and appointed state officials, e.g., cabinet members and bureaucracies, at both the national and subnational levels. *Elected (or professional) politicians* include presidents, governors, mayors[77] and national, state, or local legislators, whose main objective is to attain or retain elected office. These actors are responsible for the formulation of laws, decrees, resolutions, and other decisions that become policy, as well as for overseeing their implementation by appointed state officials and bureaucrats. In other words, they are predominantly responsible for *policy design*.

The other large category within political actors include state bureaucracies, i.e., *appointed public officials*, primarily in charge of *policy implementation*, although they also shape policies either directly or indirectly, and thus participate in the process of policy design. We focus on the three main organizations that constitute the criminal justice system: the police, the courts, and the prisons. Often these bureaucracies are directly supervised by top-tier appointed officials, i.e., the ministers and/or secretaries who make up the executive cabinet, such as the national security, defense, or justice ministers (or their functional equivalents). Although we will not explore them in detail, within this group there are also other state organizations, e.g., customs, migration, intelligence, etc., which might not appear to be directly related to citizen security policies, yet participate in the broader security system. Customs and migration agencies oversee the entry of goods and persons into the country, and thus are usually the first line of defense against the trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs and other valuables. Intelligence agencies supposedly gather information to assist politicians to prepare their security strategies or collaborate with the police in disrupting organized criminal networks. Finally, independent state agencies, such as the prosecutor's office, usually direct investigations to solve specific crimes or bring down different organized criminal networks. Unlike elected politicians, career bureaucrats are driven by other incentives, such as preserving their position or enhancing their power within their organization. Such individual interest might favor that of their organization or be aligned with those of governing politicians, or not.

[77] Of course, governors and mayors may be appointed by national-level authorities rather than elected.

4.1.1 Professional Politicians

Among the various types of interactions between elected politicians that affect the policymaking process, we can mention three key exchanges: i) between the executive and legislative branches of government, ii) within the executive branch, i.e., between members of the cabinet, and ii) between national and subnational tiers of government. In federal or decentralized countries, the first two interactions apply at both the national and subnational level. At the same time, countries with multiple layers have exchanges among several government tiers, i.e., the federal, state and local governments.

Executive-legislative relations are determined by the formal and informal attributes of each branch. Alternatively, we might describe these exchanges as conditioned by *institutional* and *partisan* factors. The former includes features such as the method of selection of both executive and legislative officials, the executive's reactive and proactive legislative powers, and the legislature's mechanisms to oversee or even remove the executive. Institutional features like the electoral system, which, for example, determines whether candidates are elected by simple plurality or proportional representation, and how many legislators are elected per district (i.e., district magnitude), will shape the distribution of partisan power. While most of these rules are written, sometimes ensconced in the constitution, they are also informal, the product of repeated interactions, shared understandings, and entrenched practices. Institutional factors also affect the internal organization of parties. Formal and informal rules determine how parties select their candidates and make collective decisions, whether in the legislature or outside it, and which actors wield power within the party.[78]

Institutional factors, however, are insufficient to predict policy outcomes. These also depend on the partisan distribution of power, and the internal organization of political parties or other political vehicles by which professional politicians obtain office. The relative degrees of interparty and intraparty fragmentation, as well as the extent of party discipline in the legislature, also determine the transaction costs of political decisions. With more potential veto or pivotal players, governments need to negotiate with more actors to get their initiatives approved.[79] The

[78] See Jones et al. (2002).
[79] Tsebelis (2002); Krehbiel (2010).

tradeoff is that these decisions are harder to modify once they are on the books,[80] which may result in policy rigidity.

A second axis of interactions occurs *within the executive branch*, that is, among members of the executive cabinet. Depending on the level of partisan fragmentation in both executive and legislative elections, presidents or governors may need to incorporate politicians from different parties into their cabinets in order to build a governing coalition and ensure legislative support from these politicians' parties.[81] Alternatively, heads of government might fill up their cabinets with technocrats or individuals without substantial partisan trajectories.[82] This might reduce policy coherence and the government's capacity to coordinate policy implementation.

Finally, a third central exchange in the policymaking process occurs between politicians of different *tiers of government*. National policies are often implemented at the state and local level, giving governors and mayors the motivation to intervene in this discussion. For example, governors may influence national policymaking through their provincial legislators, especially if they control the nomination process.[83] Smaller subnational states can become especially relevant players where there is significant malapportionment in the legislature and where in one chamber all districts have the same number of representatives.[84]

In terms of how they affect the PMP, greater institutional and partisan fragmentation might generate more coordination problems between politicians and with state agencies in charge of enforcement. These factors could also obstruct the public regardedness of policies, as different groups are able to influence the design process to benefit their specific constituencies. Finally, institutional and political factors might decrease politicians' incentives to reach intertemporal agreements and reduce the stability of citizen security policies.

While elected politicians are ultimately responsible for making policy decisions, they are influenced by their interactions with other state agencies, civil society, and, a distinctive feature of this policy realm, criminal actors.

[80] Haggard and McCubbins (2001).
[81] Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2004).
[82] Silva (2009).
[83] See Saiegh (2010).
[84] On federalism and malapportionment, see Samuels and Snyder (2004).

4.1.2 State Bureaucracies

The main state bureaucratic agencies in charge of implementing security policies include different police and security forces; the judicial and penitentiary system; military and defense forces; and intelligence agencies, among others.[85] These state organizations prevent crime in the street, patrol national ports of transit, gather information on organized criminal networks and deploy resources to confront them. Although ultimately politicians design policies and assign budgetary resources, non-elected government bureaucracies are also involved in the formulation of citizen security policies. They provide inputs (e.g., assessment of the problem and their capabilities) and lobby the government for material and non-material resources. Political actors also evaluate the outputs and consequences of these actions and determine whether they should continue without modifications, change their direction or cease completely. Most of these agencies have political actors responsible for overseeing their functioning; some of them have functional equivalents at the subnational level.[86]

State bureaucracies may influence policymaking through different channels. In some cases, their legitimacy and expertise may grant them influence in the definition of policy problems and objectives. Agencies might also tilt the PMP through different formal, informal and illicit mechanisms. Formal ones include providing information in congressional hearings to policymakers, expressing themselves through the media, lobbying through their collective associations or protesting in the streets. Alternatively, informal and illicit mechanisms include the intimidation or extortion of professional politicians, such as when police threaten government officials or shirk their crime control duties, allowing increased criminal activity to undermine the administration. Of course, police forces and other agencies also influence the course of policy through their structural power: the potential repercussions of bureaucratic resistance may dissuade policymakers from certain policy alternatives, which remain off the discussion table.

The role of bureaucracies in the policymaking process—whether in citizen security or other policy domains—depends primarily on their autonomy and technical capacity.[87] We define **bureaucratic autonomy** as the existence of a reasonable margin of independence and protection

[85] This paper acknowledges that the IDB does not support military interventions or intelligence operations in domestic citizen security. This explains why we do not explore their roles in much more detail.
[86] Some agencies are strictly prerogative of the national government, such as the military, customs, and immigration and intelligence services. Subnational state agencies include the police and the judiciary, even though they have different competences in each tier.
[87] Zuvanic, Iacoviello and Gusta (2010).

from the interference or manipulation by governmental or societal actors.[88] Politics shapes bureaucratic autonomy; in other words, bureaucratic design "reflects the interests, strategies and compromises of those who exercise political power."[89] Under greater parity in the distribution of power, political incumbents might find it harder to capture state bureaucracies, for instance, by appointing party activists to fill government posts.[90] The prospect of not being in power in the short term might induce incumbents to tie their hands and build an autonomous bureaucracy to avoid its capture if their competitors take office.

The **technical capacity** of bureaucracies refers to their specific credentials and skills. It depends on the resources they are assigned, their organizational design and their autonomy from political or societal interference. Such meddling is likely to distort the functioning of bureaucracies as rulers appoint, promote or displace managers and agents for political rather than meritocratic reasons. This process can also decrease the incentives for career bureaucrats to excel in their work. In turn, subpar performance by bureaucracies might decrease their social legitimacy, making incumbents less inclined to assign additional resources to improving these agencies.

Nonetheless, autonomy and capacity are separate dimensions. Captured bureaucracies might be highly effective in fulfilling the goals of those in power. For example, police forces might produce relative levels of order while also supplying funds from criminal activities to incumbent politicians, which benefits not just the incumbent but also a large portion of the population. On the other hand, an agency might be autonomous because it is not in the interest of elites to capture it, which might also decrease its resources and capacity. Finally, highly autonomous agencies might have such intricate internal procedures, as part of their insulation strategy, that it takes too long to get things done.

The combination of different levels of autonomy and capacity yields various types of bureaucratic arrangements: administrative, meritocratic, patronage and parallel bureaucracies.[91] Future research should apply (or refine) this typology and theorize on the relationship between these types and the production of various social outcomes, including citizen security. Bureaucratic autonomy and capacity have major implications for *policy coordination* and *enforcement*, as well as for *policy stability* and *flexibility*. We should expect administrative and meritocratic

[88] On bureaucratic autonomy, see Weber (1978); Evans (1995) and Carpenter (2001).
[89] Moe (1989: 267).
[90] See Geddes (1994) and Grzymala-Busse (2007).
[91] Zuvanic, Iacoviello and Gusta (2010: 164-171).

bureaucracies to exhibit better enforcement, at least where formal policies are concerned.[92] These bureaucracies are also likely to favor policy stability, since policymakers might have smaller incentives to change statutes governing a bureaucracy when it works reasonably well, and policy implementation is less likely to vary over time. However, autonomy might come at the price of high policy rigidity, when politicians are unable to change the functions of a given organization to meet complex citizen security challenges.

