



RE-388

***SELF EVALUATION OF OVE'S
WORK: 2001-2010***

Office of Evaluation and Oversight, OVE

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ACRONYMS

A&E	Audit and Evaluation Committee
BES	Bank Evaluation System
BOD	Board of Executive Directors
CPE	Country Program Evaluation
DAC	Development Assistant Committee
DEM	Development Effectiveness Matrix
ECG	Evaluation Cooperation Group
EDs	Executive Directors
EvalNet	Evaluation Network
EVO	Evaluation Office
EVP	Office of the Executive Vice-President
GRADE	Group Reading Assessment and Diagnostic Evaluation
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IIC	Inter-American Investment Corporation
IRP	Independent Review Panel
LACEA-IEN	Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association-Impact Evaluation Network
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
MIF	Multilateral Investment Fund
MfR	Management for Results
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
OEO	Operations Evaluation Office
ORE	Office of External Review and Evaluation
OVE	Office of Evaluation and Oversight
PCR	Project Completion Report
PPMR	Project Performance Monitoring Report
PPR	Project Performance Report
REPEC-IDEAS	Research Papers in Economics-Documents in Economics Access Service
SGO	Sovereign Guarantee Operations
NSG	Non-Sovereign Guaranteed
SPD	Strategic Planning Department
TAPOMA	Task Force on Portfolio Management

TC
TOR
WPs

Technical Cooperation
Terms of Reference
Working Papers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This self evaluation has been prepared by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) in response to a request from Executive Directors to support the work of the Independent Review Panel (IRP), which has been tasked with undertaking an external, independent review of the evaluation function at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The self evaluation consists of an executive summary, a section on the background to the evaluation function, and 8 separate sections organized around the eight issue areas contained in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the IRP (RE-366-2). Specific questions from the TORs are presented as bullets, and are followed by OVE's self evaluation responses. This document presents responses to questions that can be answered with verifiable data in OVE's possession. Several questions in the TOR ask for the subjective perceptions of others regarding OVE's work, and an attempt will be made to answer those questions in a separate annex to be completed by mid-January, 2011.

The empirical basis for this self evaluation was provided by OVE staff who conducted a structured review of evaluation product sent to the Board since 2001. A database of these individual assessments constitutes the basic material from which this summary self evaluation report has been created.

OVE was created by the Board of Executive Directors in 2000 after a period of intensive reflection on why previous attempts at institutionalizing evaluation had failed. The diagnosis found that past evaluation offices lacked both independence and credibility, that management sought to limit and constrain the scope of evaluation, and that the Board was divided with respect to the priority assigned to evaluation work. In hopes of addressing these past failures, OVE was created with a direct reporting line to the Board of Executive Directors and a separate line item in the Bank's budget. It was charged both with conducting evaluation work and overseeing Management's self evaluation work. Evaluation work was defined as a "shared responsibility" between Board, Management, and OVE. Shortly after the creation of OVE, the Bank's information disclosure policy was revised to permit the full public disclosure of evaluation reports, which contributed to the transparency of the function.

The Board approved general guidance for OVE that focused its work on the development effectiveness of Bank interventions in the region. Each year, the Board approves a work plan for the Office balanced across the areas of oversight studies, Country Program evaluations (CPEs), policy and instrument evaluations, sector, thematic and ex-post evaluations. Resource requests from the Office have been approved by the Board, and increased when necessary to accommodate new expectations for evaluation work. Staffing and budget have remained stable as a share of the Bank's overall administrative budget.

OVE was able to recruit a high-quality professional staff, and received initial support from Management in establishing a system of staff rotation. The formal

rotation system did not survive past the first two years; however OVE has established a good track record of placing staff in Management positions on an ad hoc basis, and has been able to attract Bank staff to apply for competitive openings. Previous concerns regarding the quality of evaluation staff have not been raised with regard to OVE.

The work of the Office has been organized around a key set of standards. The Development Assistant Committee (DAC) evaluation standards (relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability) have served as the core substantive questions guiding evaluation work. Because of a history of weak information systems and the lack of a culture of evidence and citation in the Bank, all evaluations have focused heavily on finding and presenting empirical evidence to validate claims of results.

OVE's insistence on evidence has been a source of tension with both Management and the Board. The task of Management is to organize effort, and there is a natural desire to be recognized and rewarded for such effort. OVE's methods, however, require evidence of results, and do not treat effort as equivalent to outcomes. This focus does not mean that outcomes were not in fact achieved, merely that the Bank has no evidence that can be cited to substantiate claims of results. When evidence on results cannot be produced by Management or discovered by OVE, the only possible conclusion is that the Bank does not know what impact it has had with its operations. This lack of evidence has at times proved frustrating to the Board, as have the recurring recommendations from OVE that more effort needs to be made to gather evidence on results in Bank operations.

A second consequence to the empirical focus of OVE's work is that it frequently challenges the prevailing conventional wisdom. An early OVE report noted the Bank's tendency to adopt policy prescriptions that were fashionable at the time, and to implement such policies without adequate evidence that they would be effective in the particular context of the Bank's borrowing member countries. Subsequent reports used empirical data to challenge the Bank's policy approaches to such critical issues as water and sanitation, poverty reduction, education, and health. While such challenges to conventional wisdom are a normal part of academic and scientific discussion, they had been much less a part of traditional Bank culture, which tended to present borrowers with a united front on the preferred course of action in a given area.

The selection of topics for evaluation was a product of Bank policy, Board preferences, and the suggestions from OVE regarding interesting topics to evaluate. Country program evaluations were mandated by policy, as were ex-post evaluations after 2003. The Board periodically requested specific evaluations dealing with the overall direction of the Bank's lending program, controversial policies such as capital adequacy and emergency lending, and the evaluation of specific "initiatives" identified as a priority by Management.

In proposing additional evaluation topics to the Board, OVE used the knowledge obtained from mandated evaluation activities to identify areas most in need of improvement. While a logical use of scarce evaluation resources, this decision shaped an evaluation agenda that emphasized Bank weaknesses rather than strengths.

Over the 10 years of its existence, OVE has produced a substantial volume of evaluation work, including 47 country program evaluations, 98 other documents in the “RE” series that are sent to the Board for consideration, 27 evaluation reports for the MIF, IIC and Japan Special Fund, and 65 technical reports and working papers.

In the course of this work, OVE make 550 specific recommendations in the RE-series substantive evaluations sent to the Board for consideration. Most of these received specific comments from Management, and all were considered by either the Policy and Evaluation Committee or the Programming Committee of the Board. A review of the comments and subsequent Board discussion shows that disagreement with OVE recommendations was rare, with some disagreements recorded in the minutes with respect to only 7% of all OVE recommendations..

The absence of disagreement is an ambiguous finding, given the nature of OVE’s recommendations and the Bank’s internal consensus culture. Most recommendations call for further analysis and consideration of complex issues related to sectors, country conditions, instruments, conditionalities, and policies. Such recommendations may be too general to elicit specific disagreement. This problem is compounded by the lack of an effective system to follow up on OVE recommendations. The Bank has not followed the practice of other institutions in requiring a formal “Management Action Response” to recommendations, and the follow-up systems adopted by the Board and Management have been largely ineffective. This is a clear area for future improvement.

OVE has established formal procedures for the quality control of its evaluations, relying on both internal and external peer reviews of documents sent to the Board. The quality of data available varies across the range of evaluation studies, and some are able to mobilize better empirical information than others. Comments on the quality of OVE documents recorded in the minutes of Board discussions are overwhelmingly favorable.

The use and impact of evaluation reports varies significantly from one study to the next. On the whole, oversight studies related to the Bank’s norms and procedures for evaluating projects and recording results have been quite influential. All Governors agreements related to the Bank’s lending program concluded after 2000 have incorporated both the analysis and recommendations of OVE reports. Management has adopted many of the recommendations of these studies, most particularly OVE’s ongoing work on assessing the evaluability of Bank interventions. Evaluability standards are now at the heart of Management’s

Development Effectiveness activities, and have been incorporated into the expectations of Governors in the IDB-9 capital increase agreement.

Country program evaluations have also generally had some influence on the evolution of the Banks' programming relations with borrowing member countries. The IDB has a greater commitment to CPEs than other multilateral institutions, as it is the only multilateral to require a specific schedule for CPEs for each borrowing member country. Agreement from Management with the conclusions and recommendations of CPEs has increased steadily over time, and country authorities have generally commented favorably on the CPE process.

Across a broad range of issues, OVE has issued reports that challenge the empirical basis of prevailing claims regarding the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of Bank interventions in the region. These challenges have sometimes provoked controversy, but on the whole, it is OVE's view that these controversies have been helpful to the institution in deepening thought and opening up new possibilities. This process has contributed to the goal set for evaluation in the Bank's Institutional Strategy that:

“The goal of an effective evaluation system is to create an internal culture of continuous improvement, where individuals and work units are constantly looking critically at their own activities in order to find new and better ways to realize their objectives.”

In thinking about the future of the evaluation function at the IDB, this self evaluation highlights the role that an independent, empirically focused, challenging OVE can play in opening up possibilities for institutional change and improvement. While there are clear opportunities for improvement in the work of the Office, (including improved outreach, more explicit and actionable recommendations, explicit and measurable quality standards for evaluation work) it's essential institutional role of challenging complacency deserves to be preserved.

The internal culture and governance structure of the institution, however, makes preserving such a function a complex and difficult task. Challenging conventional wisdom cuts against the grain of a consensus-oriented culture, while reporting directly to the Board of Executive Directors brings the potential for increased tension between Board and Management. That tension has been productive in the past, and a case could be made for continuing these institutional arrangements. A case could also be made for having OVE report directly to Governors, as partially envisioned in the IDB-9 agreement.

I. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 OVE was created in 1999 as yet another attempt to deal with a longstanding problem of how to successfully embed an evaluation function within the organization. Evaluation in the Bank started in the late 1960s, when the Board established the Group of Controllers of the Review and Evaluation System, which recommended the establishment of an Office of Ex-Post Evaluation in 1974. A 1981 review of the operation of the evaluation function found that evaluation was confined almost exclusively to the ex-post evaluation of individual projects, and that the Board's role in evaluation was "ad hoc and somewhat distant." (RE-99-A) Bank policy required countries to undertake ex-post evaluations of their projects, but these were generally not carried out.
- 1.2 From that review through 1993, the Bank had a dual evaluation system, comprised an external evaluation unit (Office of External Review and Evaluation, ORE) and an internal evaluation unit (Operations Evaluation Office, OEO). The first unit answered directly to the Board of Executive Directors and undertook studies according to an annual work plan approved by the Board (document AB-714). The second unit under the Office of the Controller was responsible for conducting and coordinating ex-post evaluations of operations and deriving lessons learned, both for the benefit of the Bank as well as for member countries, in order to improve future operations (OP-305).
- 1.3 In 1993, the Board believed the system needed to be changed (although without an explicit analysis of the problems requiring change), and approved GN-1781, which created a new Office (EVO) combining the functions of ORE and OEO. GN-1781 created a dual reporting structure, with EVO sending its reports to both the Board and the President simultaneously. The mandate of the new Office was established in RE-200, which described in broad outline a Bank Evaluation System (BES) that was to be overseen by the new EVO. The BES was endorsed by Governors in the IDB-8 replenishment agreement (AB-1704).
- 1.4 The new Office encountered substantial difficulties from the outset, related to the independence of the Office, the quality of the staff, limitations placed on the work program by Management, and excessive delays in the consideration of evaluation documents owing to the dual reporting structure. These problems were laid out explicitly in the end-of-term report made by EVO's first director (RE-235).
- 1.5 In response to these problems, the Board established the Working Group on Oversight and Evaluation in the spring of 1998 to examine the functioning of the evaluation system, "*...in light of concerns that the Bank Evaluation System (BES) was not performing the role envisaged for it when it was approved in 1995.*" (RE-238). Through a series of studies, focus groups, and interviews, the Working Group identified a series of major problems affecting the evaluation system. The focus groups reported that an underlying cause of the observed problems was one of commitment to evaluation:

- *“The majority of EDs believed that Management is not fully committed to evaluation. While some believed Management is doing internal evaluation better, there is a prevailing view that they are more interested in new projects and disbursing money...” (RE-238, Annex 3, page 4)*
- *“Some EDs also believed that the Board is not committed to evaluation. They believed that the Board needed to make more time to hear about what is working and not working in the borrowing countries.” (RE-238, Annex 3, page 4)*

1.6 RE-238 provided a thorough inventory of problems encountered by EVO in carrying out its mandate under RE-200 (See Box 1). To address these problems, RE-238 proposed the creation of a new office reporting directly to the Board of Executive Directors (called “OEO” in RE-238 but later changed to “OVE”), defined evaluation as a “shared responsibility” between OVE, Management and the Board. OVE was assigned the following responsibilities:

The Board should approve the creation of an independent evaluation office reporting to the Board of Executive Directors through its Policy and Evaluation Committee. ...The Bank requires a unit capable of undertaking independent and systematic evaluation of the Bank’s strategies, policies, programs, activities, delivery support functions and systems. This unit should be responsible for the dissemination of evaluation findings working with the Office of Learning and should provide oversight and support for enhancing the effectiveness of the Bank’s evaluation system.

Box 1 Evaluation Issues in EVO From RE-238

Implementation difficulties were encountered, however, with the actual role, work program and budgetary priorities of the Evaluation Office, as well as in dealing with its managerial and professional skills. Some aspects of the BES, which required active involvement of Management, have remained incipient, or enjoyed only limited support. The Working Group on Oversight and Evaluation has examined these issues, and held consultations with stakeholders in the Executive Board, Managers and Country Offices to see how best to address them. Areas of recurrent concern were seen in relation to:

- *the dual reporting relationship of EVO and the resulting difficulties arising from the need to serve simultaneously different clients in the Bank, and having to reconcile conflictive work priorities*
- *the expectations resulting from the requirement placed by Management that the Office dedicate a pre-determined share of its budget resources to a specific type of evaluation work This affected EVO'S ability to respond to its mandated evaluation role at the policy, program, and system levels, especially when the budget of the Office was maintained constant, in nominal terms, over the last five years*
- *the lack of the office's functional independence from Management caused by the loss of control over a significant portion of its budgetary resources*
- *the limited progress made in conducting independent evaluation work in the areas of strategic performance of IDB-8 priority areas and country programs*
- *the limited progress achieved in assuring an effective feedback and dissemination of Project Performance Reports (PPRs) for which substantial budget resources were expended -- and other evaluation studies prepared by EVO*
- *the limited progress in incorporating or mainstreaming evaluation work in departmental business plans, budget priorities, and operational decision-making processes; and*
- *the dysfunctional process followed by the Audit and Evaluation Committee of Management in reviewing or acting upon EVO evaluation reports.*
- *the limited progress achieved in developing, in partnership with Management and staff, suitable evaluation standards and benchmarks in the design of country programs, and in the newly formulated operational strategies and policies of the Bank*
- *the limited progress by Management in establishing and maintaining an ongoing and transparent mechanism to track and measure progress in implementing; Board approved recommendations resulting from independent evaluation reports.*

The initial organization and subsequent performance record of the Office were marred by management and staffing problems. Averting or mitigating their recurrence requires greater clarity in roles and responsibilities and the resources to perform them adequately. Also needed is close collaboration with Management to enhance evaluation staff mobility and career development

1.7 Management was assigned responsibility for “...real time project evaluations and the monitoring of portfolio performance, conducted in close collaboration with Country Office and borrowers”

1.8 For its part, the Board was assigned specific responsibilities for:

- Monitoring Management implementation of the performance agreements adopted in conjunction with the approval of each year's administrative budget.
- Consideration of reports on implementation by Management, of Board decisions resulting from evaluation reports and organizational studies, including such aspects as human resource management, delegation and decentralization of authority, and organizational arrangements of the Bank's governing bodies.
- Review of the annual portfolio management reports to the Programming Committee, as well as periodic monitoring reports on country loan portfolios.
- Review of the relevant findings from country program and policy evaluation reports, with special attention to implementation and future program design issues.
- Review of the dissemination and feedback practices in policy development, planning, and operational decision-making, in order to benefit from the body of Best Practices and Lessons Learned from the Bank's oversight and evaluation activities.
- Review of the findings and recommendations arising from the evaluation of Bank strategies, policies, country programs, operations, and institutional processes.
- Review of operational procedures for loan and technical cooperation processing, as well as the provision of non-financial services to Latin American and Caribbean member countries.

1.9 Aside from these definitions of responsibilities, RE-238 did not provide explicit guidance as to how evaluations should be carried out, or what evaluative criteria should be used. Deriving specific guidance from RE-238 is also hampered by its structure. It contains separate reports from a Task Group on Oversight and Evaluation, from a consulting firm reporting focus groups results, from several other Board-sponsored reports related in some way to evaluation, and from a workshop held with the President and Executive Directors. Only seven specific recommendations were approved by the Board, five of which relate to implementation procedures.

1.10 Because of the incomplete nature of RE-238, further guidance from the Board with regard to the specific objectives and practices of evaluation has been provided from time to time since the creation of OVE. Key guidance documents include the Bank's Institutional Strategy (GN-2077-1, August, 1999), OVE's mission statement (RE-244-2, October, 2000), a policy on ex-post evaluation (OP-305, October of 2003), and a protocol for the conduct of country program evaluations (RE-271-1, April, 2003, revised May, 2009).

II. EVALUATION POLICY: ROLE, RESPONSIBILITY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

• Does the institution under review have an evaluation policy?

- 2.1 As the background section above indicates, the Bank does not have an evaluation policy per se. Institutional guidance on evaluation is provided in a number of different Board-approved documents. RE-200 defines the broad outlines of the Bank Evaluation System (BES) and was approved in May of 1995 as the terms of reference for the newly created Evaluation Office (EVO). It has never been formally modified or rescinded. RE-238 (June, 1999) is a report from a joint Board-Management Working Group on Evaluation containing analysis of evaluation issues in the Bank, and seven specific recommendations that were subsequently adopted by the Board. It contains terms of reference for the newly created Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE). The Bank's Institutional Strategy (GN-2077-1, August, 1999) also contained guidance on the conduct of evaluation in the institution. The broad mandates of these two documents were converted into a specific mission statement for OVE in RE-244-2, adopted by the Board in October of 2000. The Board adopted a specific policy on ex-post evaluation (OP-305) in October of 2003, and a protocol for the conduct of country program evaluations (RE-271-1), and the Bank's operations manuals contain several procedural policies related to monitoring and evaluation of ongoing operations.

• Does the policy describe the role, governance structure and position of the evaluation unit?

- 2.2 RE-238 provides explicit guidance on role, governance structure, and position of OVE. As to role, RE-238 states:

- *•OEO evaluation work should concentrate on country, thematic, strategy and policy topics, although these should not be a priori restrictions on evaluation topics or coverage which could be performed by OEO. OEO should also perform, on a sample basis, development impact or effectiveness evaluations of loan and technical cooperation (TC) operations.*
- *•The primary focus of evaluation work carried out by Management should be (on real time project evaluations and the monitoring of portfolio performance) conducted in close collaboration with Country Office and borrowers.*
- *•OEO has responsibility for overseeing the quality of all evaluation systems involving program and project performance in the Bank. It should report to the Board, as needed, on the quality of all evaluation activities in the Bank.*

2.3 As to position, OVE has a separate line item in the Bank's budget and has a direct reporting line to the Board of Executive Directors on the Bank's organizational chart. Governance is defined by the Terms of Reference for the Director of the Office (included as an annex to RE-238). These specify approval of OVE work programs by the Board of Directors, and give the Director full responsibility for all other aspects of the work of the Office.

