

MEMORANDUM

For Inter-American Development Bank/Inter-American Dialogue:

The Consultative Process in the FORMULATION OF CANADIAN TRADE POLICY

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The Consultative Process and Trade Policy Creation:

Political Necessity or Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking

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Executive Summary

This paper attempts to address a number of questions about the dialogue between the public and private sector in the creation of Canadian trade policy. It begins with by introducing the central institutions and players involved and moves to identify major developments and controversies in the process of trade policy development. Following is a summary of the central points discussed in this paper:

- ?? Trade policy development is shaped by the constitutional and legislative framework for international trade relations. While policymaking in Canada is relatively efficient because of the top-down distribution of political power, as a federal state trade officials at the federal and provincial levels must work in close collaboration to ensure provincial cooperation in the implementation of trade commitments in areas of provincial legislative authority.
 - ?? Canada conducts broad-based consultations on matters of trade policy. While much of this is handled by the bureaucracy, officials are best suited to accept input about policy content. Concerns about the general direction of government policy are best directed through the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
 - ?? The federal government has created a large number of formal and informal mechanisms for stakeholder consultation. Some, like Internet-based document dissemination work very effectively, while others are less effective except for symbolic purposes.
 - ?? The consultative process is the subject of criticism for its emphasis on process over content. There are a growing number of claims that legitimate trade policy interests are being side-tracked in the government's attempt to consult with everyone, even those groups whose claims to a legitimate voice in trade policy matters is questionable.
 - ?? Correcting these problems may be difficult because considerable government resources and been expended to create the current system and a new area of bureaucracy responsible for managing consulting is becoming entrenched. Reform is further impeded because the apparent lack of business interest in the government's trade agenda leaves the policy development process vulnerable to capture by other interests.
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Part One: The Setting

The Constitutional and Legislative Framework for International Trade Relations

Canada is a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary democracy and a federal state. Each of these dimensions influences the conduct of international trade policy.

As a constitutional monarchy, exclusive authority for the conduct of international relations including trade relations is formally vested in the Crown and exercised as a practical matter by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The conduct of international relations including the negotiation and ratification of international agreements does not require parliamentary approval.

When the Cabinet commands a majority in Parliament, it holds, for all practical purposes, legislative power. The fusion of the legislative and executive branches of government provides for a top-down distribution of political power to which there are few points of entry except as the system permits. Hence, the Cabinet is assured of Parliamentary support for the conduct of international trade policy including the passage of any necessary implementing legislation. As consequence, trade negotiations may be conducted with Canada in the expectation that political acceptance of the result will follow.²

As a federal state, the powers of governance are divided between the federal and the provincial/territorial levels of government. These levels of government are not subordinate to each other since, in a federal system, the federal legislature and provincial legislatures are supreme in those areas that come under their respective jurisdictions. While the conduct of international trade policy is the exclusive responsibility of the federal government, Canadian provinces are not constitutionally bound to conform to Canadian international trade agreements in any matter within their jurisdiction. The negotiation and implementation of international trade agreements has required increased collaboration between both levels of government as trade

² By contrast, in the United States, a political system based upon checks and balances means that power is widely dispersed among the various actors and is open to a myriad of outside influences. The consequence is conduct of trade negotiations with the U.S. is a much riskier endeavour in terms of political acceptance of the result than negotiations with Canada.

agreement rights and obligations, for example in the area of services, are reaching deeply into areas of shared or exclusive federal jurisdiction.³

Principal Players in Trade Policy Formulation

Cabinet

Members of the Cabinet are Members of Parliament appointed by the Prime Minister and serve at pleasure. Cabinet appointments respect the need for regional and linguistic balance in Canada and have little or nothing to do with portfolio expertise. For example, while the current Minister of International Trade was a business consultant before entering politics, the two previous incumbents had spent most of their professional lives in federal or municipal politics.

While the foreign minister has formal responsibility for all foreign relations, the Minister of International Trade is responsible for international trade relations. However, virtually all other cabinet ministers with economic portfolios have interests or responsibilities for some international economic issues. The principal ministers involved are those of Finance, Industry, Agriculture, National Revenue, Natural Resources, and International Cooperation (Development Assistance). Consequently, the Trade Minister exercises the responsibilities of the portfolio in consultation with them. New issues on multilateral and regional trade agendas, for example environment and labour, have drawn a broader range of ministers into Cabinet decision-making on international trade issues than has previously been the case.

