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Abstract^{*}

This study examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness in the income distribution, perceived inequality of opportunity, and support for specific redistributive policies. Using a survey experiment administered in eight Latin American countries, we find that factual information about public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceptions of unfairness and unequal opportunity. It also increases support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, these effects do not extend to broader tax-financed redistribution: respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending, nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes. The results are consistent with trust limiting the translation of inequality concerns into support for broader tax-financed redistribution: the treatments increased perceived elite influence over government policy and reduced some measures of trust in public officials and firms.

JEL classification: D31, H21, H26, D73

Keywords: Latin America, inequality, corruption, tax evasion, redistributive policies, survey experiment.

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1 Introduction

Latin America and the Caribbean is among the most unequal regions in the world, yet redistribution from the rich to the poor remains limited. This reflects political and institutional constraints, the limited effectiveness of redistributive policies, and possibly weak citizen demand for efficient redistribution. At the same time, Latin Americans widely perceive the income distribution as unfair and report high levels of government and elite corruption, contributing to low trust in both the public and private sectors (Busso et al., 2025). These perceptions are consistent with evidence that corruption in the region exceeds levels observed in the United States and Europe, and that government inefficiency and fraud waste substantial public resources.¹ The coexistence of widespread perceived unfairness, high perceived corruption, and limited redistribution raises a central question: do corruption and tax-evasion information increase perceived unfairness while limiting support for broader tax-financed redistribution?

We examine this question using a survey experiment conducted in eight Latin American countries. The experiment exposes respondents to information about public corruption or elite tax evasion. The design allows us to assess whether this information increases perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity, and whether these concerns translate into support for broader tax-financed redistribution.

The experiment covers more than 21,000 respondents from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. Online survey respondents were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of two treatment groups. Both treatments used factual prompts based on documented corruption and tax-evasion scandals in Latin America. The first treatment emphasized public corruption, including bribes paid to politicians and public officials to obtain public contracts. The second treatment emphasized elite tax evasion, including the use of offshore structures by wealthy individuals and corporations to hide assets and reduce tax liabilities. The experiment tests whether information that emphasizes public corruption or elite tax evasion has different effects on perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity, redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending, and trust in government and elites.

We find that both treatments increase perceived corruption and tax evasion. The corruption treatment has larger effects on perceptions that politicians and public officials take bribes, but both treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals pay bribes to public officials. Both treatments also increase perceived income hidden from tax authorities by firms and rich individuals. This pattern suggests that respondents do not

¹See [Transparency International \(2025\)](#) and [Izquierdo et al. \(2018\)](#).

sharply separate public corruption from misconduct by firms and rich individuals.

The treatments also increase perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity. Treated respondents are more likely to view the income distribution as unfair. They are also more likely to perceive a larger gap in college-graduation opportunities between smart young people from poor and rich households.

The effects on redistributive preferences are more limited. Both treatments increase support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, neither treatment increases support for broader tax-financed redistribution. Respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending. Nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes.

We also find that both treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals influence government policy to obtain favorable laws and tax exemptions. The corruption treatment also reduces the belief that public officials and firms take the interests of people like the respondent into account; the tax-evasion treatment reduces this belief for firms. Taken together, the results suggest that information about corruption and tax evasion increases perceived unfairness and support for taxation at the top, but does not generate broader support for fiscal instruments that require taxation and government implementation. One interpretation is that respondents may doubt whether additional fiscal resources would be used effectively for redistributive purposes.

This paper contributes to the literature on corruption, inequality, and redistribution by showing that corruption and tax-evasion information can move different components of redistributive preferences in different directions. Prior work argues that corruption can make inequality appear less fair because it allows already privileged groups to obtain additional wealth and influence ([Uslaner, 2017](#); [Vallier, 2021](#)). This view implies that exposure to corruption or elite tax evasion may increase support for redistribution from groups perceived as having benefited unfairly ([Uslaner and Badescu, 2004](#); [Helgason and Mérola, 2022](#); [Di-Tella and Macculloch, 2009](#); [Grimalda and Pipke, 2021](#)). Other work emphasizes an opposing force: corruption may lower support for tax-financed redistribution if it weakens trust in the government's ability to redistribute effectively ([Hauk et al., 2022](#); [Silva et al., 2016](#)). We find that these forces operate at the same time and may counterbalance each other. Information about public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceived unfairness and support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households, but does not increase support for broader tax-financed redistribution. This distinction is important because redistributive preferences are multidimensional: support for taxing high-income groups need not coincide with support for transfers or social spend-

ing targeted to low-income groups (Cavallé and Trump, 2015; Margalit and Raviv, 2024).

The paper also contributes to the literature using survey experiments to study redistributive preferences. Much of this work focuses on high-income countries and shows that beliefs about inequality, mobility, and relative income position are malleable, while policy preferences are harder to move (Alesina et al., 2023, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Stantcheva, 2021). Evidence from Latin America remains more limited, although prior work shows that correcting misperceptions about income position and tax incidence can affect support for redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Ardanaz et al., 2022). We provide experimental evidence from eight Latin American countries, where inequality, corruption, and low trust are salient features of the fiscal-policy environment. The closest paper to ours is Di-Tella et al. (2021), who show that trust in elites and government shapes preferences for taxation at the top in the United States. We extend this work by studying how information about public corruption and elite tax evasion affects perceived unfairness, perceived unequal opportunity, support for taxation at the top, support for broader tax-financed redistribution, and trust in government and elites in Latin America.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the data and measurement. Section 4 presents the two information treatments administered through the survey instrument. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the main findings and additional results. Section 7 concludes.

2 Conceptual Framework

Corruption perceptions may affect redistributive preferences through two countervailing forces. First, they may make inequality appear less fair and increase support for redistribution. Second, they may weaken trust in the institutions responsible for collecting taxes and implementing redistributive policies, reducing support for tax-financed redistribution. The net effect on redistributive preferences is therefore ambiguous *ex ante*.

A first channel operates through perceived fairness. Corruption is commonly defined as the “sale of government property for private gain” (Aidt, 2009). This definition implies misconduct by public officials as well as by private actors who benefit from it. Consistent with this view, perceptions of public and private corruption are distinct but closely related (Di-Tella et al., 2021). When corruption benefits groups that are already privileged, it can make observed inequality appear less deserved. Uslaner (2017) argues that corruption, especially “grand” corruption,² violates fairness by giving additional wealth and influ-

²“Grand” corruption refers to acts of large magnitude that politicians and business leaders engage in to

ence to already advantaged groups. Under this view, inequality may itself be interpreted as evidence of corruption (Vallier, 2021).³

This argument yields two testable predictions. First, information about corruption and tax evasion should increase perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived inequality of opportunity. Second, if respondents view the resulting inequality as undeserved, the same information should increase support for redistribution from groups perceived as having benefited unfairly (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004; Di-Tella and Macculloch, 2009; Grimalda and Pipke, 2021). Scandals involving elite tax evasion may produce similar effects by revealing an unequal tax-compliance system in which wealthy individuals and firms can use offshore structures to reduce tax liabilities (Helgason and Mérola, 2022). We therefore test whether the treatments increase perceived unfairness, perceived unequal opportunity, and support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households.

A second channel operates through institutional trust. Corruption may reduce support for redistribution if citizens distrust the institutions that collect taxes or allocate public resources. Hauk et al. (2022) describe a trust channel through which corruption lowers demand for redistribution because citizens view the government as unable to redistribute efficiently or fairly. Related evidence shows that preferences for redistribution are sensitive to trust in the government's capacity to benefit intended groups (Silva et al., 2016). More generally, corruption can reduce trust in public institutions (Clausen et al., 2011; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), weaken confidence in the government's ability to provide public goods (Cahuc et al., 2011), and reduce willingness to pay for public policies when citizens doubt that governments will fulfill their promises (Anderson, 2017; Oh and Hong, 2012).

This channel is especially relevant for redistributive policies that require higher taxes and government implementation. Trust in public institutions and tax authorities is associated with greater demand for redistribution (Cahuc et al., 2011), while low trust and perceived government inefficiency reduce support for higher taxes (Stantcheva, 2020). In Latin America, low trust has been linked to weaker demand for public goods and redistributive policies, and to stronger preferences for policies that deliver immediate or individualized benefits (Keefer and Scartascini, 2022; Keefer et al., 2022). This yields a third prediction: information about corruption and tax evasion may reduce institutional trust or increase perceived elite influence, limiting support for broader tax-financed re-

enrich themselves.

³Uslaner (2017) also discusses an "inequality trap," in which high inequality reduces trust and increases corruption, which in turn reinforces inequality.

distribution even if inequality concerns increase.

The link between inequality concerns and redistributive policy preferences is therefore not mechanical. Previous survey experiments show that information can change beliefs about inequality and mobility, but policy preferences often respond less. [Kuziemko et al. \(2015\)](#) find that information about inequality increases concern about inequality in the United States but does not increase support for policies to address it, partly because respondents also reduce trust in government. [Stantcheva \(2021\)](#) emphasizes that perceptions of inequality are more malleable than policy preferences. Other studies show that beliefs about the origins of inequality and social mobility shape redistributive preferences ([Akbaş et al., 2019](#); [Alesina et al., 2018](#)). These findings imply that information about corruption and tax evasion may increase inequality concerns without increasing support for all redistributive instruments.