2.4 Finally, with respect to governance, RE-238 contains Terms of Reference for the Director of OVE which state:

“The Director will discharge his responsibilities through the Office of Oversight, and Evaluation (“the Office”) and shall report directly to the Board of Executive Directors, independently of the Bank’s Management. The Director’s liaison with the Board is to be maintained through the Policy and Evaluation Committee. The Board established this Committee in July of 1998 to assist in the conduct to its work relating to the oversight and evaluation in the Bank. The Committee reviews the work program and reports produced by the Director, the responses to them by Management and raises for consideration by the Board the issues of policy identified.”

• Does the evaluation function provide a useful coverage of all the activities/operations/programmes of the institution?

2.5 The evaluation function includes OVE, the self evaluation work done by Management, and the evaluation and oversight responsibilities of the Board of Executive Directors. In theory, these three systems provide coverage for all activities, operations, and programs of the institution; however the depth of coverage of these issues by any one of the three components varies substantially. OVE evaluates projects, programs and policies of the institution, and supervises the quality of self evaluation practices, but has a relatively small staff and can do such in-depth work on only a portion of this universe in any given year. Management has substantially more resources for its self-evaluation work, and is required by policy to assess projects and programs both in execution and upon completion. Compliance with these policy expectations, however, has only been partial. The Board has a range of oversight and evaluation responsibilities defined in RE-238 which are largely focused on the task of reviewing the work of Management and OVE.

2.6 There are three main activities of the Bank that are not well covered by evaluation work: budget, human resources, and information technology. In 1999, when OVE was created, budgets contained no information on expected results, with the consequence that they could not be subject to evaluation by either management or OVE. Over time, there have been efforts to move the Bank toward evaluable, results-based budgeting, but these efforts have achieved only partial success. The adequacy of Management's strategies and policies for human resource management has been a concern of the Board for several years, and in 2004 OVE prepared a concept paper on how these issues might be evaluated (RE-302). The

Board recommended postponement of this evaluation when it was initially proposed, and while the item has remained a possible element in OVE's work program, the Board has never endorsed its inclusion and did not do so again with the proposed work plan for 2011.

- 2.7 The Bank's systems for information storage, management, retrieval, and use have also been the focus of concern in many Board discussions. Most OVE reports find an inadequate base of information on Bank activities to permit complete evaluation, and OVE's review of the Bank's studies (RE-323) documented the difficulty of finding completed studies in the Bank's IDBDocs database. The Board has agreed that these issues fall within the purview of Management, which has undertaken several reviews of the Bank's information technology policy, with only a very slow improvement in the quality of information available to support decision making.

• According to the policy, how does evaluation contribute to institutional learning and accountability?

- 2.8 Learning and accountability are generally identified as the dual functions of evaluation in policy documents, although neither is rigorously defined by policy. According to RE-238:

The purpose of evaluation is to improve the management of specific activities. Evaluation is a tool of Board oversight when its purpose is to assess corporate accountability. It is a tool of management oversight when it aims to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of specific activities.

- 2.9 Subsequent policy documents however, tend to treat accountability as a problem for the Bank, while regarding learning as an opportunity. The Bank's Institutional Strategy (GN-2077-1) observed that the Bank needed to both "*improve its functions in order to minimize diffuse operational practices that lack transparency and accountability*" (par. 8.4) and "*view itself as a 'learning Bank'*" The realignment document (GA-232) noted that "*accountability of the operational units for project quality is diluted*" (par. 5.7) and observed that "*... the Bank's capacity to report with confidence on its contributions to development in the region or on its approach to managing developmental risks is still not satisfactory.*" (par. 5.5)

- 2.10 The Institutional Strategy sought to combine the twin objectives of learning and accountability into a broad mission statement for the evaluation function:

The goal of an effective evaluation system is to create an internal culture of continuous improvement, where individuals and work units are constantly looking critically at their own activities in order to find new and better ways to realize their objectives. (par. 6.40)

- 2.11 OVE has contributed both to the learning and accountability functions of the institution. According to OVE's internal self evaluation review of its work, 77%

percent (18/22) of the oversight studies, the recommendations were followed by Management having constituted the fundamental diagnostic basis for the New Lending Framework, the Realignment Proposal, the Development Effectiveness Framework, and the Better Bank Proposal in the context of the Global Capital increase. Chapter VIII on evaluation use includes details of the organizational changes that have explicitly been based on OVE's work.

• How is the relationship between evaluation and audit conceptualized within the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) member under review?

- 2.12 This issue was addressed in RE-238, specifically in the section dealing with Report of the Task Group on Oversight and Evaluation, which found:

The differences between the scope of the work in an evaluation and an internal audit are several and they reside in the different expectations and perceptions of the Board and Management from either of these two groups. However, there is a distinct difference in overall scope, opportunity of review, and the emphasis of the review. The internal audit focuses on ascertaining compliance with policies and procedures. The efficiency and quality of performance focuses mainly on the activities performed by Finance, Administration, and the Regional Operational Departments and Country Offices. Internal audit focuses on the quality of performance (operational audits) and targets projects under execution to ascertain the quality, adequacy, and effectiveness of supervision and surveillance. In this regard, evaluation targets projects to ascertain that project objectives are consistent with Bank development objectives and the degree to which those objectives are achieved. The objective is to derive lessons from the experience and assess performance as a necessary feedback to the project development cycle.

To this end, both functions are distinct but complementary to the extent that both should provide a valuable input to the oversight system. The relationship between evaluation and internal audit should be established through a continuous exchange of information, since the internal audit work would certainly enhance and contribute to improve the focus of the evaluation work by more effectively identifying problem areas or areas where there are abundant opportunities for adding value. This will contribute to the continuous reengineering process of the organization.

• Is the evaluation policy adequately known and implemented at all levels of the institution? (i.e. Headquarters, Country Offices, Program and Project level)

- 2.13 Since there is no single, unified evaluation policy, knowledge of its different component parts varies across the institution, as does its implementation. Country Offices are fully aware of the policies related to monitoring and reporting on operations, as well as the protocol for the conduct of country program evaluations, and these two policies are relatively well-implemented. RE-238 is not well known throughout the institution, nor are the provisions of GN-2077-1 dealing

with evaluation. RE-244 is somewhat better known because it guides the construction of the annual work program of OVE that is approved by the Board each year. OP-305 is virtually unknown in the institution, since it guides the work of OVE and management on ex-post evaluations that are not presented to the Board. However, different Bank units are aware of OVE's ex-post evaluation work in their sectors. For example, OVE's assessment of neighborhood upgrading programs is well known, as is OVE's work on labor training, competitiveness, science and technology, and recently justice and citizen security.

• To what extent are the evaluation department and the evaluation process independent from line management?

- 2.14 OVE is functionally independent from line management in the drafting of reports and recommendations. While these reports are sent for review by line management, they are not “cleared” by management, and OVE is free to accept or reject suggested changes. OVE does, however, depend somewhat on line management for the conduct of field visits, where the Bank's country offices provide support in arranging missions and interviews with stakeholders relevant to the evaluation. There have been several occasions when OVE was unable to complete field visits on schedule owing to logistical conflicts in the field offices, but an evaluation has never been blocked by line management.
- 2.15 The ECG has developed a template for the assessment of the independence of an evaluation department within a given institution. Annex 1 shows that OVE is fully independent according to that assessment methodology.

• What are the formal and actual drivers ensuring/constraining the evaluation department's independence?

- 2.16 Formally, OVE's independence is assured by having its own separate line item in the Bank's budget, having complete authority in the hiring of staff, having a review process for reports that does not require clearance from management, and by the Board practice of taking note of evaluation findings rather than approving them. Informally, however, there are some more subtle incentives that have the potential to constrain the independence of the Office.
- 2.17 At the Board level, there is an asymmetry in the reaction to evaluation reports that also exerts a subtle influence in the work of the Office. Reports that enjoy the concurrence of Management are well received by the Board, while reports that involve conflict between Management and OVE are less well-received. Regularly, Board members express a desire to receive reports which contain a consensus between OVE and Management.
- 2.18 This preference for comity is understandable for three reasons: the Board devotes at most two hours to the consideration of an OVE report and cannot be expected to be deeply familiar with the subject under discussion. Agreement between OVE and Management thus economizes on Board attention, while disagreement makes

a greater claim on this limited resource. Second, the Board makes most of its decisions by consensus, and thus finds consensus documents more familiar. Third, the Board merely “takes note” of OVE reports, and thus avoids the difficult task of instructing management. To instruct management, the Board would have to fully internalize the analysis and recommendations of OVE, a process that would require considerably more time than is typically allocated to discussion of evaluation documents.

- 2.19 The Board preference for agreement does not formally constrain OVE’s independence, and controversial documents are produced by the Office on a regular basis. This is done, however, in full knowledge of the likelihood of a less warm reception of such reports by the Board.

• What is the evaluation department’s experience in exposing successes and failures of operational activities/programmes/projects/strategies/policies and their implementation?

- 2.20 Answering this question requires the ability to determine what constitutes success or failure of Bank activities. This in turn requires a clear understanding of the intent of an activity as a benchmark against which to measure success or failure. Evaluation studies always look for intent as the starting point of evaluation work, and virtually all such studies done by OVE demonstrate very poor specification of initial intent by the Bank.

- 2.21 This problem has been demonstrated most concretely in OVE’s work on the evaluability of Bank projects and programs. The first part of an evaluability assessment looks at the diagnosis of the problem, the logic model that links a proposed intervention to that problem, and the baseline data that establish the initial conditions from which success or failure can be measured. Evaluability assessments of all projects approved in 2001, 2005 and 2009 found very few that contain sufficient data to establish initial intent and provide an adequate basis for determining success or failure. Similarly, RE-247 examined Project Completion Reports (PCRs) and found that only one-fifth contained objectives at project completion that were fully congruent with the original intent of the project. Objectives were either missing (no statement of success or failure) or different from those of the original loan (moving the goalposts). Such behavior makes accountability for results impossible.

- 2.22 This constraint is compounded by the systematic lack of documentation of results discussed elsewhere in this report. These two constraints limit the extent to which evaluations can systematically identify when projects and programmes were “successes” and when they were not. Nevertheless, when data is available and intent can be ascertained, OVE has been rigorous in documenting and demonstrating successes and failures, particularly in the context of Country Program Evaluations and Ex-Post Evaluations. Because of these characteristics of Bank interventions, OVE has been only partially effective at exposing successes and failures. OVE reports provide the full range of information

available about a given project or program, but this report on current conditions is not the same as an analysis of success or failure.

• What is the evaluation department’s experience in challenging conventional wisdom?

- 2.23 Challenging the conventional wisdom has been a component in virtually every evaluation done by OVE since its inception. In its first major substantive report on development effectiveness (RE-260), OVE drew attention to the dangers associated with thinking that merely followed convention. Quoting Moises Naim, the report noted:

“What changes more often, the fashion designs coming from Paris and Milan or the economic policy designs Washington and Wall Street prescribe to countries that are less developed or that are emerging from decades of communism? While this comparison may seem frivolous, a review of the ideas that have guided thinking and action about economic reforms in this decade shows that they are as faddish as skirt lengths and tie widths. The difference, of course, is that economic policy fashions affect the way millions of people live and define their children’s chances for a better future.”

- 2.24 OVE’s policy and strategy evaluations are particularly focused on challenging the conventional wisdom, since policies and strategies are often the guidance vehicles that embody the fashion of the moment. To get at this issue, OVE’s work in these areas concentrates on examining the evidence available to support the implementation of policy prescriptions in the context of the Bank’s borrowing member countries. Consistently, OVE has found weak empirical support for many of the Bank’s policy prescriptions. For example:

- RE-270 found that the Bank approached the water utility sector with a set of policy prescriptions that distilled the conventional wisdom from European and North America but which were not well suited to regional realities. A rigid insistence on private provision of services combined with public regulation appeared to achieve some success in major urban areas, but blocked implementation in rural areas where the private sector was not interested in a high-risk, low-return endeavor like water supply, and where public regulatory capacity was inadequate. The result was a policy-induced collapse in Bank lending for water, which has been reversed only after the policy constraints were modified.
- RE-281 found that the Bank’s approach to education embodied conventional wisdom with regard to the benefits of teacher training and increasing school autonomy. Examining data on actual student achievement, however, the evaluation found a negative impact of teacher training (reductions in student contact-time as teachers leave for training), and an insignificant impact of school autonomy on educational outcomes. The evaluation concluded that *“The results of this study call attention to several assumptions embedded in the strategies which may lack strong*

empirical support and may require a more detailed analysis than in the current strategy documents.”

- RE-291 found that the Bank’s strategic approach to agriculture embodied the conventional wisdom that existing governmental structures for protecting and promoting agricultural production were inefficient, and this led to lending operations designed to lower import barriers and dismantle public institutions granting credit to farmers. Despite a belief that private institutions would fill the void left by the dismantled public programs, the evaluation found that this did not occur.
- RE-324 found that the Bank’s approach to health embodied a conventional wisdom that was either not supported by empirical evidence, or flatly contradicted by that evidence. User fees, for example, were a feature of many projects, despite existing evidence that user fees have negative impacts on equity, access, efficiency, and revenue collection. Contracting for services to the private sector was also widely embraced, but the evaluation found that the gains from contracting did not appear. The evaluation concluded, “...one of the main findings of this evaluation is that Bank reform actions were not evidence-based; they have, to a large extent, followed a set of consensual assumptions of the time that resulted from the belief that market-based mechanisms and incentives were the only solution to the problems and inefficiencies observed in the sector. Despite the lack of empirical and sometimes conceptual support, these assumptions were not seriously questioned: they were judged to be right because they were based on the ‘right premises’.”

2.25 In addition to policy and strategy evaluations, OVE has also looked into the empirical support for other aspects of the Bank’s conventional wisdom regarding its own activities. Observing that 88 percent of Bank projects were rated as either “probable” or “highly probable” of achieving their development objectives, RE-260 reviewed the data on projects that met two criteria: they were highly rated for likely achievement of objectives, and they had an available project completion report as a data source to substantiate the claim. Of the 47 projects that met these criteria, only 3 had rate of return estimates in the PCRs, and only 2 projects had completed the promised ex-post evaluation of results achieved. 35 of the projects (74%) provided evidence only of the production of outputs, not the achievement of objectives. Management subsequently acknowledged that their results claims were not based on solid evidence and sought to improve the empirical backing for their portfolio assessment claims.

2.26 RE-275 developed and introduced in 2001 a methodology to assess the evaluability of Bank projects that has become the standard for OVE work in the area. The introduction of this standard has been the basis for a 10 years long dialogue oriented to the introduction of development effectiveness criteria for the approval of project in the institution, endorsed by the Governors in the Declaration of Cancun as key criteria to improve both the focus of the Bank’s activities and the effectiveness of Bank’s lending

- 2.27 RE-319 looked at the Bank's initial private sector lending operations with a view to confirming the conventional wisdom that the Bank was an attractive partner to private investors because its close relationships with government could aid projects in managing regulatory risk. In fact, the evaluation found that the Bank was effective in addressing regulatory problems in only one third of the cases, and this failure was a major criticism made of the Bank. by its private partners.
- 2.28 RE-300 challenged the conventional wisdom that loans categorized as "investment loans" were in fact financing the creation of fixed capital assets. The report found weak confirmation of any positive response of public capital formation to Bank "investment" loan disbursements, and noted that procurement in such loans had shifted markedly from the category "goods and works" and into the category "services."
- 2.29 RE-347 looked at the Bank's policies and practices for investing its liquid resources, and challenged the conventional wisdom that such funds were in fact liquid. Because of a lack of a specific definition of liquidity, and because of decisions to invest in complex structured securities for which the market had disappeared, the Bank found itself with the paradox of "illiquid liquidity." The evaluation recommended, and management accepted, the adoption of specific liquidity characteristics as part of the policy.
- 2.30 RE-342-2 looked at the conventional wisdom that the Bank should set limits on approvals based on maintaining a "sustainable level of lending." The concept originated in discussions regarding the IDB-8 agreement in 1994, and became embedded in policy with the first New Lending Framework adopted in 2005. The evaluation showed that concept was an inappropriate guide for setting lending limits, that it conflicted with other financial policies of the Bank, and that it contained a variety of perverse consequences for the Bank and the borrowing member countries. Following the evaluation, this piece of conventional wisdom was dropped from the second Lending Framework Agreement.
- 2.31 Finally, in ex-post reports, which do not go to the Board, OVE has also challenged conventional wisdom. For example, OVE's working paper on social investment funds in Honduras demonstrated that community-led design of projects does not necessarily lead to better results, at least in education. OVE's report on housing in Chile also showed that mortgage delinquency rates from state-run programs are not higher than that from privately-run programs, when borrowers of similar characteristics are compared with each other. OVE's work on education showed that school management characteristics were relatively unimportant in educational outcomes. And in neighborhood upgrading, OVE's work showed that there is little evidence that improvements in urban infrastructure can impact health, education, or income. OVE's work on land titling also showed that titles by themselves impact property values, but that this is not sufficient to increase access to credit.

• Is the evaluation process transparent enough to ensure its credibility and legitimacy? Are evaluation findings consistently made public?

2.32 All evaluation findings are consistently made public, and most major evaluations are preceded by an approach paper which is also made available. The process is thus transparent, but it is an open question whether transparency alone is sufficient to “ensure” credibility or legitimacy.

• Is there a policy on managing conflicts of interest?

2.33 There is a Bank policy on conflict of interest which is binding on OVE staff. With specific reference to evaluation work, however, there is no formal policy but there is a longstanding practice in the Office that staff are not assigned to evaluate projects or programs with which they had previously been associated. OVE’s Deputy Director, for example, had been country division chief for Peru prior to joining the Office, and he recused himself from participation in the CPE for that country. Similarly, there is an internal practice, which requires that a new country program evaluation not be carried out by staff who were responsible for the previous CPE.

• How is the balance between independence and the need for interaction with line management dealt with by the system?

2.34 The IDB Board was aware of this important balancing issue, and RE-238 contained the following instruction in the Director’s terms of reference: “*Without compromising its independence, the staff will endeavor at all times to maintain close and continuing contact with the departments and their staff, so that the views of the Bank staff are adequately considered in reports of the Office.*”

2.35 In practice, OVE staff have endeavored to maintain close and continuing contact with both headquarters and field office personnel during the conduct of evaluations, exchanging views and data as the evaluations progressed. This collaboration is often mentioned in Management’s comments on evaluation work, particularly work on country program evaluations.

III. RESOURCES AND STAFF

• Is evaluation supported by appropriate financial and staff resources?

3.1 OVE has consistently been able to obtain both the financial and staff resources it has requested to carry out the work program approved by the Board. The requirements for consultant services increased sharply in 2003, following the adoption by the Board of an ex-post evaluation policy which significantly increased the workload of the Office. This request was granted by the Board. Since then, OVE has requested no change in headcount and has requested budgets that remain constant in real terms from year to year. The previous conflicts over staff and budget that characterized EVO’s history have not made a reappearance.

