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# Seemingly irrelevant factors and willingness to block polluting investments\*

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## Abstract

Using an online multi-country video-vignette survey experiment, we measure bias against extractive industries and foreign firms in individuals' perceptions and preferences related to industrial projects with potential economic benefits and environmental costs. Individuals face a hypothetical industrial investment project with a randomly assigned implementing firm, which varies in one or two dimensions: nationality (foreign or national), and industrial sector (extractive or generic). We elicit several incentivized and non-incentivized measures of acceptance of hypothetical investments. We find a precisely estimated null effect on willingness to pay to block the projects across experimental treatments: respondents express similar reactions to the same information independently of the firms' origin or industrial sector.

*JEL codes:* C90, D70, D90, L71, Q30, Q51

*Keywords:* experimental economics, extractive industries, perceptions, willingness-to-pay, valuation

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# 1 Introduction

Extractive industries make important contributions to economic activity (Robinson et al., 2006; Allcott and Keniston, 2018; Ericsson and Löf, 2019), and, historically, they have been crucial for developing countries (Ebeke et al., 2015; Adams et al., 2019). A potential downside of these industries is the environmental cost and damage to the host communities their projects might inflict (Aragón and Rud, 2013; Betz et al., 2015; Aragón and Rud, 2016; Von der Goltz and Barnwal, 2019). These costs and damages may create tension that trigger social discomfort, in many cases delaying and blocking new investments and creating conflicts (Acuña, 2015; Middeldorp et al., 2016; Conde and Le Billon, 2017).

Under certain assumptions, policymakers, communities, and nations should allow projects with a positive net expected social benefit and block those that do not benefit them. However, assessing the cost-benefit of big industrial projects could be challenging for a layperson. Evidence shows belief formation about climate-related issues is often subject to biases (Douenne and Fabre, 2022). In such a context, individuals could be prone to form inaccurate perceptions and beliefs about the benefits and costs based on seemingly irrelevant cues (Bursztyn and Yang, 2021; Nyhan, 2020; Bastian et al., 2015) and, thus, informational frames could affect the receptiveness of individuals to new extractive projects.

In this paper, we examine the role of two seemingly irrelevant attributes of industrial projects (factors that do not affect the expected costs or benefits of investment) on residents' resistance to industrial investments. The first attribute is the firm's nationality, which could plausibly induce home bias (Gaar et al., 2020). And the second attribute is the type of industry (extractive or generic) to which the artificial firm belongs. These two attributes are especially relevant in many Latin American countries given their colonial history. Particularly in mining-abundant countries, colonial empires were seen as abusers who extracted valuable local resources and exploited the local populations, leaving a long-lasting footprint on crucial socioeconomic outcomes –see, for instance Dell (2010). We based our analysis on a multi-country online video-vignette experiment in three Latin American countries where extractive industries are relevant (Brazil, Colombia, and Mex-

ico). More specifically, we explore whether experimentally manipulating the industrial sector and firms' nationality of a hypothetical industrial project affects individual willingness to pay for blocking (WTPb), when holding projects' information on economic and environmental costs and benefits constant.

In particular, we analyze whether individuals' behavior, such as agreeing to pay a certain amount to block a project or distributing an endowment among different non-governmental organizations (NGOs), varies across treatment groups exposed to different frames. We also explore if the treatments affect the perceived benefits of an industrial project.

We first show that each country's responses satisfy a minimum economic rationality requirement. That is, the WTPb is decreasing on the proposed payment amount. We then document a precisely estimated null effect of the treatments on both the WTPb and the perceived benefits of a project. We thus fail to identify a bias against extractive industries or foreign firms. The results are not driven by a weak salience of the treatments or by survey participants' inattention. Moreover, in line with previous literature, our WTPb estimates are influenced by individual characteristics such as environmental awareness, institutional trust, and age.

We complement our empirical findings with a simple model to study how the *fundamentals* of a project –i.e., project's benefits and environmental costs— affect the willingness to block it. Our model allows us to disentangle how WTPb as a function of the expected benefits, costs, and individual characteristics for a rational expected utility maximizer agent. Implications of the model reveal that WTPb is either a function of the project's fundamentals that varies with individual characteristics, such as proximity to the project or history with industrial projects. In the experiment, individuals could fail to act as rationally expected utility maximizers and thus be affected by perception biases.

Our results are consistent with the implications of the model. We document significant differences in the WTPb between countries. This is expected because industrial projects' fundamentals vary significantly across countries. Such differences include, for

example, the relevance of the extractive industries, the number of royalties assigned to local governments, and their records of environmental damage and social conflict.

We focus on three countries: Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. These countries were selected for three main reasons. First, the natural resource extraction sector is important in these countries, accounting in the last decade for approximately 3.2%, 5.5%, and 4% of their GDPs, respectively. Second, these countries have experienced conflicts between civil society and the sector. Indeed, around 36% of all regional mining conflicts in Latin America are located in these countries, affecting 188 extractive projects with 78 criminal acts in total (OCMAL, 2022).<sup>1</sup> Historically, communities have acted in the past to block extractive projects in this region (see, e.g., Shenk, 2022; Tetreault, 2020; Saes and Bisht, 2020). The town of Cajamarca in Colombia, is a salient example in this as in 2017, 97% of their population voted to impede a mining company to start operations in their community (El Espectador, 2023).

Our paper relates to the literature on natural resources and conflict. An extensive literature explores the civil acceptance of natural resources projects (Hyland and Bertsch, 2018; Guo et al., 2015; Mononen and Sairinen, 2021; Conde and Le Billon, 2017; Balza et al., 2023) and the conflicts it might generate (Hernández-Cedeño et al., 2021). In many cases, these conflicts arise when there are objective costs to relevant stakeholders (Axsen, 2014). Our paper explores a complementary dimension of this problem by studying how willingness to block an investment that affects the environment (a potential root of conflict) could be affected by contextual factors above and beyond cost-benefit calculations.<sup>2</sup>

## 2 Model and hypotheses

We develop a concise model of willingness to pay to block (WTPb) for the implementation of a generic industrial project, interpreting WTPb as either activity to restrain the firm from operating or as donations to an institution to stop the project (Becker, 1976). We

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<sup>1</sup>Threats, female activists, murders and attempts thereof, criminal investigation and prosecution, and use of force are included in this dataset.

<sup>2</sup>Several articles have questioned the validity of contingent valuation methods to elicit incentive compatible responses and subsequent estimates Diamond and Hausman (1994), similarly several authors have defended its methodology (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1996). In this model, we took a similar approach to Carson and Groves (2007) to maximize the chances that our responses are incentive compatible.

assume an individual's WTPb is contingent on her beliefs about others' contributions and the institutional ability to block the project effectively. We then relate the model to the testable hypotheses of the experiment.

## 2.1 A model of quantifiable resistance to industrial projects

We assume a rational expected utility maximizer respondent  $i$  to a ballot question. The agent lives in location,  $l$ , has a status quo utility  $U_{il} = u(m_i, e_l, h_i|X_i)$ , depending positively on income  $m_i$ , environmental amenities  $e_l$ , and health status  $h_i$ , and  $X_i$  represents demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. We simplify the model by focusing on country aggregates and removing the individual index and location subscript. Respondents face a dichotomous choice question regarding their WTP for blocking a new industrial project in location  $l'$  (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hanemann and Kanninen, 1996; Carson and Groves, 2007).

In each question, the rational respondents analyze the benefits and costs of an industrial project. Any new project is characterized by its costs and benefits, with benefits as economic opportunities and costs as societal damages. The damages of an industrial project include negative environmental effects ( $e'$ ) and health impacts ( $h'$ ). Respondent's WTPb is the monetary amount they are willing to extract from their status quo utility  $U$  to prevent a lower new utility  $U'$  from occurring. The expected utility of a new industrial project,  $U'$ , is based on individuals' beliefs about its effects on  $m$ ,  $e$ , and  $h$  (Carson and Groves, 2007).

At the time of the question, the respondent's expected utility of implementing a new industrial project before the project is implemented depends on its beliefs regarding the associated benefits and damages. Thus, for a new project leading to  $S$  possible states of the world, where each state results in different magnitudes of benefits and damages, ex-ante individuals' expected utility is expressed as:

$$U' = u(m', e', h'|X) = E[u(\cdot)] = \sum_{s \in S} \Phi^s \times U^s(m^s, e^s, h^s|X) \quad (1)$$



where  $s$  represents one state of the world, and  $\Phi^s$  is the distribution of probabilities (subjective beliefs) across particular states of the world. Equation (1) describes the expected utility of a new industrial project as the sum of state-dependent utilities over all states of the world.

It is straightforward to notice that any rational respondent has a positive WTPb when Equation (1) is lower than her status quo utility. In those cases, respondents will state a positive WTPb that reflects the maximum value they will pay to prevent an expected decrease in their status quo utility.<sup>3</sup>

## 2.2 Testing the model

In this section, we build upon the relationships, individual characteristics, expectations, and WTPb, a new industrial project. We present two types of hypotheses: macro (cross-country) and micro (individual) hypotheses. Macro-hypotheses primarily focus on the relationships between industrial project fundamentals and population levels of WTPb, while micro-hypotheses consider the influence of idiosyncratic factors on the primary determinant of  $d$ .

For each country  $j$ , if individuals employ similar subjective weights to estimate expected benefits and damages, the country's measures should reflect general trends.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, we formulate the following macro hypotheses:

1.  $WTPb_j$  increases with the probabilities of expected damages.
2.  $WTPb_j$  decreases with the probabilities and magnitudes of expected benefits.
3.  $WTPb_j$  is an increasing function of the damage magnitude generated by the industrial project.
4.  $WTPb_j$  is a decreasing function of the income magnitude the industrial project generates.

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<sup>3</sup>We provide further details on consequentialism, incentive compatibility, socio-demographic characteristics, and utility assumptions in the appendix. We also discuss the conditions a positive WTPb must satisfy to be consistent with our model. These assumptions enable us to establish a clear relationship between respondents' beliefs about the expected benefits and damages of the industrial project and their willingness to pay to block it.

<sup>4</sup>From integrating Equation (1) over individuals in a country, we can obtain  $WTPb_j$  –where  $j$  indexes a representative individual from a particular group, for example, a country.

In the experiment, we provided all respondents with a video containing information on past benefits and potential damages of specific extractive industries. Thus, respondents could base their  $WTPb_j$  on the artificial industrial project’s expected net benefits (or damages), manipulated by the video-vignette observed in their corresponding treatment. Information has a single goal: to lead respondents toward creating an informed expectation of the net benefits or damages a new industrial project could generate.

Eliciting  $WTPb$  in the real world is difficult because many factors influence respondents’ valuation, opinions, and responses. Two important features in which the empirical problem of estimating  $WTPb$  departs from our theoretical model. First, respondents use multiple information sources to estimate the expected net benefits of damages. Thus, the elements generating their expected utility are multiple. In our study, we control by this feature of the empirical problem by selecting a subset of all possible facts that can be used to characterize an industry. We focus on those recorded similarly across countries, such as employment, GDP, exports, taxes, and government take. Second, if expectations are multidimensional, ranking any two objects when the multi-dimensional comparison is a complex process. Table 1 reveals the information that we presented in the videos. Notice that although we simplified the informational cost of comparing projects, differences across categories might not be straightforward to be perceived by a layperson. We could unequivocally compare two countries for any pairwise comparison of projects if the differences across all variables presented in Table 1 have the same sign. Therefore, even when our model implies that with clear one-dimensional information, the following inequality should hold:

$$WTPb_1 \geq WTPb_2 \geq WTPb_3 \tag{2}$$

In practice, finding this country’s ranking is an empirical question. The ranking of industrial projects according to expected benefits or damages is likely influenced by respondents’ weighting of each information piece.

Table 1 shows the numerical differences across those variables we choose to characterize the benefits of industrial projects. We selected to portrait variables like the number

Table 1: Information presented to participants in the experiment

Countries	Employment		GDP	Exports	Taxes	Royalties		
	%	No.	%	%	%	%	USD	Local (%)
Colombia	31	150,000	2	22	12	[4-12]	2 billions	20
Mexico	32	125,000	4	5	36	7.5	700 million	20
Brazil	21	180,000	2.2	18	15	[1-3]	1500 million	88

*Notes:* This table lists the information provided to our respondents via video vignettes. Employment is presented as the percentage of the labor force, and the number of employees working for the sector. GDP, exports, and taxes corresponds to the percentage of total that corresponds to the industry. Royalties from the industry are presented as the percentage of total, the nominal USD revenue value, and the percentage of total royalties, respectively.

of employees generated by the sector, the sector’s percentage contribution to a country’s GDP, government taxes, royalty rates, and local community transfers. To value the expected cost, our videos showed quantitative information on conflicts derived from extractive projects and qualitative information on potential damages, such as water pollution, deforestation, and biodiversity loss. In our simplified experimental environment, respondents were provided with multidimensional information to expected benefits and the qualitative characteristics to estimate expected damages. We consider that even in this simplified environment, respondents might have difficulties in ranking expected benefits.

In summary, although a simplified model offers a clear rule for comparing WTPb projects based on expected benefits or damages at a country level, the reality is less straightforward. The lack of relevant information and the accuracy of multiple information pieces might diminish the model’s implications based on expected benefits or damages. Our study provides respondents with accurate information to form expectations about an artificial industrial project’s potential benefits or damages. As information varies across countries, we anticipate differences in average responses, with the observed ranking revealing respondents’ willingness to pay for blocking the project and the relative weights assigned to each information piece.

### 2.2.1 Individual implications base for individual hypotheses and heterogeneous effects

In this section, we focus on describing how certain individual characteristics, such as subjective beliefs and past experiences, are hypothesized to affect individuals' responses. This section presents the theoretical reasons why location characteristics, environmental and ecological awareness, education, and gender were collected in our study. Each one of these characteristics is likely to influence  $WTPb_i$ . The following guidelines are provided:

1.  $WTPb_i$  increases with the subjective probabilities of the expected damages.
2.  $WTPb_i$  decreases with the subjective probabilities and magnitudes of the expected benefits.
3.  $WTPb_i$  increases with the magnitude of the individual expected damage generated by the industrial project.
4.  $WTPb_i$  decreases with the magnitude of the individual expected income generated by the industrial project.

To elucidate the implications of individual comparisons on aggregate analysis, we consider a hypothetical scenario in which an individual compares two distinct projects. The individual will assess each project based on their subjective expected benefit,  $B_{ji}$ , and subjective expected damage,  $D_{ji}$ . A comparison of these factors results in a ranking of the projects.

Comparing the  $B_{ji}$  and  $D_{ji}$  of two projects yields nine possible outcomes depending on the magnitudes of each component. Table 2 illustrates the combinations that respondents consider when comparing two industrial projects and how these differences relate to WTPb according to this extension of the model.

In a within-subjects design, each respondent provides one comparison between two projects, revealing estimates of the differences between projects  $WTPb_{ij}$  and  $WTPb_{ik}$ . Comparisons are more likely to be significantly different when a respondent's perceptions of the subjective benefits and costs diverge, leading to off-diagonal outcomes in Table 2. If perceptions of subjective costs and benefits are similar, the comparison is more likely to fall along the main diagonal.

Table 2: Possible relationships between comparable projects and their equivalence to WTPb in  $d$

	$B_1 > B_2$	$B_1 = B_2$	$B_1 < B_2$
$D_1 > D_2$	$\leftrightarrow$	$\bar{d}_{i1} > \bar{d}_{i2}$	$\bar{d}_{i1} > \bar{d}_{i2}$
$D_1 = D_2$	$\bar{d}_{i1} < \bar{d}_{i2}$	$\bar{d}_{i1} = \bar{d}_{i2}$	$\bar{d}_{i1} > \bar{d}_{i2}$
$D_1 = D_2$	$\bar{d}_{i1} < \bar{d}_{i2}$	$\bar{d}_{i1} > \bar{d}_{i2}$	$\leftrightarrow$

*Notes:*  $\leftrightarrow$  indicates that the relation is indeterminate and depends on the magnitude of  $B$  and  $D$ .

This thought experiment has implications for aggregating individual responses across treatments. In this context, comparisons of estimates of population benefits and costs should fall into one of the nine cases in Table 2. The challenges an individual encounters when comparing two projects also arise when attempting to identify significant differences between *WTPb* across two projects at the country or group level.

To observe significant differences between subjects the *WTPb* of any two projects, a larger proportion of respondents evaluating one type of project must perceive benefits and damages significantly differently than those evaluating the other. If this shift in perception occurs, population perceptions should be shifted between treatments, making it more likely to fall into the off-diagonal cases of Table 2.

Our experimental design evaluates whether the frame alone generates different perceptions of benefits and damages. A successful treatment effect should alter the proportion of respondents in one of the nine cells of Table 2, increasing the likelihood of observing significant differences between treatments. Similarly, we hypothesize that individuals with different location characteristics, levels of environmental and ecological awareness, education levels, and gender may respond differently to the framing of the industrial projects and may have different willingness to pay for the projects as they are connected to  $B_{ji}$  and  $D_{ji}$ .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>For example, location characteristics may influence the degree to which an individual is directly affected by the project and may also affect the individual's sense of community identity and responsibility. Environmental and ecological awareness may influence an individual's perceptions of the project's potential environmental impact and willingness to pay to mitigate such impacts. Education may influence an individual's understanding of the potential risks and benefits of the project and their ability to make informed decisions. Gender may also influence an individual's perceptions of the project and willingness to pay, as studies have shown that men and women may have different risk preferences and decision-making processes.

### 3 Research design and data collection

Our paper uses data from an online video-vignette experiment conducted in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. We select these countries for three reasons. First, they are three of the top five economies in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of GDP. Second, they depend heavily on resource extraction. Indeed, natural resource rents in the last decade accounted for approximately 3.2%, 5.5%, and 4% of their GDPs, respectively. Finally, around 36% of all regional mining conflicts are located in these countries, affecting 188 extractive projects with 78 criminal acts in total (OCMAL, 2022).<sup>6</sup> The context is pertinent to our research question because individuals and communities historically have acted in the past to block extractive projects in this region (see, e.g., Shenk, 2022; Tetreault, 2020; Saes and Bisht, 2020) even when the industry has brought economic benefits like tax collection, royalties, international capital influxes, and new jobs.