This distinction matters because redistributive preferences are multidimensional. Support for taxing high-income groups does not necessarily imply support for transfers or social spending targeted to low-income groups. [Cavallé and Trump \(2015\)](#) distinguish between support for redistribution from the rich and support for redistribution to the poor, which may reflect different motivations. [Margalit and Raviv \(2024\)](#) show that support for redistribution need not map directly into support for specific progressive taxes or social transfers. We therefore test whether the treatments affect support for taxation at the top, support for broader tax increases to finance social spending, and support for expanding transfer programs through higher taxes.

The framework implies four empirical hypotheses. First, information about corruption and tax evasion should increase perceived corruption and tax evasion. Second, it should increase perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity. Third, it should increase support for taxing rich households if respondents interpret corruption and tax evasion as evidence that high-income groups benefit unfairly. Fourth, it may fail to increase support for broader tax-financed redistribution if the same information weakens institutional trust or increases perceived elite influence over taxation and implementation. The empirical analysis tests these predictions.

3 Data

We designed and fielded the Inter-American Development Bank’s Preferences for Redistribution Survey (IPRS) in eight Latin American countries in fall 2021. The survey collected information on redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending, perceptions of unfairness and unequal opportunity, perceptions of corruption and tax

evasion, and trust in government and elites. Baseline modules elicited respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, political orientation, and policy knowledge.⁴

The survey was administered online.⁵ Samples were collected in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, with a target of 3,000 completed responses per country, and in Guatemala and Panama, with a target of 3,500 completed responses per country. Respondents were required to answer each question before proceeding to the next. Of the 32,805 respondents who accessed the survey, 26,238 completed it. After excluding low-quality responses, the final sample includes 21,471 respondents.⁶

For the analysis, we use four groups of variables.^{7,8} The first group measures redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending. We organize these outcomes into three families. The first family measures support for progressive taxation, including whether rich households should pay a higher share of their income in taxes than middle-class households and whether a person earning three times the minimum wage should pay a higher share than a person earning the minimum wage.⁹ The second family measures support for raising specific taxes—VAT, corporate taxes, and the personal income tax—to finance health, education, and social welfare spending.¹⁰ The third family measures support for increasing spending on the main conditional cash transfer and non-contributory pension programs in each country, explicitly linking higher spending to higher taxes.¹¹

⁴Appendix A provides details on the survey structure, attrition, sample restrictions, and balance across treatment arms. It reports the order and content of the survey modules, documents completion patterns, describes the exclusion of low-quality responses, and compares the control group with each treatment group on baseline characteristics.

⁵Fieldwork was implemented in collaboration with LAPOP at Vanderbilt University. Respondents were recruited from established online panels operated by NetQuest and Offerwise, allowing the survey to be fielded efficiently across countries while limiting the sampling frame to adults with internet access.

⁶See Appendix A for details on the process of removing low-quality responses and additional quality measures.

⁷Appendix B reproduces the survey instrument, including the wording, response options, country-specific VAT answer options, country-specific transfer-program names, and visual formats used for slider and budget-allocation questions.

⁸Appendix C defines the variables used in the empirical analysis, including baseline controls, policy knowledge, perceived income position, political ideology, perceived intergenerational mobility, the corruption indexes, and the main outcome variables. It also explains the minimum-wage anchor used for the within-middle-class progressivity question and the interpretation of the personal-income-tax outcome as support for broadening the tax base among middle-class taxpayers.

⁹We anchor the within-middle-class comparison to the minimum wage because respondents may define the middle class differently across and within countries. The minimum wage provides a common country-specific reference point for comparing support for higher tax rates at different earnings levels.

¹⁰The personal-income-tax question was framed as broadening the tax base among middle-class taxpayers rather than raising rates only on high-income households. This distinction matters because, in much of Latin America, personal income taxes are paid by a relatively small share of households.

¹¹The survey referred to each program by its country-specific name (e.g., Bolsa Familia in the case of

The second group measures perceived corruption and tax evasion. These outcomes include perceptions that politicians and public officials take bribes, perceptions that firms and rich individuals pay bribes to public officials, and perceived income hidden from tax authorities by firms, rich individuals, and other groups. The third group measures perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity. These outcomes include respondents' assessments of how fair the income distribution is and their beliefs about the likelihood that smart young people from poor and rich households can graduate from college. The fourth group measures trust and perceived elite influence. These outcomes include perceptions that firms and rich individuals influence government policy to obtain favorable laws and tax exemptions, and perceptions that politicians, public officials, and firms take into account the interests of people like the respondent.

Table 1: Sample Characteristics

	IPRS Survey	Comparison with other surveys
<i>Panel A: Comparison with Sociómetro (BID)</i>		
Sex (=1 men)	0.44	0.48
Age	35.92	43.21
Married or in cohabitation	0.49	0.57
Has children	0.57	0.75
Completed less than high school	0.07	0.58
Completed high school	0.49	0.25
Completed college	0.44	0.17
Employed	0.58	0.58
<i>Panel B: Comparison with Latinobarómetro (2020)</i>		
Income quintile (perceived)		
Q1	0.21	0.19
Q2	0.20	0.30
Q3	0.19	0.39
Q4	0.21	0.09
Q5	0.18	0.03
Left ideology	0.19	0.29
Right ideology	0.22	0.45
Center or no ideology	0.59	0.38
Policy knowledge	0.47	

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS, Sociómetro-BID, and Latinobarómetro (2020). Perceived income position and political ideology are not directly comparable across surveys because they are measured on different scales. IPRS asks respondents to place themselves in the income distribution on a 0–100 scale, whereas Latinobarómetro uses a 0–10 scale. IPRS measures political ideology on a five-point scale, whereas Latinobarómetro uses a 10-point scale. The variable *policy knowledge* equals one if the respondent correctly answers questions about the VAT rate and the frequency of the government budget cycle. We do not report a comparison for this variable because Latinobarómetro does not include an equivalent question.

Brazil) and briefly described its objective.

The online design enabled broad coverage across eight countries, while producing a sample with the composition typically observed in online surveys. Panel A of Table 1 compares the sample’s socio-demographic characteristics with nationally representative data for the closest available year. Respondents are younger, less likely to be men, married, or have children, and more educated than the general population. Panel B compares the sample with Latinobarometro (2020), a regionally representative public opinion survey. Respondents in our sample are more likely to place themselves in higher income quintiles and to identify as centrist or as having no political ideology.¹²

4 Intervention

The intervention consisted of two information treatments embedded in the survey. All respondents first completed baseline modules on socio-demographic background, political orientation, and policy knowledge. They were then randomized into three groups: a control group that received no prompt and two treatment groups that received either the “corruption” or the “tax evasion” prompt. After the intervention, all respondents answered questions on trust in government and elites, perceptions of unfairness and unequal opportunity, and redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending.¹³

The corruption treatment emphasized public corruption. It provided information on corruption in Latin America, focusing on bribes, cost overruns, and the role of public officials and politicians. The prompt used the Odebrecht scandal as an example of corruption in public procurement and infrastructure contracting.¹⁴ It also compared Latin America with developed countries using a corruption index and presented the fiscal cost of corruption as a share of GDP and relative to public education spending. The prompt stated that bribes and inflated procurement budgets are estimated to equal 26 percent of project costs, or 2.6 percent of the region’s GDP (Izquierdo et al., 2018).

The tax-evasion treatment emphasized elite tax evasion. It used the Panama Papers as

¹²The comparisons in Panel B should be interpreted with caution because the surveys use different scales to measure perceived income position and political ideology.

¹³Appendix D describes the information treatments and reproduces the treatment materials shown to respondents. It reports the background information used in the corruption treatment, which relied on the Odebrecht case and broader evidence on corruption, public procurement, and the fiscal cost of corruption in Latin America. It also reports the background information used in the tax-evasion treatment, which relied on the Panama Papers and evidence on offshore wealth, tax evasion, and hidden wealth in Latin America. The appendix reproduces the treatment screens shown to respondents, describes the control condition, reports the attention check administered before the intervention, and documents the information-retention checks administered to treated respondents at the end of the questionnaire.

¹⁴The Odebrecht case involved at least US \$788 million in bribes between 2001 and 2016 and implicated hundreds of politicians and public servants across Latin America (U.S., 2019; Campos et al., 2021).

an example of offshore financial arrangements that allowed wealthy individuals, firms, and political elites to hide assets and reduce tax liabilities.¹⁵ The prompt compared Latin America with developed countries and presented hidden wealth as a share of the region’s GDP and relative to public education spending. It stated that hidden wealth in Latin America amounts to 13 percent of regional GDP, more than twice the region’s annual public spending on education (Zucman, 2015).