- 3.2 This decision has, however, meant that OVE has not had the resources to fulfill completely all of the mandates it has been given by RE-238, nor all of the evaluation work desired by members of the Board. Some aspects of the mandate (eg. Evaluation capacity development, see paragraph 4.5 below) have been explicitly restricted due to resource limitations, while the dynamics of managing a full work program with limited resources have led to delays or postponements of some planned activities that became “crowded out” by higher priority evaluation work. On the whole, however, operating within budget constraints is a useful discipline for OVE, and resource issues have not been a major concern for the Office.
- 3.3 OVE has also been asked to provide evaluation services to three other institutions in the Bank Group: The Inter American Investment Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Fund and the Japan Special Fund. In each case, resources to cover these evaluation services were provided by the institutions involved, making no claim on the administrative budget resources provided to OVE by the Bank. These exercises were performed by recruiting and managing consultants and specialized consulting firms from the region, which were subsequently quality reviewed, analyzed and consolidated by OVE staff.
- Does the evaluation department have a dedicated budget? Is it annual or multiyear? Does the budget cover activities aimed at promoting feedback and use of evaluation and management of evaluation knowledge?**
- 3.4 OVE’s budget is a dedicated line item in the Bank’s overall administrative budget. To date, budgets have been done on an annual basis, however the current year’s budget is connected to a two-year plan of work, only the first year of which has an approved budget.
- How is the head of the evaluation unit selected and/or extended? Who does his/her annual performance review? Who decides his/her salary increase?**
- 3.5 3.5 As per the instructions in RE-238, the Director of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight is appointed by the Board of Directors for an initial 5 year term, with the possibility of a second five year term if performance is deemed adequate by the Board. There is no provision for annual performance review, which is done by the Board at the contract renewal point. The Director receives an automatic salary increase equivalent to the Bank’s Overall Salary Increase (OSI) as determined each year by the Board
- How independent is the evaluation department in selecting and recruiting staff?**
- 3.6 OVE has had complete independence in the selection of staff to the Office, as provided for in the Terms of Reference for the Director included in RE-238. Only once has senior Management attempted to place a particular person in OVE, and that request was withdrawn after consultation with the Director.

• Do staff have specific expertise in evaluation, and if not, are training programmes available?

3.7 Reflecting the growth and recruitment patterns in the Office, staff fall into two broad expertise categories: those with expertise in a particular subject matter, and those with expertise in research and evaluation methods. OVE recruits method experts primarily through its research fellow program, which seeks recent PhD recipients with recent training in emerging evaluation methodologies. Many research fellows are subsequently offered full time staff jobs in the Office. Subject matter experts are recruited from the Bank or from equivalent development finance institutions in the region. Evaluation work is always performed in teams which marry substantive expertise and strength in evaluation methods. Staff from either category are encouraged to pursue training opportunities to either deepen their existing expertise or to improve their understanding of the other types of expertise required by the Office.

• Is there a flow of staff between the evaluation department and the operational departments and vice versa?

3.8 The lack of staff rotation between management and evaluation was a major concern of the Working Group. As a result, RE-238 contained a specific recommendation (Recommendation 5) which stated:

Management should appoint a small work group, with appropriate OEO participation, to develop a plan for guiding the assignment and subsequent rotation of personnel into and out of OEO. This plan should also define a process which will ensure that recruitment from outside the Bank for OEO will result in the selection of people who will be acceptable for rotation into the Bank after their initial assignment to OEO. The plan should provide that the OEO Director will have the authority to approve all assignments to OEO and the timing of staff transfers out of OEO. The Plan should be submitted to the Policy and Evaluation Committee within 90 days of the approval of this report.

3.9 While no such plan was ever prepared or submitted to the Policy and Evaluation Committee, the Bank was experimenting with a general approach to staff rotation, and an agreement was reached to rotate three Bank staff into OVE for a three year tour of duty, at which point they would be entitled to reappointment to a position within Management. The initial transfer went smoothly, but when it came time for staff to return, the previous return commitments proved difficult to implement.

3.10 On the basis of this experience, OVE elected to pursue this objective through more conventional means. Several members of Bank staff were recruited into OVE using the standard internal processes of open competition or lateral transfer. No return commitments were asked or offered. Other staff were recruited from outside the Bank, and both internal and external hires were told that future transfers into the Bank would be facilitated, provided there was demand for their services from Management.

- 3.11 This system has worked reasonably well over the years. Both the Director and the Deputy Director of the Office were previously in management positions in the Bank. Of 17 professional staff slots, 9 have been filled through internal recruitment from the rest of the Bank. Panels for advertised positions in OVE always attract dozens of applications from staff within the Bank.
- 3.12 Transfers from OVE to the Bank indicate that the objective of selecting “.... *people who will be acceptable for rotation into the Bank after their initial assignment to OEO*” has been fully met. Data on staff migration to the Bank show a revealed preference by the Bank to utilize OVE as a source of recruitment. Since 2000, two OVE staffers, (one internal and one external recruit) were promoted to senior management positions in the Bank, and the OVE Deputy Director was seconded to senior management for a 6 month tour of duty to facilitate the Realignment process. A total of 9 other full-time OVE staff have won competitions for staff positions in the Bank, and 25 of OVE’s contract Research Fellows also have won positions in management.
- Is there a policy on recruiting consultants, in terms of qualification, impartiality and deontology?**
- 3.13 Since 2000, OVE has employed 313 different consultants to support its work. There is no formal policy regarding recruitment, however OVE has a practice of hiring consultants with advanced degrees (97 Phd, 153 Masters), and a preference for hiring consultants from borrowing member countries when they have the necessary technical qualifications. 214 of the 313 consultants (68%) were nationals of borrowing member countries. Impartiality is ensured by not recruiting consultants to evaluate activities, projects, programs or processes with which they had previously been involved.
- 3.14 Deontology is a branch of ethics associated with compliance with duty and obligation, often with reference to duty to God. OVE has no policy with regard to deontology in the hiring of consultants.

IV. EVALUATION PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

- To what extent are beneficiaries, borrowers or executing agencies involved in the evaluation process?**
- 4.1 All evaluations of Bank projects and programs involve consultations with beneficiaries, borrowers and executing agencies as a part of the design and data gathering phase of the work. Impact evaluations often involve extensive interviews with beneficiaries, while project evaluations devote considerable attention to discussions with executing agencies regarding their experience with the Bank. Borrowing member governments usually provide a liaison to the evaluation team, and are given extensive opportunities to comment on evaluation reports before they are sent to the Board. Oversight reports, which examine

policies and processes internal to the Bank do not generally have the same level of involvement of beneficiaries and borrowers as field work.

• To what extent does the institution rely on local evaluators or, when not possible, on third party evaluators from borrowing member countries?

4.2 OVE has taken steps to maximize the quality human resource pool available for hiring consultants and firms. One of these has been the creation of a mailing list of institutions and individuals interested in evaluation, EvalNet. EvalNet was created in 2005, and has been used ever since as a resource in hiring consultants and firms, primarily from borrowing member countries. EvalNet has been successful at helping to generate applicants (both individuals and firms) for consultant work both in OVE and the Bank as a whole.

4.3 OVE has also taken steps to hire local consultants in work done in both CPEs and Sector and Thematic evaluations. In particular, in ex-post evaluations, OVE has integrated the identification of consultants as part of ex post missions, resulting in hiring of local consultant in almost all of outsourced ex post evaluations. For example, in the 2007 evaluation of tax administration, OVE undertook missions in each of the countries and hired consultants from borrowing countries in each of the three country studies outsourced. In the 2008 evaluation of competitiveness, OVE hired local consultants in each of the five project evaluations done. OVE also hired local consultants in the five country studies done (CH, CR, AR, PE, ME). Also in the 2009 justice evaluation OVE conducted a local mission and hired two local firms (GRADE and APOYO) for the project evaluation done. The same was true in the case of the 2009 citizen security evaluation, in which OVE conducted local missions which resulted in hiring a local firm in the case of the Colombia projects (Econometria), as well as a local consultant for the case of the Argentina evaluation.

• Does the institution engage in partner-led evaluations?

4.4 OVE has not engaged in partner-led evaluations.

• Does the evaluation department support evaluation training and capacity building programmes in borrowing member countries?

4.5 Building local evaluation capacity is frequently a part of the mandate for evaluation offices in multilateral finance institutions. The 1994 IDB-8 agreement, however, gave such a mandate to the Bank as a whole, rather than to the evaluation office, stating:

The Bank will endeavor to promote and support in-country capacity building and facilitate cooperation in evaluation activities with other development agencies.

4.6 When reviewing the evaluation function in 1999, RE-238 did not devote much attention to an evaluation capacity building mandate for the new independent evaluation office. Instead, the Task Force Report assigned responsibility for in-

country capacity-building efforts to the Regional Operations Departments. (Re-238, Annex 4, page 4). In this context, it is important to note that consultation with borrowing member countries as to their evaluation needs was not part of the process used to construct RE-238.

- 4.7 Despite this limited mandate, OVE included evaluation capacity building as a basic component of its initial proposed evaluation work plan (RE-244). To complement that work, in 2001 OVE produced a conceptual study on how to approach evaluation capacity building in the region (RE-252). Evaluation capacity development by OVE was inherently limited by budgetary resource availability, and in a review of the OVE work plan by the Policy and Evaluation Committee in 2003 it was noted that:

“Directors recognized the importance of capacity building. However, potential demand is so large that the Bank should help mobilize other sources in order to respond to this need.... Directors agreed that OVE should concentrate on its core line of business, and allocate its limited resources accordingly (PEA/03/8, 10 April, 2003)”

- 4.8 By 2004, responsibility for evaluation capacity development was assumed by Management in the “Medium Term Action Plan for Development Effectiveness,” which stated:

“The Bank will respond to requests from Borrowing Member Countries interested in strengthening their MfR [Management for Results] capacity through a wide array of activities, from stand-alone Modernization-of-the-State projects to capacity strengthening components in individual projects. The Bank will design a work plan in this critical area, grounded in a stocktaking exercise of current in-country MfR capacity, and an analysis of current modalities of Bank support to MfR capacity strengthening. (GN-2324, August 2004)”

- 4.9 As a result, the Bank created a facility to provide diagnoses and strengthen the MfR capacity of borrowing member countries (PRODEV). As part of its oversight function, OVE assessed the relevance of PRODEV operations vis-à-vis their foundational objectives and has been active in promoting focus and value added of Bank’s interventions in the area. OVE has partnered with Management in the organization and facilitation of capacity building activities in the region, by providing strategic guidance, and technical support.
- 4.10 OVE retains a limited role in capacity building in member countries by supporting staff presentation of technical work in seminars. OVE also supports the practice of impact evaluation by financing the *Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association Impact Evaluation Network (LACEA-IEN)*¹.

¹ OVE was one of the three organizations (along with the World Bank and CEDLAS) to set up the Impact Evaluation Network in LACEA, and has since continued to provide financing for the organization’s annual meetings.

V. QUALITY OF EVALUATION PRODUCTS

• How does the evaluation department ensure the quality of its evaluations (including reports and process)?

5.1 From the outset, OVE established a rigorous quality control function for its work. All draft reports are subject to a three-phase quality review process. In the first phase, team leaders responsible for draft reports are encouraged to discuss their potential findings and recommendations with colleagues both inside and outside the office. Phase 2 involves a formal structured internal peer review with OVE staff of the draft report, and Phase 3 involves a formal structured external peer review meeting with Management (and in the case of country program evaluations, with country authorities as well). If desired by Management, a fourth review of the evaluation document can take place with senior Management at the Audit and Evaluation Committee, Chaired by the EVP. This final review is intended to focus on the recommendations of evaluation reports. Only after these reviews have been completed is the final report sent to the Board for consideration.

5.2 The external peer review process was designed to respond to a mandate from RE-238, which noted:

It is vital for Management and the Board to agree on a process whereby OEO draft reports can be commented upon by Management prior to their being submitted to the Board. This process should not be looked upon as way to reach “the lowest common denominator” in terms of acceptable recommendations, but rather, to ensure that facts are correct and that OEO recommendations are realistic from an implementation standpoint.” RE-238

5.3 The review process has performed this function reasonably well at the operational level. Disagreements with Management regarding the facts of evaluation reports are almost always resolved before the document is sent forward, meaning that discussions with the Board can concentrate on the recommendations developed upon an agreed factual basis. Particularly in the area of oversight which usually involves reviews of numerous loan projects or reports, this review protocol has been particularly useful by giving Managements officials the opportunity to challenge OVE findings on individual reviews, and correcting any possible factual errors. This was particularly the case in the validation of PCRs (RE-247), the analysis of economic and sector work (RE-323), and Evaluability (RE-333).

5.4 RE-238 identified the “*dysfunctional process followed by the Audit and Evaluation Committee of Management in reviewing and acting upon EVO evaluation reports*”. To address this concern the Committee was restructured to serve as a forum where evaluation findings could be brought to the attention of senior management. The committee met regularly, reviewing about a third of

evaluation reports produced between 2002 and 2006. In 2007, however, the work of this Committee dropped off significantly, and no meetings of the Committee have been held since September of 2007. In the initial years, review by the A&E committee provided a forum for developing “consolidated” comments on OVE reports, reflecting the views of Management as a whole. With the eclipse of the A&E Committee in 2007, all subsequent comments have come from the management unit whose work was the subject of evaluation, rather than from management as a whole.

• Does the institution have guidelines for the conduct of evaluations and are they used?

- 5.5 The Bank has guidelines for both self and independent evaluation. Self evaluation guidelines relate to project performance monitoring report (PPMRs), project completion reporting (PCRs), project supervision, country strategies, and, more recently, to the preparation of development effectiveness matrices. These guidelines are approved and changed internally within Management, requiring no involvement of the Board. OVE has done oversight studies on each of these guidelines (RE-247, RE-293, RE-309, RE-379), and has found substantial issues with regard to compliance, coverage and quality, but will leave this subject for the self evaluation review being undertaken by Management. It is worth noting, however, that the project monitoring system for project in execution has been under review by SPD and discontinued from June 2009.
- 5.6 OVE has worked to bring IDB self evaluation guidelines into conformity with the good practice standards developed by the ECG. The Office has worked extensively with the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) and the Bank’s private sector lending department to encourage convergence with the ECG standards on private sector evaluation. Two benchmarking exercises carried out by the ECG find substantial improvement in compliance with these guidelines. A similar benchmarking exercise has recently been completed for the implementation of standards for public sector evaluation, where the IDB does not compare favorably with its counterparts (Cohn and Associates, 2010 as reported in RE-370).
- 5.7 For its own part, OVE has specific, Board-approved guidelines for the conduct of country program evaluations (RE-271). These guidelines were followed in all subsequent CPEs. These guidelines were revised by the Board in 2009 (RE-348), and continue to guide the conduct of CPEs. Ex-post evaluations are governed by internal OVE guidelines.

- **Has the ECG member under review developed/adopted standards/benchmarks to assess and improve the quality of its evaluation reports?**

5.8 OVE has a process for the quality control of all of its evaluation reports (described above). It does not score or rate the quality of each individual report produced.

- **What is the assessment of the quality of the evaluation reports in terms of coverage, presentation of the evidence to support the conclusions, dispassionate, objective analysis and use of best international evaluation practice?**

- Coverage—OVE reports generally cover the five DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Different OVE products emphasize these in a different way. For example, CPEs assess all five dimensions, although the main emphasis is on the first three. Ex post evaluations, on the other hand, focus on documenting and estimating effectiveness and impact, given that this work generally takes place after the intervention benefits have been delivered².
- Evidence—all OVE reports are expected to be evidence-based, and a central role of OVE’s quality review process is to assure that conclusions are adequately supported by evidence. A frequent observation in evaluation reports, however, relates to the low quality of evidence available in either the Bank’s own files or those of executing agencies through which the Bank implements its programs. Only some of the missing data can be discovered by field work, and so a reasonable assessment of OVE’s evaluation work is that it suffers from some of the lack of information that characterizes the Bank as a whole. In comparison to management’s self evaluation work, however, OVE’s reports explicitly identify data gaps, and routinely contain footnotes and citations, things generally not done by management.
- Analysis—OVE reports are dispassionate and factual in their presentation of evidence on a given subject. While it is somewhat frustrating to an interested audience, OVE is reluctant to offer its opinion on subjects for which there is an inadequate evidentiary basis.

² OVE has been conservative in its treatment of sustainability, which is defined by OECD as “concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.” (OECD DAC, 2010). Given the forward-looking and perhaps conjectural nature of the concept, OVE has emphasized sustainability as an empirical demonstration that benefits have or have not been sustained.

- Best international practice—the best international practice standards for evaluation quality are the “Evaluation Quality Standards” developed by the DAC. Annex 2 shows the self-evaluation scores made by OVE staff on 69 recent reports. Measured against these criteria, OVE reports are largely compliant with best international practice, albeit with some variation across individual dimensions and in individual reports.

• Does the evaluation department interact with the OECD-DAC Evaluation Committee and do the products of the evaluation department meet OECD-DAC standards for evaluation?

5.9 OVE participates in the annual OECD-DAC meetings, as well as those of the ECG of the multilateral development Banks. As the response to the previous question indicates, OVE is generally in compliance with the DAC standards for evaluation.

VI. PLANNING, COORDINATION AND HARMONIZATION

• Does the participating ECG member have a multi-year evaluation work plan, describing future evaluations according to a defined timetable?

• How is the evaluation plan developed? Who, within the organization, identifies the priorities and how?

6.1 OVE prepares annually a work program that describes the work to be undertaken in the next two years, while requesting a specific budget to support only the first year of the work program. The work program is revised each year to describe work completed in the preceding year, and the work anticipated for the next year. This evaluation plan is developed initially by OVE, and sent to Management’s Audit and Evaluation Committee for review and comment. Discussion and approval of the work plan by the Board provides an opportunity for Board members to suggest additional priorities for evaluation work. In 2003 and 2004, a mid-year revision to the work program was authorized by the Board in order to incorporate high-priority evaluations not included in the original work program.

• Does the work programme reflect an appropriate balance between corporate level evaluations, complex evaluations (e.g., country/sector/policy/thematic evaluations) and project level evaluations?

6.2 Annex 3 contains the annual work plan summaries of OVE for the past 10 years, and contains a list of anticipated reports to be sent to the Board. Starting with the 2002 program year, these summaries follow a standard exposition format that distinguishes among the different types of OVE reports. Collectively, the summaries demonstrate that OVE has consistently proposed a work program that is balanced across the dimensions noted above. Actual delivery of evaluation reports generally tracks well with the work plans, although work is not always

completed in the year for which it was originally programmed, reflecting the slippage of due dates created by a limited staff, an ambitious planned program, and a willingness to accommodate ad-hoc requests for the Board for evaluation work not contained in each year's workplan.

- 6.3 Annex 4 shows the full list of the 242 evaluation reports produced by OVE, including ex-post and impact evaluations that are not individually sent to the Board for consideration.

• How is the evaluation function organized within the institution?