#### 3.1 Instrument and experiment

The survey instrument included 5 screening questions and 40 main questions. Panel (a) of Table 3 presents a summary of the questionnaire content by section.<sup>7</sup> We obtained additional information on the participants and their households using previously recorded data from the panel provider.

Participants could accumulate experimental points that acted as lottery tickets by completing several tasks along with the instrument. The lottery offered a chance to implement the choices of one respondent per country. Thus, because the probability of winning the lottery increased with the experimental dollars the respondent obtained, respondents had the incentive to maximize their experimental dollars. Winning the lottery meant the winner could select her choice in a distributional dictator game (DDG) task following Cardenas and Sethi (2010). In this task, participants were asked to distribute a donation among four different NGOs. At the beginning of the survey, they were informed of the relationship between the tasks that provided tickets to implement their choice and its implementation. The monetary reward was intended to incentivize individuals to achieve

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<sup>6</sup>Threats, female activists, murders and attempts thereof, criminal investigation and prosecution, and use of force are included in this dataset.

<sup>7</sup>The full questionnaire is included in the Supplementary Materials Section.

incentive-compatible revelation of their preferences among NGOs and survey completion. We were not able to offer direct payments to the participants because of internal restrictions of the firm implementing the survey.

Our experimental design aims to test for the existence of a nationality and/or an industry-specific (extractive) bias. In the experiment, each participant watched a video describing an industry’s benefits and potential damages. The information included objective statistics about the country’s economy and its industries. After watching the video, respondents were presented with vignettes that described the characteristics of a new industrial project. In each country, participants were divided into four treatments based on the industry’s framing and the firm’s nationality. Our design was 2x2 (extractive industry versus neutral industry, national versus foreign firm); thus, there were four arms: extractive and national, extractive and foreign, neutral and national, and neutral and foreign.

Participants were initially split randomly into extractive versus neutral videos.<sup>8</sup> For each country, half of the participants were assigned to the neutral or generic industry group and the other half to the extractive group. Participants in each country-industry dimension of the experiment watched a unique pair of videos. In each video, the statistics of an industry’s revenue as a percentage of GDP, royalties, fiscal revenue, environmental costs, and the number of industry-related conflicts were displayed. The type of information presented in both videos was identical, with statistics corresponding to the official values of the extractive industry. The only difference was that information in the neutral industry dimension of the experiment was framed as *an industry*, while participants in the extractive industry dimension were told the industry was *mining* for participants in Brazil and Colombia or **oil** for participants in Mexico.

Every time a specific industry was mentioned, the vignettes were adjusted to the assigned treatment group, showing images of either extractive industry or generic industry images. The video vignettes were two minutes long and presented in two parts of equal length to test individuals’ attention. Between the first and second parts, participants

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<sup>8</sup>The videos can be accessed through this [link](#). A sample of the illustrations prepared for the videos is presented in Appendix Figure B1.

Table 3: Questionnaire content and timeline

Section	Content
<i>Panel A: Pre-treatment</i> (or explanatory variables)	
Screener	Respondent’s age, geographical location, gender, and results from technological tests (such as audio and video tests) that were used to ensure the survey was conducted without technical issues..
Labor and education	Economic activity and education level.
Altruism	Willingness to make donations under specific scenarios, as reported by the respondent themselves.
Risk aversion	Level of risk aversion which is measured using a task similar to the one used by <a href="#">Eckel and Grossman (2002)</a> with parameters from <a href="#">Cardenas and Carpenter (2013)</a> .
New ecological paradigm (NEP)	Environmental and ecological attitudes in a survey format using the New Ecological Paradigm Scale from ( <a href="#">Dunlap et al., 2000</a> ) and following <a href="#">Attari et al. (2010)</a> .
Institutional trust	Level of trust or mistrust in various institutions, such as national and local governments, the Congress, public employees, judges, national and foreign businessmen, political parties, the police, banks and financial system, and national and local environmental agencies.
Knowledge	General knowledge on the regulation and economic activity of extractive industries, as well as the relevant economic activities in their country and local governments.
Armed conflict (only Colombia)	Level of victimization and magnitude of impact of the armed conflict. A comprehensive review on the Colombian armed conflict and resources extraction can be found in <a href="#">Rettberg et al. (2020)</a> .
<i>Panel B: Treatments</i>	The experiment had two independent and random treatment dimensions. With the first we test for an industry bias against extractive industries using video vignettes, and with the second we test for a nationality bias using text vignettes. Respondents were placed in one of four groups: i) neutral and national, (ii) extractive and national, iii) extractive and foreign, and iv) neutral and foreign.
<i>Panel C: Post-treatment</i> (or outcome variables)	
Contingent valuation	Individuals elicit their preferences to block a project with the characteristics of the treatment group they are in. It is in this section where individuals are assigned to the nationality treatment.
Perceived benefits	Respondents report their perceived benefits from the start of the project for their community and household. Text of questions is adapted according to the treatment group.
Distributional dictator game	Individuals decide how to distribute a monetary donation between four different non-governmental organizations (NGO). This task is designed following <a href="#">Cardenas and Sethi (2010)</a> . The module is intended to be independent from the altruism self-reported questions.

*Notes:* This table is organized in the same order of the questionnaire and it summarizes its content by section. Attention checks were included throughout the instrument. Respondents were able to accumulate tickets for a lottery during the risk aversion section of the questionnaire. On top of the information from the questionnaire, we had access to panel provider records, which include socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and their households. The survey was in the native language in every case. Spanish for Colombia and Mexico, and Portuguese for Brazil. Native speakers of each country checked for spelling errors and adapted language for common use expressions.



were asked to identify the type of industry discussed in the videos. After participants answered the question, any incorrect responses were corrected, and they were informed of the industry depicted in the videos. Nonetheless, given that the most important extractive industry with the highest exposure to conflict varies between the three countries, the extractive treatment in Brazil and Colombia referred to mining, while in Mexico, it referred to oil.

As for the second experimental dimension (designed to test nationality/home bias), we used only a text vignette approach. After watching the videos, participants were exposed to a double dichotomous choice, as described in the timeline shown in Table 3, in which they received a vignette with a hypothetical scenario describing a firm’s project in their country. The vignette presented additional information on the project’s benefits and negative impacts; i.e., they were informed that the project would directly generate jobs while possibly polluting a nearby river. In the vignette’s text, the type of industry was either extractive or neutral (i.e. undefined), depending on the treatment assigned in the video.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the firm’s nationality (national or foreign) was randomly assigned between the two groups. Half of the participants were assigned to the *national* firm group, while the other half were assigned to the *foreign* firm group.

As a result of the randomization, respondents were allocated into one of the following four arms: i) neutral and national, (ii) extractive and national, iii) extractive and foreign, and iv) neutral and foreign.<sup>10</sup>

Once assigned to a treatment, respondents participated in a contingent valuation exercise. We implemented this exercise using a double-bounded dichotomous choice framework. After randomly assigning how much money (hereafter *bids*) they were willing to give annually to an NGO to stop a hypothetical project from starting operations in their country. The project would generate 400 direct jobs if implemented, but could possibly pollute a nearby river. The firm implementing the project was described according to the treatment group assignment in terms of nationality and industry sector.

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<sup>9</sup>For the neutral industry treatment, we referred to ‘an industry’ or ‘an industrial project.’

<sup>10</sup>See Table B3 for the final arm allocation in each country.

Each participant faced two different bids: an initial and a follow-up bid. In particular, we considered four scenarios for the initial bid expressed in percentages of the 2019 median annual wage in each country: (i) 1%, (ii) 3%, (iii) 5%, and (iv) 10%.<sup>11</sup> This initial bid was randomly assigned to the participants and was independent of the treatment status. The follow-up bid is a function of the initial bid and the respondents' answers for that initial bid. If the participant was willing to pay the initial bid, the follow-up bid increased by 50%. However, if they were not, the follow-up bid decreased by 50%. Given these conditions, the bids ranged from 0.5% to 15% of the median annual wage.

After the contingent valuation exercise, participants were asked about the project's perceived benefits for their communities and household, aiming to elicit individual beliefs about the costs and benefits of the project described on their vignettes. Finally, all participants decided how to allocate \$500 according to the DDG task.<sup>12</sup> Panels (b) and (c) in Table 3 summarize the treatment assignment as well as our outcome variables.

### 3.2 Sample design and composition

We set a two-stage stratified sampling method to select the sample. The first stage consisted of a pre-defined sample of resource-intensive areas, in which we divided the sample of completed surveys equally across two groups: i) resource rich, and ii) non-resource rich. The former consists of the four states or departments with the highest extractive industry production values, and the latter is composed of the rest of the country.<sup>13 14</sup> The second stage consisted of samples of administrative divisions within the (non-)resource-intensive area, where the sample size within each group was allocated across states or departments proportionally to their population size.

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<sup>11</sup>In the survey, individuals faced the equivalent nominal values in local currency units instead of in percentages.

<sup>12</sup>Unlike with the canonical DDG, we do not have a sufficient budget to implement all the decisions of every participant. Thus we proceed to incentivize their choices by drafting one winner per country. The money was distributed to local NGOs according to the distribution stated by the winner of the lottery in each country specified.

<sup>13</sup>States in Brazil and Mexico and departments in Colombia correspond to the second-level administrative boundaries.

<sup>14</sup>As mentioned previously, we focus on the mining sector in Brazil and Colombia and the oil sector in Mexico. To build the resource-rich and non-resource rich groups, we use official production values in each case. The 2019 total commercialized mineral values come from the 2019 Anuario Mineral (ANM, 2019) in Brazil, the 2020 total gold and coal royalties come from the Mining Information System (UPME, 2020) in Colombia, and the 2020 total production of oil barrels come from the Energy Secretariat (SENER, 2020) in Mexico.

We then adjusted the target samples using the panel composition to facilitate participant recruitment and quota fulfillment. Because the panel size in Colombia is limited in resource-rich areas, we adjusted the target size to 35% for this group instead of 50%. Thus, the non-resource-rich target area in Colombia is 65% of the sample. In Mexico, we decided to follow the panel composition as well and set the target sample size to 45% and 55% for the resource-rich and non-resource-rich areas, respectively. Table B2 shows the final target quotas and the location categorization by resource intensiveness.

We conducted a power analysis for a sample with these characteristics to ensure a high chance of identifying reasonable effects. In Appendix, Figure B2, we show that, using a 5% significance level, the power of our stratum’s sample size ranges from 83% to 100%, which is higher than the 80% parameter commonly used to calculate sample sizes in random survey designs.<sup>15</sup> However, the calculation of a range for the statistical power is a more parsimonious approach given that the lack of empirical evidence in this particular setting hinders the precision of the power estimates for this sample size, and the survey’s stratified design could also interfere with these estimates. Furthermore, we calculate the power of the sample in each stratum of the first sampling stage, defined by the size of the resource-rich group instead of the full sample. The final sample for each country is targeted to have 2,500 complete surveys for adults aged 18 years or older.

### 3.3 Recruitment, data collection, and validity

A total of 13,418 panelists were invited and 7,566 interviews were completed.<sup>16</sup> Table B3 shows some of the sociodemographic characteristics of the sample, panel, and country. For all three countries, the survey respondents over-represented individuals who are younger, male and have attained higher levels of education compared to the population and characteristics of the full panel. Most of the completed interviews come from the youngest age group (18–34 years). However, in Mexico and Brazil, respondents aged 35–54 years also

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<sup>15</sup>We consider different values of the stratum’s sample size and means for the control and treatment groups of our main outcome variable, i.e., the proportion of individuals’ WTPb.

<sup>16</sup>Screening completion rates ranged from 86.7% in Colombia to 100% in Brazil and Mexico, ineligibility rates ranged from 8.2% in Mexico to 14.1% in Brazil, and interview completion rates ranged from 83.9% in Mexico to 86.6% in Brazil. Additionally, we conducted two pilots before the final implementation to ensure the quality of the data collection and to gather information to produce a reasonable estimate of treatment parameters for the experiment on contingent valuation. The survey was fielded between May 18, 2021 and July 22, 2021

show significant participation. The difference in participation by education level was more striking for Mexico, where 95.8% of the surveyed individuals are enrolled in or finished tertiary education. On average, participants with a tertiary education account for more than 75% of the sample.

In practice, we have a convenience sample where resource-rich areas are over-sampled relative to their national representation in terms of population. The additional number of respondents in resource-rich areas was desirable for two reasons. First, proximity to extractive sites was likely to be correlated with experimental outcomes and beliefs related to the resource extractive sector. Based on our intuition and the implication of our model, we expect that those who are directly affected by an extractive industry project might react differently to WTPb questions. Second, the oversampling of resource-rich areas is expected to increase the sample size (and thus the diversity) of respondents from the resource-rich group.

The survey's composition is affected by the target quotas and the panel composition. Respondents to online surveys do not necessarily reflect the average characteristics of the main population, although there has been a recent debate over whether online participants do replicate the results from a representative national sample (Mullinix et al., 2015; Levay et al., 2016; Coppock and McClellan, 2019). Also, certain types of sampled panel members may have had higher propensities to complete the survey relative to their panelist peers, which would introduce additional deviations from the population composition. Thus, internal validity is the main focus of this analysis.

The sample is balanced between treatment groups. We do not observe significant differences when comparing the sample by treatment type on pre-treatment variables, as shown in Table B4. Retired individuals and those with a middle-upper socioeconomic status<sup>17</sup> show statistically significant differences for the treatments by industry, but these groups represent a small percentage of the sample, or the absolute differences are insignificant in terms of the mean deviations. Furthermore, multivariate tests on the means of all the pre-treatment variables by sub-samples, defined by the treatments, fail to reject that

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<sup>17</sup>This variable is available only for Colombia.

the treatment groups are homogeneous. Thus, we assume that our random placement of individuals across treatments is successful in controlling for observable and usually unobservable characteristics that could be correlated simultaneously to our outcome variables and treatment assignment. This implies that the experimental design addressed endogeneity concerns. In the regression analyses, we also present extended models that include covariates to test for the robustness of the results.

## 4 Methodology

Let  $T^{ind}$  and  $T^{nat}$  represent the treatment groups for the industry and the nationality treatments, respectively. In particular,  $T^{ind} = 0$  if the participant is assigned to the neutral industry, and  $T^{ind} = 1$  if they are assigned to the extractive industry. Similarly,  $T^{nat} = 0$  if they are assigned to a national firm, and  $T^{nat} = 1$  if they are assigned to a foreign firm. We use this notation to analyze the contingent valuation exercise, the perceived benefits about the industry, and the allocation decisions in the DDG.

### 4.1 Contingent valuation: Double-bounded dichotomous choice exercise

To elicit WTPb an industrial project, we implement a double-bounded dichotomous choice, *DBDC* method (Hanemann, 1984; Hanemann and Kanninen, 1996; Hanemann et al., 1991). The *DBDC* is widely used in the environmental and medical services valuation literature. The *DBDC* method has significant advantages compared with other approaches, such as open-ended and single-bounded dichotomous choice questions. *DBDC*'s advantages include greater statistical efficiency, less ambiguity about the recovered preferences, and more precise confidence intervals for the *WTP* estimates than the single-bounded dichotomous choice model.

Let  $WTP_{1k}$  and  $WTP_{2k}$  be the  $k$ th respondent's WTP for the first and second questions, as described in 3.1, respectively. Similarly, let  $Bid_{1k}$  and  $Bid_{2k}$  represent the initial and follow-up bids associated with the *WTP* responses. In practice, for  $h \in \{1, 2\}$ ,  $WTP_{hk} = 0$  means that the individual is not willing to pay the  $Bid_{hk}$  to block the extractive project, while  $WTP_{hk} = 1$  means they are willing to pay. By construction,

$WTP_{1k}$  and  $WTP_{2k}$  are not independent as  $Bid_{2k}$  in  $WTP_{2k}$  is a function of  $WTP_{1k}$ , and the two correlated WTP equations might not be estimated independently (Haab and McConnell, 2003). Using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SUR-biprobit) model, we allow for a non-zero correlation between  $WTP_{1k}$  and  $WTP_{2k}$  while simultaneously estimating the following system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} WTP_{1i} = \beta_1^1 + \beta_1^2 T_i^{nat} + \beta_1^3 T_i^{ind} + \beta_1^4 T_i^{nat} \times T_i^{ind} + \beta_2^5 X_i + \epsilon_{1i} \\ WTP_{2i} = \beta_2^1 + \beta_2^2 T_i^{nat} + \beta_2^3 T_i^{ind} + \beta_2^4 T_i^{nat} \times T_i^{ind} + \beta_3^5 X_i + \epsilon_{2i}, \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

where  $i$  indexes individuals and  $X_i$  refers to additional explanatory variables since the individual's WTP depends on several variables, including individual preferences, income, taste, attitude, perceptions, and sociodemographic characteristics. For our analyses,  $X_i$  includes age, number of children, gender, region's resource intensiveness, education level, occupation and economic activity status, risk aversion, institutional distrust, economic and sectoral knowledge, and environmental awareness (see Table B5 for a description of how we measure these variables). Country fixed effects are also included for the pooled estimates. Finally,  $\epsilon_{1i}$  and  $\epsilon_{2i}$  refer to the error term with  $corr[\epsilon_{1i}, \epsilon_{2i}] = \rho$ , where  $\rho \neq 0$  is allowed. Allowing for non-zero correlation means that the WTP could vary across questions, but we still assume the average WTP is the same for all individuals.