The two prompts were designed to vary the actor made salient by the information treatment while relying on documented real-world cases. The corruption treatment made misconduct by public officials and politicians salient, whereas the tax-evasion treatment made misconduct by rich individuals and firms salient. This contrast allows us to examine whether information about public corruption and elite tax evasion changes perceived corruption and tax evasion, perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity, trust in government and elites, and redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending. We do not interpret the two treatments as isolating separate mechanisms. Instead, the results trace how respondents update related beliefs and preferences after exposure to two alternative frames of corruption.

5 Empirical Strategy

We estimate treatment effects using the following specification:

$$Y_{ic}^{*k} = \gamma_1 T_i^1 + \gamma_2 T_i^2 + \beta X_{ic} + \nu_c + \varepsilon_{ic}, \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ic}^{*k} is a latent variable representing respondent i ’s agreement with outcome statement k in country c . The variables T_i^1 and T_i^2 are indicators for assignment to the corruption and tax-evasion treatments, respectively. The omitted category is the control group. The coefficients of interest are γ_1 and γ_2 , which measure the effect of each treatment relative to the control group. All specifications include country fixed effects (ν_c) and individual controls (X_{ic}): age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, and perceived income quintile.

We do not observe Y_{ic}^{*k} . Instead, for most outcomes, we observe an ordered categorical variable Y_{ic}^k that measures agreement on a four-point scale, with 1 denoting “strongly disagree” and 4 denoting “strongly agree.” The observed outcome is related to the latent variable as follows:

¹⁵The Panama Papers were 11.5 million documents leaked from Mossack Fonseca, an offshore law firm based in Panama. The documents revealed the use of shell companies for activities including tax evasion, money laundering, and the circumvention of international sanctions (Joaristi et al., 2019).

$$Y_{ic}^k = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } Y_{ic}^{*k} \leq \mu_1, \\ 2 & \text{if } \mu_1 < Y_{ic}^{*k} \leq \mu_2, \\ 3 & \text{if } \mu_2 < Y_{ic}^{*k} \leq \mu_3, \\ 4 & \text{if } Y_{ic}^{*k} > \mu_3. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

We estimate this model using ordered probit, assuming that ε_{ic} is normally distributed. This specification is appropriate for ordinal outcomes because it preserves the ordering of response categories without imposing cardinal distances between them and accounts for ceiling and floor restrictions in the response scale (Winship and Mare, 1984).¹⁶ OLS estimates based on binary transformations of ordinal outcomes are easier to interpret, but dichotomization discards variation across response categories and ignores differences between respondents who change their level of agreement without crossing the chosen cutoff (Baetschmann et al., 2015). We report ordered-probit coefficients in Section 6, and OLS estimates using binary versions of the main redistributive-preference outcomes in Appendix E.1.

6 Results

We organize the results around the empirical sequence motivated by the experimental design. We first test whether the treatments changed perceived corruption and tax evasion. We then examine treatment effects on perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity. Finally, we estimate treatment effects on redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending, and on trust and perceived elite influence. This sequence does not identify causal mediation from one outcome to the next. It shows how the same information treatments changed related beliefs and policy preferences.

6.1 Increased Perceived Corruption and Tax Evasion

Table 2 reports treatment effects on perceived corruption and tax evasion. Both treatments increased perceived corruption among politicians, public officials, firms, and rich

¹⁶Ordered probit and ordered logit models are commonly used in studies of redistributive preferences with ordinal outcomes; see, among others, Hauk et al. (2022); Justino and Martorano (2019); Kuziemko et al. (2014); Akbaş et al. (2019); Di-Tella et al. (2021); Fong (2001); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Corneo and Grüner (2002).

individuals. The corruption treatment had larger effects on perceptions that politicians and public officials take bribes than the tax-evasion treatment (columns (1) and (2)). In contrast, both treatments had similar effects on perceptions that firms and rich individuals pay bribes to public officials (columns (3) and (4)).

Table 2: Perception of Corruption

	Take bribes		Pay bribes		Percentage hidden income by	
	Politicians (1)	Public officials (2)	Firms (3)	Rich (4)	Firms (5)	Rich (6)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.120*** (0.022)	0.145*** (0.020)	0.178*** (0.018)	0.087*** (0.020)	2.049*** (0.403)	1.702*** (0.386)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.060*** (0.022)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.121*** (0.018)	0.085*** (0.021)	0.925** (0.404)	1.685*** (0.388)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.602	3.448	3.202	3.521	73.439	80.193
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	OLS	OLS

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are based on the question "Do you think it is common or uncommon for these groups of people to receive bribes in exchange for favors?" The dependent variables in columns (3) and (4) are based on the question "Do you think it is common or uncommon that people from these groups pay bribes to public officials?" In columns (1)–(4), the outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "very uncommon" and 4 being "very common." The dependent variables in columns (5) and (6) are based on the question "What percentage of their income does each of these groups hide from the authorities in order to pay less taxes?" and take values from 0 to 100. Columns (1)–(4) are estimated using ordered probit models, and columns (5) and (6) are estimated using OLS. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Columns (5) and (6) report effects on perceived income hidden from tax authorities. Respondents were asked what percentage of income firms and rich individuals hide from the authorities to reduce their tax burden. Both treatments increased the perceived share of income hidden by rich individuals by about 1.7 percentage points, relative to a control-group mean of 80 percent. Both treatments also increased perceived hidden income by firms, although the effect was larger for the corruption treatment: about 2 percentage points, compared with about 1 percentage point for the tax-evasion treatment.

These results show that the treatments changed beliefs in the expected direction, but also that respondents did not sharply separate public corruption from misconduct by firms and rich individuals. The corruption treatment affected perceptions that firms and rich individuals pay bribes and hide income, while the tax-evasion treatment affected perceptions that politicians and public officials take bribes. This overlap is consistent with

the idea that perceptions of public and private corruption are closely related (Di-Tella et al., 2021).¹⁷

6.2 Increased Perceived Unfairness and Unequal Opportunity

We next examine whether the treatments affected perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity. Ex ante, information about corruption and elite tax evasion could make inequality appear less fair because it reveals ways in which public authority and private influence can benefit already advantaged groups (Uslaner, 2017). Consistent with this prediction, both treatments increased perceived unfairness in the income distribution. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that treated respondents were more likely to view the income distribution in their country as unfair.

Table 3: Inequality Perceptions

	Unfair income distribution	College graduation		Unequal opportunities
		Unprivileged	Privileged	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.087*** (0.020)	-0.046** (0.019)	0.050** (0.020)	0.066*** (0.022)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.068*** (0.020)	-0.041** (0.019)	0.045** (0.020)	0.069*** (0.022)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.576	1.694	3.546	0.681
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variable in column (1) is based on the question "How fair or unfair do you think the distribution of income is in [country survey]?" and takes values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "very fair" and 4 being "very unfair." Column (1) is estimated using an ordered probit model. The dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) are the raw variables used to construct the outcome of column (4). Column (2) is based on the question "In [country], how easy is it for a smart young person from a poor household to graduate from college?" Column (3) is based on the question "In [country], how easy is it for a smart young person from a rich household to graduate from college?" Both variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "very difficult" and 4 being "very easy." Columns (2) and (3) are estimated using ordered probit models. The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent assigns a higher likelihood of graduating from college to a smart young person from a rich household than to one from a poor household. Column (4) is estimated using a probit model. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

¹⁷Appendix E.2 reports perceived income hidden from tax authorities by additional groups. The corruption treatment also increases perceived hidden income among middle-class respondents, while the tax-evasion treatment reduces perceived hidden income among poor respondents, middle-class respondents, and respondents' friends and family.

The treatments also affected perceptions of unequal opportunity. Respondents were asked how likely it is that a smart young person from a poor household could graduate from college. A similarly framed question asked how likely it is for a smart young person from a rich household to do so. The treatments reduced the perceived likelihood of college graduation for the young person from a poor household and increased it for the young person from a rich household (columns (2) and (3)). We summarize these responses using an indicator equal to one if the respondent assigns a higher likelihood of college graduation to the young person from a rich household than to the young person from a poor household. Column (4) shows that both treatments increased this measure of perceived unequal opportunity by about 10 percent relative to the control-group mean.¹⁸

6.3 Support for Taxing the Rich, Not for Broader Redistribution

We next examine whether the treatments changed redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending. The effects could go in either direction. Information about corruption and elite tax evasion may increase support for taxation at the top by making inequality and unequal opportunity appear less fair. At the same time, if the information reduces trust in government or increases perceived elite influence over policy, respondents may be less willing to support broader tax-financed redistribution. We therefore examine whether the treatments increase support across several tax and spending instruments, or whether they affect only support for taxation at the top.

Table 4 presents treatment effects on redistributive preferences. Both treatments increased support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. Respondents assigned to either the corruption or tax-evasion treatment expressed stronger agreement that rich households should pay a higher share of their income in taxes than middle-class households (column (1)).