- 6.4 In a formal sense, Bank policy defines a Bank Evaluation System (BES) as a "shared responsibility" between Management, OVE and the Board. The shared responsibility is governed by a "Matrix of Shared Evaluation Responsibilities" contained in RE-238 and attached as Annex 5 to this report. In practice, many of the activities called for in RE-238 have never been implemented, and subsequent developments have re-shaped the organization of the evaluation function within the institution.

- 6.5 When RE-238 was written in 1999, Management responsibilities for evaluation were dispersed across a range of operating departments, a structure that made effective collaboration between self and independent evaluation difficult. In 2002, OVE recommended in (RE-260) that management create specific organizational unit devoted to improving development effectiveness. In 2007, the Realignment created the Office of Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness which has become the organizational focal point for self evaluation work by Management. Self evaluation work by Management has become focused around the preparation and use of a Development Effectiveness Matrix (DEM) for each Bank intervention. Recently, the Bank lost focus on self evaluation at the Country Program level, partially as a result of an evaluation performed by OVE that observed very scarce use from Management of country portfolio reviews (RE-314).

- 6.6 In the past, senior Management was actively involved in the Bank's self evaluation system through its Audit and Evaluation Committee. As noted previously, this Committee has not met since September of 2007.

• Does the evaluation department assess the quality of the self evaluation processes in the institution?

- 6.7 OVE carries out oversight studies on critical components of the self evaluation system. Most directly, OVE validates the results of Management's self evaluation work at the project level. RE-247 validated project monitoring and project completion reporting, and found that most evaluative judgments contained therein did not have an adequate evidentiary basis. Validation work has continued on a sample basis through the 2009 crop of projects.

- 6.8 OVE also evaluates processes related to self evaluation. RE-293 looked at how projects were supervised; RE-323 looked at the processes for approving, monitoring and evaluating the production of studies and other knowledge products. Finally, OVE's periodic evaluability assessments examine the Bank's processes for the quality control of projects upon entry into the portfolio.
- 6.9 In addition to these activities, OVE is actively involved in supporting Management's efforts to bring the IDB into compliance with good practice evaluation standards developed by the ECG. Two benchmarking reviews were carried out on compliance with standards for the self evaluation of private sector lending operations, with the result that the IDB is now one of the most compliant of the ECG members.
- **Does the evaluation department coordinate its evaluation activities with other multilateral agencies and bilateral donors?**
- 6.10 OVE has attempted to coordinate country program evaluations with other agencies, but the rigid timetable created by the IDB's linkage to the electoral cycle does not give the Office sufficient freedom of maneuver to make such coordination effective.
- **How are field level evaluation activities coordinated? Is authority for evaluation centralized or decentralized?**
- 6.11 Field level evaluations are coordinated by the evaluation team in consultation with the Bank's country offices. Authority for a given evaluation is decentralized to the team during the preparation phase but then subject to extensive review by OVE prior to release of the report to the Board.
- **Does the evaluation department engage in joint/multi donor evaluations?**
- 6.12 OVE has not engaged in joint/multi donor evaluations.
- **Does the evaluation department make use of evaluative information coming from other MDBs, bilateral donors, academia or NGOs?**
- 6.13 Most OVE reports make use of evaluative information from this entire range of sources. In contrast to normal Bank practice, OVE reports are heavily footnoted and contain extensive bibliographies of works consulted in the preparation of each report. The most frequently cited works, in descending order, come from the World Bank, ECLAC, academic publications and bilateral reports. Where NGOs have published work related to a particular evaluation, their contributions are also cited, although this occurs in a relatively small number of evaluation studies.

VII. DISSEMINATION, FEEDBACK, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND LEARNING

- **How are evaluation findings disseminated? In addition to reports, are other communication tools used (e. g., press releases, press conferences, abstracts, annual reports providing a synthesis of findings, repackaging of evaluation findings, web based technologies, articles in non-ECG member publications)?**
- 7.1 OVE considers its primary responsibility to be informing the Board of Executive Directors with regard to the performance of the institution. Dissemination of evaluation findings, therefore, has been done largely through reports to the Board, which are subsequently published on OVE's website. This has responded to a communication approach targeted to key decisions makers. In the area of oversight, influence has been based on a deliberate strategy to deliver timely information to relevant stakeholders in the context of organizational change (management staff, executive directors, governors, etc.). The self-evaluation survey reveals also that this strategy has been also effective in CPEs. A targeted communication strategy with specific country authorities was particularly effective to improve programming decisions in the cases of the CPE-Argentina 1990-2002 (RE-299); the CPE Uruguay 1991-2004 (RE-312) and the CPE-Honduras 2001-2006 (RE-263) which provide concrete examples of valuable influence. The office has never relied on public opinion to comply with its mandate. In fact, the Office has never considered necessary to issue a press release, nor held a press conference. An annual report on evaluation activities was provided for the first two years of OVE's existence, based largely on an information disclosure policy which allowed for publication of only summaries of evaluation reports rather than the full text. When evaluation reports were made public, the need for such a summary annual report diminished, and OVE discontinued such reports in 2003.
- 7.2 Ex-post impact evaluations, which serve largely a learning function, are more widely distributed. Most are published as small monographs, which are distributed at seminars and conferences either organized or attended by OVE staff. . These are published in the form of Working Papers (WP), which are distributed through OVE-sponsored Bank seminars and through presentation at conferences by OVE staff. Starting in 2007 WPs were also disseminated via Research Papers in Economics/Documents in Economics Access Service (REPEC-IDEAS), which is a consortium of academic papers. As of the publication of this report, WPs had been accessed 13,754 times³.
- **Are all evaluation reports made public? Are position papers made public? Are comments from third parties on the evaluation products made public?**

³ These included 10,278 abstract consultations, and 3,476 downloads of the papers (see <http://logec.repec.org/scripts/seriesstat.pf?item=repec:idb:ovewps>).

7.3 The Bank adopted a new information disclosure policy in 2003. The prior policy authorized the publication of only summaries of evaluation reports, not the reports themselves. The new policy created a presumption of full disclosure of all evaluation reports, with some possibility for borrowing member countries to redact portions of CPEs related to their country. Such redactions are required to be shown as blacked-out text in the final released version, and no such redactions have ever been requested by countries.

7.4 Management's comments on OVE evaluations are made public along with the reports themselves. Comments from governments on CPEs can be released to the public if the country so requests. There are no provisions for other third parties to have their comments released by OVE.

• What mechanisms are in place to ensure feedback of evaluation results to policy makers, operational staff and the general public?

7.5 Evaluation results produced by OVE are fed back into the policy-making process through the consideration by the Board of such reports. Operational staff interact with these reports through the commenting and review process. Evaluation reports produced by Management, including PPMRs and PCRs are generally not fed directly into the policy making process as they are not considered by the Board. This information does, however, form the basis for periodic reports by Management to the Board on the results of the Bank's activities. Operational staff are deeply involved in the production of such reports. The general public has access to all OVE reports that are seen by the Board, and similarly has access to many of the reports produced by Management.

• What mechanisms are in place to ensure that knowledge from evaluation is accessible to staff and other relevant stakeholders?

7.6 This question really has two parts: the making of information available and the actual accessing of that information by "staff and other relevant stakeholders." All OVE reports and most management self-evaluation reports are available to the staff through IDB Docs, a searchable data base of Bank documents. Oversight reports have provided the basis for supporting knowledge and implementation of OVE developed standards. This has been the case in quality management, quality of supervision, and country capacity building efforts. OVE's knowledge development strategy has both responded to OVE's initiative and demands from Management. However, demands from Management and appetite for knowledge in these areas have been variable over the years.

7.7 RE-323 looked at how the Bank used the knowledge embedded in formal written studies to support its operational work. It found that few such studies played any significant role at all in the Bank's work, largely because of a lack of a "culture of citation" within the Bank. The report concluded:

Stakeholders state that Management has actively discouraged citations in project documents. For the projects of the team leaders surveyed by this evaluation, 73% of the loan documents did not include footnotes, and none had footnotes citing the documents and page numbers. Furthermore, 26% of the projects had no bibliography. Even the studies commissioned directly for project preparation do not cite other IDB work. A random sample of 10 studies commissioned by project team leaders contained only 2 studies with other IDB studies in their bibliographies one stakeholder stated, "It could very well be that the problem is that operations do not make adequate use of studies in general... for all the weaknesses in supply, the main problem may be in demand."

- 7.8 If the institution does not demand the citation of knowledge in its daily operations, then the knowledge produced by OVE or Management will not be accessed by staff. The existing information access systems can, of course, be improved, but the real issue is creating institutional demand for knowledge.

• Is evaluation viewed as an integral part of the knowledge management system?

- 7.9 Strengthening the Bank's knowledge management system was a major objective of the Realignment undertaken in 2007. According to that document:

"... as a result of the realignment, the Bank will: (i) be a knowledge-based decision-making organization; (ii) enhance its knowledge partnership with its member countries, based on knowledge of the countries and of the region, which will increase the value-added and effectiveness of its programs and projects; (iii) use integrated knowledge through all its activities (strategic planning; development leadership; programming and dialogue with clients; design, execution and evaluation of activities, programs and projects; etc.) and (iv) upgrade access to learning, building an infrastructure for sharing and disseminating information and knowledge." (GA-232, par. 6.37)

- 7.10 7.10 To implement this objective, in April of 2008 the Board adopted a specific Knowledge and Learning Strategy (GN-2479), which had as its central objective the development of "...an environment conducive to knowledge and learning activities and encourage ongoing evaluation". To implement this objective, the strategy contained the following policy statement:

With the high institutional priority given to the acquisition, exchange, and use of knowledge, the Bank needs to strengthen itself as a knowledge-based institution. What this specifically means is that:....(4) there is close interaction between the units that generate and use knowledge in the strategy, programming, design, execution, and evaluation phases of Bank programs, projects, and activities;

- 7.11 These statements demonstrate clearly that evaluation is seen by the Bank as an integral part of the knowledge management system.

VIII. EVALUATION USE

• **Who are the main users of evaluations within and outside the institution?**

- 8.1 As OVE is part of the governance structure of the Bank, the main formal users of independent evaluations are the Board of Governors and the Board of Executive Directors. Directors formally consider and take note of “RE” documents, and Governors have incorporated OVE findings in the Bank’s principal direction-setting activities.
- 8.2 Other internal users include senior management (who review OVE reports and prepare responses), line management (whose work is the subject of evaluation), country offices (who are the principal point of contact for the conduct of OVE’s work); government officials (who learn about the effectiveness of Bank-supported programs through OVE evaluations); civil society (who use OVE reports for learning and accountability purposes); and academia (mainly in the case of impact evaluations).
- 8.3 Since all OVE reports are made public, there is a broader community of users who have access to evaluation studies.

• **Does evaluation respond to the information needs expressed by the Board of Directors, Management, operational staff, developing countries and/or civil society?**

- 8.4 This question can be approached in several ways. First, the specific topics of evaluation are approved by the Board as part of OVE’s work program, and thus reflect the needs and desires of the Board with respect to topics studied. Management is also given an opportunity to comment on proposed OVE work programs and has on occasion submitted suggestions for items to be included. Second, comments made by Board members during the consideration of OVE documents generally remark favorably on the quality of the information contained and the clarity with which this information is presented.
- 8.5 Third, some directors have raised questions regarding the recommendations of evaluation reports, expressing a desire for more specific guidance as to how the Bank should behave in the future in light of past experience. Such observations have been frequently made in the context of country program evaluations. Strictly speaking, these are not requests for information, but instead requests for opinion from OVE regarding a future that has not yet been evaluated
- 8.6 OVE’s reports have informed central institutional issues and how the institution has reacted to these issues. In some cases this work was formally requested as an input for the Bank’s decision-making process, and in other cases it emerged as part of OVE’s evaluation work. CPEs are presented to the Board prior to or jointly with the new strategy. Likewise, key OVE reports have informed

important institutional changes. For example, OVE's report on the financial losses that the Bank suffered during the financial sector collapse was used to effect changes on how the Bank managed its investment portfolio.

- 8.7 Another clear piece of evidence that OVE evaluations respond to the information needs of the institution can be found in the ongoing contractual relationships with both the MIF and the IIC. OVE has provided evaluation services to these organizations since 2002 through service contracts which are renewed annually. This provides both constant feedback and constant evidence that these institutions perceive that they are receiving value from these services. In 2010, MIF elected to contract with OVE for a major comprehensive evaluation of MIF operations similar to the one carried out by OVE as part of the MIF II negotiation process.

• Are there systems in place to ensure monitor and track action taken on the implementation of evaluation findings and recommendations?

- 8.8 The issue of tracking evaluation recommendations was part of the mandate provided in RE-238, which specifically stated:

“There needs to be a more effective system whereby Management and OEO can track progress in implementing recommendations in OEO reports. OEO should report periodically to the Board on the status of recommendations, but to do so, OEO must be able to obtain information on implementation progress.”

- 8.9 OVE initially proposed to undertake the monitoring of its recommendations. In 2003 and 2004, OVE assembled a list of its recommendations and sought feedback from Management on their implementation. As anticipated in RE-238, the requested information on implementation progress was not provided, and OVE was unable to track compliance with recommendations. Reflecting on this experience, both the Board and OVE concluded that the job of OVE was to conduct evaluations. Once completed and accepted by Management, the tracking of recommendations became a responsibility of Management, rather than OVE. In December of 2006, the Chair of the Policy and Evaluation Committee noted in his report on the 2005-6 OVE work plan that: *“a number of Executive Directors also asked Bank Management to devise a mechanism for tracking OVE recommendations.”* RE-321-2. The following year's Chair report noted that: *“The Manager of the Strategic Planning Department (SPD) reported that his department was responsible for monitoring these recommendations.”* RE-335-1. Despite this commitment, no regular reporting on the status of OVE recommendations has been produced by SPD.

- 8.10 The persistence of this problem over many years suggests that it is not a trivial matter, amenable to easy solution. There are three factors that help explain the pattern. First, as noted above, many recommendations from strategy and program evaluations are meant to be a stimulus to thought, and are less concrete and easy to monitor. They may have an impact on reorganizing thought, but that impact may be difficult to detect.

- 8.11 Second, because of the independence of OVE, the Board has moved over time from endorsing OVE recommendations to simply taking note of them. Direction from the board and their ownership of the recommendations is thus not clear to management.
- 8.12 Third, Management sometimes takes a conflict avoidance approach in dealing with OVE recommendations. Informal discussions prior to document release indicate substantial disagreement, but such disagreements are not present in the formal written or oral comments made to the Board. There is little incentive for Management to track recommendations with which they disagree, but for which their disagreement is not a matter of record.
- 8.13 Finally, it is worth noting that follow up to evaluation recommendations is a problematic issue in most multilateral institutions with evaluation departments. This subject is frequently discussed at meetings of the ECG, and while there is currently no good practice standard on this issue, follow up is easier in cases where Management makes a commitment to undertake specific actions as a result of an evaluation. A specific “management action record” is a clearer statement of intended follow up than simple comments on an evaluation report, and the IDB should consider adopting this practice in the future.

• Are recommendations included in evaluation reports clear and capable of being acted on and monitored?

- 8.14 The nature and purpose of recommendations differs across the different evaluation products. Oversight reports review current institutional policies and practices and make concrete and actionable recommendations regarding those policies and practices. Such recommendations are clear, capable of being acted upon and monitored. Policy evaluations have the intent of informing change to specific Bank policies, and also contain clear actionable recommendations.
- 8.15 Strategy evaluations and country program evaluations, on the other hand, have a much broader focus by examining the way in which the Bank approaches development problems in individual countries and sectors. In such evaluations, context is critical, for it is the matching of an intervention with the local institutional, social, economic and political conditions which is the key to generating successful results. In such context-sensitive activities, useful recommendations are those that aim to improve the quality of future engagement with different contexts, by emphasizing such elements as diagnostics, data requirements and the logic that links interventions to underlying causal relationships. Such recommendations may appear overly general, but they reflect the evaluator’s belief that future contexts always require new thought by the Bank and the countries. Evaluation contributes to improving future thought by exposing the weaknesses of thought in the past, not by making highly prescriptive recommendations regarding what precisely should be done in the future.

• What is the linkage between the timing of evaluations and new operations? For example, are there institutional requirements for evaluations of policies, country strategies or projects to be completed before policies or country strategies are revised or follow on projects are funded?

8.16 Bank policy formally requires that a CPE be completed prior to the approval of a new country strategy document. In 2004, the Board’s budget committee requested OVE to evaluate expiring line-item “initiatives” with budgets of \$2 million or more as an input to decisions regarding their termination or continued funding.

8.17 With respect to the approval of new operations, the Bank does not have a standing policy that subsequent operations would need to be evaluated prior to the approval of second and third phases. The Bank does have a policy that all operations have to have a PCR. However, OVE’s assessment of PCRs show that PCRs are generally not results-focused and do not provide an empirical basis on project effectiveness. The Bank ex post policy does not require impact evaluations, either by OVE or others, to be conducted prior to approval of new operations.

• How does the institution promote follow up on findings from relevant stakeholders (through e.g. steering groups, advisory panels or sounding boards)?

8.18 OVE has not used steering groups, advisory panels or sounding boards in reviewing the findings of its evaluations. Relevant stakeholders are sent drafts of evaluation reports as part of the review process leading to final submission to the Board. Particular efforts are made to secure stakeholder feedback in the case of country program evaluations, which are always sent for comment to the government. OVE routinely attempts to schedule review meetings with governments to discuss findings and recommendations.

• Are links with decision making processes ensured to promote the use of evaluation in policy formulation? For example, is there a “just in time” dissemination system – i. e., ensuring that evaluation findings are packaged in a digestible form and delivered to decision makers who can influence decisions?

8.19 The links to decision-making processes vary somewhat across the different types of evaluation products. Oversight studies are frequently requested by the Board to support specific anticipated major decisions regarding Bank governance. These studies have been produced in advance of the decision moment, and have played a significant role in the policy discussions. Examples include:

- The adoption by Governors of the first Lending Framework Agreement (AB-2151), which was supported by OVE’s analysis of the development effectiveness of the Bank. (RE-260).

- The adoption of the second Lending Framework Agreement (GN-2200-13), which was supported by OVE’s evaluation of the Bank’s instruments (RE-300).
- The IDB-9, for which the Board had requested and considered an OVE analysis of past replenishments (RE-354).
- The adoption by Governors as part of the IDB-9 of evaluability standards as key criteria for approvals, which was supported by OVE’s work in its evaluability reviews over the last ten years (RE-275, RE-333, and RE-379).
- The MIF 2 agreement by donors was dependent upon the results of a comprehensive evaluation of activities undertaken in MIF 1 (MIF/GN61).

8.20 Studies evaluating specific policies and instruments have also been closely linked to discussions regarding the continuance or modification of those policies and instruments. Examples include:

- The continuation of emergency lending as an explicit Bank instrument (RE-251, RE-300);
- The performance of the new method for assessing Bank capital adequacy and loan charges policy (RE-322); and
- The modifications of the Bank’s policies for managing its liquid asset portfolio following significant mark-to-market losses in that portfolio (RE-347).