The system expressed in Equation (3) can be estimated using its likelihood function, which can be expressed in terms of probabilities and distributions following a few simple steps. First, to simplify notation and to derive the function, we express the average of the initial and follow-up responses, controlling for additional covariates as  $\mu_{1i}$  and  $\mu_{2i}$ , respectively, where

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{1i} &= \beta_1^1 + \beta_1^2 T_i^{nat} + \beta_1^3 T_i^{ind} + \beta_1^4 T_i^{nat} \times T_i^{ind} + \beta_2^5 X_i \\ \mu_{2i} &= \beta_2^1 + \beta_2^2 T_i^{nat} + \beta_2^3 T_i^{ind} + \beta_2^4 T_i^{nat} \times T_i^{ind} + \beta_3^5 X_i \end{aligned}$$

Second, we derive the probabilities of observing all four response vector scenarios. That is, we construct the probability of individual  $k$  falling into each of the following response sequences: i)  $WTP_{1k} = 0$  and  $WTP_{2k} = 0$ , ii)  $WTP_{1k} = 0$  and  $WTP_{2k} = 1$ , iii)  $WTP_{1k} = 1$  and  $WTP_{2k} = 0$ , and iv)  $WTP_{1k} = 1$  and  $WTP_{2k} = 1$ . The probabilities for these scenarios can be expressed as follows using  $Bid_{1k}$  and  $Bid_{2k}$  as the bids for the first and second WTP questions, respectively:<sup>18</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr(WTP_{1k} = 0, WTP_{2k} = 0) &= Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} < Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} < Bid_{2k}), \\
Pr(WTP_{1k} = 0, WTP_{2k} = 1) &= Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} < Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} > Bid_{2k}), \\
Pr(WTP_{1k} = 1, WTP_{2k} = 0) &= Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} \geq Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} < Bid_{2k}), \\
Pr(WTP_{1k} = 1, WTP_{2k} = 1) &= Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} > Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} \geq Bid_{2k}),
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the  $k$ th contribution to the likelihood function in the bivariate discrete choice model becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
L_k(\mu|Bid) &= Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} < Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} < Bid_{2k}) \\
&\quad \times Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} < Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} > Bid_{2k}) \\
&\quad \times Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} \geq Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} < Bid_{2k}) \\
&\quad \times Pr(\mu_{1k} + \epsilon_{1k} > Bid_{1k}, \mu_{2k} + \epsilon_{2k} \geq Bid_{2k})
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Additionally, in the context of a SUR-probit model, we assume that each  $\epsilon$  is normally distributed with mean zero and variance  $\sigma^2$ . Thus, the system in Equation (3) has a bivariate normal distribution. The covariance between the errors of the system can be expressed as  $cov(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2) = \sigma_{12}$ , and, by definition,  $\rho = \frac{\sigma_{12}}{\sqrt{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_1^2}}$ . Therefore, under these assumptions, Equation (4) can be rewritten as

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<sup>18</sup> $Bid_{1k}$  and  $Bid_{2k}$  in the framework cannot be generalized to all individuals as the initial bids were assigned randomly.

$$\begin{aligned}
L_k(\mu|Bid) = & \Phi_{\epsilon_1\epsilon_2} \left( \frac{Bid_{1k} - \mu_{1k}}{\sigma_1}, \frac{Bid_{2k} - \mu_{2k}}{\sigma_2}, \rho \right) \\
& \times \Phi_{\epsilon_1\epsilon_2} \left( \frac{Bid_{1k} - \mu_{1k}}{\sigma_1}, -\frac{Bid_{2k} - \mu_{2k}}{\sigma_2}, -\rho \right) \\
& \times \Phi_{\epsilon_1\epsilon_2} \left( -\frac{Bid_{1k} - \mu_{1k}}{\sigma_1}, \frac{Bid_{2k} - \mu_{2k}}{\sigma_2}, -\rho \right) \\
& \times \Phi_{\epsilon_1\epsilon_2} \left( -\frac{Bid_{1k} - \mu_{1k}}{\sigma_1}, -\frac{Bid_{2k} - \mu_{2k}}{\sigma_2}, \rho \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where  $\Phi_{\epsilon_1\epsilon_2}(\cdot)$  is the standardized bivariate normal cumulative distribution function with zero means, unit variances, and correlation coefficient  $\rho$ .

For our analysis, estimating Equation (5) using the SUR-biprobit model allows us to recover an estimate for  $\mu$  and  $\beta^{bid}$ , where  $\beta^{bid}$  is the coefficient for the bid variable when included in the estimation for all individuals in the sample.<sup>19</sup> Indexing estimate parameters as  $\hat{\mu}$  and  $\widehat{\beta^{bid}}$ , the WTP value with normal distribution and logarithmic function form<sup>20</sup> is

$$WTP = \exp \left( \frac{-\hat{\mu}}{\widehat{\beta^{bid}}} \right) \tag{6}$$

Similarly, to calculate the confidence intervals of Equation (6), we use the [Krinsky and Robb \(1990\)](#) procedure.<sup>21</sup> This method randomly draws sub-samples from the original estimation sample and calculates Equation (6) multiple times to obtain an empirical distribution of WTP. Then, the 95% confidence interval is calculated dropping the observations out of range for the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the simulated distribution.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Note that in previous equations, the bid is not included explicitly, but appears as part of the  $k$ th contribution of the bivariate discrete choice model in Equation (5).

<sup>20</sup>We implement a logarithmic function form as it implicitly restricts the WTP to be strictly positive. In practice, this is  $Bid = \log(Bid)$ . However, the results using a linear function instead also are consistent with our conclusions.

<sup>21</sup>See [Park et al. \(1991\)](#), [Haab and McConnell \(2003\)](#), and [Creel and Loomis \(1991\)](#) for a comparison with other methods.

<sup>22</sup>See [Jeanty \(2007\)](#) for more details about this estimation.



## 4.2 Ancillary results

Following the prior notation, we propose the following model to evaluate the treatments impact on other outcome variables from the perceived benefits section and the DDG. In particular, we estimate an ordinary least squares model for

$$y_i = \delta^1 + \delta^2 T_i^{nat} + \delta^3 T_i^{ind} + \delta^4 T_i^{nat} \times T_i^{ind} + \delta^5 X_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (7)$$

where  $y_i \in \{PB_i^c, PB_i^h, NGO_i^{Alliance}, NGO_i^{Mongabay}, NGO_i^{Cancer}, NGO_i^{WaterAid}\}$ . As before,  $T_i^t$ :  $t \in \{nat, ind\}$ ,  $X_i$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  represent the treatment groups, the control variables, and the error term.  $PB_i^c$  and  $PB_i^h$  are the perceived benefits of the proposed project to the community and household, respectively.  $NGO_i^k$  is the allocated donation to the different  $K$  NGOs. Table B5 shows specific details on each of these variables.

## 5 Results

This section discusses our four main findings. First, the WTPb is decreasing with respect to the individual's contributions.<sup>23</sup> Second, we fail to find evidence of systematic bias in the WTPb and find that other outcome variables, such as perceived benefits and environmental awareness, are not different across treatment groups. Third, we find that heterogeneity exists between countries in the overall median WTPb and the perceived benefits. Finally, we observe differences in the WTPb between particular sub-populations of the sample.

### 5.1 WTPb


Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarize the results of estimating Equation (5). The full set of results is tabulated in Table B6. Figure 1 shows the predicted marginal probability of accepting to pay for blocking a project, for all possible bids in our experiment. We add covariates at the individual level and country dummies in the pooled sample. The results indicate that the responses to the contingent valuation exercise satisfy a minimum

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<sup>23</sup>WTPb is equivalent to the WTP described in Section 4.1. We use the abbreviation WTPb to highlight that in our framework individuals pay to block a project.

requirement of economic rationality from our respondents. This is revealed in the negative relationship between the bid amount and the  $WTP_b$ . In particular, the figure shows that the probability of agreeing to pay the bid is decreasing on the value of the bid. Similarly, we observe that countries differ in the elasticity of their  $WTP_b$  function. In addition, we find that Colombian participants are more willing to pay to block industrial projects when compared to Brazilian and Mexican participants.

Figure 1: Demand curves and willingness-to-pay to block



*Notes:* This figure plots the probability of observing  $WTP_1 = 1$  (agreeing to pay the bid) against the bids as percentages of the median income in each country, with the 95% confidence intervals in gray. This is equivalent to a demand curve of the willingness-to-pay measure from the SUR-biprobit model using Equation (5). The full set of results is tabulated in Table B6, Columns (5)–(8). Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4, respectively.

Another finding is that the estimation loses precision when the bid is higher, which is expected for two reasons. First, a rational agent will reject higher bids more often. Given the way we constructed our bid values, fewer participants would be facing the highest value (15%) as respondents would first have to agree to pay the second highest value (10%) to even get that option. Second, we have a higher accumulation of values to the


right side of the distribution, meaning fewer participants will be paying higher values (above 7.5% of the median income).

By estimating Equation (5) and using Equation (6), we can calculate the median WTPb –illustrated in Figure 2–, which is the bid value in which the marginal success probability is equal to 50% in Figure 1 and any respondent is indifferent between paying to block or not. In the pooled sample, the median WTPb is equal to 7.71% of the country’s median income, but heterogeneity exists between countries. For Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, the WTPb estimates are 11.15%, 7.37%, and 5.08% of the median income, respectively. The confidence intervals of these estimates allow us to infer that the median WTPb in Colombia is higher than that of Mexico. For Brazil, the estimate is between the estimates for Colombia and Mexico, but the confidence intervals overlap.

Similarly, Figure 2 shows the WTPb estimates for each treatment group by country and for the pooled sample aggregate. The results indicate no statistically significant differences exist in all the samples for the median WTP by treatment group. Slight differences arise between neutral and extractive industries for Brazilian participants in the foreign treatment. Mexican participants in the national-neutral treatment show WTPb as a percentage of median income, although the difference from the other treatment groups is not statistically significant. The estimations are robust to excluding covariates and to constraining  $WTP_1$  and  $WTP_2$  to have identical coefficients. Figure B3 shows the WTPb by treatment type, but our main findings remain unchanged. In panel (c) of Table B6, the full set of results on the WTPb estimates are tabulated. We also tested parametric and non-parametric models for the double-bounded dichotomous choice analyses instead of the SUR-biprobit model, and the results are robust to these alternatives.

Given the differences in the elasticity of demand between countries, we test to see if that is also the case between treatment groups. For this analysis, we estimate a SUR-biprobit model for each independent treatment group. The results are summarized in Figure 3 and are tabulated in Table B7; Figure 3 is equivalent to Figure 1 but not identical. In Figure 3, we show the conditional probability of observing  $WTP_1 = 1$  for each type of treatment in the treatment groups, which uses the distribution of errors in  $WTP_2$

Figure 2: Demand curves and willingness-to-pay to block



*Notes:* This figure plots the median willingness-to-pay estimates as a percentage of the country’s median income by treatment group with 95% confidence intervals. A SUR-biprobit model is used to estimate Equation (5), and the calculation for the median and the confidence intervals are retrieved using the Krinsky and Robb (1990) procedure. The full set of results are tabulated in Appendix Table B6, Columns (5)–(8). Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Tables B5 and B4, respectively.


to normalize the marginal probability of observing  $WTP_1 = 1$ . Moreover, the median WTP is calculated using the first equation for  $WTP_1$  in the SUR-biprobit model. The conclusions are consistent with those shown in Figure 2. Neither the nationality nor the industry treatments cause significant differences. Similarly, Brazil’s point estimates of WTPb are higher for the extractive treatment than for the neutral treatment, while for Mexico, the WTPb is higher for national versus foreign treatment. Non-linearities in the demand curve could affect the relative differences between treatment groups for different bid values, but non-significant differences hold throughout the demand curve.

## 5.2 Attention checks


One possible explanation for the null results in the experimental treatment effects on the WTPb is that participants failed to capture their treatment information, that is, the industry’s frame or the firm’s nationality. If a large proportion of participants failed to

Figure 3: Conditional probability of success in  $WTP_1$  by country and treatment type

(a) Nationality treatments



(b) Industry treatments



*Notes:* This figure plots the conditional probability of observing  $WTP_1 = 1$  against different bids expressed as a percentage of the median income. The conditional probability result is equivalent to the marginal probability of success, but it takes into account the marginal probability of success for  $WTP_2$ . In terms of Equation (5), the conditional probability is equal to  $\Phi_{\epsilon_1 \epsilon_2}(\cdot) / \Phi_{\epsilon_2}(\cdot)$ , where  $\Phi_{\epsilon_2}(\cdot)$  is the standard normal distribution function for  $WTP_2$ .  $\Phi_{\epsilon_1 \epsilon_2}(\cdot)$  is evaluated when  $WTP_1 = WTP_2 = 1$ , while  $\Phi_{\epsilon_2}(\cdot)$  when  $WTP_2 = 1$ . Figure 3a presents the conditional probability demand curve estimated for sub-samples defined by the nationality treatment group, while Figure 3b shows the estimation for sub-samples defined by the industry treatment group. Probabilities include the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The full set of results are tabulated in Table B7. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4, respectively.

assess the correct treatment, then we should expect no differences between their WTPb across different treatments. To control this potential issue in treatment, we added an attention check question between our two video vignettes. On an individual screen placed between the two video vignettes, all participants were asked to identify the industry sector to which the video was referring. For all treatments, both video treatments were added among the multiple responses options, that is, “*an industry*” and the corresponding extractive industry (mining or oil and gas). Furthermore, to ensure that all participants understood their treatments and if their individual response to the attention check was incorrect, the correct response appeared on their screen.

Failing to answer correctly in the attention check question presents several types of failure to treat. One type of failure was when participants confused one treatment for another. This mistake is captured in our dataset for participants whose response reveals, even after explicitly seeing a video of a particular treatment, that they believed to be in the opposite treatment. In particular, we are interested in knowing the percentage of participants who believed they were in the extractive industries treatments or vice versa despite being placed in the neutral treatment. However, they did not have different responses to the attention question depending on the sector treatment. On average, 82% of respondents accurately answered the attention question. To test these potential causes on our treatments’ different results, we conducted additional analyses excluding from this confused participants, i.e., those who responded incorrectly to our attention checks. These results can be found in Table B8. Furthermore, our main results remain robust.

### 5.3 Perceived benefits and distributions of donations

Two other outcome variables capture the potential treatment effects, perceived benefits and donations to a variety of NGOs with different missions. We captured perceived benefits across two dimensions: communities, and households<sup>24</sup>. Furthermore, we capture intentions to donate to different NGOs via the DDG.

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<sup>24</sup>We asked participants the level to which they agreed or disagreed on the benefits that the proposed projects would bring to their household and community to see how they would change their environmental awareness after the treatments


We use Equation (7) to explore treatment effects on perceived benefits and donations. Participants do not alter their expected benefits from an industrial project simply due to the firm's nationality and sector. This result is shown in Figure 4 by treatment group and is tabulated in Table B9. The predictive margins of the perceived benefits of a neutral/extractive industry project to the individual's community and household do not vary by treatment group. Although some statistical differences exist between treatment groups in selected cases, the deviations are not economically significant and do not change the individual's behavior significantly. On average, the expected benefits from a neutral/extractive industry are lower in Colombia than in the other countries and are also in line with a higher WTP.

Similar to expected benefits, participants do not vary the allocation to different NGOs. We do not observe evidence that individuals show partiality to a particular organization because of the treatments. In Figure 5 we show the predictive margins derived from estimating Equation (7) with the share of donations to each organization as the dependent variable. The results are tabulated in Table B10. Survey participants, on average, split the money equally among the four options that were presented, and treatments do not have an effect on their individual decisions. In the cases where we observe weak statistical significance, the difference in the average allocation is no more than 2 percentage points.

In summary, failing to observe differences in WTPb across treatments is consistent with the results for the perceived benefits and the allocation decisions. Furthermore, these results are consistent with our theoretical model in which if respondents have similar estimates for those elements generating the benefits and damages of an industrial project, their WTPb should be the same.

Even if there is a bias toward foreign and/or extractive firms, individuals seem to understand the project characteristics and net benefits, and they do not significantly adjust the expected return from the industry activity or alter their general environmental awareness. At the same time, this could explain the mechanism behind why individuals' WTPb does not reflect any bias.


Figure 4: Differences in treatment groups in community and household perceived benefits



Notes: This figure plots the ordinary least squares predictive margins of Equation (7) when  $y_i$  is equal to the individual perceived industry benefits to their community (panel (a)), or to their households (panel (b)). The difference in predictive margins treatment groups can be inferred from the results shown in Appendix Table B9. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4, respectively.



Figure 5: Differences in treatment groups in the distributional dictator game



*Notes:* This figure plots the ordinary least squares predictive margins of Equation (7) when  $y_i$  when  $y_i$  is equal to the donation to each of the non-governmental organizations shown to the survey participants for the DDG. The difference in predictive margins treatment groups can be inferred from the results shown in Appendix Table B10. Donations to NGOs are expressed in terms of the share of the total amount available for donations. The NGOs are described in Table B1. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4, respectively.

#### 5.4 WTPb for strategic populations

It is straightforward to deduce from our model that intrinsic individuals' characteristics, such as location and past experiences, could affect expectations of damages and benefits thus affecting individual's WTPb<sup>25</sup>. For instance, negative externalities of extractive projects, like environmental degradation, tend to be geographically constrained to ex-

tractive regions (Aragón et al., 2015). Moreover, higher distrust toward local or state institutions can increase resistance to extractive projects (Conde and Le Billon, 2017).

Additional individual’s intrinsic characteristics such as her environmental awareness could affect individual’s weights of the expected costs and benefits of extractive projects. Previous evidence shows that environmental awareness changes with an individual’s age (Morrison and Beer, 2017). To assess the influence of intrinsic characteristics on WTPb, we compare the median WTPb for the pooled sample with those of particular groups of interest. Figure 6a shows the results dis-aggregated by individuals’ location, age, sex, institutional distrust, and environmental awareness. Table B5 explains in detail how each of these variables is constructed. For this analysis, we again use Equation (3) and add our set of covariates  $X_i$  to alleviate some of the potential endogeneity arising in the pre-treatment variables. However, any differences in the WTP coming from these pre-treatment variables must be interpreted only as controlled correlations. The full set of results using all individual characteristics can be found in Table B11.