The Minister of International Trade reports to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Union. Cabinet Committee decisions such as, for example, Canada's negotiating objectives in FTAA, are subject to approval by the full Cabinet. It is only on rare occasions, however, that the

³ For a more detailed account of the structure of governmental decision making in Canada, see Dymond and Ritchie Dawson, "The Consultative Process in the Formulation of Canadian Trade Policy," in *The Trade Policy-Making Process: Level One of the Two-Level Game*, INTAL-ITD-STA Occasional Paper 13 (Buenos Aires: INTAL-IDB, 2002).

full Cabinet reconsiders Committee decisions or is called upon to discuss the progress of the negotiations.

Parliament

Parliament has come to play an increasingly important role in international trade relations principally by providing a forum for business, labour and civil society to express their views to the government. This role is exercised principally by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) of the House of Commons. It is composed of Members of Parliament from of all parties in the House of Commons but has a majority of members of the governing party. Its principal role is to hold public hearings across Canada on international trade and foreign policy issues. It held extensive hearings prior to the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the WTO and is currently conducting hearings on the negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Although the SCFAIT, like all parliamentary committees, may establish its own agenda, in practice it usually holds hearings on issues at the request of, or with the concurrence of, the Cabinet. Since the Committee has a government majority, its recommendations, often adopted by vote along party lines, are consistent with the government's position. These recommendations are public, however, and the government is required to issue a public response to them.

Within the Senate, the Foreign Affairs Committee has taken a growing interest in international trade issues, holding hearings on the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) and NAFTA. As an appointed body, the Senate wields little political influence, but can serve as an outlet for the government to seek public comment on controversial issues while keeping political distance from either the substance of the hearings or the recommendations that emerge.

Government Officials

Canadian trade officials, like all federal government officials, are politically independent. They hold permanent appointments and are not removed from the public service upon a change in government or minister. The senior official in government departments is the deputy minister, a permanent official.

In formal terms, the responsibility of officials is to implement the policies adopted by Cabinet and administer the legislation enacted by the Canadian Parliament. In reality, however, Canadian officials play a key role in shaping government policy. Frequently officials will be the initiators, executors and administrators of policies. Without exception, the chief negotiator for multilateral and regional trade negotiations is a permanent official usually drawn from DFAIT.

Consistent with Cabinet-based decision-making is the practice of continuous interdepartmental consultation and consensus building among all departments and agencies involved in trade negotiations. As international trade agreements have grown more complex, the number of departments and agencies involved in their negotiation and implementation has grown rapidly. For example, there were four government departments (together with their ministers) involved in the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. By contrast, 24 departments and agencies were involved in the preparations for the Doha Ministerial Meeting of the WTO and will be involved in the conduct of the negotiations.

For major multilateral and regional trade negotiations, interdepartmental consultations are conducted through an informal committee of senior officials, chaired by a senior DFAIT official and composed of senior counterpart officials from all involved government departments and agencies. Reporting to the committee will be committees of officials established for each of the main items on the negotiating agenda. These committees are chaired typically by DFAIT officials or by the department whose jurisdiction is principally affected by the negotiating issue of concern to the committee. For example, a senior official of the Department of Agriculture chairs the committee charged with such issues in the FTAA negotiations. The division of labour of

specialist teams is *ad hoc*, established by the chair in consultation with team members. The scope and frequency of team meetings is determined by the demands of the multilateral negotiating schedule.

Such practice ensures political and bureaucratic commitment to the decision to initiate negotiations, to their conduct and to the implementation of the results. It also ensures that the legislative and regulatory implications as well as financial and human resource consequences of trade agreement implementation are under continuous review. The weaknesses are that it can be a slow and inefficient mechanism for decision-making. The emergence of any controversial or innovative policy recommendations is unlikely because any decision requires consensus across departments. Conversely, on rare occasions there can be too much cooperation within the interministerial process and major policy issues will be resolved at the bureaucratic level rather than at the political level.