8.21 CPEs are explicitly linked by policy to decisions regarding approval of a subsequent Bank strategy in a country. The expectation is that a CPE should be completed and sent to the Board prior to the approval of the next strategy. Since the strategy cycle had been, until very recently, closely tied to a country’s electoral cycle, this rule produced unanticipated “bunching” of demand for CPEs when many countries experienced elections in the same year, and this led in turn to some delay in the consideration of the next country strategy. In only 2 of 50 cases in the past 10 years has OVE been unable to complete a CPE prior to Board consideration of the next strategy paper (see OVE, 2011).

8.22 The linkage between evaluation and decision-making is weakest for strategy, sector and thematic evaluations. RE-286 pointed out that while the Bank had 30 operational sectoral policies and 23 sectoral strategies, few of them actually were specific enough to be binding on the action of project teams. RE-286 recommended that strategy evaluation should be confined to a narrow universe: *“Strategies with clear and measurable objectives, resourced action plans, and country ownership should be subject to independent as well as self evaluation. Strategies lacking these characteristics do not gain sufficient benefit from*

independent evaluation for such exercises to be worthwhile". Since that time, there have been relatively few strategies approved by the Board, and sector/thematic evaluations have focused on developing knowledge and learning rather than focusing on Board decision making.

• Are there recent examples of major operation and policy changes attributable to evaluation findings and recommendations, i. e., influential evaluations?

- 8.23 Evaluation work exerts influence on the Bank through a variety of channels. At the most basic level, the mere existence of an independent unit doing evaluation work is likely to have some influence on how projects and programs are designed and developed. The knowledge that one's work may possibly be subject to evaluation in the future serves as a small counterweight to the pressures of current deadlines and production expectations.
- 8.24 Evaluation can also exert influence through altering the language with which the Bank talks to itself about its activities. RE-260, for example, introduced the concept of a "complete results framework" (see Box) for project preparation and this concept has subsequently been adopted by Management. Similarly, RE-244 introduced the concept of "evaluability," a concept later developed in three separate evaluability assessments of projects, and an evaluability assessment of country strategies. This concept has also been internalized, most recently in the IDB-9 Agreement by Governors which instructed Management to establish minimum evaluability standards for all projects.

Box 8.1: Results Frameworks (from RE-260):

A project has a “complete” results framework if it incorporates, for each, objective, the following items.

- **An Objective:** a clear statement of what is problematic in the current situation and how it is to be improved. Objectives must always be defined with reference to how project outputs will be used to improve a situation.
- **A Baseline:** An analysis describing in measurable terms, the current state of affairs prior to a development intervention, against which progress can be assessed or comparisons made
- **Indicators:** Quantitative or qualitative factors or variables that provide a simple and reliable means to describe the baseline condition, to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.
- **A Target:** An anticipated future value, at a date certain, for each relevant indicator. Where possible, targets should be set using **Benchmarks**, which are reference points or standards against which performance or achievements can be assessed. Note: A benchmark refers to the performance that has been achieved in the recent past by other comparable organizations, or what can be reasonably inferred to have been achieved in the circumstances.
- **Milestones:** Specific intermediate values (with dates) anticipated for indicators, indicating the pace at which movement is expected from baseline to target.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation System:** A concise description of who will be observing movement in the indicators, and what reporting will be provided to the executing agency on the progress in goal achievement.

8.25 At a more concrete level, evaluations can influence the institutional processes and structures that govern the internal work of the Bank. RE-260 (2002) recommended the creation of a “Development Effectiveness Assessment Unit” within Management. Such an Office was created by the Realignment in 2007, and by 2009 had started to perform the role of quality control of projects envisioned in RE-260. Similarly, RE-247 brought about significant changes in the information content of PPMRs and PCRs, RE-293 helped to substantially redesign the project supervision system, and RE-323 helped to rationalize and introduce systematic peer reviews into the Bank’s processes for approving its knowledge and capacity building products.

8.26 Past evaluations have also had an impact on the strategies the Bank uses to develop operations in a particular sector or thematic area. After RE-270 pointed out that the Bank’s policies were hindering lending for potable water and sanitation by insisting on the implementation of a market-based paradigm inconsistent with local conditions, the Bank eventually modified the policy to permit a more pragmatic approach to the sector, with a resulting increase in lending for water.

- 8.27 Finally, the influence of evaluation work is most visible in the area of formal Bank guidance documents. Every major guidance document approved by Governors since 2000 has incorporated recommendations first introduced to the Bank in evaluation reports prepared in anticipation of decisions on the new guidance.
- 8.28 The first of these guidance documents was AB-2151 (January, 2002) which created the first lending framework agreement. In preparing that document, Directors considered two reports, one from OVE on development effectiveness (CS-3402), and one from management proposing a draft framework agreement. (CS-3399). Management's document contained two general paragraphs on enhancing development effectiveness, one of which cited the OVE paper. A meeting of the Committee of the Board of Governors was convened to discuss the issues, which recommended the addition of more specific language on developmental effectiveness derived from the OVE report. As a result of that meeting, the final agreement (AB2151) contained the following paragraph, not part of Management's original proposal:

“The Bank shall adopt measures to strengthen the development effectiveness of all the instruments of its lending categories. These measures shall address the following aspects to improve quality at entry and the quality of the Bank's portfolio: (a) operative aspects of programming and project preparation and execution; (b) internal organization and approval procedures for operations, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight; (c) monitoring and evaluation systems; (d) continued efforts to strengthen country programming by improving country papers and analytical and diagnostic work on public sector management and fiduciary safeguards; and (e) continued efforts to strengthen coordination and harmonization with other bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions on analytical assessments, policy and procedures, financial sector reforms, and codes and standards.”

- 8.29 In addition, the final agreement indicated that Policy Based loans were expected to have “evaluable expected results” (paragraph 9). This reflected the discussion of evaluability contained in OVE's background paper (CS-3402).
- 8.30 OVE carried out an evaluation of the first New Lending Framework (RE-342) as part of the process of adopting a second lending framework by Governors. This new agreement, named the New Operational Framework (GN-2494) incorporated both the analysis and recommendations made by OVE. As to Analysis, GN-2494 observed that:

Evaluations conducted by OVE of Bank sovereign guarantee operations (SGO) over the past five years have found that the incentive structure, validation methods with little evidence-based information, and lack of common criteria to assess and evaluate programs (non-compliance with MDB-ECG standards) are at the heart of the Bank's inability to demonstrate the development results of its operations. The weakness of the evaluation framework generates discrepancies

between the self-assessments, done on the probability of achieving development results, and the actual results of NSG operations at completion. (par. 3.6)

8.31 With respect to recommendations, GN-2494 contained the following provisions which directly reflected the recommendations of RE-342:

- Elimination of lending limits based on the “sustainable level of lending” and relying instead on capital adequacy calculations to define the size of the lending program;
- The substitution of a two year allocation framework for the prior four year one;
- Adoption of “evaluability” standards for Bank projects;
- Strengthening the oversight, planning and evaluation of technical cooperation activities;
- Placing greater reliance on country systems for the management of financial resources and the performance of fiduciary oversight.

8.32 The most recent guidance document, (AB-2764 Report on the Ninth General Capital Increase) acknowledges past evaluation findings, incorporates OVE recommendations, and assigns new duties and responsibilities to the Office that expand substantially its scope and authority. Paragraph 2.5 of AB-2764 notes:

“In the review of the Bank’s performance under IDB-8 (RE-354), OVE identified a number of shortcomings that hindered the effectiveness of its interventions. These include ambiguous corporate mandates, insufficient analytical work to sustain the design of operations, an “inward focus” on internal organization and procedures that tended to compromise country focus, and weakness in the results framework of projects. While some of these issues have been addressed by the 2007 realignment, others remain part of an evolving corporate agenda. “

8.33 AB-2764 has an explicit results framework (recommended in RE-354), contains a commitment to results-based budgeting (recommended in RE-334), embraces evaluability targets for projects (RE-260, RE-275, RE-333), re-incorporates ERR and cost-benefit calculations into project design (RE-260, RE-346), endorses the simplification of Bank lending instruments and greater reliance on country systems (RE-300), and incorporates a commitment to impact evaluations (introduced to the Bank in RE-284).

8.34 Finally, AB-2764 assigns OVE the responsibility of evaluating the implementation of the reform agenda contained in the Cancun declaration. This evaluation is a required prerequisite for a subsequent Governor’s vote to authorize the subscription of the second half of the planned replenishment of resources.

This mandate gives OVE a role in the replenishment of Bank resources that is unprecedented for an evaluation office anywhere in the multilateral system.

- 8.35 An analysis of the influence of evaluations needs to give special consideration to country program evaluations. They are the most numerous OVE products, they are governed by a specific Board-approved protocol, and they are explicitly linked to future Management action in the next country strategy. The IDB is unique among multilateral institutions in requiring country program evaluations for all borrowers on a relatively short time cycle (generally every four years, timed to coincide with countries' electoral cycles).
- 8.36 To review the experience with CPEs, OVE staff completed self-evaluation reports on 25 CPEs, 11 from the "first generation" of CPEs produced between 2001 and 2006, and 14 from the "second generation" where a new CPE builds on the work done in a prior CPE.
- 8.37 This analysis reveals a strong connection between the recommendations made in the CPE and the subsequent discussion at the Board regarding future Bank programming. There has been a substantial evolution over time in the response of both Board and Management to CPEs. 46 percent of first generation CPEs encountered disagreement from Management regarding the findings and recommendations, but in 82 percent of the cases the recommendations of the evaluation were endorsed by the Board during discussion of the CPE or subsequent discussion of the new Bank country strategy. In contrast, 86 percent of second generation CPEs received high levels of agreement from Management regarding conclusions and recommendations, and the Board felt the need to instruct management in only 50 percent of the cases rather than the 82 percent for first generation CPEs.
- 8.38 OVE's review of this experience also found that country authorities have consistently commented positively on the CPE process. While there have been disagreements on some elements of the analysis in some of the CPEs, the formal comments of governments generally affirm that they found the process a useful support for the Bank's subsequent programming exercise.

• Are there examples of how evaluation serves as an accountability mechanism?

- 8.39 All OVE evaluations serve as an accountability mechanism. Accountability means demonstrating the results of Bank actions in the borrowing member countries and then comparing those results to the original intentions of the Bank. "Did you do what you said you would do?" and "Did you get the results you expected?" are the key questions in assessing accountability. In this sense, the Bank has a long-recognized problem of accountability for which rigorous evaluation is only part of the solution.

8.40 In 1993, the Bank appointed a special external Task Force on Portfolio Management (TAPOMA) to address problems in the portfolio. It identified the roots of portfolio problems as lying in: *“The Bank’s present organizational structure and personnel policies and the lack of authority, responsibility and accountability for decision making. (p. 31)”*. In 1999, the Bank’s Institutional Strategy noted: *“the Bank must improve its functions in order to minimize diffuse operational practices that lack transparency and accountability.”* In 2002, OVE identified the cause of persistent accountability problems as the lack of clear assignment of responsibility for results (See Box).

8.41 The consistent theme in these diagnoses of accountability is that vagueness and ambiguity discourage accountability, while clarity and specificity enhance it. To promote clarity and specificity in Bank projects and programs, OVE developed a methodology for assessing the “evaluability” of a proposed intervention, and has applied that method to all Bank projects approved in 2001 (RE-275), 2005 (RE-333) and 2009 (RE-379), as well as to a sample of country strategy documents (RE-309). In launching this series of initiatives, it was anticipated that clarity and specificity of Bank interventions would improve over time, thus enhancing the accountability of the institution.

8.42 The influence of the Bank though evaluability over the last 10 years is illustrative of OVE’s function as an accountability mechanism. A first report produced in 2001 introduced the method and the concept of evaluability. Although Management and the BOD endorsed the recommendation of using evaluability as a standard for approval, a second report in 2005 found that that was not the case, and signaled accountability gaps and misaligned incentives throughout the organization. The BOD agreed with OVE recommendations and Management introduced in 2005 another instrument, the Development Effectiveness Matrix (DEM). A third report in 2009 demonstrates that the DEM instrument neither provide reliable qualitative information nor capture evaluability. However, the IDB 9 agreement endorses evaluability as a key consideration and the BOD have

Box 8.2: The Accountability Problem

The most important defining element of Bank internal culture with respect to development is the organizational separation of project design from project execution. Headquarters staff design, country office staff execute. This organizational division creates a profound “two cultures” problem within the institution. For the culture of design, success is defined as an elegant document which moves smoothly through the approval process. What happens once the document is approved is largely irrelevant to the career of the designer, who has already moved on to the next design task.

For the culture of execution, success is defined as prompt and timely disbursement, accompanied by assured compliance with Bank procedures and contractual commitments. Achievement of developmental outcomes is not part of the currently-defined job of country office staff.

Within this structure, **nobody is accountable for development results**, and there are few incentives to attend to this complex, difficult but essential task

RE-260

decided to ask for OVE support to improve the DEM. Thanks to continuous work and technical rigor, 10 years after having recommended the use of evaluability standards, OVE is presently working with management to implement evaluability standards as a key consideration for approvals in the organization.

- 8.43 After some improvement between 2001 and 2005, however, the evaluability of projects in the 2009 cohort showed lower evaluability scores than their predecessors, suggesting that accountability remains a major challenge for the institution. It is encouraging to note the endorsement of evaluability assessment by both the Governors and Management as part of the IDB-9 process. Another encouraging sign is that in December of 2010, the Board reviewed both OVE's 2009 evaluability report (RE-379) and Management's proposed changes to the Development Effectiveness Matrix (GN-2489-3). The discussion led to a request that OVE and Management collaborate to bring the DEM into closer alignment with the evaluability assessment methodology used by OVE.

IX. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE

- 9.1 The purpose of reviewing past experience is to learn from it to devise more successful strategies for the future. The preceding review of 10 years of evaluation work by OVE show a record of substantial production, considerable influence on the norms and policies of the institution, and an improved regard for the quality of evaluation staff (as measured by Bank hires). Yet despite this record, the evidence suggests that there has not been as much change in the practices of the institution as one might expect from this historical narrative. Project evaluability has declined somewhat since 2001, most country programs have limited and incomplete results frameworks, there is still not a culture of citation of evidence in the presentation of Bank initiatives, and the goal articulated by the Institutional Strategy of creating "*an internal culture of continuous improvement, where individuals and work units are constantly looking critically at their own activities in order to find new and better ways to realize their objectives*" remains elusive.
- 9.2 There is no doubt that many institutional changes have been adopted since the creation of OVE that embody to a considerable extent the norms advanced by the work of the evaluation office. There is now a Office of Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness, results frameworks are part of each project and country program, and evaluability standards have been embraced by Management, Board and Governors. This change in norms is an important shift, but it has yet to translate into a deeper internalization of change within the institution.
- 9.3 Part of the explanation for this may lie in the relatively weak follow-up to the recommendations of OVE reports.(discussed above in paragraphs 8.8 to 8.13). Neither OVE nor Management invested heavily in tracking changes resulting from OVE reports, and it is possible that a more diligent follow-up system in the

future might achieve greater institutional impact. This should be explored more closely by the IRP.

- 9.4 But it is also the case that the Bank has a system of incentives regarding the production of projects and programs, and OVE is only a small part of this overall incentive structure. Previous reform efforts have found the Bank very resistant to change, and this has posed a problem for the effective use of evaluation work. This is not a problem limited to the IDB. A former World Bank evaluator pondered this question deeply, and came to the conclusion that there were few incentives for evaluation, and that as a result, for most actors, “it pays to be ignorant.” (See Box). For most actors, evaluation findings are seen as more likely to hinder their objectives than to help them. With such an incentive structure, hostility to independent evaluation should be the expected outcome, regardless of the quality of the evaluation work.

Box 9.1: It pays to be ignorant

[In a situation of multiple advocates seeking institutional resources] ... only the most naïve would voluntarily undertake a rigorous evaluation of their own preferred issue/instrument. An evaluation would pin down the claims the advocate could make. This makes them a sitting duck for those advocates within the organization who have not done an evaluation and who would like more of the institutions resources for their preferred activity. Any evaluation will reveal weaknesses and a lower impact than could have been plausibly claimed for some other instrument. For instance, doing a rigorous evaluation of social funds sets them up to be attacked by supporters of specific sectors (education, roads, micro-credit) and vice versa.

The “real world” solution is likely to be one in which the organization tries to generate just enough evaluation was done to allow the experts and “general issue” advocates to push the organization towards the more effective interventions and maintain persuadability of key stakeholders, but not so much evaluation that any sector/intervention that needs support for political reasons would be ruled out. Moreover, there would definitely not be enough evaluation to assess rigorously the overall level of efficacy of the broad organization.


Who really wants to know? While serendipity plays some role in knowledge, most increases in knowledge about the impact of public programs or policies are the result of deliberate research. If a program can already generate sufficient support to be adequately funded then knowledge is a danger. No advocate would want to engage in research which potentially undermines support for his/her program. Endless, but less than compelling, controversy is preferred to knowing for sure. (Pritchett, 2002)

- 9.5 These general incentive issues are compounded in the case of the IDB by the complex nature of its governance structure. In 2005, OVE commissioned an independent review of country program evaluations by a former Governor of the Bank, Eduardo Wiesner. His paper (a summary of which was distributed to the

Board as CS-3625) concluded that the controversy surrounding country program evaluations was directly related to two factors of the IDB’s governance.

- 9.6 First, management enjoyed substantial autonomy and most decisions regarding program and project development were made endogenously, “with little space for higher-order effectiveness considerations”. Second, while the formal institutional rules state that the Board is the “principal” and management the “agent,” in practice, management is able to split the principal “...into several “principals” with ambiguous boundaries. This way the “Agent” dilutes its responsibility and the “Principal’s” authority. In such situations, “The capacity of evaluations to correct or to strengthen policies is weakened.” (Weisner, 2004)
- 9.7 These general findings were given additional support by the results of two surveys conducted by OVE as part of the development of an evaluation of IDB governance. Senior Management and Board members were separately surveyed on governance issues, and both concluded that the ability of the Board (the principal) to control the behavior of Management (the agent) was very limited.
- 9.8 The survey of Board members found strong support for the proposition that the Board “ratifies management preferences” and weak support for the proposition that the Board “is willing and able to change Management’s behavior.” (See Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1



Source: Survey to members of the Executive Board

10


- 9.9 The survey of Management, on the other hand, revealed the perception that the Board had little ability to “control management’s behavior and encourage

performance.” (See Figure 9.2). Evaluation was not seen by Management as an effective tool used by the Board in this context.

Figure 9.2

Survey to Management
Mechanisms available to the Board to change Management’s behavior

In practice, how effectively the following mechanisms available to the Board of Executive Directors are used to control Management's behavior and encourage performance? (weighted index)



Source: Survey to members of IADB Management

9

- 9.10 These institutional characteristics mean that an evaluation office reporting directly to the Board is in a relatively weak institutional position to effect change. It has no direct authority over Management, and must find influence indirectly through the Board as a whole or individual directors. Given these constraints, it is remarkable that the past 10 years contain numerous examples of effective collaboration between OVE and the Board to “induce” rather than “command” significant changes in the organization.
- 9.11 OVE’s role in this process has been to consistently hew to a few fundamental principles: It insists on evidence in support of any claims; it focuses on results rather than intentions or efforts; it looks for actual improvements in conditions for borrowers and beneficiaries. By hewing to these principles, OVE reports often are disturbing to a Bank culture that focuses on effort and avoids the citation of evidence.
- 9.12 In a very complex system such as the Bank, however, disturbance opens up possibilities for change. The most successful evaluations, therefore, create moments when Board members, country authorities, or actors within Management are able to see things differently and imagine new alternatives. It is the behaviour of these actors, rather than evaluation reports themselves, that bring about real change to the institution.