Our results show that the WTPb extractive projects for individuals in resource-rich areas is not statistically different from the one in non-resource-rich areas. A possible explanation for this is that panel participants are generally located in urban areas that are likely to perceive the negative externalities of extractive resources as the main source of environmental damage. Thus, their expected subjective distributions of benefits and damages of the project ( $B_{ji}$  and  $D_{ji}$ ), would not change much by individual’s location. Extractive projects thus might not be as relevant for urban populations as they are for rural ones. Interestingly, WTPb is decreasing on the individual’s age and increases on the individual’s distrust in institutions. On the other hand, we see clear differences on the WTPb with environmental and ecological awareness. Individuals who have a higher environmental and ecological awareness are willing to pay more to block the project. This result is consistent with the idea that those individuals would put more weight on the environmental amenities when evaluating the costs and benefits of the project and would be more willing to pay to block projects that they expect to be damaging.

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
<sup>25</sup>Subjective benefits  $B_{ji}$  and damages  $D_{ji}$  and their influence on comparisons, and thus on WTPb are shown on Table 2

Figure 6: Willingness-to-pay in sub-populations of the full sample

(a) Pre-treatment variables



(b) Post-treatment variables



*Notes:* This figure plots the median willingness-to-pay for blocking estimates as a percentage of the country's median income with 95% confidence intervals. A SUR-biprobit model is used to estimate Equation (5), and the calculation for the median and the confidence intervals are retrieved using the Krinsky and Robb (1990) procedure. The results from the SUR-biprobit model are tabulated in Table B11. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4, respectively.

From our model, we have that both individual characteristics and subjective beliefs might change the WTPb. Thus, we further test for differences on the WTPb between individuals who have different levels of perceived benefits. Figure 6b shows the results of estimating Equation (3) for different groups of individuals. These post-treatment variables (perceived benefits, DDG, and WTP) could suffer from simultaneity issues when used in the same model. Even when the treatment effects are included in estimating Equation (3) for Figure 6b and this could reduce the bias, the endogeneity issues do not disappear. In general, the results do not show strong and statistically significant differences for subgroups. Differences are observed only for individuals who definitely perceive benefits for their communities and those who do not. However, the number of individuals in the right-hand tail of the bid distribution is low, which explains the long confidence intervals. These results are consistent with those found in the previous section, with individuals appearing to understand the project’s characteristics and net benefits.

## 6 Conclusion

In the last few decades, the number of conflicts related to natural resource exploitation has been increasing (OCMAL, 2022). Although in many cases blocking a project could be a rational response to a project that is not socially convenient (for instance, because its environmental costs are too high), seemingly irrelevant factors – attributes that do not affect the cost-benefit equation but that could serve as cues – could also play a role. To improve our knowledge of these issues, we conducted an online video vignette experiment to elicit citizens’ attitudes and beliefs toward extractive industries and new industrial projects.

We experimentally manipulate the frame in which many respondents observe information regarding the benefits and environmental costs of past industrial projects in three countries with a history of natural resources exploitation and conflict.

Frames were modified in two dimensions: i) the industrial sector in which a new project would be proposed, i.e., neutral versus extractive, and ii) the nationality of the firm, national versus foreign, that benefits from implementing the project. A theoretical frame-

work guides how WTPb should vary as a function of expected benefits and environmental damages. While our experiment allows us to identify no differences between WTPb for general industrial projects and those in extractive industries.

Our results indicate that respondents act solely based on the fundamental (economic) incentives they face, i.e., expected benefits and damages and their preferences, in an unbiased and informative environment. Respondents indeed disregard factors that should be, in principle, irrelevant.

Our study has several limitations. Due to its online implementation, the sample is neither representative nor fully convenient despite us achieving a certain degree of representation in the targeted countries. Thus, contrary to larger and more complex studies with representative samples, our conclusions are not necessarily possible to generalize to these countries' populations. Similarly, we are aware of neither the degree to which the respondents have been indirectly affected by extractive (or other types of) industrial projects nor their potential participation in conflicts. Our best approximation to this is whether the individual lives in a resource-rich state or department or not. However, individuals in our panel could be concentrated in urban areas, thus creating ambiguity on how much they are affected by the extractive sector. Our heterogeneity results on individuals' location point in this direction.

Our findings suggest that individuals disregard cues such as the firm's nationality or specific industrial sector when the environmental costs and expected benefits are transparently explained. These results are relevant to inform communication strategies for potentially controversial investments in developing countries.

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# Appendix

## A Model considerations

This appendix provides additional considerations for analyzing the relationship between individual and country characteristics with the WTPb, and for comparing two industrial projects in terms of their benefits and damages. It discusses factors such as complex comparisons, inaccurate estimates, and the aggregation of individual responses across treatments. It also highlights the importance of avoiding deception and experimenter demand effects when manipulating information.

### A.1 Individual characteristics and WTPb

In our model, the WTPb of an individual  $i$  is a function of their status quo utility and expectations regarding the effects of a new industrial project. The status quo utility of an individual is likely to vary across demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, which we denote as  $X_i$ . These factors, such as age, education, and occupation, can influence an individual's utility and shape their preferences and perceptions regarding the industrial project and WTPb.

### A.2 Consequentialism and incentive compatibility

Consequentialism is the belief that one's answers in a contingent valuation study will influence real policy (Carson and Groves, 2007). Ensuring consequentialism is essential for obtaining incentive-compatible responses. To maximize consequentialism likelihood, we designed our experiment to make respondents believe their answers have real-world consequences. This design choice aims to elicit truthful and incentive-compatible responses.

### A.3 Positive WTPb conditions and assumptions

We discuss the conditions for a positive WTPb and make three key assumptions.

#### A.3.3 Separable and monotonic expected utility

We assume that the respondent's expected utility function is additively separable and monotonic in income. Changes in income, environmental amenities, and health status independently affect the expected utility.

### **A.3.3 Excluding strategic and political concerns**

We exclude strategic and political concerns, focusing only on individual-level preferences and beliefs without considering strategic interactions between respondents and other stakeholders or political factors' influence on WTPb.

### **A.3.3 Successful blockage assumption**

We assume that if respondents have a positive WTPb or take actions to block a project, they believe the blockage will succeed. This assumption aligns with consequentialism proposed by ? and [Vossler and Watson \(2013\)](#), implying that respondents with a positive WTPb believe their contributions will successfully prevent the industrial project.

## **A.4 Additional considerations for comparing projects**

### **A.4.4 Complex comparisons and inaccurate estimates**

When a respondent compares the benefits and damages of two projects, and the magnitudes of each component are not clearly distinguishable, the comparison becomes more difficult. In these cases, respondents might struggle to make a decision, leading to a higher likelihood of falling into one of the more complex cases described in our model. Furthermore, inaccurate estimates of the benefits and damages could also increase the likelihood of falling into these complex cases.

### **A.4.4 Aggregating individual responses across treatments**

The thought experiment presented in the main text has implications for aggregating individual responses across treatments. When comparing the WTPb of two treatments, the same difficulties that an individual faces in comparing two projects are present when significant differences between WTPb are sought at the country or group level. To observe significant differences between the WTPb of any of our two treatments, a larger proportion of respondents in one treatment should perceive the benefits and damages differently than respondents in the other treatment.

#### **A.4.4 Manipulating information and experimenter demand effects**

In our experimental design, we do not vary the magnitudes of information. Respondents observe the same magnitudes of the benefits and damages across treatments. The aim is to test if the frame alone generates differences. However, if the information were manipulated, it would be more likely to observe significant differences between WTPb. Varying information such as the probabilities or magnitudes that induce subjective probabilities and expected benefits and damages of two projects could be interpreted as deceptive. Deception is not allowed among experimental economists. Furthermore, manipulating information could also affect experimenter demand effects. For instance, if information is presented to portray projects as extremely different, respondents may be more likely to perceive a difference and behave accordingly, even if the projects are objectively similar. To mitigate this issue, we carefully designed our information presentation to provide a balanced and accurate description of the projects' benefits and damages.


## B Figures

Figure B1: Illustrations from the video shown in Colombia for participants in the extractive industry group




*Notes:* The figures display select snapshots taken from the educational video developed for this experiment. The purpose of this video was to aid participant comprehension of the complex topics presented. The full video can be accessed via the following [link](#).

Figure B2: Power analysis for a two-sample proportions chi-squared test




*Notes:* The figure illustrates the range of power estimates using a two-sample proportions chi-squared test with different stratum's sample size.  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  represent the proportions for the contingent valuation questions. As there were no prior assumptions about the initial and follow-up bids in the experiment, the power calculations consider a range of different combinations for  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ .

Figure B3: WTPb by treatment type



*Notes:* This figure plots the median willingness-to-pay estimates as a percentage of the country's median income by treatment type with 95% confidence intervals. A SUR-biprobit model is used to estimate Equation (5), and the calculation for the median and the confidence intervals are retrieved using the [Krinsky and Robb \(1990\)](#) procedure. The full set of results are tabulated in Appendix Table B6, Columns (5)–(8). Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Tables B5 and B4, respectively.


Figure B4: Differences in treatment types in community and household perceived benefits



Notes: This figure plots the ordinary least squares predictive margins of Equation (7) when  $y_i$  is equal to the individual perceived industry benefits to their community (panel (a)), or to their households (panel (b)). The difference in predictive margins treatment groups can be inferred from the results shown in Appendix Table B9. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4 respectively.



Figure B5: Differences in treatment types in the distributional dictator game



Predictive margins (share of total donations)

Notes: This figure plots the ordinary least squares predictive margins of Equation (7) when  $y_i$  is equal to the donation to each of the non-governmental organizations shown to the survey participants for the DDG. The difference in predictive margins treatment groups can be inferred from the results shown in Appendix Table B10. Donations to NGOs are expressed in terms of the share of the total amount available for donations. The NGOs are described in Table B1. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Tables B5 and B4, respectively.

Table B1: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) descriptions

NGO	Description
Alliance for Responsible Mining	An NGO that transforms artisanal mining into a social an environmental sustainable activity.
Liga Contra el Cancer	An NGO that helps cancer patients who lack the financial means to cover the costs of their treatment.
Mongabay	An NGO that raises awareness about social and environmental issues related to forests and ecosystems through news, analysis and reports.
Oceana	An NGO that helps to restore habitats in the ocean and has helped during oil spills in the Mexican Gulf.
WaterAid	An NGO that works to increase access to clean water and reliable.

*Notes:* This table presents the brief description of the 5 different NGOS presented to survey respondents. Respondents had to decide how to distribute a donation among them, and only the decisions of the lottery winner were implemented. Only 4 options were made available for participants in each country. In Colombia and Brazil, participants could distribute the donation between Alliance for Responsible Mining, Mongabay, Liga contra el Cancer, and WaterAid. In Mexico, Oceana replaced Alliance for Responsible Mining.

Table B2: Target sample quotas

First stage group	Brazil			Colombia			Mexico		
	Second stage group	Country (as %)	Sample size	Second stage group	Country (as %)	Sample size	Second stage group	Country (as %)	Sample size
Resource-rich	Pars	14.9	187	Cesar	12.5	52	Tabasco	12.5	192
	Minas Gerais	42.3	528	La Guajira	8.7	20	Veracruz	44.0	496
	Goiás	13.1	163	Choco	4.9	4	Chiapas	25.1	192
	Bahia	29.7	372	Antioquia	73.9	800	Tamaulipas	18.4	264
Total		100.0	1,250		100.0	876		100.0	1,144
Non resource-rich	Central-West Region (minus Goiás)	5.6	70	Atlántica Region (minus Bolívar, Cesar, La Guajira)	21.3	348	Center Region	40.0	540
	North Region (minus Pará)	5.5	69	Bogotá Region	20.3	328	East Region (minus Veracruz)	10.0	136
	Northeast Region (minus Bahia)	26.0	325	Central Region (minus Antioquia)	13.4	216	North Region (minus Tamaulipas)	23.0	312
	South Region	19.5	244	Oriental Region (minus Meta, Santander)	23.1	380	South Region (minus Tabasco and Chiapas)	8.3	112
	Southeast Region (minus Minas Gerais)	43.4	542	Orinoquía y Amazonia Region (minus Casanare)	3.2	52	West Region	18.7	256
				Pacífica Region (minus Chocó)	18.7	300			
Total		100.0	1,250		100.0	1,624		100.0	1,356

*Notes:* This table shows the survey target quotas for the two-stage stratified sampling implemented in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. The population distributions are obtained from the 2014–2015 PNAD dataset in Brazil, the 2010 census data in Mexico, and the 2020 census in Colombia.

Table B3: Comparison of samples

	Population composition			Panel provider composition			Survey sample		
	Brazil	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Colombia	Mexico
<i>Gender</i>									
Female	47.8	48.0	47.9	44.6	50.3	45.0	50.2	52.5	53.8
Male	52.2	52.0	52.1	55.4	49.7	55.0	49.8	47.5	46.2
<i>Age</i>									
15-29 <sup>†</sup>	20.4	28.4	34.2	21.1	47.5	48.5	63.8	48.3	39.3
29-39	29.2	20.8	18.9	45.9	27.8	28.3	20.1	26.1	30.1
40-59	32.2	50.8 <sup>‡</sup>	36.2	28.7	24.7 <sup>‡</sup>	20.8	15.9	25.6 <sup>‡</sup>	29.9
60 or more	18.2		10.6	4.3		2.4	0.2		0.6
<i>Educational attainment</i>									
Primary incomplete	7.4	N/A	29.2	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.0
Primary complete	59.2	N/A	18.9	9.0	5.0	2.6	1.1	0.8	0.1
Secondary complete	18.4	N/A	26.5	45.3	44.9	12.4	27.0	19.2	4.2
Tertiary	15.1	N/A	25.5	45.7	49.5	84.5	71.3	79.9	95.8
<i>Treatment allocation</i>									
Neutral and national							23.7	24.1	26.7
Neutral and foreign							26.4	24.9	25.0
Extractive and national							26.0	25.4	24.2
Extractive and foreign							23.9	25.6	24.1
N	161,792,379	36,009,926	91,506,562	301,674	76,019	159,151	2,524	2,523	2,509

*Notes:* This table shows the final sample size by individual characteristics. Country and panel compositions are included for comparison of samples. The population distributions are obtained from the 2014–2015 National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) in Brazil, the 2017 National Household Survey (ENH) in Mexico, and the 2020 projections of population from the 2018 census in Colombia. <sup>†</sup> This group is 18-29 for Colombia. <sup>‡</sup> indicates that the estimates for that age category correspond to 40 or more years old.

Table B4: Descriptive statistics by type of bias

	Treatment by nationality				Treatment by industry				Difference	
	National		Foreign		Neutral		Extractive		tests	
	Mean (1)	SD (2)	Mean (3)	SD (4)	Mean (5)	SD (6)	Mean (7)	SD (8)	Diff (1) – (3)	Diff (5) – (7)
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	34.65	11.82	34.22	11.85	34.38	11.92	34.49	11.75	0.43	-0.12
Number of children	0.84	1.02	0.83	1.00	0.82	1.00	0.85	1.02	0.01	-0.03
Male (dummy)	0.52	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.52	0.50	-0.01	0.01
Resource intensive region (dummy)	0.45	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.00	0.00
<i>Education level</i>										
Secondary or less (dummy)	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38	0.17	0.38	0.18	0.38	-0.00	-0.01
Technical (dummy)	0.16	0.37	0.17	0.37	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.37	-0.00	-0.00
University or greater (dummy)	0.66	0.47	0.66	0.48	0.66	0.47	0.66	0.48	0.01	0.01
<i>Occupation and economic activity</i>										
Agriculture (dummy)	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.15	-0.00	0.00
Extractive industries (dummy)	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.13	0.00	-0.00
Manufacturing (dummy)	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.18	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.19	0.00	-0.01
Retired (dummy)	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.11	-0.00	0.01**
Services (dummy)	0.37	0.48	0.38	0.48	0.38	0.48	0.37	0.48	-0.00	0.01
Student (dummy)	0.13	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.14	0.34	0.14	0.35	-0.01	-0.00
Unemployed (dummy)	0.08	0.28	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.27	0.01	-0.01
<i>Socioeconomic level<sup>‡</sup></i>										
Low-low (dummy)	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.13	-0.00	0.01
Low (dummy)	0.10	0.30	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.32	0.10	0.30	-0.01	0.01
Middle-low (dummy)	0.28	0.45	0.31	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.29	0.45	-0.03	0.01
Middle (dummy)	0.40	0.49	0.36	0.48	0.39	0.49	0.37	0.48	0.04	0.02
Middle-high (dummy)	0.18	0.38	0.17	0.37	0.15	0.36	0.19	0.40	0.01	-0.04**
High (dummy)	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.16	0.00	-0.00
<i>Altruism and risk aversion</i>										
Risk aversion	2.51	1.56	2.45	1.56	2.46	1.55	2.50	1.57	0.07	-0.04
Self-perceived altruism (index)	8.15	2.47	8.16	2.43	8.16	2.44	8.15	2.46	-0.01	0.01
Hypothetical altruism (share)	0.39	0.27	0.38	0.26	0.38	0.26	0.39	0.26	0.00	-0.00
<i>Institutional trust, environmental awareness, and economic knowledge</i>										
Institutional trust (index)	0.01	1.01	0.00	0.98	0.01	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.01
Environmental awareness (index)	-0.00	1.02	0.00	0.98	0.01	1.00	-0.01	1.00	-0.00	0.02
Knowledge of economic context (index)	-0.00	0.99	0.00	1.01	0.01	1.00	-0.01	1.00	-0.01	0.02
Knowledge of country industries (index)	-0.01	0.99	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.01	-0.01	0.99	-0.01	0.01
Knowledge of regional industries (index)	0.00	1.01	-0.00	0.99	-0.01	0.99	0.01	1.01	0.01	-0.02
Knowledge of local industries (index)	0.01	1.01	-0.01	0.99	-0.01	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.01	-0.02
<i>Armed conflict<sup>‡</sup></i>										
Conflict impact (dummy)	0.69	0.46	0.68	0.47	0.68	0.47	0.69	0.46	0.01	-0.01
Victim of conflict (dummy)	0.31	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.32	0.47	-0.00	-0.03
Victim of conflict's relative (dummy)	0.73	0.44	0.74	0.44	0.74	0.44	0.73	0.45	-0.01	0.02
<i>Contingent valuation<sup>§</sup></i>										
Bid <sub>1</sub>	4.81	3.19	4.73	3.15	4.79	3.19	4.75	3.14	0.08	0.04
Bid <sub>2</sub>	4.90	4.16	4.79	4.10	4.89	4.21	4.80	4.05	0.11	0.09
WTP <sub>1</sub> (dummy)	0.56	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.01	-0.00
WTP <sub>2</sub> (dummy)	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.50	-0.01	-0.00
<i>Perceived benefits from the treatment industry<sup>§</sup></i>										
Industry benefits to community (index)	3.94	1.74	3.95	1.75	3.98	1.73	3.91	1.76	-0.01	0.07
Industry benefits to household (index)	3.64	1.78	3.63	1.79	3.74	1.76	3.52	1.81	0.01	0.22***
<i>Distributional dictator game: donations to the non-governmental organizations<sup>§</sup></i>										
Alliance/Oceana donation (share)	0.26	0.14	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.15	-0.00	0.00
Mongabay donation (share)	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.01	0.00
Cancer donation (share)	0.24	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	-0.00	0.00
WaterAid donation (share)	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.00	-0.00
<i>Attention checks<sup>§</sup></i>										
Good attention (dummy)	0.83	0.38	0.80	0.40	0.76	0.42	0.87	0.34	0.02*	-0.10***
N	3776		3780		3798		3758		7556	

Notes: ‡ indicates that these variables are only available for Colombia. § indicates that these variables are recorded in the survey post-treatment. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. The F-statistics for multivariate tests of means by national treatment, and industry treatment groups are 0.76 and 1.08 (p-values of 0.78 and 0.36), respectively. The null hypothesis in these tests is that the sub-samples defined by the group variables are homogeneous. Variables included in the multivariate test are all the pre-treatment variables, except those available only for Colombia<sup>‡</sup>, and country dummies. Variable definitions are available in Appendix Table B5, and NGO descriptions in Appendix Table B1.