Provinces

The Canadian provinces play a prominent role in the formulation and implementation of trade policy in areas that fall under their jurisdiction such as the regulation of professions, resources management, the environment and regulation of business, agriculture, education, and health. As described previously, while the federal government may conclude and sign international trade agreements on any subject, it is powerless to ensure implementation in any area of provincial jurisdiction without the agreement of the provinces. The impact of trade agreements is not only felt within areas of provincial jurisdiction but also affects other areas of provincial action such as programs undertaken to develop the provincial economy.

Provincial officials are quick to point out that while the federal government consults with stakeholders in industry, civil society, etc., the relationship between the federal and provincial governments in the conduct of trade policy is rooted at a much deeper level. Noted one official, “Provinces have legislative responsibility and legal authority for many matters covered in

international trade negotiations, they are not merely the recipient of effects like business or individuals so there has to be more than 'consultation'."

Federal-provincial collaboration takes place before, during, and after formal negotiations. In developing policies to reflect provincial interests the provinces, like the federal government, have evolved practical means of interdepartmental coordination. Cooperation with the provincial government is also facilitated by federal assistance with joint export promotion programs.

Meetings of federal provincial trade ministers occur infrequently. Much more frequent are consultations at the level of the bureaucracy between federal trade officials and their provincial counterpart. The central vehicle for coordinating these discussions is the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Trade (C-Trade). A senior official from DFAIT chairs the committee and the agenda, although proposed by DFAIT, must be accepted by all members. A similar forum is used for collaboration between provincial and federal officials on agricultural trade matters. Generally, the committee meets four times a year with more frequent meetings taking place between officials but the intensity of federal-provincial consultations increases around specific issues.⁴

Provincial officials, while acknowledging the usefulness of C-Trade meetings, add that they also expect the federal government to deal with them directly on matters of significant commercial interest to their provinces. Consequently, the two levels of government often work together through informal collaboration mechanisms on such matters as dispute settlement, dispute avoidance and early warning systems for potential trade disputes. Provincial officials regularly attend certain, international negotiations or dispute procedures as part of the Canadian delegation. They have access to confidential trade negotiating documents associated with current negotiations and they are often asked to review and comment on Canadian proposals or contributions before release or submission. In contrast, perhaps, to civil society participation,

⁴ For example, Canada's dispute with the U.S. over lumber is of primary concern four provinces which are intensively involved with the federal government to find a solution.

provinces are regularly, rather than sporadically asked for their views and priorities in negotiations.

Business and Industry

Canadian business is involved in international trade consultations at three levels: national business federations; sectoral business associations; and individual company consultations with government officials. The main federations in Canada are the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters. There is considerable overlap in membership.

Most Canadian business is also organized into sector-specific interest groups such as producers of steel or professional engineers. These groups will have representation in the Sectoral Advisory Groups organized by the government (See *Consensus Building* section). The position that these groups will take with respect to Canada's external trade negotiations depends upon the specific trade interests of their constituent members.

Individual Canadian companies can seek consultations with trade officials on specific company interests in trade negotiations. These can occur in situations where a country involved in the negotiations is maintaining a trade barrier affecting the interests of a specific company.⁵

Labour

The Canadian Labour Congress and its Quebec-based counterpart, the *Congres des Syndicats Nationaux*, are the principal labour federations in Canada. In recent years, the federations have opposed trade liberalization. They have strongly advocated the incorporation of clauses into trade agreements requiring countries to maintain core labour standards as defined by the International Labour Organization. In the past they have been resistant to participation in the formal Sectoral

⁵ For a more detailed description of consultative process between government and business, see Dymond and Ritchie-Dawson.

Advisory Group process, preferring to work directly with individual Members of Parliament, but this trend seems to be changing and they have been strongly involved in SCFAIT hearings on the Doha Round and the FTAA.

It is important to note that the labour federations represent a minority of Canadian workers. Public opinion polling in recent years has consistently shown that a majority of union members support trade agreements.

