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A Survey Experiment on Signaling

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Abstract

Transparency initiatives are well-known tools introduced to foster trust and empower citizens. To explain why some governments introduce them but others do not, in a theoretical model we interpret these initiatives as a signal that complements the information already provided by visible government performance. To analyze how citizens react to these initiatives, we conducted a randomized survey experiment in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the incumbent mayor made a set of post-electoral promises. Our results show that post-electoral promises matter in shaping citizens' perceptions about the trustworthiness of the government. We find strong heterogeneity among three groups of citizens. A group unfamiliar with the policy was impervious to treatment: they seem to react to deeds, not words, and have low trust on average. The treatment effects are entirely through those vaguely familiar with the promises, closing the average gap in trust with those familiar with the promises. More generally, our study suggests that transparency initiatives may be an effective signal in a setting with some initial trust. Still their informational value may be more limited than visible public performance.

Keywords: Rent-seeking, Trust, Post-electoral Promises, Signaling, Political Economy, Development, Survey Experiment.

JEL codes: D72, D78, D82, D83, H41

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1 Introduction

Trust can facilitate economic growth.[1] Defined as the belief that others will not act opportunistically given a chance, trust is more prevalent when there are no information and power asymmetries (Keefer and Scartascini, 2022). Reforms aimed at fostering trust must both inform and empower. For examples, improved communication and information strategies about policy outcomes can boost trust (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Alessandro et al., 2021; Butler et al., 2021). Voter's access to information allows citizens to hold government accountable (Khemani et al., 2016) and empowers citizens by bolstering their power to reward or censure elected officials for their performance in office (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Kendall et al., 2015). Rent-seeking and corruption become costlier the easier they are to detect.

This paper contributes to the literature on transparency and trust theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, little is known about the conditions under which policymakers have the incentive to introduce transparency initiatives. We conceptualize transparency initiatives as a signal of the trustworthiness of incumbent governments, because trustworthy types have no problem opening up to show what they are doing. Since trustworthiness is a valence issue, incumbents who are seen as more trustworthy will have an advantage over challengers (see Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000). We formalize the transparency initiatives, such as the post-electoral promises, as a signal that has differential costs for benevolent and non-benevolent governments. Post-electoral promises allow honesty to have a bite, insofar as this signal is costlier if a government must cover up what is actually doing. Moreover, these initiatives can make it less costly for benevolent governments to signal their type than through the allocation of visible public goods (that may require investing too little in the non-visible). The good news is that according to the analytical framework, a benevolent government will always be willing to launch the reform. The choice of non-benevolent ones will depend on the cover-up costs of acting dishonestly.

Empirically, while there are examples of successful transparency initiatives (Alessandro et al., 2021; Ardanaz et al., 2023), evidence of the particular conditions under which transparency

[1] Mistrust, both political and interpersonal, hinders investment and innovation, increases transaction costs and reduces hiring, which contribute to lower economic growth (Keefer and Scartascini, 2022). Mistrust also shapes public policy preferences for public spending. Citizens who lack trust prefer politicians who prioritize transfers over public goods and who promise immediate and certain benefits, even if they do not yield long-term growth (Yamamura, 2014; Anderson, 2017; Keefer et al., 2018; Cai et al., 2020; Keefer et al., 2022).

fosters trust is scant, especially in the context of developing countries and young democracies (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013; Evans et al., 2019). The empirical analysis is based on a survey experiment carried out in an actual policy setting in the City of Buenos Aires (henceforth CABA, for its acronym in Spanish), Argentina, a developing country, in which we provided information about the government's post-electoral promises and performance.[2] Participants were randomly assigned to one of three different informational treatments and a control group. Treatment 1 (T^1) provides information about a series of pledges made by the Mayor of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the government period. Treatments 2 (T^2) and 3 (T^3) supplement the general information provided in Treatment 1 by providing information about compliance with the pledges at the aggregate (city), or local level (commune).

The treated and control individuals were asked about their perceptions regarding the city government's degree of trustworthiness using a multidimensional approach that includes the components of trust listed by Grimmelikhuijsen (2012): competence, benevolence and honesty, and questions regarding trust in government members (Keefer et al., 2018, 2022).[3]

Our framework leads to expect a two-way relationship between trust and transparency. With Bayesian updating, the treatment's impact on posteriors, i.e., final trust, will depend on priors, i.e., initial trust. Since most people from the control group consider the government quite trustworthy, we expect that treatments will have positive and significant effects on trust ($T^1 > 0$, $T^2 > 0$, $T^3 > 0$), and that informing about the compliance with the commitments should have a more substantial effect than informing only about the existence of the commitments ($T^2 \geq T^1$, $T^3 \geq T^1$). Results show that disclosing information (T^1) indeed increases trust in government by about 0.1 standard deviations (SD). Effects tend to be relatively uniform across the different components of our main index. The coefficients for T^2 and T^3 are positive and statistically significant, and they tend to be larger than those of T^1 but are not statistically different from it.

Average effects may present an incomplete account of how treatments interact with beliefs.

[2] At the beginning of his tenure, the Mayor made 50 commitments. These commitments were clear and measurable promises that were tracked regularly and the state of advance was publicly available in a dedicated website.

[3] Since dependent variables are measured shortly after the treatment, we acknowledge that there is potential for interviewer demand effect. However, results are not uniform across the three treatments and dependent variables, as will be shown in the results and discussion sections, which provides reassurance that respondents did not simply rate the government more favorably after getting the treatment due to a bias, but in response to the information provided in the vignettes.

Aligned with the analytical framework, we expect the most substantial effect of the transparency initiative to be on those with intermediate trust priors, because in a Bayesian framework those who do not trust the government at all should be unaffected by the treatments, and those with the highest trust face a ceiling effect. We examine this prediction in the data in two ways. First, looking at how trust changes along the full spectrum of priors. Second, looking at the effect of treatments conditional on the perceived quality of government, a variable that is closely related to initial trust. People with intermediate priors are indeed more responsive to information about the commitments and their fulfillment than those at the extremes.

Additionally, the analytical framework predicts that the effect of the signal is conditional on an individual's starting knowledge of city government plans and actions. Since the information set of the group already aware of the government's pledges does not change with the treatment, information should only affect individuals not familiar with them. While the data confirm our framework's prediction that those who were already aware of the post-electoral promises would be unaffected by the treatment, it did not predict the existence of two very distinct subgroups among people not wholly familiar with the government's plans. A subgroup vaguely familiar with the post-electoral promises, i.e., those that had heard about it, reacted strongly to the treatment assignment. A second subgroup, completely unaware of the promises, showed no response at all to the informational treatment. A possible interpretation of this second subgroup response is that these individuals acquire knowledge through direct observation rather than third-party information (Hertz et al., 2021). While we cannot prove causality in our setting, there is suggestive evidence that this group of people does not rely on others (family, social, or traditional media) nor on the government to acquire information about the government's performance.

This empirical finding feeds back into our signaling model. The model can accommodate these dynamics by differentiating among individuals according to their learning modes. This feature of the data implies that transparency initiatives are a signal that is less effective than visible government performance, because a subgroup of the population ignores them. However, in our sample the median respondent seemed affected by the initiative, so it may still be very effective in terms of the median voter.

Finally, the treatment effects on people who had only heard of the program, but were not well familiarized with it, are of the same magnitude as the initial gap in trust between people

aware of the commitments and people who had only heard of them. It suggests that the impact of the vignettes is not only short-term: the effects are between 0.14 and 0.19 SD. Hence, unlike Marvel (2016), the effects of the treatment (here, post-electoral promises) seem to be long-lasting, perhaps because they are backed by government performance that is seen as good by most respondents.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a framework to analyze the interconnection between information and trust that informs the analytical framework and the empirical strategy. Section 3 introduces a model to formally examine the role of transparency reforms when voters face incomplete information. In Section 4 we describe the survey experiment that explores the effect of a transparency initiative on political trust. Section 5 describes the data, empirical strategy, and results, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Information and Trust

Information sometimes matters for trust, sometimes not. Why? We explore three reasons: the content of the informational treatments, initial trust priors, and the respondents' familiarity with the transparency initiative.

A first reason for the impact of transparency initiatives to differ is the informational content of the vignettes. This paper finds that treatments providing information that the government fulfilled its promises (T^2 and T^3) increase trust. If there is nothing good to show, more transparency could instead hurt the incumbent. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that transparency might not affect governmental perceptions and, in some cases, it can even have detrimental effects (Piotrowski et al., 2019). Alessandro et al. (2021), for instance, show that people who received a treatment indicating that the government was over-performing on its promises had higher trust in the government than those who received a treatment showing that the government was under-performing. The content of the information is important in a more fundamental sense: what the government says might be accurate or not. In other words, transparency initiatives complement other information voters have on government performance, like the state of the economy (Sances, 2021). Since respondents in our experiment live in the city, they can rely on their own experience to see whether the government actually keeps its promises. This might help explain why T^1, which only provides information on post-electoral promises, also

has significantly positive effects on trust

Second, there is a circular relationship between transparency initiatives and trust in government, because initial trust affects how people process this verbal information. Our experiment allows us to control for the endogeneity of trust by discriminating between initial trust (the priors) and final trust (the posteriors). We expect our experiment to affect trust because we are looking at a relatively high-trust environment.[4]

However, even in this environment one would not expect either the low or high-trust groups to react strongly to new information. New information might be disregarded in the first group due to no initial trust, and a ceiling restriction limits the effect in the second group. Instead, one would expect individuals with intermediate priors to react most strongly to the experiment. We explore below the implications of heterogeneous priors.

Third, respondents vary greatly in their familiarity with the post-electoral promises. The respondents can be classified into three groups: "Familiar," "Somewhat familiar," and "Unfamiliar."[5] We do not expect the group "Familiar" to react to the the treatments because that information is already in their information set. That is indeed what we find. Surprisingly, the treatment only leads the group "Somewhat familiar" to update their priors, and close the gap in trust with the group "Familiar". On the other hand, the group "Unfamiliar", which could potentially learn the most, does not react to any treatment.

We now turn to the implications for the learning process. First, we incorporate transparency initiatives as an additional signal. In the model, the incumbent has two signals: visible public goods, a signal with which respondents are already familiar with, and a transparency initiative that can increase information on the provision of less visible public goods. Both signals are analyzed jointly.

Second, since there is huge heterogeneity among respondents, the common prior assumption does not hold. Heterogeneous priors imply that new information will not be evaluated the same way by all. An extreme case is individuals that believe they are facing an utterly untrustworthy government that provides fake news: increasing access to information will not reduce

[4]Trust requires honesty, as well as competence and benevolence. To understand the psychological nature and mechanisms of trust, Hamm et al. (2019), following the organizational model of trust developed by Schoorman et al. (2007), identify the integrity, ability, and benevolence of governments as mediators of information on final trust perceptions update.

[5]The familiarity level is determined by the answer to the question "Are you familiar with the Buenos Aires Elige program?" Individuals could respond "I am familiar with it,", "I have heard of it" (that we treat as somewhat familiar,) or "I am unfamiliar with it."

citizens' mistrust because the impact of good news will be nil. As trust in government grows, greater weight is placed on the probability that the signal is from a trustworthy government, so information can positively impact trust posteriors until a ceiling is hit.

Once we allow subjective beliefs to differ among individuals, this opens the door to politically-motivated reasoning, an issue extensively discussed in the literature. In a political context, heterogeneous priors can reflect partisan and ideological differences.[6] Citizens may use affective mechanisms to interpret newly acquired information, analyzing the facts through the lens of their party affiliation or their affection toward certain ideology (Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010).[7] In this regard, Gerber and Green (1999) distinguish between evaluations, which reflect preferences, and beliefs, which refer to objective facts. Gerber and Green (1999) try to explain the differential presidential approval ratings among Democrats, Republicans and Independents as mainly reflecting differences in evaluations, due to differences in presidential policy orientations. However, politically-motivated reasoning rather than unbiased learning is required to explain differences in how beliefs react to the same facts: Bartels (2002) shows that, in comparison to independent voters, partisans over-react to favorable information and under-react to unfavorable information, identifying a partisan bias in presidential approval ratings. Focusing on how to isolate politically-motivated reasoning, Thaler (2022) discovers that this happens with new information because voters tend to trust more information that they find more to their liking. Consequently, motivated reasoning not only has an effect on learning but also on priors: due to the biased updating of information in the past, pro-government individuals will have higher trust priors than independent voters, while anti-government individuals will have lower priors. In our study, initial perceptions of government trustworthiness can capture the effect of politically-motivated reasoning.[8] Heterogeneous priors allow distinguishing how the reactions to the informational treatments vary among individuals.

Third, some people seem to mainly learn from their own experience and observation, not from

[6] Our survey experiment lacks information on respondents' partisanship and ideological preferences, so it is not possible to determine how they affect the initial level of trust in government.

[7] When citizens are presented with information on government performance, motivational processes involving consistency with previous attitudes and salient identities with those in power may induce differing belief updating heuristics in the various segments of the initial trust distribution (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Hamm et al., 2019). Part of the disparities in priors can be due to informational gaps (Molina, 2014; Banerjee, 2006).

[8] The signaling model incorporates these heterogeneous priors in the learning process. We do not incorporate the potential under-reaction of respondents with low trust (which presumably includes more opposition voters), and over-reaction of respondents with high trust (which presumably includes more government supporters), to good news, because in our data what is salient is something else: different learning styles.

verbal information and the experience of others. This unexpected finding leads us to distinguish two types of information updating. Regarding the learning style in the group "Unfamiliar," our conjecture is that this group might not care about what the government says, trusting deeds rather than words, only responding to direct evidence they collect themselves.

We incorporate this into the signaling model to explore how transparency can complement performance in enhancing trust in government. Since the group "Unfamiliar" is not responsive to the transparency initiative, transparency initiatives may be less effective as a signal than the provision of visible public goods; at the same time, if the signal reaches the median voter, that may be good enough for the incumbent. We incorporate these insights into our theoretical and empirical model.

3 Transparency, signaling, and electoral competition

The literature on rational retrospective voting that starts with Rogoff and Sibert (1988) shows that information on government performance matters.[9] Why may transparency initiatives matter too? Our explanation is that they may act as an additional signal about government type. The transparency initiative we study provides additional information on plans, i.e., the post-electoral promises made by the Mayor of Buenos Aires that are referred to as "commitments," as well as on performance.[10]

We set up a work-horse model to analyze how the information provided by transparency initiatives can affect trust in government. To capture why governments may be interested in showing that they are trustworthy, we use a two-period model in which a good reputation increases the chances of reelection. We develop a setting where benevolence, competence, and honesty go together naturally: a benevolent government does not divert resources to its own pockets, so it can provide more public goods with a given budget, being perceived as more competent; since it has nothing to hide, it can also be open and honest about what it does.[11] If a better reputation improves reelection chances, non-benevolent incumbents are tempted to

[9] Ashworth (2012) summarizes theoretical and empirical literature to support this fact.

[10] These promises, which the city government calls *compromisos* (i.e., commitments), are available at `http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/compromisos`. For example, the Mayor of CABA said in a public statement after he was elected: "We are committed to ensuring that, during this term of office, 20,000 families will be able to fulfill their dream of owning their home". Another example was the building of eight educational centers, mainly located in vulnerable neighborhoods of the city.

[11] This reflects the feature that the responses about trustworthiness and its three dimensions (benevolence, honesty, and competence) are driven in the sample by a single factor according to parallel and factor analyses.

send the same signal as benevolent governments in the first period.

The transparency reform positively impacts respondents in the treatment group, who trust the government more and see it as more benevolent, honest, and competent.[12] We model post-electoral promises as a costly signal that can potentially reveal information about government goals and performance when some dishonest government types are deterred from sending it due to cover-up costs.[13]

3.1 Voters and Government

Public goods can be more or less visible. Visible public goods g_v, which go from varieties 0 to υ, are immediately observed by the voter. Non-visible public goods g_{nv}, which go from υ to 1, are observed later. The utility is the same for each variety, so governments will want to provide the same quantity within each group:

$$u(g_{vt}, g_{nvt}) = \upsilon u(g_{vt}) + (1 - \upsilon)u(g_{nvt}).$$

The per-period utility u is concave in the consumption of public goods. We further assume that utility is logarithmic in consumption, $u(.) = \ln(.)$, leading to an explicit analytical solution.

