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Abstract

This online appendix presents a thorough analysis of the nature, dynamics, and most important events for 38 cases of democratization, including the list of democracy experts and key country-specific references obtained from the survey and from numerous books and academic articles.

JEL classifications: E02, E20, N40
Keywords: Democracy, Growth, Democratic transitions, Endogeneity

Argentina (1983)

Synopsis

"Argentina fell from the position of a rising world power in the 1920s to a third-world nation in the span of 60 or so years" (McClure, 2004). This created a culture of successive political coups at the expense of institutional stability, and led Argentina to have one of the most violent and unstable political systems and one of the worst economies in the Western world. Since 1974, Argentina suffered a currency crisis every year and stock market crashes every two years (Reinhart, 2014), with annual inflation rates surging to 335 percent (Edwards, 2008) in 1975. In 1976, after more than three decades of Peronism, a military government took power and launched the so-called Dirty War, which caused the death or disappearance of a huge portion of the population and "left a feeling of revulsion for the military among the populace" (Anderson, 1984). The unemployment rate increased while wages fell, inflation returned to over 100 percent, and Argentina faced another severe recession in 1981. Social unrest broke out against the government. Having lost its capacity to win support on economic grounds, the regime attempted to regain legitimacy through appeals to nationalistic militarism. Hoping to bolster the regime's credibility, General Galtieri launched the Falklands War against the United Kingdom. However, "the defeat of the military regime in the War in the context of severe violations of human rights and increasing economic crisis" (Lodola) eventually brought down the military dictatorship. The presidential elections in October 1983 formally ended military rule, ushering in democracy in Argentina.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 3/7

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: seven
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Alberto Föhrig, Professor, School of Political Science, University of San Andres
- German Lodola, Research fellow at CONICET and Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University Torcuato Di Tella
- Diego Reynoso, Faculty member, Department of Social Sciences, University of San Andres
- Javier Zelaznik, Faculty member, Departamento de Ciencia Politica y Estudios Internacionales Inter at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
- Catalina Smulovitz, Professor of Political Science at the University Torcuato Di Tella

Chronology of Main Events

July 1974	**Juan Perón dies. Estela Martínez de Perón (Isabelita) assumes power.**
1975	The severe economic adjustment known as the *Rodrigazo* leads to 335 percent inflation.
March 1976	General Jorge Videla takes power, establishing a military dictatorship (National Reorganization Process, PRN). The Dirty War (1976–1983) begins.
March 1981	General Viola succeeds General Videla as president.
July 1981	Political platform Multipartidaria Nacional, aimed at reestablishing a democratic regime, is instituted.
December 1981	General Leopoldo Galtieri becomes president.
April 1982	The Army invades the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
June 1982	The Argentine Army is defeated in the Falklands War.
July, 1981	General Galtieri resigns and is replaced by General Bignone.
1983	Inflation reaches 200 percent.
February 1983	Elections are announced.
October 1983	The dictatorship ends. Raúl Alfonsín is elected president.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

The Legacy of Peronism and the Panorama of Chaos (1944–1976)

"Since 1930, Argentina has been characterized by a culture of successive political coups in which all of the major political actors have conspired against the regime in power. Political parties, labor unions, business associations, the rural bourgeoisie, and the military have worked tenaciously for short-term interests, even at the expense of institutional stability" (Mainwaring, 1984). The "pendular game of Argentine politics (the vacillation between military and civilian rule that has marked the country for the last century)" (Anderson, 1984) is the latest response to a crisis that dates back to at least 1930. Since then, periods of growth have alternated with stagnation and retrogression" (Ramos and Waisman, 1987). This state of affairs led Argentina to have "one of the most violent and unstable political systems and one of the worst economies in the Western world" (Mainwaring, 1984).

Until the 1980s, military juntas often alternated with elected presidents, as economic problems provided pretexts for a number of military takeovers. Juan Perón came to power as part of a junta in 1944 and was elected president in 1946, 1951, and again in 1973. "Starting in 1946, when Perón reached power, a new institutional framework was created. This framework redefined the role of the State in the economy, increasing the power to intervene that it had acquired during the inter-war period and the crisis of the

1930s. The economic measures implemented, their nature, and the decision-making process in which they originated gave rise to a long distributive conflict and to the loss of legitimacy of the political system" (Cortés Conde, 2002). In short, the Peronists "were poor managers of economic policy" (Saxton, 2003), which generated a severe financial and fiscal imbalance and extremely weak international relations. Their economies were not their only problem. "Socially, the Peronist era was dominated by social polarization" (Saxton, 2003).

Perón won his third term in office 10 months before he died in July 1974. His widow, Estela Martínez de Perón (Isabelita), assumed power upon his death. By then, Argentina was facing a severe economic and political crisis, which was creating a climate of permanent economic and political volatility. "International oil prices surged, government spending skyrocketed, Argentine exports plummeted, inflation soared, and economic activity contracted sharply" (Pei and Adesnik, 2000).

Isabelita's administration was unable to address Argentina's extreme economic challenges by creating political fissures: "The constitutional but hopelessly inept government of Perón's widow…quickly became mired in international party divisions and inflationary economic policies and faced a difficult challenge from leftist guerrillas" (Anderson, 1984). Annual inflation kept rising, reaching 335 percent by 1975 (Saxton, 2003). In order to halt rising prices, Celestino Rodrigo (the finance minister) implemented drastic measures, including a 150 percent devaluation of the currency for the commercial exchange rate and a 100 percent increase in utility and transportation prices, among others. As a consequence of these measures (later known as the *Rodrigazo)*, inflation rates reached 35 percent per month and eventually resulted in the March 1976 coup that removed the Peronist government (Calvo, 1986).

Military Rule: From a World Cup to a War (1976–1983)

In 1976, a military junta seized power from Isabelita Perón and initiated the so-called National Reorganization Process (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, or PRN), whose central goal was an intensive restructuring of the State. The reorganization featured a profound militarization of the State, covering the central government as well as the decentralized agencies, provinces, municipalities, and state-owned enterprises.

Under the leadership of General Jorge Rafael Videla, the dictatorship applied severe repression against the opponents of the regime, but its economic goals were unsuccessful. "The junta also tried to make economic reforms but never combined a coherent plan with the will to persist with drastic changes" (Saxton, 2003). José H. Martínez de Hoz, Minister of Economy, introduced a rigid economic program with new exchange rates and trade reforms that promoted agricultural exports and industrial imports. State-owned corporations were sold, tariffs were reduced, and the private sector had to learn quickly how to compete. In the first few months, there was a dramatic increase in exports and a drop in inflation. However, shortly afterward, industrial output fell and stagnated for two years, the unemployment rate increased, and wages dropped. Little economic progress was made by selling public corporations. By 1980, inflation had again surged out of control, reaching over 100 percent.

Argentina was not only suffering from a severe economic crisis, but it was also living in absolute fear. The military government launched the Dirty War *(la guerra sucia)*, a campaign of state terrorism against real and suspected enemies of the state. Using police and military personnel and other state resources, the dictatorship took thousands of suspected enemies of the State into custody. Working with dictatorships in

Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay, the military government pursued its enemies in foreign countries. From 1975 to 1983, the Dirty War led to the death and disappearance of "tens of thousands of Argentines" (Lewis, 2001), which in turn "left a general feeling of revulsion for the military among the populace" (Anderson, 1984). It also led to the creation of peaceful social movements, such as Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who marched in front of the office of the President of Argentina (the Casa Rosada) to protest and demand answers about their disappeared children and grandchildren. "In 1978, Argentina hosted the World Cup, during which foreign journalists also reported on the weekly demonstrations occurring in the Plaza de Mayo. A number of soccer players also demonstrated in solidarity with the mothers" (Global Nonviolent Action Database).

On March 29, 1981, General Videla finished his four-year mandate (as established by the internal status of the National Reorganization Process) and was replaced by General Roberto Eduardo Viola. Viola did not command the power that Videla had, however, as he "was already politically weakened because he hadn't been unanimously elected by the military junta" (Fundación Mapfre).

In response to the existing economic and political crisis, Finance Minister Lorenzo Sigaut ended the era of the open economy and reinstituted numerous controls, launching a series of regulations and borrowing from abroad. "Although these policies met with guarded optimism, they promised only a temporary breathing space for Viola's regime" (Smith, 1991). The global recession that hit Argentina in 1981 made things even worse, and GDP fell by 6 percent that year (Edwards, 2008). "By 1981, the economic situation had deteriorated severely" (Viola and Mainwaring, 1985).

In this context, on July 14, 1981, instigated by the radical leader Ricardo Balbin, the top leaders of the major political parties—Radical Civic Union (UCR), Justicialist Party (PJ), Intransigent Party (PI), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and Integration and Development Movement (MID)—met to create a political platform or movement, later known as La Multipartidaria, that pressured the military government to establish a democratic government. Their first public message stated "we thus initiate the transition to democracy, which is our nontransferable goal and irrevocable decision" (Wikisource). Despite their initial popularity, after Balbin died in September, the military junta decided to take action against the movement. Viola was removed from office, and soon afterward, General Galtieri took office in December of that year.

General Leopoldo Galtieri "decided the country needed a diversion from its economic troubles. Hence, in the spring of 1982, he launched the invasion of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands" (Ramos and Waisman, 1987). Indeed, this invasion raised the population's support of the military until the defeat of the Argentine Army in June 1982. "The nation was shocked by the rapid collapse and surrender of its numerically superior armed forces" (Edwards, 2008). "In a context of severe violations of human rights and increasing economic costs" (Lodola), "the Argentina surrender in the Malvinas War promoted large protests against the ruling military government, which hastened its downfall" (Expert 2).

On June 17, 1982, General Galtieri resigned and was replaced by a relatively unknown general, Reynaldo Bignone. He began negotiations with civilian leaders to orchestrate the end of the dictatorship and promised a return to a civilian rule by 1984. The regime was facing a sharp decline: "The first half of 1983 saw intense activity of the political parties, and the severe economic crisis further contributed to the regime's inability to control the transition" (Viola and Mainwaring, 1985). "The economy continued to

deteriorate; inflation reached around 200 percent, and workers lost approximately 25 percent of their purchasing power. The government also went into de facto default on its foreign debt" (Edwards, 2008).