4.1.3 The Courts

Within state bureaucracies, the *courts* and *the judiciary system* merit a special discussion. The judicial branch is one of the three main parts in the classic division of republican governments, and, as such, has the capacity to check the other two branches and influence policy design. For example, presidents and legislators might strategically draft bills to meet the ideal point of the median justice in the Supreme Court, assuming that, should the law be subjected to judicial review, this would ensure a favorable ruling by the Court.[93] In this sense, the courts can act as a veto player and oversee the formulation of policies. Finally, the courts also make policy because, regardless of whether their decisions apply generally or for a specific case, they restrain legislators' future decisions.[94]

At the same time, the courts offer varying possibilities of judicial review of existing legislation, allowing underrepresented sectors to redress violations on behalf of the state.[95] This depends on the judicial activism of the courts, the ease of access of these sectors to the judiciary and the formal and informal institutions that govern the relationship between the judiciary and other state agencies, such as the police. These decisions can change the way in which policies are enforced, as well as the extent to which they consider the interests of the public at large rather than privileged minorities.

This analysis focuses on the work of lower-level courts, which conduct or oversee criminal investigations and issue the respective sentence to the accused individual(s).[96] We should not

[92] Patronage or parallel bureaucracies might be efficient in enforcing *informal* or *illicit* policy mandates, emanating from either political actors or other patrons, e.g., criminal actors.
[93] Executives also appoint Supreme Court justices to "move the median" justice, to shift deliberations in their favor. See Krehbiel (2007).
[94] See Black and Owens (2009).
[95] Magaldi de Sousa (2010: 88).
[96] In inquisitorial judicial systems, judges are in charge of conducting criminal investigations themselves, with the aid of the respective police force. In accusatorial systems, prosecutors conduct the investigation while the judge authorizes

restrict the judiciary system to the person of the judge. Whether at the national or the subnational level, the judiciary system includes other relevant actors, such as prosecutors, public defenders, and judicial employees. At this stage, the judiciary does resemble other bureaucracies in that its members presumably enjoy tenure security accruing from their position; develop technical expertise and competence; follow a predictable career path; build their social reputation on their expertise and legitimacy; and deliver a public good (justice) to citizens. Unlike professional politicians, citizens cannot hold members of the judiciary accountable for their performance, at least not via electoral processes in most jurisdictions. Rather, political incumbents appoint and dismiss members of the judiciary, with different degrees of participation by other social actors, depending on the distribution of political power and the specifications of existing institutional arrangements, e.g., what is the procedure for removing a judge. The extent to which the selection, promotion and dismissal processes of judges and prosecutors allow for political influence—as opposed to meritocratic criteria—might affect judicial independence by making these officials more responsive to specific political patrons. In turn, this might alter the credibility of policies—as they lack an impartial arbiter—and decrease policy stability, as policymakers place little value in them and are quick to modify them. Finally, as with police and security forces, judges can be bound not only to political incumbents but also to powerful criminal actors—when different individuals occupy these categories.

4.2 Civil Society: Business, Social Movements and Media

A political economy approach also includes non-state actors from **civil society**. While some are pertinent to the study of economic or social policies, such as labor unions or doctors' associations, others play a relevant role in shaping citizen security policies as well. Among them, we include private business groups, social movements, and the media.[97] As with state bureaucracies, these groups can affect the course of policies through their structural power or via specific actions like lobbying, judicial activism or street protests.

In terms of incentives, unlike state agencies, business actors' main objective is to optimize their economic performance, while social movements' main interest lies in achieving specific

different procedures and oversees that the process abides with civil rights guarantees of the defendant. In the latter case, different judges from those who participated in the investigation supervise the trial and impose the sentence.

[97] Labor unions, a typical actor in political economy analyses, are not included in this framework given that their role in formulating citizen security policies is indirect and/or negligible. The role of specific unions of criminal justice actors, such as the police or prison guards, is considered in the analysis of these state agencies.

policy goals. Finally, media groups, on the one hand, share a profit motive with other business actors, while, on the other hand, individual reporters or outlets might be driven by the intention of shaping policy by exposing politicians and holding them accountable.

The concept of **business** encompasses interest groups from the private sector, which may possess different levels of organization.[98] Business actors may be affected directly or indirectly by citizen insecurity. On the one hand, insecurity can force businesses to close their doors or move to calmer jurisdictions. In some cases, state actors reinforce this situation, as when police officers demand contributions from business owners in exchange for protection from crime. On the other hand, high levels of insecurity have macroeconomic consequences, which impact businesses as well as society: opportunity cost in expenditures, reduced investments, increased health-related costs, absence from work and lost life years. In Latin America, the direct annual cost of crime is 3 percent of GDP, as much as the region spends on infrastructure and twice the cost of crime in developed countries.[99]

However, business is not only affected by citizen security outcomes; it can also shape security policies. This is particularly the case of the private security industry, which offers various goods and services geared toward the situational prevention of crime, either in public or private spaces, such as guards, cameras, X-ray monitoring, GPS tracking, etc. Private security guards outnumber police and law enforcement agents,[100] and they frequently have fewer regulatory constraints on their operations. Additionally, private business actors might also be providers for state agencies and supply them with equipment and infrastructure. In short, business actors have a strong incentive to tilt citizen security policies to favor their economic interests.

Business can lobby the state through their collective associations or engage in individual dialogues with policymakers. They can have formal, transparent interactions with politicians or seek to influence policy through informal, obscure mechanisms. Depending on their organization and the avenues through which they advise, lobby or pressure politicians, business interests might attempt different strategies to achieve their objectives. This might also influence the policy

[98] On the types of interactions between business and the state in Latin America, see Schneider (2004, 2010).
[99] Jaitman, editor (2017); see summary of report in http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2017-02-03/how-much-does-crime-cost-latin-america-and-Caribbean,11714.html?WT.mc_id=NewsEmail_Short_11714&wtSrc=Email&wtType=Short&wtArticleID=11714
[100] Private guards outnumber public officers by 2-1 in the region and as much as 5-1 in some countries. Many private security agents are indeed police officers working part-time or former officers. News OK, "Private firms filling Latin America's security gap", November 26, 2014. http://newsok.com/private-firms-filling-latin-americas-security-gap/article/feed/765333

outcome they obtain. When policies result from a personal, informal negotiation between business and politicians, outcomes might be particularistic and unstable, depending on friendly relations with the politicians in power for enforcement, whereas when business associations spearhead negotiations, policies might be more encompassing and stable.

Social movements are non-state, organized collective actors that seek to influence the policymaking process through various strategies usually involving contentious actions, which adversely affect the interests of those against whom the claim is made.[101] Typical examples include stable organizations like human rights groups and other national or transnational advocacy networks, as well as sporadic collective mobilizations. This category also comprises groups that engage in violent collective action on behalf of citizens, such as neighborhood watch groups, which can easily become an organized criminal actor.

Following the social movement literature, we can divide the factors that influence the level of contestation, and its consequences, into state (supply) and civil society-related (demand) features. On the supply side, mobilization may depend on whether individuals perceive that the state fails in preventing violence, or is even complicit with criminal actors. In this sense, communities that suffer greater levels of violence and state inaction might be more inclined to accept or promote self-defense groups to combat organized criminal actors. Of course, the alternative is that criminal actors' intimidation of citizens dissuades participation. Another factor is whether citizens can convey their proposals through existing institutionalized channels, such as the legislature or political parties. Relatedly, in the case of social movements, policy outcomes might depend on the overall openness of the political system and the ease to access different instances of the policymaking process, for example, through the legislature or the courts.

On the demand side, the social movement literature typically emphasizes the grievances of these organizations and the resources available to them. A community's *grievances* may stem from levels of violent crime, or be triggered by specific homicides, cases of police corruption or instances of abuse of force, among other factors. Far from disengaging individuals from politics, victimization can increase political participation;[102] citizens might be mobilized by rage as opposed to being paralyzed by fear.[103] The set of *resources* includes not only organizations' material assets

[101] McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2009).
[102] Bateson (2012).
[103] Kessler (2009).

but also their experience in navigating the political terrain and their connections with political insiders. Other relevant resources might be the capacity to coordinate demands with other social movements and the protest repertoire—the different ways in which demands are formulated—that is implemented.

Finally, the **media** is another civil society actor that can shape citizen security policies. The news media, whether audiovisual or graphic, traditional or non-conventional, can influence the policymaking process by stressing insecurity as a public concern, regardless of the actual levels of crime. These reports may heighten civilian fear, discontent or outrage, and consequently pressure politicians to formulate and implement quick responses to perceived crime waves. In this sense, the media not only reflects but also transforms (and often distorts) social reality.

Media groups also have an economic interest in reporting crime—especially of a violent nature. The proverbial dictum "if it bleeds, it leads" is often exacerbated by the current media scenario, in which individuals can get news from many more sources, often free of charge, which hurts the bottom lines of TV and newspaper outlets. Media companies are interest groups that, like the private sector, apply diverse political strategies to achieve their objectives. For instance, when in confrontation with governments over different issues, media groups might pressure the government by highlighting insecurity to fuel social discontent with incumbents. Whether they carry out this strategy (and the extent to which it is successful) may depend on the concentration of media markets and the existing relationship between the national government and the main media groups.

At the same time, journalistic investigations are vital in unmasking state corruption or complicity with organized crime. To the extent that media vigilance, driven by political interests or not, is a real threat to governing politicians and state officials, these might tailor and implement policies with greater attention to the rule of law, i.e., with fairer enforcement and greater concern for the public.

4.3 Criminal Actors

Unlike other policy domains, a political economy of citizen security must also incorporate **criminal actors**, who can shape political decisions through their structural power, organizational features or via bribes or violent intimidation. Organized criminal actors include drug cartels, street or prison gangs, or criminal factions, as well as paramilitary groups and militias. In Latin America,

as well as in other regions, there is considerable variation in the extent to which criminal actors can influence the policymaking process and the degree to which "formal" state and non-state actors overlap with organized crime.

Some studies presume organized criminal actors to behave as rational economic actors, seeking to maximize their profits. Authors like Schelling (1971) and Gambetta (1996) have stressed that the main business of organized crime is not necessarily supplying illegal goods and services but rather providing private protection for individuals and groups who do, although they still consider these actors to have primarily economic interests. Varese (2011), among others, has also argued that organized criminal groups behave similarly to firms: they develop market reputations, branding, internal divisions of labor and domestic and international expansion strategies. Nonetheless, organized criminal groups might also have political objectives, such as controlling territory or populations, and social functions, since they supply a collective identity to their members and are built on networks of trust.