Each individual voter i is subject to a political shock σ_i that has an idiosyncratic component identically distributed over time. It represents the relative preferences for the opposition party in relation to the incumbent party.

$$u_{it} = u(g_{vt}, g_{nvt}) + \sigma_{it}.$$

We know from the data that perceptions of trustworthiness and its components are heterogeneous. This additive shock in the model can capture politically-motivated reasoning: if party preferences lead to different perceptions of the provision of visible public goods, they will also lead to different perceptions of benevolence and trustworthiness. We assume the shock is uniformly distributed around zero, so the median voter $i = m$ is not affected by the idiosyncratic shock.[14] A voter's expected utility is given by the discounted sum $\mathbb{E}_t[U_{it}] = \mathbb{E}_t[\sum_{t=1}^{2} \delta^{t-1} u_{it}]$.

[12] Effects vary systematically according to prior familiarity with the initiative, something we turn to below.

[13] Since post-electoral promises involve an administrative reform that can improve the monitoring of the public administration, this might enhance the provision of public goods. We abstract from this issue in what follows.

[14] This makes voting deterministic, because candidates have complete information about the median voter that is decisive in choosing between the incumbent and the challenger. If there were also a common component in the

Incumbents have the same preferences as voters, as in the citizen-candidate models (Besley and Coate, 1997). They differ in benevolence, which is captured by whether the per-period utility u of the incumbent is only determined by what is best for voters, or it also depends on an additional term r of personal rents:

$$u_{jt} = u(g_{vt}, g_{nvt}) + \alpha_j r_t,$$

where a benevolent government, $j = b$, has $\alpha_b = 0$, while a non-benevolent government, $j = nb$, has $\alpha_{nb} = \alpha > \underline{\alpha}$, where $\underline{\alpha} > 0$ is the threshold level beyond which personal rents are positive, as shown below. The expected utility of the incumbent is given by $\mathbb{E}_t[U_{jt}] = \mathbb{E}_t[\sum_{t=1}^{2} \delta^{t-1} u_{jt}]$.

Public expenditure determines the provision of public goods:

$$g_{st} = \gamma_{st} \quad \text{for} \quad s = v, nv.$$

The transparency initiative can provide information on government plans and performance regarding all varieties $\omega \in [0, 1]$. We adopt a simple specification by which transparency initiatives are limited to the interval $\omega \in [0, \nu + \lambda]$: revealing information is not costly until variety $\nu + \lambda$, but beyond that there is a prohibitively high information cost. Our motivation is that some things are easier to communicate than others, e.g., certain maintenance costs are hard to report, certain expenses may be hard to explain (for instance, the city government has been criticized for stockpiling vaccines that later expired).

We assume that the transparency reform imposes no costs if incumbents act honestly, $l = h$. On the other hand, if they act dishonestly, $l = nh$, while a proportion $q_{nh,low}$ face no costs, a proportion $q_{nh,high} = 1 - q_{nh,low}$ face a cover-up cost of $K + \kappa(\lambda - \nu)$, because a more transparent public administration system makes it harder to hide the diversion of resources for personal rents from the less visible varieties. This turns the transparency reform into costly talk for dishonest types with high cover-up costs.

By the per-period budget constraint in per-capita terms, government expenditures γ_s, for $s = v, nv$, plus rents r appropriated by the incumbent, net of fixed and variable cover-up costs,

political shock, it would make voting probabilistic.

equal tax revenues τ:

$$\nu\gamma_{vt} + (1-\nu)\gamma_{nvt} + r_t - (K_l + \kappa_l(\omega - \nu)) = \tau \qquad \text{for} \qquad l = h; nh, low; nh, high.$$

3.2 Visible Public Goods

The basic signal to voters is the provision of visible public goods. This setup characterizes the control group not exposed to the post-electoral promises.

Incumbents differ in the degree of benevolence. The priors are that there is a proportion β of benevolent incumbents and a proportion $1-\beta$ of non-benevolent ones. In the second period, there are no reputational concerns, so each type picks its preferred level of public goods provision. Benevolent types pick $\left(\gamma^b_{vt+1}, \gamma^b_{nvt+1}\right) = (\tau, \tau)$, since they do not appropriate any personal rents. With log utility, non-benevolent types pick instead $\left(\gamma^{nb}_{vt+1}, \gamma^{nb}_{nvt+1}\right) = \left(\frac{1}{\alpha}, \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)$, given that α is the constant marginal utility of private rents for non-benevolent incumbents, and, for $s = v, nv$, the level of public goods that provides that marginal utility is $\frac{1}{\alpha} = u^{-1}_{g_{st+1}}(\alpha)$.[15]

In the first period, voters will want to reelect a benevolent incumbent and replace a non-benevolent one; this introduces reputational concerns in the model since a good reputation is important to get reelected. Though a benevolent government, which shares the objectives of voters, has no problem in announcing what it actually plans to do, because it has nothing to hide, a non-benevolent government must be willing to lie if it deviates resources from the public treasure to its own pockets. Hence, announcements are cheap talk, so only the provision of visible public goods counts.

The equilibrium can be either pooling or separating. In a pooling equilibrium, the non-benevolent type mimics the provision of visible public goods by the benevolent type, and rents are extracted from the under-provision of non-visible public goods, as discussed in the Appendix. The median voter will be indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger because expected utility in the second period is the same with either candidate: there will be a proportion β of benevolent incumbents and a proportion $1-\beta$ of non-benevolent ones. Hence, the probability of reelection $P(\gamma^b_{vt}) \in [0, 1]$. Let $P(\gamma^b_{vt}) = \frac{1}{2}$ when the median voter is indifferent. Besides the equilibrium where the pooling signal is $\gamma_{vt} = \tau$, there might also be an equilibrium with a

[15] Above the threshold $\underline{\alpha}$, the higher α is, the lower the provision of public goods. With log utility, the threshold is determined by $\underline{\alpha} = \frac{1}{\tau}$; at or below that threshold, rents are null.

separating signal $\gamma_{vt} > \tau$ in which the benevolent incumbent provides an extraordinary amount of visible public goods.[16] For a benevolent government, the drawback of a separating signal is that it has a welfare cost, because it distorts the optimal provision of public goods.[17] This is where transparency initiatives, and post-electoral promises, come in: they may be a less costly way for benevolent governments to signal their type.

3.3 Post-electoral Promises

Rather than increasing the provision of visible public goods, what happens if the government can launch a transparency initiative to reveal part of its plans and their future fulfillment? This characterizes the scenario faced by individuals assigned to the treatment group in our experimental design. We formalize these post-electoral promises as a signal that has differential costs for benevolent and non-benevolent governments. Post-electoral promises allow honesty to have a bite, insofar as this signal is costlier if a government must cover up what it is actually doing. Honest governments face no costs in this regard, since they do not have to cover up anything. Hence, they will not have problems launching a transparency initiative. Non-benevolent governments do face the cost of being dishonest, so these announcements are not cheap talk: cover-up costs negatively affect their rents. This reform thus works as a potential signal of trustworthiness.

In the second period, there are no reputational concerns, so each type picks its preferred level of public goods provision. As before, benevolent types pick $\left(\gamma^b_{vt+1}, \gamma^b_{nvt+1}\right) = (\tau, \tau)$, since they do not appropriate any personal rents, while non-benevolent types pick $\left(\gamma^{nb}_{vt+1}, \gamma^{nb}_{nvt+1}\right) = \left(\frac{1}{\alpha}, \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)$. A benevolent type assigns the full budget in the first period to the provision of public goods, $\left(\gamma^b_{vt+1}, \gamma^b_{nvt+1}\right) = (\tau, \tau)$. A benevolent incumbent will always be willing to launch the reform, because the reform has no current costs but future benefits, raising its reputation of trustworthiness (in the model, it brings a higher probability of reelection). While benevolent types will always want to implement the reform, the Appendix shows that the choice of non-benevolent types depends on their cover-up costs if they act dishonestly. There will be a semi-separating equilibrium if non-benevolent incumbents that face cover-up costs do not want to implement the reform. This semi-separating equilibrium will be characterized by either a

[16] A separating equilibrium may not exist if future reputation is sufficiently important.

[17] It's pretty common across the world the allocation of public monies to new construction (visible) but much less to maintenance works (non-visible).

transparency reform and a high provision of visible public goods γ_{vt}^{b}, or no transparency reform and a low provision of visible public goods γ_{vt}^{nb}.

These results show that post-electoral promises are introduced in equilibrium if they increase trust, which we test in the empirical section. The model also provides insights into the importance of priors as the basis of the heterogeneous analysis we conduct later.

4 Survey Experiment

We study an actual transparency initiative in Buenos Aires City to assess the value of information about post-electoral promises on political trust.[18] The city has been steadily increasing transparency over the last two decades (Alessandro et al., 2021).[19] Complementing the city's ongoing efforts, the mayor of Buenos Aires, made a series of promises to residents upon taking office as part of his transparency promotion strategy. These promises are specific and quantifiable objectives that span government sectors and are based on citizens' interests and the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (UN). Over 50 goals are outlined and progress toward their compliance is reported on the local government's website.

We designed an online questionnaire to elicit information about trust in the government. It includes questions that attempt to capture individuals' perceptions about the competence, benevolence, and honesty of the government, and their confidence in politicians and public servants, following Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) and Keefer et al. (2018, 2020) – questions are available in Supplementary Material (SM) C.[20] A total of 2,375 complete interviews were carried out in December 2019 by a company that specializes in collecting online survey data.[21] The sample was stratified with quotas by gender, age group (18 to 60 years old), and socioeconomic status. Within strata, individuals were assigned at random to one of four possible treatment categories: three informational vignettes and a control group. Treated individuals answered the battery of questions on trust in the government after receiving the informational pieces. Figure A1 presents a description of the timeline of the survey experiment.

We use a simple design, as recommended by Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016), to

[18] The City of Buenos Aires, Argentina's capital and most populous city, is subdivided in fifteen *comunas* that work as territorial, administrative and political entities, and include 48 neighborhoods (SM, Figure C4).

[19] All the city government initiatives for increasing transparency are listed here: https://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/ministerio-de-gobierno/transparencia.

[20] See Alessandro et al. (2021) for additional details. The full questionnaire in Spanish is available upon request.

[21] For details about the company, visit http://www.isonomia.com.ar/en/.

evaluate the importance of information regarding promises and their impact on trust. Each treatment presents information about the promises made by the government. Treatment 1 mentions the mayoral promises' existence, their relevance, and gives four examples at the city level, without any details on level of compliance (see Figure C1). Treatment 2 provides the same information as Treatment 1 and shows the government's performance fulfilling the promises (see Figure C2). Treatment 3 provides the same general information about the promises, but it presents a map with dots for all the achievements at the *comuna* level, highlighting three specific examples of promises fulfilled at such level. It is important to note that individuals in Treatment 3 received an infographic designed for the specific *comuna* they report living in (see Figure C3).[22] Unfortunately, by the nature of the implementation of the experiment, there are differences between Treatments 2 and 3 beyond the fact that the first provides examples of fulfillment at the city level and the latter at the *comuna* the respondent lives in level. On the one hand, the number of promises displayed is four in Treatment 2 and three in Treatment 3. On the other, the type of promises is also different and does not necessarily align with the policy area disclosed in Treatment 2 (infrastructure investments, mainly).

5 Data and Empirical Analysis

5.1 Data Description

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main observable characteristics of the respondents and balance on covariates measured before presenting the experimental vignette to participants. The first column shows the sample average and the standard deviation for the control group. The average respondent is female (57%), completed secondary education (nearly 85% of surveyed individuals have completed high school), and is employed (52%).[23] Despite the existence of a dedicated website and the public announcement of post-electoral promises, only 22% of the sample were familiar with them before the intervention took place, while another 42% found them vaguely familiar (see Figure A6).

The groups are well balanced; only 4 out of 45 differences are statistically significant at

[22]Individuals were asked in the characterization module about the *comuna* they live in; then, the survey program selected the infographic that matched it.

[23]The sample is not necessarily representative of the overall population of the city. In particular, it is slightly more educated, older (average age in city is about 40 years), and has a higher share of women than the city's population –which is about 53% according to the 2010 census data.

the 10% level, consistent with chance. Based on the balance on observable characteristics, we consider the randomization successful.[24] Additionally, p-values of tests of equality of coefficients identify no systematic differences in sample composition across treatment groups. There are minor disparities between people assigned to the first and second treatment groups regarding gender and educational attainment, with more women in the first treatment arm and more educated individuals in the second.

Dependent variables are classified into two encompassing groups: (1) Trust in the Government and (2) Trust in Actions made by politicians and public servants.[25] For the first set of questions that evaluate trust in the government, we work with the individual responses to a series of eleven questions that inquired the participant to show her position on different statements about the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree*. Those questions attempt to identify how the respondent feels about the competence (is capable? does what is best for the city? is innovative? thinks in the long term? plans and informs its plans?), benevolence (acts in the interests of residents? helps those in need? pursues policies my family cares about?), and honesty (is sincere? is transparent? fulfills its promises?) of the city government.

To reduce the dimensionality of the information provided by the eleven questions, we construct summary indexes.[26] We also have the perception of trustworthiness, which we do not include in the estimation of the indexes but rather use as a direct measure of trust. To construct the indexes, we exploit a principal component analysis methodology (PCA henceforth) in which the first component explains at least 80 percent of the variance regardless of the index (see Table A2 in the SM).[27] We build three sub-indexes (Competence, Benevolence, and Honesty) and one global index that summarizes all questions on perceptions.[28]

[24] We estimate an OLS regression with clustered errors at the *comuna* level to assess balance across treatment assignment. In this specification, observable characteristics act as dependent variables and treatment variables as independent. To assess balance, we also conducted randomization inference procedures over the difference in means between treated and control units. Adjusted p-values from a thousand Montecarlo simulations of the OLS regressions provide similar conclusions.

[25] Descriptive statistics on dependent variables are shown in Table A1 in the Supplementary Material.

[26] The aggregation improves statistical power to detect consistent effects across specific outcomes when these specific outcomes also have idiosyncratic variation.

[27] We also applied a factor analysis methodology and consistently found that the first factor explains a significant proportion of the variation. Furthermore, in a parallel analysis, we see that we should stay with a single factor under a decision rule of thumb of one. However, we report results for indices constructed for each dimension of trust, namely, competence, benevolence, and honesty, for interpretation purposes.

[28] Robustness exercises include running the regressions with the individual questions. Conclusions on statistical inference remain the same when we correct p-values using the Westfall and Young procedure (Jones et al., 2019).

Citizens have relatively high trust in the city government to begin with. Figure 1 provides a first glimpse at the perceptions of the respondents. It looks at the control group's responses on each aspect of government competence, benevolence and honesty. In general, there is a positive assessment of the government. Respondents consider the government to be capable and innovative, among the top attributes. However, they grade the government lower regarding how much it helps those in need and pursue programs that benefit families. The remaining dependent variables will be explored in the discussion section.

5.2 Empirical Strategy

We first estimate the following model to understand the effect of providing information about government promises and their fulfillment on government trust:

$$Y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i^1 + \beta_2 T_i^2 + \beta_3 T_i^3 + \lambda X_{ic} + \epsilon_c, \tag{1}$$

where T^n is the treatment assignment, $n = 1, 2, 3$, depending on the treatment individual i from *comuna* c was exposed to. The treatment arms are as follows: (1) Promises at the city level, (2) Promises and their fulfillment at the city level, and (3) Promises and their fulfillment at the *comuna* level. A respondent was exposed to one treatment arm only, and individuals in each treatment arm were compared against those who did not receive any information. X_{ic} is a vector of controls that includes all observable characteristics available from the survey: age, gender, education (completed high school or college), labor status (employed or unemployed), socioeconomic level (ABC1 describes the group with the highest income), revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure, and pre-treatment beliefs on government quality. We also include *comuna* fixed effects for political divisions within the city.