Collapse of the Dictatorship, Beginning of Democracy

"In the last year of the military administration…there were practically no economic policy options for an administration that was already at the end of its days" (Damill and Frankel, 1992). In February, 1983, General Bignone announced that the election would take place in October of that year. However, the 1983 election that ended the dictatorship was viewed as the landmark event that defined the beginning of democracy. "Yet while the opportunity for establishing stable constitutional government [was] huge, the problems faced by the new administration, especially its more than US$43 billion in foreign debt [were also] severe" (Anderson, 1984). On October 30, 1983, Radical Party candidate Raúl Alfonsín won the presidential election in the midst of a severe economic crisis, aggravated by inflation, uncertainty, and exchange rate speculation.

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Benin (1991)

Synopsis

Between 1986 and 1988, Benin's three state-owned commercial banks became illiquid, preceding a collapse of its economy and resulting in "increasing popular mobilizations demanding political changes" (Gazibo). In addition, "years of failed economic policies had left the regime without any funds to maintain the regime. As parallel student and professional organizations organized protests, the regime could not count on its unpaid soldiers and police forces to end the social unrest. These conditions pushed the regime into a national conference, where it reached a compromise with the opposition forces" (Expert 3). All in all, the 17 years of Kerekou's regime were marked by economic decline, political oppression, and failed relationships with foreign regimes. However, "without the extreme economic devastation of Benin's economy, the call for democracy would not have been as urgent, large, or unified. It was the severe economic crisis in Benin which…limited Kerekou's ability to resist the coming change" (Soble, 2007).

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 3/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Mamoudou Gazibo, Professor of Political Science, Université de Montréal
- John R. Heilbrunn, Associate Professor and Research Fellow, Colorado School of Mines

Chronology of Main Events

1972	**Lt. Col. Mathie Kerekou overthrows the government. Establishes 17 year-long Marxist regime.**
1979	Kerekou holds an election in which he is the only candidate.
1986–1988	Government takes over more and more businesses, including the banking sector.
January 1989	Teachers begin setting off a series of strikes and protests that continue all year.
May 1989	The government shuts down the banking system.
June-July 1989	More riots break out after government fails to pay the army; 13 of 16 government ministries go on strike.
August 1989–January 1990	Kerekou renounces Marxism, releases political prisoners, and meets with dissident leaders.
February 1990	A National Conference votes to abolish the existing form of government.
December 1990	A new parliamentary government votes to adopt a multi-party system.
February 1991	The first multi-party elections are held in Benin. Kerekou loses to Nicephore Soglo.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

1972 Coup and Marxist-Leninist Ideology

In 1972, Lt. Col. Mathie Kerekou overthrew the government in power, making himself the de facto ruler and dictator of Benin. This "ended a series of coups and countercoups that had plagued the stability of the country since its independence from France in 1960" (Freedom House). Three years later, he founded the Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin (PRPB), declared Benin a Marxist state, and began instituting greater government control over the economy" (Decal and Hougnikp, 2013) by nationalizing the banks and the petroleum industry.

"For the remainder of the 1970s, the main focus of regime activity lay in securing its future through reform of social, political and economic structures....Power and increasingly spending were centralized in

a presidency, ruling through a hierarchy of prefects and their subordinates... Kerekou dominated the system both through his formal offices in state, party and army and through his extensive use of appointment, patronage, and ethnic balancing" (Hughes, 1992). All in all, Kerekou's rule was characterized by political oppression: "The regime actively abused the human rights of its citizens and transformed the country into a police state, sending the opposition underground" (Adjolohoun).

From Public Sector Expansion to the Collapse of the State-owned Banking Sector

"The economic reforms centered on reducing dependence on France (by diversifying trade and aid flows and nationalizing some French interests) and on expanding the public sector thorough the creation of well over one hundred parastatal bodies in trade, agriculture, transport and industry" (Hughes, 1992).

However, Kerekou's rule was fraught with economic failures. Between 1986 and 1988, Benin's three state-owned commercial banks became illiquid, preceding a collapse of its economy and resulting in "increasing popular mobilizations demanding political changes." By the end of Kerekou's 17-year reign, Benin's economy had become increasingly dependent on the public sector and foreign aid and had contracted significantly. "By December 1989, Benin was completely and utterly bankrupt. Between 1985 and 1987, Benin's annual GDP fell from 499.8 million CFA3 to 476.4 million. Real GDP growth rates during this time declined precipitously to reach -3.6 percent in 1987" (Soble, 2007).

At the same time, "the public sector expanded at breathtaking speed, from approximately 2,000 employees in 1960 to 12,000 in 1980 and 49,000 in 1990" (Biershenk, 2009). This rapid job growth created problems: as government payrolls expanded but government revenues shrank, the financial condition of the country became increasingly strained, especially by the early 1980s. "With the economy collapsing in 1981 under onerous state payrolls (92 percent of the budget) and parastatal deficits, several state companies were closed down in 1982, others were privatized, and still others reorganized as mixed economy companies" (Decal and Hougnikp, 2013). In addition, "in the mid-1980s Benin suffered a reduction in trade with Nigeria, both through legal channels and by smuggling, together with the ending of hopes for high oil revenues, which further confirmed that it was now in economic crisis" (Hughes, 1992).

Political Oppression and Stream of Protests

Kerekou's long legacy of political oppression had also brought the country to this boiling point: "The long ban on civil and political rights fueled growing discontent among domestic social and political forces, which resorted to indefinite strikes and country-wide protests demanding change" (Adjolohoun).

In the late 1980s, the press "became the mouthpiece for a virulent critique of the government and rampant corruption" (Biershenk, 2009). With criticisms becoming increasingly strident, 1989 was "characterized by strikes, demonstrations, and unrest in the major cities, which rendered the country increasingly ungovernable" (Biershenk, 2009). In addition, by 1989 the country's economic conditions had resulted in constant rioting. "Without the payment of government salaries, a majority of the urban population's income was eliminated. An urban famine began to take hold as food became unaffordable" (Soble, 2007). "In January 1989, university students demanding the return of guaranteed public sector employment and teachers angered by months of unpaid salaries began a stream of protests and strikes that lasted some 20 weeks. By the end of 1989, the movement had grown to include other civil society groups and had taken on a more general political nature, demanding the resignation of Kerekou and the implementation of democratic rule. In December alone, more than 40,000 citizens participated in street demonstrations in the country's two largest cities."

Lack of Foreign Support and National Conference

As the domestic economy weakened, Benin became more dependent on foreign support. Kerekou reached out to foreign allies but found himself and his country increasingly isolated. The lack of foreign support further isolated and undermined Kerekou's regime.

In 1989, as the Western world was shaken by the collapse of communism in Europe, "political reform movements in Benin gained momentum [and] were organized rapidly. Kerekou saw the handwriting on the wall more quickly, as support from France and the East bloc suddenly evaporated…. Kerekou was pressured by internal reformers and external donors to convene a sovereign national conference to reconsider the country's political future" (Clark and Magnusson, 2005).

Eventually Kerekou gave in. He released political prisoners and agreed to a national conference with opposition leaders to decide on the political future of the country. The national conference went on to declare a new government for Benin, establishing a new legislative body with a prime minister and a multi-party election system. Kerekou agreed to the conditions and went on to lose the election in February 1991 to Nicephore Soglo (Biershenk, 2009).

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Bolivia (1982)

Synopsis

Since its inception in 1825, Bolivia has suffered through nearly 190 irregular changes of government and an extreme cycle of economic boom and bust pivoting around a primary product export economy (mining). The period between 1978 and 1982 was one of Bolivia's most unstable in its history, leaving the country mired in a severe economic and political crisis. The peso was devalued multiple times, and civil-military relations fell to an all-time low. As a result, the economy collapsed. By 1981, the Confederation of Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs had joined the Confederation of Bolivian Workers (Central Obrera Boliviana, or COB) and sectors of the middle class in pushing for rapid democratization. The Catholic Church was also actively involved as a mediator among all sides. The Congress elected in 1980 was reconvened in October 1982 and selected as the new president Hernan Siles Zuazo, who had won a plurality of votes in the annulled 1980 elections. He assumed office on October 10, 1982.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 3/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three

Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Martin Mendoza-Botelho, Assistant Professor, Eastern Connecticut State University
- Mauricio Jaramillo Jassir, Professor of Political Science, Universidad del Rosario

Chronology of Main Events

April 1952–November 1964	**1952 Revolution, led by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)**.
November 1964	Coup d'état led by General Barrientos and General Ovando (initiating the so-called co-presidency).
August 1971	After several terms in power, General Banzer rules as a dictator for seven years, initiating the *Banzerato*.
October 1972	Bolivian peso is devalued by 40.6 percent.
November 1979	First constitutional coup led by Alberto Natusch Busch (later known as *Masacre de Todos Santos*). Guevara is deposed by Colonel Natusch Busch. General labor strike called by Juan Lechín (COB).
November 1979	Lidia Gueiler Tejada assumes power as interim president.
July 1980	Coup d' état headed by Garcia Meza (the "Cocaine Coup").
1981	Garcia Meza is forced to resign in favor of General Bernal. General Bernal resigns in favor of General Torrelio.
July 1982	General Guido Vildoso comes to power as a de facto president. The 1980 Congress is recalled.
September 1982	General labor strike, organized by the COB.
October 1982	Hernan Siles Suazo (from the Democratic and Popular Unity Party, or UDP) is elected president.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Ethnic Politicization, the 1952 Revolution, and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)

Bolivia has experienced a number of extreme political changes. "Since its inception in 1825, Bolivia has suffered through nearly 190 irregular changes of government and an extreme cycle of economic boom and bust, pivoting around a primary product export economy (mining). Since its swing with the regional trend toward democracy, Bolivia has experienced a tortuous political transition marked by violent, irregular, and multiple changes of government, featuring dictatorships, interim civilian regimes, and mass unrest" (Malloy, 1991). A major contributing factor to that unrest might be that Bolivia has long been considered "one of the most multi-ethnic countries in the American hemisphere, with one of the highest levels of inequality" (Gray Molina, 2006).

The 1952 Revolution deposed the mining oligarchy that had ruled the country for six years. This revolution, led by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), "triggered extreme measures such as nationalization of the tin mines, agrarian reform, neutralization of the army, and universal sufferage" (Patch, 1961). With time, "the emblematic party of Bolivia's 1952 Revolution, the MNR, and its leader, Paz Estenssoro, were discredited for their failure to accomplish some of the primary objectives of the 1952 Revolution related to social change and material improvements. Moreover, the MNR resorted to a series of odd and short-lived alliances with the military and other institutional actors, which further damaged its credibility. The left remained dispersed and tied to episodes of violent insurgency (such as the guerrilla activity led by Ernesto Che Guevara in Ñancahuazú in the mid-1960s and the Teoponte guerrillas in the early 1970s) with little possibility of gaining influence in a mostly oligarchic and exclusive political system. This political vacuum at the end of this decade became the incentive for the military to intervene to guarantee stability" (Mendoza-Botelho).