Various *economic factors* shape the strategies and behavior of organized criminal groups. Organized crime develops around the legal prohibition of a type of good or service that is in high demand, whether it be drugs, alcohol, prostitution, physical protection or contract enforcement. With transnational organized crime (TOC), these factors do not just apply in a single country but have effects throughout the globe. The wholesale and retail price of drugs in consumption countries, especially the United States and Europe, affects the profitability margins of drug cartels in developing nations, and their capacity to avoid state detection in their countries of origin, including via the distribution of bribes to state officials. At the same time, the price differential of drugs sold in the United States or Europe as opposed to Latin America relates to the greater risk of punishment due to the greater efficiency and integrity of law enforcement institutions in developed countries. Organized crime generally operates transnationally: illicit goods and services—e.g., drugs, weapons, humans, organs, wildlife, art, minerals, etc.—typically cross several national borders between their point of origin and destination. Subsequently, responses to organized crime require the collaboration between the agencies of several national governments. Unsurprisingly, the difficulties in coordination between different national governments and the rigidity of international criminal legislation favors the development of organized criminal groups.

However, domestic *political factors* also affect the evolution of organized crime. Organized criminal groups (OCGs) are more likely to emerge in circumstances of significant

political change, including revolution or regime collapse. Skaperdas (2001: 174) also posits that organized crime is prevalent in spaces where states are absent or weak, in territories that are geographically and socially distant from the centers of political decision-making. This argument, however, does not account for the various types of linkages between states and organized criminal actors, or for the emergence of OCGs in the main metropolitan areas of Brazil or Colombia, just to name a few. Organized crime might prosper not where states are weak, but where state enforcement is selective or corrupt. While organized crime is in the business of providing protection for the provision of illicit goods and services, it typically requires protection from certain state actors to subsist. These linkages between state and criminal actors have implications for the type of policies implemented by governments against organized crime and resulting citizen security outcomes such as criminal violence.

An expanding scholarship has focused on how relations between the state and criminal actors affect levels of violence. Most of these studies center on the drug insurgency in Mexico.[104] Several authors agree that the high political uncertainty generated by the demise of the PRI hegemony and the collapse of informal protection arrangements between the PRI and drug cartels, increased criminal violence. Adopting a broader comparative perspective, Arias (2016) argues that the concentration of criminal actors and their relationship with the state determines levels of criminal violence in urban neighborhoods, among other outcomes.

Drug trafficking organizations involved in the production, transshipment and wholesale distribution of narcotics are prevalent primarily in Mexico and Colombia, although in a more fragmented status than in previous decides. A more common organized criminal actor is *street gangs*, present throughout the entire region, but particularly strong in the Central American Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras). Gangs vary in their degree of organization, cohesiveness and involvement in criminal rackets, but they are normally more inclined to use violence to resolve market disputes and interpersonal conflicts. Many gangs, not just in Central America but also in Brazil, continue to run their criminal enterprises from behind prison bars.

[104] Other authors focus on earlier periods. For instance, Dube, Dube and García Ponce (2013) argue that the increase in gun supply from the United States after the lift of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (FAWB) in 2004 fueled violence in municipalities close to the U.S.-Mexico border. Trejo and Ley (2017) propose that state-level turnover has disrupted the cartels' informal networks of protection and increased inter-cartel violence since the early 1990s.

Other major organized criminal actors in Latin America are *paramilitary groups* and *urban militias*. Both often start as vigilante squads, in the paramilitary's case, purporting to defend citizens from leftist guerrillas and drug cartels. In Colombia, paramilitary groups, which called themselves "self-defense forces," presumably demobilized after 2002, but in fact many of them set up new Bandas Criminales (Criminal bands, BACRIMs), and now run most of the drug trade in Colombia. Similar vigilante groups have risen in Mexico, especially in the state of Michoacán, initially claiming to protect citizens against traffickers given the state's inaction or complicity.

Militias are predominantly urban and usually composed of former and off-duty police officers. While also originating as community watch groups battling drug gangs, over time they have developed their own rackets. For example, militias are now the predominant actor in control of favelas (slums) in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro and its urban periphery, levying protection taxes and charging citizens for access to informal gas, water, electricity, TV and Internet services. Militias are an increasingly relevant political actor, controlling clientelistic networks and running their own candidates in state and local elections. Both paramilitaries and militias show that organized criminal actors have not only economic but also political interests. Therefore, a political economy analysis should consider them not just as the object of citizen security policies but should also address how they can influence the policymaking process.

In this sense, criminal actors might seek to coopt state officials (politicians, police forces, judges, etc.) by distributing bribes, or compel them to adopt policies in their favor through threats, intimidation, or actual attacks, which some authors refer to as "violent lobbying" or "violent corruption."[105] Currently, in reminiscence of Pablo Escobar's war against the Colombian state in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mexican, Central American and Brazilian groups are targeting (and killing) politicians—especially mayors—at an alarming rate.

Criminal actors might also be entangled with the state in supplying campaign finances or clientelistic networks for politicians, especially at the local level. As in the case of militias, members of these groups might even become "formal" political actors. More generally, criminal governance is not entirely separate from, or parallel to, that of the state. The greater the territorial control and economic power of criminal actors, the more likely these domains will intersect, and the greater impact criminal actors will have on the citizen security PMP.

[105] Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006); Lessing (2015).

4.4 Arenas

We define *arenas* as the sites where the policymaking process takes place, i.e., where political decisions are made. These arenas can be formal—e.g., cabinets and legislature—or informal—the street or deals made behind-the-scenes—and are thus more or less transparent to the public. Citizen security policies take shape in the same arenas as many other types of policies. Presidents and their cabinets presumably elaborate public safety and criminal justice policies in their respective government departments or in cabinet meetings. Legislators discuss and either approve or obstruct these initiatives in congressional committees or on the floor. The same could be said for governors or mayors and state or local legislatures. Similarly, other actors can pressure politicians to enact a specific policy through formal mechanisms such as congressional hearings and judicial review, informal mechanisms such as lobbying and street protests, or even illegal mechanisms, such as the intimidation of officials.

Whereas policy design is more likely to occur in formal arenas, implementation takes place in other venues, also formal and informal. Recall that, given the inter-temporal nature of the policymaking process, appointed state officials and bureaucratic agencies do not only implement, but also *make* policies. How policies are enforced not only affects its outcome, but also influences the posterior policymaking process. Police officers implement citizen security policies mainly in the street, where there is often a great distance from the formal imperatives of their function and the reality of dealing with crime, as well as in police stations, where, among other activities, they decide whether and how to classify crimes. Judges, prosecutors and public defenders implement criminal justice policy decisions when imposing sentences in their courtrooms, as well as when they advance or delay investigations in the privacy of their offices. Penitentiary system operatives' work occurs predominantly outside of the public eye, given that their main clients are incarcerated individuals, whose voice carries little weight with public opinion.

Finally, although they do not implement policy decisions, criminal actors' behavior affects the entire policymaking process, and takes place predominantly, if not exclusively, in informal or illicit arenas, although they can also infiltrate formal spheres of policymaking, such as legislatures or cabinets.

5. How Does Politics Shape Citizen Security Outcomes?

This section links the incentives and interactions of the actors analyzed above to citizen security policy outcomes. The overarching question is how institutions and politics matter for citizen security. We focus on two main types of processes and outcomes. The first are "intermediate" outcomes such as the reform of criminal justice institutions or the level of penetration of the state by criminal actors. These clearly exhibit differences between policymaking processes, particularly in terms of whether and how policies are enforced, what kind of coordination they exhibit and whether they consider a large portion of the public, as opposed to a social minority, or even criminals. Second, in terms of how political and institutional factors shape citizen security policy outcomes (Y), we will concentrate on levels of criminal violence, especially homicide rates. While we will primarily utilize references from political science and economics, we should stress that there is not a unified scholarly research on the political economy of citizen security as such. Although these texts share similar assumptions on the strategic nature of individual actors, they vary in their conceptions of organized crime and the role of the state.

This section outlines how institutional and political factors shape citizen security policies in Latin America. It is structured according to the main actors involved in the policymaking process described in the prior section: political actors, civil society and criminal actors, although these may overlap in each section. We also highlight some of the main research questions unaddressed by this literature, which country studies might tackle in the future.

There are a few caveats that should be mentioned. The first is that most of the research is centered on a few Latin American countries, mainly Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, which are the ones most profoundly analyzed by the literature. The second caveat is that most of the research focuses on a specific citizen security outcome—homicides as an indicator of criminal violence. This is not presumed to be the only or best indicator of citizen security, but there are valid reasons for its selection. Homicides are the prototypical citizen security indicator not only because of their importance but also because homicide data are more reliable and less subject to underreporting than other types of crime. A further caveat is that most of the studies referenced below tend to focus on homicides resulting from the actions of organized criminal actors, while neglecting homicides stemming from domestic or interpersonal violence. This does not imply that these forms of violence are less common or less important for Latin American countries to resolve. The final caveat is that many of the ensuing explanations do not necessarily establish a direct

causal relationship between an institutional or political feature and an outcome of citizen security. Instead, many authors present a complex process, with various causal mechanisms illustrating the links between the independent and dependent variables.

5.1 Political Actors

5.1.1 Professional Politicians

A central finding by the literature on the politics of criminal violence is its *positive relation with political competition,* especially in contexts of regime transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. In this sense, Mexico is the paradigmatic case study, given the temporal coincidence between the end of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional's (PRI) hegemony (1930-2000) and the surge in criminal violence, especially in relation to drug trafficking.