Sixty percent of respondents in the control group consider that the government is transparent. Since most respondents consider that the government is truthful, our expectation is that providing information about post-electoral promises and their fulfillment matters. Since trust depends on the expectations that other people will act in good faith and comply with what they promise, providing information about what the government is doing and its compliance should increase trust: $\beta_n > 0$, $n = 1, 2, 3$. City residents can of course compare the information received with their personal experience. Thus, promising, if the government is not expected to comply

with those promises, is not good policy in equilibrium; as such, promises by themselves already carry a load of information (Alessandro et al., 2021).[29] Still, because individuals may feel more comfortable in updating their perceptions if they are also shown information on fulfillment, we expect $\beta_2 \geq \beta_1$.

Targeted information could have added value for the recipient ("the government is not only doing what they promise but they are doing it in my *comuna*").[30] Although showing information on the achievement of the goals at a more local level could be more informative than presenting the promises alone, we do not have a strong prior on the differentiated effect of T^3 compared to T^1. First, T^3 shows fewer promises than those presented in T^1 due to logistical issues in the implementation phase. Second, T^3 does not consistently present promises in policy areas comparable to those shown in treatments 1 and 2. While promises in T^1 and T^2 mainly concentrate on urban mobility and infrastructure issues, the ones presented in T^3 include health and education, in addition to infrastructure projects. And third, some of the displayed vignettes in T^3 contain information that may not be informative for all citizens from those *comunas*. Imagine the case of information about a public school extended schedule; this exclusively affects those individuals with school-aged children who could be potential beneficiaries of such improvement. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that $\beta_3 \geq \beta_1$. We do not have strong priors regarding the relationship between β_3 and β_2.[31]

5.3 Baseline Estimates

We start by evaluating the effect of the different vignettes on indices that approximate the trust components we attempt to explain: a general composite index of trust in government and three sub-indexes that capture its perceived competence, benevolence, and honesty. We then estimate

[29] This project is carried out with political will and in conjunction with the City of Buenos Aires' local government. The government is aware that making promises and reminding citizens of them has a meaningful information load.

[30] There is evidence that individuals update their priors more when the information they receive refers to closer or more homogeneous group. See, for example, Miranda et al. (2020) for the case of water consumption. Still, that evidence may not travel well because the information is not about individuals in the *comuna* but government action that affected the *comuna*.

[31] Table A9 shows the results by *comuna*, considering the third treatment arm nature. There is no regular pattern in the relationship between treatments 2 and 3. As expected, the influence of tailored information on individuals' beliefs about the government is systematically stronger than generic information about the promises. However, we do not observe statistically significant changes in treatment allocations (except for *comunas* 5 and 14). Because mixed results within communes could be explained by the fact that families living in different communes may have characteristics that cause them to respond differently to treatment, we offer in Table A10 a selection analysis that evaluates whether socio-demographic traits and ex-ante perceptions of the government are more widespread in particular communes than others.

the effect on a direct measure of trustworthiness.

Average Effects

Figure 2 presents a graphical first approximation to the overall results of the intervention. Differences between the control and treated groups (pooled) are of about 0.10 standard deviations (SD) for the composite index and its sub-indices (referred herein as dimensions). Table 2 presents the compound index results, and each of the dimensions of trust identified by Grimmelikhuijsen (2012), looking at the disaggregated treatment arms level.[32] We do not observe significant differences between providing performance information or just informing about the promises.[33] Further, when we compare people who received information on performance at the aggregate -city- versus the local -*comuna*- level we do not observe differences in trust perceptions. However, the effect of Treatment 2 is consistently higher than the remaining two treatment arms. Results on each dimension of the index —competence (column 4), benevolence (5), and honesty (6)— are very similar to those of the composite index. The last column of Table 2 depicts the results of providing information on the direct measure of trustworthiness. Again, the three treatments are positive and significant (but not statistically different than each other.)

Table 3 shows the results for the components of each of the three

dimensions. The same conclusions as in Table 2 prevail. In general, information about *compromisos* and government performance at the city level lead to higher increases in perceptions, with no statistically differences within treatment arms, except for the case of the perception of a government that plans and informs its plans, where information on fulfillment at the city level increases the perception of competence to a greater extent than promises themselves (0.18 SD).[34]

These results indicate that in our sample: (i) providing information about promises is valuable for increasing trust, i.e., $\beta_1 > 0$ in terms of equation 1; (ii) providing information about the fulfillment of those promises seems to add some but little additional information, i.e., $\beta_2 \geq \beta_1$; (iii) providing information at the *comuna* level does not increase trust more than providing

[32] The table is constructed progressively, including control variables and *comuna* fixed effects.

[33] We conducted Wald tests of equality of coefficients in each estimation. We did not find statistically different results with any of the informational treatments.

[34] While not significantly different to the other treatments, the second largest coefficient for T^2 is on the question about whether the government fulfills its promises or not.

information at the city level, i.e., $\beta_2 \geq \beta_3$, but we can not interpret these results given the caveats about the experiment design discussed earlier. Supplementing information about fulfillment either at the city or comuna level perhaps does not add significantly more to trust than simply providing information about the government promises because many of the respondents have already acquired much of that information first hand, by personal experience in the city streets. Besides the government transparency initiative, another signal is at work: government performance (as analyzed in the theoretical model.)

Effect by Trust Scale

The initial beliefs of the respondents are very heterogeneous. The Generalized Ordered Logit specification in Table 4 considers all categories of the agreement scale for each component of the trust dimensions and the direct measure of trustworthiness (see also Figures A2 to A4 in the SM). Treatment 2 stands out because, unlike the other two treatments, it has a significant positive effect on all the components of trust (including innovation, where the average effect was insignificant). People move to higher levels of the trust distribution with all the treatments: category 1 (strongly disagree) falls in 35 out of 36 cases, with a significant fall in 29 cases, while category 7 (strongly agree) always rises, significantly so in 30 cases.

As to the intermediate categories, if the treatments push people up from one category to the next (as in the model), then the effects are cumulative and the biggest jumps in trust are led by the net changes in the middle part of the distribution: when we single out the highest category in the 31 cases with a significant fall, there is one case in category 3 (somewhat disagree), six in category 4 (neutral), nineteen in category 5 (somewhat agree), and five in category 6 (agree). This suggests that greater levels of trust might be led by positive impacts in the middle part of the distribution. We now look into this issue using initial perceptions about quality of government.

5.4 Heterogeneous Effects

To try to understand better how the treatments effects may depend on initial trust, we ask how trust differs in the treatment and control groups for different priors on government quality. This takes advantage of the fact that we have information on initial beliefs on the quality of government from all respondents and that perceptions of the quality of government and trust

priors are very closely correlated in the control group.[35]

We then explore our framework's prediction that individuals with ex-ante information about post-electoral promises will respond less to the informational treatments than those without. We separate two categories of those unfamiliar with the pledges: those who are completely unaware of the post-electoral promises ("Unfamiliar") and those who are only slightly familiar with the transparency program ("Somewhat familiar").

Finally, we examine the interaction of prior knowledge with the perceived quality of government, attempting to disentangle the impacts of initial information on the transparency program from that of a proxy of initial trust in government.

Perceived Government Quality

Our sample thinks highly of the city government's quality. People in the control group gave an average rating of 7.2 points on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest perceived quality and 10 being the highest. Considering the sample sizes in each of the initial variable's categories and for interpretation purposes, we have narrowed the spectrum of perception of government quality to three categories to evaluate heterogeneous effects: low, medium, and high quality. Categories were constructed ad hoc to reflect their definition. Those who ranked the government quality between 1 and 3 were classified as low (L), 4 to 7 as intermediate (M), and 8 to 10 as high (H).

People appear to respond differently to the informational treatments across the perceived quality distribution. Figure 3 shows the effects on trust vary with the perceived quality of the government (see Table A3 in the SM for further details in a simplified version considering a general treatment condition). Individuals with the lowest assessments of the government quality have wide confidence intervals that do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect; however, they show a positive response to information, although lower than those who have an intermediate evaluation of the government quality. On the other hand, participants who had an intermediate evaluation of the government's quality were highly receptive to information. People with a very high assessment of the government quality do not significantly respond to the information provided through the vignettes, which is consistent with a ceiling effect. As mentioned before, Figure A5 shows that quality perceptions go hand in hand with the initial levels of trust in

[35] Figure A5 in the Supplementary Material depicts the correlation between perceived quality of the government and trust. Overall, the correlation is 0.7603.

government. If the perception of government quality is a good proxy for initial trust, then these results lend support to the interpretation that the largest effects in Table 4 are in the intermediate categories of trust.

Prior knowledge

The participants vary a lot in their familiarity with the transparency initiative, despite the existence of a dedicated website and its public announcement: 22% of the participants were familiar (F) with the promises before implementing the survey experiment, 42% were somewhat familiar (S), and 36% were unfamiliar (U).

People who knew about the promises before taking the survey had different opinions of the local government than those who did not. Although we observe balance across treatment assignments among people with diverse knowledge of the policy, there remains huge heterogeneity in the assertions of the government's competence, benevolence and honesty among them. Figure A7 shows a positive gradient in the relationship between prior knowledge of the policy and assessments of the city government. Individuals within the control group who are unaware of or have never heard of the policy start with a lower level of trust in the government and each of its components. This level increases as people acquire information about the promises. Another way of looking at this is using the perceived quality of government as a proxy of initial trust. Figure A8 depicts the distribution of the perceived quality scores by each level of knowledge. The distribution of people who previously knew about the pledges is skewed right in comparison to those who had heard of it, while those who did not know about the pledges are marginally shifted to the left.[36]

Prior knowledge of the policy was not randomly assigned, yet from Table 1 we observe that the proportion of people who have previously known about the policy is not statistically different among treatment status (which was randomly assigned). People who receive information about promises and their fulfillment at the city level are marginally more aware of the policy's existence. Considering that treatment arms have roughly the same proportion of people who know the policy ex-ante, and they are assigned at random, we explore how differing levels of

[36]The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions reject the null hypothesis of no difference between distributions. Instead, it indicates that perceptions of the quality of the government are shifted left for people unfamiliar with the pledges compared both to those familiar with them and to those who have heard something about them. Similarly, there is a difference between the distribution for those who had heard about the policy and those familiar with it.

previous knowledge of the policy modifies trust in the government. We assess whether there were heterogeneous responses to the treatment among people unfamiliar with the promises, people who had heard of them, and those already familiar with them. Our framework leads us to anticipate that previous knowledge of the post-electoral promises can strongly affect the response to informational treatments. In particular, if someone was already familiar with the promises and the government's performance in fulfilling them before taking the survey, their information set should remain unchanged with the vignettes. We observe that people who previously knew the promises already have high assessments of the city government's competence, benevolence, and honesty; thus, they may have already incorporated this information into their trust perceptions (see Figures 4 and A7). Compared to those who knew 'Compromisos', we expect that people who did not know the policy at all and those who had heard about it but were not very familiar with it respond to the informational treatment to a greater extent.

Figure 5 shows the heterogeneous effects of previous knowledge of the governmental promises. As before, we observe that the second treatment arm, T^2, had a slightly higher impact on trust than T^1 and T^3, although the difference is not statistically significant. However, this result is heterogeneous depending on the initial information set. Table A4 in the SM provides the regression findings of a simplified version interacting previous knowledge with ever been treated, regardless of the information received. This shows that the treatment closes the average gap in trust between the groups somewhat familiar and familiar with the pledges. Figure A9 additionally shows that the distribution of the intermediate group is the only one that significantly shifts to the right, though not enough to match the distribution of those already familiar with the initiative.

The fact that people who previously knew about the 'Compromisos' policy do not significantly respond to the information provided through the vignettes confirms our framework's prediction that those familiar with the pledges would be unaffected by the treatment. Surprisingly, participants who were exposed to information about the transparency policy for the first time were much less receptive to the vignettes than those who had already heard something about the policy.

While in Table A4 we do not reject the null hypothesis that all treatments close the gap in the initial perception of trust between those familiar with the pledges and those vaguely familiar with them, . on the contrary

we reject the null hypothesis that the treatment closes that gap in trust perceptions for individuals who are first exposed to the pledges through the survey. [37]

Interaction Effects

We now look at the treatment effects conditional on familiarity with the transparency initiative and perceived government quality.

Table A5 presents a triple interaction identification strategy of treatment T (versus control C), previous knowledge F, S, or U, and initial perceptions of government quality H, M, or L.

Table 5 summarizes the conditional treatment effects implied by Table A5.

Within each group, the effects on individuals with high perceived government quality are the smallest in absolute value, so ceiling effects are apparent. The most uniform effects appear for medium perceived government quality, since they are always positive, being significant in four out of six cases.[38] For low perceived government quality, on the other hand, the effects are insignificant in four out of six cases.[39]

The factor that stands out in Table 5 is the type of prior knowledge. Consistent positive effects only show up in the respondents somewhat familiar with the transparency initiative. The effects are significantly positive whether perceptions of government quality are high, medium or low. The largest positive effects are for those with a low initial perception of government quality, a result that would be very surprising if people who gave the government a low quality rating are mainly those opposed to it for ideological or partisan reasons and politically-motivated reasoning is the predominant factor that drives belief updating.[40] As to the group unfamiliar

[37] Figure A9 in the SM shows how initial levels of confidence are distributed differently according to the previous knowledge of the policy , and that the treatments only have a relevant effect for the group that is vaguely knowledgeable about the policy , being irrelevant for the extremes.

[38] Perceived quality seems to be related to political ideology, insofar as individuals who gave the government a low rating are more likely to be opposed to it, while those who gave it a high rating are more likely to be its supporters. On the other hand, individuals in the middle range of the distribution are less likely to be politically radical. As Butler et al. (2021) point out, those with a moderate view of politics are less concerned with politicians' policy positions and more concerned with problem-solving.

[39] Though insignificant, the group familiar with the initiative shows a large negative effect of the treatment when initial quality perceptions are low, so perhaps some people get upset when they are reminded of something they already dismissed. In this regard, when individuals receive information contradicting their beliefs from sources they do not trust, they may interpret it as an attempt to manipulate them, reinforcing their (incorrect) perceptions (Aruguete et al., 2021; Keefer et al., 2022).

[40] Citizens' responses to information are influenced by their prior expectations and attitudes toward the government (Baekgaard, 2015; Marvel, 2016; Sances, 2021). Individuals who employ motivated reasoning make their perceptions correspond to their priors and partisan commitments (Bolsen et al., 2014; Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010). This is most likely for people with extreme priors about the quality of the government, i.e., those with polarized political views (Butler et al., 2021).

with the initiative, while we expected the effects of the treatment to be the largest, they are always much smaller and, with one exception, insignificant. In the next section, we relate this to a different learning style.