This effect does not extend to broader tax-financed redistribution. The treatments did not increase support for raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing VAT to finance health, education, and social benefits (columns (3)–(5)). Nor did they increase support for expanding non-contributory pensions or CCTs through higher taxes (columns (6) and (7)). Attitudes toward progressivity within the middle class were also unaffected (column (2)). These near-zero estimates are precisely estimated rather than the product of an underpowered design: with a standard error of approximately 0.018 across outcomes, the minimum detectable effect at 80 percent power is approxi-

¹⁸The estimated effects are 0.066 for the corruption treatment and 0.069 for the tax-evasion treatment. Compared with a control-group mean of 0.68, these estimates imply increases of 9.7 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively.

mately 0.05 on the latent index, smaller in magnitude than the effect estimated for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households in column (1).¹⁹ The results therefore point to a narrow shift in support for taxation at the top, rather than a broader increase in support for tax-financed redistribution.

Table 4: Preferences for Redistribution

	Progressive taxation		Taxes for Redistribution			Social Spending for Redistribution	
	Rich vs. Middle Class (1)	3x Min Wage vs. Min Wage (2)	Increase Corporate Tax (3)	Increase Income Tax (4)	Increase VAT (5)	Increase of Non-contributory pensions (6)	Increase of CCTs (7)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.046** (0.018)	0.027 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.018 (0.018)	0.025 (0.018)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.060*** (0.018)	0.018 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.015 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.048	2.636	2.719	2.046	1.913	2.536	2.327
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. Each variable elicits information about how strongly the respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) *Progressive taxation: Rich vs. middle class*: "Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households"; (2) *Progressive taxation: 3x min wage vs. min wage*: "A person who earns three times the minimum wage should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage"; (3) *Increase corporate tax*: "It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (4) *Increase income tax*: "It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (5) *Increase VAT*: "It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (6) *Increase of non-contributory pensions*: "The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension program of the country] by increasing taxes to fund it"; and (7) *Increase of CCTs*: "The government should increase spending in [main CCT program of the country] by increasing taxes to fund it." All outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6.4 Increased Perceived Elite Influence and Lower Trust

We finally examine whether the treatments affected trust and perceived elite influence. This is important for interpreting the redistributive-preference results. The same information that increases perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity may also reduce trust

¹⁹The standard errors reported in this table are similar across outcomes and treatments (0.018 when rounded to three decimals), reflecting the common sample size ($N = 21,471$) and identical treatment-arm shares across all regressions, rather than coincidence across unrelated estimation procedures. Because the latent-index scale is not directly comparable across outcomes with different response distributions, the similarity in minimum detectable effects across columns does not establish that the substantive (probability-scale) effects being ruled out are of similar magnitude; it establishes that the precision of estimation, in standard-error terms, is similar across these outcomes.

in the actors responsible for collecting taxes and implementing redistributive policies. If so, respondents may support higher taxation of rich households without increasing their support for broader tax-financed redistribution.

Table 5 shows that both treatments increased perceived elite influence and reduced some measures of trust. Respondents assigned to either treatment were more likely to report that firms and rich individuals influence government policy to obtain favorable laws and tax exemptions (columns (1) and (2)). The corruption treatment also reduced the belief that public officials and firms take the interests of people like the respondent into account when making decisions (columns (4) and (5)). The tax-evasion treatment reduced this belief for firms, but did not significantly affect the corresponding measure for public officials. Neither treatment significantly affected this trust measure for politicians (column (3)).²⁰

The pattern is more consistent with weakened institutional trust than with a simple belief that the state lacks capacity. Respondents assigned to the corruption treatment reported lower satisfaction with public services relative to the taxes they pay, but they were more likely to agree that the state has the capacity and tools to reduce inequality.²¹ This suggests that respondents may view the state as capable of reducing inequality while doubting whether public officials, elites, and firms will use fiscal resources fairly or in the interest of citizens.

Taken together, the results suggest that the treatments increased support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households, but did not generate broader support for tax-financed redistribution. This pattern is consistent with respondents reacting to perceived unfairness and perceived elite influence at the top of the income distribution while remaining reluctant to support fiscal instruments that require broader taxation or expanded government spending. It is also consistent with prior evidence that support for redistribution is multidimensional: support for taxing high-income groups need not imply support for expanding transfers or social spending targeted to lower-income groups (Cavallé and Trump, 2015; Margalit and Raviv, 2024). In our setting, information about corruption and tax evasion shifted preferences over taxation at the top, but not over broader fiscal instruments or transfer expansions.

²⁰Appendix E.2 reports the corresponding estimates for additional groups. The corruption treatment increases perceived influence of the middle class over government policy and reduces the belief that judges and police take the interests of people like the respondent into account. The tax-evasion treatment does not produce similar effects for these additional groups.

²¹See Appendix E.3.

Table 5: Trust

	Influence the government		Have your best interest in mind		
	Firms (1)	Rich (2)	Politicians (3)	Public officials (4)	Firms (5)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.115*** (0.019)	0.095*** (0.021)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.051*** (0.019)	-0.099*** (0.018)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.091*** (0.019)	0.063*** (0.021)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.072*** (0.018)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.304	3.575	1.475	1.618	1.864
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The outcome variables in columns (1) and (2) are based on the question "Do you think it is common or uncommon that these groups of people influence the government to be favored through laws and tax exemptions?" The outcome variables in columns (3)–(5) are based on the question "Do you think it is common or uncommon that these groups think of you and the interests of people like you when making decisions?" All outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6.5 The Main Pattern Is Similar Across Respondent Groups

We next examine whether the main pattern varies by political ideology, policy knowledge, and perceived position in the income distribution.²² For the heterogeneity analysis, we pool the two treatment arms into a single indicator for assignment to either treatment. We do so because the two treatments have similar effects across most outcomes and specifications, and because splitting the sample further by treatment arm and subgroup substantially reduces statistical power. The results are broadly stable across these groups. The treatments increase support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households, but provide little evidence of systematic increases in support for broader tax-financed redistribution. There is some evidence that ideology moderates responses to specific tax and spending instruments: left-leaning respondents show stronger support than right-leaning respondents for broadening the personal income tax and increasing the VAT to finance health, education, and social benefits, and for expanding non-contributory pensions and CCTs through higher taxes. This divergence reflects a genuine split in direction rather than only a difference in magnitude: among right-

²²Appendix E.4 reports the heterogeneity along these dimensions. Policy knowledge is measured as an indicator equal to one if respondents correctly answered questions about the VAT rate and the frequency of the government budget cycle. The analysis by perceived income position uses respondents' self-placement in the income distribution.

leaning respondents, the treatments significantly reduce support for raising the VAT to finance social spending, while left-leaning respondents move in the opposite direction. Heterogeneity by policy knowledge is limited, and there is no systematic evidence of heterogeneous effects by perceived income position.

7 Conclusion

This paper examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness, perceived unequal opportunity, and redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending. Using a survey experiment in eight Latin American countries, we show that factual information about public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceptions of unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity. These effects arise under both frames: one emphasizing misconduct by public officials and politicians, and the other emphasizing tax evasion by rich individuals and firms.

The treatments also change redistributive preferences, but only along a narrow margin. Respondents exposed to either treatment become more supportive of taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, this increased support for taxation at the top does not extend to broader tax-financed redistribution. The treatments do not increase support for raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing VAT to finance social spending. Nor do they increase support for expanding non-contributory pensions or conditional cash transfers through higher taxes.

The effects of the intervention on trust may help interpreting this pattern. The treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals influence government policy to obtain favorable laws and tax exemptions, and the corruption treatment reduces some measures of trust in public officials and firms. These findings suggest that information about corruption and tax evasion can heighten perceptions of unfairness and elite influence while leaving citizens reluctant to support broader fiscal instruments that require taxation and government implementation. In settings with low institutional trust, perceiving inequality as unfair may therefore be insufficient to generate support for expanded tax-financed redistribution.

Disclaimer: The authors used ChatGPT, GPT-5.5 Thinking, for assistance with language editing, organization, and copyediting. The authors reviewed and revised all AI-assisted text and take full responsibility for the manuscript’s content, analyses, interpretations, and conclusions.

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A Data Collection and Sample

This data appendix provides additional descriptions of our data sources and processing methods. Table A.1 shows the survey components, the number of questions included, the group of respondents to which the question was applied, and the order in the questionnaire. An important feature of the questionnaire is that a respondent could not advance to the next question without having answered the previous one. As a result, we have information for all the questions for respondents who completed the survey.


Table A.1: Structure of the Questionnaire

Module	Number of questions	Individuals	Order
Consent to participate	1	All	1
Socio-demographic background	21	All	2
Political orientation	5	All	3
Political knowledge	2	All	4
Attention check	1	All	5
Intervention			
Understanding of the intervention	1	Treated	6
Trust in the government	3	All	7 or 8
Trust in the elites	3	All	7 or 8
Perceptions of inequality	4	All	9, 10 or 11
Redistribution through taxes	8	All	9, 10 or 11
Redistribution through public spending	6	All	9, 10 or 11
Perception about impartiality of the survey	1	All	12
Intervention recall check	1	Treated	13
Comment about the survey	1	All	14
Total	60		

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS.