Table B5: Variable descriptions

Variable	Description
Age	Age of the participant.
Bid (log)	The (log) monetary amount that the participant is willing-to-pay (or not) to block the extractive project. During the interview, each participant will face two different bids: an initial, and a follow-up bid. We consider 4 scenarios for the initial bid expressed in percentages of the 2019 median annual wage in each country: (i) 1%, (ii) 3%, (iii) 5%, and (iv) 10%. This initial bid is randomly assigned to the participants. The follow-up bid is a function of the initial bid and the willingness-to-pay for that initial bid. If the participant is willing-to-pay the initial bid, the follow-up bid increases 50%. However, if the participant is not willing-to-pay the initial bid, the follow-up bid decreases 50%. Thus, the total range of the bids goes from 0.5% to 15% of the median annual wage. Participants were presented the equivalent of these in local currency nominal values.
Conflict impact (dummy)	Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant thinks that the armed conflict in Colombia has affected his department, the second level of administrative divisions in the country, and 0 otherwise.
Country (dummies)	Dummy variables indicating which country individuals belong to. Survey participants can come from (i) Colombia, (ii) Mexico, or (iii) Brazil. Country (i) is used as the base level for the regression analyses in the pooled samples.
Donations to the non-governmental organization (shares)	Individual's decisions on how to distribute a monetary donation between four different non-governmental organizations (NGO). The lottery is framed as a distributional dictator game and it is designed following <a href="#">Cardenas and Sethi (2010)</a> . The total value of the donations was \$500 USD but we use the share of the total amount for the analysis. The NGOs in consideration were four but one of them was not the same for all countries. In Colombia and Brazil, participants were able to distribute the donations between Alliance for Responsible Mining, Mongabay, Liga contra el Cancer, and WaterAid. In Mexico, Oceana replaced Alliance for Responsible Mining. Appendix Table B1 presents a brief description of the NGOs.
Self-perceived altruism (index)	Discrete index with ten levels that takes the value 0 if the participant is not willing to give a donation to a good cause, and the value 10 when the participant is very willingly to act that way.
Hypothetical altruism (share)	The share of unexpected income that the participant is willing to donate to a good cause. The values of the unexpected income were expressed in local currency.
Education level (dummies)	Dummy variables indicating the level of education of the participant. There are three groups: (i) secondary or less, (ii) technical, and (iii) university or greater. Group (i) is used as the base level for the regression analyses.
Environmental and ecological awareness (index)	Index from the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of all the questions included in The New Ecological Paradigm section of the survey. Each independent question in the MCA index was recoded to reflect less to more environmental awareness in a scale of one to seven.
Foreign (dummy)	Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant belongs to the treatment group for the nationality bias with foreign firms, and 0 otherwise.
Good attention (dummy)	Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant did not respond correctly to a question asking in which treatment group they were a part of, and 0 otherwise.
Industry benefits to community (index)	Discrete index with seven levels that takes the value 1 if the participant completely disagrees with his community receiving benefits from the proposed project shown to the participant in the contingent valuation section, and the value 7 when the participant completely agrees. The industry's sector depends on the individual's treatment group.
Industry benefits to household (index)	Discrete index with seven levels that takes the value 1 if the participant completely disagrees with his household receiving benefits from the proposed project shown to the participant in the contingent valuation section, and the value 7 when the participant completely agrees. The industry's sector depends on the individual's treatment group.
Institutional distrust (index)	Index from the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of all the questions included in the Institutional Trust section of the survey. Each independent question in the MCA index is coded from less to more distrust in national institutions in a scale of one to five. The following institutions are included: the national government, the departmental/state government (second level of administrative divisions), the congress, public employees, judges, national businessmen, political parties, police, banks and the financial system, and national and local environmental agencies.
Knowledge of economic context (index)	Index from the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of some of the questions included in the Knowledge section of the survey. The questions included measure the participant's knowledge about the extractive industries; production and regulations in the country. Questions about how confident the respondent is about their answers are not included in the MCA index.
Knowledge of country industries (index)	Index from the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of one of the questions included in the Knowledge section of the survey. The question included measures the participant's knowledge about the economic activities that produce the most money in the country.

Knowledge of regional industries (index)	Index from the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of one of the questions included in the Knowledge section of the survey. The question included measures the participant’s knowledge about the economic activities that produce the most money in their department/state (second level of administrative divisions).
Knowledge of local industries (index)	Index from the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of one of the questions included in the Knowledge section of the survey. The question included measures the participant’s knowledge about the economic activities that produce the most money in their municipality (third level of administrative divisions).
Male (dummy)	Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant is male, and 0 otherwise.
Median income	Annual median income for each country in 2019. In the survey, values are expressed in local currency units. For the calculations, we are assuming a constant middle class since 2011, no external shocks to its composition or relative position in the economy. The values are obtained using data from the World Bank and the IADB (Castellani et al., 2014).
Number of children	Number of children
Occupation and economic activity (dummies)	Dummy variables indicating the economic activity of the participant, and for students, retired or unemployed individuals the economic activity of the person responsible for their expenses. In particular, individuals are classified in one of seven categories: (i) agriculture, (ii) extractive industries, (iii) manufacturing, (iv) non-manufacturing, (v) retired, (vi) student, and (vii) unemployed. Some of these categories aggregate additional possibilities that were presented in the survey. Extractive industries includes <i>mining and quarrying</i> and <i>oil and gas</i> . Non-manufacturing includes <i>electricity, gas and water, construction, wholesale and retail trade, transport, storage, and communication, financing, insurance, real estate and business services, and community, social ad personal services</i> . Category (i) is used as the base level for the regression analyses.
Resource intensive region (dummy)	Dummy variable that assumes takes the value 1 if the participant is located in a resource intensive area, and 0 otherwise. Resource intensive group is composed of the four states or departments with the highest extractive industry production values. The data used for each case is: the 2019 total commercialized mineral value from the 2019 Anuario Mineral (ANM, 2019) in Brazil, the 2020 total gold and coal royalties from the Mining Information System (UPME, 2020) in Colombia, and the 2020 total production of oil barrels from the Energy Secretariat (SENER, 2020) in Mexico.
Risk aversion (index)	Discrete index with six levels that takes the value 1 when the participant is risk averse, and the value 6 when the participant is risk lover. This value is captured using a risk lottery game during the survey.
Socioeconomic level group (dummies)	Dummy variables indicating the socioeconomic level of the participant. In particular, individuals are classified in one of six categories: (i) low-low, (ii) low, (iii) middle–low, (iv) middle, (v) middle–high, and (vi) high. Group (i) is used as the base level for the regression analyses. This variable is available only for Colombia as these classifications are mapped one-to-one with the socioeconomic stratification system in the country which classifies households by income according to the physical characteristics of the dwelling and its surroundings in six groups. For Mexico and Brazil we do not have a proxy for income.
Treatment groups (dummies)	Dummy variables indicating the treatment group to which the individual was assigned. Given that the two treatment dimensions are independent, respondents fall randomly into one of the following four groups that define the nature of the firm investing in their country: i) neutral and national, (ii) extractive and national, (iii) extractive and foreign, and (iv) neutral and foreign.
Type of treatment group (dummies)	Dummy variables indicating in which group the individuals were assigned during the first and the second dimension of the treatments. In particular, let $T^{ind}$ and $T^{nat}$ represent the type of treatment for the firm’s industry and nationality, respectively. $T^{ind} = 0$ if the participant is assigned to the neutral industry, and $T^{ind} = 1$ when is assigned to the extractive industry. Similarly, $T^{nat} = 0$ if the participant is assigned a national firm, and $T^{nat} = 1$ when is assigned a foreign firm.
Victim of conflict (dummy)	Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant is a victim of the armed conflict in Colombia, and 0 otherwise. This variable is available only for Colombia and was self reported by the participants.
Victim of conflict’s relative (dummy)	Dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the participant knows a victim of the armed conflict in Colombia, and 0 otherwise. This variable is available only for Colombia. and was self reported by the participants
Willingness-to-pay (dummy)	Dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the participant is willing-to-pay the bid amount every year to block the extractive project, and 0 otherwise. $WTP_1$ and $WTP_2$ correspond to the response to the initial bid and to the follow-up bid, respectively.

*Notes:* This table describes all the variables used in our analyses. Variables are organized in alphabetical order. Variable summary statistics are available in Table B4. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are described in Appendix Table B1.

Table B6: Effect of treatments on the willingness-to-pay to block projects

Model:	Simple model				Extended model				Constrained coefficients			
Sample:	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: WTP<sub>1</sub></i>												
Bid <sub>1</sub> (log)	-0.243*** (0.034)	-0.202*** (0.035)	-0.170*** (0.031)	-0.203*** (0.019)	-0.235*** (0.035)	-0.202*** (0.037)	-0.186*** (0.033)	-0.209*** (0.020)	-0.213*** (0.028)	-0.130*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.027)	-0.171*** (0.016)
Foreign (dummy)	-0.068 (0.073)	-0.109 (0.070)	-0.111 (0.071)	-0.098** (0.041)	-0.069 (0.075)	-0.126* (0.072)	-0.126* (0.072)	-0.113*** (0.042)	-0.061 (0.060)	-0.109* (0.056)	-0.042 (0.060)	-0.073** (0.034)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.140** (0.071)	-0.043 (0.071)	-0.075* (0.041)	-0.032 (0.075)	-0.153** (0.073)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.081* (0.042)	-0.043 (0.061)	-0.156*** (0.057)	-0.013 (0.061)	-0.072** (0.034)
Foreign × Extractive	0.109 (0.102)	0.154 (0.101)	0.182* (0.101)	0.149** (0.058)	0.123 (0.105)	0.157 (0.104)	0.213** (0.103)	0.164*** (0.060)	0.141* (0.085)	0.172** (0.081)	0.129 (0.086)	0.148*** (0.049)
Constant	0.617*** (0.070)	0.428*** (0.068)	0.328*** (0.066)	0.589*** (0.044)	0.456*** (0.144)	0.737*** (0.186)	0.422*** (0.136)	0.656*** (0.086)	0.492*** (0.057)	0.259*** (0.054)	0.232*** (0.055)	0.458*** (0.037)
<i>Panel B: WTP<sub>2</sub></i>												
Bid <sub>2</sub> (log)	-0.224*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.037)	-0.123*** (0.033)	-0.148*** (0.020)	-0.228*** (0.035)	-0.110*** (0.039)	-0.123*** (0.034)	-0.156*** (0.021)	-0.213*** (0.028)	-0.130*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.027)	-0.171*** (0.016)
Foreign (dummy)	-0.056 (0.070)	-0.108 (0.069)	0.025 (0.070)	-0.048 (0.040)	-0.060 (0.072)	-0.107 (0.071)	0.025 (0.071)	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.061 (0.060)	-0.109* (0.056)	-0.042 (0.060)	-0.073** (0.034)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.045 (0.070)	-0.170** (0.070)	0.016 (0.070)	-0.068* (0.040)	-0.061 (0.072)	-0.171** (0.072)	0.023 (0.072)	-0.072* (0.041)	-0.043 (0.061)	-0.156*** (0.057)	-0.013 (0.061)	-0.072** (0.034)
Foreign × Extractive	0.173* (0.098)	0.188* (0.100)	0.078 (0.099)	0.147** (0.057)	0.185* (0.101)	0.176* (0.102)	0.079 (0.102)	0.143** (0.059)	0.141* (0.085)	0.172** (0.081)	0.129 (0.086)	0.148*** (0.049)
Constant	0.428*** (0.066)	0.148** (0.068)	0.156** (0.064)	0.348*** (0.043)	0.440*** (0.138)	0.087 (0.184)	0.219* (0.132)	0.399*** (0.084)	0.492*** (0.057)	0.259*** (0.054)	0.232*** (0.055)	0.458*** (0.037)
Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Country (dummies)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
$\rho$ (ath)	0.798*** (0.052)	0.524*** (0.045)	0.808*** (0.050)	0.706*** (0.028)	0.792*** (0.053)	0.491*** (0.047)	0.778*** (0.050)	0.682*** (0.029)	0.768*** (0.046)	0.539*** (0.041)	0.821*** (0.047)	0.719*** (0.026)
$\rho$	0.66	0.48	0.67	0.61	0.66	0.46	0.65	0.59	0.65	0.49	0.68	0.62
Wald test	236.08	132.53	265.28	636.34	222.17	108.12	237.49	569.87	279.54	173.80	310.48	760.30
N	2523	2509	2524	7556	2420	2434	2460	7314	2523	2509	2524	7556
<i>Panel C: Willingness-to-pay point estimates with 95% confidence intervals</i>												
Overall	11.33 [8.35, 18.45]	5.43 [4.24, 7.49]	5.71 [4.23, 8.93]	7.40 [6.25, 9.20]	11.15 [8.08, 18.74]	5.08 [3.71, 7.45]	7.37 [5.31, 12.44]	7.71 [6.49, 9.70]	9.29 [7.13, 13.88]	3.68 [2.58, 5.09]	5.41 [3.97, 8.72]	7.29 [6.06, 9.19]
National x neutral	12.68 [7.84, 24.10]	8.33 [5.10, 15.79]	6.91 [3.79, 14.92]	9.45 [6.98, 13.76]	13.52 [8.24, 28.82]	9.72 [5.90, 21.28]	7.00 [4.01, 14.80]	10.12 [7.46, 14.84]	10.05 [6.52, 17.21]	7.32 [4.03, 16.78]	5.23 [2.83, 11.08]	8.97 [6.58, 13.16]
National x extractive	10.74 [6.87, 19.76]	4.16 [2.46, 7.04]	5.36 [3.02, 10.52]	6.53 [4.86, 9.02]	11.80 [7.28, 23.16]	4.56 [2.67, 8.01]	5.65 [3.32, 10.78]	6.87 [5.14, 9.50]	8.23 [5.44, 13.85]	2.21 [0.90, 4.12]	4.78 [2.63, 9.48]	5.90 [4.37, 8.18]
Foreign x neutral	9.59 [6.22, 17.52]	4.86 [2.97, 8.48]	3.59 [2.02, 6.64]	5.84 [4.45, 7.99]	10.07 [6.28, 20.10]	5.21 [3.12, 9.42]	3.56 [2.07, 6.37]	5.89 [4.45, 7.98]	7.56 [5.05, 12.88]	3.18 [1.56, 6.08]	3.89 [2.20, 7.65]	5.87 [4.44, 8.12]
Foreign x extractive	12.71 [8.05, 23.91]	5.21 [3.10, 9.21]	8.14 [4.37, 18.94]	8.40 [6.17, 11.99]	14.88 [9.01, 31.21]	5.32 [3.21, 9.51]	8.99 [4.99, 19.92]	8.73 [6.48, 12.60]	12.01 [7.80, 21.61]	3.59 [1.73, 7.06]	8.93 [4.64, 23.40]	9.19 [6.65, 13.45]

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SUR-biprobit) model for the double-dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses using Equation 5. The results are disaggregated by model, and sample. Columns 1-4 show the results of including only the treatment group dummies but excluding the  $X_i$  vector. Columns 5-8 show the results after including the  $X_i$ . The covariates included are: male (dummy), resource intensive area (dummy), age, education level (categorical), occupation (categorical), risk aversion, institutional trust (index), environmental awareness (index), and economic activity knowledge (indexes). In Columns 9-12, covariates are not included but we restrict the coefficients in equations  $WTP_1$  and  $WTP_2$  to be identical -i.e.  $\beta_1^1 = \beta_2^1$ , and  $\forall h, \beta_{1h}^2 = \beta_{2h}^2$ . The samples represent estimates for each country, and one additional column for the pooled estimates of the three countries. The median willingness-to-pay with the 95% confidence intervals are retrieved using the Krinsky and Robb (1990) procedure. Confidence intervals are presented in brackets and robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B5 and Table B4, respectively.