These studies pose various explanations of the growth in violence in Mexico. Some studies highlight that partisan alignment determines the allocation of security resources and thus influences the extent to which violence is likely to increase. Another interpretation is that political competition implies the "decentralization of political authority" and "destabilizes informal networks of protection" granted by state actors to organized criminal groups, which results in increased violence. Different researchers locate the key arena of collapse of protection networks at the national, state or municipal level.[106] A take-away from analyses of the Mexican case is that political decentralization often affected the coordination between actors, and preceded the fragmentation of the criminal market, and the surge in violence.[107]

A political economy approach has yet to specify why government officials decide to adopt certain types of policies, including crackdowns and punitive policies, something that is not exclusively predicted by levels of violence. For instance, conservative or right-leaning governments can implement iron-fisted security policies to tap a valence issue and bridge internal differences on other policy arenas, such as economic policies.[108] This strategy, which typically finds high degrees of support among citizens, might apply in both contexts of predominantly organized or amateur criminal actors. This decision could also relate to the networks involved in

[106] Rios (2015); Osorio (2015); Trejo and Ley (2016 and 2017); Dell (2015).
[107] Government policies are also relevant: a study finds that the "kingpin strategy"—capturing or killing heads of drug trafficking organizations—by President Calderón's administration increased drug-related and overall violence. This study emphasizes that the effect was greater in municipalities that served as transportation networks or featured more than one drug cartel.
[108] Holland (2013).

the policy design and implementation process, something that could be explored by blending this political economy framework with social network analysis (SNA).[109]

There are still various avenues to explore how politics and institutions influence the evolution of criminal violence and the implementation of citizen security. Research has yet to exploit the variation in institutional arrangements in federal as opposed to unitary contexts, the impact of decentralization, and the differences among parties and party systems in Latin America. Some preliminary findings and alternative hypothesis are at hand. For example, greater competition within or between clientelistic parties could increase politicians' need to obtain finance from illicit activities and generate more violence as the criminal market becomes more unstable.[110] The variation between programmatic and clientelistic party systems in Latin America, not just across but within countries, also presents an interesting research avenue to trace the effects of party system institutionalization and greater transparency in campaign finance on the power of organized crime.

Additionally, political decentralization can impact politicians' linkages to organized crime in countervailing ways. On the one hand, decentralization can make incumbents more accountable to their constituencies, and limit their impulse to approach criminal actors. On the other hand, the creation of partially autonomous administrative units, often without sufficient material resources or institutional prerogatives, might facilitate criminals' penetration of politics, the police or the judiciary.[111]

How does the legislature fit into these studies? There is a presumption that executives—presidents and governors—are the predominant, if not exclusive, policymakers in Latin America. While all countries in the region vary in their legislatures' capacity to formulate or oversee policies, in most Latin American countries, the Executive branch initiates legislation while Congress typically plays a reactive role. Future studies might examine whether and how legislative oversight might influence the Executive's design and implementation of security policies. Furthermore, given that the legislature is often a relevant arena for subnational actors to express their interests, one might ask how legislative coalitions influence the allocation of security resources across subnational units? Two final questions related to this political actor are: how does the

[109] See Bonvecchi, Johannsen and Scartascini (2015) for an application to the analysis of social policies.
[110] Föhrig (2015).
[111] On the relationship between political decentralization and the advance of organized crime, see Perdomo and Uribe Burcher (2016).

policymaking process vary when a sizable proportion of legislators are suspected (or known) to have links with organized crime[112] and, going back one step, how does the electoral or party system influence organized criminal actors' capacity to coopt, bribe or pressure politicians?

5.1.2 State Bureaucratic Agencies

The autonomy and technical capacity of state bureaucracies is both a product and a determinant of the policymaking process in citizen security. Features of bureaucracies such as how they recruit, train, promote, and supervise their members condition the quality of **enforcement** in the citizen security sector. At the same time, these bureaucratic processes result from political decisions, which depend on the distribution of power among politicians and public officials. Politics can also affect two other features of the PMP: **instability** and **rigidity**, which are particularly manifest with respect to attempts to reform institutions of the citizen security system.

A paradigmatic case are police forces. Several countries and subnational states have attempted to reform their police forces to make them responsive to citizens, respectful of human rights and accountable to the rule of law.[113] These reforms entailed creating new security forces; establishing instances of civilian control over the police; separating the police from the military; altering police recruitment, training, promotion and monitoring to enhance the role of political officials, in detriment of police prerogatives.[114] Whether these reform attempts succeeded or not often depended on political dynamics such as the possibility of turnover between governments of different parties,[115] clashes between different levels of government,[116] electoral competition,[117] as well as institutional and societal obstacles,[118] which makes politicians more likely to embrace popular claims for punitive solutions to purported crime waves. In general, political turnover and politicians' short-term time horizons has resulted in policy instability—fluctuation between opposing approaches to policing by administrations—and rigidity in how police perform their functions, especially crime prevention, and manage their internal affairs, e.g., how they recruit and train personnel.

[112] A notorious example is the case of several national deputies linked to paramilitary groups in Colombia.
[113] Bayley (2005); Manning (2005).
[114] Frühling (2003:15-16). On the content of Latin American reforms see also Ungar (2011: 5).
[115] Davis (2006).
[116] Eaton (2008).
[117] Hinton (2006).
[118] Ungar (2011).

Unfortunately, there have been few successful experiences of encompassing police reform in Latin America. The few examples combine several factors that are hard to obtain and systematically analyze, such as commitment from politicians and police commanders[119] or societal mobilization.[120] We should emphasize that comprehensive reform is not the same as the implementation of different crime prevention strategies, such as community policing, hot spot policing or proximity policing, where the record of Latin American governments is more varied. While evaluations and evidence-based policy analyses have concentrated on specific interventions, they are less suitable for evaluating longer processes that affect various organizational aspects, and as such, undergo convoluted, sometimes turbulent, implementation.

Following various interactions and negotiations with political actors, police forces with different levels of autonomy and/or capacity vary in how they enforce citizen security policies. Achieving an autonomy that promotes positive policy outcomes—e.g., efficiency, fairness, and celerity—requires politicians to achieve a complicated balance between controlling police behavior and not exploiting the police for political purposes. Police forces are susceptible to capture by three different collective actors: governments, criminal actors, and powerful social sectors. From one perspective, police autonomy from any of these three groups is desirable. When subdued to organized criminal groups, police will apply the law only to the benefit of their principals, engage in human rights violations and reinforce violence as it confronts rival criminal groups. This systematic corruption severely undermines citizen trust in the institution.

Politicization of the police, i.e., when government actors use police forces for their own benefit, is also dangerous. Governments facing few constraints, i.e., those with high concentration of power because of a weak or fragmented opposition, may utilize police forces to appropriate rents from crime, repress social uprisings or monitor political opponents.[121] Few studies, to our knowledge, assess the impact of increased capacity on police propensity to engage in corruption or on the overall levels of crime. From another perspective, however, police autonomy from political control might result in increased propensity to use lethal force, violate human rights, and engage in corruption, which may ultimately increase criminal violence.

[119] Arias and Ungar (2009).
[120] Fuentes (2005); González (forthcoming).
[121] See Wilkinson (2004) and Taylor (2011).

5.1.3 Judiciary

As mentioned above, the judiciary's role can be analyzed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it is a component of the system of checks and balances in a republican system of government. In this sense, scholars find that alternation in and de-concentration of political power constitutes an obstacle against corruption and impunity, whether considering the judiciary or other accountability institutions.[122] The independence of the judiciary has important implications for citizen security in that it limits organized criminal groups' capacity to collude with state officials or carry out violent actions with impunity. At the same, an independent judiciary is more likely to ensure that prosecution of criminal activities follows due process and respects the rule of law.

On the other hand, judges and prosecutors are key members of the criminal justice system, and thus affect how citizen security policies are enforced. In this sense, few studies have explored how lower-level judicial operatives' incentives lead them to resort to different sentencing guidelines or resolutions. Flom and Post (2016), for example, find that judges' incentive to avoid blame for salient crimes, which might derive in societal and political backlash against them and jeopardize their career advancement, leads them to adopt punitive criteria in their resolutions, especially regarding pretrial detention.

As with the police, judicial operatives' autonomy from politicians or criminal actors is not simply a product of their capacity but of the institutional design affecting judges' career incentives and the degree to which these guidelines are enforced. Perhaps even more than the police, the judiciary remains a political "black box," in part due to the corporate coherence (and silence) among its members. In this sense, future studies should illuminate whether certain organizational features of the judiciary make it more liable to capture by either politicians or organized criminal actors, as well as what explains the varying linkages (including different forms of collusion) between politicians, police forces and the judiciary.

5.1.4 Penitentiary System

We have already commented on the multiple problems facing most Latin American prisons. In this context, in addition to focusing on penitentiary systems' capacity to decrease recidivism, there are other processes and outcomes that affect the capacity of penitentiary institutions to execute their intended goals. There is a vast literature on the political economy of mass incarceration in the

[122] Melo, Pereira and Figuereido (2009); Leiras, Giraudy and Tuñón (2014).

United States, which displays the highest incarceration rates in the world. Several scholars highlight the retrenchment of the US welfare state, and the repressive targeting by the state of individuals from poor backgrounds and racial minorities.[123] Others emphasize factors such as shifts in public opinion,[124] political opportunism to exploit the "law and order" issue,[125] the local implementation of the War on Drugs, and the economic prowess of the burgeoning prison-industrial complex and prison guard unions.[126] While most scholars point to changes since the 1960s to explain mass incarceration, others focus on the long-term historical development of institutional capacity to implement concrete initiatives in response to calls for get-tough policies.[127]

Despite important increases in population in most Latin American countries, there are few analyses explaining this trend or its cross-national and subnational variation. There is also, to our knowledge, little comparative analysis of the inner-workings of various prison systems. While several prison inmates' surveys reveal that, unsurprisingly, the lowest-ranking criminals are the ones doing time, we have little understanding of what triggers the state's repressive response. There is also a dearth of research on how citizen attitudes toward crime might shape politicians' policy preferences and lead them to adopt punitive policies—or whether politicians are the ones driving public opinion. Once again, the role of the media in fueling get-tough policies is another avenue to be explored.