5.5 Calibration

The evidence above shows that, on average, the posteriors regarding trust and its dimensions improve with the treatment, so the transparency initiative is not a pooling signal. Though informative, it is not a separating signal either: the partial updating of beliefs observed in the data points to a semi-separating equilibrium between these cases.[41]

This reasoning extends from a setup with homogeneous priors to our setup with heterogeneous priors: except for respondents with priors that either show no trust or complete trust in the government, there is partial updating of beliefs. Bayes' law gives the following posterior for the trustworthiness of the incumbent, i.e., the belief that the incumbent is benevolent when a reform is carried out:

$$\mu(b|\Pi) = \frac{p_b}{p_b + (1 - q_{nh,high})(1 - p_b)} > p_b, \quad \text{if } q_{nh,high} > 0.$$

According to this equation, the impact of the treatment on beliefs will depend on the priors and the parameter $q_{nh,high}$, which gives the probability that a non-benevolent government has high cover-up costs and will not launch the administrative reform. The survey experiment shows that the effects of the transparency initiative depend on initial priors, which may be affected by ideological inclinations, among other things. The Generalized Ordered Logit model results indicate that political trust gains are mainly obtained through belief updating of individuals who have intermediate priors. We calibrate the model to the data in the survey to see how well it can replicate this pattern in the sample (Table 6). Using the assumption that the responses are uniformly distributed within each category, we find that the model can indeed explain part of the pattern in the whole sample. When $q_{nh,high}$ equals 0.14, the model correctly predicts that categories 5 to 7 increase, and categories 1 to 4 decrease, with one exception: the miss is that it predicts that category 2 will increase, when in fact it decreases. The model implies that the impact of the signal is greatest for the intermediate categories, especially categories 3 and 4:

[41] If the equilibrium was pooling, the treatment group would have the same posteriors as the control group. If the equilibrium were instead separating, then the treatment group would have completely updated its beliefs.

the percentage that shifts to the next category is $0.122, 0.208, 0.255, 0.261, 0.221, 0.136, 0$ when $q_{nh,high} = 0.14$. However, this calibration does not capture how reactions vary according to the initial familiarity of individuals with the transparency initiative. A simple way of capturing this is assigning to each group a different parameter $q_{nh,high}$: in our calibration exercise, the parameter $q^S_{nh,high} = 0.20$ for the group "Somewhat Familiar", which doubles the value $q^F_{nh,high} = 0.10$ for "Familiar" and $q^U_{nh,high} = 0.11$ for "Unfamiliar". This calibration can explain a sizable proportion of the treatment effects for the group "Somewhat Familiar", and correctly predicts that categories 1 to 4 fall, and categories 5 to 7 rise. On the other hand, it explains next-to-nothing for the groups "Familiar" and "Unfamiliar".

The above calibration is a lower bound of the effects of the transparency initiative, because individuals already familiar with the promises should not be affected by the experimental treatment, but they certainly have been affected by the initiative through their own prior experience, and so has the group "Somewhat Familiar." Though the group "Unfamiliar", which has the lowest trust levels, may differ from the other two groups for a variety of reasons, it can be taken as a reference point to calculate an upper bound on the effect of the transparency initiative. If we calibrate the effect of the transparency initiative against the control group of "Unfamiliar," we thus obtain a very speculative upper bound on the total effects of the initiative, experimental and non-experimental, leading to the ordering $q^F_{nh,high} > q^S_{nh,high} > q^U_{nh,high}$ (Table 7).

5.6 In Whom do We Trust?

We have seen that trust is crucial for new information to affect beliefs.[42] Hence, one would expect trusted sources to affect beliefs more than mistrusted sources. This can help explain the differences in the respondents regarding their previous information about the transparency initiative. Figure A11 shows that trust in different sources of information varies strongly among the groups of individuals according to their previous knowledge of the policy.

The group U, which is unfamiliar with the policy, stands out. Figure A11 shows that this group does not trust much any information from others: while it has some trust in the family (though much less than groups F and S), it has very little trust in information from the government, social media, or traditional media. Given that they seem distrustful of verbal

[42] Though Thaler (2022) finds that motivated reasoning leads to a bias, that of giving more credence than warranted to information one would want to believe, his insight that people update beliefs more when they have more trust (in his experiment, more trust in the contents of the messages) applies much more broadly.

information, they fit the pattern in Hertz et al. (2021) of people who gather information from direct observation rather than from third-party information. This group might thus react to observed performance rather than to transparency initiatives. The fact that they heard nothing at all might thus really mean something else: that they ignored the pledges because they only believe what they see. Perhaps they basically trust themselves.

On the other hand, groups S and F are remarkably similar in their trust of family, social media, and TV or radio; the only noticeable difference is that group S trusts the government a bit less, though the difference is not statistically significant. If people rely more on the most trusted sources to get information, this might help explain why the sources through which groups F and S gather information about the 'Compromisos' differ. Group F, the most familiar with the policy, obtained information primarily from official sources: around 60% had visited its website, and an additional 15% were aware of its existence. Group S had heard about the policy mainly through social media and pamphlets. Group F was 9.3 pp more likely than group S to have known them by attending a mayor's presentation, 8.1 pp by visiting the city's website, and 3.6 pp by reading CABA articles or notes, with only a small percentage visiting the policy website (see Table A6).[43]

In summary, the transparency reform with post-electoral promises expands the range of visibility of public good provision, and can be a more efficient signal than the over-provision of visible public goods. However, this signal does not seem to work equally well with all kinds of respondents. Only the most politically informed fully incorporated it to their information set, but it also seems to have been somewhat effective with the people active on social media. If there is a spill-over effect of government information through social media, the reform might end up being quite a potent signal.[44]

[43] Piotrowski et al. (2019) discuss the differences between more and less politically informed citizens. While Piotrowski et al. (2019) find that citizens who actively engage with politicians and the political process tend to be more critical when presented with information about the government's achievements, in our sample the group of individuals that is the most politically engaged has the highest trust levels; the fact that they do not react to the treatment is because of another reason: this information is not new for them.

[44] While in the group unfamiliar with the initiative, the median belief in the trustworthiness of the city government is 4, both for the control and the treatment subgroups, in the groups somewhat or very familiar with the post-electoral promises the median is 5, both for the control and treatment subgroups. Since these last two groups comprise two-thirds of the sample, this suggests that the transparency initiative may have potentially been able to move the median's evaluation in the whole sample from 4 to 5, i.e., to above average, with the transparency initiative.

6 Conclusions

Since trust and initiatives to promote transparency are endogenous variables, it is difficult to disentangle their causal relationships. To study this, we developed a theoretical model and conducted an empirical experiment in the City of Buenos Aires to evaluate the conditions that make the initiatives more likely and how a transparency initiative influenced and was affected by trust in the government and its agents (politicians and public servants). The transparency initiative entailed revealing the achievements of the local administration and the plans that had been initially made. These promises are what the city government calls "commitments."

The analytical framework shows that these transparency initiatives allow benevolent governments to signal their type without having to resort to costly misallocations of public goods that are common across the world (too much spending on visible compared to non-visible goods.) As long as hiding its cheating is costly, non-benevolent governments will be less likely to introduce them.

Our framework suggests that the effect of transparency initiatives is critically dependent on priors, i.e., baseline trust levels. People at the extremes of no trust and complete trust will not be affected by the initiatives; only those in the middle will be impacted. Furthermore, the framework predicts that the treatment will mainly affect those unfamiliar with the transparency policy. The experimental results corroborate both predictions, showing that the impact of the policy is greatest for intermediate levels of trust, and that there is no effect whatsoever on people who are already familiar with the project (our interpretation is that they are not receiving new information).

However, the experimental results go beyond our framework's predictions. When we control for prior knowledge, the data show a stark difference between people who did not know at all about the commitments and those who had heard something about them, so they seemed vaguely familiar. All the treatments' effects are through this group that had heard of the treatment. While the "Somewhat familiar" group had higher initial trust levels than the "Unfamiliar" group, this is not enough to explain the difference, because even individuals with higher initial trust do not react to the treatment. This result might have to do with different learning styles: some people only trust what they observe directly, not what others say. Unlike public good provision, which has to do with the direct experience of citizens, the provision of verbal information is a

very different kind of signal: it is a verbal signal which is not merely cheap talk only if there are cover-up costs for a substantial proportion of dishonest types. The experiment thus suggests that post-electoral promises may be useful as a complementary tool to solid performance and efficient administrative management. Transparency reforms on their own may be less effective in changing citizens' perceptions than performance, as there is a group of people, those unaware of the pledges, that seems to be affected mainly by deeds, not words.

The implications of the analytical model and empirical results are important. First, they show that there are conditions under which introducing transparency initiatives is incentive-compatible for politicians. For benevolent governments, these transparency initiatives provide the opportunity to signal their type without having to incur in costly misallocations of resources. Overall transparency makes it harder for non-benevolent actors to hide their actions, which increases the chances that these specific transparency initiatives will work as a separating equilibrium. Second, actively delivering information to most citizens to enhance trust. Third, they provide initial evidence that individuals may be unconcerned about the aggregation level at which the information is provided. Although the effect of commitments' compliance is consistently higher than the effect of general information about them, citizens equally change their trust levels when the government informs fulfillment of their promises at the city or the commune level. Moreover, all informational treatments elicited a feeling of caring and concern for the population from the city government. Consequently, these results should encourage governments to follow these types of policies: making and keeping promises appears to be rewarded with greater trust in a context where a great deal of citizens already have substantial initial trust in government and perceive, on average, that government quality is high. Finally, results show that there are important differences in the impact of information according to priors. Previous information matters, as well as the sources of information. Therefore, an environment of greater transparency and information would make it more likely that additional transparency initiatives take place and that they affect on citizens' evaluations of the government.

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Appendix

Pooling Equilibrium

The text first considers what happens if visible public goods are the only available signal. Let the pooling signal be $\gamma_{vt} = \tau$, the optimal signal for the benevolent type. Then $\left(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{b}\right) = (\tau, \tau)$, $\left(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}\right) = \left(\tau, \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)$. Plugging the optimal $t+1$ solutions derived above in the utility function $U(.)$, in a pooling equilibrium the expected indirect utility of the non-benevolent type has to be larger if it mimics the benevolent type:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb}(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb})\right] > \mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb}(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb})\right]. \tag{2}$$

If the non-benevolent type mimics the benevolent type in the first period, it will have a positive probability of reelection $P(\gamma_{vt}^{b})$:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb}(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb})\right] =& u(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}) + \alpha(\tau - \upsilon\gamma_{vt}^{b} - (1-\upsilon)\gamma_{nvt}^{nb}) \\ &+ \delta P(\gamma_{vt}^{b})\left[u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt+1}^{nb}) + \alpha(\tau - \upsilon\gamma_{vt+1}^{nb} - (1-\upsilon)\gamma_{nvt+1}^{nb})\right] \\ &+ \delta(1 - P(\gamma_{vt}^{b}))\left[\beta u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt+1}^{b}) + (1-\beta)u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt+1}^{nb})\right].\end{aligned}$$

If it instead separates out, $P(\gamma_{vt}^{b}) = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb}(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb})\right] =& u(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}) + \alpha(\tau - \upsilon\gamma_{vt}^{nb} - (1-\upsilon)\gamma_{nvt}^{nb}) \\ &+ \delta\left[\beta u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt+1}^{b}) + (1-\beta)u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt+1}^{nb})\right].\end{aligned}$$

Rearranging terms, a non-benevolent incumbent resigns some utility from rents today (net of utility gain from more visible public good provision now) if this opens the door to even more utility from rents in the future (net of utility loss from lower future provision of both types of public goods):

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha\upsilon(\gamma_{vt}^{b} - \gamma_{vt}^{nb}) - \upsilon\left[u(\gamma_{vt}^{b}) - u(\gamma_{vt}^{nb})\right] <& \delta P(\gamma_{vt}^{b})\alpha\left(\tau - \upsilon\gamma_{vt+1}^{nb} - (1-\upsilon)\gamma_{nvt+1}^{nb}\right) \\ &- \delta P(\gamma_{vt}^{b})\beta\left[u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt+1}^{b}) - u(\gamma_{vt+1}^{nb}, .\gamma_{nvt+1}^{nb})\right].\end{aligned}$$

Semi-separating Equilibrium

We here consider what happens when the benevolent type can launch a transparency reform, to supplement the information provided by visible public goods. If a non-benevolent type nb mimics the provision of visible public goods undertaken by a benevolent type, the benefits of a reform for types who act dishonestly and have type $l = nh, low$ are not affected, but types $l = nh, high$ are negatively affected by the cover-up costs of the rents extracted from the under provision of public goods in the first period:

$$B^{nb,high} = -K - \kappa(\lambda - \nu) < 0.$$

The reform can work as a semi-separating signal if it is only adopted by benevolent types and by non-benevolent types that face no cover-up costs. Using the indirect utility function $V(.)$, the expected utility for the non-benevolent type that faces cover-up costs by mimicking the visible expenditure of benevolent types and adopting the reform, Π has to be smaller than if it does not, $\sim \Pi$,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb,high}\left(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}, \Pi\right)\right] \leq \mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb,high}\left(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}, \sim \Pi\right)\right]. \tag{3}$$

Combining the results from the signal γ_{vt}^{b} with the additional term that captures the impact of the reform, these conditions imply that

$$\mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb,high}\left(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}, \Pi\right)\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb,high}\left(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}, \sim \Pi\right)\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb}\left(\gamma_{vt}^{b}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}\right)\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[V^{nb}\left(\gamma_{vt}^{nb}, \gamma_{nvt}^{nb}\right)\right] + B^{nb,high} \leq 0.$$

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Summary statistics and randomization balance

Variable	Control (av. & s.d.) (1)	Diff wrt. Control T1 (2)	T2 (3)	T3 (4)	p-value Wald test equality coefficients T1=T2=T3 (5)	T1=T2 (6)	T1=T3 (7)	T2=T3 (8)	Sample Size (9)
Gender	0.570	0.042	-0.011	0.005	0.197	0.084	0.168	0.538	2,375
	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.033)					
Age	47.656	-1.829	-2.155**	-2.146*	0.942	0.740	0.780	0.992	2,375
	(1.399)	(1.165)	(0.956)	(1.099)					
College	0.404	0.007	0.015	-0.011	0.615	0.747	0.426	0.366	2,375
	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.034)					
High school	0.846	-0.022*	0.025	-0.001	0.047	0.041	0.250	0.395	2,375
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.017)					
Employed	0.522	0.039	0.017	0.009	0.630	0.449	0.366	0.765	2,375
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.031)					
Unemployed	0.152	-0.018	0.010	-0.008	0.307	0.133	0.557	0.413	2,375
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.028)					
Socio-economic level (high)	0.244	-0.025	-0.040**	-0.038	0.656	0.463	0.557	0.938	2,375
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.027)					
Voluntary Health Insurance	0.430	-0.007	-0.013	0.011	0.768	0.843	0.584	0.483	2,375
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.015)					
Internet at home	0.526	0.000	0.000	-0.013	0.908	0.986	0.666	0.734	2,375
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.021)					
Credit Card	0.347	0.016	-0.010	0.006	0.697	0.411	0.687	0.520	2,375
	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.017)					
One or more cars	0.175	0.005	-0.015	0.001	0.625	0.354	0.877	0.483	2,375
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.025)					
Perc. Quality of Governm.	7.200	-0.142	-0.055	0.197	0.088	0.616	0.068	0.064	2,331
	(0.103)	(0.154)	(0.098)	(0.126)					
Knowledge of 'Compromisos'	0.219	-0.001	0.047	0.005	0.289	0.123	0.728	0.205	2,375
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.020)					
Trust Others	0.662	0.003	-0.026	-0.022	0.589	0.333	0.396	0.867	2,265
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.020)					
Collective Action	0.671	0.010	-0.009	0.012	0.603	0.444	0.936	0.344	2,261
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.032)					

Notes: Column (1) shows the sample average and the standard deviation in parentheses for the control group. Columns (2)-(4) show the regression coefficient and the standard error in parentheses corresponding to an OLS regression - observable is the dependent variable and the treatment variables are the independent ones (T1-T3). Columns (5)-(8) show the p-value of a Wald test of equality of coefficients. Finally, column (9) shows the sample size. *Gender* is a indicator variable for women. *Age* is a continuous variable from 18 to 100 years old. *College* takes the value of one when the individual has a college degree at least, and *High school* is read similarly. *Employed* and *Unemployed* are binary variables for those who have full-time employment (or work from/at home) and those who are looking for a job at the time of the survey, respectively. *Socio-economic level (High)* is a binary variable for those with the highest category in socio-economic level. *Perceived Quality of the Government* is self-explanatory and takes values between 1 and 10, in which the lowest value reflects a very bad score while the greatest an excellent score. *Knowledge* is a binary variable and takes the value one if the participant knows the 'Compromisos' policy and zero otherwise. *Trust Others* is a binary variable that takes the value of one when participants indicate that others are reliable or very reliable. *Collective Action* is a dummy variable that indicates whether participants indicate that they would be able to collect 500 signatures to support a petition for the government among their neighbors. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: Treatment Effect on Trust in Government (by dimension)