- 9.13 The problem with evaluation's role as a provoker and disturber is that it is a constant irritant to the organization. In the best case, the irritant is like the grain of sand in the oyster that provokes it to produce a pearl. In other cases, the irritant is too painful, and is simply expelled.
- 9.14 Tensions are inevitable in evaluation relationships, and they are heightened considerably by the decision to place independent evaluation within the system being evaluated. This institutional arrangement was never the only possibility for evaluation of multilateral organizations. In 1994, the Development Committee established a Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks, which initially proposed creating an evaluation function completely outside each individual institution. Although that suggestion was not included in the final report of the Task Force, there have been subsequent calls for a fully independent evaluation of both bilateral and multilateral development aid from the Center for Global Development and academics such as William Easterly.
- 9.15 Given this context, the IRP might want to give some consideration to the trade-offs associated with different institutional mechanisms for organizing the IDB's evaluation function. A global, multi-institution evaluation function is beyond the scope of the IRP's mandate, but an analogous question arises within the IDB's current governance structure.
- 9.16 At present, OVE is located within the institution and under the supervision of a resident Board of Executive Directors. That Board has primary responsibility for approving Bank programs and projects and thus has some ownership of the projects and programs being evaluated. The extent of ownership can be seen in the fact that in the entire 10 year history of OVE, the Board has never demanded reconsideration of a loan or a country strategy because of poor past results or inadequate evaluability.
- 9.17 OVE's work also has been incorporated into the actions of Governors. All of the key Governor's decisions since the IDB-8 agreement have incorporated analysis and recommendations developed by OVE, and the IDB-9 agreement assigns OVE a direct supporting role to the Governors in implementing the second half of the capital increase.
- 9.18 These decisions suggest a potential interest from the Governors in having some form of more routine direct reporting from OVE, alongside the traditional reporting relationship with the Board. Governors are less involved in the day-to-day business of the Bank, and may be interested in something like an annual report on the findings and recommendations of OVE during the year. Such an arrangement could enhance the governance of the evaluation function and potentially improve its impact, while retaining the virtues of the current system of direct reporting to the Board of Executive Directors. The IRP may wish to explore this issue with Governors and Directors in the course of their work.

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ANNEX 1: ECG TEMPLATE FOR ASSESSING THE INDEPENDENCE OF EVALUATION ORGANIZATIONS

Criterion	Aspects	Indicators	IDB/OVE
Organizational independence	The structure and role of evaluation unit	Whether the evaluation unit has a mandate statement that makes clear its scope of responsibility extends to all operations of the organization, and that its reporting line, staff, budget and functions are organizationally independent from the organization's operational, policy, and strategy departments and related decision-making	Compliant (RE-238)
	The unit is accountable to, and reports evaluation results to, the head or deputy head of the organization or its governing Board	Whether there is a direct reporting relationship between the unit, and a). the Management , and/or b). Board or c). relevant Board Committee, of the institution	Compliant, reports to the Policy and Evaluation Committee
	The unit is located organizationally outside the staff or line management function of the program, activity or entity being evaluated	The unit's position in the organization relative to the program, activity or entity being evaluated	Compliant, reports to Board, not Management
	The unit reports regularly to the larger organization's audit committee or other oversight body	Reporting relationship and frequency of reporting to the oversight body	Complaint, reports to Policy and Evaluation Committee
	The unit is sufficiently removed from political pressures to be able to report findings without fear of repercussions	Extent to which the evaluation unit and its staff are not accountable to political authorities, and are insulated from participation in political activities	Compliant
	Unit staffers are protected by a personnel system in which compensation, training, tenure and advancement are based on merit	Extent to which a merit system covering compensation, training, tenure and advancement is in place and enforced	Compliant, hiring and promotion follow Bank HR policies
	Unit has access to all needed information and information sources	Extent to which the evaluation unit has access to the organization's a). staff, records, and project sites; b). co-financiers and other partners, clients; and c). programs, activities, or entities it funds or sponsors	Compliant
II. Behavioral Independence	Ability and willingness to issue strong, high quality, and uncompromising reports	Extent to which the evaluation unit: a). has issued high quality reports that invite public scrutiny (within appropriate safeguards to protect confidential or proprietary information	Compliant

		and to mitigate institutional risk) of the lessons from the organization's programs and activities; b). proposes standards for performance that are in advance of those in current use by the organization; and c). critiques the outcomes of the organization's programs, activities and entities	

ANNEX 2: DAC EVALUATION QUALITY STANDARDS APPLIED TO OVE PRODUCTS

2.3	Evaluation scope: evaluation criteria The evaluation report applies the five DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The criteria applied for the given evaluation are defined in unambiguous terms. If a particular criterion is not applied this is explained in the evaluation report, as are any additional criteria applied.	3.52
3.3	Context: the socio-political context The evaluation report describes the socio-political context within which the intervention takes place, and its influence on the outcome and impact of the development intervention.	3.72
4.3	Evaluation methodology: relevant stakeholders consulted Relevant stakeholders are involved in the evaluation process to identify issues and provide input for the evaluation. Both donors and partners are consulted. The evaluation report indicates the stakeholders consulted the criteria for their selection and describes stakeholders' participation. If less than the full range of stakeholders was consulted, the methods and reasons for selection of particular stakeholders are described	3.65
4.4	Evaluation methodology: sampling The evaluation report explains the selection of any sample. Limitations regarding the representativeness of the evaluation sample are identified..	3.89
4.5	Evaluation methodology: evaluation team The composition of evaluation teams should possess a mix of evaluative skills and thematic knowledge, be gender balanced, and include professionals from the countries or regions concerned.	3.67
7.2	Evaluation ethics: acknowledgement of disagreements within the evaluation team Evaluation team members should have the opportunity to dissociate themselves from particular judgments and recommendations. Any unresolved differences of opinion within the team should be acknowledged in the report..	3.85
8.2	Quality assurance: quality control Quality control is exercised throughout the evaluation process. Depending on the evaluation's scope and complexity, quality control is carried out either internally or through an external body, peer review, or reference group. Quality controls adhere to the principle of independence of the evaluator..	3.70
9.2	Relevance of the evaluation results: evaluation implemented within the allotted time and budget The evaluation is conducted and results are made available in a timely manner in relation to the purpose of the evaluation. Un-envisaged changes to timeframe and budget are explained in the report. Any discrepancies between the planned and actual implementation and products of the evaluation are explained.	3.64
9.4	Relevance of the evaluation results: use of evaluation Evaluation requires an explicit acknowledgement and response from management regarding intended follow-up to the evaluation results. Management will ensure the systematic dissemination, storage and management of the output from the evaluation to ensure easy accessibility and to maximise the benefits of the evaluation's findings in the evaluation report, as are any additional criteria applied.	3.62
10.1	Completeness: evaluation questions answered by conclusions The evaluation report answers all the questions and information needs detailed in the scope of the evaluation. Where this is not possible, reasons and explanations are provided.	3.93
	Average Score	3.72

ANNEX 3: OVE WORK PLANS 2001-2011

SUMMARY TABLE ON OVE WORK PLAN OUTPUTS FOR 2001

OUTPUTS	TARGET DELIVERY
I. OVERSIGHT PRODUCTS	
1. 2001 Annual Report on Evaluation in the Bank	December, 2001
2. Report on Development Effectiveness	January, 2002
3. Oversight Reports on Institutional Strategy Implementation	Ongoing
4. Annual Memo on Resource Allocation for Evaluation	November, 2001
5. Methodological Guidelines for: -Evaluating Bank Strategies -Evaluating Country Papers	Ongoing
6. Evaluability Assessments of Projects moving through the approval process	Ongoing
7. Four Seminars for Bank Staff on Evaluation Methodology	Ongoing
8. Review of sample of PCR's	Ongoing
II. COUNTRY PROGRAM EVALUATIONS	
9. Country Program Evaluation of Honduras	June, 2001
10. Country Program Evaluation of Nicaragua	September, 2001
11. Country Program Evaluation of Guyana	July, 2001
12. Country Program Evaluation of Bolivia	February, 2002
13. Country Program Notes for Haiti	June, 2001
14. Country Program Notes for Mexico	September, 2001
III. EVALUATION CAPACITY BUILDING	
15. Execution of Technical Cooperation ATN/SF-5574-RG Evaluation Capacity Building	Ongoing
16. Collaborative work with Caribbean Development Bank to develop local capacity for Public Sector Results Assessment	Ongoing
17. Incorporation of Evaluation Capacity Building as a component of Bank loans for Public Sector Modernization	Ongoing

OUTPUTS	TARGET DELIVERY
IV. STRATEGY EVALUATION	
A. Poverty	
18. Poverty Reduction Sections of Country Program Evaluations	See items 9-13
19. Evaluation of Programs targeted to Poverty Reduction for Indigenous Groups	April 2001
20. Reaching the Poor through NGOs	October 2001
21. Summary Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy	June 2002
B. Modernization of the State	
22. Evaluation Report on the Bank's Justice Programs	October 2001
23. Evaluation Report on Bank Support to Sub-National Government	March 2002
24. Evaluation Report on Institution Building in Taxation and Fiscal Management	November 2001
C. Social Investments	
25. Strategy Evaluation Report: Health	October 2001
26. Strategy Evaluation Report: Education	January 2002
27. Summary Evaluation: Social Services Delivery Strategy	July 2002
D. Integration	
28. Strategy Evaluation Report: Regional Integration	November 2001
E. Competitiveness of Productive Sectors	
29. Strategy Evaluation: Microenterprise	June 2001
30. Strategy Evaluation: Small and Medium Enterprise	March 2001
31. Evaluation of the Pilot Program in Informatics and Development	July 2001
IV. POLICY AND INSTRUMENTS EVALUATION	
32. Policy Evaluation: Non-Metropolitan Urban Water and Sanitation Systems	October 2001
33. Policy Evaluation: Lending for Energy	February 2002

OUTPUTS	TARGET DELIVERY
34. Summary Evaluation: Public Utilities Policy	June 2002
A. Instrument Evaluation: Innovation Loans	
35. Aide Memoirs on Critical Events in Innovation Loans	2002 or 2003
B. Instrument Evaluation: Technical Cooperation	
36. Integration TCs into Bank Monitoring System	Ongoing
37. TC Analysis in four Country Program Evaluations	Ongoing
38. Impact Assessment on Large TC Operations	October 2001
C. Instrument Evaluation: Research Network	
39. Impact Evaluation: Red de Centros de Investigación	November 2001
D. Programs for Environmental Institutional Development	
40. Instrument Evaluation: Lending to Strengthen Environmental Protection Agency	December 2001

OVE Work Program: 2001-2003

Completed and Delivered 2001	Completed 2001 delivery 2002	2002		2003
		Original Plan	New Items	
Oversight				
Review of PCRs PPMRs and Mid-term reviews		Annual Report 2001	Tools for project supervision	Risk assessment and mitigation
Annual Report 2000				
Resource allocation memo		Resource allocation memo	Bank data	
Evaluability of country papers	Evaluability of strategies		Evaluability assessments of programming documents	
80 Evaluability assessments and report	Development Effectiveness			
Country Program Evaluation				
Peru	Nicaragua		Bahamas	Ecuador
Trinidad and Tobago	Guyana		Brazil	Paraguay
Haiti			Bolivia	Belize
Mexico			Costa Rica	Argentina
Honduras			Jamaica	Guatemala
			Colombia	
Evaluation Capacity Building				
ECB Report		Regional Seminar on ECB*	Country evaluation capacity reports	
Support for project teams on evaluation methods and indicators (ongoing)				
Collaborative evaluation work with CDB and CABEI (ongoing)				
Strategy				
Programs targeted to the indigenous	Water	Information and development*		Civil Society
Decentralization and citizen participation	Justice	Delivery of social services		MOS strategy evaluation
		Public Utilities		
		Taxation and Fiscal reform*	Public service reform	Audit and control entities
		Poverty	Agriculture	Rural Development
	Delivery of service through NGOs	Sub-national government		Transportation
		Microenterprise*		Legislatures
		Integration*		
		Energy		
		SME*		
Policy and Instrument				
Encerronas	Large TCs	Innovation loans	In-country ESW	Red de Centros
Social Information System+	Natural Disaster facility+		Loans as instruments	Main environmental projects
MIF preliminary			IIC	Financial sector
Emergency lending+			MIF	
Environmental Protection Agencies			Natural disaster policy	
* Indicates item postponed into 2002 from 2001				
+ Indicates item not in original workplan				

Table 2.1: OVE Multi-year Work Program

Oversight Studies			
2003	Status	2004	2005
Annual Report 2002/3	C03	Annual Report and Budget 2003/4	Annual Report 2004/5
Tools for project supervision	TBC03	Risk assessment and mitigation in projects	
		Country Portfolio Review Oversight Study	
OVE Work plan And Budget	C03		
Validation of PCRs	O	Validation of PCRs	Validation of PCRs
Review of methodology for performance-based FSO allocation	C03	Independent Inspection Mechanism	
Evaluability assessment of programming documents	O		
Additionality of C and D Action Plan	C03		
Project Evaluability Report	C03	Evaluability Assessment of Projects	
Validation PPMR	O	Validation PPMR	Validation of PPMRs
Country Program Evaluations			
2003	Status	2004	2005
Protocol for Country Program Evaluation	C03	Review of CPE Protocol	
Costa Rica	C03	Dominican Republic	Uruguay
Colombia	C03	Panama	
Bahamas	C03	El Salvador	
Nicaragua	C03	Barbados	
Ecuador	TBC03	Guatemala	
Paraguay	TBC03	Jamaica	
Belice	TBC03		
Brazil	TBC03		
Bolivia	TBC03		
Argentina	TBC03		
Sector and Thematic Evaluations			
2003	Status	2004	
			Early Childhood Programs
Education	C03	Health Sector Evaluation	
		Taxation and Fiscal reform	
		Public service reform/Institutional Infrastructure Activities	
Agriculture	TBC03		
Delivery of service through NGOs	C03		
Fiscal Federalism	C03	Transportation	
Poverty	C03		
Legislative strengthening	TBC04		
	P		Audit and control entities
SME	C03		

Table 2.1: Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2004-2006

2004	Status	2005	2006
Oversight Studies			
Annual Report and budget 2003/4	C04	Annual Report and Budget 2004/5	Annual Report and budget 2004/5
Risk assessment and mitigation in projects	TBC04	Country Portfolio Reviews	Quality review of supervision
Validation of PCRs	O	Validation of PCRs	Evaluation of Bank Initiatives
Evaluability assessment of programming documents	O	Review of the Bank's Human Resources Strategy	Review of the Bank's Capital Adequacy Model
Tools for project supervision	C04	Evaluability Assessment of Projects	Oversight of DEV action plan
Validation PPMR	O	Validation PPMRs	Validation of PPMRs and PCRs
Country Program Evaluations			
Brazil	C04	Uruguay	Chile
Argentina	C04	Surinam	Costa Rica
Bolivia	C04	Panama	Guyana
Ecuador	C04	Dominican Republic	Peru
Paraguay	C04		Colombia
Belize	C04		Venezuela
Barbados	TBC04		Honduras
Guatemala	TBC04		
Jamaica	TBC04		
El Salvador	TBC04		
Review of CPE Protocol	TBC04		
Sector and Thematic Evaluations			
Legislative strengthening	C04	Early Childhood Programs	Science and Technology
Health Sector Evaluation	TBC05	Public service reform	
Taxation and Fiscal reform	TBC05	Transportation	
		Audit and control entities	
		Financial Sector Reform/multisector credit	
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
Lending Instruments Evaluation	C04	Public Utilities Policy: Energy	Regional Policy Dialogues
Natural and Unexpected Disasters	C04	Private Sector Action Plan for C and D countries	
In-country ESW	TBC05		
Private Sector Lending	TBC04	Economic Analysis in lending Instruments	
IIC	O	IIC	IIC
Ex-Post Evaluation Activities			
EPSA Reports	TBC04	EPSA Reports	EPSA Reports
Ex-post Impact Evaluations	TBC04	Ex-post Impact Evaluations	Ex-post Impact Evaluations
Evaluation Capacity Building			
2004	Status	2005	2006
Regional Conference on ECB	C04	Country seminars on capacity building, REDEVAL	

Status Codes: O: Ongoing
 C04: Completed prior to Sept. 04
 TBC04: Expected completion in 2004
 TBC05: Work started in '04, delivery '05

Table 2.1: Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2005-2007

2005	Status	2006	2007
Oversight Studies			
Annual Report and budget 2004/5	C04	Annual Report and Budget	Annual Report and Budget
Risk assessment and mitigation in projects	TBC05	Quality review of supervision	Validation of PPMRs and PCRs
Validation of PCRs	O	Validation of PCRs and PPMRs	PRODEV
Evaluability assessment of country strategies	C05	Use of Human Resources*	
Evaluability Assessment of Projects	TBC06	Review of the Bank's Capital Adequacy Model	
Country Portfolio Reviews	TBC05	Oversight of MTAP	
Validation PPMR	O	MIF	MIF
IIC		IIC	IIC
Country Program Evaluations			
Guatemala	C05	Chile	Ecuador
Suriname	TBC05	Costa Rica	Brazil
Panama	C05	Guyana	Nicaragua
Dominican Republic	C05	Peru	Bahamas
El Salvador	C05	Colombia	
Jamaica	C05	Venezuela	
Barbados	TBC05	Honduras	
Uruguay	C05	Haiti	
Review of CPE Protocol	TBC06	Mexico	
Sector, Thematic And Ex-Post Evaluations			
Budget Process Evaluation	C05	Early Childhood Programs	Integrated Rural Development
Health Sector Evaluation	TBC05	Public service Reform	Compensating for Adjustment
Taxation and Fiscal Reform	TBC05	Transportation	Housing
Multi-sector credit/ Financial Sector Reform	TBC06	Science and Technology	
Report on Ex-Post Evaluations EPSAs and IERs	C05	EPSAs and IERs	EPSAs and IERs
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
Private Sector Action Plan for C and D Countries	TBC06	Public Utilities Policy: Energy	Programmatic lending
The Bank's Private Sector Lending	C05		
Regional Policy Dialogues	TBC05	Economic Analysis in Lending Instruments	IIRSA
Evaluating Studies (ESW)	TBC05		Plan Puebla-Panama
Evaluation Capacity Development			
		REDEVAL, team support	

Status Codes: C05=completed in 2005; TBC05=to be completed by December, 2005; TBC06=to be completed first semester 2006; O=ongoing