Important differences between the United States and most Latin American countries nuance or challenge the plausibility of some alternative explanations for increased incarceration in the region. For one, the role of prison guard unions or even private industries in promoting imprisonment is likely much less prominent in Latin America. Additionally, most Latin American countries prohibit the death penalty, a lingering feature of U.S. penal policy, although the high number of homicides resulting from police lethal interventions, a large proportion of which are unjustified, act as an informal substitute for this type of sentence.

A final issue is the extent to which public policies foster the development of criminal governance within Latin American prisons. There are some preliminary analyses of the growth of

[123] Western (2006); Alexander (2012).
[124] Garland (2001); Enns (2014).
[125] Beckett (2001); Simon (2007).
[126] Page (2011).
[127] Gottschalk (2006).

Sao Paulo's PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital)[128] and various prison gangs in Central America,[129] but these rarely include politicians and their decisions in their analytical framework. A related question is what drives state officials to not just tolerate this form of governance, but also to rely on incarcerated organized groups to control crime inside and outside the prison, a strategy that governments in Sao Paulo and El Salvador implemented to reduce confrontation with the gangs and homicide rates.

5.2 Civil Society

Mass mobilizations and social movements can pressure policymakers to implement certain policies. Mass protests may signal politicians that they are unlikely to succeed electorally if they maintain the status quo. Nonetheless, there is still a shortage of analyses on when such demonstrations are most likely to occur and how much they affect policymakers' decisions. An additional question is whether certain protest repertoires, actions by specific groups or social sectors or by a given number of claimants are more likely to be successful. Among the many works in this literature, we discuss one that focuses on human rights organizations and another that examines sporadic mobilizations.

In a comparative study of human rights organizations in Argentina and Chile during the 1990s, Fuentes (2005) shows that *advocacy networks* "can play a central role in getting an issue noticed (agenda setting) and influencing its passage," although this influence is ephemeral, given the transitory discussion of the issue. In this sense, human rights groups and other social movements need to seize on specific events that widen the "political opportunity structure" to shift the locus of discussion with respect to citizen security policies.

Meanwhile, in her forthcoming book, Yanilda González shows how *mobilized scandals* may trigger police reform in Latin America. According to her study, societal views on citizen security and, particularly, the police, are generally fragmented and even polarized: some groups push for restricting police interventions, while others favor granting more prerogatives to the police and justify human rights abuses. Scandals, such as cases of police killings of specific victims (e.g., children, "respectable" middle-class citizens or journalists), lead societal preferences to converge, making politicians promote reformist initiatives. However, societal mobilizations may

[128] Denyer-Willis (2009); Dias and Salla (2013).
[129] Rodgers and Muggah (2009); Cruz (2010b).

also bring about conservative policy shifts and are generally not sufficient to maintain reforms that are implemented.

Given that civil society groups seek to promote policies that benefit not just their members but also larger constituencies and place new items on the agenda, social movements and advocacy networks can affect the policymaking process by decreasing policy rigidity and, in some cases, increasing the "public regardedness" of security policies. However, in some cases the opposite can occur, as social movements can gear policies to favor narrow interests, such as those of a specific social or ethnic group.

Business can also affect policymaking by sponsoring or vetoing certain policy alternatives, according to their levels of organization and sectoral interests. For example, Moncada (2013) argues that business can either reinforce the status quo of reactive security responses or embrace reformist initiatives, which affect urban violence in different ways. According to his study, the variation in business security preferences depends on the type of sector: goods-producing sectors are more sympathetic to reactive policies given their vulnerability to targeted physical violence by criminal actors. In contrast, service-oriented sectors favor reformist policy initiatives that promote a different perception of their city and attract customers or tourists.

This study notwithstanding, this terrain is still vastly unexplored, which is surprising given the high levels of criminality, its correlated economic costs, extreme concentration of wealth, and insufficiently regulated channels of business influence that characterize most Latin American countries.[130] It would seem that business actors, either individual or collective, have the motivation and the means to influence the design of citizen security policies. Nonetheless, we have yet to explore systematically how they exercise such influence and with what results.

One business sector that is highly likely to shape the course of citizen security policies is the *media*. While there is a consensus that reports on alleged crime waves can create moral panics and compel policymakers to adopt hasty and unsubstantiated "solutions" to crime, particularly punitive policies that disfavor socially underprivileged groups,[131] there is still scant research on the extent and mechanisms of the media's influence on policy outcomes, especially in Latin America. For example, Dammert and Malone (2006) find that trust in the press—as a proxy of media

[130] While crime is a burden to most economic investment, this is certainly not the case for the private security sector, which has grown immensely in Latin America in the last three decades.
[131] Cohen (2002); Garland (2001).

exposure—is positive correlated with an individual's fear of crime. More recent research connects criminal violence, media reporting and electoral accountability. Using municipal-level crime data and surveys in Mexico, John Marshall (2016) finds that homicides before elections increase the salience of public security and reduce confidence in mayors, and that homicide shocks decrease the incumbent party's vote share significantly.[132] This assessment does not downplay the media's positive role: journalistic investigations can expose corruption rackets that bring down crooked police commanders and, in some cases, politicians.

So far, the few studies on the role of media reporting on security policing have focused on traditional media sources (especially newspapers) while the analysis of social media and other sources remains scant. Among the avenues to explore are also the political utilization of crime by powerful media groups during the tenure of left-leaning governments, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela and their impact on fear of crime, perception of government, and, ultimately, government policies.

5.3 Criminal Actors

Criminal actors, especially those with greater organizational capacity, can also shape policy decisions and citizen security outcomes through different mechanisms. We can divide their influence into that which relates to the structural features of the illicit market, the internal organization of organized criminal actors, and their economic and political strategies.

One structural feature is the respective geographies of organized criminal groups (OCGs) and law enforcement actors. Snyder and Durán-Martínez (2009) show that when the geographies and numbers of state and organized criminal actors coincide, criminal violence is less likely. This is especially the case where a single, cohesive state actor concentrates enforcement of the law (or protection of criminals) and there is a criminal monopolist. In other words, centralized state authorities can more credibly enforce the law, while centralized criminal actors can more credibly contain their violent actions.

The political science literature on criminal violence has borrowed extensively from civil war theories.[133] This influence has been particularly present in accounting for the micro-foundations and dynamics of conflict.[134] Some authors within this tradition argue that the internal

[132] Paper available at: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jmarshall/files/political_information_cycles_new_2_4.pdf
[133] Kalyvas (2006).
[134] See Kalyvas (2015).

organization of armed groups shapes their behavior during the conflict. Less cohesive groups and those made up of primarily opportunistic individuals are presumably more inclined to terrorize populations and confront the state.[135] Another possibility is that criminal violence escalates when organized criminal groups rely on private armies for protection from other criminal actors or the state.[136] A further driver of conflict is the fragmentation of the illicit market. Mexico is an illustrative case: the proliferation of drug trafficking organizations, driven by the government's aggressive kingpin strategy, amplified violence among cartels in an increasingly competitive market.[137]

However, unlike insurgents in civil wars, OCGs do not seek to annihilate or take over the state. Furthermore, violent attacks against state actors are likely to result in massive retaliation, which decreases organizations' earnings and puts their subsistence at risk. This leads to the puzzle of why drug trafficking organizations will attack the state in the first place. According to Lessing, organized criminal groups attack the state to attain specific policy outcomes, or to reduce the price of bribes state officials charge them.[138] An example is the (successful) attempt by Pablo Escobar to force the Colombian government to ban drug traffickers' extradition to the United States. Lessing finds additional corroborative evidence for his theory in the cases of drug cartels in Mexico and criminal factions in Rio de Janeiro.

Criminal actors might influence the policymaking process through other means besides violence. Criminals may share familial or personal links with high-ranking politicians. They might lobby government actors individually or through a collective organization, much like legitimate business actors. They might fund political campaigns to coopt decision makers within the formal political system, as in the case of paramilitaries in Colombia. They might act as brokers that allow politicians to build and maintain clientelistic networks, as in various neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, Medellin or Kingston.[139] Finally, they might even become political actors themselves, as occurred with various members of militias in Rio de Janeiro.[140] These different strategies might depend on the electoral system's openness and transparency; the resources at the disposal of

[135] Staniland (2012); Weinstein (2006).
[136] Trejo and Ley (2017).
[137] Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2011: 11).
[138] Lessing (2015).
[139] Arias (2016).
[140] InsightCrime, October 24, 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/rio-militias-muscle-in-on-brazil-elections

OCGs; the concentration or diffusion of elites; and the approaches governments undertake with respect to OCGs—i.e., the status quo criminals seek to modify. In short, organized criminal actors can shape the PMP—and through it policy outcomes, including levels of violence—mainly by influencing whether policies will be designed to favor the public or themselves, and whether (and how) policies that matter to them will be enforced.

A final issue to discuss is how criminal groups might coordinate between each other and the state to contain violence. There are at least three cases where this has occurred in the region. In Medellín, the head of the Oficina de Envigado, Diego Murillo, alias Don Berna, agreed with the government to restrict violent actions by his subordinates in exchange for blocking his extradition to the United States.[141] Second, in São Paulo, police and politicians acknowledge an implicit pact with the main drug gang, the Primeiro Comando da Capital, to end prison rebellions and contain street killings since 2006.[142] Finally, in El Salvador, the government brokered a truce between the main street gangs, which reduced homicides by 50 percent between 2012 and 2014.[143] Future studies should try to ascertain not only the magnitude of violence prevented by these informal arrangements, but also what conditions are likely to motivate criminals to cease conflict, and which enable the arrangement to persist. Although these initiatives are certainly problematic in that they grant favors or exceptions to individuals who have violated the law, it is nonetheless important to understand what shapes the behavior of organized criminal actors, who are likely to be relevant players in the citizen security policymaking process, at least for the short-term.

6. Research Agenda and Methodological Issues

We conclude this document by presenting some guiding questions and suggestions for country teams to adopt (and refine) this theoretical framework to the study of citizen security policies.[144] Assuming that this framework is applicable and does not require a substantial modification to understand security policies, we will first present some guiding questions with respect to the main components of the framework. We conclude with an enumeration of the main tradeoffs in the various methodological strategies researchers could apply.