A.1 Survey Attrition

The survey received 32,805 responses, of which 26,238 were completed (78.98 percent). Attrition is defined as the fraction of respondents who are in the potential estimation sample but are not in the final sample because they did not finish the questionnaire. Figure A.1 shows the attrition on the first survey. There are two major drops in the number of responses: in the first question of the module "Trust in the government" ("We are going to ask you about some groups of people and if you think it is common or uncommon that they do what they promise") and in the first question of the module "Perceptions of inequality" ("In [survey country], how easy is it for a smart young person from a poor home to graduate from college?"). Table A.2 presents a comparison between the final sample and the non-completed responses.

Figure A.1: Attrition

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. We exclude 12 questions about socio-demographic information, as this information was already available for respondents from all countries except Guatemala and Panama, and treatment-related questions, as these were not asked to all respondents. Because the order of modules 4–8 was randomized, the graph shows, at some points, an increase in the number of responses. This does not reflect respondents skipping questions but rather that the module was presented first.

Table A.2: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

	Main sample	Non-completed
Sex (=1 men)	0.44	0.20
Age	35.92	28.83
Married or in cohabitation	0.49	0.23
Has children	0.57	0.53
Completed less than high school	0.07	0.12
Completed high school	0.49	0.37
Completed college	0.44	0.51
Employed	0.58	0.34
Q1	0.21	0.12
Q2	0.20	0.11
Q3	0.19	0.11
Q4	0.21	0.11
Q5	0.18	0.55
Left ideology	0.19	0.07
Right ideology	0.22	0.08
Centrist or no ideology	0.59	0.32
Policy knowledge	0.47	0.13


Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS and Sociométr-BID. The category “married” includes respondents living in cohabitation.

A.2 Sample Restrictions

From the sample of completed responses, 5,167 observations (19.69 percent of the completed responses) were removed as low-quality responses. First, we dropped observa-

tions of 23 respondents from Peru who received an invitation to complete Colombia’s survey due to technical problems with NetQuest’s interface. Second, we dropped observations of 67 respondents in which NetQuest was unable to provide information on their marital status. According to their team, those panelists had unsubscribed, and NetQuest could not retrieve their data. Third, in the middle of the questionnaire we asked respondents if they paid attention to the questionnaire and dropped 446 observations of those who responded “no.” Fourth, we dropped 2,581 observations that had an unusual time of response according to the length of the questionnaire (below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile). Fifth, we dropped 208 observations of respondents who had an unusual income (above the 99th percentile)). Finally, we dropped 1,445 respondents who were older than 65. Figure A.2 shows the histogram of the distribution of response time for the final sample of 21,471 respondents.

Figure A.2: Distribution of Response Time



Notes: Authors’ own elaboration based on IPRS.

A.3 Balance

To test the validity of the experiment, we check the balance of the final sample. Table A.3 shows that, following randomization of the survey experiments, the control and treated groups have very similar socio-demographic characteristics. This indicates successful randomization of the survey experiments.

Table A.3: Characteristics of Control and Treated Groups

	Control	Treated T1 (mean)	Treated T1 (p-value)	Treated T2 (mean)	Treated T2 (p-value)
Sex (=1 men)	0.44	0.45	0.42	0.44	0.68
Age (years)	36.04	35.74	0.12	35.94	0.64
Married	0.49	0.48	0.38	0.49	0.79
Has children	0.57	0.57	0.55	0.57	0.83
Less than High School	0.07	0.07	0.50	0.07	0.34
High School	0.49	0.49	0.89	0.50	0.44
College	0.44	0.44	0.62	0.43	0.77
Employed	0.58	0.58	0.65	0.58	0.58
Unemployed	0.20	0.21	0.31	0.22	0.10
Non occupied	0.22	0.21	0.12	0.21	0.32
Firm owner	0.11	0.11	0.64	0.11	0.28
Beneficiary of CCT	0.15	0.14	0.36	0.13	0.02
Beneficiary of non-contributory pension	0.10	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.98
Q1	0.21	0.21	0.76	0.21	0.87
Q2	0.20	0.20	0.77	0.20	0.83
Q3	0.19	0.20	0.48	0.20	0.54
Q4	0.21	0.20	0.13	0.21	0.94
Q5	0.18	0.18	0.80	0.18	0.88
Left ideology	0.19	0.19	0.44	0.20	0.32
Right ideology	0.22	0.22	0.93	0.21	0.11
Centrist or no ideology	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59
Policy knowledge	0.47	0.47	0.85	0.47	0.54

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. *Statistically significant at 5 percent.

B Survey Instrument

In this section, we present the questionnaire. Sentences in normal font are reproduced as they appeared in the survey, and sentences in italics are explanatory notes for the readers of this paper (not presented to respondents). Text in brackets varies by country. The questionnaire was not divided into subsections; these have been introduced for the readers of this paper.

Consent to Participate

1. We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Our objective is to understand perceptions and their role in public policy. It is important for the success of our investigation that you respond honestly and read the questions carefully before answering. There are no right or wrong answers, we are solely interested in your viewpoints. To ensure the quality of the survey data, your responses will be subject to sophisticated statistical control methods. Your participation in this study will be treated confidentially, and your responses will not be revealed in any manner that might identify you. Furthermore, your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time if you wish.

This survey should take (on average) about 15-20 minutes to complete. If you complete this survey to the end, you will be invited to take another similar, but shorter, follow-up survey. The principal investigator for this study is Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister of Vanderbilt University. If you have any questions about this survey, please contact Elizabeth Zechmeister at liz.zechmeister@vanderbilt.edu.

Would you like to participate in the survey?

- Yes, I would like to participate in this study and confirm that I am a resident of [country] and I am 18 years old or older.
- No, I would not like to participate.

Socio-Demographic Background

Questions from 2–5, 9, and 10 were only asked in the questionnaire for Guatemala and Panama, as NetQuest already had this information for respondents in the other countries.

2. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other
- Prefer not to say

3. What is your age?
4. What is your marital status?
 - Single
 - Married
 - Unmarried cohabitation
 - Divorced
 - Widowed
5. How many children do you have?
 - I do not have children
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4
 - 5 or more
6. Do you consider yourself a _____ person?
 - White
 - Mestiza
 - Indigenous
 - Black
 - Mulata
 - Other
7. What country were you born in? [List of countries]
8. *If the answer above is different from the country in which the survey is being conducted, the following question is shown:* In what year did you arrive to [country]?
9. What department/state do you live in? [List of departments/states]
10. What municipality/providence/city do you live in?
11. Which category best describes your highest level of education?
 - None
 - Incomplete primary education
 - Complete primary education
 - Incomplete secondary education

- Completed secondary education
 - Incomplete higher education (technical or professional)
 - Complete higher education (technical or professional)
 - Master's degree
 - Doctorate
12. What is your current employment situation?
- Full-time employee
 - Part-time employee
 - Business owner without employees or self-employed
 - Business owner with employees under supervision
 - Unemployed and looking for a job
 - Student
 - Not working and not looking for a job (for example: retired or at home care)
13. What is your household's regular monthly household income (in a typical month) before taxes, including remittances from abroad and the income of all working adults and children?
14. Before the pandemic, what was your employment situation?
- Full-time employee
 - Part-time employee
 - Business owner without employees or self-employed
 - Business owner with employees under supervision
 - Unemployed and looking for a job
 - Student
 - Not working and not looking for a job (for example: retired or at home care)
15. Before the pandemic, what was your household's regular monthly household income (in a typical month) before taxes, including remittances from abroad and the income of all working adults and children?
16. Before the pandemic, how did your family's income compare to the rest of the families in [country] at the time? *Respondents could answer using a slider scale (see Figure B.1).*
17. Is any member of your household a beneficiary of the program [main CCT program of the country]?
18. Is any member of your household a beneficiary of the program [main non-contributory pension program of the country]?

19. In which country was your father born? [List of countries]
20. In which country was your mother born? [List of countries]
21. Among your father and mother, which category best describes the highest level of education achieved by either of them?
 - None
 - Incomplete primary education
 - Complete primary education
 - Incomplete secondary education
 - Completed secondary education
 - Incomplete higher education (technical or professional)
 - Complete higher education (technical or professional)
 - Master's degree
 - Doctorate
22. When you were little (around 10 years or so), how did your family's income compare to the rest of the families in [country] at the time? *Respondents could answer using a slider scale (see Figure B.1).*

Political Orientation and Values

23. Political tendencies from the left and the right are often spoken of. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, which political tendency do you sympathize with?
 - Left
 - Center-left
 - Center
 - Center-right
 - Right
 - I am not interested in politics.
24. If children from rich and poor backgrounds have unequal opportunities to succeed in life, do you believe this is:
 - Not a problem at all
 - A minor problem
 - A serious problem

- A major problem
25. How interested or uninterested are you in political, economic, and social news?
- Not interested at all
 - Somewhat interested
 - Interested
 - Very interested
26. In the past week, approximately how many hours did you spend following economic and social news on the radio, television, newspapers and social media?
- Less than an hour
 - 1 to 2 hours
 - 2 to 5 hours
 - 5 to 10 hours
 - More than 10 hours
27. How much do you trust your neighbors?
- Not at all
 - A little
 - A lot
 - Completely

Policy Knowledge

28. The budget of the national government decides the allocation of spending to different items (education, health, etc.). How often is the budget typically decided in [country]?
- Once a month
 - Once every six months
 - Once a year
 - Once every two years
29. The Value Added Tax (VAT) is a tax on the consumption of goods and services. What is the general rate of the VAT in [country]? *The answer options depended on the country. We presented five options, with the correct option in the middle and differences of 2 and 4 percentage points on each side, as shown in Table [B.1](#).*

Table B.1: Answer Options for VAT Question

Country	Correct VAT	Answer Options
Argentina	21%	17% , 19% , 21%, 23%
Brazil	17%	15% , 17%, 19%, 21%
Chile	19%	15% , 17% , 19%, 21%
Colombia	19%	15% , 17% , 19%, 21%
Guatemala	12%	10% , 12% , 14%, 16%
Mexico	16%	14% , 16%, 18%, 20%
Panama	7%	5% , 7% , 9%, 11%
Peru	18%	16% , 18%, 20%, 22%

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on information from [Centro Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias \(2023\)](#).