Military Rule, *Banzerato*, and Economic Crisis

From 1964 to 1978, General Barrientos and General Ovando occupied the presidential palace (initiating the so-called co-presidency period). During this time, "the military sponsored a variety of formal regimes, but failed to convert any into an institutionalized system of rule" (Malloy, 1991). The death of Barrientos in a helicopter crash, Ovando's loss of popularity, and the polarization of the military led to several changes in government.

In 1971, Colonel Hugo Banzer assumed the presidency and remained in power until 1978. An anti-populist model was put in place, which helped create temporary, though ultimately unsustainable, growth. "Partly because of the model and partly because of favorable international economic factors such as high commodity prices, Bolivia experienced a burst of economic growth during this period. However, the growth proved superficial and did not reflect a structural basis for sustained long-term economic development. In spite of the apparent economic success, Banzer was unable to create a new institutionalized regime to generate power and underwrite his government" (Malloy, 1991). In addition, "the government's economic policies benefited only a narrow sector of the population. While key sectors of the middle and upper classes prospered, workers and peasants experienced the darker side of the economic boom. The sharp devaluation of the Bolivian peso (of 40.6 percent) in October 1972 fell heavily and inequitably on Bolivia's poor" (Morales, 2010). Banzer's failure to address effectively these socioeconomic upheavals defined his second term as president.

As a result, Bolivia began to slide into a deepening economic crisis (which later became known in the region as the lost decade). "At the end of the 1970s, the overall political system, sustained heavily on an extractive economic model, was in crisis (in part due to economic turmoil). The oil bonanza of the 1970s was coming to an end; international prices for some of Bolivia's staple commodities (tin and silver) were falling and the external debt burden kept rising" (Mendoza-Botelho). Thus, "In the early 1980s, Bolivia sustained years of negative growth rates and plummeting living standards. The economic crisis stood out most clearly in a raging hyperinflation, which in 1985 reached 23,000 percent, marking Bolivia's as the seventh most severe inflation in human history" (Malloy, 1991).

Political Instability and Frustrated Democracy

"The 1978-1982 period was one of the most unstable periods in Bolivia's history. The country saw the impeachment of one president due to fraudulent elections, the overthrown of two constitutional provisional governments, four military coups d'état, one military junta (in addition to other two transitional juntas), and three other unconstitutional seizures of the presidency. The political system and the capacity of the State to govern were completely broken" (Mendoza-Botelho). "The chronic political instability resulting from the swings between populist and antipopulist politics reflected the deeper divisions in the Bolivian economy and society" (Morales and Sachs, 1987).

On November 16, 1979, President Lidia Gueiler, the first Bolivian woman to be elected president, took office and had the extremely difficult task of "preserv(ing) what remained of the democratic opening and shepherding the country through the next presidential election. Bolivia was mired in a severe economic and political crisis. The peso had to be devalued a second time, and civil-military relations fell to an all-time low" (Morales, 2010). Although "she was the one president who made a significant effort to foster the weak existing democracy, she was deposed by a military coup led by Luis Garcia Meza. Not surprisingly, the economy degenerated apace, heading for total collapse" (Malloy, 1991).

Civic Movement and Democratic Transition

"Garcia Meza's oppressive and corrupt military government, which took power in 1980, was brought down in 1981. His repressive and internationally isolated government eroded support in the military's ranks. Amid the severe ongoing economic crisis that triggered international isolation, mass protests and a crippling general strike in 1982, the military high command decided to return to the barracks.

Throughout the preceding period, opposition to the regime had centered on the main union in Bolivia, the COB. By 1981, the Confederation of Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs had joined the COB and sectors of the middle class in pushing for rapid democratization. The Catholic Church was also actively involved as a mediator among all sides. The Congress elected in 1980 was reconvened in October 1982 and selected as the new president Hernán Siles Zuazo, who had won a plurality of votes in the annulled 1980 elections. He took office on October 10, 1982.

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Brazil (1985)

Synopsis

In Brazil, "democratization has been a long process of transition, during which division among the regime's supporters and the interplay between regime 'doves' and the democratic opposition has been crucial" (Tavares de Almeida). After a period of spectacular growth (1968–73) and big projects (largely financed by overseas borrowing), Brazil was seriously hit by the international debt crisis and the oil and interest rate shocks of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The almost unbearable economic constraints and the protracted nature of the decompression process led to protests over economic policy (coming from the modern industrial community), a gradual erosion of the legitimacy of the military, and a powerful opposition that was finally able to persuade civil society to mobilize. In March 1985, the opposition took office, and the military and its allies were swept from power.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 3/4

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: four

Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Elisa Reis, Professor of Sociology and Political Science, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
- Renato Janine Ribeiro, Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy, University of São Paulo
- Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, Professor, Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences, University of São Paulo

Chronology of Main Events

1930–1937	**Revolution of 1930. Getúlio Vargas is president.**
1937–1945	Authoritarian regime. Vargas exercises dictatorial power.
1946–1964	Democratic regime of President João Goulart is in power.
March 1964	Military coup overthrows President Goulart. Military regime is established.
March 1974	General Ernesto Geisel becomes president.
1968–1973	"Miracle growth" period: average GDP growth rate jumps to 11.1 percent, led by industry, with 13.1 percent average growth.
1975	II National Development Plan (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento, or PND).
March 1979	João Figueiredo takes power.
1979	Second oil and interest-rate shock.
1982	Brazil halts payment of its main foreign debt.
January 1985	Electoral college elects Tancredo Neves, who dies without taking office. José Sarney replaces him.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Revolution of 1930, Getulio Vargas, Estado Novo, and the 1964 Coup

In October 1930, due to a combination of intense regional differences and severe discontent of the urban middle class and the military, a revolutionary movement led by Getúlio Vargas overthrew the First Republic. "The main institutional result of the movement was an irreversible increase in central authority: the federative excesses of the First Republic were curtailed; government intervention in the economy was legitimized to a far greater degree; and, last but not least, important changes in representation concepts and practices were quickly introduced" (Lamounier, 1999).

In 1937, after running constitutionally for seven years, Vargas ruled as a dictator through the Estado Novo (a new political economic system). "Vargas had centralizing, modernizing tendencies and a populist appeal to urban nationalism. Especially after the early 1930s, as the protracted nature of the international depression became obvious and the Brazilian economy shifted to domestic industrial growth, Vargas used selective state economic intervention as a tool to speed this shift" (Frieden, 1991). The Vargas administration did not last long. It "dissolved in frustration and charges of corruption. Faced with military demands for his resignation, Vargas shot himself on August 24, 1954" (Hudson, 1997).

After Vargas' suicide and several changes in regime (Café Filho, Luz, and Ramos), Juscelino Kubitschek was finally inaugurated, serving from 1956 to 1961. In the early 1960s, "the fragmentation of the party

system was itself associated with the overall process of economic and social change. This relationship operated in two ways. On the one hand, urbanization and social mobilization eroded traditional attachments and social-control mechanism. On the other, the lack of substantial advance toward deconcentration (reduction of social inequality) left the parties, individually and as a system, without strong bases of popular support, setting the stage for the military takeover" (Lamounier, 1999). Moreover, "protectionism remained the rule (effective rates of protection for manufacturing averaged 184 percent)…. The anti-export bias of industrial policy, especially chronic currency overvaluation, led to recurring balance of payments crises. As taxation did not meet the needs of the growing government sector, budget deficits grew and inflation accelerated. No political actor seemed capable of controlling the situation, and in March 31, 1964 the military overthrew Goulart and took power" (Frieden, 1991).

1964 Coup, Military Regime, and "Distensão"

"Although the specific causes of the 1964 coup are many and controversial, there is little question that it grew out of generalized dissatisfaction by the elite with populist political practices, and fear of the turmoil that had characterized the last years of democratic government" (Frieden, 1991). Economically, "the 1964–1967 period was one of structural reform, stabilization, and relative stagnation. Market-oriented technocrats led by Roberto de Oliveira Campos and Otávio Gouveia de Bulhões "emphasized rebuilding the system of economic incentives itself rather than stimulating economic growth and the reforms drove many firms into bankruptcy" (Frieden, 1991).

General Ernesto Geisel's (1974–1979) term was seen as "essentially an opening through elections. It was not the result of sharp mass mobilization and was not precipitated by a dramatic or external event.... Election results functioned as indicators of the degree to which the authoritarian regime was losing legitimacy and, in turn, helped to aggregate further pressures against it....Geisel's economic policies were designed not only to sustain high rates of growth but, through an ambitious strategy of import substitution in basic sectors, to reduce Brazil's external dependency significantly...which aggravated Brazil's external debt intolerably" (Lamounier, 1999). "Ernesto Geisel's accession signaled a move away from repression toward democratic rule. Geisel replaced several regional commanders with trusted officers and labeled his political program "*distensão,*" meaning a gradual relaxation of authoritarian rule. It would be, in his words, "the maximum of development possible with the minimum of indispensable security" (Hudson, 1997).

From a "Big Projects Period" to an International Debt Crisis

The principal components of the 1974–1980 economic policies were contained in the second National Development Plan (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimiento, or PND), whose foremost goal was to strengthen the country's most sophisticated industries producing basic imports, heavy equipment, and capital goods.

However, a great deal of this public investment was financed by overseas borrowing, increasing the public sector's medium and long-term debt from US$13.1 billion in 1973 to US$43.3 billion in 1979 (in 1982 US dollars). A second major feature of the "big projects" period was a systematic network of subsidies and incentives to more advanced portions of private industry. Between 1974 and 1980, GDP grew 62 percent and industrial production 66 percent (Frieden, 1991).

The last military president, João Figueiredo (1979–1985), chosen by Ernesto Geisel to succeed him, signed a general amnesty into law and turned Geisel's *distensão* into a gradual *abertura* (opening of the political system), stating that his goal was "to make this country a democracy." The hardliners reacted to the opening with a series of terrorist bombings. An April 1981 bombing incident confirmed direct military involvement in terrorism, but "Figueiredo proved too weak to punish the guilty. The incident and the regime's inaction strengthened the public's resolve to end military rule" (Hudson, 1997).

In addition, due to rising inflation, drained exchange reserves and deteriorating external conditions, "the Brazilian economy began a downward spiral that had dramatic effects on patterns of political activity" (Lamounier, 1999). "When international financial conditions changed after 1980, substantially reducing the availability of funds, the regime was far less able to satisfy its erstwhile supporters….A solid drumbeat of protest over economic policy thus arose from the modern industrial community centered in Sao Paulo" (Frieden, 1991).