[141] WOLA (2011).
[142] Denyer-Willis (2015).
[143] *The Economist*, January 29, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21641289-end-armistice-between-gangs-has-led-soaring-murders-broken-truce-theory
[144] For this section, I draw inspiration on the Murillo, Scartascini and Tommasi's (2008) suggested framework of analysis for the political economy of productivity in Latin America.

First, with respect to the main actors:

1. Who are the central actors involved in the policymaking process of citizen security?
2. What is the level of aggregation at which they operate?
3. What are their respective institutional and political constraints?
4. What are their main incentives and preferences? What defines these incentives?
5. What are their main resources and sources of power?
6. What factors affect their position in the relative distribution of power?
7. What is the level of internal cohesion within each collective actor, e.g., governments, political parties, police forces, judiciary, etc.?

With respect to actors' interactions and their industrial organization:

8. What are the main instruments through which actors make binding decisions?
9. What are the main interactions between actors? Which are the most relevant ones for the citizen security policymaking process?
10. What is the relevance of formal (e.g. laws, decrees, resolutions, organizational norms) and informal (i.e. unwritten norms, shared practices, etc.) institutions in shaping the interaction between collective actors?

To provide a more concrete example of these kinds of questions, we might ask with respect to the police:

1. How are the police organized? How many police forces are there? How are citizen security functions divided between different police forces or within the same force?
2. What is the level of autonomy of police from politicians, criminals or other social actors? Who are the main political authorities with which the police interact? How do different political and social actors influence police autonomy?
3. What is the degree of internal cohesion in the police? How much control do commanders have on their mid-level managers? What are the mechanisms through which they exert this control?

4. How do changes in political leadership and in the distribution of political power affect police behavior?
5. What are the sources of police power? When are police more likely to pressure politicians to get what they want? What instruments will they utilize for that purpose?

In terms of arenas, country teams might explore:

1. What are the main arenas in which citizen security policies are designed and implemented?
2. What determines whether decision-making takes place in one arena or the other?
3. When are formal arenas more likely to be infiltrated by informal or illicit relevant actors?

After describing the main actors, interactions and arenas in this setting, researchers can transition to establishing the links between the factors that condition actors' behavior (X), the features of the policymaking process (Z) and different policy outcomes (Y), such as those described in this report, i.e., criminal violence, homicide rates, criminal justice system reform or criminal recidivism.

6.1 Research Agenda

In short, researchers employing this theoretical framework should focus on the following elements:

1. The role of **institutional and political factors** as the main independent variables (X) determining actors' incentives, strategies and behavior. In this paper, we have provided examples on how political decentralization, fragmentation, and turnover can affect crime and violence, whether directly or through their influence on bureaucratic autonomy, judicial independence, or the capacity to make informal arrangements with organized criminal actors.
2. The relevant actors involved in policy design and enforcement as well as their interests, constraints and interactions. Recognizing the mutual interactions between actors is crucial to adopt a systemic, i.e., general equilibrium, approach to citizen security. From a policy perspective, this implies that when tackling a given problem

(e.g., property crime), or dealing with a given agency (e.g. national police forces), it is necessary to consider how these decisions can affect the cooperation between other actors and the implementation of other policies.

3. The **industrial organization** of each relevant political and social actor, in other words, what are the main organizational forms, e.g., key institutional mechanisms, that enable these actors to reduce their respective transaction costs, that is, that allow them to establish credible commitments, solve contractual problems (such as imperfect information and incomplete contracts), and cooperate with each other. Following our examples, the incentives of principals (politicians) and agents (police) often align when police officers see cooperating with political incumbents in their career interest, which generally occurs when governing politicians concentrate a larger share of power. Within the police organization itself, its hierarchical chain of command is often sufficient to induce obedience; however, this might also depend on commanders' capacity to select their immediate subordinates, their discretion in assigning duties, benefits and punishments, and the capacity and social legitimacy of the organization.
4. The **inter-temporal dimension** of policymaking, including actors' discount factors, feedback effects and path dependence. Policies are implemented *after* actors agree to put them into effect, giving players incentives to renege on their commitment. The longer actors' time horizons, the more likely they will implement policies whose benefits will potentially accrue in the future. In addition, policy outcomes affect the distribution of power for future iterations of these interactions (feedback effects). Finally, policies have legacies, such that it is often increasingly difficult to deviate from a given course as time passes (path dependence).
5. The resulting features of the **policymaking process** (Z), among them, policy stability, rigidity, coordination, enforcement, efficiency and public regardedness.
6. The emerging **citizen security outcomes** (Y), including but not limited to the evolution of different forms of crime and criminal violence.

Of course, this list is not exclusive, and this framework should be subject to modifications and refinements. We have hinted above some of the unexplored areas involving different actors and arenas, but this does not leave out the possibility of substantially modifying the components

of the framework, if necessary. Below, we develop some of the methodological tradeoffs that should be considered when embarking on studies that adopt this type of analytical framework.

6.2 Methodological Issues

Contrary to the evidence-based studies discussed in Section 2, this type of approach poses greater problems for causal inference, at least in terms of establishing the impact of a given factor. Most of the research questions mentioned above and throughout the second part of this document are not suited for experimental designs. Researchers typically cannot manipulate either the institutional or political characteristics of a country or the features of its policymaking process—at least without major ethical concerns. We cannot randomly establish which police forces will coordinate and which will not, the lethality of police interventions, the degree of autonomy of state bureaucracies or the type of sentences handed out by judges. There are, of course, semi-experimental methods to test these theories. While researchers cannot randomly assign an electoral result to different jurisdiction, we can empirically test its impact through regression discontinuity designs. This enables us to see whether, for example, the fact that a given municipality or state is governed by a different party than the one at the national level, influences the distribution of security resources and the subsequent levels of violence in those subnational districts.[145]

However, outside of these types of designs, there are multiple alternative research strategies that could apply. While these designs might not necessarily be able to establish causal inference, they have some advantages over experimental studies. First, they can adopt a broader, integrated perspective on the working of the citizen security system. In this sense, we can assess the impact of several policies rather than a sole intervention, which might be of limited scope and hard to reproduce outside the original context. Second, they can establish some generalizations about the political aspects that produce better policy outcomes. As said before, getting the process right matters, and these studies might be able to establish patterns that distinguish countries with better policies than others. Third, by working from a specified set of assumptions about actors' incentives and constraints, they can illuminate the mechanisms linking these factors to actual behavior, whereas experimental designs, by themselves, are extremely valuable in determining whether a given factor is causally relevant and what is its impact, but not exactly *how* it matters. For example, we might be able to establish that new police patrolling protocols reduce crime, but,

[145] Dell (2015).

to replicate the experience, it would be preferable to have a theory about how this intervention modified police incentives to perform their functions.

These various observational, i.e., non-experimental, designs also present limitations and tradeoffs. We can group these strategies according to the number of cases included in the research, ranging from a case study (N=1) to a large, quantitative cross-national statistical analysis (N of hundreds or thousands). A case study's main virtue is that it "elucidates the mechanisms connecting a particular X to a particular Y,"[146] since there is only one possible route through which these points could have been connected. Case studies also allow us to control for alternative explanatory factors—especially when analyzing how an outcome changes over time in a single case—, and to generate new theories, which can then be tested on other cases. To accomplish this goal, of course, the case should have theoretical significance: it should be either a least-likely case shown to be positive or a most-likely case that proves to be negative.[147] For instance, Nicaragua is a case where we would expect much greater levels of violence, given the features it shares with its Central American neighbors, which are the most violent countries in the world. Yet, this case proves to be negative in this outcome: while El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala's homicide rates exceed 100 per 100,000 individuals, Nicaragua's is less than 10 per 100,000. Knowing what lies behind Nicaragua's comparatively low homicide rate can provide the basis for a theory of criminal violence, as well as a concrete set of policy recommendations. This finding might be even more robust if viewed comparatively in a study that includes the other Central American countries. The main problem with a research design based on a single case is, of course, its lack of plenitude. What case studies, and small-N analyses more generally, gain in precision, they typically lose in representativeness: it is very easy to disqualify the findings as applicable to only the case under consideration.

On the other extreme, the virtues of large-N statistical studies include their capacity to illustrate correlations between variables, ensure the inclusion of all, or most, relevant cases, and maximize variation on the independent and dependent variables. However, they lack the ability to specify mechanisms and are unable to escape the problem of reciprocal causation—whether the

[146] Gerring (2007: 215).
[147] Gerring (2007: 220).

assumed cause is an effect (or is unrelated to the outcome of interest).[148] Quantitative, large-N studies are also often devoid of attention to context, processes and sequences. Given the lack of reliable data on citizen security indicators in many countries in the region, it is imperative to have detailed knowledge on the incentives of individual actors, their interactions and how specific factors shaped a given outcome. Getting this type of information generally requires qualitative data, which can be obtained through research strategies such as interviews, focus groups, participant observation and ethnography. This in-depth case knowledge is not only necessary for epistemological reasons, but also, and more importantly, for designing policy recommendations, which should also consider the perspective of the participants and targets of such interventions.

In short, there is no methodological silver bullet. Researchers in country teams should be cautious of the tradeoffs presented by different designs, and open to adopt multiple research methods, both qualitative and quantitative, to achieve causal inference or comprehensive descriptions. A fundamental principle is that the question should drive the research strategy, not the other way around.

Finally, each of these research designs poses complex **logistical issues**. Aside from the usual financial and logistical constraints that characterize every research project, there is still a major informational deficit in conducting research on crime in Latin America. Obtaining reliable data on even basic crime indicators, especially at the level of municipalities or below, remains a challenge for researchers (and citizens) in many Latin American countries. Moreover, procuring information on the informal and illicit aspects of public policies can be daunting, if not dangerous, especially for researchers doing fieldwork in that country. For obvious reasons, state and/or civil society organizations could be reticent to share such data. No organization likes to incriminate itself, even if it means admitting it is not doing a great job. Furthermore, one should not take available information at face value. First-hand knowledge of how state and civil society organizations, including the media, collect and publish data is essential to determine potential biases in such processes as well as to access various sources of data. Naturally, establishing such links with different state actors and assessing of their roles and interactions takes time, especially to gain a deeper understanding of how these organizations work. In many countries, there might

[148] Brady and Collier, editors (2010). Furthermore, these studies assume a set of properties about the data-generating process, that is, how the data came to be—such as independent and identically distributed errors, a specific functional form, and independence between observations—that are seldom justifiable.

be significant subnational differences in institutional design and performance, requiring multiple research sites. Researchers' temporal and budgetary constraints are a fundamental factor to consider in the study plan.