Intervention Modules

At this point of the survey instrument individuals randomized to treatment were exposed to the intervention modules (See Appendix D for more details) while control individuals continued to the next module.

The numbering of questions below, reflect the question number after the intervention module finished.

Trust in the Government

1. We are going to ask you about some groups of people and if you think it is common or uncommon that they do what they promise.
2. Do you think it is common or uncommon that these groups think of you and the interests of people like you when making decisions?
3. Do you think it is common or uncommon for these groups of people to receive bribes in exchange for favors?

Groups for questions 1–3:

- Politicians in general
- Public officials
- Firms and corporations
- The police in my neighborhood
- The teachers at the public school in my neighborhood
- Judges and prosecutors

Answer options for questions 1–3:

- Very uncommon
- Uncommon

- Somewhat common
- Very common

Trust in Elites

4. We are going to ask you about some groups of people. Do you think it is common or uncommon that people from these groups pay bribes to public officials?
5. Do you think it is common or uncommon that these groups of people influence the government to be favored through laws and tax exemptions?
6. According to you, what percentage of their income does each of these groups hide from the authorities to pay less taxes? *Respondents could define this percentage using a slider scale (see Figure B.2).*

Groups for questions 4–6:

- Poor people
- Your friends and family
- Businesses and corporations
- Rich people
- Middle-class people

Answer options for questions 4 and 5:

- Very uncommon
- Uncommon
- Somewhat common
- Very common

Perceptions of Inequality

7. In [country], how easy is it for a smart young person from a poor home to graduate from college?
8. In [country], how easy is it for a smart young person from a rich home to graduate from college?

Answer options for questions 7 and 8:

- Very hard
- Hard

- Easy
- Very easy

9. What is the most important challenge facing [country] today?

- Economic situation
- Inequality
- Corruption
- Democracy and political representation
- Public services
- Security

10. How fair or unfair do you think the distribution of income is in [country]?

- Very unfair
- Unfair
- Fair
- Very fair

Redistribution Through Taxes

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

11. "It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits."
12. "It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits."
13. "It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits."
14. "Paying taxes is a moral obligation to contribute to society."

Answer options for questions [11–14](#):

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

15. How common or uncommon is it for people in each of these groups to be caught evading taxes and have to pay a fine?

Groups asked:

- Poor people
- Your friends and family
- Entrepreneurs
- Rich people
- Middle-class people

Answer options:

- Very uncommon
- Uncommon
- Somewhat common
- Very common

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

16. "A person who earns three times the minimum wage should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage."
17. "Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households."
18. "Progressive tax rates (where the tax rate increases as income increases) are fairer than a fixed tax rate (where the tax rate is the same for all income levels)."

Answer options for questions [16–18](#):

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Redistribution Through Public Spending

19. We now ask you how you would like to spend the total government budget. Suppose that you are the person deciding the budget of [country] for the upcoming year. You can choose how you want to allocate the budget (in percentages) between the following 5 categories:
 - 1) Urban crime, defense and national security, which refers to the costs of preventing internal crime and supporting security operations in foreign countries.
 - 2) Public infrastructure, which includes, among others, transportation infrastructure such as roads, bridges and airports, and water infrastructure.

- 3) Expenditures on schooling and higher education, including the help for children from low-income families to attend school and college.
- 4) Transfer programs. This includes programs such as [main CCT program of the country] and [main non-contributory pension program of the country] that help low-income households.
- 5) Public spending on health and tax subsidies to help families with health insurance.

Enter the percentage of the budget that you would allocate to each expense category (the total must add up to 100). (See Figure B.3.)

20. The [main non-contributory pension program of the country] provides cash transfers to the elderly population who did not have sufficient contributions during their working life to have access to a pension after the age of retirement. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension program of the country] by increasing taxes to fund it.”
21. The [main CCT program of the country] program provides cash transfers to the most vulnerable families to improve their living conditions. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “The government should increase spending in [main CCT program of the country] by increasing taxes to fund it.”

Table B.2: Main CCT and Non-Contributory Pension Programs

Country	CCT Program	Non-contributory Pensions Program
Argentina	Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social (AUH)	Programa de Pensiones No Contributivas (PNC)
Brazil	Programa Bolsa Família	Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC)
Chile	Subsidio Familiar (o Subsidio Único Familiar - SUF)	Sistema de Pensiones Solidarias (SPS)
Colombia	Familias en Acción	Colpensiones
Guatemala	Mi familia progresa	Aporte Económico del Adulto Mayor
Mexico	Programa Oportunidades	Programa Pensión para Adultos Mayores (PAM)
Panama	Red de Oportunidades	120 a los 65: Programa Especial de Transferencia Económica a los Adultos Mayores
Peru	Programa Nacional de Apoyo Directo a los Más Pobres - Juntos	Pensión Mínima (PM) de vejez

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on information from [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean \(ECLAC\)](#). For the Colombian case, instead of referring to “Colombia Mayor,” we inquired about the institution that provides this non-contributory pension program.

Answer options for questions 20 and 21:

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

22. Considering the taxes paid by your household, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of public services you get?

- Very unsatisfied
- Unsatisfied
- Satisfied
- Very satisfied

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

23. "The government has the capacity and the tools to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born into poor and rich households."
24. "The social programs of the government subsidize people who are not willing to work hard enough."

Answer options for questions 23 and 24:

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Perception About Impartiality of the Survey


25. How unbiased/neutral did you find this survey?
 - It seemed impartial/neutral to me.
 - I thought it was a survey with right-wing tendencies.
 - I thought it was a survey with left-wing tendencies.

Comment About the Survey


26. Would you like to give us any feedback on the survey? (*Open-ended question*)

Questionnaire Figures

Figure B.1: Position on the Scale



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Figure B.2: Position on the Scale

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Figure B.3: Position on the Scale

Ahora le preguntamos cómo le gustaría gastar el presupuesto total del gobierno. Suponga que usted es la persona que decide el presupuesto de Argentina para el próximo año. Puede elegir cómo desea dividir el presupuesto (en porcentaje) entre las siguientes 5 categorías:

- 1) Crimen urbano, defensa y seguridad nacional, que se refiere a los costos de prevenir el crimen interno y apoyar las operaciones de seguridad en países extranjeros.
- 2) Infraestructura pública, que incluye infraestructura de transporte como carreteras, puentes y aeropuertos, e infraestructura de agua.
- 3) Gasto en escolaridad y educación superior, incluida la ayuda para que los niños de hogares de bajos ingresos asistan a la escuela y a la universidad.
- 4) Programas de transferencias. Esto incluye programas como Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social (AUH) y Programa de Pensiones No Contributivas (PNC) que ayudan a los hogares de menores ingresos.
- 5) Gasto público en salud y subsidios fiscales para ayudar a los hogares a comprar un seguro médico.

Ingrese el porcentaje del presupuesto que asignaría a cada categoría de gasto (el total debe sumar 100):

Programas de transferencias	0
Crimen urbano, defensa y seguridad nacional	0
Gasto público en salud y subsidios fiscales	0
Gasto en escolaridad y educación superior	0
Infraestructura pública	0
Total	0

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

C Definition of Variables

C.1 Baseline Variables and Correlates

We build four baseline indicators, where $\mathbb{1}(\cdot)$ is an indicator variable equal to one if the condition holds: age: $\mathbb{1}(\text{age} < 25)$, $\mathbb{1}(25 \leq \text{age} < 50)$; sex: $\mathbb{1}(\text{men})$; and race: $\mathbb{1}(\text{white})$. We also construct two additional variables capturing satisfaction with public services and beliefs about state capacity, which we use as counter-balancing factors in the analysis of trust (Section 6, Appendix E.3).

To measure perceived position in the income distribution, we use categories from 1 to 10 that indicate the percentile in the income distribution to which the respondent belongs, based on the amount of income declared. We construct this measure using the latest information available for the eight countries in our study (2020 for all countries and 2019 for Panama) from Sociómetro-BID.