VARIABLES	Trust in the Government Global Index			Dimensions of Trust Competence	Dimensions of Trust Benevolence	Dimensions of Trust Honesty	Direct measure Trustworthiness
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1: Commitments	0.051	0.095***	0.095***	0.083**	0.097**	0.099***	0.127***
	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.028)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.116**	0.125***	0.124***	0.125***	0.119**	0.113***	0.114***
	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.033)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	0.129**	0.104***	0.104***	0.107***	0.119***	0.073**	0.081*
	(0.056)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Constant	-0.070*	-2.233***	-2.206***	-2.187***	-1.922***	-2.242***	-2.191***
	(0.038)	(0.120)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.134)	(0.114)	(0.146)
Observations	2,375	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278
R-squared	0.003	0.663	0.665	0.639	0.594	0.625	0.606
Joint significance (p-value)	0.483	0.668	0.679	0.524	0.849	0.573	0.566
T1=T2	0.268	0.422	0.432	0.279	0.584	0.725	0.755
T1=T3	0.309	0.844	0.841	0.638	0.635	0.514	0.330
T2=T3	0.836	0.573	0.582	0.656	0.995	0.307	0.384
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Comuna FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: All dependent variables are constructed using a PCA method, and standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. The Competence dimension considers the assessments of the following characteristics, the government: is capable, does what is best for the city, is innovative, thinks in the long run, and plans and informs its plans; the Benevolence dimension considers the following: acts in the interests of its residents, helps those in need and pursues policies and projects beneficial for the families. Finally, the Honesty dimension takes into account: is sincere, is transparent, fulfills its promises. We also study the effect of information on a direct measure of trust in government that asks the respondents to indicate the degree in which she agrees that the city government is trustworthy. Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), being first exposed to information on , pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and the collective action dummy variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Treatment Effect on Trust in Government (by component)

	Competence					Benevolence			Honesty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T1: Commitments	0.069*	0.053*	0.031	0.120***	0.102**	0.047	0.119***	0.106**	0.104***	0.063*	0.116***
	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.024)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.097***	0.095**	0.052	0.142***	0.177***	0.079**	0.148***	0.106**	0.084*	0.072**	0.169***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.030)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	0.107**	0.073*	0.053	0.134***	0.116***	0.056	0.123***	0.154***	0.063	0.033	0.113***
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Constant	-2.103***	-1.929***	-2.060***	-2.057***	-1.658***	-1.838***	-1.787***	-1.738***	-2.001***	-2.133***	-2.285***
	(0.106)	(0.133)	(0.094)	(0.164)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.151)	(0.134)	(0.119)	(0.134)	(0.111)
Observations	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278
R-squared	0.556	0.596	0.509	0.501	0.441	0.560	0.493	0.499	0.566	0.565	0.581
Joint significance (p-value)	0.738	0.462	0.892	0.800	0.0401	0.659	0.707	0.443	0.667	0.537	0.415
T1=T2	0.543	0.228	0.641	0.549	0.0458	0.420	0.556	0.983	0.649	0.831	0.225
T1=T3	0.537	0.673	0.749	0.803	0.808	0.870	0.932	0.314	0.379	0.444	0.924
T2=T3	0.874	0.595	0.988	0.824	0.144	0.613	0.456	0.238	0.598	0.292	0.240

Notes: All regressions include controls and commune fixed effects. All dependent variables are standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Each column presents the result for perceived performance of the CABA government. The first column displays the global effect on the Index of Trust in the Government. Following Grimmelikhuijsen (2012), next five columns reflect Government Competence: (1) is capable, (2) does what is best for the city, (3) is innovative, (4) thinks in the long-term, and (5) plans and informs; following three columns show Benevolence: (6) acts in the interests of the residents, (7) helps those in need, (8) pursues policies and projects that are beneficial for families; next three, Honesty: (9) is sincere, (10) is transparent, (11) fulfills its promises. Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), first exposure to 'Compromisos' and pre-treatment beliefs on government quality. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Average Marginal Treatment Effect on Trust in Government - Generalized Ordered Logit

Panel A: Competence

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The CABA Government...	**Strongly disagree**	**Disagree**	**Somewhat disagree**	**Neutral**	**Somewhat agree**	**Agree**	**Strongly agree**
Competence 1: is capable							
T1: Commitments	-0.009**	-0.004*	-0.005*	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.003*	0.035**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.017)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.011**	-0.005**	-0.006**	-0.008**	-0.009**	-0.004**	0.042**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.017)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.013***	-0.006***	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.011***	-0.005**	0.054***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.017)
Competence 2: does what is best for the city							
T1: Commitments	-0.008*	-0.003*	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.004*	0.000	0.025*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.014)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.012***	-0.005**	-0.008**	-0.008***	-0.007**	0.000	0.040***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.015)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.010**	-0.004**	-0.006**	-0.007**	-0.006**	0.000	0.032**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.014)
Competence 3: is innovative							
T1: Commitments	-0.007	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004	-0.001	0.021
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.017)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.010*	-0.003*	-0.005*	-0.007*	-0.006*	-0.001	0.033*
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.018)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.009	-0.002	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.001	0.028
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.017)
Competence 4: thinks in the long term							
T1: Commitments	-0.018***	-0.003**	-0.009***	-0.012***	-0.010***	-0.005**	0.056***
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.018)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.022***	-0.004***	-0.011***	-0.014***	-0.012***	-0.006***	0.068***
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.018)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.016	0.013	-0.041***	-0.013	-0.033**	0.027	0.063***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Competence 5: plans and informs its plans							
T1: Commitments	0.006	-0.013	-0.044***	-0.001	0.002	0.021	0.028
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.021***	-0.008***	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.012***	0.003*	0.069***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.017)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.015***	-0.006***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.008**	0.002	0.049***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.018)

Panel B: Benevolence

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The CABA Government...	**Strongly disagree**	**Disagree**	**Somewhat disagree**	**Neutral**	**Somewhat agree**	**Agree**	**Strongly agree**
Benevolence 1: acts in the interests of neighbors							
T1: Promises	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.010*	-0.004*	-0.005*	-0.006*	-0.003*	0.004*	0.025*
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.014)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.008	-0.003	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	0.003	0.020
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Benevolence 2: does everything in its power to help those in need							
T1: Promises	-0.022***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.007***	0.000	0.010***	0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.012)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.028***	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.009***	0.000	0.013***	0.043***
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.013)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.025***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	0.000	0.012***	0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.012)
Benevolence 3: pursues policies and projects that my family cares about							
T1: Promises	-0.022***	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.010***	-0.002	0.009***	0.039***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.013)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.017**	-0.007**	-0.005**	-0.008**	-0.001	0.007**	0.031**
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.013)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.030***	-0.013***	-0.009***	-0.014***	-0.003	0.013***	0.055***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.013)

Panel C: Honesty

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The CABA Government...	**Strongly disagree**	**Disagree**	**Somewhat disagree**	**Neutral**	**Somewhat agree**	**Agree**	**Strongly agree**
Honesty 1: is sincere							
T1: Commitments	-0.019***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.004**	0.003**	0.039***
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.013*	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.003*	0.002*	0.028*
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.012*	-0.004*	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.002*	0.002*	0.026*
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)
Honesty 2: is transparent							
T1: Commitments	-0.013**	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.003*	0.002*	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.014)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.015**	-0.005**	-0.006**	-0.005**	-0.003**	0.002*	0.032**
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.015)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.008	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	0.018
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.015)
Honesty 3: fulfills its promises							
T1: Commitments	-0.019***	-0.006***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.007***	0.006***	0.046***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.027***	-0.008***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.010***	0.009***	0.065***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.014)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.017***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.006***	0.006***	0.042***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Observations	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278

Panel D: Trustworthiness (Direct measure)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The CABA Government...	**Strongly disagree**	**Disagree**	**Somewhat disagree**	**Neutral**	**Somewhat agree**	**Agree**	**Strongly agree**
Trust 1: is trustworthy							
T1: Commitments	-0.038***	0.015*	-0.001	0.013	-0.030**	-0.018	0.059***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.015)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	-0.019***	-0.004***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.004***	0.001	0.040***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.014**	-0.003*	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.003*	0.001	0.029**
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.011)
Observations	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278

Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and pre-intervention preferences for public education and infrastructure. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 5: Treatment Effect on Trust in Government Conditional on Previous Knowledge of Transparency Initiative and Perceived Government Quality

Category Degree of Familiarity and Perceived Level of Government Quality	Trust in Government Global Index	Trustworthiness Direct Measure
Familiar, High Quality: T	-0.083*	-0.030
	(0.045)	(0.054)
Familiar, Medium Quality: $T + T$ x M	0.200	0.277*
	(0.140)	(0.144)
Familiar, Low Quality: $T + T$ x L	-0.226	-0.327
	(0.382)	(0.365)
Somewhat Familiar, High Quality: $T + T$ x S	0.091**	0.104*
	(0.046)	(0.053)
Somewhat Familiar, Medium Quality: $T + T$ x $S + T$ x $M + T$ x S x M	0.252***	0.276***
	(0.069)	(0.081)
Somewhat Familiar, Low Quality: $T + T$ x $S + T$ x $L + T$ x S x L	0.367**	0.468***
	(0.158)	(0.132)
Unfamiliar, High Quality: $T + T$ x U	0.036	0.024
	(0.063)	(0.073)
Unfamiliar, Medium Quality: $T + T$ x $U + T$ x $M + T$ x U x M	0.174**	0.056
	(0.073)	(0.088)
Unfamiliar, Low Quality: $T + T$ x $U + T$ x $L + T$ x U x L	0.079	0.077
	(0.132)	(0.137)

Notes: T stands for treatment with an informational vignette, F, S, and U stand for familiar, somewhat familiar and unfamiliar with the transparency initiative, and H, M, and L stand for high (8 to 10), medium (4 to 7) and low (1 to 3) perceived quality of government. This table is based on the results found in Table A5 in the Supplementary Material. We computed standard errors for linear combinations of the estimated parameters; they are shown in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 6: Calibration of Treatment Effects on Trust

Category	All			Unfamiliar			Somewhat Familiar			Familiar		
	C	T	P $q_{nh,high} = 0.14$	C	T	P $q^U_{nh,high} = 0.11$	C	T	P $q^S_{nh,high} = 0.20$	C	T	P $q^F_{nh,hihg} = 0.10$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1	0.149	0.129	0.131	0.207	0.207	0.188	0.108	0.075	0.089	0.131	0.114	0.120
2	0,068	0.058	0.072	0.087	0.093	0.093	0.069	0.044	0.067	0.034	0.032	0.041
3	0.075	0.070	0.070	0.100	0.092	0.094	0.065	0.056	0.061	0.055	0.062	0.050
4	0.131	0.126	0.116	0.170	0.161	0.156	0.137	0.125	0.108	0.055	0.077	0.055
5	0.143	0.145	0.146	0.137	0.159	0.148	0.159	0.162	0.159	0.124	0.094	0.115
6	0.179	0.189	0.187	0.183	0.126	0.187	0.209	0.245	0.219	0.117	0.176	0.125
7	0.253	0.284	0.278	0.116	0.162	0.135	0.253	0.293	0.296	0.483	0.444	0.494
Total	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Proportion of squared deviations explained			0.791			0.170			0.647			0.071

Notes: The direct measure of Trustworthiness is used. There are seven categories of trust that go from 1 (low) to 7 (high). C stands for Control, T for Treatment, and P for Prediction. The last line presents the proportion of the sum of the squared differences between the treatment group and the prediction that can be explained by using the parameter $q_{nh,high}$ that minimizes the sum of squared errors.

Table 7: Potential Effects of Transparency Initiative on Trust

Category	Unfamiliar		Somewhat Familiar		Familiar	
	C	T P $q^{U}_{nh,high} =$ 0.11	C P $q^{S}_{nh,high} =$ 0.43	T P $q^{S}_{nh,high} =$ 0.52	C P $q^{F}_{nh,high} =$ 0.70	T P $q^{F}_{nh,high} =$ 0.70
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	0.207	0.188	0.126	0.108	0.069	0.069
2	0.087	0.093	0.108	0.111	0.117	0.117
3	0.100	0.094	0.071	0.061	0.038	0.038
4	0.170	0.156	0.094	0.069	0.001	0.001
5	0.137	0.148	0.182	0.191	0.203	0.203
6	0.183	0.187	0.197	0.198	0.183	0.183
7	0.116	0.135	0.223	0.263	0.390	0.390
Total	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Proportion of squared deviations explained		0.170	0.836	0.784	0.797	0.768

Notes: The direct measure of Trustworthiness is used. There are seven categories of trust that go from 1 (low) to 7 (high). C stands for Control, T for Treatment, and P for Prediction. The last line presents the proportion of the sum of the squared differences between the treatment group and the prediction that can be explained by using the parameter $q_{nh,high}$ that minimizes the sum of squared errors.

Figure 1: Components of the index - PCA



Notes: The figure presents categorical variables that assess citizens' perception of the Government, standardized between zero and one. They account for each of the characteristics asked in the question: *Using a scale from 1 to 7, where one is "Completely disagree," and seven is "Completely agree," please show your level of agreement with the following statements about the Government of the city of Buenos Aires.* The interpretation of each bar goes as follows, e.g.: *68%* of the surveyed individuals consider that the CABA Government *is capable.*

Figure 2: Information and trust perception - PCA



Notes: Dependent variables depicted in this figure are constructed using a PCA method, and standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. They account for indices following Grimmelikhuijsen (2012). Bars are constructed both for the control and treated groups. For illustration purposes, we present the average result for all treatment arms as one. Values in orange correspond to the average of each index for the treated units, and green for their counterpart, the control group

Figure 3: Treatment Effect on Trust in the Government by perceived quality of the government



Notes: Perceived quality of the government is a categorical variable that takes values 1 to 10, with one meaning very low quality and 10 very high quality. We reclassified the participants assessments in three categories, low, med-high and high, given the sample composition. People who scored the government quality below 4 are part of the "Low" category, people who scored 4 to 7 in the "Mid" and people who scored 8 or more in the "High" category. The color intensity of confidence intervals represents the confidence level, from darker to lighter, 90%, 95%, and 99%.

Figure 4: Trust in the Government in the control group by previous knowledge of the policy



Notes: Dependent variables depicted in this figure are constructed using a PCA method, and standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. The bars depict the level of trust in the government individuals from the control group have grouped by level of initial knowledge of the commitments policy. They could be classified as *unfamiliar* if they did not know the policy at all, *somewhat* familiar if they had heard about it, or *familiar* if they were aware of it beforehand.

Figure 5: Treatment Effect on Trust in the Government by level of knowledge of 'Compromisos'



Notes: Dependent variables depicted in this figure are constructed using a PCA method, and a standardization with mean zero and standard deviation one. The estimate points correspond to the effect of each treatment in the level of knowledge indicated in the legend. For example, people who had heard of the commitments but did not know them for sure (somewhat familiar) before the survey increase their trust in the government by a greater extent than people who did not know them at all (unfamiliar) or those who knew the policy (familiar), regardless of the trust measure used. The color intensity of confidence intervals represents the confidence level, from darker to lighter, 90%, 95%, and 99%.