To conclude, we hope to have shown the potential gains of constructing and implementing a political economy of citizen security framework in Latin America. It is our intention that research teams might also refine this theoretical template, incorporating new analytical approaches that make it more adept at understanding the causes and effects of citizen insecurity in Latin America, as well as better suited to the formulation of sound policies to tackle these problems.

References

Alexander, M. 2012. *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.* New York, United States: The New Press.

Arias, E.D. 2016. *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Arias, E.D., and M. Ungar. 2009. "Community Policing and Latin America's Security Crisis." *Comparative Politics* 41(4): 409-429.

Auyero, J., and M.F. Berti. 2015. *In Harm's Way: The Dynamics of Urban Violence*. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.

Axelrod, R. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York: Basic Books.

Bateson, R. 2012. "Crime Victimization and Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 570-587.

Bayley, D. 2005. *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Policing Abroad.* Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Becker, G.S. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 76(2): 169-217.

Beckett, K. 2001. *Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics.* Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Beltrame, J.M. 2014. *Todo Dia é Segunda-Feira*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Sextante.

Biderman, C.J., J.M.P. De Mello and A. Schneider. 2009. "Dry Laws and Homicides: Evidence from the São Paulo Metropolitan Area." *Economic Journal* 120(543): 157-182.

Black, R.C., and R.J. Owens. 2009. "Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence." *The Journal of Politics* 71(3): 1062-1075.

Blanco, L. 2012. "The Impact of Reform on the Criminal Justice System in Mexico." Labor and Population Working Paper WR-948. Santa Monica, United States: RAND Corporation.

Blanco, J., and J. Varela. 2011. "Adaptación Local de Prácticas Exitosas de Prevención Social del Delito." In: J. Araya, editor. *Experiencias en América Latina: El Desafío de Evaluar Programas de Seguridad Ciudadana*. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Asuntos Públicos, Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana.

Bonvecchi, A., J. Johannsen and C.G. Scartascini. 2015. *¿Quiénes Deciden la Política Social? Economía Política de Programas Sociales en América Latina*. Washington, DC, United States: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Brady, H.E., and D. Collier, editors. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards.* Lanham, United States: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Braga, A.A. 2001. "The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 578: 104-125.

Braga, A.A., A. Papachristos and D. Hureau. 2012. "The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis." *Justice Quarterly* 31(4): 633-663.

Braga, A.A., and D.L. Weisburd. 2010. *Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Braga, A.A., D.L. Weisburd, E.J. Waring, L.G. Mazerolle, W. Spelman, and F. Gajewski, 1999. "Problem- oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment. *Criminology, 37*(3): 541-580.

Braga, A.A., D.M. Kennedy, E.J. Waring, and A.M. Piehl, 2001. "Problem-oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire." *Journal of research in crime and delinquency*, 38(3):195-225.

Brinks, D. 2007. *The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Latin America: Inequality and the Rule of Law*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Byrne, J., and G. Marx. 2011. "Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention and Policing: A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact." *Journal of Police Studies* 3(20): 17-40.

Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF). 2014. *Por una América Latina Más Segura: Una Nueva Perspectiva para Prevenir y Controlar el Delito.* Bogota, Colombia: CAF.

Camacho, A., and D. Mejía. 2014. "The Externalities of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs on Crime: The Case of Bogotá's Familias en Acción Program." In: LACEA 2013 Papers. Bogota, Colombia: LACEA.

Campbell, A.L. 2012. "Policy Makes Mass Politics." Annual Review of Political Science 15: 333-351.

Carpenter, D. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928.* Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.

Castillo, J.C., D. Mejía and P. Restrepo. 2014. "Scarcity without Leviathan: The Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War." Working Paper 356. Washington, DC, United States: Center for Global Development.

Cerdá, M. et al. 2012. "Reducing Violence by Transforming Neighborhoods: A Natural Experiment in Medellín, Colombia." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 175(10): 1045-1053.

Cheibub, J.A., A. Przeworski and S.M. Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34(4): 565-587.

Chioda, L., J.M.P. De Mello and R.R. Soares. 2012. "Spillovers from Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Bolsa Família and Crime in Urban Brazil." IZA Discussion Paper 6371. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor/IZA.

Cohen, S. 2002. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers.* Hove, United Kingdom: Psychology Press.

Cruz, J.M. 2009. "Police Abuse in Latin America." *Americas Barometer Insights* 11: 1-8.

Cruz, J.M. 2010a. "Police Misconduct and Democracy in Latin America." *Americas Barometer Insights* 33: 1-5.

Cruz, J.M. 2010b. "Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational Protection Rackets." *Global Crime* 11(4): 379-398.

Dal Bó, E., P. Dal Bó and R. Di Tella. 2006. "Plata o Plomo? Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence." *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 41-53.

Davis, D. 2006. "Undermining the Rule of Law: Democratization and the Dark Side of Police Reform in Mexico." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48(1): 55-86.

Dammert, L., and F.T. Malone. 2006. "Does It Take a Village? Policing Strategies and Fear of Crime in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48(4): 27-51.

Dammert, L., and L. Zuñiga. 2008. *La Cárcel: Problemas y Desafíos para las Américas.* Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).

De Mello, J., D. Mejía and L. Suárez. 2013. "The Pharmacological Channel Revisited: Alcohol Sales Restrictions and Crime in Bogota." Working Paper IDB-WP-394. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Dell, M. 2015. "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War." *American Economic Review* 105(6): 1738-1779.

Denyer-Willis, G. 2009. "Deadly Symbiosis? The PCC, the State, and the Institutionalization of Violence in São Paulo, Brazil." In: G. Jones, editor. *Youth Violence in Latin America: Gangs and Juvenile Justice in Perspective*. New York, United States: Palgrave Macmillan.

Denyer-Willis, G. 2015. *The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil.* Berkeley, United Sates: University of California Press.

Dias, C.N. and F. Salla. 2013. "Organized Crime in Brazilian Prisons: The Example of the PCC." *International Journal of Criminology and Sociology* 2013(2): 397.

Di Tella, R., and E. Schargrodsky. 2004. "Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces after a Terrorist Attack." *American Economic Review* 94(1): 115-133.

Di Tella, R., and E. Schargrodsky. 2013. "Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring." *Journal of Political Economy* 121(1): 28-73.

Draca, M., S. Machin and R. Witt. 2011. "Panic on the Streets of London: Police, Crime and the July 2005 Terror Attacks." *American Economic Review* 101(5): 2157-2181.

Dube, A., O. Dube and O. García Ponce. 2013. "Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico." *American Political Science Review* 107(3): 397-417.

Dunning, T. 2012. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Eaton, K. 2008. "Paradoxes of Police Reform: Federalism, Parties, and Civil Society in Argentina's Public Security Crisis." *Latin American Research Review* 43(3): 5-32.

Eck, J., and W. Spelman. 1987. *Problem-Oriented Policing: Research in Brief*. Washington, DC, United States: National Institute of Justice.

Ellsberg, M. et al. 2014. "Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls: What Does the Evidence Say?" *The Lancet* 385(9977): 1555-1566.

Enns, P.K. 2014. "The Public's Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on Mass Incarceration in the United States." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 857-872.

Evans, P. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformations.* Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.

Fajnzylber, P., Dl Lederman and N. Loayza, N. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45(1): 1-40.

Flom, H., and A.E. Post. 2016. "Blame Avoidance and Policy Stability in Developing Democracies: The Politics of Public Security in Buenos Aires." *Comparative Politics* 49(1): 23-46.

Föhrig, A. 2015. "Political Determinants of Violence in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires." Paper prepared for delivery at the XXXIII Congress of the Latin American Studies Association conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 27-30.

Freedman, D. et al. 2010. *Statistical Models and Causal Inference: A Dialogue with the Social Sciences.* Cambridge, United States: Cambridge University Press.

Frühling, H. 2003. "Police Reform and the Process of Democratization." In: H. Frühling, J.S. Tulchin and H. Golding, editors. *Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State.* Washington DC, United States: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Frühling, H. 2009. "Recent Police Reform in Latin America." In: N. Uildriks, editor. *Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America.* Lanham, United States: Lexington Books.

Fuentes, C. 2005. *Contesting the Iron Fist: Advocacy Networks and Police Violence in Democratic Argentina and Chile.* London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Galiani, S., M. Rossi and E. Schargrodsky. 2011. "Conscription and Crime: Evidence from the Argentine Draft Lottery." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3(2): 119-136.

Galiani, S. et al. 2014. "Shelter from the Storm: Upgrading Housing Infrastructure in Latin American Slums." Working Paper IDP-WP-528. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Gambetta, D. 1996. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection.* Cambridge, United States: Harvard University Press.

Garay, C. 2016. *Social Policy Expansion in Latin America.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

García, J., D. Mejía and D. Ortega. 2013. "Police Reform, Training and Crime: Experimental Evidence from Colombia's Plan Cuadrantes." Documento CEDE No. 2013-04. Bogota,

Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE).

Garland, D. 2001. *The Culture of Control.* Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Geddes, B. 1994. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America.* Berkeley, United States: University of California Press.

Gelber, A., A. Isen and J. B. Kessler. 2014. "The Effects of Youth Employment: Evidence from New York City Summer Youth Employment Program Lotteries." NBER Working Paper 20810. Cambridge, United States: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Gerring, J. 2007. *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

González, Y.M. Forthcoming. "Authoritarian Coercion by Democratic Means: The Paradox of Police Reform in Latin America." Cambridge, United States: Harvard University. Manuscript.