By 1981, "sustaining high rates of growth became impossible after the second oil and interest-rate shock of 1979. Deep recession and the succession crisis combined to make the negotiation between the regime and the opposition virtually impossible after 1982....The almost unbearable economic constraint and the protracted nature of the decompression process thus led to a sharp fall of aggregate authority in the political system from 1981 to 1985" (Lamounier, 1999). Hence, the "rise in international interest rates increased payments on the country's variable-rate debt, which caused stagnation in world trade and a deterioration in the country's terms of trade. By 1982 business discontent was widespread; by 1984 it was nearly universal, and the regime had lost most of its support" (Frieden, 1991).

Powerful Oppositions and Transition to Democracy

Thus, "the gradual erosion of the legitimacy of the military, a deliberate effort of the army to control the process of democratization and the end of the "economic miracle" (resulting in a stagnant economy and very high inflation)" (Reis) combined to set the ground for a new beginning.

"Hence, the opposition led by the Partido do Movimiento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), PDT and PT was finally able to persuade a popular majority against the military regime" (Ribeiro). Moreover, "given that even military presidents were chosen by military command but "elected" every four years by the Congress (which was itself elected by the voters), the Brazilian transition was a process of transition through elections that became increasingly open and competitive" (Tavares de Almeida).

In April 25, 1984, the Congress voted down a proposal of direct elections. "A proposed amendment to the Constitution, determining that Figueiredo's successor would be chosen by direct election, set the stage for a major popular campaign led by the opposition parties and supported by the opposition state governors. This was the *"diretas já"* (direct elections now), marked by a series of impressive popular rallies in early 1984....The proposed amendment failed to get the two-thirds majority in the chamber, but after the vote the process of democratic opening was close to irreversible. Combined, the Frente Liberal and the largest of the opposition parties, the PMDB, established the Democratic Alliance and led Tancredo Neves to victory in the Electoral College in January 1985. Tancredo died without taking office and was succeeded in the presidency by José Sarney, a PDS dissident who had been nominated for vice-president." (Frieden, 1991).

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Bulgaria (1991)

Synopsis

In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, advocated for economic and political reforms. In order to remain in line with the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) pushed for similar reforms. At the same time, the Bulgarian intelligentsia united around ecological issues, which represented broader discontent with head of state Todor Zhivkov's regime. Its harsh Turkish assimilation policies also undermined the regime, leading to protests by both Bulgarians and the international community. Ultimately, the fall of the Soviet empire provoked "[communism] to be unsustainable" (Stoyanov). These factors enabled the BCP to carry out an internal coup in November 1989 and remove Zhivkov from power. To retain some form of political power, the BCP agreed to Roundtable negotiations with the opposition in early 1990, allowing Bulgaria to transition to democracy. In July 1991, the General National Assembly, composed of both former BCP members and the opposition, ratified a new Constitution. The first parliamentary elections under the new Constitution were held in October 1991, marking Bulgaria's transition from a communist state to a democratic state.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Alexander Stoyanov, Director of Research, Center for the Study of Democracy
- Andrey Nonchev, Assistant Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of National and World Economy

Chronology of Main Events

June 1984	**Todor Zhivkov resolves to forcibly assimilate the Turkish minority.**
March 1985	Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union.
April 1989	Ecoglasnost, a group focused on ecological issues, is established as a legal entity.
May 1989	A group of Bulgarian Turks goes on a hunger strike; 370,000 flee the country in the following three months.
October 1989	Ecoglasnost is demonstrated during the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe's Conference on the Environment in Sofia.
November 1989	Zhivkov resigns and Petar Mladenov is appointed head of state.
December 1989	The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) is formed.
January 1990	Roundtable negotiations begin between the Communist Party and the UDF.
May 1990	Roundtable negotiations end.
June 1990	General National Assembly (GNA) elections are held.
August 1990	The GNA elects Zhelyu Zhelev president after Mladenov resigns.
July 1991	GNA adopts a new Constitution.
October 1991	First parliamentary elections are held under the new Constitution.
January 1992	Zhelev is elected to a five-year presidential term.

Brief background and Description of the Democratization Process

Relationship with the Soviet Union

Though Bulgaria was never officially admitted to the Soviet Union, it experienced a close relationship with the USSR until the 1980s. In fact, at the time, Bulgarian officials considered it the 16th satellite state, greatly benefiting from the discounted oil and gas sold by the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, due to deteriorating economic conditions, the Soviet Union decreased subsidies to Bulgaria and suspended the sale of low-cost gas and oil. This action, as well as other factors that culminated in the fall of the Soviet empire, resulted in Bulgaria's overall political and economic deterioration.

Though many of these fissures eventually led to the end of Zhivkov's 35-year regime, "the most important event was the appointment of 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev as leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985" (Crampton, 1990). Gorbachev, who advocated for increased

political openness through glasnost and perestroika, suggested to Zhivkov, the Bulgarian head of state, that Bulgaria needed to reform in order continue receiving Soviet assistance.

As a result, reformist members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) began challenging the current political rule and pushing for reform. Thus, "the doctrines and actions of…Mikhail Gorbachev played a significant part in strengthening the hand of reform elements within the BCP" (Melone, 1998). However, Zhivkov was not committed to political reform, creating tensions within the party and decreasing the legitimacy of the regime.

Turkish Assimilation and the Ecological Movement

In June 1984, Zhivkov enacted plans to integrate Bulgaria's Turkish minority. The administration banned the Turkish language, closed Turkish newspapers, ended Turkish broadcasts, and forced all Turks to adopt Bulgarian names. These policies met internal as well as international resistance and strained the country's economic and political relations with the West.

In May 1989, the Club for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, formed by a group of 100 leading intellectuals, encouraged a group of Turks to go on a hunger strike prior to a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting. This led to a number of clashes and mass protests in the Turkish districts of northeast Bulgaria, causing Zhivkov to announce that any Turks who wanted to leave Bulgaria were permitted to do so, not believing that anyone would actually emigrate. This prompted a wave of emigration, with more than 300,000 Turks eventually fleeing the country. Soon afterward, the agricultural sector collapsed because most agricultural workers were Turks. These events, in addition to the Soviet reforms, weakened Zhivkov's legitimacy by "focus[ing] world attention on Bulgaria's human rights record and disrupt[ing] an already shaky economy" (Bell, 1997).

Because Zhivkov had always rewarded intellectuals who complied with the regime, Bulgaria's dissident movement did not emerge until the late 1980s. During this time, independent groups of Ecoglasnost (an ecological movement, which openly challenged the regime's indifference to the destruction of the Bulgarian environment (Bell, 1997), was established. They included the Club for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, the Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Bulgaria, and Podkrepa (an independent trade union). To counter these groups, Zhivkov sanctioned or expelled Party members affiliated with these dissidents.

As a result, protests and resistance—largely surrounding ecological issues—began to undermine Zhivkov's regime. In the fall of 1987, the city of Ruse organized an art exhibition illustrating a rise in lung disease due to a metallurgical plant located across the Danube River in Romania. This issue united Bulgaria's intelligentsia with the broader population. In response, in July 1988, Zhivkov purged Party members respected by the intelligentsia, including the secretary of the Central Committee. In 1989, many opposition groups formed to shine light and protest deteriorating ecological security, among other causes. Although "the mobilization had no impact on environmental policies, [it] represented defiance to the absolute power of the BCP" (Rossi, 2012).

Zhivkov's Resignation and the Rise of the Union of Democratic Forces

By early November 1989, Zhivkov's regime was severely weakened by "economic, political and moral failure" (Nonchev). On November 8, Dobri Djurov, the minister of defense and head of the army, and the

more moderate officials of the Communist leadership deposed Zhivkov in an internal coup. On November 10, they replaced him with Petar Mladenov, the former minister for foreign affairs, who became the leader of the BCP and head of state. The coup reflected "the desire of the Communist leadership to retain power and to ensure its self-preservation" (Giatzidis, 2002). The BCP was willing to implement major reforms if they could maintain the status quo in terms of their political power.

Thus, following the coup, most BCP officials kept the positions they had held under Zhivkov. In mid-December 1989, Mladenov called a plenum and promised more democracy within the country. The BCP ended the persecution of Turks, allowed opposition groups to register as legal entities, and promised to reduce the role of the internal state security force. They also amended the laws that had recognized the Communist Party as the "guiding force in society" (Bell, 1997). In January 1990, the Party changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP).

Despite these concessions, one month after the coup, 10 opposition groups united to form the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a political party whose goal was the elimination of communism. Zhelyu Zhelev, a dissident philosopher, became the chairman of the UDF's coordinating council. The opposition arranged mass protests calling for the release of political prisoners and constitutional amendments.

Roundtable Negotiations and Elections

In late 1989, under mounting social pressure and following mass protests, Mladenov announced in a televised speech that the constitution would be amended to allow a multi-party system and that free parliamentary elections would be held in the spring (U.S. Embassy Bulgaria). After another demonstration, the anti-communist coalition UDF, the BSF and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) initiated a series of roundtable negotiations. Their main goal was to "choose the minimum required constitutional amendments that were absolutely necessary for conducting free and fair elections for a Constituent Assembly" (Kolarova and Dimitrov, 1996).

On March 30, 1990, the Roundtable drafted the Agreement on the Basic Ideas and Principles of the Draft Law on Amendment and Addenda to the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which "represent[ed] national consensus on common principles with respect to the political system; the economic system; basic rights and freedoms of citizens; the organization of state power under the transition of parliamentary democracy; a strong, competent, and responsible government; and a call for elections" (Melone, 1998).

The results of these negotiations were expressed in three agreements signed on March 12, 1990. First, elections for a new national assembly were called to elaborate a new constitution. The GNA's role was to function as both an ordinary parliament and as a constitutional convention. Second, national elections would be held on June 10 and 17, 1990. Finally, Mladenov was appointed to be in charge of the country until the elaboration of the new constitution. As a result of some violent episodes, all of the parties and organizations decided that no extra-institutional means would be used in the transitional period (Rossi, 2012).

On July 12, 1991 the GNA ratified and a new constitution was adopted. The Constitution is now considered "a republican document…it that allows for competing political parties and it discards the Communist notion that one party should lead. It contains the principle of separation of powers with a

strong parliament and a relatively weak president, and it establishes a strong judiciary, including a Constitutional Court designed to guard against backsliding into totalitarianism" (Melone, 1998).