* Pending Board Decision

Table 3.1: Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2006-2008

2006	Status	2007	2008
Oversight Studies			
Annual Report and budget	C06	Work Program and Budget	Work Program and Budget
Validation of PCRs/PPMRs	C06	Quality of supervision*	
Evaluability Assessment of	C06	Validation of PCRs	Validation of PCRs
Country Portfolio Reviews	C06	MIF/IIC	Budgeting for Results
MIF/IIC	O	Integration of Information Systems	
Capital Adequacy Policy	C06	PRODEV/MTAP*	MIF/IIC
		Economic Analysis in Projects	
Country Program Evaluations			
Suriname	C06	Ecuador+	Argentina+
Chile	C06	Nicaragua+	Brazil+
Costa Rica	TBC06	Guyana+	Belize+
Peru	TBC06	Bahamas+	Dominican Republic+
Honduras	C06	Colombia+	Guatemala+
Barbados	C06	Venezuela+	Jamaica+
Haiti	TBC06	Mexico+	Paraguay+
	TBC06	Bolivia+	
		Trinidad and Tobago+	
		Revision of CPE Protocol	
Sector, Thematic And Ex-Post Evaluations - EPSA's & IER's			
Science and Technology	C06	Health project studies	
Health Sector Overview	C06	Public service reform*	
Fiscal Sector	C06	Adjustment costs*	Reaching the Majority
Multi-sector credit operations	TBC06	Integrated rural development*	
Transportation	TBC07	Social Investment Funds	
Labor Training	C06	Early Childhood Programs*	
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
Private Sector Action Plan for C and D countries	C06	Plan Puebla-Panamá	Programmatic lending*
Regional Policy Dialogues	TBC06	IIRSA+	Disaster risk management
Evaluating Studies (ESW)	C06	JSF TC Evaluation	Local currency lending
Public Utilities Policy: Energy	C06		Enhancing country studies+
Evaluation Capacity Development			

Status Codes: C06=completed in 2006; TBC06=to be completed by December, 2006; TBC07=to be completed first semester 2007; O=ongoing

- + Mandated by Bank Policy or prior Board Decision
- * Described in prior year work program

Table 1.1. Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2007-2009

2007	Status	2008	2009
Oversight Studies			
Work Program and budget	C07	Work Program and Budget	Work Program and Budget
Budgeting for Results	C07	NLF Review	IDB Governance
Evaluability Assessment of Projects	C07	Economic Analysis in Projects*	Monitoring Results of Realignment
Quality of Supervision	C07	Integration of Information Systems*	Evaluability Assessment of Projects
Results Framework for the Realignment	C07	Evaluability Assessment of Initiatives	Evaluation of OVE
Validation of PCRs/PPMRs/XPSR	O	Validation of PCRs/PPMRs/XPSR	Validation of PCRs/PPMRs/XPSR
MIF/IIC	O	MIF/IIC	MIF/IIC
Country Program Evaluations			
Guyana	C07	Trinidad and Tobago	Dominican Republic
Peru	C07	Ecuador	Panama
Honduras	C07	Argentina	El Salvador
Bolivia	C07	Brazil	Barbados
Haiti	C07	Belize	Evaluability Review of New Country Strategies
Venezuela	C07	Guatemala	
Bahamas	TBC07	Jamaica	
Colombia	TBC07	Paraguay	
Mexico	TBC07		
Nicaragua	TBC07	Revision of CPE Protocol	
Sector, Thematic And Ex-Post Evaluations			
Rural development+	C07	Compensating for Adjustment*	
Health project studies+	C07	Public service reform	Water and Sanitation+
Multi-sector credit operations	C07	Citizen Security+	Technical Education+
Transportation	C07	Housing+	Educational IT+
Social Investment Funds+	TBC07	Justice Sector Reform+	Competitiveness+
Early Childhood Programs+	TBC07	Environmental Mitigation	
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
Plan Puebla-Panama	TBC07	Management of TC	Regional Public Goods
IIRSA	TBC07	Disaster risk management	Sustainability Initiative
JSF TC Evaluation	C07	Local currency lending	Opportunities for the Majority
Public Utilities Policy: Energy	C07	Enhancing county studies	Development of Private Sector
Evaluation Capacity Development			

* Carried forward from 2007

+ Ex-Post Project reviews

Table I.1: Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2008-2010

2008	Status	2009	2010
Oversight Studies			
Work Program and Budget	C08	Work Program and Budget	Work Program and Budget
NLF Review	C08	IDB Governance	Results of Realignment
Economic Analysis in Projects	C08	Integration of Info. Systems*	
Investment Policies	TBC08	Evaluability of Projects	
Evaluability of Initiatives	Ongoing	Evaluability of Initiatives	Evaluability of Initiatives
		Compliance with Paris Declaration	Compliance with Paris Declaration
		Validation of COMPAS Results#	Validation of COMPAS Results#
		Evaluation of OVE	
		Validation of PCRs	Validation of PPMRs/PCRs
Support to MIF / IIC / SCF	Ongoing	Support to MIF / IIC / SCF	Support to MIF / IIC / SCF
Country Program Evaluations			
Mexico	C08	Dominican Republic	Honduras
Ecuador	C08	Panama	Chile
Argentina	TBC08	El Salvador	Costa Rica
Brazil	TBC08	Barbados	Uruguay
Belize	TBC08	Paraguay*	
Guatemala	TBC08	Jamaica*	
Nicaragua	C08	Evaluability of Strategies	Evaluability of Strategies
Bolivia	C08		
Trinidad and Tobago	TBC08		
Bahamas	TBC08		
Revision of CPE Protocol	TBC08		
Sector, Thematic And Ex-Post Evaluations			
Compensating for Adjustment	C08	Financial Administration	Technical Education+
Tax Administration+	TBC08	Primary Roads	Water and Sanitation+
Housing+	TBC08	Educational IT+	Safeguards in Transportation
Social Investment Funds+	C08	Competitiveness+	Competitiveness+
Justice Sector Reform+*	TBC08	Safeguards: Water+	Empirics of Poverty Targeting+
Safeguards: Energy+	TBC08	Citizen Security+*	Synthesis of Ex-Post Findings+
Agricultural Sanitation and Health+	TBC08		
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
HIRSA	C08	Regional Public Goods	Opportunities for the Majority
Plan Puebla-Panama	C08	Sustainability Initiative	SECCI
Local currency lending	C08	NSG Evaluation Cluster	Development Risk Management
		Risk Management Cluster	Concessional Resources
		Management of TCs*	Disaster Risk Management*
		Enhancing county studies*	KCP Products

* Carried forward from 2008+ Ex-Post Project reviews.# In the areas where OVE performs oversight

Table 1.1. Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2009-2011

2009	Status	2010	2011
Oversight Studies			
Work Program and Budget	C09	Work Program and Budget	Work Program and Budget
NLF Review	C09	DEM Oversight review	
Economic Analysis in Projects	C09	Project Evaluability 2009	
Investment Policies	C09	Review of OVE	
Evaluability of Initiatives			
Evaluability of Country Strategies			
IDB Governance			
Validation of PPMRs/PCRs			
Support to MIF / IIC / SCF			
Evaluation Findings Related to IDB-8 mandates	C09		
Lessons Learned from REDIBOL	C09		
Results of Realignment	TBC09		
Country Program Evaluations			
Paraguay	C09	Uruguay	Brazil
Bahamas	C09	Bolivia ³	Haiti
Argentina	C09	Honduras	Peru
Brazil	C09	Costa Rica	Guyana
Venezuela	C09	Chile	
Guatemala	C09	Colombia	
Trinidad and Tobago	C09	Suriname	
El Salvador	TBC09		
Revision of CPE Protocol	C09		
Dominican Republic	TBC09		
Jamaica	TBC09		
Panama	TBC09		
Barbados	TBC09		
Sector, Thematic And Ex-Post Evaluations			
Financial Administration	TBC10	Empirics of Poverty Targeting	
Ex-post project evaluations: Housing, educational IT, safeguards in energy projects; competitiveness, social investment funds; justice; early childhood development; multicultural education; water and health; conditional cash transfers			
Primary Roads	TBC09	Technical Education	
Synthesis of Ex-Post Findings	TBC09	Rural Water	
Citizen Security	TBC09		
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
Enhancing county studies	TBC09	Regional Public Goods	PRODEV
Plan Puebla-Panama	C09	Subnational lending	Disaster Risk Management
Origination of NSG Operations	TBC09	Sustainability Initiative	Opportunities for the Majority
Management of TCs	TBC09	Involuntary Resettlement	KCP Products
Concessional Resources	TBC09	Indigenous	SECCI
		Institutional Strengthening	

³ The last CPE was completed in 2008. A full CPE may not be required in 2010.

Table 1.1
Status of OVE's Multi-Year Work Plan 2010-2012

2010	Status	2011	2012
Oversight Studies			
Work Program and Budget	C10	Work Program and Budget	Work Program and Budget
Evaluability of Projects and DEM oversight	C10	Validation of results frameworks and PCRs for KCPs	Realignment evaluation
Self Evaluation for IRP	TBC10	Project evaluability review	
		IDB-9 Evaluation	
Evaluability of Country Strategies			
IDB Governance			
Validation of PPMRs/PCRs and LRRs			
Support to MIF / IIC / SCF			
Country Program Evaluations			
El Salvador	C10	Haiti	Nicaragua
Bahamas	C10	Bolivia ²	Argentina
Argentina	C10	Honduras	Peru
Jamaica	C10	Brazil	Guyana
Panama	C10	Colombia	Guatemala
Chile	C10	Suriname	
Dominican Republic	C10	Ecuador	
Costa Rica	C10		
Uruguay	C10		
Barbados	C10		
Sector, Thematic And Ex-Post Evaluations			
Financial Administration			
Ex-post project evaluations: Housing, educational IT, safeguards in energy projects; competitiveness, social investment funds; justice; early childhood development; multicultural education; water and health; conditional cash transfers.	C10	Ex-post evaluations: Rural water, regional development, MIF remittances, tourism; clusters approach to productive sectors, Technical Education, Health	
Primary Roads	C10	Impact of Safeguards	
Synthesis of Ex-Post Findings	TBC10		
Empirics of Poverty Targeting	C10		
Citizen Security	C10		
Policy and Instrument Evaluations			
Enhancing county studies	C10	Regional Public Goods	KCP-Products
Origination of NSG Operations	C10	Subnational lending	Disaster Risk Management
Management of TCs	C10	SECCI	PRODEV
Concessional Resources	C10	NSG Evaluation Cluster OOMJ Initiative	
		Performance Driven Loans	
		Indigenous	

ANNEX 4: EVALUATION REPORTS BY YEAR AND TYPE 2001-2010

Country Program Evaluations		
Number	Product Name	Date
RE-256	Country Program Evaluation. Trinidad and Tobago: 1985-1999.	10/1/2001
RE-259	Mexico. Country Program Evaluation. 1990-2000.	2/1/2002
RE-262	Peru. Country Program Evaluation. 1990-2000.	3/1/2002
RE-263	Honduras. Country Program Evaluation. 1990-2000.	4/1/2002
RE-266	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Guyana: 1989-2001.	8/1/2002
RE-272	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Nicaragua: 1991-2001.	11/1/2002
RE-274	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Haiti.	12/1/2002
RE-277	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Costa Rica: 1990-2001.	2/1/2003
RE-278	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Bahamas: 1990-2000.	2/1/2003
RE-280	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Colombia: 1990 – 2002.	7/1/2003
RE-294	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Paraguay: 1991-2002.	6/1/2004
RE-295	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Ecuador: 1990-2002	6/1/2004
RE-296	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Belize: 1993-2003.	6/1/2004
RE-297-3	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Bolivia: 1990-2002.	6/1/2004
RE-298	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Brazil: 1993-2003.	7/1/2004
RE-299	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Argentina: 1990-2002.	8/1/2004
RE-304	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Guatemala: 1993-2003	3/1/2005
RE-306	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Dominican Republic: 1993-2003.	6/1/2005
RE-307	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) El Salvador: 1992-2004.	6/1/2005
RE-305-3	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Panama: 1993-2003	9/1/2005
RE-310	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Jamaica 1990-2002. .	10/1/2005
RE-312	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Uruguay 1991-2004.	12/1/2005
RE-313	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Barbados 1989-2004.	3/1/2006
RE-318	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Suriname: 1980-2004.	12/8/2006
RE-320	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Chile: 1995-2005.	12/8/2006
RE-325	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Costa Rica (2002-2006).	1/29/2007
RE-328	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Honduras: 2001-2006.	4/1/2007
RE-327	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Haiti: 2001-2006	4/27/2007
RE-330	Country Program Evaluation (CPE) Peru: 2002-2006.	7/1/2007
RE-331	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Guyana: 2002-2006.	7/1/2007
RE-337	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Colombia 1998-2006	3/1/2008
RE-339	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Mexico 2001-2006	7/1/2008
RE-340	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Bolivia 2004-2007	7/1/2008
RE-341	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Ecuador 2000-2006	7/1/2008
RE-344	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Nicaragua 2002-2007	9/1/2008
RE-349	Country Program Evaluation (CPE): Belize 2004-2008.	1/1/2009
RE-351	Country Program Evaluation: Venezuela 1999-2007	4/1/2009
RE-352	Country Program Evaluation: Guatemala 2004-2007	4/1/2009

Country Program Evaluations (cont.)		
Number	Product Name	Date
RE-353	Country Program Evaluation: Trinidad and Tobago 2000-2008	5/1/2009
RE-355	Country Program Evaluation Brazil 2000-2008	6/1/2009
RE-356	Country Program Evaluation: Paraguay 2003-2008	8/4/2009
RE-358	Country Program Evaluation: The Bahamas 2001-2008	12/17/2009
RE-359	Country Program Evaluation: Panama 2005-2009	1/22/2010
RE-360	Country Program Evaluation: Salvador 2004-2008	2/18/2010
RE-361	Country Program Evaluation: Argentina 2003-2008	2/19/2010
RE-365	Country Program Evaluation: Jamaica 2003-2008	6/29/2010
RE-369	Country Program Evaluation: Barbados 2005-2009	8/23/2010
RE-371	Country Program Evaluation: Dominican Republic 2004-2008	9/13/2010
RE-377	Country Program Evaluation: Costa Rica 2006-2010	10/29/2010
RE-380-1	Country Program Evaluation: Chile 2006-2010. Revised version	11/18/2010

Other REs		
Number	Product Name	DATE
RE-258	Summary of OVE work on development effectiveness. Revised Version.	1/1/2002
RE-239	Summary Report: Evaluation of the policy-based loan portfolio Phase III. Final Version.	7/1/1999
RE-240	An evaluation of UNDP participation in the execution of Bank-funded operations. Final Version.	7/1/1999
RE-241	Report on Environmental Regulation and Supervision of Infrastructure Investments.	8/1/1999
RE-242	Evaluation Report of the Plan of Action for C and D Countries.	11/1/1999
RE-244	2000 Work Plan of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight. Final Version.	2/1/2000
RE-245	OVE Multi-year Work Plan and Budget for 2001. Final Version.	11/1/2000
RE-246	Evaluation Note on the Argentina Program 1996-1999.	2/1/2001
RE-247-2	Oversight review of the IDB's project monitoring review, the mid-term evaluation and the project completion report. Final Version.	4/1/2001
RE-249	2000 Annual Report of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight. Approved Final Version.	5/1/2001
RE-250	(WP/01-01) - Summary of findings – Decentralization and effective citizen participation: Six cautionary tales.	6/1/2001
RE-251 Rev.	Evaluation of the IDB Emergency Lending: 1998-1999.	9/1/2001
RE-252	Evaluation capacity building: Elements of an approach to the region.	10/1/2001
RE-253	(WP/02-01) - Evaluability of country strategies: Methodology Note.	10/1/2001
RE-254	SIS – Social Information System. Analysis of the Research Department's activities and the work of the Bank.	10/1/2001
RE-255	Economic Assessment Reports (EARs)/High-level consultation meetings (encerronas). Analysis of research department activities and the Bank's work.	10/1/2001
RE-257	OVE Multi-Year Work Plan and Budget for 2002.	10/1/2001
RE-260	Development Effectiveness Report.	3/1/2002
RE-261-1	Summary of evaluation findings of 10 projects that include indigenous people as beneficiaries. Updated Information. June 19, 2002.	3/1/2002
RE-264	Evaluation of the Emergency Reconstruction Facility (ERF).	6/1/2002

Other REs (Cont.)		
Number	Product Name	Date
RE-265	Implicit IDB strategy for regional integration: Its evaluation.	6/1/2002
RE-268	Annual Report of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight for 2001. Revised Version.	9/1/2002
RE-269	OVE Work plan and budget for 2003.	10/1/2002
RE-270	Evaluation of the public utilities policy (PU policy, OP-708) for potable water and sanitation services. 2003.	11/1/2002
RE-273	Evaluation of Bank action and strategy for small and medium enterprise (1990-2000).	12/1/2002
RE-275	Analysis of Project Evaluability Year 2001.	1/1/2003
RE-276	Authorization to use resources from the IDB-Swiss Consultant Trust Fund to support evaluation activities. 26, 2003.	2/1/2003
RE-279	Oversight Note on the Performance Criteria for Allocation of Concessional Resources.	6/1/2003
RE-281	Evaluation of the Bank's basic education strategy.	10/1/2004
RE-282	OVE's 2002-2003 Annual Report and proposed 2004 Work Program and Budget.	10/1/2004
RE-282	Proposed revisions to 2004 OVE Workplan.	6/1/2004
RE-283	A review of selected non-reimbursable technical cooperation: Guyana, Nicaragua and Bolivia.	10/1/2003
RE-284	A Proposal for a pilot program on impact evaluation.	10/1/2003
RE-285	Evaluation of innovative Bank projects that work with Non-Governmental Organizations.	10/1/2003
RE-286	Overview of OVE's work on strategy evaluation.	10/1/2003
RE-287	Synthesis of OVE evaluations of Bank action for Private Sector development. Released on October, 2003.	10/29/2003
RE-288	Poverty reduction and the IDB: An evaluation of the Bank's strategy and efforts.	11/1/2003
RE-289	From awareness to action: An evaluation of the Bank's policy on information age technologies and development (OP-711). Approved on February 5, 2004.	11/1/2003
RE-290	Oversight note on the additionality of resources of the C and D action plan.	11/1/2003
RE-291	Evaluation of the IDB's program in the agriculture sector (1990-2001).	2/1/2004
RE-292	Evaluation on the Bank's policy and operational practice related to natural and unexpected disasters.	4/1/2004
RE-293	The project supervision system: an evaluation of use of its instruments.	4/1/2004
RE-300	Instruments and development: An evaluation of IDB lending modalities.	9/1/2004
RE-301	OVE's 2003-2004 Annual Report and proposed 2005 Work Program and Budget.	11/1/2004
RE-302	Concept paper: Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Bank's application of human resources.	11/1/2004
RE-303	Evaluation of the Bank's Direct Private Sector Lending Program 1995-2003.	2/1/2005
RE-308	Ex Post Project Evaluations – 2004 Annual Report.	8/1/2005
RE-309	Report on the Evaluability of Bank Country Strategies.	10/1/2005
RE-311	OVE's 2004-2005 Annual Report and Proposed 2006 Work Program and Budget.	11/1/2005
RE-314	Evaluation of Country Portfolio Review Reports.	3/24/2006
RE-315	Assessment of the 2004 Project Completion Reports (PCR) produced under the Bank's new PCR guidelines.	4/1/2006
RE-316	Interim report – Regional Policy Dialogue Networks 2004-2005.	6/1/2006
RE-316	Evaluation Report - Regional Policy Dialogue Networks.	11/1/2006
RE-317	Evaluation of the IDB's Role in the Fiscal Sector.	10/1/2006
RE-317	Evaluation of the IDB's Role in the Fiscal Sector. Revised Version.	3/1/2008
RE-319	Evaluation of IDB Action Plan for Private Sector Development in C & D Countries.	10/1/2006
RE-321	OVE's 2005-2006 Annual Report and Proposed 2007 Work Program and Budget.	11/1/2006