Gottschalk, M. 2006. *The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Grzymala-Busse, A. 2007. *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Guerrero-Gutiérrez, E. 2011. *Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey*. Washington, DC, United States: 7th North American Forum. Available at: https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/evnts/media/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf

Haggard, S., and M.D. McCubbins. 2001. *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Hjalmarsson, R., H. Holmlund and M.J. Lindquist. 2015. "The Effect of Education on Criminal Convictions and Incarceration: Causal Evidence from Micro-Data." *Economic Journal* 125(587): 1290-1326.

Heaton, P. 2012. "Sunday Liquor Laws and Crime." *Journal of Public Economics* 96(1-2): 42-52.

Heller, S.B. 2014. "Summer Jobs Reduce Violence among Disadvantaged Youth." *Science* 346(6214): 1219-1223.

Hidrobo, M., A. Peterman and L. Heise. 2016. "The Effect of Cash, Vouchers and Food Transfers on Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 8(3): 284-303.

Hinton, M. 2006. *The State on the Streets: Police and Politics in Argentina and Brazil.* Boulder, United States: Lynne Rienner.

Holland, A.C. 2013. "Right on Crime? Conservative Party Politics and *Mano Dura* Policies in El Salvador." *Latin American Research Review* 48(1): 44-67.

Holland, A.C. 2015. "The Distributive Politics of Enforcement." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(2): 357-371.

Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (ICHR). 2009. *Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights.* Washington, DC: Organization of American States.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2012. "Citizen Security Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence." Discussion Paper IDB-DP-232. Washington, DC: IDB.

Jaitman, L. and R. Guerrero Compeán. 2015. "Closing Knowledge Gaps: Toward Evidence-Based Crime Prevention Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean." Technical Note IDB-TN-848. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Jaitman, L., editor. 2017. *The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean.* Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Jones, M.P. et al. 2002. "Amateur Legislators—Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System." *America Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 656-669.

Kalyvas, S.N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, S.N. 2015. "How Civil Wars Help Explain Organized Crime—and How They Do Not." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(8): 1517-1540.

Kennedy, D.M. et al. 2001. "Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 38(3): 195-225.

Kessler, G. 2009. *El Sentimiento de Inseguridad: Sociología del Temor al Delito.* Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

Klevens, J. et al. 2009. "Evaluation of Two Interventions to Reduce Aggressive and Antisocial Behavior in First and Second Graders in a Resource-Poor Setting." *International Journal of Education Research* 48(5): 307-319.

Klick, J., and A. Tabarrok. "Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 48(1): 267-279.

Krehbiel, K. 2007. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 231-240.

Krehbiel, K. 2010. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking*. University of Chicago Press.

Leiras, M., A. Giraudy and G. Tuñón. 2014. "Who Wants an Independent Court? Political Competition and Supreme Court Autonomy in the Argentine provinces (1984-2008)." *Journal of Politics* 77(1): 175-187.

Lessing, B. 2015. "Logics of Violence in Criminal War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(8): 1486-1516.

Levitt, S. 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime." *American Economic Review* 87(3): 270-290.

Lochner, L. 2004. "Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach." *International Economic Review* 45(3): 811-843.

Machim, S., O. Marie and S. Vujic. 2011. "The Crime Reducing Effect of Education." *Economic Journal* 121(552): 463-484.

Magaldi de Sousa, M. 2010. "How Courts Engage in the Policymaking Process in Latin America: The Different Functions of the Judiciary." In: C. Scartascini, E. Stein and M. Tommasi, editors. 2010. *How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking.* Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Magaloni, B., E. Franco and V. Melo. 2015. "Killing in the Slums: An Impact Evaluation of Police Reform in Rio de Janeiro." CDDRL Working Paper. Stanford, United States: Stanford University, Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law

Manning, P.K. 2005. "The Study of Policing." *Police Quarterly* 8(1): 23-43.

Marshall, J. 2016. "Political Information Cycles: When Do Voters Sanction Incumbent Parties for High Homicide Rates?" Available at: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jmarshall/files/political_information_cycles_new_2_4.pdf

McAdam, D., S. Tarrow and C. Tilly. 2009. “Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics.” In: M. Lichbach A. Zuckerman, editors. *Comparative Politics: Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics.* Second edition. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Melo, M., C. Pereira and C.M. Figuereido. 2009. “Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions.” *Comparative Political Studies* 42(9): 1217-1244.

Miller, L.L., 2016. *The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Moe, T. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure.” In: J.E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, editors. *Can the Government Govern?* Washington, DC, United States: The Brookings Institution.

Moncada, E. 2013. “Business and the Politics of Urban Violence in Colombia.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48(3): 308-330.

Muggah, R. et al. 2016. “Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America.” Strategic Paper 20. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarapé Institute.

Munizaga, A. 2009. “Consideraciones Relevantes para la Prevención del Delito en Barrios Vulnerables.” *Conceptos* 8. Santiago, Chile: Fundación Paz Ciudadana.

Murillo, M.V., C. Scartascini and M. Tommasi. 2008. “The Political Economy of Productivity: Actors, Arenas and Policies: A Framework of Analysis.” Research Department Working Paper 640. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

North, D.C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Osorio, J. 2015. “The Contagion of Drug Violence: Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican War on Drugs.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(8): 1403-1432.

Owens, E.G. 2009. “More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 52: 551-579.

Lorenzo, L., C. Riego and M. Duce, editors. 2011. *Prisión Preventiva y Reforma Procesal Penal en América Latina: Evaluación y Perspectivas*. Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudio de Justicia de las Américas.

Mahoney, J., and K. Thelen. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Page, J. 2011. "Prison Officer Unions and the Perpetuation of the Penal Status Quo." *Criminology & Public Policy* 10(3): 735-770.

Perdomo, C., and C. Uribe Burcher. 2016. "Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Local Democracy." Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Pierson, P. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-267.

Pribble, J. 2013. *Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America.* Cambridge, United States: Cambridge University Press.

Ramos, C., A.M. Nieto and E. Chaux. 2009. "Classrooms in Peace: Preliminary Results of a Multi-component program." *Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy* 1(1): 35-58.

Ricardo, C., M. Eads, and G. Barker. 2011. "Engaging Boys and Men in the Prevention of Sexual Violence." Pretoria, South Africa: Promundo, Sexual Violence Research Initiative, OAK Foundation and MRC South Africa.

Rios, V. 2015. "How Government Coordination Controlled Organized Crime: The Case of Mexico's Cocaine Markets." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(8): 1433-1454.

Rodgers, D., and R. Muggah. 2009. "Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Central American Case." *Contemporary Security Policy* 30(2): 301-317.

Ronconi, L., D. Lenis and E. Schargrodsky. 2011. "Evaluación del Programa de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego en Argentina." *Perspectivas sobre el Desarrollo* 9(1): 14-36.

Saiegh, S. 2010. "Active Players or Rubber Stamps? An Evaluation of the Policymaking Role of Latin American Legislatures." In: C. Scartascini, E. Stein and M. Tommasi, editors. *How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking.* Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Samuels, D., and R. Snyder. 2004 "Legislative Malapportionment in Latin America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives." In: E.L. Gibson, editor. *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, United States: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Scartascini, C., E. Stein and M. Tommasi, editors. 2010. *How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking.* Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Schelling, T.C. 1971. "What Is the Business of Organized Crime?" *The American Scholar* 40(4): 643-652.

Schneider, B.R. 2004. *Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Schneider, B.R. 2010. "Business Politics and Policymaking in Contemporary Latin America." In: C. Scartascini, E. Stein and M. Tommasi, editors. *How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking.* Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Silva, P. 2009. *In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile.* University Park, United States: Penn State University Press.

Simon, J. 2007. *Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear.* Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Skaperdas, S. 2001. "The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection when the State Does Not." *Economics of Governance* 2(3): 173-202.

Skarbek, D. 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs." *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 702-716.

Skarbek, D. 2012. "Prison Gangs, Norms, and Organizations." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 82(1): 96-109.

Snyder, R., and A. Durán-Martínez. 2009. "Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets." *Crime, Law and social change*, 52(3), 253-273.

Snyder, R., and D.J. Samuels. 2004. "Legislative Malapportionment in Latin America." In: E. Gibson, editor. *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, United States: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Soares, Y. and M. Sviatschi. 2010. "The Impact of Modernization of Justice on Court Efficiency in Costa Rica." IDB Working Paper OVE-06/10. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Spiller, P.T. and M. Tommasi. 2007. *The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Staniland, P. 2012. "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 243-264.

Stein, E. and M. Tommasi, editors. 2008. *Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies.* Cambridge, United States: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies.

Taylor, B.D. 2011. *State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism.* Cambridge University Press.

Thelen, K. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 369-404.

Tommasi, M. 2011. "Latin America: How State Capacity Determines Policy Success." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 24(2): 199-203.

Trejo, G., and S. Ley. 2016. "Federalismo, Drogas y Violencia: Por Qué el Conflicto Partidista Intergubernamental Estimuló la Violencia del Narcotráfico en México." *Política y gobierno* 23(1), 11-56.

Trejo, G. and S. Ley. 2017. "Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence." *Comparative Political Studies*. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720703.

Tsebelis, G. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.

Ungar, M. 2011. *Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America.* Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ungar, M. and Magaloni, A. 2009. "Latin America's Prisons: A Crisis of Criminal Policy and Democratic Rule." In: M. Bergman and L. Whitehead, editors. 2009. *Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America.* Notre Dame, United States: University of Notre Dame Press.

Varese, F. 2011. *Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territories.* Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.

Weber, M. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*. Berkeley, United States: University of California Press.

Weingast, B.R., and W.J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1): 132–63.

Weinstein, J.M. 2006. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Western, B. 2006. *Punishment and Inequality in America.* New York, United States: Russell Sage Foundation.

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). 2011. "Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment." Washington, DC, United States: Washington Office on Latin America.

Wilkinson, S. 2004. *Votes and Violence.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Zuvanic, L., M. Iacoviello and L.R. Gusta. 2010. "The Weakest Link: The Bureaucracy and Civil Service Systems in Latin America." In: C. Scartascini, E. Stein and M. Tommasi, editors. *How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking.* Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.