Counter-balancing factors are captured through two variables. *Satisfied with public services* is defined as 1 if the respondent answers “very satisfied” or “satisfied” to the question “Considering the taxes you pay on your household, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of public services you get?” *Believes state capacity* is defined as 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement “The government has the capacity and the tools to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born into poor and rich households.”

C.2 Outcomes

The outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 4 being “strongly agree.” For each variable, we present the corresponding sentence.

Two outcome measures require additional explanation. First, for the question on tax progressivity within the middle class, we anchor the comparison to the minimum wage. This avoids relying on respondents’ subjective definitions of the middle class, which may vary across countries and individuals. The minimum wage provides a salient country-specific earnings benchmark. The question asks whether a person earning three times the minimum wage should pay a higher share of income in taxes than a person earning the minimum wage.

Second, for the personal-income-tax outcome, the survey asks about broadening the tax base among middle-class taxpayers rather than increasing rates only on high-income households. This wording distinguishes support for a broader tax-financed expansion of social spending from support for taxing the rich. This distinction is relevant in Latin America, where personal income tax liability begins at relatively high income levels. Barreix et al. (2017) report that the threshold for personal income tax liability in Latin America is 1.32 times GDP per capita, compared with 0.12 in OECD countries and 0.7 in middle-income countries.

Progressive Taxation:

- *Rich vs. middle class*: “Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households.”

- *3x min wage vs. min wage*: “A person who earns three times the minimum wage should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage.”

Taxes for Redistribution:

- *Increase corporate taxes*: “It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits.”
- *Increase income tax*: “It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits.”
- *Increase VAT*: “It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits.”

Social Spending for Redistribution:

- *Increase of non-contributory pensions*: “The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension program of the country] by increasing taxes to fund it.”
- *Increase of CCTs*: “The government should increase spending in [main CCT program of the country] by increasing taxes to fund it.”

D Intervention

The corruption treatment used the Odebrecht scandal as a regional example of public corruption. Odebrecht, a Brazilian conglomerate active in construction, energy, and real estate, paid at least US \$788 million in bribes between 2001 and 2016 to obtain large public contracts from state-owned companies (U.S, 2019). The scheme involved about 600 politicians and public servants in 10 Latin American countries and was used to win public procurement processes for infrastructure projects and renegotiate contracts at higher prices after they had been awarded (Campos et al., 2021). The payments were used mainly to support political campaigns and secure advantages in future public bidding processes and contracts (U.S, 2019). The treatment combined this case with broader information comparing corruption in Latin America with developed countries and presenting evidence on the fiscal cost of corruption. In particular, it emphasized the waste of public funds in public procurement and infrastructure projects, where bribes and inflated procurement budgets are estimated to equal 26 percent of project costs, or 2.6 percent of the region's GDP (Izquierdo et al., 2018). The treatment also stated that corruption, including the incidence of bribes paid to public officials, is markedly higher in Latin America than in developed countries (World Bank, 2022).

The tax-evasion treatment used the Panama Papers as a regional example of tax evasion by rich individuals and firms. The Panama Papers were 11.5 million documents leaked from Mossack Fonseca, an offshore law firm based in Panama. The leaked documents revealed the use of shell companies for activities including tax evasion, money laundering, and the circumvention of international sanctions (Joaristi et al., 2019). The scandal implicated political leaders around the world and was especially salient in Latin America. Londoño-Vélez and Ávila Mahecha (2021) show that the Panama Papers affected wealth-tax compliance, tax revenue, and tax progressivity in Colombia. Ait Bihi Ouali (2020) studies the scandal as a natural experiment and reports a 2 to 3.3 percent increase in public support for redistributive policies. The treatment combined this case with information comparing tax evasion in Latin America with developed countries and presenting hidden wealth as a share of regional GDP and relative to public education spending. According to Zucman (2015), hidden wealth in Latin America amounts to 13 percent of the region's GDP, more than twice the region's annual public spending on education.

Respondents were randomized into two treatment groups and one control group. Figures D.1 and D.2 reproduce the intervention materials shown to respondents in the two treatment groups. Sentences in normal font are reproduced as they appeared in the survey, sentences in italics are explanatory notes for the readers of this paper and were not presented to respondents, and text in brackets varies by country.

Attention Check

We start by asking all respondents the following question.

1. Before moving on to the next set of questions, we would like to ask for your opinion regarding the answers you have provided so far. It is crucial for our study to include

responses only from respondents who have given their full attention to this survey. This will not in any way impact the compensation you will receive for completing this survey. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your answers since you did not dedicate your full attention to the questions so far?

- Yes, I have given all my attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my answers for your study
- No, I have not given all my attention to the questions so far and I don't think you should use my answers for your study

Respondents were randomized into two treatment groups and one control group. The following questions were shown to the treated groups.

1. *If the respondent was assigned to the treated group of the first intervention (corruption), the screen would show the sequence of images shown in Figures [D.1](#) (a)-(h) and then following question was shown: Government corruption in Latin America is:*
 - Much higher than the United States and Europe
 - Same as the United States and Europe
 - Much less than the United States and Europe
2. *If the respondent was assigned to the treated group of the second intervention (tax evasion), the screen would show the sequence of images shown in Figures [D.2](#) (a)-(h) and then following question was shown: Tax evasion of the rich in Latin America is:*
 - Much higher than the United States and Europe
 - Same as the United States and Europe
 - Much less than the United States and Europe
3. *If the respondent was assigned to the control group no figure was shown.*

Then, all respondents will continue with the same questionnaire starting in the "Trust in Government Module" described in Appendix [B](#).


Figure D.1: Intervention 1: Corruption

(a)

In Latin America**the waste of public funds due to corruption is enormous.**

Much of this corruption occurs in the purchase of supplies for the public sector and in the execution of infrastructure projects.

(b)

Source: [Transparency International \(2020\)](#).

(c)

Corruption and the incidence of paying bribes to public officials are much higher in **Latin America** than in developed countries.

Source: [World Bank \(2022\)](#).

(e)



(f)

Odebrecht, one of the largest construction companies in Latin America, confessed to the court that **politicians and public officials** from 10 Latin American countries collected almost **740 million** dollars in exchange for agreeing to public contracts with cost overruns for the country.

(g)



(h)

Corruption of public officials, in the form of bribes and “inflated” procurement budgets, is estimated to be equivalent to **26 % of the cost of these projects.**

Source: [Izquierdo et al. \(2018\)](#).

The total cost is equivalent to 2.6 % of the region's GDP, approximately


half of the annual expenditure on education.Source: [Izquierdo et al. \(2018\)](#).

Figure D.2: Intervention 2: Tax Evasion

(a)

Many wealthy families and large firms hide part of their wealth abroad, contributing to **tax evasion and capital flight**

(b)




(c)

The scandal of the **“Panama Papers”** in 2016 revealed that the firm Mossack Fonseca - based in Panama - had created nearly 214,000 companies (or “shell companies”) **in tax heavens to evade taxes and money laundering.**

Source: O'Donovan et al. (2019).

(e)



Source: Zucman (2015).

(g)



(d)

The **rich and large firms owned** the vast majority of these “shell companies”.

(f)

The problem of hidden wealth abroad is much more serious in **Latin America** than in developed countries.

(h)

Latin America accumulates a hidden wealth abroad of 13% of GDP, equivalent to more than **double the amount of what the region spends on education each year.**


Source: Zucman (2015).

D.1 Information Retention Checks

At the end of the questionnaire, respondents assigned to a treatment arm answered a retention question about the information shown in the prompt. Respondents assigned to the corruption treatment are coded as answering correctly if they state that ‘Government corruption in Latin America is much higher than in the United States and Europe.’ Respondents assigned to the tax-evasion treatment are coded as answering correctly if they state that ‘Tax evasion of the rich in Latin America is much higher than in the United States and Europe.’

Figure D.3 shows that most treated respondents correctly recalled the relevant information. About 80 percent of respondents assigned to the tax-evasion treatment answered correctly, compared with almost 90 percent of respondents assigned to the corruption treatment. These results suggest that respondents retained the information presented in the treatment prompts.

Figure D.3: Treatment Comprehension



Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS.