Other REs (Cont.)		
Number	Product Name	Date
RE-322	Evaluation of the Bank's Capital Adequacy and Loan Charges Policy.	11/1/2006
RE-323	Evaluation of the IDB's Studies. Released on December, 2006.	12/1/2006
RE-324	Health sector evaluation: 1995-2005. Released on January, 2007. .	1/26/2007
RE-326	Evaluation of the Public Utilities Policy as applied to the Electricity Sector (PUP-E).	4/1/2007
RE-329	Results framework for the realignment: OVE views.	6/1/2007
RE-332	First Independent Evaluation of the Expanded Project Supervision Report Exercise.	8/1/2007
RE-333	Analysis of Project Evaluability - Year 2005.	9/1/2007
RE-334	An oversight note on budgeting for results at the IDB.	10/1/2007
RE-334	Towards results-based budgeting at the IDB: OVE's suggested next steps.	10/26/2007
RE-335	OVE's Proposed 2008 Work Program and Budget	11/1/2007
RE-336	Evaluation of the Bank's Global Multisector Credit Operations (GMCs) – 1990 to 2005	12/14/2007
RE-338	Evaluation of the IDB action in the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA)	5/1/2008
RE-342	The evaluation of the New Lending Framework: 2005-2008	9/1/2008
RE-343	MDB-ECG Good-Practice Standards for Country Strategy and Program Evaluation	8/1/2008
RE-345	OVE's Proposed 2009 Work program and Budget	10/1/2008
RE-346	Evaluation of the Quality of Economic Analysis for Projects approved 1997-2006	11/14/2008
RE-347	Review of the Bank's Investment Policy: Expert Panel Report	12/1/2008
RE-347	Additional information regarding the investment policy review eval	2/4/2009
RE-350	Evaluation of the IDB's Initiative for the Plan Puebla Panama.	2/5/2009
RE-354	Evaluation findings regarding IDB-8 guidance and implications for future Capital Increase Agreements	7/21/2009
RE-357	OVE's Proposed 2010-2011 Work Program and Budget	10/29/2009
RE-362-1	(RAP) 2009 Board Retreat Action Plan: Action 8. Timeline for the development of a Board self evaluation framework. Revised Version	4/5/2010
RE-364	Evaluation of the Bank's processes for managing technical cooperation	5/6/2010
RE-366	OVE Comments on document RE-366-4 Independent Review Panel (IRP) of the Evaluation Function of the Inter-American Development Bank. Terms of Reference. Revised version"	9/13/2010
RE-367	OVE's Initial Comments on RAP Implementation	7/14/2010
RE-368	La Acción del Banco en el Desarrollo de Carreteras Principales	7/16/2010
RE-370	Third Benchmarking Review of Evaluation of Private Sector Investment Operations	9/3/2010
RE-372	The Country Studies Initiative and its effect on the Bank's Knowledge Strategy	9/24/2010
RE-373	Is Gender Being Mainstreamed in Bank's Projects?	9/24/2010
RE-374-1	OVE's Proposed 2011-2012 Work Program and Budget	9/29/2010
RE-375	Do we know if the Bank's pro-poor projects benefit the poor?	9/30/2010
RE-376	Evaluation of the Fund for Special Operations during the Eighth Replenishment (1994-2010) – Part I	10/5/2010
RE-378	Crime and Violence Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from IDB's interventions	11/5/2010
RE-379	Evaluability review of Bank projects 2009	11/17/2010
RE-271	Protocol for the conduct of country program evaluations.	11/1/2002
RE-348	Protocol for Country Program Evaluation (CPE) 2008.	12/1/2008

MIFs		
Number	Product Name	DATE
MIF/GN-61	An evaluation of the functions and performance of the Multilateral Investment Fund.	5/1/2001
MIF/GN-78	MIF Evaluation: A proposal for external evaluation by OVE.	2/1/2002
MIF/GN-78-1	Independent evaluation of MIF: Progress report and preliminary results.	11/1/2002
MIF/GN-78-11	Evaluation of MIF Projects: Development of venture capital.	1/1/2004
MIF/GN-78-12	Evaluation of MIF Projects: Business development services.	1/1/2004
MIF/GN-78-13	Evaluation of MIF Projects: Environment.	2/1/2004
MIF/GN-78-14	Evaluation of MIF Projects: Market functioning: Promotion of competition and consumer protection.	2/1/2004
MIF/GN-78-18	Independent Evaluation of the MIF (2002-2003): Final report.	5/1/2004
MIF/GN-78-2	Evaluation of MIF: Alternative dispute resolution (MARC).	11/1/2002
MIF/GN-78-3	Evaluation of MIF projects: Micro – finance.	11/1/2002
MIF/GN-78-4	Evaluation of MIF Projects: Financial Reform & Capital Markets.	11/1/2002
MIF/GN-78-7	Independent evaluation of the MIF 2002. Report of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight.	3/1/2003
MIF/GN-78-8	Evaluation of MIF projects: Human resources and labor market projects.	9/1/2003
MIF/GN-78-9	Evaluation of MIF projects: Support of Private Participation in Infrastructure.	9/1/2003
MIF/RE-1	First Independent Evaluation Report of the MIF.	3/1/2008
MIF/RE-2	Second Independent Evaluation Report of the MIF.	7/1/2009
MIF/RE-3	Transmission Note: Third Benchmarking Review of ECG Member's Evaluation Practices for their Private Sector Investment Operations	8/1/2010

IIC		
Number	Product Name	DATE
CII/RE-1	Progress report: Toward an evaluation system for the IIC.	8/1/2001
CII/RE-10	Modification of OVE-IIC Evaluation Services Agreement	3/1/2010
CII/RE-11	Seventh independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Directors	9/14/2010
CII/RE-12	Transmission Note: Third Benchmarking Review of ECG Member's Evaluation Practices for their Private Sector Investment Operations	9/14/2010
CII/RE-2 Corr.	First independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Directors. Revised version.	4/1/2002
CII/RE-3	Second independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Directors.	7/1/2003
CII/RE-4	Third independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Directors.	2/1/2005
CII/RE-6	Evaluation of the Financial Intermediary Lines of the Inter-American Investment Corporation.	12/1/2005
CII/RE-7	Fourth independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Director.	10/1/2006
CII/RE-8	Fifth independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Directors.	2/1/2008
CII/RE-9	Sixth independent evaluation report to the IIC Board of Executive Directors.	4/1/2009

Japanese Fund		
Number	Product Name	DATE
CS-3746	External Independent Evaluation of the Japanese Trust Funds.	11/1/2007

Working Papers		
Number	Product Name	Date
WP/01-07	Does Community Participation Produce Dividends in Social Investment Fund Projects	1/7/2010
WP/01-08	Evaluating the Impact of Technology Development Funds in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Latin America	1/1/2008
WP/01-09	Does Technical Assistance Matter? An Impact Evaluation Approach to Estimate its Value Added	1/1/2009
WP/01-10	Does ICT Increase Years of Education? Evidence from peru	5/1/2010
WP/02-07	A Meta-Impact Evaluation of the Social Housing Programs: The Chilean Case	8/1/2007
WP/02-08	The Welfare Impacts of Local Investment Projects: Evidence from the Guatemala FIS	2/8/2010
WP/02-09	Should Central Banks Target Happiness? Evidence from Latin American	2/1/2009
WP-02/10	Does Owning Your Home Make you Happier? Impact Evidence from Latin America	5/1/2010
WP/03-07	The Impact of Natural Resources Funds” an Evaluation of the Chilean FONDECYT	3/1/2007
WP/03-08	Incapacity to Pay or Moral Hazard: Public Mortgage Delinquency Rates in Chile	3/1/2008
WP/03-09	Microcrédito y su Impacto: Un Acercamiento con Datos Chilenos	3/1/2009
WP-03/10	Impact Evaluation of a Program of Public Funding of Private Innovation Activities. An Economic Study of FONTAR in Argentina	6/1/2010
WP/04-07	On-Site Costs and Benefits of Soil and Conservation Among Hillside Farmers in El Salvador	4/1/2007
WP/04-08	Hysteresis in Unemployment: Evidence from Latin America	4/8/2010
WP/04-09	Improving Techonlogy Adoption in Agriculture through Extension Services: Evidence from Uruguay	4/1/2009
WP-04/10	The Transparency, Incidence, and Targeting Efficiency of Housing Programs in Latin America	10/12/2010
WP/05-07	Public Support to Firm-Level Innovation: an Evaluation of the FONTEC Program	5/1/2007
WP/05-08	The Impact of Agriculture Extension Services: The Case of Grape Production in Argentina	6/1/2008
WP/05-09	The impact of Technology Adoption on Agricultural Productivity: The Case of the Dominican Republic	5/1/2009
WP/05-10	Do Social Housing Programs Increase Poverty? An Empirical Analysis of Shelter Induced Poverty in Latin America	10/2010
WP/06-08	An Impact Evaluation of the Chile’s Progressive Housing Program	6/1/2008
WP/06-10	The Impact of Modernization of Justice on Court Efficiency in Costa Rica	10/2010
WP/07-08	Technology Adoption, Productivity and Specialization of Uruguayan Breeders: Evidence from an Impact Evaluation	7/1/2008
WP-07/10	Can SME Policies Improve Firm Performance? Evidence from an Impact Evaluation in Argentina	12/2010
WP/08-08	Fear of Crime: Does Trust and Community Participants Matter?	7/1/2008
WP-08/10	The Impact of Improving Access to Justice on Conflict Resolution. Evidence from Peru	12/2010
WP/09-08	An impact Evaluation of a Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program: Does Safer Commune make Chileans Safer?	11/1/2008
WP-01/05	Evaluating the Impact on Child Mortality of a Water Supply Sewerage Expansion in Quito: Is Water enough?	5/15/2005
WP-02/05	Una Evaluación de Impacto del Programa de Fondo de Inversión Social de Panamá	6/20/2005
WP-03/05	An Impact Evaluation of Agricultural Subsidies on Human Capital Development and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Rural Mexico	7/20/2005
WP-04/05	An Assessment of Propensity Score Matching as a Non-Experimental Impact Estimator: Evidence from Mexico’s PROGRESA Program	7/22/2005

Working Papers (Cont.)		
Number	Product Name	Date
WP-05/05	Demand & Supply-Side Determinants of Conditional Cash Transfer Program's Effectiveness: Improving the First-Generation Programs	7/1/2005
WP-06/05	An Impact Evaluation of the National Student Scholarship Program in Argentina	7/1/2005
WP-07/05	An Impact Evaluation of Land Titles On Rural Households in Peru	8/1/2005
WP-08/05	The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Barrio: What do the data say?	8/1/2005
WP-09/06	An Evaluation of Training for the Unemployed in México	9/1/2006
WP-1	Bank Lending for Sub-national Development: The Policy and Institutional Challenges	1/1/2003
WP-1	La Cooperación Técnica no Reembolsable: El Caso de Argentina	8/1/1999
WP-10/06	An Evaluation of the Peruvian "Youth Labor Training Program – PROJOVEN	10/1/2006
WP-11/06	Evaluating the Effectiveness of Public Support to Private R & D: Evidence from Argentina	12/1/2006
WP-12/06	Evaluating a Program of Public Funding of Scientific Activity. A Case Study of FONCYT in Argentina	11/1/2006
WP-13/06	The Impact of University Enterprise Incentive Program on the Performance and Technological Efforts of Brazilian Industrial Firms	12/1/2006
WP-14/06	Impact of P & D Incentive Program on the Performance and Technological Efforts of Brazilian Industrial Firms	12/1/2006
WP-15/06	The Impact of Training Policies in Argentina: An evaluation of Proyecto Joven	10/1/2006
WP-16/06	Evaluating a Program of Public Funding of Private Innovation Activities: An Econometric Study of FONTAR in Argentina	11/1/2006
WP-17/06	Output Diversification Among Small Scale Hillside Farmers in El Salvador	12/1/2006
WP-18/06	Adoption of Soil Conservation Technologies in El Salvador: A Cross Section and Overtime Analysis	12/1/2006
WP-2	Justice Reform in Latin America: The Role of the Inter-American Development Bank	3/1/2003
WP-2	Evaluability of country strategies: Methodology Note	9/1/2001
WP-2	La Cooperación Técnica no Reembolsable: El Caso de Bolivia – Análisis de Siete Proyectos	12/1/1999
WP-3	La Cooperación Técnica no Reembolsable en Bolivia: Lecciones Aprendidas	12/1/1999
WP-4	Performance Monitoring Non-Reimbursable Technical Cooperations: Current Practices and Future Directions	12/1/1999
WP-5	Las Reformas Económicas en América Latina	12/1/1999

Technical Discussion Papers		
Number	Product Name	Date
TDP-01/05	Labor Market Modernization Project	1/1/2005
TDP-01/06	Infraestructura Vial y Bienestar Económico: Evaluación de un Programa de Caminos Rurales en la República Dominicana	12/1/2006
TDP-01/07	Modernización de la Administración Tributaria Ecuatoriana. Impacto de la Cooperación Técnica Informe Final	11/1/2007
TDP-01/08	Programas de Administración Tributaria Evaluación del Préstamo 1034/OC-AR-Programa de Apoyo a la Institución de la AFIP	2/1/2008
TDP-01/09	Evaluación Ex-Post de Proyectos de Sanidad Agropecuaria y Seguridad Alimentaria	1/1/2009
TDP-02/05	Análisis del Programa Remediar. Notas sobre Evaluación y Seguimiento	4/1/2005
TDP-02/06	Supply Side Subsidies, Educational Outcomes and Child Labor Supply in Honduras	1/1/2005

Technical Discussion Papers (Cont.)		
Number	Product Name	Date
TDP-02/07	Series de Incumplimiento del Impuesto al Valor Agregado para la Evaluación Ex-Post de Programas de Reforma de la Administración Tributaria. Informe Final	12/1/2007
TDP-02/08	Evaluación de la Focalización de la Pobreza en el Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo en El Salvador	3/1/2008
TDP-02/09	Procesos de Reasentamiento y su Impacto Socioeconómico . El Caso del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Porce II, Colombia	6/1/2009
TDP-03/05	Ecuador Housing Sector Program	7/1/2005
TDP-03/07	Programas de Reforma de la Administración Tributaria Bolivia	12/1/2007
TDP-03/08	Reforma de la Administración Tributaria en Ecuador	4/1/2008
TDP-04/08	Reforma de la Administración Tributaria en Argentina	4/1/2008
TDP-05/08	Reforma de la Administración Tributaria en Nicaragua	5/1/2008
TDP-06/08	Reforma de la Administración Tributaria en Bolivia	11/1/2008
TDP-07/08	Energy Sector: An Environmental Performance Review	12/1/2008
TDP-08/08	La Generación Térmica y la Mitigación de su Impacto Evaluación Ex-Post en los Proyectos de Samalayuca II y Monterrey III, México	12/1/2008
TDP-09/08	Medidas de Mitigación Ambiental Asociadas a Proyectos Hidroeléctricos	12/1/2008
TDP-01/10	The Impact of Jamaica's CSJP Program	11/1/2010
TDP-02/10	An Evaluation of the Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security: Bogotá and Medellín	11/1/2010
TDP-03/10	An Evaluation of the Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security: Cali	11/1/2010
TDP-04/10	Evaluación del Fondo del Asistencia Económica y Social	11/1/2010
TDP-05/10	Community Heterogeneity and Collective Action in Demand-driven Poverty Reduction Programs	11/1/2010
TDP-06/10	Una evaluación de los Programas Públicos de Vivienda ABC: Un caso de estudio para Costa Rica	12/1/2010
TDP-07/10	La Política de Vivienda Social y su Impacto en el Bienestar: el caso de Ecuador	12/1/2010
TDP-08/10	Panama's Housing Programs: an Evaluation	12/1/2010

ANNEX 5: MATRIX OF SHARED EVALUATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Evaluation Product	Purpose	Frequency / Coverage	Producer	Reporting (product sent to)	Dissemination	Implementation
1. Annual Review of OEO Activities	Provide synthesis of lessons learned, main findings and recommendations from evaluation activities in the Bank.	Annually	OEO in consultation with Managers and Country Offices	Board of Directors and Management	Institutional performance in achieving development effectiveness	Improve development effectiveness of Bank operational activities
2. Project Mid-term Reports	Enhance relevance; increase project control mid-course correction	As indicated in project report	Country Office, Project Team and Borrower	Borrower, Management, and OEO with Action Plan. Annual Report to Borrowers and OEO	Project teams/Division Chiefs and Country Representatives Lessons learned by OEO	Agreement among COF/PT/Borrowers. Lessons Learned incorporated in new operations
3. Project Completion Reports	Performance and development Assessment Enhance learning	All loan projects within 3 months of completion	Country Office and Borrower	Individual reports sent to COF, Borrowers	Lessons extracted form OEO Annual Reports and broadly distributed. Used by LRN.	Lessons Learned incorporated in new operations. OEO verifies incorporation in periodic reports.
4. Development Impact Evaluations	Enhance relevance of Policies and Strategies	Sample (15-25%) of projects within 2-3 years of completion	OEO and Borrowers	Borrower, Management; OEO collects and reports Lessons Learned	Lessons extracted form OEO Annual Reports and broadly distributed. Used by LRN	Lessons Learned Incorporated by SDS and DPP in Policies and Strategies.
5. Sector Performance Reviews	Lessons Learned Improve Formulation of Strategies, policies	Two Sectors every year	Central Depts. W/Sector responsibility	Management and Board	Lessons Learned and best practices disseminated by Central Department	Lessons Learned incorporated in new operations, policies and strategies. OEO verifies compliance in periodic reports
6. Portfolio Performance Reports	Corporate accountability Monitor rigor / health of overall operations	Yearly/all projects moving steadily to incorporate PRI, MIF and TC	Country Office	Regional Department and OEO	Operational Departments, Upper Management and COFs	Lessons Learned incorporated into new country programs. OEO verifies compliance in periodic reports

7. Annual Portfolio Review	Provide Board and Management with assessment of Performance	Annual	COF, RSS	Management ad Board	Operational Departments, Upper Management and COFs	Regional Departments and COFs to take corrective measures.
8. Country Program Evaluations	Corporate Accountability Lessons Learned for Strategies and policies	As determined by the Board in OEO Work Plan	OEO with support of COF and Country Divisions	Management and Board	Lessons Learned extracted by OEO / LRN uses in training	Lessons Learned incorporated in new Country Programs. OEO verifies compliance in periodic reports to the Board.
9. Policy/Strategy Implementation Reviews	Development effectiveness and corrective action	Select number of Strategies/ Policies each year to provide coverage over time	OEO with support from Central Depts.	Management and Board	Lessons Learned with Best Practices disseminated by Central Departments	Lessons Learned incorporated in new strategies, policies and operations. OEO verifies compliance in periodic reports to the Board.