Table B7: Effect of treatments on the willingness-to-pay to block projects

Type of treatment:	Nationality								Industry							
	National				Foreign				Neutral				Extractive			
Sample:	National				Foreign				Neutral				Extractive			
Country:	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
<i>Panel A: WTP<sub>1</sub></i>																
Bid <sub>1</sub> (log)	-0.245***	-0.191***	-0.186***	-0.208***	-0.228***	-0.210***	-0.186***	-0.208***	-0.196***	-0.181***	-0.198***	-0.192***	-0.274***	-0.225***	-0.190***	-0.228***
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.028)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.026	-0.163**	-0.048	-0.084**	0.088	0.003	0.179**	0.080*								
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.042)								
Foreign (dummy)									-0.062	-0.116	-0.127*	-0.112***	0.061	0.042	0.091	0.054
									(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.042)
Constant	0.499***	0.760***	0.426**	0.628***	0.339*	0.549**	0.254	0.563***	0.504***	1.080***	0.343*	0.679***	0.412**	0.312	0.469**	0.550***
	(0.193)	(0.258)	(0.190)	(0.118)	(0.199)	(0.263)	(0.181)	(0.118)	(0.196)	(0.268)	(0.187)	(0.117)	(0.200)	(0.257)	(0.184)	(0.119)
<i>Panel B: WTP<sub>2</sub></i>																
Bid <sub>2</sub> (log)	-0.241***	-0.111**	-0.084*	-0.150***	-0.208***	-0.099*	-0.158***	-0.160***	-0.212***	-0.068	-0.090*	-0.127***	-0.242***	-0.141**	-0.163***	-0.184***
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.029)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.068	-0.180**	0.026	-0.073*	0.121*	0.003	0.100	0.071*								
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.041)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.042)								
Foreign (dummy)									-0.062	-0.100	0.029	-0.047	0.129*	0.067	0.108	0.099**
									(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.041)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.042)
Constant	0.554***	0.281	0.026	0.383***	0.249	-0.171	0.418**	0.373***	0.543***	0.268	0.209	0.421***	0.340*	-0.265	0.257	0.301***
	(0.187)	(0.255)	(0.186)	(0.115)	(0.190)	(0.263)	(0.175)	(0.114)	(0.188)	(0.265)	(0.180)	(0.114)	(0.193)	(0.254)	(0.179)	(0.116)
Country (dummies)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
$\rho$ (ath)	0.859***	0.495***	0.751***	0.693***	0.735***	0.483***	0.818***	0.673***	0.762***	0.426***	0.701***	0.618***	0.821***	0.556***	0.882***	0.746***
	(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.041)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.039)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.042)
$\rho$	0.70	0.46	0.64	0.60	0.63	0.45	0.67	0.59	0.64	0.40	0.60	0.55	0.68	0.50	0.71	0.63
Wald test	120.92	55.56	113.72	294.35	100.53	51.12	122.12	275.64	108.69	43.94	103.18	253.52	111.29	62.43	133.26	311.65
N	1201	1237	1217	3655	1219	1197	1243	3659	1186	1254	1238	3678	1234	1180	1222	3636
<i>Panel C: Willingness-to-pay point estimates with 95% confidence intervals</i>																
Median WTP	11.08	6.31	8.66	8.40	11.09	4.16	6.55	7.24	13.94	8.22	6.19	8.28	9.68	3.67	8.28	7.31
	[7.31,	[3.73,	[5.21,	[6.49,	[7.03,	[2.43,	[4.18,	[5.75,	[8.00,	[4.74,	[4.10,	[6.31,	[6.73,	[2.17,	[5.16,	[5.90,
	23.98]	13.75]	23.45]	12.26]	26.72]	6.65]	14.08]	10.03]	50.77]	23.13]	12.17]	12.51]	17.54]	5.51]	20.75]	9.94]

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SUR-biprobit) model for the double-dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses using Equation 5. The results are disaggregated by model, and sample. Columns 1-4 show the results of including only the treatment group dummies but excluding the  $X_i$  vector. Columns 5-8 show the results after including the  $X_i$ . The covariates included are: male (dummy), resource intensive area (dummy), age, education level (categorical), occupation (categorical), risk aversion, institutional trust (index), environmental awareness (index), and economic activity knowledge (indexes). In Columns 9-12, covariates are not included but we restrict the coefficients in equations  $WTP_1$  and  $WTP_2$  to be identical –i.e.  $\beta_1^1 = \beta_2^1$ , and  $\forall h, \beta_{1h}^2 = \beta_{2h}^2$ . The samples represent estimates for each country, and one additional column for the pooled estimates of the three countries. The median willingness-to-pay with the 95% confidence intervals are retrieved using the Krinsky and Robb (1990) procedure. Confidence intervals are presented in brackets and robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B5 and Table B4, respectively. The non-governmental organizations are described in Appendix Table B1.

Table B8: Effect of treatments on the willingness-to-pay to block projects for participants with good attention

Model:	Simple model				Extended model				Constrained coefficients			
Sample:	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: WTP<sub>1</sub></i>												
Bid <sub>1</sub> (log)	-0.276*** (0.039)	-0.187*** (0.038)	-0.222*** (0.035)	-0.229*** (0.021)	-0.272*** (0.040)	-0.187*** (0.040)	-0.239*** (0.036)	-0.233*** (0.022)	-0.238*** (0.032)	-0.124*** (0.031)	-0.184*** (0.031)	-0.192*** (0.018)
Foreign (dummy)	-0.023 (0.085)	-0.144* (0.078)	-0.104 (0.081)	-0.095** (0.047)	-0.031 (0.088)	-0.176** (0.081)	-0.088 (0.083)	-0.109** (0.048)	-0.033 (0.070)	-0.112* (0.063)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.074* (0.039)
Extractive (dummy)	0.004 (0.080)	-0.190** (0.077)	-0.025 (0.079)	-0.073 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.083)	-0.203** (0.080)	-0.013 (0.081)	-0.082* (0.047)	-0.013 (0.067)	-0.188** (0.062)	0.010 (0.067)	-0.066* (0.038)
Foreign × Extractive	0.038 (0.115)	0.191* (0.110)	0.162 (0.112)	0.133** (0.065)	0.065 (0.118)	0.210* (0.113)	0.172 (0.115)	0.150** (0.095)	0.095 (0.066)	0.165* (0.089)	0.105 (0.095)	0.123** (0.054)
Constant	0.653*** (0.078)	0.439*** (0.075)	0.374*** (0.074)	0.644*** (0.050)	0.509*** (0.160)	0.721*** (0.203)	0.480*** (0.153)	0.690*** (0.096)	0.520*** (0.064)	0.272*** (0.060)	0.282*** (0.063)	0.505*** (0.041)
<i>Panel B: WTP<sub>2</sub></i>												
Bid <sub>2</sub> (log)	-0.245*** (0.039)	-0.096** (0.040)	-0.156*** (0.037)	-0.166*** (0.022)	-0.245*** (0.040)	-0.108** (0.043)	-0.159*** (0.038)	-0.172*** (0.023)	-0.238*** (0.032)	-0.124*** (0.031)	-0.184*** (0.031)	-0.192*** (0.018)
Foreign (dummy)	-0.043 (0.081)	-0.081 (0.077)	-0.030 (0.080)	-0.054 (0.046)	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.086 (0.079)	-0.013 (0.082)	-0.051 (0.047)	-0.033 (0.070)	-0.112* (0.063)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.074* (0.039)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.028 (0.077)	-0.185** (0.076)	0.042 (0.078)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.060 (0.079)	-0.180** (0.079)	0.066 (0.080)	-0.061 (0.046)	-0.013 (0.067)	-0.188*** (0.062)	0.010 (0.067)	-0.066* (0.038)
Foreign × Extractive	0.147 (0.110)	0.138 (0.109)	0.052 (0.110)	0.114* (0.063)	0.170 (0.113)	0.130 (0.112)	0.040 (0.113)	0.108* (0.065)	0.095 (0.095)	0.165* (0.089)	0.105 (0.095)	0.123** (0.054)
Constant	0.454*** (0.074)	0.159** (0.075)	0.210*** (0.073)	0.387*** (0.049)	0.393** (0.154)	0.080 (0.202)	0.274* (0.148)	0.390*** (0.093)	0.520*** (0.064)	0.272*** (0.060)	0.282*** (0.063)	0.505*** (0.041)
Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Country (dummies)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
$\rho$ (ath)	0.814*** (0.059)	0.519*** (0.050)	0.822*** (0.057)	0.712*** (0.031)	0.812*** (0.061)	0.493*** (0.052)	0.788*** (0.058)	0.687*** (0.032)	0.784*** (0.052)	0.530*** (0.045)	0.846*** (0.053)	0.728*** (0.029)
$\rho$	0.67	0.48	0.68	0.61	0.67	0.46	0.66	0.60	0.65	0.49	0.69	0.62
Wald test	188.34	109.57	211.26	515.74	178.24	91.62	187.48	462.77	227.27	141.30	251.89	621.55
N	2028	2091	2046	6165	1955	2035	1998	5988	2028	2091	2046	6165
<i>Panel C: Willingness-to-pay point estimates with 95% confidence intervals</i>												
Overall	10.69 [7.98, 16.98]	5.42 [4.05, 8.04]	4.84 [3.78, 6.65]	6.90 [5.88, 8.45]	10.03 [7.43, 15.91]	4.92 [3.37, 7.81]	6.22 [4.72, 9.07]	7.18 [6.09, 8.90]	8.97 [6.90, 13.29]	3.62 [2.35, 5.30]	4.63 [3.57, 6.47]	6.74 [5.65, 8.36]
National x neutral	10.66 [6.73, 19.34]	10.40 [5.68, 25.87]	5.37 [3.18, 9.69]	8.62 [6.38, 12.46]	11.20 [7.03, 22.33]	12.44 [6.66, 39.12]	5.27 [3.22, 9.46]	9.22 [6.81, 13.38]	8.92 [5.80, 15.12]	8.93 [4.44, 28.80]	4.63 [2.70, 8.47]	8.29 [6.09, 12.08]
National x extractive	10.83 [7.05, 19.48]	3.77 [1.97, 6.88]	4.79 [3.01, 8.00]	6.27 [4.74, 8.52]	11.05 [7.10, 20.46]	4.19 [2.16, 7.99]	4.99 [3.20, 8.30]	6.49 [4.93, 8.83]	8.44 [5.63, 14.07]	1.97 [0.64, 3.93]	4.88 [3.03, 8.42]	5.87 [4.41, 8.05]
Foreign x neutral	9.80 [6.21, 18.31]	4.82 [2.62, 9.71]	3.36 [2.04, 5.65]	5.70 [4.32, 7.82]	9.98 [6.17, 19.76]	4.85 [2.56, 10.05]	3.64 [2.25, 6.09]	5.78 [4.34, 7.91]	7.76 [5.07, 13.46]	3.61 [1.58, 8.09]	3.24 [1.96, 5.54]	5.64 [4.26, 7.79]
Foreign x extractive	11.44 [7.45, 20.58]	4.84 [2.62, 9.37]	6.22 [3.69, 11.60]	7.40 [5.54, 10.27]	12.53 [7.93, 23.65]	5.02 [2.76, 9.90]	7.07 [4.32, 12.84]	7.73 [5.82, 10.90]	10.96 [7.23, 19.19]	3.00 [1.20, 6.38]	6.05 [3.51, 11.84]	7.59 [5.59, 10.70]

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SUR–biprobit) model for the double-dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses using Equation 5. The sample of participants for this table consists of only individuals who correctly identified their treatment group after the video vignettes. The results are disaggregated by model, and sample. Columns 1-4 show the results of including only the treatment group dummies but excluding the  $X_i$  vector. Columns 5-8 show the results after including the  $X_i$ . The covariates included are: male (dummy), resource intensive area (dummy), age, education level (categorical), occupation (categorical), risk aversion, institutional trust (index), environmental awareness (index), and economic activity knowledge (indexes). In Columns 9-12, covariates are not included but we restrict the coefficients in equations  $WTP_1$  and  $WTP_2$  to be identical –i.e.  $\beta_1^1 = \beta_2^1$ , and  $\forall h, \beta_{1h}^2 = \beta_{2h}^2$ . The samples represent estimates for each country, and one additional column for the pooled estimates of the three countries. The median willingness-to-pay with the 95% confidence intervals are retrieved using the Krinsky and Robb (1990) procedure. Confidence intervals are presented in brackets and robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B5 and Table B4, respectively.

Table B9: Effect of treatments on the individuals' perceived benefits of the industry to their communities and households

Model:	Simple model								Extended model							
Dependent variable:	Perceived benefits (index)								Perceived benefits (index)							
Sample:	Community				Household				Community				Household			
	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Foreign (dummy)	0.150 (0.098)	-0.022 (0.096)	0.017 (0.097)	0.049 (0.056)	0.001 (0.101)	0.095 (0.097)	-0.112 (0.100)	-0.002 (0.057)	0.183* (0.099)	-0.031 (0.097)	0.037 (0.096)	0.064 (0.056)	0.025 (0.101)	0.080 (0.097)	-0.083 (0.098)	0.012 (0.057)
Extractive (dummy)	0.064 (0.096)	-0.048 (0.099)	-0.079 (0.098)	-0.020 (0.056)	-0.304*** (0.100)	-0.009 (0.099)	-0.302*** (0.101)	-0.201*** (0.058)	0.065 (0.097)	-0.032 (0.098)	-0.029 (0.099)	-0.003 (0.057)	-0.280*** (0.100)	-0.007 (0.098)	-0.267*** (0.101)	-0.183*** (0.058)
Foreign × Extractive	-0.255* (0.136)	0.130 (0.141)	-0.100 (0.140)	-0.077 (0.080)	-0.052 (0.140)	-0.090 (0.143)	0.115 (0.143)	-0.013 (0.082)	-0.306** (0.138)	0.131 (0.140)	-0.132 (0.139)	-0.099 (0.080)	-0.105 (0.141)	-0.076 (0.140)	0.068 (0.141)	-0.037 (0.081)
Constant	3.522*** (0.071)	4.103*** (0.067)	4.225*** (0.069)	3.570*** (0.049)	3.423*** (0.073)	3.841*** (0.067)	3.961*** (0.072)	3.361*** (0.051)	3.364*** (0.178)	4.161*** (0.232)	4.452*** (0.165)	3.670*** (0.108)	3.365*** (0.182)	3.875*** (0.236)	4.054*** (0.168)	3.484*** (0.109)
Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country (dummies)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	2449	2471	2490	7410	2455	2473	2492	7420	2361	2402	2428	7191	2367	2405	2434	7206
R-squared	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.024	0.009	0.001	0.005	0.026	0.034	0.061	0.047	0.060	0.052	0.077	0.059	0.073

Notes: This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of Equation 7 when  $y_i$  is equal to the industry benefits to community (index), or the industry benefits to household (index). Columns (1)-(8) do not include covariates in the estimations, while Columns (9)-(16) do. The covariates included are: male (dummy), resource intensive area (dummy), age, education level (categorical), occupation (categorical), risk aversion, institutional trust (index), environmental awareness (index), economic activity knowledge (indexes), and country dummies for the pooled estimates. For each model, we present the estimates for each country, and a last column with the results for the pooled sample of the three countries. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B5 and Table B4, respectively.

Table B10: Effect of treatments on the distributional dictator game

Dependent variable:	Donation to the NGO (share of total donation)															
	Alliance/Oceana				Mongabay				Liga contra el cancer				WaterAid			
	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	All
Sample:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Foreign (dummy)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	0.009 (0.008)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.012 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)
Foreign $\times$ Extractive	0.011 (0.011)	0.011 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.009 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.001 (0.007)
Constant	0.283*** (0.015)	0.229*** (0.018)	0.256*** (0.014)	0.260*** (0.009)	0.243*** (0.013)	0.267*** (0.020)	0.244*** (0.014)	0.253*** (0.009)	0.230*** (0.015)	0.244*** (0.019)	0.255*** (0.014)	0.239*** (0.009)	0.244*** (0.015)	0.259*** (0.021)	0.245*** (0.014)	0.248*** (0.009)
Country (dummies)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	2412	2420	2453	7285	2412	2420	2453	7285	2412	2420	2453	7285	2412	2420	2453	7285
R-squared	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.002	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.002	0.013	0.011	0.006	0.002	0.010	0.009	0.005	0.002

*Notes:* This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of Equation 7 when  $y_i$  is equal to the donations to the non-governmental organizations (shares for each NGO). The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(4) is the share of donations to Alliance (or Oceana for Mexico), in Columns (5)-(8) is the share of donations to Mongabay, in Columns (9)-(12) is the share of donations to Liga contra el Cancer, and in Columns (13-16) is the share of donations to WaterAid. We include the vector of covariates  $X_i$  in all the estimations.  $X_i$  includes: male (dummy), resource intensive area (dummy), age, education level (categorical), occupation (categorical), risk aversion, institutional trust (index), environmental awareness (index), economic activity knowledge (indexes), and country dummies for the pooled estimates. For each model, we present the estimates for each country, and a last column with the results for the pooled sample of the three countries. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*,\*\*,\*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B5 and Table B4, respectively. The non-governmental organizations are described in Appendix Table B1.