Post-electoral promises, performance and trust in government: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Supplementary material

A Additional Support Tables & Graphs

A.1 Tables

Table A1: Descriptive statistics - Control group

	Mean	SD.	Min	Max	Obs.
Trust in Government	-0.099	1.000	-2.2	1.2	663
Dimensions of Trust					
Competence	-0.099	1.003	-2.4	1.1	663
Benevolence	-0.101	0.994	-1.9	1.3	663
Honesty	-0.087	1.006	-1.9	1.2	663
Trustworthiness	-0.095	1.013	-1.8	1.1	663
Components of Trust					
Competence					
is capable	0.670	0.320	0.0	1.0	663
does what is best for the city	0.651	0.322	0.0	1.0	663
is innovative	0.690	0.318	0.0	1.0	663
thinks in the long-term	0.656	0.335	0.0	1.0	663
plans and informs	0.638	0.319	0.0	1.0	663
Benevolence					
acts in the interests of residents	0.598	0.331	0.0	1.0	663
helps those in need	0.510	0.344	0.0	1.0	663
pursues proj. beneficial for fam.	0.542	0.330	0.0	1.0	663
Honesty					
is sincere	0.574	0.353	0.0	1.0	663
is transparent	0.587	0.351	0.0	1.0	663
fulfills its promises	0.588	0.332	0.0	1.0	663
Trustworthiness					
is trustworthy	0.592	0.352	0.0	1.0	663
How likely are ... to keep promises?					
Politicians	0.219	0.414	0.0	1.0	628
Public Servants	0.513	0.500	0.0	1.0	633
How likely are ... to care for people like you?					
Politicians	0.265	0.442	0.0	1.0	625
Public Servants	0.484	0.500	0.0	1.0	633

Notes: Trust in government and dimensions of trust are constructed using a PCA method, and standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. Each component of trust is a standardized version of a categorical variable, between zero and one. Variables of trustworthiness based on Keefer et al., 2018 - *keep promises* and *care for people* - are also categorical variables standardized between zero and one.

Table A2: Principal Component Analysis

	Eigenvalue (1)	Proportion (2)	Std. Err. (3)	Cumulative (4)	Std. Error (5)	Bias (6)
Trust in Government						
Comp1	8.72	0.79	0.005	0.79	0.005	0.001
Comp2	0.42	0.04	0.001	0.83	0.004	0.002
Comp3	0.31	0.03	0.001	0.86	0.004	0.002
Comp4	0.27	0.02	0.001	0.88	0.003	0.002
Comp5	0.24	0.02	0.001	0.91	0.002	0.001
Comp6	0.22	0.02	0.001	0.93	0.002	-0.000
Comp7	0.21	0.02	0.001	0.95	0.002	-0.001
Comp8	0.19	0.02	0.001	0.96	0.001	-0.001
Comp9	0.16	0.01	0.001	0.98	0.001	-0.001
Comp10	0.14	0.01	0.001	0.99	0.000	-0.001
Comp11	0.11	0.01	0.000	1.00	0.000	-0.001
Competence						
Comp1	4.03	0.81	0.005	0.81	0.005	0.000
Comp2	0.31	0.06	0.002	0.87	0.003	0.001
Comp3	0.24	0.05	0.002	0.92	0.003	0.002
Comp4	0.23	0.05	0.002	0.96	0.001	-0.002
Comp5	0.19	0.04	0.001	1.00	0.000	-0.001
Benevolence						
Comp1	2.60	0.87	0.004	0.87	0.004	0.000
Comp2	0.22	0.07	0.003	0.94	0.002	0.001
Comp3	0.19	0.06	0.002	1.00	0.000	-0.001
Honesty						
Comp1	2.73	0.91	0.003	0.91	0.003	0.000
Comp2	0.16	0.05	0.002	0.96	0.001	0.000
Comp3	0.11	0.04	0.001	1.00	0.000	-0.000

Notes: The table shows eigenvalues from the principal component analysis (PCA) eigen decomposition (column 1). The underlying eigenvectors are orthonormal (uncorrelated and normalized). First eigenvalue is our index for each category because the first component explains more than 80% of the variance in each index (columns 2 and 4). Under PCA assumptions, the first principal component is the best synthetic indicator (in the least square sense) of the range of variability of variables considered. The index can be considered a sort of synthetic index that combines or condenses, in a single variable, the consistent information originally dispersed over different measurements. Heteroskedastic robust bootstrap confidence intervals are computed (columns 3 and 5).

Table A3: Treatment Effect on Trust in the Government by perceived quality of the government

VARIABLES	Trust in the Government Global Index	Dimenions of Trust			Direct measure Trustworthiness
		Competence	Benevolence	Honesty	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T: Received informational vignette	0.035	0.039	0.026	0.035	0.053
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Perceived Quality of the Government (base = very high)					
Low	0.010	-0.176	0.088	0.212	-0.024
	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.175)	(0.118)
Medium	-0.249**	-0.224**	-0.311***	-0.197**	-0.253***
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.084)	(0.053)
Interactions					
T × Low	0.060	0.086	0.054	0.022	0.049
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.121)	(0.112)
T × Medium	0.181***	0.163**	0.216***	0.152**	0.134**
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.045)
Constant	-2.202***	-2.052***	-1.953***	-2.406***	-2.140***
	(0.155)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.142)	(0.170)
Observations	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278
R-squared	0.668	0.639	0.602	0.630	0.609
Low = -T × Low	0.506	0.434	0.234	0.034	0.809
T×Low = T	0.834	0.694	0.815	0.933	0.977
Medium = -T × Medium	0.254	0.247	0.208	0.460	0.071
T×Medium = T	0.116	0.195	0.056	0.231	0.300
T×Med-high=T×Low	0.270	0.519	0.131	0.282	0.376

Notes: All regressions include controls and *comuna* fixed effects. All dependent variables are constructed using a PCA method, and standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. The Competence dimension considers the assessments of the following characteristics, the government: is capable, is innovative, thinks in the long run, and plans and informs its plans; the Benevolence dimension considers the following: does what is best for the city, acts in the interests of its neighbors, helps those in need and pursues policies and projects beneficial for the families. Finally, the Honesty dimension takes into account: is sincere, is transparent, fulfills its promises. We also study the effect of information on a direct measure of trust in government that asks the respondents to indicate the degree in which she agrees that the city government is trustworthy. Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), being first exposed to information on , pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and the collective action dummy variable. Clustered errors at the commune level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Treatment Effect on Trust in the Government by level of knowledge of 'Compromisos'

VARIABLES	Trust in the Government Global Index	Dimenions of Trust			Direct measure Trustworthiness
		Competence	Benevolence	Honesty	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T: Received informational vignette	-0.021	-0.035	-0.011	-0.006	0.025
	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.086)
Knowledge of the 'Compromisos' Policy (base = Knows it)					
Don't know it	-0.292**	-0.291***	-0.323**	-0.232**	-0.230**
	(0.102)	(0.090)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.098)
Have heard of it	-0.190*	-0.168*	-0.197**	-0.196*	-0.169*
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.085)
Interactions					
T × Don't know	0.129	0.184*	0.109	0.053	0.025
	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.115)
T × Heard of	0.187*	0.172*	0.188*	0.186*	0.162
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Constant	-2.078***	-2.056***	-1.791***	-2.137***	-2.096***
	(0.142)	(0.133)	(0.167)	(0.131)	(0.162)
Observations	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278
R-squared	0.670	0.642	0.601	0.629	0.611
Don't Know = -T × Don't know	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.000	0.000
T×Don't know = T	0.432	0.214	0.557	0.767	0.999
Heard = -T × Heard	0.917	0.907	0.817	0.776	0.868
T×Heard = T	0.266	0.240	0.296	0.326	0.467
T×Don't know = T×Heard	0.395	0.865	0.289	0.070	0.118

Notes: All regressions include controls and *comuna* fixed effects. All dependent variables are constructed using a PCA method, and standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. The Competence dimension considers the assessments of the following characteristics, the government: is capable, is innovative, thinks in the long run, and plans and informs its plans; the Benevolence dimension considers the following: does what is best for the city, acts in the interests of its neighbors, helps those in need and pursues policies and projects beneficial for the families. Finally, the Honesty dimension takes into account: is sincere, is transparent, fulfills its promises. We also study the effect of information on a direct measure of trust in government that asks the respondents to indicate the degree in which she agrees that the city government is trustworthy. Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), being first exposed to information on , pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and the collective action dummy variable. Clustered errors at the commune level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5: Triple Difference

VARIABLES	Trust in the Government Global Index	Trustworthiness Direct Measure
	(1)	(2)
T: Received any informational vignette	-0.083*	-0.030
	(0.045)	(0.054)
Previous knowledge of compromisos (base: Familiar)		
Unfamiliar (U)	-0.287***	-0.245***
	(0.062)	(0.075)
Somewhat familiar (S)	-0.222***	-0.158**
	(0.053)	(0.065)
Perceived quality of the city government (base: High)		
Low Quality (L)	-0.000	0.182
	(0.389)	(0.375)
Medium Quality (M)	-0.416***	-0.445***
	(0.131)	(0.140)
Interactions		
Knowledge and Perceived Quality as categorical (base: Familiar, High)		
Unfamiliar x Low	-0.052	-0.262
	(0.383)	(0.374)
Unfamiliar x Medium	0.146	0.231
	(0.146)	(0.162)
Somewhat Familiar x Low	-0.176	-0.554
	(0.382)	(0.360)
Somewhat Familiar x Medium	0.221	0.185
	(0.141)	(0.154)
T x Unfamiliar	0.119	0.054
	(0.078)	(0.091)
T x Somewhat Familiar	0.174***	0.135*
	(0.064)	(0.076)
T x Low	-0.143	-0.296
	(0.385)	(0.369)
T x Medium	0.283*	0.307**
	(0.148)	(0.154)
T x Unfamiliar x Low	0.186	0.349
	(0.411)	(0.401)
T x Unfamiliar x Medium	-0.146	-0.275
	(0.177)	(0.192)
T x Somewhat Familiar x Low	0.419	0.660*
	(0.417)	(0.394)
T x Somewhat Familiar x Medium	-0.123	-0.135
	(0.169)	(0.182)
Constant	-1.890***	-1.873***
	(0.165)	(0.184)
Observations	2,278	2,278
R-squared	0.676	0.618

Notes: All regressions include controls and *comuna* fixed effects. We assess the interacted effect of previous knowledge, perceived quality of the government and the informational treatment over the Index of Trust in the Government and its direct measure. People who had never heard about the compromisos are classified as *Unfamiliar* in the Knowledge variable, those who have heard about it, are categorized as *Somewhat familiar*, and those aware of its existence, as *Familiar*. Perceived Quality of the Government is categorized as High, Medium, or Low, which stand for 8 to 10 ranking, 4 to 7, and 1 to 3 perceived quality of government, respectively. In all cases where categorical variables are used, category three is used as the base, i.e., *Familiar* and *High*. Control variables include age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences and the collective action dummy variable. Standard errors in parentheses (Stata hc3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Means by which individuals got information about the commitments

	By what means did you find out about the commitments?					
	Announc. pub. road	Diff. in subway	CABA website	Social Media	CABA articles	Mayor present.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Know Compromisos	-0.032**	-0.029***	0.077***	-0.155***	0.038***	0.101***
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Constant	0.114***	0.053***	0.201***	0.486***	0.059***	0.086***
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Observations	1,533	1,533	1,533	1,533	1,533	1,533

Notes: People who reported knowing the commitments or hearing about them ex-ante were asked about the means through which they got information about the policy. People indicated that they had heard or known about 'Compromisos' through: (1) Announcements in public roads, (2) Diffusion in the subway, (3) The CABA Government web page, (4) Social media, (5) Notes and articles of the CABA Government, (5) Mayor presentations. The independent dependent variable takes the value of one if the respondent indicated that she knew the policy before the survey, and zero if she indicates that had heard about it.

Table A7: Estimations with extreme values

VARIABLES	Capable		Best		Innovative		Long-term		Plans		Neigh		Helps needy		Benef		Sincere		Transparent		Promises		Trust	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
T1: Commitments	0.009	0.049**	0.016	0.054**	0.000	0.025	0.033*	0.070***	0.034*	0.068**	0.029	0.033	0.056*	0.049**	0.045**	0.077***	0.052**	0.043*	0.025	0.028	0.035	0.071***	0.054***	0.055**
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)
T2: Commit. + Fulfil. city	0.027	0.063**	0.036*	0.035	0.004	0.031	0.043**	0.087**	0.061***	0.095***	0.032	0.032	0.062**	0.052*	0.040	0.059**	0.045*	0.035	0.009	0.025	0.062***	0.095***	0.034	0.046*
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
T3: Commit. + Fulfil. comuna	0.025	0.068***	0.017	0.065**	0.009	0.042	0.028	0.105***	0.032	0.078***	0.006	0.042*	0.048**	0.045*	0.060**	0.093***	0.017	0.029*	-0.008	0.023	0.047**	0.090***	0.024	0.043**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Constant	-0.043	-0.323***	-0.072	-0.255***	0.020	-0.327***	-0.050	-0.385***	0.019	-0.178**	-0.160**	-0.247***	-0.317***	-0.215**	-0.251***	-0.280***	-0.310***	-0.353***	-0.349***	-0.410***	-0.307***	-0.505***	-0.313***	-0.461***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.062)
Observations	1,550	2,278	1,493	2,278	1,558	2,278	1,585	2,278	1,438	2,278	1,397	2,278	1,291	2,278	1,327	2,278	1,455	2,278	1,479	2,278	1,375	2,278	1,501	2,278
R-squared	0.587	0.386	0.632	0.397	0.540	0.343	0.546	0.357	0.512	0.304	0.612	0.350	0.584	0.255	0.575	0.295	0.618	0.369	0.626	0.373	0.650	0.373	0.651	0.413
Extreme values	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5	6a7 vs 1a2	6a7 vs 1t5
Joint significance (p-value)	0.646	0.786	0.368	0.195	0.954	0.901	0.724	0.514	0.227	0.252	0.639	0.842	0.830	0.969	0.663	0.557	0.438	0.848	0.347	0.981	0.561	0.527	0.397	0.844
t1=t2	0.419	0.650	0.195	0.413	0.842	0.839	0.523	0.506	0.135	0.234	0.835	0.958	0.837	0.948	0.816	0.529	0.728	0.728	0.541	0.923	0.292	0.359	0.359	0.750
t1=t3	0.549	0.518	0.968	0.702	0.777	0.673	0.847	0.257	0.946	0.731	0.426	0.729	0.800	0.869	0.578	0.543	0.223	0.573	0.158	0.851	0.598	0.302	0.186	0.586
t2=t3	0.937	0.896	0.345	0.0960	0.873	0.693	0.548	0.474	0.227	0.337	0.352	0.609	0.552	0.824	0.373	0.288	0.274	0.790	0.452	0.929	0.519	0.823	0.610	0.847

Notes: All dependent variables are binary variables that take the value of one if people indicated a high level of agreement with the statement (6 or 7) and zero if they respond with a low level of agreement (1 or 2) in each variable first column, and zero if people responded less than 6 in each variable second column. The Competence dimension considers the assessments of the following characteristics, the government: is capable, does what is best for the city, is innovative, thinks in the long run, and plans and informs its plans; the Benevolence dimension considers the following: acts in the interests of its residents, helps those in need and pursues policies and projects beneficial for the families. Finally, the Honesty dimension takes into account: is sincere, is transparent, fulfills its promises. We also study the effect of information on a direct measure of trust in government that asks the respondents to indicate the degree in which she agrees that the city government is trustworthy. Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), being first exposed to information on , pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and the collective action dummy variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A8: ITT on Trust in Institutions

Dimension of Trust	**Keep their promises**				**Care about people like you**				**Comply with the law**			
Agent	Politicians	Public Servants	Family members	Neighbors	Politicians	Public Servants	Family members	Neighbors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
T1: Commitments	0.020	-0.003	-0.013	0.002	0.036*	0.045***	0.011	-0.002	0.014	0.014	0.006	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.021)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.023	0.027	-0.035	-0.035*	0.004	0.039	-0.004	-0.027	0.017	0.030	-0.009	0.015
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.024)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.001	0.007	0.013	0.038	-0.007	0.049**	0.005	0.024	0.043*	0.009	0.043*	0.028
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Constant	0.228***	0.531***	0.869***	0.516***	0.266***	0.513***	0.853***	0.454***	0.255***	0.581***	0.887***	0.566***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Observations	2207	2221	2217	2155	2192	2208	2216	2174	2188	2164	2197	2157
Joint significance	0.601	0.524	0.274	0.044	0.030	0.957	0.697	0.083	0.109	0.747	0.059	0.895
T1=T2	0.830	0.280	0.285	0.237	0.024	0.855	0.434	0.449	0.928	0.549	0.440	0.842
T1=T3	0.397	0.784	0.162	0.338	0.041	0.808	0.793	0.275	0.050	0.874	0.028	0.751
T2=T3	0.318	0.493	0.116	0.015	0.614	0.779	0.578	0.041	0.230	0.475	0.038	0.639