E Appendix Tables

E.1 OLS Estimates

Table E.1: Preferences for Redistribution (OLS), Agree

	Progressive taxation		Taxes for Redistribution			Social Spending for Redistribution	
	Rich vs. Middle Class (1)	3x Min Wage vs. Min Wage (2)	Increase Corporate Tax (3)	Increase Income Tax (4)	Increase VAT (5)	Increase of Non-contributory pensions (6)	Increase of CCTs (7)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.011 (0.119)	0.010 (0.214)	-0.005 (0.507)	-0.006 (0.409)	-0.001 (0.934)	0.010 (0.212)	0.005 (0.499)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.020*** (0.002)	0.008 (0.298)	-0.004 (0.596)	0.002 (0.768)	0.005 (0.464)	0.009 (0.252)	-0.001 (0.864)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	0.777	0.594	0.637	0.286	0.232	0.515	0.401
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables elicit information about how strongly a respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) "Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households"; (2) "A person who earns 3 times the minimum wage should pay more of his/her income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage"; (3) "It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (4) "It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (5) "It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (6) "The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it"; and (7) "The government should increase spending in [main CCT of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it." All outcome variables are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent answered "agree" or "strongly agree," and 0 otherwise. All columns are estimated using OLS. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.2: Preferences for Redistribution (OLS), Strongly Agree

	Progressive taxation		Taxes for Redistribution			Social Spending for Redistribution	
	Rich vs. Middle Class (1)	3x Min Wage vs. Min Wage (2)	Increase Corporate Tax (3)	Increase Income Tax (4)	Increase VAT (5)	Increase of Non-contributory pensions (6)	Increase of CCTs (7)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.022*** (0.008)	0.011* (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.023*** (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006* (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	0.328	0.162	0.221	0.046	0.047	0.150	0.102
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables elicit information about how strongly a respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) "Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households"; (2) "A person who earns 3 times the minimum wage should pay more of his/her income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage"; (3) "It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (4) "It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (5) "It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (6) "The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it"; and (7) "The government should increase spending in [main CCT of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it." All outcome variables are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent answered "strongly agree," and 0 otherwise. All columns are estimated using OLS. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.2 Robustness

Table E.3: Perceived Percentage of Income Hidden from Authorities by Each Group

	Firms (1)	Rich (2)	Middle class (3)	Poor (4)	Friends and family (5)
Treatment 1: Corruption	2.049*** (0.403)	1.702*** (0.386)	1.041** (0.423)	-0.476 (0.460)	0.717 (0.436)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.925** (0.404)	1.685*** (0.388)	-1.911*** (0.427)	-4.141*** (0.442)	-4.201*** (0.422)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	73.439	80.193	48.284	21.296	26.205
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables are based on the question "What percentage of their income does each of these groups hide from the authorities in order to pay less taxes?" and take values from 0 to 100. All columns are estimated using OLS. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.4: Perceived Prevalence of Groups Influencing the Government to Obtain Favorable Laws and Tax Exemptions

	Firms (1)	Rich (2)	Middle class (3)	Poor (4)	Friends and family (5)
Treatment 1: Corruption	0.115*** (0.019)	0.095*** (0.021)	0.069*** (0.018)	-0.026 (0.020)	0.027 (0.019)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	0.091*** (0.019)	0.063*** (0.021)	0.012 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.020)	0.023 (0.019)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.304	3.575	2.449	1.578	1.695
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The outcome variables in columns (1)–(5) are based on the question "Do you think it is common or uncommon that these groups of people influence the government to be favored through laws and tax exemptions?" and take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "very uncommon" and 4 being "very common." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.5: Perceived Prevalence of Groups Acting in the Best Interest of Respondents and People Like Them

	Politicians (1)	Public officials (2)	Firms (3)	Judges (4)	Police (5)	Teachers (6)
Treatment 1: Corruption	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.051*** (0.019)	-0.099*** (0.018)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.051*** (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	1.475	1.618	1.864	1.809	1.955	2.572
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The outcome variables in columns (1)–(6) are based on the question "Do you think it is common or uncommon that these groups think of you and the interests of people like you when making decisions?" and take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "very uncommon" and 4 being "very common." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.3 Other Outcomes

Table E.6: Other Outcomes

	Satisfaction with public services (1)	State capacity to redistribute (2)	Paying taxes is a moral obligation (3)	Progressive taxes are fairer (4)
Treatment 1: Corruption	-0.037** (0.018)	0.052*** (0.018)	-0.010 (0.018)	0.026 (0.018)
Treatment 2: Tax evasion	-0.010 (0.018)	0.040** (0.018)	0.034* (0.018)	0.037** (0.018)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	1.985	3.088	2.817	2.752
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variable in column (1) elicits information about how satisfied respondents are with the quality of the public services they receive given the taxes paid. It takes values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "very unsatisfied" and 4 being "very satisfied." The dependent variables in columns (2)–(4) elicit information about how strongly respondents agree with the following statements: (1) "The government has the capacity and the tools to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born into poor and rich households"; (2) "Paying taxes is a moral obligation to contribute to society"; and (3) "Progressive tax rates (where the tax rate increases as income increases) are fairer than a fixed tax rate (where the tax rate is the same for all income levels)." All outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being "strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.4 Heterogeneity Analysis

Table E.7: Preferences for Redistribution: Heterogeneity by Political Ideology

	Progressive taxation		Taxes for Redistribution			Social Spending for Redistribution	
	Rich vs. Middle Class (1)	3x Min Wage vs. Min Wage (2)	Increase Corporate Tax (3)	Increase Income Tax (4)	Increase VAT (5)	Increase of Non-contributory pensions (6)	Increase of CCTs (7)
Treated	0.028 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.032)	-0.046 (0.033)	-0.069** (0.033)	0.001 (0.032)	-0.036 (0.032)
Treated x Left ideology	0.043 (0.049)	0.066 (0.047)	0.069 (0.048)	0.118** (0.048)	0.119** (0.048)	0.077* (0.047)	0.097** (0.047)
Treated x Centrist or no ideology	0.029 (0.038)	0.043 (0.037)	0.023 (0.037)	0.010 (0.038)	0.074* (0.038)	-0.013 (0.037)	0.048 (0.037)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
P-value: T x Left = T x Centrist/No	0.734	0.558	0.259	0.007	0.258	0.023	0.219
Mean dep. var.	3.048	2.636	2.719	2.046	1.913	2.536	2.327
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables elicit information about how strongly a respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households"; (2) A person who earns 3 times the minimum wage should pay more of his/her income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage"; (3) It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (4) It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (5) It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (6) The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it"; and (7) The government should increase spending in [main CCT of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it." All outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. The p-value row reports the test of equality between the treatment interaction with left ideology and the treatment interaction with centrist or no ideology. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.8: Preferences for Redistribution: Heterogeneity by Knowledge

	Progressive taxation		Taxes for Redistribution			Social Spending for Redistribution	
	Rich vs. Middle Class (1)	3x Min Wage vs. Min Wage (2)	Increase Corporate Tax (3)	Increase Income Tax (4)	Increase VAT (5)	Increase of Non-contributory pensions (6)	Increase of CCTs (7)
Treated	0.042** (0.021)	0.017 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.021)
Treated x High policy knowledge	0.023 (0.031)	0.011 (0.030)	0.058* (0.030)	-0.006 (0.030)	0.040 (0.031)	0.046 (0.030)	0.028 (0.030)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.048	2.636	2.719	2.046	1.913	2.536	2.327
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables elicit information about how strongly a respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households"; (2) A person who earns 3 times the minimum wage should pay more of his/her income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage"; (3) It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (4) It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (5) It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (6) The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it"; and (7) The government should increase spending in [main CCT of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it." All outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.9: Preferences for Redistribution: Heterogeneity by Perceived Position in the Income Distribution

	Progressive taxation		Taxes for Redistribution			Social Spending for Redistribution	
	Rich vs. Middle Class (1)	3x Min Wage vs. Min Wage (2)	Increase Corporate Tax (3)	Increase Income Tax (4)	Increase VAT (5)	Increase of Non-contributory pensions (6)	Increase of CCTs (7)
Treated	0.040 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.057* (0.033)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.051 (0.035)	0.026 (0.034)	-0.023 (0.035)
Treated x Q2	0.038 (0.048)	0.032 (0.047)	0.083* (0.047)	0.046 (0.048)	0.037 (0.049)	-0.007 (0.047)	0.075 (0.048)
Treated x Q3	0.008 (0.048)	0.016 (0.047)	0.078* (0.047)	0.058 (0.048)	0.117** (0.048)	-0.060 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.048)
Treated x Q4	-0.019 (0.047)	0.038 (0.046)	0.090* (0.046)	0.028 (0.047)	0.035 (0.048)	-0.025 (0.047)	0.045 (0.047)
Treated x Q5	0.043 (0.050)	0.056 (0.049)	0.027 (0.049)	0.033 (0.050)	0.059 (0.051)	0.001 (0.049)	0.064 (0.050)
Observations	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471	21,471
Mean dep. var.	3.048	2.636	2.719	2.046	1.913	2.536	2.327
Model	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Notes: Authors' own elaboration based on IPRS. The dependent variables elicit information about how strongly a respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) Rich households should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than middle-class households"; (2) A person who earns 3 times the minimum wage should pay more of his/her income in taxes than a person who earns the minimum wage"; (3) It is desirable to raise corporate taxes to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (4) It is desirable that more middle-class people pay income tax to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (5) It is desirable to increase VAT to spend more on health, education and social benefits"; (6) The government should increase spending in [main non-contributory pension of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it"; and (7) The government should increase spending in [main CCT of the survey country] by increasing taxes to fund it." All outcome variables take values from 1 to 4, with 1 being strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." All columns are estimated using ordered probit models. All specifications control for age, gender, ethnicity, political ideology, policy knowledge, perceived income quintile, and include country fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported in all columns, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.