Table B11: Correlations between covariates and the willingness-to-pay to block projects

Model: Sample:	Pre-treatment variables				Post-treatment variables			
	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall	Colombia	Mexico	Brazil	Overall
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: WTP<sub>1</sub></i>								
Bid <sub>1</sub> (log)	-0.235*** (0.035)	-0.202*** (0.037)	-0.186*** (0.033)	-0.209*** (0.020)	-0.244*** (0.036)	-0.205*** (0.037)	-0.187*** (0.033)	-0.212*** (0.020)
Foreign (dummy)	-0.069 (0.075)	-0.126* (0.072)	-0.126* (0.072)	-0.113*** (0.042)	-0.043 (0.077)	-0.124* (0.074)	-0.129* (0.073)	-0.107** (0.043)
Extractive (dummy)	-0.032 (0.075)	-0.153** (0.073)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.081* (0.042)	-0.031 (0.077)	-0.155** (0.074)	-0.047 (0.075)	-0.083* (0.043)
Foreign x extractive (dummy)	0.123 (0.105)	0.157 (0.104)	0.213** (0.103)	0.164*** (0.060)	0.070 (0.108)	0.165 (0.105)	0.178* (0.105)	0.143** (0.061)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Male (dummy)	0.014 (0.053)	-0.003 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.054)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.024 (0.055)	0.008 (0.055)	-0.031 (0.055)	0.003 (0.031)
Resource intensive region (dummy)	-0.050 (0.054)	-0.085 (0.057)	0.018 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.056)	-0.075 (0.057)	0.019 (0.054)	-0.033 (0.032)
Technical (dummy)	0.124 (0.082)	-0.117 (0.144)	-0.007 (0.095)	0.046 (0.053)	0.097 (0.085)	-0.117 (0.147)	0.014 (0.096)	0.047 (0.055)
University or greater (dummy)	0.128* (0.073)	0.027 (0.133)	0.101 (0.062)	0.115*** (0.044)	0.108 (0.075)	0.019 (0.136)	0.116* (0.063)	0.115** (0.045)
Number of children	-0.001 (0.029)	0.016 (0.024)	0.031 (0.028)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.030)	0.026 (0.025)	0.036 (0.029)	0.023 (0.016)
Extractive industries (dummy)	0.096 (0.287)	-0.126 (0.172)	0.067 (0.226)	-0.063 (0.121)	0.181 (0.292)	-0.015 (0.175)	0.094 (0.221)	0.020 (0.122)
Manufacturing (dummy)	0.324** (0.155)	0.108 (0.126)	0.001 (0.166)	0.142* (0.082)	0.331** (0.163)	0.125 (0.127)	-0.006 (0.173)	0.151* (0.084)
Non-manufacturing (dummy)	0.115* (0.067)	0.084 (0.061)	-0.015 (0.060)	0.058 (0.036)	0.136** (0.069)	0.092 (0.062)	-0.024 (0.061)	0.059 (0.036)
Unemployed (dummy)	0.019 (0.102)	0.038 (0.127)	0.077 (0.100)	0.038 (0.062)	0.060 (0.106)	0.038 (0.130)	0.077 (0.102)	0.048 (0.063)
Retired (dummy)	0.272 (0.309)	0.137 (0.240)	-0.219 (0.159)	-0.061 (0.118)	0.189 (0.310)	0.197 (0.249)	-0.166 (0.161)	-0.017 (0.120)
Student (dummy)	0.086 (0.087)	-0.021 (0.095)	0.008 (0.099)	0.019 (0.053)	0.122 (0.089)	-0.015 (0.097)	-0.017 (0.101)	0.021 (0.054)
Risk aversion (index)	0.014 (0.017)	-0.043** (0.017)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.015 (0.018)	-0.045*** (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.010)
Institutional distrust (index)	-0.038 (0.029)	0.095*** (0.026)	0.100*** (0.028)	0.061*** (0.016)	-0.020 (0.030)	0.109*** (0.027)	0.120*** (0.029)	0.082*** (0.016)
Environmental awareness (index)	0.126*** (0.028)	0.151*** (0.025)	0.228*** (0.028)	0.167*** (0.015)	0.103*** (0.029)	0.145*** (0.026)	0.226*** (0.029)	0.159*** (0.016)
Industry benefits to community (index)					-0.093*** (0.023)	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.045* (0.023)	-0.061*** (0.013)
Industry benefits to household (index)					-0.042* (0.022)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.050** (0.023)	-0.034*** (0.013)
Mongabay donation (share)					-0.212 (0.243)	-0.103 (0.219)	0.165 (0.217)	-0.016 (0.130)
Cancer donation (share)					-0.111 (0.246)	-0.152 (0.222)	0.165 (0.218)	-0.018 (0.130)
WaterAid donation (share)					0.498** (0.248)	0.244 (0.220)	0.165 (0.204)	0.279** (0.128)
Mexico (dummy)				-0.222*** (0.038)				-0.186*** (0.039)
Brazil (dummy)				-0.148*** (0.039)				-0.108*** (0.040)
Constant	0.456*** (0.144)	0.737*** (0.186)	0.422*** (0.136)	0.656*** (0.086)	0.898*** (0.214)	1.044*** (0.243)	0.721*** (0.202)	0.968*** (0.122)
$\rho$ (ath)	0.792*** (0.053)	0.491*** (0.047)	0.778*** (0.050)	0.682*** (0.029)	0.754*** (0.054)	0.485*** (0.048)	0.766*** (0.051)	0.663*** (0.029)
$\rho$	0.66	0.46	0.65	0.59	0.64	0.45	0.64	0.58
N	2420	2434	2460	7314	2337	2377	2409	7123

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SUR-biprobit) model for the double-dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses using Equation 5. We only show the results for  $WTP_1$  because the results for  $WTP_2$  are similar. Columns 1-4 show the results of including the  $X_i$  vector with pre-treatment variables only. Columns 5-8 show the results after including post-treatment variables in  $X_i$ . The column header indicates the sample. Results for each country and for the pooled estimates of the three countries are presented. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions and summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B5 and Table B4, respectively. The non-governmental organizations are described in Appendix Table B1.

**SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS**

**Questionnaire - English version**

## Survey

---

We are currently conducting research with Internet users such as yourself. We would be very grateful if you could spare 20 minutes of your time to help us to better understand your preferences, attitudes and beliefs towards industries.

Participation is easy, voluntary, and **very important**. Your answers will be kept private and confidential and your data will never be sold.

---

### [SC1] How old are you?

(Please enter a whole number.)

---

Thank you for your willingness to participate. However, you are ineligible at this time.

---

### [hAge] Age Quota

#### Row:

[r1] 18-24

[r2] 25-34

[r3] 35-44

[r4] 45-54

[r5] 55-64

[r6] 65+

---

### [SC2] Where do you currently live?

\$\_{res.S}

#### Row:

[r1] Colombia

[r2] Mexico

[r3] Brazil

---

**[SC2a] In what department do you currently reside in?**

#{res.DD1}

**Choice:**

[ch1] Amazonas

[ch2] Antioquia

[ch3] Arauca

[ch4] Atlántico

[ch5] Bolívar

[ch33] Bogotá, D.C.

[ch6] Boyacá

[ch7] Caldas

[ch8] Caquetá

[ch9] Casanare

[ch10] Cauca

[ch11] Cesar

[ch12] Chocó

[ch13] Córdoba

[ch14] Cundinamarca

[ch15] Guainía

[ch16] Guaviare

[ch17] Huila

[ch18] La Guajira

[ch19] Magdalena

[ch20] Meta

[ch21] Nariño

[ch22] Norte de Santander

[ch23] Putumayo

[ch24] Quindío

[ch25] Risaralda

[ch26] San Andrés y Providencia

[ch27] Santander

[ch28] Sucre

[ch29] Tolima

[ch30] Valle del Cauca

[ch31] Vaupés

[ch32] Vichada



[ch99] I don't know

---

**[hSC2a] SC2a Quota**

**Row:**

- [r1] Cesar
  - [r2] La Guajira
  - [r3] Chocó
  - [r4] Antioquia
  - [r5] Atlántica Region (excluding Cesar and La Guajira)
  - [r6] Bogota
  - [r7] Central Region (excluding Antioquia)
  - [r8] Oriental Region
  - [r9] Orinoquía y Amazonía Region
  - [r10] Pacifica Region (excluding Chocó)
- 

**[SC2b] In what state do you currently reside in?**

\$\_{res.DD1}

**Choice:**

- [ch1] Aguascalientes
- [ch2] Baja California
- [ch3] Baja California Sur
- [ch4] Campeche
- [ch5] Chiapas
- [ch6] Chihuahua
- [ch7] Coahuila de Zaragoza
- [ch8] Colima
- [ch9] Distrito Federal
- [ch10] Durango
- [ch11] Guanajuato
- [ch12] Guerrero
- [ch13] Hidalgo
- [ch14] Jalisco
- [ch15] México
- [ch16] Michoacán de Ocampo

[ch17] Morelos  
[ch18] Nayarit  
[ch19] Nuevo León  
[ch20] Oaxaca  
[ch21] Puebla  
[ch22] Querétaro  
[ch23] Quintana Roo  
[ch24] San Luis Potosí  
[ch25] Sinaloa  
[ch26] Sonora  
[ch27] Tabasco  
[ch28] Tamaulipas  
[ch29] Tlaxcala  
[ch30] Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave  
[ch31] Yucatán  
[ch32] Zacatecas  
[ch99] I don't know

---

**[hSC2b] SC2b Quota**

**Row:**

[r1] Tabasco  
[r2] Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave  
[r3] Chiapas  
[r4] Tamaulipas  
[r5] Center Region  
[r6] East Region(excluding Veracruz)  
[r7] North Region (excluding Tamaulipas)  
[r8] South Region (excluding Tabasco and Chiapas)  
[r9] West Region

---

**[SC2c] In what state do you currently reside in?**

\$\_{res.DD1}

**Choice:**

[ch1] Acre

[ch2] Alagoas  
[ch3] Amapá  
[ch4] Amazonas  
[ch5] Bahia  
[ch6] Ceará  
[ch27] Distrito Federal  
[ch7] Espírito Santo  
[ch8] Goiás  
[ch9] Maranhão  
[ch10] Mato Grosso  
[ch11] Mato Grosso do Sul  
[ch12] Minas Gerais  
[ch13] Pará  
[ch14] Paraíba  
[ch15] Paraná  
[ch16] Pernambuco  
[ch17] Piauí  
[ch18] Rio de Janeiro  
[ch19] Rio Grande do Norte  
[ch20] Rio Grande do Sul  
[ch21] Rondônia  
[ch22] Roraima  
[ch23] Santa Catarina  
[ch24] São Paulo  
[ch25] Sergipe  
[ch26] Tocantins  
[ch99] I don't know

---

### **[hSC2c] SC2c Quota**

#### **Row:**

[r1] Pará  
[r2] Minas Gerais  
[r3] Goiás  
[r4] Bahia  
[r5] Central-West Region (excluding Goiás)  
[r6] North Region (excluding Pará)

[r7] Northeast Region (excluding Bahia)

[r8] South Region

[r9] Southeast Region (excluding Minas Gerais)

---

Please ensure your speakers are turned on, or you can use your headphones, as you need to listen and identify the sound of an animal.

---

#### **[hRML6ErrMsg] RML6 Error Messages**

##### **Row:**

[r1] Please make sure all the items have been answered

[r2] Please finish watching the video before you proceed

---

#### **[hAudioScreener]**

##### **Row:**

[r1] Number of times the video has been played

[r2] Amount watched in seconds: start

[r3] Amount watched in seconds: end

#### **[SC3] Please identify the animal you just heard.**

\$\_{res.S}

##### **Row:**

[r1] Dog

[r2] Cat

[r3] Elephant

[r4] Frog

[r5] Ape

[r6] Horse

[r7] Bird

[r9] I could not hear the animal

---

Thank you for your willingness to participate. However, you are ineligible at this time.

---

On the next screen you will be shown the image of an animal and asked to identify which animal you see.

---

**[hVideoScrPlayer]**

**Row:**

[r1] Number of times the video has been played

[r2] Amount watched in seconds: start

[r3] Amount watched in seconds: end

**[SC4] What animal can you see in the video above.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Dog

[r2] Cat

[r3] Elephant

[r4] Frog

[r5] Ape

[r6] Horse

[r7] Bird

[r9] I could not see the animal

---

Thank you for your willingness to participate. However, you are ineligible at this time.

---

**[Consent] This is a study to recollect information and elicit opinions about different industries. The data will be anonymous and respect Dynata's international standards of data management. The questions usually take about 20 minutes. You do not have to be in the survey, but we hope you agree to participate since your views are important. All of the answers you give will be confidential and will not be shared with anyone other than members of our survey team. Your participation is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time. In case you need more information about the survey, you can utilize the "Help" page under your account profile to send an email. Alternatively, you can use the automated assistant "Q" which is available on your panel's website. Do you wish to continue?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

**[Section0\_LOI] Section 0: Screener : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

This survey will include two exercises, in which your responses to those exercises will allow you to accumulate Tickets for a lottery. Your chances of winning the lottery will depend on the Tickets you earn in the survey. The more Tickets you earn, the greater your chances of winning the lottery. At the end of the survey, you will be asked to choose how to distribute a donation of 500USD between four NGOs. If you are the winner of the lottery, then the 500USD will be distributed according to your answer to the last exercise. This exercise will be completed by all the survey respondents, and there is going to be only one winner. Thus, only the decisions of the winner are going to be implemented. We'll provide you with more details of the lottery and donation throughout the survey.

---

**[DEM1] Which economic activity best describes the type of work you do?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
  - [r2] Mining and quarrying
  - [r3] Manufacturing
  - [r4] Electricity, gas and water
  - [r5] Construction
  - [r6] Wholesale and retail trade
  - [r7] Transport, storage and communication
  - [r8] Financing, insurance, real estate and business services
  - [r9] Community, social and personal services
  - [r10] Oil and Gas
  - [r11] Unemployed
  - [r12] Retired
  - [r13] Student
  - [r14] Other
  - [r99] Prefer not to answer
- 

**[DEM2] In case you don't perceive any income, which economic activity best describes the type of work the person that is responsible for your expenses does?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
- [r2] Mining and quarrying

- [r3] Manufacturing
  - [r4] Electricity, gas and water
  - [r5] Construction
  - [r6] Wholesale and retail trade
  - [r7] Transport, storage and communication
  - [r8] Financing, insurance, real estate and business services
  - [r9] Community, social and personal services
  - [r10] Oil and Gas
  - [r11] Unemployed
  - [r12] Retired
  - [r13] Student
  - [r14] Other
  - [r99] Prefer not to answer
- 

**[DEM3] What is the highest degree or level of school you completed? If you are currently enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree received.**

\$\_{res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] No schooling complete
  - [r2] Primary
  - [r3] Secondary
  - [r4] Technical
  - [r5] University or greater
  - [r8] I don't know
  - [r9] Prefer not to answer
- 

**[Section1\_LOI] Section 1: Labor and Education: LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

Next, we would like to ask about donations to good causes.

---

[ALT1] Please respond using a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being "you are not willing to act that way at all" and 10 being "you are very willing to act that way". You can also use any number between 0 and 10 to indicate where you are on the scale.

**How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r0] 0 - Not willing to act that way at all

[r1] 1

[r2] 2

[r3] 3

[r4] 4

[r5] 5

[r6] 6

[r7] 7

[r8] 8

[r9] 9

[r10] 10 - Very willing to act that way

[r99] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[ALTValue] Hidden in live.**

**Row:**

[r1] 280.000 pesos

[r2] 1,600 pesos

[r3] R\$400

---

**[ALT2CO] Suppose that today you unexpectedly receive \${ALTValue.selected.text}. How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause?**

\${res.N1}

---

**[ALT2ME] Suppose that today you unexpectedly receive \${ALTValue.selected.text}. How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause?**

\${res.N1}

---



[ALT2BR] Suppose that today you unexpectedly receive  $\${ALTValue.selected.text}$ . How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause?

$\${res.N1}$

---

[Section2\_LOI] Section 2: Altruism: LOI Timer (Minutes)

---

Now, you will participate in an activity that will allow you to accumulate Tickets for the lottery. You will be shown six circles and you will need to select your preferred circle. Each circle presents two values of Tickets you could earn if you select that circle. There are no good or bad decisions. To determine how many Tickets, you will win in your selected circle, a computer will randomly flip a virtual coin. If the outcome of the flip is "heads", you will win the value displayed on the right side of your selected circle. If the outcome is "tails", then you will earn the value displayed on the left of your selected circle.

---

[RA1] Please select the circle that you prefer.

[//ssiprojects.s3.amazonaws.com/ssihyd/+ORD-226585-L9Y2/coin.png]

$\${res.S}$

**Row:**

[r1] A

[r2] B

[r3] C

[r4] D

[r5] E

[r6] F

---

[RA1\_LOI] RA1 LOI Timer (Minutes)

---

[Fifty50] HIDDEN: split Rs 50-50%

**Row:**

[r1] 50%

[r2] another 50%

---

[RA2Value] Hidden in live.

**[VAL1] Hidden in live.**

---

The coin was flipped, and you earned  $\{RA2Value.val\}$  Tickets from this activity.

---

You will participate in another exercise will allow you to accumulate Tickets for the lottery.

In this task two people completing this survey will participate. We will randomly divide the participants of the survey into two groups. Group 1 participants will decide how many Tickets to transfer to one anonymous and randomly selected person of the other group. Group 2 participants will simply receive the Tickets and make no further decisions.

---

**[hRA3] Hidden in live.**

**Row:**

[r1] RA3\_1

[r2] RA3\_2

---

[RA3\_1] You have been randomly chosen to group 1 and have been assigned 100 Tickets. Now you must indicate how many of the 100 Tickets you would like to transfer to another person that has been randomly selected into group 2. The other person will not make any decisions.

At the end of this task, you will receive the difference between the 100 Tickets assigned to you and the amount of Tickets that you transferred to the other person. The Tickets that you chose to transfer, will be assigned to a randomly selected respondent in group 2.

**How many Tickets would you like to transfer to the other person?**

$\{res.S\}$

**Row:**

[r1] 0

[r2] 10

[r3] 20

[r4] 30

[r5] 40

[r6] 50

[r7] 60

[r8] 70

[r9] 80

[r10] 90

[r11] 100

---

**[VAL2] Hidden in live.**

**[Random\_X\_RA3\_2] Hidden in live.**

**[X\_RA3\_2] Hidden in live.**

**[hX\_RA3\_2] Hidden in live.**

**Row:**

[r1] 0

[r2] 10

[r3] 20

[r4] 30

[r5] 40

[r6] 50

[r7] 60

[r8] 70

[r9] 80

[r10] 90

[r11] 100

---

You have been randomly selected to group 2. A random person from group 1 has transferred you \${X\_RA3\_2.val} Tickets.