Notes: All regressions include controls and commune fixed effects. All dependent variables are binary and take the value of one when the individual scored 'Very common' or 'Somewhat common' to the question *Do you think it is very common, somewhat common, unusual, or not at all common that* ***the agent*** *KEEP THEIR PROMISES/CARE ABOUT THE INTERESTS OF PEOPLE LIKE YOU?* Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), first exposure to , pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and the collective action dummy variable. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A9: Treatment Effect on Trust in the Government by perceived quality of the government

	Comunas														
Trust in the Government (Index)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
T1: Commitments	0.092	0.154	0.147	0.122	0.030	-0.246	-0.075	-0.032	0.306**	0.240	0.151	-0.082	0.061	0.043	0.261*
	(0.122)	(0.135)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.131)	(0.184)	(0.127)	(0.189)	(0.144)	(0.165)	(0.139)	(0.170)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.143)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.139	-0.011	0.064	0.097	0.244*	-0.120	0.100	0.152	0.108	0.331**	-0.031	0.055	-0.013	0.296**	0.235
	(0.120)	(0.146)	(0.164)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.175)	(0.145)	(0.221)	(0.196)	(0.167)	(0.128)	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.154)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	0.005	-0.019	0.158	0.093	0.244*	0.209	-0.032	-0.076	0.184	0.354**	-0.212	0.145	0.114	0.323**	0.162
	(0.103)	(0.198)	(0.125)	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.211)	(0.161)	(0.210)	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.218)	(0.143)	(0.120)	(0.148)	(0.164)
Constant	-1.800***	-3.042***	-2.403***	-1.762***	-2.550***	-2.083*	-2.484***	-1.843***	-1.946***	-2.210***	-2.179***	-3.185***	-2.165***	-2.443***	-1.904***
	(0.348)	(0.498)	(0.417)	(0.334)	(0.527)	(1.156)	(0.551)	(0.542)	(0.341)	(0.437)	(0.543)	(0.399)	(0.498)	(0.486)	(0.627)
$\beta_3 - \beta_1$	-0.087	-0.173	0.011	-0.029	0.213	0.455	0.043	-0.044	-0.122	0.115	-0.363	0.227	0.053	0.28	-0.099
$\beta_3 - \beta_2$	-0.134	-0.009	0.094	-0.004	-0.001	0.329	-0.132	-0.228	0.076	0.023	-0.181	0.090	0.127	0.027	-0.073
Wald tests															
Joint significance (p-value)	0.490	0.413	0.854	0.976	0.183	0.339	0.414	0.561	0.441	0.756	0.250	0.302	0.610	0.079	0.831
T1=T2	0.702	0.264	0.622	0.862	0.091	0.520	0.189	0.364	0.247	0.617	0.279	0.397	0.525	0.082	0.855
T1=T3	0.484	0.317	0.937	0.847	0.110	0.143	0.757	0.838	0.336	0.469	0.119	0.130	0.643	0.064	0.545
T2=T3	0.237	0.964	0.592	0.980	0.996	0.262	0.397	0.337	0.649	0.895	0.440	0.459	0.323	0.881	0.670
R-squared	0.647	0.683	0.677	0.727	0.809	0.677	0.699	0.580	0.701	0.738	0.612	0.716	0.760	0.758	0.736

Dimension: Competence	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
T1: Commitments	0.119	0.166	0.139	0.152	-0.022	-0.207	-0.053	-0.053	0.285**	0.211	0.236	-0.089	0.074	-0.003	0.095
	(0.130)	(0.146)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.202)	(0.130)	(0.198)	(0.142)	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.185)	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.134)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.135	0.102	0.018	0.095	0.209	0.039	0.035	0.247	0.126	0.365*	0.038	0.043	-0.032	0.230*	0.183
	(0.125)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.180)	(0.154)	(0.209)	(0.199)	(0.191)	(0.142)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.156)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.001	0.082	0.167	0.106	0.266*	0.258	-0.037	-0.100	0.235	0.329**	-0.231	0.138	0.146	0.290*	0.044
	(0.108)	(0.210)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.147)	(0.216)	(0.161)	(0.209)	(0.169)	(0.151)	(0.236)	(0.145)	(0.120)	(0.148)	(0.174)
Constant	-1.702***	-2.910***	-2.381***	-1.921***	-2.453***	-2.489**	-2.555***	-1.913***	-1.937***	-1.999***	-2.125***	-2.908***	-2.247***	-2.490***	-1.964***
	(0.391)	(0.499)	(0.409)	(0.362)	(0.636)	(1.228)	(0.529)	(0.563)	(0.398)	(0.540)	(0.572)	(0.418)	(0.384)	(0.515)	(0.729)
$\beta_3 - \beta_1$	-0.120	-0.0840	0.0290	-0.0460	0.288	0.465	0.0150	-0.0460	-0.0490	0.118	-0.468	0.228	0.0720	0.293	-0.0500
$\beta_3 - \beta_2$	-0.136	-0.0200	0.149	0.0110	0.0570	0.219	-0.0720	-0.347	0.109	-0.0360	-0.270	0.0950	0.178	0.0600	-0.138
Wald tests															
Joint significance (p-value)	0.503	0.872	0.705	0.912	0.157	0.272	0.799	0.174	0.639	0.660	0.150	0.346	0.379	0.114	0.742
T1=T2	0.906	0.703	0.487	0.702	0.112	0.220	0.511	0.112	0.346	0.450	0.253	0.460	0.369	0.131	0.553
T1=T3	0.383	0.655	0.825	0.735	0.0650	0.143	0.912	0.829	0.705	0.436	0.0590	0.163	0.530	0.0630	0.776
T2=T3	0.268	0.925	0.410	0.940	0.660	0.458	0.644	0.112	0.531	0.854	0.265	0.452	0.166	0.736	0.473
R-squared	0.593	0.630	0.656	0.723	0.758	0.670	0.680	0.601	0.687	0.682	0.584	0.686	0.757	0.732	0.711

Dimension: Benevolence	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
T1: Commitments	0.089	0.138	0.153	0.102	-0.093	-0.272	-0.024	0.143	0.248	0.324*	0.081	-0.224	0.016	0.096	0.444**
	(0.131)	(0.150)	(0.135)	(0.115)	(0.162)	(0.193)	(0.143)	(0.182)	(0.171)	(0.176)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.184)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.110	-0.143	0.153	0.138	0.195	-0.260	0.160	0.100	0.156	0.393**	-0.087	-0.062	-0.034	0.381***	0.333*
	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.160)	(0.134)	(0.155)	(0.192)	(0.161)	(0.231)	(0.217)	(0.183)	(0.159)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.144)	(0.181)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	0.020	-0.123	0.159	0.082	0.196	0.167	0.007	0.025	0.200	0.429**	-0.230	0.054	0.103	0.302*	0.377*
	(0.111)	(0.204)	(0.145)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.213)	(0.185)	(0.225)	(0.177)	(0.166)	(0.219)	(0.146)	(0.127)	(0.167)	(0.194)
Constant	-1.461***	-3.176***	-2.108***	-1.296***	-2.173***	-1.533	-1.940***	-1.816***	-1.764***	-2.275***	-2.191***	-3.114***	-1.630***	-2.134***	-1.488**
	(0.367)	(0.576)	(0.438)	(0.324)	(0.459)	(1.000)	(0.552)	(0.515)	(0.396)	(0.469)	(0.549)	(0.428)	(0.594)	(0.497)	(0.582)
$\beta_3 - \beta_1$	-0.0680	-0.261	0.00600	-0.0190	0.289	0.439	0.0320	-0.117	-0.0480	0.105	-0.311	0.279	0.0870	0.207	-0.0670
$\beta_3 - \beta_2$	-0.0900	0.0200	0.00700	-0.0560	0.00100	0.427	-0.153	-0.0740	0.0450	0.0360	-0.143	0.116	0.137	-0.0790	0.0440
Wald tests															
Joint significance (p-value)	0.736	0.137	0.999	0.946	0.0980	0.299	0.483	0.887	0.909	0.830	0.379	0.161	0.604	0.123	0.759
T1=T2	0.872	0.0740	1	0.808	0.0450	0.955	0.236	0.850	0.671	0.711	0.368	0.296	0.721	0.0640	0.458
T1=T3	0.592	0.150	0.967	0.910	0.0670	0.147	0.854	0.626	0.776	0.546	0.186	0.0600	0.500	0.204	0.693
T2=T3	0.455	0.919	0.971	0.753	0.993	0.146	0.422	0.781	0.824	0.844	0.548	0.339	0.331	0.688	0.785
R-squared	0.598	0.649	0.617	0.668	0.751	0.623	0.591	0.528	0.623	0.712	0.569	0.703	0.686	0.702	0.668

	Comunas														
Dimension: Honesty	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
T1: Commitments	0.044	0.133	0.140	0.084	0.219*	-0.252	-0.148	-0.155	0.359**	0.177	0.071	0.075	0.079	0.057	0.310*
	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.180)	(0.139)	(0.262)	(0.161)	(0.178)	(0.141)	(0.182)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.164)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.154	-0.056	0.043	0.052	0.312**	-0.211	0.129	0.043	0.026	0.185	-0.080	0.176	0.037	0.282**	0.198
	(0.119)	(0.163)	(0.171)	(0.138)	(0.129)	(0.187)	(0.150)	(0.285)	(0.203)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.130)	(0.175)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	0.001	-0.072	0.127	0.072	0.229*	0.153	-0.058	-0.126	0.073	0.283*	-0.144	0.224	0.063	0.349**	0.121
	(0.109)	(0.199)	(0.138)	(0.164)	(0.129)	(0.216)	(0.167)	(0.246)	(0.168)	(0.153)	(0.216)	(0.155)	(0.148)	(0.144)	(0.179)
Constant	-2.056***	-2.749***	-2.442***	-1.754***	-2.756***	-1.751	-2.604***	-1.543**	-1.895***	-2.216***	-1.998***	-3.281***	-2.289***	-2.377***	-1.976***
	(0.334)	(0.696)	(0.454)	(0.363)	(0.542)	(1.144)	(0.629)	(0.664)	(0.404)	(0.384)	(0.596)	(0.428)	(0.649)	(0.443)	(0.679)
$\beta_3 - \beta_1$	-0.0430	-0.205	-0.0130	-0.0120	0.0100	0.406	0.0900	0.0290	-0.286	0.106	-0.214	0.148	-0.0150	0.292	-0.190
$\beta_3 - \beta_2$	-0.153	-0.0170	0.0840	0.0190	-0.0830	0.364	-0.187	-0.169	0.0470	0.0980	-0.0630	0.0480	0.0260	0.0670	-0.0770
Wald tests															
Joint significance (p-value)	0.364	0.349	0.850	0.978	0.700	0.382	0.153	0.719	0.118	0.791	0.568	0.638	0.941	0.0840	0.471
T1=T2	0.376	0.257	0.578	0.833	0.442	0.835	0.0550	0.439	0.0880	0.962	0.405	0.556	0.727	0.112	0.466
T1=T3	0.736	0.225	0.928	0.945	0.936	0.181	0.543	0.904	0.0720	0.554	0.357	0.345	0.913	0.0440	0.232
T2=T3	0.168	0.933	0.645	0.911	0.499	0.207	0.227	0.520	0.804	0.560	0.787	0.718	0.861	0.680	0.654
R-squared	0.629	0.678	0.639	0.668	0.799	0.641	0.687	0.451	0.658	0.732	0.572	0.663	0.678	0.736	0.707

Trust in the Government (Direct)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
T1: Commitments	0.056	0.187	0.114	0.107	0.188	-0.199	0.072	0.158	0.227	0.402*	0.189	-0.008	-0.036	-0.027	0.271*
	(0.131)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.183)	(0.135)	(0.257)	(0.170)	(0.205)	(0.162)	(0.185)	(0.131)	(0.144)	(0.153)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.123	-0.023	0.032	0.021	0.276*	-0.113	0.206	-0.053	-0.110	0.438**	-0.005	0.086	0.103	0.285*	0.188
	(0.113)	(0.154)	(0.191)	(0.138)	(0.152)	(0.190)	(0.159)	(0.255)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.148)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.151)	(0.160)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.000	-0.068	0.199	0.097	0.155	0.192	0.079	-0.135	0.094	0.499**	-0.173	0.077	-0.085	0.310*	0.134
	(0.099)	(0.195)	(0.156)	(0.186)	(0.152)	(0.231)	(0.152)	(0.263)	(0.165)	(0.196)	(0.221)	(0.149)	(0.140)	(0.176)	(0.169)
Constant	-1.904***	-2.562***	-2.682***	-1.635***	-2.826***	-1.624	-2.631***	-1.145	-1.673***	-2.267***	-2.244***	-3.343***	-2.598***	-2.165***	-1.788***
	(0.363)	(0.706)	(0.467)	(0.388)	(0.651)	(1.050)	(0.568)	(0.795)	(0.490)	(0.480)	(0.549)	(0.493)	(0.454)	(0.418)	(0.661)
$\beta_3 - \beta_1$	-0.0570	-0.255	0.0850	-0.0100	-0.0330	0.391	0.00700	-0.293	-0.134	0.0970	-0.362	0.0850	-0.0490	0.338	-0.137
$\beta_3 - \beta_2$	-0.123	-0.0460	0.167	0.0760	-0.121	0.305	-0.128	-0.0820	0.204	0.0610	-0.168	-0.00800	-0.189	0.0260	-0.0540
Wald tests															
Joint significance (p-value)	0.506	0.254	0.655	0.837	0.599	0.450	0.614	0.387	0.277	0.843	0.305	0.850	0.352	0.0800	0.637
T1=T2	0.604	0.214	0.643	0.568	0.540	0.679	0.369	0.335	0.112	0.843	0.325	0.597	0.272	0.0640	0.535
T1=T3	0.662	0.144	0.556	0.957	0.816	0.210	0.960	0.207	0.439	0.562	0.136	0.601	0.719	0.0650	0.363
T2=T3	0.244	0.815	0.370	0.690	0.321	0.297	0.397	0.747	0.257	0.744	0.476	0.949	0.178	0.897	0.725
R-squared	0.632	0.677	0.627	0.594	0.753	0.617	0.702	0.465	0.634	0.647	0.546	0.675	0.685	0.668	0.739
Observations	266	121	175	185	147	120	154	110	130	115	123	167	168	160	137