Before adjourning, the GNA held new parliamentary elections in October 1991. In the first elections held under the new Constitution, the UDF (led by Filip Dimitrov) won 110 of the 240 seats, narrowly defeating the BSP. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which was Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority, was the third party to win parliamentary representation. Following the election, UDF leader Filip Dimitrov created a coalition cabinet with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and became prime minister. Presidential elections followed on January 12, 1992. Zhelev (UDF) was elected to a five-year presidential term.

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Cape Verde (1991)

Synopsis

Despite the impact of foreign democratization movements, the root causes of Cape Verde's democratization process were internal. That is, the ruling party recognized a need to open up the political system. Pressure from the opposition—the Movement for Democracy—and the public's desire to pursue democracy also led the ruling party to take initiatives to establish a pluralistic democracy. The main factor in Cape Verde's democratization is the 1980s political liberalization by its single ruling party—the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde, specifically its adoption of a transition to pluralism in 1990. As a result, the first multi-party legislative and presidential elections were held in January 1991 and marked the country's formal transition to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 2/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Roselma Mariza Lima Évora, University of Brasilia
- Edalina Rodrigues Sanches, Post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon
- Joao Resende-Santos, Associate Professor, Bentley University
- Roy May, Professor Emeritus of African Politics, Coventry University
- Peter Meyns, Professor, University Duisburg-Essen

Chronology of Main Events

July 1975	**The Republic of Cape Verde is granted independence from Portugal.**
January 1977	Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau form the Council of Unity.
September 1980	The Constitution is amended to establish the PAIGC as the sole political party.
January 1981	Cape Verde PAIGC dissolves itself and reforms as PAICV.
February 1981	Aristides Pereira is re-elected president.
June 1982	Reconciliation talks due to previous separation begin between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.
December 1985	PAICV-approved candidates win 95 percent of votes in legislative election.
January 1986	Aristides Pereira (president from 1975 to 1991) is re-elected to another five-year term.
February 1990	The government agrees to consider proposals for multi-party political system.
September 1990	National People's Assembly approves multi-party system.
January 1991	Control of government transferred to the Movement for Democracy (MpD) through legislative elections.
January 1991	MpD leader Carlos Veiga becomes prime minister of the transition government.
February 1991	Antonio Monteiro from MpD is elected president.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Independence of Cape Verde and the Evolution of PAICV

On July 5, 1975, Cape Verde gained independence from Portugal. At that time, it shared a unique feature with Guinea-Bissau, another former Portuguese colony located on the West African coast, whose independence—at first proclaimed unilaterally—had been confirmed by the new government in Lisbon in 1974.

In both countries, the same liberation movement, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), took over from the colonial administration (Meyns, 2002). In the 1970s, PAIGC gained high legitimacy through its efforts to achieve national liberation. Although there were groups opposed to the PAIGC, their numbers and influence were marginal. A coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau in 1980 provoked a formal rupture within the PAIGC and led to the formation of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) by the Cape Verdean wing of the PAIGC.

PAICV's Rule and Internal Division

"Though officially socialist, Cape Verde was in practice governed by 'an administrative and paternalist system of power,' essentially a pragmatic state in which the government ruled with the consent of the majority of the population—as expressed in one-party legislative elections" (Andrade, 2002). However, the one-party state, though it asserted its political control over the country and tolerated little opposition, "set up an effective and largely uncorrupt administrative structure" (Baker, 2006).

Domestically, a reformist, pro-liberalization wing emerged inside the one-party regime by the mid-1980s (Resende-Santos): "the impetus for political change came from a younger generation of party members, many of whom were technocrats, who had grown impatient with the increasing rigidity of the party and favored political and economic liberalization" (Chabal and Birmingham, 2002).

Faced with internal pressure for political opening and external challenges due to democratization efforts elsewhere in the continent, in 1981, Abdou Diouf of nearby Senegal was elected president of his country in peaceful, multi-party elections. He even included the opposition in his cabinet (Lobban, 1995). The PAICV oversaw selective liberalization in the mid-1980s.

In the 1985 parliamentary elections, some independent candidates were placed on the PAICV list allowing, for instance, Carlos Veiga—the future Movement for Democracy (MpD) leader and future prime minister—to be voted into the National Assembly (Chabal and Birmingham, 2002).

Collapse of Soviet Union and Third Wave of Democratization

Apart from domestic reasons, "an important contributing factor prompting Cape Verde's full democratization was the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and the perception in Cape Verde that change was inevitable and the ruling party would be in a better position if it was out in front of the change" (Resende-Santos). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 promoted the third wave of democratization—prompting internal conflict within one-party states around the world, including Africa (Lima Evora). The Cape Verdean government, faced with the fact that "the ideological underpinning of one-party rule had gone" (May) feared the same reaction.

At the same time, similar to other African countries, Cape Verde's donor community—consisting of major Western countries and international organizations—put stress on the country's democratization process, for the first time linking foreign aid with political change (Andrade, 2002).

Emergence of Opposition Party and the End of One-party Rule

In addition to international pressure, economic liberalization began to lead the way to political liberalization as well (Lima Evora). Thus, in 1990, the PAICV adopted an inclusive political reform agenda. Though PAICV actually opened up to dialogue with emerging opposition forces, notably the MpD, it still created changes within the existing one-party constitutional framework (Meyns, 2002). During the mid-1980s, the government initiated a policy of support to the private sector and created the Industrial Promotion Unit (Unidade de Promoção Industrial), a semi-official institution designed to offer credit to small private enterprises. The Third Party Congress, held in November 1988, marked the beginning of a systematic reform of the economic system [as it] proposed a new strategy of externally oriented development (Chabal and Birmingham, 2002).

In February 1990, the PAICV called an emergency congress to discuss the constitutional changes to one-party rule in response to growing political pressure. “Seeing this electoral opening, other PAICV dissidents and defectors aligned themselves with the MpD to restrain the PAICV’s appetite for greater power, and eventually won the two-thirds majority necessary for a constitutional reform allowing plural democracy” (Lobban, 1995). Consequently, the one-party system was abolished on September 28, 1990.

The opposition’s victory in achieving plural democracy directly led to the second phase of democratization, during which a legislative and a multi-party presidential election took place. The legislative election was held in January 1991, during which the opposition MpD won with 62 percent of the votes and 56 seats in the National Assembly against 32 percent and 23 seats for the ruling PAICV. The presidential elections of February 17, 1991, delivered an even more emphatic verdict, with the MpD candidate, Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, garnering 75 percent of the vote against the incumbent, Aristides Pereira (Andrade, 2002).

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Chile (1988)

Synopsis

Before General Pinochet ascended to power in a military coup in 1973, Chileans had enjoyed a long democratic culture and a strong sense of constitutionalism. The 1980 Constitution limited the length of Pinochet's power to two terms with a plebiscite scheduled in 1988 to determine whether Pinochet would stay in power. The economic crisis in 1982 and 1983 also created political space for the opposition parties to ally against the regime. By 1988, there were divisions and conflicts among the civilian supporters of the regime, and a considerable amount of international pressure to force the regime to loosen political repression. In addition, the influential Catholic Church advocated for a transition to democracy and attempted to dispel fears around voting (Angell). In the aftermath of the 1988 Plebiscite, the professionalism of the military to "move away from their political involvement" (Angell), the limitation of Pinochet's power outlined in the 1980 constitution in regards to succession, and the desire to maintain current economic success helped to ensure the success of the democratic election. In 1989, Chileans elected Concertación candidate Patricio Aylwin as president. In March 1990, Alywin was sworn into office, marking the transition of Chile from dictatorship to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 2/7

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: seven
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Peter Hakim, President Emeritus and Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue
- Alfredo Rehren, Doctoral Program Director and Professor of Political Science, Catholic University of Chile
- Alan Angell, Emeritus Fellow in Latin American Politics, St Antony's College, Oxford University
- Rodrigo Mardones, Associate Professor and Director of the Institute of Political Science, Catholic University of Chile
- Mireya Dävila Avendaño, Assistant Professor, University of Chile
- Oscar Landerretche Gacitúa, Assistant Professor, University of Chile
- Jaime Baeza Freer, Assistant Professor, University of Chile

Chronology of Main Events

September 1980	**New constitution is promulgated, calling for a plebiscite in 1988 on the return to democracy.**
1982	Chile's economy is hit by the Latin American debt crisis, but recovers quickly.
1983–1984	Regime focuses on economic recovery while mass protests sweep the country.
February 1985	Büchi is appointed finance minister; the economy begins to recover.
September 1986	Frente Patriótica Manuel Rodríguez attempts to assassinate Pinochet.
December 1986	Pinochet promulgates electoral registration law.
March 1987	Law on Political Parties comes into effect, legalizing political activity. Voter registration for the Plebiscite process begins.
September 1987	Political advertising is legalized.
February 1988	The center-left party Concertación de Partidos por el No is formed.
May, 1988	Electoral law is passed, setting forth the regulations governing future democratic elections.
August 1988	Pinochet is nominated as the candidate for Plebiscite by commanders; "Yes" and "No" campaign for the Plebiscite begins.
October 1988	Pinochet loses the Plebiscite.
July 1989	Constitutional referendum occurs. Patricio Aylwin is chosen to be presidential candidate by Concertación.
December 1989	Aylwin is elected president, but Pinochet remains commander-in-chief; most of the economic model is retained.
March 1990	Congressional elections are held. Alywin succeeds Pinochet as the new president.
1997	Pinochet retires from army command and becomes senator-for-life.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

1980 Constitution, Grassroots Movement and Opposition Political Parties Alliance

Chile has had a "strong tradition of democracy and constitutionalism" (Angell) since its independence in 1826. Until 1973, elections had been held regularly and democratically elected leaders had been able to finish their terms with only one exception. However, in September 1973, amid a deep socioeconomic

crisis, the Chilean military, headed by Augusto Pinochet, took power through a coup d'état and abolished the civilian government of socialist President Salvador Allende.

At first, the military had "widespread support in Chile's sizable middle and upper classes" (Valenzuela, 1991) and shortly after, a new Chilean constitution (the 1980 Constitution) was passed and adopted by a military junta. The 1980 Constitution gave Pinochet two more terms as president of the Republic until 1989 and called for a presidential plebiscite in 1988 on whether the military regime should remain in power. As a result, "Pinochet's authoritarian regime was considered illegitimate by a significant majority in Chile" (Landerretche Gacitúa).

Not long after the new Constitution, Chile, like other Latin American countries, was deeply affected by the economic and debt crises of the early 1980s. In 1982, Pinochet replaced Finance Minister Sergio de Castro, a prominent member of the so-called Chicago Boys who had dominated economic decision-making since Pinochet came into power. Nonetheless, the economy remained stagnant and unemployment soared, triggering a wave of protests across the country in 1983.