---

**[Section3\_LOI] Section 3: Risk & DG : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

In the next set of questions, we are interested in your opinion of the environment. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

---

**[NEP1] We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP2] Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP3] When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP4] Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP5] Humans are severely abusing the environment.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP6] The earth has plenty of natural resources if we can just learn how to develop them.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP7] Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP8] The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[NEP9] Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

- [r5] Somewhat agree
  - [r6] Agree
  - [r7] Completely Agree
  - [r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer
- 

**[NEP10] The so-called "ecological crisis" facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

- [r1] Completely disagree
  - [r2] Disagree
  - [r3] Somewhat disagree
  - [r4] Neither agree nor disagree
  - [r5] Somewhat agree
  - [r6] Agree
  - [r7] Completely Agree
  - [r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer
- 

**[NEP11] The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

- [r1] Completely disagree
  - [r2] Disagree
  - [r3] Somewhat disagree
  - [r4] Neither agree nor disagree
  - [r5] Somewhat agree
  - [r6] Agree
  - [r7] Completely Agree
  - [r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer
- 

**[NEP12] Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.**

\$\_{res.S}\$

**Row:**

- [r1] Completely disagree

- [r2] Disagree
  - [r3] Somewhat disagree
  - [r4] Neither agree nor disagree
  - [r5] Somewhat agree
  - [r6] Agree
  - [r7] Completely Agree
  - [r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer
- 

**[NEP13] The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Completely disagree
  - [r2] Disagree
  - [r3] Somewhat disagree
  - [r4] Neither agree nor disagree
  - [r5] Somewhat agree
  - [r6] Agree
  - [r7] Completely Agree
  - [r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer
- 

**[NEP14] Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Completely disagree
  - [r2] Disagree
  - [r3] Somewhat disagree
  - [r4] Neither agree nor disagree
  - [r5] Somewhat agree
  - [r6] Agree
  - [r7] Completely Agree
  - [r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer
-



**[NEP15] If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.**

\$\_{res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[StrNEP] Straight Liner NEP**

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

**[Section4\_LOI] Section 4. The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

**[NDP\_CI2]**

**Row:**

[r1] gobierno departamental

[r2] gobierno estatal

[r3] governo estadual

**[NDP\_CI11]**

**Row:**

[r1] Agencia Nacional de Licencias Ambientales (ANLA)

[r2] Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT)

[r3] Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renovaveis (IBAMA)

---

Next, we are interested in your opinion about institutions in your country.

---

**[NDPC11C19] Hidden: for testing purpose only**

**Row:**

[r1] CI1

[r2] CI2

[r3] CI3

[r4] CI4

[r5] CI5

[r6] CI6

[r7] CI7

[r8] CI8

[r9] CI9

[r10] CI10

[r11] CI11

---

**[hC11C19order] Hidden in live. stores order of C11 - C19**

**Column:**

[c1] 1st shown

[c2] 2nd shown

[c3] 3rd shown

[c4] 4th shown

[c5] 5th shown

[c6] 6th shown

[c7] 7th shown

[c8] 8th shown

[c9] 9th shown

[c10] 10th shown

[c11] 11th shown

**Row:**

[r1] CI1

[r2] CI2

[r3] CI3

[r4] CI4

[r5] CI5

[r6] CI6  
[r7] CI7  
[r8] CI8  
[r9] CI9  
[r10] CI10  
[r11] CI11

---

**[CI1] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} The national government**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust  
[r2] I somewhat trust  
[r3] I neither trust nor distrust  
[r4] I somewhat distrust  
[r5] I definitely don't trust  
[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI2] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} The \${res.Govttype}**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust  
[r2] I somewhat trust  
[r3] I neither trust nor distrust  
[r4] I somewhat distrust  
[r5] I definitely don't trust  
[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI3] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} The Congress**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust  
[r2] I somewhat trust  
[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI4] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} Public employees**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI5] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} Judges**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI6] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} National businessmen**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI7] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} Foreign businessmen**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI8] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} Political parties**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI9] \${res.QText\_CII\_CT11} Police**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI10] \${res.QText\_CI1\_CT11} Banks and the financial system**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[CI11] \${res.QText\_CI1\_CT11} National and Local Environmental Agencies like \${res.CI11Agency}**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] I definitely trust

[r2] I somewhat trust

[r3] I neither trust nor distrust

[r4] I somewhat distrust

[r5] I definitely don't trust

[r8] I don't know/Prefer not to answer

---

**[StrCI] Straight Liner CI**

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

**[Section5\_LOI] Section 5. Institutional trust : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

Now, we would like to ask you a few questions about the natural resource extraction industry in your country.

---

**[KN1] What percentage of all that is produced in the country in a year (GDP) do you think that is produced by natural resources (for example mining, oil, and gas) extractive industries?**

$\{\text{res.SLR1}\}$

---

**[KN1a] How confident are you of your response?**

$\{\text{res.S}\}$

**Row:**

[r1] Not at all

[r2] A little bit

[r3] Somewhat

[r4] Very much

[r5] Completely

---

**[KN2] What percentage of tax revenues of the national government do you think that come from natural resources (for example mining, oil, and gas) extractives industries?**

$\{\text{res.SLR1}\}$

---

**[KN2a] How confident are you of your response?**

$\{\text{res.S}\}$

**Row:**

[r1] Not at all

[r2] A little bit

[r3] Somewhat

[r4] Very much

[r5] Completely

---

**[KN4] Royalties are payments made by the owner or the operator of  $\{\text{res.Indus}\}$  to compensate for natural resources that are extracted. What percentage of  $\{\text{res.Indus2}\}$  sales are  $\{\text{res.Indus2}\}$  companies obliged to give to the national government for royalties?**

$\{\text{res.SLR1}\}$

---

**[KN4a] How confident are you of your response?**

\$\_{res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Not at all
  - [r2] A little bit
  - [r3] Somewhat
  - [r4] Very much
  - [r5] Completely
- 

**[KN5] What percentage of sales are \$\_{res.Indus2} companies obliged to give to the \$\_{res.Govttype}, where the resources were extracted from, for royalties?**

\$\_{res.SLR1}

---

**[KN5a] How confident are you of your response?**

\$\_{res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Not at all
  - [r2] A little bit
  - [r3] Somewhat
  - [r4] Very much
  - [r5] Completely
- 

**[StrKN] Straight Liner KN**

**Row:**

- [r1] Yes
  - [r2] No
- 

Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge.

---

**[KN9a] To the best of your knowledge, what are the two economic activities that produce the most**



**money in your country?**

(Please select 2 options.)

**Row:**

- [r1] Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
  - [r2] Mining and quarrying
  - [r3] Manufacturing
  - [r4] Electricity, gas, and water
  - [r5] Construction
  - [r6] Wholesale and retail trade
  - [r7] Transport, storage, and communication
  - [r8] Financing, insurance, real estate, and business services
  - [r9] Community, social and personal services
  - [r10] Oil and Gas
  - [r11] Other
  - [r99] Prefer not to answer
- 

**[KN9c] Regarding total production, what are the two economic activities that produce the most money in your \${res.location}?**

(Please select 2 options.)

**Row:**

- [r1] Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
  - [r2] Mining and quarrying
  - [r3] Manufacturing
  - [r4] Electricity, gas, and water
  - [r5] Construction
  - [r6] Wholesale and retail trade
  - [r7] Transport, storage, and communication
  - [r8] Financing, insurance, real estate, and business services
  - [r9] Community, social and personal services
  - [r10] Oil and Gas
  - [r11] Other
  - [r99] Prefer not to answer
-

**[KN9d] Regarding total production, what are the two economic activities that produce the most money in your municipality?**

(Please select 2 options.)

**Row:**

- [r1] Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
  - [r2] Mining and quarrying
  - [r3] Manufacturing
  - [r4] Electricity, gas, and water
  - [r5] Construction
  - [r6] Wholesale and retail trade
  - [r7] Transport, storage, and communication
  - [r8] Financing, insurance, real estate, and business services
  - [r9] Community, social and personal services
  - [r10] Oil and Gas
  - [r11] Other
  - [r99] Prefer not to answer
- 

**[KN11] Interactive natural resource exploitation maps allow you to see the location of mines or oil wells in your country. They might also present basic information of the mine or oil field, such as the type of mineral extracted or size of the mine or field. Have you ever seen an interactive map like the one just described?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

- [r1] Yes
  - [r2] No
  - [r8] I don't know
  - [r9] Prefer not to answer
- 

**[Section6\_LOI] Section 6. Knowledge : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

Now, we will ask you some questions about the armed conflict in Colombia.

---

**[CA1] Do you consider yourself as a victim of the armed conflict in Colombia?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[CA2] Do you know any victims of the armed conflict in Colombia?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[CA3] How much do you think did the armed conflict in Colombia affect your department?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] A lot

[r2] A little

[r3] Not at all

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[Section7\_LOI] Section 7. Armed Conflict : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

**[VideoEN]**

**Row:**

[r1] VIDEO - E

[r2] VIDEO - N

---

**[VideoEN1]**

**Row:**

[r111] VIDEO-COLOMBIA1\_E

[r112] VIDEO-COLOMBIA1\_N

[r211] VIDEO-MEXICO1\_E

[r212] VIDEO-MEXICO1\_N

[r311] VIDEO-BRAZIL1\_E

[r312] VIDEO-BRAZIL1\_N

---

**[STATIC\_TEXT\_CO1] We invite you to watch this 1-minute video on your country. The play button will appear once the file has buffered.**

Click to play when you are ready.

**Row:**

[r1] Number of times the video has been played

[r2] Amount watched in seconds: start

[r3] Amount watched in seconds: end

---

**[ATN1] What was the video you just saw about?**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Mining Industry

[r2] Oil Industry

[r3] An Industry

[r4] Tourism

[r5] Food

[r9] I don't know

---

**[ATN2Industry]**

**Row:**

[r1] mining industry

[r2] an industry

[r3] oil industry

---

The previous video was about [pipe: ATN2Industry].

Click Continue to confirm that you have understood that the correct answer is [pipe: ATN2Industry].

---

**[VideoEN2]**

**Row:**

[r111] VIDEO-COLOMBIA2\_E

[r112] VIDEO-COLOMBIA2\_N

[r211] VIDEO-MEXICO2\_E

[r212] VIDEO-MEXICO2\_N

[r311] VIDEO-BRAZIL2\_E

[r312] VIDEO-BRAZIL2\_N

---

**[STATIC\_TEXT\_CO2] We invite you to continue watch the video on \${res.Indus3}. The play button will appear once the file has buffered.**

Click to play when you are ready.

**Row:**

[r1] Number of times the video has been played

[r2] Amount watched in seconds: start

[r3] Amount watched in seconds: end

---

**[Section8\_LOI] Section 8 – Attention : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

**[NAC]**

**Row:**

[r1] national

[r2] foreign

---

**[TAX1]**

**Row:**

[r1] \${res.TAX1x1}

[r2]  $\text{\$}\{\text{res.TAX1x2}\}$

---

[TAX1Label]

---

Now that you know more about this industry, let's make a hypothetical exercise. Suppose that in 2021 the [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias wants to invest in project Omega, one of the biggest projects in  $\text{\$}\{\text{res.Indus3}\}$  of the last decade. With the investment of the [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias, project Omega would:

Generate 400 direct jobs It could possibly pollute a nearby river, making its water not safe for human consumption.

Project Omega would have all the other potential benefits and negative impacts described in the videos. Please answer the following questions regarding project Omega of  $\text{\$}\{\text{res.Indus3}\}$  and the investment of [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias.

---

[WTA1] Would you be willing to accept the project if it entails a tax reduction or payment to your social security of [pipe: TAX1], each year that the project Omega is under operation?

$\text{\$}\{\text{res.pop\_WTP}\}$

$\text{\$}\{\text{res.S}\}$

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

[TAX2]

[NDPWTP] Now that you know more about this industry, let's make a hypothetical exercise. Suppose that in 2021 the [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias wants to invest in project Omega, one of the biggest projects in  $\text{\$}\{\text{res.Indus3x1 if SC2.r1 else "}\}\{\text{res.Indus3x2 if SC2.r2 else "}\}\{\text{res.Indus3x1 if SC2.r3 else "}\}$  of the last decade. With the investment of the [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias, project Omega would:

· Generate 400 direct jobs · It could possibly pollute a nearby river, making its water not safe for human consumption.

**Project Omega would have all the other potential benefits and negative impacts described in the videos. Please answer the following questions regarding project Omega of  $\text{\$}\{\text{res.Indus3x1 if SC2.r1 else "}\}\{\text{res.Indus3x2 if SC2.r2 else "}\}\{\text{res.Indus3x1 if SC2.r3 else "}\}$  and the investment of [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias.**

---

Now that you know more about this industry, let's make a hypothetical exercise. Suppose that in 2021 the [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias wants to invest in project Omega, one of the biggest projects in  $\{res.Indus3\}$  of the last decade. With the investment of the [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias, project Omega would: Generate 400 direct jobs It could possibly pollute a nearby river, making its water not safe for human consumption.

Project Omega would have all the other potential benefits and negative impacts described in the videos. Please answer the following questions regarding project Omega of  $\{res.Indus3\}$  and the investment of [pipe: NAC] firm Pecunias.

---

[WTA2] Would you be willing to accept the project if it entails a tax reduction or payment to your social security of [pipe: TAX2], each year that the project Omega is under operation?

$\{res.pop\_WTP\}$

$\{res.S\}$

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

[TAX3]

**Row:**

[r1]  $\{res.TAX3x1\}$

[r2]  $\{res.TAX3x2\}$

---

[TAX3Label]

---

[NDPWTP1] In case the project does not start operations, there would be no way to produce the 400 jobs and neither to obtain all the other potential benefits as described to you in the video. The possibility of the river being contaminated and the potential negative impacts would not exist.

**Now suppose a non-profit association is trying to stop the project from starting operations, but they lack resources to continue operating.**

---

In case the project *does not start operations*, there would be no way to produce the 400 jobs and neither to obtain all the other potential benefits as described to you in the video. The possibility of the river being contaminated and the potential negative impacts would not exist.

Now suppose a non-profit association is trying to stop the project from starting operations, but they lack resources to continue operating.

---

[WTP1] Would you be willing to give [pipe: TAX3] of your own money every year to the association so they can carry on with trying to stop the project from starting?

**#{res.pop\_WTP1}**

#{res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

**[TAX4]**

---

In case the project does not start operations, there would be no way to produce the 1000 jobs and neither to obtain all the other potential benefits as described to you in the video. The 3 conflicts would not be present either and the potential negative impacts would not occur.

Now suppose a non-profit association is trying to stop the project from starting operations, but they lack resources to continue operating.

---

[WTP2] What if you have to give [pipe:TAX4] every year to the association so they can carry on with trying to stop the project from starting?

**#{res.pop\_WTP1}**

#{res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

**[Section9\_LOI] Section 9. Willingness to Pay : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:

---

**[BP1Indus] Hidden in live.**

(Hidden in LIVE.)



**Row:**

[r1] the mining industry

[r2] the oil industry

[r3] this industry

---

**[BP1] My community would benefit from \${BP1Indus.selected.text}.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[BP2] My household would benefit from \${BP1Indus.selected.text}.**

\${res.S}

**Row:**

[r1] Completely disagree

[r2] Disagree

[r3] Somewhat disagree

[r4] Neither agree nor disagree

[r5] Somewhat agree

[r6] Agree

[r7] Completely Agree

[r8] I don't know/ Prefer not to answer

---

**[Section10\_LOI] Section 10. Perceived Benefits : LOI Timer (Minutes)**

---

---

[NDPDDG1] Hidden: for testing purpose only

**Row:**

[r1] \${res.Sec10ax2 if SC2.r2 else res.Sec10ax1 }

[r2] Mongabay: An NGO that raises awareness about social and environmental issues related to forests and ecosystems through news, analysis and reports (<https://mongabay.org>)

[r3] Liga contra el Cancer: An NGO that helps cancer patients who lack the financial means to cover the costs of their treatment (<https://ligacontraelcancer.org/es/>)

[r4] WaterAid: An NGO that works to increase access to clean water and reliable (<https://www.wateraid.org/us/LAC>)

---

[DDG1order] Hidden: for testing purpose only

**Column:**

[c1] 1st shown

[c2] 2nd shown

[c3] 3rd shown

[c4] 4th shown

**Row:**

[r1] \${res.Sec10ax2 if SC2.r2 else res.Sec10ax1 }

[r2] Mongabay: An NGO that raises awareness about social and environmental issues related to forests and ecosystems through news, analysis and reports (<https://mongabay.org>)

[r3] Liga contra el Cancer: An NGO that helps cancer patients who lack the financial means to cover the costs of their treatment (<https://ligacontraelcancer.org/es/>)

[r4] WaterAid: An NGO that works to increase access to clean water and reliable (<https://www.wateraid.org/us/LAC>)

---

In this activity, you will decide how to distribute a 500 USD donation between four organizations.

We will donate the 500USD according to **the distribution provided by the lottery winner in the following table**. All survey participants in your country will conduct this activity. *Your chances of winning the lottery are proportional to the points you accumulated so far*. Your decision on how to distribute the 500 USD donation **does not affect your chances** of winning the lottery.

To assign the 500USD, look at all the organizations in the table.

First, select your preferred organization and allocate as many of the 500USD as you wish to allocate to that organization.

Second, select (if there is) the organization that you prefer in the second place and allocate as many of the

remaining 500USD as you wish to allocate to that organization.

You may also allocate dollars to the other organizations according to your preferences. If you win the lottery, these organizations will receive as many dollars as you stated in the following table.

`\${ASK\_PIPE()}`

---

[DDG1] How would you distribute the 500USD among the four organizations?

**`\${res.pop\_NGO}`**

`\${res.NL}`

**Column:**

[c1]

**Row:**

[r1] `\${res.DDG1\_row1}`

[r2] Mongabay

[r3] Liga contra el Cancer

[r4] WaterAid

---

**[NDPINT11] Hidden in live.**

(Hidden in LIVE.)

**Row:**

[r1] Colombia

[r2] Mexico

[r3] Brasil

---

**[INT11] Your responses are highly valued by this project. Would you be interested in learning more about interactive `\${res.Indus2}` maps of [pipe: NDPINT11]?**

`\${res.S}`

**Row:**

[r1] Yes

[r2] No

---

**[NDPVAL1] Hidden in live.**

---

**[hSentence]**

**Row:**

[r1] You have accumulated a total of \${NDPVAL1.val} tickets in this survey.

[r2] You have accumulated between \${NDPVAL1.val} tickets in this survey.

---

Thank you very much for your participation. \${hSentence.selected.text} The more tickets you have, the greater your chances of winning the lottery and that your decisions regarding the donations to the NGOs are implemented.

---