Table A10: Selection Analysis

	Commune in which the individual lives in														
Variable	C.1	C.2	C.3	C.4	C.5	C.6	C.7	C.8	C.9	C.10	C.11	C.12	C.13	C.14	C.15
T1: Commitments	-0.020	0.011	0.021	-0.020	0.009	-0.006	-0.007	0.008	-0.016	0.003	0.025*	-0.008	0.001	-0.024	0.023*
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.008	-0.002	-0.009	-0.011	-0.003	0.004	0.004	-0.005	-0.024*	-0.005	0.033**	0.021	-0.002	-0.029*	0.021
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	0.002	0.022	0.005	-0.027	0.005	-0.013	-0.014	0.009	-0.018	-0.003	0.008	0.016	-0.003	-0.022	0.033**
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Age	-0.001***	0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.001***	0.000	0.001**	0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender	-0.020	-0.006	-0.013	0.010	-0.002	0.012	0.009	0.004	0.000	-0.001	0.007	-0.001	0.002	-0.006	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
College	0.012	0.044***	0.010	-0.041***	-0.011	-0.007	0.002	-0.029***	-0.005	-0.015	-0.018	-0.009	0.031**	0.020	0.016
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
High School	-0.037	0.014	-0.005	-0.018	-0.003	-0.003	0.003	-0.015	0.003	0.007	0.003	0.014	0.020	0.029**	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Employed	0.028	-0.004	-0.001	0.008	-0.004	0.012	0.026**	-0.032***	-0.021*	-0.007	0.001	0.009	-0.027*	0.019	-0.004
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Unemployed	0.001	-0.021	-0.017	-0.019	0.008	-0.004	0.044**	0.017	-0.006	-0.001	0.007	-0.005	-0.016	0.027	-0.013
	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Socio-economic level (high)	-0.031*	0.019	0.007	-0.015	-0.026*	0.023	-0.014	0.019	-0.026*	0.014	0.011	0.001	0.019	0.001	-0.002
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Voluntary Health Insurance	0.012	0.033	-0.057	-0.053	0.026	0.045*	0.014	-0.003	0.002	0.007	-0.021	-0.046	-0.009	0.022	0.029
	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.022)
Internet at home	0.005	0.005	-0.037	-0.035	0.017	0.016	-0.000	0.002	0.009	0.001	-0.004	-0.026	-0.013	0.014	0.047***
	(0.035)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Credit Card	0.000	0.006	0.022	-0.007	0.016	0.009	-0.026	-0.033*	-0.020	-0.025	-0.007	0.040*	0.024	0.018	-0.017
	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)
One or more cars	-0.033	-0.027	-0.036*	0.006	-0.018	-0.013	0.004	0.006	0.031*	0.008	0.047***	-0.021	-0.001	0.010	0.038**
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Perceived Quality of Governm.	0.005*	-0.000	0.002	-0.007**	-0.004*	-0.000	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Knowledge of the 'Compromisos' Policy (base = Knows it)															
Doesn't know it	0.021	0.001	-0.014	-0.017	0.010	0.006	-0.012	-0.014	-0.025*	0.023*	0.000	0.024	-0.001	-0.015	0.014
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Have heard of it	0.020	-0.002	-0.051***	-0.002	0.002	-0.006	0.032**	-0.007	-0.003	0.014	0.005	-0.008	0.019	-0.010	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Trust in others	0.009	0.015	-0.014	0.003	0.009	0.011	0.002	-0.013	-0.002	-0.035***	-0.015	0.023*	-0.012	0.012	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Collective Action	-0.039**	-0.011	-0.010	0.005	-0.009	0.000	0.028**	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.018*	0.008	-0.000	-0.015	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Constant	0.178***	-0.018	0.188***	0.247***	0.058	0.003	0.021	0.162***	0.144***	-0.014	0.016	0.002	0.019	0.021	-0.026
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Observations	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152	2,152
R-squared	0.021	0.029	0.016	0.022	0.007	0.014	0.014	0.037	0.014	0.017	0.012	0.013	0.018	0.015	0.012

Notes: All regressions above include control variables: age, gender (female=1), socio-economic level, labor status, first exposure to commitments and pre-treatment beliefs on government quality. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.

A.2 Figures

Figure A1: Experiment 'Timeline'



Source: Authors' design

Figure A2: Trust in the Government - Competence dimension



Notes: Each bar displays the percentage of people who indicated the given level of agreement that the city government: is capable, does what is best for the city, is innovative, thinks in the long term, plans and informs. Gray bars depict people from the control group, while red bars show the percentage of people assigned to any treatment arm. The agreement scale goes from (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree.

Figure A3: Trust in the Government - Benevolence dimension



Notes: Each bar displays the percentage of people who indicated the given level of agreement that the city government: acts in the interests of the residents, helps those in need and pursues projects that are beneficial for your family and friends. Gray bars depict people from the control group, while red bars show the percentage of people assigned to any treatment arm. The agreement scale goes from (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree.

Figure A4: Trust in the Government - Honesty dimension



Notes: Each bar displays the percentage of people who indicated the given level of agreement that the city government: is sincere, is transparent and fulfills its promises. Gray bars depict people from the control group, while red bars show the percentage of people assigned to any treatment arm. The agreement scale goes from (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree.

Figure A5: Correlation between Perceived Quality of the Government and Trust in the Government



Notes: The dependent variable is constructed using a PCA method, and a standardization with mean zero and standard deviation one.

Figure A6: Previous knowledge of the 'Compromisos' Policy



Notes: The figure presents the percentage of citizens within the control group that knew the policy before the survey experiment, had heard about it or did not know it at all.

Figure A7: Components of the index by level of knowledge of the Compromisos Policy



Notes: The figure presents categorical variables that assess citizens' perception of the Government, standardized between zero and one. They account for each of the characteristics asked in the question: *Using a scale from 1 to 7, where one is "Completely disagree," and seven is "Completely agree," please show your level of agreement with the following statements about the Government of the city of Buenos Aires.* The interpretation of each bar goes as follows, e.g.: *68%* of the surveyed individuals consider that the CABA Government *is capable*. Darker bars represent individuals from the control group who indicated they did not know or had only heard of the 'Compromisos' policy, the lighter one depicts the control participants who knew for sure the policy. Stars show the level of significance of the difference between people who know and do not know the policy among the control individuals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Figure A8: Distribution of Perceived Quality of the Government by Level of Knowledge of 'Compromisos'



Notes: We present two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of the distribution functions in a pairwise fashion. Comparisons of distribution x (Dx) vs. distribution y (Dy) are uni-directional and one-tailed tests. They indicate whether perceptions of the government are smaller for Dx compared to Dy, p-values are shown in parentheses. D2 vs. D3: 0.134 (0.000); D1 vs. D3: 0.308 (0.000); D1 vs. D2: 0.179 (0.000).

Figure A9: Distribution of Trust by Level of Knowledge of 'Compromisos'



Notes: Dashed lines (Dd) correspond to the distribution of the Trust Index for the control while solid lines (Ds) for the treated group. We present two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of the distributions in a pairwise fashion for the Trust (Index) Measure, Trust(Direct) available upon request. Comparisons of Ds,k vs. Dd,k - solid versus dashed lines for each knowledge level k - are uni-directional and one-tailed tests. They indicate whether the trust index is smaller for the Dd (control group) compared to Ds (treatment). Ds,k=1 vs. Dd,k=1: 0.079 (0.236); Ds,k=2 vs. Dd,k=2: 0.120 (0.006); Ds,k=3 vs. Dd,k=3: 0.073 (0.621). Finally we include the test for people who was treated and already knew about the commitments and those who had only heard about them to test for whether the impact of the information can level trust between those who already knew and those who acquire new information. Ds,k=3 vs Ds,k=2: 0.169 (0.000)

Figure A10: Treatment Effect Trust in the Government (dimensions) by level of knowledge of 'Compromisos'



Notes: Dependent variables depicted in this figure are constructed using a PCA method. The estimate points correspond to the effect of each treatment in the level of knowledge group of people indicated in the legend. For example, people who did not know about the commitments before the survey increase their perception of competence of the government to a greater extent than people who have heard about the policy or knew for sure. The color intensity of confidence intervals represents the confidence level, from darker to lighter, 90%, 95%, and 99%.

Figure A11: Average Trust in Information provided by different agents, by level of previous knowledge (control group)



Notes: All variables are categorical and respond to the question "To what extent do you trust the information about government performance and management provided by [*the Government / your family / social media / traditional media (TV or radio)*]?" They take values between one and five, being 1 the lowest category ("Not at all"), and 5 the highest ("Very much").

B Institutions and Individuals

Trust is a multidimensional state in which individuals rely on the integrity, ability, and surety of a person or institution. Providing information about the mayor's commitments at the beginning of his mandate and their fulfillment have been shown to induce important changes in citizens' perceived trustworthiness of the city government as an institution. However, trust is also grounded in the belief that state members can deliver what they promise and commit to it. Citizens rely upon government officials to carry out the investments they promised while in the campaign. Hence, individuals expect public servants and politicians to care about the population and act accordingly.

Following Keefer et al. (2018) and Keefer et al. (2020), we consider two important trust components: whether others can keep their promises and whether they care about people like the respondent to assess how much do people trust those who develop public policy and commit to achieving the city's goals when shown with relevant information about their management. Citizens can update their beliefs about government members' trustworthiness and benevolence when presented with relevant information on what they have done for the city.

We do not find that information on commitments marginally affects politicians' and public servants' perceived trustworthiness. However, we observe that people are 5 pp more likely to express that public servants care about people like the respondent when they receive general information, regardless of whether it is supplemented by accomplishments at the city or commune level (see Table B1). The management model developed in recent years in CABA is based on transparency, both internal and external. Although this study focuses mainly on how information affects citizens' trust in government (external transparency), this result shows us that internal management perceptions are also changing. In particular, we observe that individuals consider public servants to be more empathetic with society.

We have identified that respondents to the experiment make a sharp distinction between "politicians in general" and the "city government." This is reflected in the high initial perception of *government* quality, and the low perception of the politicians ability to keep their promises in the control group (21.5%). Treatments have less impact on the more personalized evaluation of politicians and public employees than on institutional evaluation of the city government. The non-significance of the effect on politicians may be explained in part by relatively low statistical power.[1,2]

[1]Following McKenzie and Ozier (2019) recommendations, we conduct ex-post Minimal Detectable Effect (MDE) calculations. As we use the estimated standard error to calculate ex-post MDE, it may present some variation from sample to sample. However, this imprecision is lower than the one obtained with ex-post power. Power is set to 80%, the significance level to 5%, and we correct for baseline correlation given that randomization conducted over blocks of age and gender. We conduct pairwise power calculations considering the binary nature of dependent variables, as in Hemming and Marsh (2013), and do not compare two different informational treatments in any case. MDEs are significantly higher than the coefficients we observe in our regressions, which suggest that a greater sample size would have avoided both type I and II errors. An effect lower than 8 pp would not be detected on average.

[2]Our experimental design has three treatment arms, therefore, we also calculate Cohen's δ, which defines the effect size for a one-way analysis of variance, as the square root of the contrast variance to the error or within-group variance. According to Cohen's rule of thumb, we find a small treatment effect. Cohen (2013) indicates that an effect size of 0.2 is small, 0.5, medium, and 0.8 large. This means that if two groups' means do not differ by 0.2 standard deviations or more, the difference is trivial, even if it is

Table B1: Treatment Effect on Trust in Institutional Agents

Dimension of Trust	**Keep their promises**		**Care about people like you**	
Agent	Politicians in General	Public Servants from the City	Politicians in General	Public Servants from the City
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T1: Commitments	0.020	-0.003	0.036*	0.045***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.017)
T2: Commitments + Fulf. city	0.023	0.027	0.004	0.039
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.027)
T3: Commitments + Fulf. comuna	-0.001	0.007	-0.007	0.049**
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Constant	0.228***	0.531***	0.266***	0.513***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	2207	2221	2192	2208
Joint significance	0.601	0.524	0.030	0.957
T1=T2	0.830	0.280	0.024	0.855
T1=T3	0.397	0.784	0.041	0.808
T2=T3	0.318	0.493	0.614	0.779

Notes: All regressions include controls and commune fixed effects. All dependent variables are binary and take the value of one when the individual scored 'Very common' or 'Somewhat common' to the question *Do you think it is very common, somewhat common, unusual, or not at all common that* ***the agent*** KEEP THEIR PROMISES/CARE ABOUT THE INTERESTS OF PEOPLE LIKE YOU? Control variables include: age, gender, socio-economic level, labor status, public policy preferences (revealed preferences for public budget allocation between education and infrastructure), first exposure to , pre-treatment beliefs on government quality and the collective action dummy variable. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

statistically significant.

Figure B1: Treatment Effect on Trust in Government members - Heterogeneous effects



Notes: The color intensity of confidence intervals represents the confidence level, from darker to lighter, 90%, 95%, and 99%.

Table B2: Power estimation - Trust in Government Agents

	Keep their promises		Care about people like you	
	Politicians	Public Servants	Politicians	Public Servants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minimum Detectable Effect				
T1	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08
T2	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08
T3	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08
Control mean	0.23	0.53	0.27	0.49
Baseline adjustment	0.06	0.30	0.05	0.27
Cohen's δ	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.069
Variances				
Between group	2.0	2.7	2.2	2.7
Within group	419.3	571.3	456.7	568.9

Notes: All estimations of the Minimum Detectable Effect specify a comparison of proportions between the treated individuals and people from the control group in a pairwise fashion. We have 596 respondents in T1 - Promises, 549 in T2 - Promises and fulfillment at the city level, 567 individuals in T3 - Promises and fulfillment at the commune level, the remaining 663 in the control group. Power is set to be 80% and significance of the effect 5%. Means and standard deviations of the control group are shown. Considering that the RCT design is multiarmed, we conduct power calculations considering the joint significance of the differences among treatment assignments. The Cohen's δ (Cohen, 2013) provides a unitless measure of the magnitude of an effect with a lower bound of zero. δ is computed as the square root of the ratio between the group's means variance and the error variance; between and within-group variance, respectively.

C Survey Module

C.1 Perceptions of Trust

Items adapted from Grimmelikhuijsen (2012).

- Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is "Completely disagree," and 7 is "Completely agree," please show your level of agreement with the following statements about the Government of the city of Buenos Aires.

The government of the city of Buenos Aires…
Competence:
... is capable.
... does what is best for the city.
... is innovative.
... thinks in the long term.
... plans and informs its plans

Benevolence:
... acts in the interests of residents.
... does everything in its power to help those in need.
... pursues policies and projects that my family cares about.

Honesty:
... is sincere.
... is transparent
... fulfills its promises.

C.2 Trust in Government Members following Keefer et al. (2018)

Specific questions about the expectation that politicians (public officials) will do what they promise, comply to the law or care about the interest of people like the respondent. All categorical variables become binary ones; they take the value of one whenever the respondent answers (1) very common or (2) somewhat common, and zero otherwise.

- Now I am going to ask you about some groups of people, do you think it is (1) very common, (2) somewhat common, (3) uncommon, or (4) not common at all that they comply with the laws and regulations of the country?

... Politicians in general
... Public Servants of the CABA Government
... Members of your family
... Your neighbors

- And thinking about these groups of people, do you think it is (1) very common, (2) somewhat common, (3) uncommon, or (4) not common at all that they think of you and the interests of people like you when making decisions?

- And thinking about these groups of people, do you think it is (1) very common, (2) somewhat common, (3) uncommon, or (4) not common at all that they keep their promises?

C.3 Trust in the Government - by its actions

Specific questions about the expectation that the government will listen to the people when they make a petition or inform about its plans and results. All categorical variables become binary ones.

- Suppose you identify a problem in your neighborhood that needs to be solved by the city government, so you meet with your neighbors to make a request. How feasible do you think it is that the government will listen to your community?

(1) Very likely
(2) Somewhat likely
(3) Unlikely
(4) Very unlikely
(88) - (98) Does not know/ Does not answer

- In your opinion, tell us which of the following statements best represents the City Government:

(1) The CABA Government does not report what it plans to do
(2) announces its plans but then does not report what it has achieved and what is missing
(3) announces its plans and then explains what it accomplished and what is missing

C.4 Trust in the information provided by different agents

Specific questions about the trustworthiness of the information provided by different agents, formal and informal reporting agents. All categorical variables become binary ones.

- On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means "not at all" and 5 means "a lot" To what extent do you trust the information about government performance that you receive from

... The CABA Government itself
... Your closest family and friends
... Social media
... Traditional media (TV or radio)

Figure C1: Treatment 1 - Government promises

Los Compromisos Públicos son objetivos específicos y medibles pensados para mejorar el bienestar y la calidad de vida de los vecinos. Surgen de escuchar las necesidades de los vecinos y responden a los metas específicas que impulsa Naciones Unidas (ONU).

A modo de ejemplo, estos son algunos de los compromisos que efectuamos al inicio de nuestro gobierno :

Figure C2: Treatment 2 - Government promises and fulfillment at the city level (aggregate)

Figure C3: Treatment 3 - Government promises and fulfillment at the comuna level (local)

Figure C4: Map of communes and neighborhoods of CABA

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