Taking advantage of the "political space created by both economic crisis and popular mobilization in the streets" (Hecht Oppenheim), opposition parties within the country reorganized (Angell). Political alliances, such as the center-left Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática), began to form. This popular mobilization was met with repression by Pinochet regime as well as the arrest of a number of protesters.

Economic Recovery, National Accord, and Attempt to Assassinate Pinochet

In August 1985, 11 center-left political parties— in collaboration with the Catholic Church—published a national accord calling for a transition to full democracy (Acuerdo Nacional para la Transición a la Plena Democracia.). However, with the implementation of newly appointed Finance Minister Hernán Büchi's pragmatic neoliberal economic policies and the help of international financial institutions, Chile's economy started to recover in early 1985. As a result, Pinochet's government refused to negotiate this new accord.

Even though the grassroots movement and National Accord were not successful in removing Pinochet's regime, they "demonstrated the depth of the opposition to the authoritarian regime among middle- and orking-class people" (Hecht Oppenheim) as well as the "organizational capacity of the opposition" (Dávila Avendaño) to unite for a common purpose, posing a real challenge to Pinochet's regime.

On September 7, 1986, Pinochet escaped an assassination attempt by Manuel Rodríguez of the Patriotic Front" (Frente Patriotica). "His survival together with the reviving economy reinforced Pinochet's position in Chile" (Fernandois).

Since "political repression was severely criticized from abroad (UN, the United States, and European countries)" (Mardones), 1986 and 1987 saw a number of political changes, including a policy for the return of some 3,500 exiles and the promulgation of the recently passed electoral registration law as required by the Constitution. At the same time, the military partly re-legalized the political activity when the Law on Political Parties came into effect in March 1987. During this month, voter registration for the Presidential Plebiscite started. Later in September of that same year, political advertisement was also legalized, and in May 1988, the Electoral Law was passed.

The 1988 Plebiscite, 1989 Presidential Election, and the Transition to Civilian Government

The 1988 plebiscite was first conceived by the military to grant legitimacy of the regime's continuing rule. Nevertheless, they also gave the opposition "much-needed room to maneuver" (Huneeus) as opposition parties shifted to practical strategies of "play[ing] politics by the very rules that Pinochet had devised" (Hecht Oppenheim). Thus, the regime "fell into its own political and institutional trap" (Mardones). Civic and nongovernmental organizations including the Catholic Church engineered voter education programs to encourage people to vote in the Plebiscite and to "overcome the fear of voting No" (Angell). In February 1988, negotiated by future president Patricio Aylwin Azócar, 16 center and left-wing parties formed an alliance called the Coalition of Parties to Vote No (Concertación de Partidos por el No). As the coalition began its coordinated campaign, the Pinochet regime and its supporters experienced internal divisions as some suggested the idea of a civilian candidate for the plebiscite (Hunees).

Nevertheless, military commanders nominated Pinochet as the candidate for the plebiscite in August 1988 and set the date for October 5. During the campaign period, Pinochet and the opposition each obtained 15 minutes of TV presentation time from 10:45 pm to 11:15 pm. Despite the inconvenient time slot, the presentations were very popular and heavily discussed the ensuing days (international delegation report), reflecting the "deeply rooted democratic and law-abiding political culture in Chile" (Constable, 1989). On October 5, Pinochet and the military regime were defeated 55 percent to 44 percent. In the aftermath of the plebiscite, military officers respected the Constitution and the outcome, despite the disappointing results (Huneeus).

As a consequence of the defeat, all parties (except the Communist Party) agreed to a reform of the 1980 Constitution (Rehren) and a constitutional referendum, set for July 1989. The Coalition of Parties to Vote No changed its name to Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) and nominated Aylwin to be its presidential candidate.

On December 14, 1989, Aylwin won the presidential election by an absolute majority of 55 percent, defeating former Finance Minister Hernán Büchi (29 percent), and millionaire entrepreneur Francisco Javier Errázuriz (15 percent). In March 1990, Alywin was sworn into office as president. Pinochet remained the commander-in-chief of the military, marking the end of the 17-year military authoritarian regime. In 1997, Pinochet retired from the military and became senator-for-life.

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Croatia (2000)

Synopsis

"The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the ruling party in Croatia from 1990 to 1999, entered the parliamentary elections on January 3, 2000, in a situation characterized by the deteriorating health and later death of its leader, the first Croatian president Franjo Tudjman" (Expert 1). In addition, "the uneven results of the privatization process, together with general economic deterioration and growing income inequality, resulted in a contraction and relative economic decline of the former 'socialist middle class,' which helped build and operate most of Croatia's existing infrastructure before 1990" (Dolenec, 2013). Additional triggers for democratization include corruption and a succession struggle between various factions of HDZ and the gradual development of opposition parties. However, the fundamental cause of the HDZ's downfall was its disrespect for political rights and democracy, though all these factors led to large-scale opposition against the Tudjman regime and eventually to the failure of HDZ in the 2000 election, where Stjepan Mesic of the Croatian People's Party won the presidency, marking the country's transition to a fully democratic system.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Mietek Boduszynski, Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations, Pomona College
- Neven Andjelic, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Human Rights, Regent's University
- Mr. Luka Oreskovic, Associate at Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University
- Davor Pauković, Assistant Professor, University of Dubrovnik

Chronology of Main Events

April 1990	**Croatia's first free election and the victory of HDZ, in which Tudjman is elected president during the first multi-party parliamentary elections since 1913**.
December 1990	Liberal-democratic constitution of Croatia is passed.
May 1991	Referendum declares Croatia's independence.
August 1991	Serb secessionists declare the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Western Slavonia.
August 1992	Tudjman is re-elected president.
August 1995	Croat forces retake three out of four areas occupied by Serbs.
October 1995	HDZ wins a majority of seats in the Croatian parliamentary elections.
June 1997	Tudjman is re-elected president.
November 1999	Croatian Parliament announces new elections in January 2000.
December 1999	Tudjman dies.
January 2000	HDZ is defeated in a parliamentary election.
February 2000	Stjepan Mesic of the Croatian People's Party wins the presidency.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

"Croatia's first few years of post-communist rule (1990–1995) were marked by trends that may be viewed as both promising and inauspicious. For many Croatian citizens and leaders, it was an exhilarating period filled with achievements: jettisoning a one-party Communist regime, holding competitive elections, obtaining statehood and international recognition, embarking on a transformation of the economy. For many years, however, the same years were characterized by dashed hopes. Societal deterioration and repressive regime policies as Croatia experienced a tumultuous secession from the former Yugoslav socialist federation" (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997).

War Issues and State Building

On January 23, 1990, with mounting pressure which led to a proposal to hold multi-party elections and to reform the system into a loose confederation, the Socialist Republic of Croatia's Communist Party Congress ended the party's legal monopoly. As a self-determined country that evolved from former Yugoslavia, Croatia's transition mirrored the pattern of significant and complex transformations across Eastern Europe, which "included a political, economic and state transformation" (Pauković).

Not long after the Communist Party relinquished sole control, the first free, multi-party election since 1938 was held in late April and early May 1990. The HDZ, led by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, won 205 out of 356 seats in Croatia's legislature, including a majority in each of that body's three chambers. On May 30,

Tudjman was elected president. “In the context of conflict with the Croatian Serbs and Yugoslav state, the party was progressively institutionalized as semi-authoritarian” (Abromeit et al., 2005). After his inauguration, Tudjman quickly prioritized two crucial tasks: the Croatian Homeland War and state building.

The Croatian Homeland War lasted from July 1991 to November 1995, during which Croatia fought the Serbian paramilitary—which was occupying a third of Croatian territory and ruling the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina there. The war both pushed the democratization process down on Croatia’s political agenda and provided an excuse for the Tudjman regime to have political discretion over the country. The HDZ’s state-transformation strategy consisted on “a strong military, a muzzled press, and a silent opposition” (Irvine, 1996).

Thus, the Tudjman government’s preoccupation with these two issues “greatly reduced the strength of the opposition parties and contributed to authoritarian characteristics of the system” (Pauković).” After the war ended, it was not possible for the governing elite to keep pressure on society for much longer” (Andjelic), and that led to public pursuit for democratic transformation.

Tudjman’s Semi-presidential Rule

“The adoption of the new Constitution on December 22, 1990, established a semi-presidential form of government, in which the president of the Republic had two important powers: the right to issue decrees with the legislative branch in extraordinary situations, and the right to control the cabinet. The president gained not only the power to appoint the prime minister and (on his advice) ministers, but also to dismiss the cabinet. Parliament has the power to vote confidence to the new cabinet or appointed minister, as well as the right to issue a vote of no confidence” (Boban). Indeed, “the populist charisma of Tudjman was institutionalized in the form of a semi-presidential system...and transplanted to the Croatian state, with a deleterious impact on the transition and consolidation of democracy in the country” (Abromeit et al, 2005).

The regime adopted many semi-authoritarian modes of governance. For instance, the Tudjman regime limited the country’s political freedom through “proliferation of intelligence services under the close personal control of the president, executive controls limiting the independence of the judiciary and the ‘rule-of-law,’ and the regime’s manipulation of the media” (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997). “The various new features of the presidential office (bodyguards, expensive cars, presidential jet) represented ominous expressions of Tudjman’s taste for power and the underlying realities of excessive executive control” (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997).

In addition, Croatia exhibited high state capture in the 1990s, which represented practices of influencing the creation of laws and regulations that enabled a specific group to obtain rents from the State in exchange for bribes, illicit equity stakes, and informal control rights, among other things (Dolenec, 2013).

Economic Decline, Privatizations, and Isolation

The tight political control and high levels of corruption were not Croatia’s only problems: the country’s economic conditions were hardly conducive to a smooth post-communist transition. The 1991 war disrupted the already weak Croatian economy. More importantly, the country’s process of privatization “created a very small ‘private elite’ or ‘new rich’ consisting of those individuals who possessed sufficient

capital to buy the most profitable socially owned assets" (Dolenec, 2013). At the same time, the majority of the Croatian population suffered a sharp decline in their standard of living. Both of these trends led to high levels of inequality and growing dissatisfaction of the socialist middle class against the Tudjman regime—which then contributed to a widespread desire for a democratic transition.

Furthermore, the Tudjman regime faced strong pressure from Western countries to democratize the country. Because of Tudjman's disrespect for basic democratic norms, Croatia was eventually isolated by the west and international organizations, receiving only limited foreign aid destined for infrastructure destroyed during the war (Ramet et al., 2008).