Civil Society

Civil society groups and various non-governmental organizations (apart from business and labour) have played an increasingly visible role in the Canadian public debate on international trade issues in recent years. Generally opposed to trade agreements, these groups represent a broad spectrum of Canadian society, ranging from environmental interests, human rights advocates, anti-globalization organizations, and groups that argue that trade agreements constitute unacceptable infringements of Canadian sovereignty. Unlike business and labour groups, which seek to advance the economic interests of their members through supporting or opposing trade agreements, civil society groups seek to assert the primacy of public policy goals other than trade, such as protection of the environment, through international trade agreements.

Civil society groups have had some modest success in influencing the objectives of the Canadian government in trade negotiations. While they have not been able to mobilize public opinion against trade agreements, they have persuaded the Canadian government to press for the incorporation of labour and environment provisions in the NAFTA, and the Canada-Chile and the Canada-Costa Rica free trade agreements.

Academics

Academics play a role in trade policy consultations in a number of ways. First, the government may call on individual experts to serve as a source of technical information and advice. Secondly,

academic think tanks⁶ make important contributions to policy analysis through government sponsored and independent research on issues of concern to policymakers. The publication of such material in the public domain can play an important role in shaping and informing public opinion on an issue. For example, a significant level of public opinion in Canada was opposed to the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States in the 1980s. However, compelling analysis by reputable scholars indicated the consequences for Canadian competitiveness in the absence of such an agreement, thus helping to shift public opinion in the opposite direction.

Part Two: Discussion Issues

Education

The government plays an important role in public education as a resource and as a mediator. Through the government's on-line and printed publications, educators and researchers have access to recent and extensive primary and secondary documentation on a range of trade issues. Another area of strength for the federal government is coordination with outside agencies on the preparation and delivery of education programs. Government input is necessary for defining the terms of reference, and ensuring that the focus remains trade-relevant and is not sidelined by other interests.

The Canadian government has also attempted to get involved in direct education programs in a limited way, with mixed results. The provision of extensive Internet documentation and online consultative mechanisms has been a great benefit to researchers, interest groups, and the general public. On the other hand, federal participation in other forms of direct education has had limited utility because DFAIT lacks means of direct interaction with teachers and students.

⁶ The Canadian think tanks with primary or specialist knowledge in trade policy are the Centre for Trade Policy and Law (Ottawa), the Institute for Research on Public Policy (Montreal), and the C.D. Howe Institute (Toronto). Business and industrial organization such as the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Canadian Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters have some in-house analytical capacity.

Attempts to provide teaching curriculum for senior high school students, for example, have worked to the extent that students can now download detailed material from the Internet written in accessible language, but curricula are not well incorporated into actual classroom work because of lack of knowledge and support by secondary school teachers. By contrast, federal support for seminars and publications by trade and economic think tanks have reached a broad audience and produced important resource materials. This experience suggests that the government's public education objectives should be channeled through independent research organizations with broad public and private sector linkages.

Capture by Private Sector Interests

A certain amount of capture is both necessary and desirable in the creation of trade policy. Those sectors with a material interest in a governmental policy should be consulted on its content and intent and be willing to support it before a government makes the final decision to pursue such an initiative. Generally speaking, however, the more problematic effects of private sector capture are usually avoided in Canada through the checks and balances afforded by a regionally diverse federal system. Politicians must consider the effects of any economic policy decision across the range of industrial sectors, regional interests, and social constituencies to which they are accountable.

Capture is most evident in discrete areas of the domestic economy that are traditionally considered "special" or "sensitive" to imports. These are usually regionally concentrated sectors and/or sectors that have political importance that is proportionately greater than their economic contribution to national incomes. For example, Canada maintains protectionist dairy policies because a high proportion of dairy farmers living in the province of Quebec support the separation of their province from Canada. High consumer prices for milk are thus traded off for national unity considerations.

On the other hand, the textiles and clothing sector, which has in the past successfully ‘captured’ official attention, now seems to be less successful in urging the government to maintain its traditionally protectionist stance. This suggests that other interests, such as retail enterprises or consumers, are becoming relatively more successful at placing their interests on the political agenda than they have been in the past.

In areas of conflict between private sector interests, or between private interests and public goods, reconciliation is a product of the political process. It is based on a judgment by government ministers about which policy option will attract the most public support or the least opposition.

Communications

The Canadian government devotes considerable resources to communications in order to develop and maintain public support for trade policy initiatives their inception to their implementation.

The broad focus of the effort is to analyze the currents in public opinion, often by regional, sectoral or societal interest group, identify the factors likely to change opinion for or against the negotiations, and propose ways and means to consolidate support and counter opposition.

Elements include the preparation of media briefings for ministers, draft speeches, articles for the print media, together with the identification of representatives of business, academics and others who may be expected to support the government’s objectives and provide off-the-record interviews with journalists.

The increased public attention to international trade issues and the widespread access of Canadian citizens to the Internet has made web-based communications a key part of the government’s communications strategies. However, while the government has become a skilled user of Internet resources, they are no match for the web know-how of anti-globalization organizations. Recent experience suggests that while there may be only a small number of people involved in opposition campaigns, anti-trade activists are extremely skilful in conveying their

message to local media and the public, often relying on a mix of domestic and foreign anti-trade sources to produce a “balanced” message. Negative intervention by foreign NGOs, particularly from the United States, may target some domestic organizations in other states on labour, environment, and human rights issues, particularly those countries that have historically been the subject of negative attention by the foreign media in the past

Consultation on Non-Economic Issues

With respect to issues of a non-economic nature such as labor, environment, health, and safety, the first point of government contact for stakeholders would be the relevant federal department (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Labour, etc.). For those areas where responsibilities overlap, i.e. the environmental provisions of a trade agreement, the usual interministerial consultation process would apply (See section on *Federal Interdepartmental Consultation*).

Despite a functional mechanism for dealing with areas of shared concern, trade officials expend a great deal of energy dispelling misinformation about issues that are not the subjects of trade agreements. For example, the government of Canada has promised formally and unconditionally to take no commitments in the areas of social services, public education, or health services. However, DFAIT is continually called upon to repeat this pledge because groups opposing trade capture media attention with claims that social programs, education, and public health are in jeopardy as a result of the WTO, NAFTA, FTAA, etc.

Part Three: The Dialogue with Civil Society in Canada– Achievements and Challenges

By far, the most productive federal consultations are with those groups who share with the government fundamentally similar views on trade liberalization and who are called upon to advise on technical issues of approach and implementation within their sector. More difficult are

the discussions with organizations with markedly different views on the direction of government policy and the impact of trade liberalization efforts on other areas of public policy.

As a matter of process, the dialogue is well developed in Canada. There is no trade policy initiative currently under consideration for which extensive public input has not been sought by the federal government. The formal and informal mechanisms for consultation, education and information dissemination are exemplary and the groups that participate in the policy development process come from all regions and conceivable sphere of interest. Despite these achievements, the process is not without its problems. Chief among them are determinations of legitimacy of civil society groups, bureaucratic rent seeking, and effectiveness.

While numerous groups seek to influence federal policy, their right to a voice in public affairs is largely self-proclaimed. There are troubling questions as to whether self-appointed civil society organizations have legitimate representative authority, especially in a democracy where constituents can and do maintain direct contact with their political representatives. To complicate matters further, problems can arise when a country like Canada, which has an open model of citizen engagement and allows its citizens broad access to negotiating documents, is involved in negotiations with a less open country. It is inevitable that the Canadian NGOs will pass information on to their counterparts in the more closed country. Therefore the openness model used by all countries involved will become, *de facto*, identical to the most open model adopted by any participating country.⁷

Even though they are most often on the front lines of consultation with civil society, bureaucrats, since they are not elected themselves, lack the authority to decide which organizations have a legitimate voice in influencing government action and which do not. Nevertheless, some observers argue that it is the bureaucracy that has the greatest interest in perpetuating the civil society consultation mechanism. Over the past decade in Canada,

considerable resources have been expended to establish bureaucratic coordination of the consultative process. Those officials who have built their careers in this area of government have a vested interest in seeing the consultation bureaucracy continue and expand.