1992 Elections, Political Division within HDZ, and Opposition Parties

On August 2, 1992, Croatia held elections for president of the Republic as well as for seats in the House of Representatives, one of two chambers in Croatia's Sabor, or Assembly. These were the second multi-party elections in Croatia since 1990, when alternative political parties first competed for power. The incumbent Tudjman easily won a first-round victory among a field of eight presidential candidates. His party also won just over half of the parliamentary seats. This result allows the HDZ to form a new government alone rather than in a coalition with other parties (CSCE, 1992).

Under severe political suppression, opposition parties in Croatia slowly started to develop their influence. "After coming close to annihilation in 1992 when it barely made it into parliament, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was over time slowly winning back votes. The Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) only contested 1992 and 1995 elections on its own, with dwindling support over time" (Dolenec, 2013).

"The crucial event that accelerated the process of full democratization was the deteriorating health of Franjo Tudjman, which led to major disagreements between various factions within his party. A major Croatian opposition group (SDP and HSLS) formed a fairly structured coalition since 1998, in addition to the existing bloc of four smaller parties" (Expert 1). Eventually, these parties also contributed to the formation of a large-scale opposition against the HDZ.

The Death of Tudjman and Free Elections

"While the momentum of democratization forces and elements was building up for years under President Tudjman and the HDZ, the strong hold of the party and its leader on political institutions as well as popular support did not allow a significant pro-democratic movement to emerge and leave a trace on the political landscape" (Oreskovic).

Eventually, "the death of Tudjman in December 1999 brought an end to the party's popularity. At the same time, the electorate was becoming highly disillusioned with the intentions of the ruling party, the pillaging of state owned enterprises and wild privatizations (Oreskovic). In addition, due to political and popular distress, a series of corruption scandals were also revealed, which led to the emergence of street protests across the country.

These factors gradually led to the downfall of HDZ, when a coalition of SDP-HSLS, together with a bloc of four other parties, won two-thirds at the parliamentary elections on January 3, 2000. It enabled them to amend the Constitution and turn the Republic from a semi-presidential system into a parliamentary system (Expert 1). A month later, in February 2000, Stjepan Mesic of the Croatian People's Party won the presidency.

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Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993)

Synopsis

Czechoslovakia's conservative communist regime was undermined by the Soviet Union's advocacy of glasnost and perestroika, as well as its unwillingness to intervene in the affairs of its satellite states. The government's fall was also a result of the "structural deficiencies in the communist regime itself" (Váňa). While the catalyst to Czechoslovakia's democratic transition was a November 1989 student demonstration in Prague that resulted in police brutality and sparked mass protests and a general strike, "the internal situation was ready for this change" (Gyarfasova). Furthermore, within the broader population there was "public support for democratic values" (Meseznikov) as it was "a nation that had enjoyed Central Europe's strongest democratic tradition prior to its occupation by Nazi Germany and subsequent Soviet takeover" (Ethridge and Handleman, 2012). The communist regime negotiated with the opposition in November and December of 1989, agreeing on a new multi-party government and revisions to the 1960 Constitution (where two provisions were deleted: the leading role of the Communist Party and the education of youth in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism) (Calda, 1999). Following elections in June 1990 and June 1992, the country's federal assembly was unable to agree on a new constitution, largely due to cultural and social differences between the Czechs and Slovaks. Repeated attempts to compromise on the structure of a common state failed, and the heads of Slovakia and the Czech Republic's largest coalition parties negotiated an agreement to dissolve Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1992. Slovakia approved a Slovak constitution in September 1992 while the Czech Republic approved their constitution in December 1992. On January 1, 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent, democratic states.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 4/11

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: eleven
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Vit Hlousek, Professor in Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University
- Ladislav Cabada, Department for Politics and International Relations, University of West Bohemia
- Petr Just, Head at the Department of Political Science and Humanities, Metropolitan University Prague
- Jan Bureš, Deputy Head at the Department of Political Science and Humanities, Metropolitan University Prague
- Mgr. Tomáš Váňa, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University
- Prof. Jan Holzer, Associate Professor, Department of Political Sciences, Masaryk University

- Kevin Deegan-Krause, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Wayne State University
- Grigorij Meseznikov, President, Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia
- Sona Szonmolanyi, Head of Department, Comenius University
- Andrej Findor, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University in Bratislava
- Olga Gyarfasova, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia

Chronology of Main Events

October 1918	**Czechoslovakia is formed.**
August 1968	The Soviet Union invades Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring).
March 1985	Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union.
November 1989	Students demonstrate on Národní Street in Prague; general strike throughout Czechoslovakia.
December 1989	Gustáv Husák, president under the communist regime, resigns. Dissident playwright Václav Havel becomes president of Czechoslovakia.
June 1990	First free elections held in Czechoslovakia following the fall of communist rule.
December 1990	Federal Assembly adopts a power-sharing bill between the Czech lands and Slovakia.
February 1991	Draft state treaties between the Czech and Slovak Republics.
June 1992	Second free elections are held.
July 1992	Slovak National Council approves the Slovak Declaration of Sovereignty. Havel resigns as president.
September 1992	Slovak National Council approves the Slovak Constitution.
November 1992	Federal Assembly bill passed declaring the dissolution of Czechoslovakia by December 31, 1992.
December 1992	Czech National Council approves the Constitution of the Czech Republic.
January 1993	Czechoslovakia separates into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Developments in the Eastern Bloc

After the Communist Party rose to power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the country became a satellite state of the Soviet Union. During the 1968 Prague Spring, reformist members of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party began to implement liberal reforms, such as the removal of media censorship, and promoted a movement to democratize the socialist system in the country. In response, the Soviet Union invaded the country to end the reforms and impose "one of the most restrictive totalitarian systems in the Soviet bloc" (Shepherd, 2000). Most of the party's reformists were purged, making the surviving regime resistant to enacting reforms through the 1980s. However, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he advocated for increased political and economic openness through glasnost and perestroika. He also informed the leaders of Czechoslovakia and other bloc countries that they would

have more independence from Moscow, loosening support for Communist hardliners. In this way, Czechoslovakia's democratic transition was a result of the "change of the Soviet policy toward them after Gorbachev came to power" (Just).

In the 1980s, throughout the Eastern bloc, there was a "snowball effect" (Cabada) of the "collapse of communism in other countries" (Gyarfasova), including Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. Despite Gorbachev's reformist position, Czech leaders resisted launching the radical reforms being implemented in other bloc countries. For instance, Ladislav Adamec, the Czechoslovak Federal Premier introduced modest reforms beginning in October 1988, the majority of them "focused on purely cosmetic changes in the area of economics (Bureš). Consequently, "changing attitudes among the public were increasingly evident through protests" (Bell, 2002).

Velvet Revolution

Until the late 1980s, the most "concrete opposition to the regime was shown by several organized groups" (Bureš), particularly through an informal civic initiative called Charter 77. Charter 77, named after a declaration under the same name, was formed by Václav Havel and other dissidents in 1977. The document focused on human, political, civil, economic, and cultural rights. The government rejected the legality of the movement and prosecuted the signatories.

Due to the stronghold of the socialist regime, most Czechoslovaks "did not consider the opposition to be important until such time that a real possibility for making far-reaching political changes seemed within grasp" (Bureš). In August 1989, after many years of discontent with living standards and economic inefficiency, Michael Kocáb and Michal Horáček (a musician and a journalist, respectively) formed a civic initiative called MOST (bridge, in English) to try to start a dialogue between Federal Premier Adamec and Charter 77 and to "establish contact with the holders of power via leading cultural personalities" (Bureš). They prepared a statement for Federal Premier Adamec, informing him that protest activities would continue and offered him the opportunity to negotiate political reforms. Though the negotiations never took place, the "contacts initiated between the state and the opposition…proved to be crucial for ensuring the transfer of power in November [1989], (Bureš)" "for in MOST, Adamec and his chief advisor, Oskar Krejčí, found people whom they could trust more than the villainized Charterists" (Saxonburg, 2013).

In November 1989, a series of demonstrations took place: On November 17, students marched on Národní Street in Prague originally to pay tribute to a student killed by the Nazis, which eventually led to a series of demonstrations against the one-party communist regime. This was seen as a sign that students were no longer "afraid to manifest their ambivalence towards the regime" (Váňa). The government violently suppressed the demonstrations, which resulted in hundreds of arrests and dozens of assaults. The government's actions resulted in the "focus on this act of violence in the foreign and Czechoslovak media" (Bureš). On November 27, million people participated in a two-hour general strike to show their "lack of confidence in the Communist Party" (Bureš). The "November events opened a process and led to an outcome that can be seen as the 'revolutionary' change" (Szonmolanyi).

Opposition political groups formed after the events on Národní Street. The political movement "Civic Forum," led by Havel, was established in Czech territory, and the counterpart "Public against Violence" was formed in Slovakia. The groups cooperated with each other, united by their opposition to the regime.

Facing the implosion of the [Czechoslovak] communist elites after the government security forces refused to repress the demonstrations (Szonmolanyi), the regime "recognized that the status quo [was] not viable anymore, and therefore; started talks with the opposition on the reformulation of policies to transition to a more democratic system" (Váňa).

Political negotiations began on November 21 between the Civic Forum and the government, which "became the chief means for political change in Czechoslovakia. In other words, the political transformation made by the end of 1989 resulted from the agreements made between the Civic Forum and the chairman of the federal government" (Bureš). The opposition stressed that it "would not be satisfied with a simple shuffling of personalities in positions of power but…sought the creation of a legal and democratic state" (Bureš). The Civic Forum demanded free elections and a new, democratic constitution.

The regime conceded to most of the demands, which mainly included ending decades of censorship. On November 29, the Federal Assembly amended the constitution, eliminating one-party rule by the Communist Party. Adamec resigned as federal premier on December 3, and Gustáv Husák, after swearing in a cabinet with a non-Communist majority, resigns as president on December 10. Marián Čalfa (from Czechoslovakia's Communist Party) was appointed Prime Minister to lead a new Government of National Understanding in place of Adamec. He also assumed most presidential duties as a result of Husak's resignation. On December 29, Parliament elected Vaclav Havel as president of Czechoslovakia. Shortly thereafter, Havel announced that his government intended to adopt free market principles and increase ties with Western Europe (Kirkpatrick, 1992).

Elections for two-year terms were held in June 1990 and were considered the "referendum on the fall of communism." (Olson, 1997). The Civic Forum and Public against Violence won sweeping majorities in both houses of Parliament (gaining 170 out of 300 seats.)