Effectiveness is an important measure of the civil society dialogue. Many civil society organizations bring an agenda that government officials cannot deal with – demanding changes in the fundamental direction of government policy rather than on policy content, which is the only area officials have the authority to deal with in a representative democracy. So from the perspective of civil society groups seeking to influence public policy, most points of access to the government are ineffective for achieving their ends.

In contrast, consultation does provide a measure of effectiveness in terms of managing the policy process. The dialogue with civil society performs a political function because it allows the government to be seen to be doing the right thing. As Mike Moore, former WTO-Director General reminds us, even though “civil society is not always civil... they deserve to be listened to. If we are not inclusive, we cannot expect public support.”⁸ However, in Canada, policy is more likely to be swayed by public opinion polling that reaches directly to a broad cross-section of the electorate rather than through lobbying by organizations whose right to speak on behalf of others is largely self-proclaimed.

Another gauge for measuring effectiveness is in the area of federal-provincial consultation. From the provincial perspective mechanisms for consultation are largely effective. However, the provinces criticize the government for being too timid on transparency if it involves challenging the norms of international regimes. They argue that Canada should not, for example, have to ask a NAFTA Chapter 11 panel for permission to share documents with provinces with

⁷ This concern was brought to the attention of the Canadian trade officials in a report prepared for DFAIT by Grant Isaac entitled *International Trade and Citizen Engagement: Transparency and Participation in the Trade Policy Advisory System* (20 June 2001).

⁸ Mike Moore, “Challenges for the Global Tradeing System in the New Milennium,” Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC (September 28, 1999).

direct interests in the dispute. Argues one provincial official, “The federal government should proactively assert what it will do and panels will have to adjust.”

Effectiveness depends on the question being asked: effective for what? The recommendations of SCFAIT on public consultation in trade matters are that “there be space within trade rules to allow for appropriate exercise of democratic judgment on matters within the public interest.” In practice, this has meant the creation of more mechanisms for public input and greater attention paid by officials to recognizing this input, so a “space” has been created and the SCFAIT objective nominally fulfilled. Has much of this input shaped public policy? Probably not. The diversion of government attention to dealing with public consultation forces us to ask whether the content of Canadian trade policy has suffered as a result. On the one hand, officials argue that too many resources are being allocated to the “appearance of doing the right thing” and too few on developing farsighted and effective policy content.

On the other hand, the demand for such policies has not been high. One of the reasons for this is conspicuous silence on the part of business to articulate meaningful demands for future trade policies.⁹ As one official noted, “it’s difficult to find a business constituency for consultations, let alone to have ‘effective’ ones.” Tougher critics of the inclusiveness of the process however, attribute business silence to displacement by other groups and frustration with a system that now moves so slowly as DFAIT tries to be all things to all people. A veteran participant in the consultative process notes that the value of consultation seems to be diminished as DFAIT “tries to be seen to be including the desires of every diverse interest group. Seemingly

nothing can proceed without stakeholder consultations and the determination of the lowest common denominator position. My sense is that the business community is finding less and less value in participation as they are asked to input at the same time as any NGO and seemingly have no more weight in their advice.”

⁹ Syliva Ostry, “Foggy in Seattle,” *The National Post* (November 26, 1999), 21.

In many ways, Canada provides a worthwhile model for of public-private sector consultation in the formation of trade policy. However, the operation of a number of the instruments employed in the model raises important questions about the appropriate balance between public participation and development of effective trade policy and how the government might work to improve this in the future.

Selected Background Documents

SCFAIT. *Canada and the Future of the World Trade Organization: Advancing a Millennium Agenda in the Public Interest*. Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (June 1999).

Gerald J. Schmitz, “Democratizing Trade Agreements: Contesting the “Corporate Millennium”?” Paper presented to the International Political Science Association (July 2000).

Peter J. Smith and Elizabeth Smythe, “This is What Democracy Looks Like? Globalization, New Information Technology and the Trade Policy Process: Some Comparative Observations,” Paper presented to the International Studies Association (March 2002).

Denis Stairs, “The Policy Process and Dialogues with Demos: Liberal Pluralism with a Transnational Twist,” in *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue*, Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, eds. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998)

Robert Wolfe, “Confronting the Aftermyth of Seattle: Canada Must Set Key Trade Priorities Now,”