"Velvet Divorce"

Czech lands had been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire while the Magyars ruled Slovakia; Czechoslovakia was not formed until 1918, partially to unite against imperialism. The communist regime had suppressed the differences between Czech and Slovak economic structures, as well as their history and culture. After the Velvet Revolution, however, these factors contributed to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state. Ultimately, cultural differences, "first and foremost a diverse history that exposed [Czechs and Slovaks] to profoundly divergent influences" (Stein, 1997), caused the breakup. In fact, while the Czechs considered themselves Czechoslovak, "a majority of Slovaks considered their nationality to be Slovak." (Heimann, 2009).

Czechoslovakia's political structure also played a role in the state's dissolution. After the Prague Spring, a 1968 law affirmed the federal government's control of major state activities and stipulated that the Czechs and Slovaks would jointly control economic production. After the 1989 revolution, each government was individually responsible for education and cultural affairs. During the communist rule, the "inauguration of some aspects of the federation was as far as Slovak national consciousness could go in institutional terms….However, the 1989 revolution left the federation intact while removing the obstacles to its proper functioning" (Shepherd, 2000).

After the Velvet Revolution, representatives from the Federal Assembly, as well as the Slovak and Czech National Councils, were charged with drafting a new constitution before the June 1992 elections. The core issue that arose was how power would be split between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. After months of negotiation, the Federal Assembly adopted a power-sharing bill in December 1990. However, it was not ratified by either of the National Councils; the Slovaks thought "the law did not resolve the issue of the foundation of the common state and did not provide a mechanism for a potential dissolution." (Stein, 1997). This issue was revisited in February 1991 following a suggestion to agree on a state treaty before adopting a federal constitution. At the same time the treaty was being negotiated, the Federal Assembly began drafting a constitution. However, the federal government was unable to even pass a bill on the constitution's structure. By March 1992 the government conceded that the politicians elected in the June elections would be responsible for drafting the constitution.

Against this backdrop, the Czechoslovak government instituted rapid economic reforms. Slovakia's economy, which was heavily concentrated in large industry, was more affected by the transition from the communist economic regime than the Czech Republic. For example, Slovakia had higher unemployment and lower GDP per capita. This created further tension between the Czech and Slovak leaders; the Slovaks advocated gradual economic transformation while the Czechs insisted on rapid reforms. Their disagreements "injected a new and highly volatile variable into the already charged negotiations over the federal constitution" (Stein, 1997). As a result, "opinions had become polarized throughout Czechoslovakia and, in turn, the composition of the Federal Assembly was so polarized that it was hard to see how the members could reach any working compromises" (Pithart and Spencer, 1998).

Consequently, in the June 1992 elections, only slightly more than 17 percent of the deputies in the Federal Assembly were re-elected (Stein, 1997). The parties ran along Czech and Slovak lines, with little overlap between Czech and Slovak voters. Despite the electoral division, polls repeatedly revealed that the broader population wanted to remain in a Czechoslovak state. "Knowing that the voters might not accept secession in a referendum, both Klaus and Mečiar decided against holding one, claiming that a referendum was unnecessary and possibly even dangerously provocative" (Pithart and Spencer, 1998). Václav Klaus, the head of the dominant Czech party, and Vladimír Mečiar, the head of the dominant Slovak party, were charged with forming two independent states. Their negotiations concluded with an agreement to develop "a road map toward dissolution" (Stein, 1997).

In September 1992, the Slovak National Council approved the Slovak constitution. The Czech constitution was passed on December 16, 1992. The Federal Assembly approved a bill declaring that the Czechoslovak state would become extinct on December 31, 1992. The Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent states on January 1, 1993. Havel was elected president of the Czech Republic in January 1993, and Michal Kováč became president of Slovakia in February 1993.

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Dominican Republic (1978)

Synopsis

Although elections were held regularly between 1966 and 1978, the 1978 elections marked the Dominican Republic's transition to democracy. During that period, President Balaguer of the rightist Reformist Party (PR) exercised authoritarian rule that alienated rising business sectors, entrepreneurs, and former supporters "due to his drive for power, aspirations of re-election, and policy decisions" (Espinal, 1989). At the same time, the leftist Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the main opposition party, improved its political capacity and popularity by allying with opposition forces, forging international ties, and enhancing organizational power. In May 1978, most eligible Dominicans turned out to vote in the presidential election. Advocates of Balaguer from the military attempted a coup to keep Balaguer in power after the initial results indicated a victory for Antonio Guzmán, the presidential candidate of the PRD. Other military officers resisted the coup, as Balaguer, a civilian autocrat, did not fully control the armed forces. International pressure "made it difficult to sustain the authoritarian situation with unfair elections" (Marsteintredet). Domestic mobilization, calling for respect for constitutional rules, also played an important role in forcing Balaguer to abide by the electoral results. In July 1978, the official results named Guzmán the winner, defeating the incumbent President Balaguer. The Dominicans' struggle for an open established democracy eventually culminated in Guzmán's inauguration in August 1978.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/2

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: two
Name of expert (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Leiv Marsteintredet, Professor, School of Political Science, University of San Andres

Chronology of Main Events

May 1961	**Rafael Trujillo Molina is assassinated; protégé and puppet President Joaquin Balaguer remains in power.**
October 1961	Juan Bosch Gaviño, founder of Dominican Revolutionary Party, returns to the Dominican Republic from exile.
November 1961	Trujillo family flees the country and the regime ends.
January 1962	General Pedro Rodríguez Echavarría stages a coup d'état; Puppet President Joaquin Balaguer flees to the United States; Council is restored to power without Balaguer.
December 1962	Bosch is elected president, defeating Fiallo, candidate of the National Civic Union.
February 1963	Juan Bosch is sworn into office.
April 1963	New constitution is promulgated.
July 1963	Balaguer, in exile, forms the Reformist Party.
September 1963	Juan Bosch is deposed by a military coup which then establishes a Triumvirate.
April 1965	Civil war starts and the United States invades the Dominican Republic.
August 1965	The Act of Dominican Reconciliation and an Institutional Act is signed, ending the civil war.
June 1966	Joaquin Balaguer is elected president with the support of the United States.
October 1966	U.S. troops leave the Dominican Republic.
November 1966	New constitution is promulgated; Bosch leaves the country.
May 1974	Balaguer wins presidential election with 86 percent of the vote.
December 1974	Santiago Agreement (a coalition of opposition parties) is established.
May 1978	Presidential election; military officials take control of the electoral office.
July 1978	Silvestre Antonio Guzmán is elected president.
August 1978	Silvestre Antonio Guzmán is sworn into office.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Assassination of General Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican Civil War, and U. S. Intervention

After the assassination of long-term dictator General Rafael Trujillo in May 1961, "civil society was reflected in the organization of political parties, unions, and business and professional associations, which eventually emerged and flourish in the Dominican Republic" (Conaghan and Espinal, 1990). In response, President Joaquin Balaguer, a Trujillo protégé, "realized that his own continuance in office depended on democratizing the new regime" (Wells, 1966). Although he remained in power, he adapted to the changing climate. He allowed political exiles—notably Juan Bosch, the founder of the leftist Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, or PRD)—to return to the country. Meanwhile, the Trujillo family, who had tried to seize power under the dictator's brother, was faced with "a threatened U.S. military intervention…and serious opposition from Balaguer and within the Dominican armed forces" (Hartlyn, 1998). As a result, they lost political influence and were pressured to flee the country.

In January 1962, the seven members of the Council of State were sworn in. It was a newly established institution tasked with governing the Dominican Republic until a general election could be held on December 20, 1962. Despite these changes, the country still faced intense political turmoil. On January 16, General Rodríguez Echavarría attempted to take over the Council. Even though he failed, it led to strikes and riots all around the country. After this failed coup d'état, President Balaguer "who had relied on Rodríguez Echavarría to keep him in power" (Chester, 2001), was forced into exile in the United States.

Juan Bosch, the PRD's presidential candidate, won a clear victory against Viriato Fiallo of the rightist National Civic Union (Unión Cívica Nacional, or UCN), an anti-Trujillista but conservative and economically wealthy (Hartlyn, 1998) party in the election. Juan Bosch was sworn in as president of the Dominican Republic in February 1963. Under his leadership, a new constitution was drafted, which "alienated the most powerful elites" (Sanchez, 1992) as well as the influential Catholic Church. As a result, President Juan Bosch was deposed via a UNC- and military-backed coup in September 1963, only seven months after his inauguration.

Shortly after the coup d'état, the military installed a three-man civilian junta called the Triumvirate. "With the military holding power behind the scenes, the new Triumvirate found itself trapped between the political extremes" (Gomez, 1997), which caused "increased social mobilization and polarization." (Conaghan and Espinal, 1990). Finally in April 1965, civil war broke out between "constitutionalists," supporters of the deposed Juan Bosch, and "loyalists," proponents of the Triumvirate. On April 28 of that same year, the civil war led to a direct U.S. invasion in the Dominican Republic under the command of President Johnson as "the result of an exaggerated fear on the part of the United States regarding a potential 'second Cuba.' (Espinal et al., 1990). With the U.S. intervention, the war ended in August 1965, and a provisional government led by Hector Garcia-Godoy (who had served as foreign minister under President Juan Bosch) announced general elections for 1966.

Former President Joaquin Balaguer, who had returned from exile and formed the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista—PR), was elected president, defeating Bosch and the PRD. Because of the U.S. support for Balaguer's presidency, the 1966 election was "viewed as tainted by many Dominicans…thus, for many

Dominicans, Balaguer's administration lacked legitimacy" (Espinal, 1999) and "was the restoration of authoritarian rule under a new guise" (Conaghan and Espinal, 1990) from the very beginning.

Balaguer's Rise to Power, the 1966 Constitution, Reorganization of the PRD, and the Elections of 1970 and 1974

U.S. troops left the Dominican Republic in October 1966, not long after the elections. A month later, in November 1966, after taking office in July, President Balaguer enacted a new constitution that permitted unlimited presidential re-election (Hartlyn, 1998) every four years. Although the 1966 Constitution technically protected democracy and free elections, "contestation and respect for opposition was not upheld" (Marsteintredet).

In 1970, the PR split, as Balaguer's vice president, Francisco Lora, left the party to run for president against Balaguer. Due to violence by the police against Balaguer's opponents and their supporters (Atkins and Wilson, 1998), "the entire spectrum of opposition parties had boycotted the elections" (Chester, 2001). Without real opposition, Balaguer easily defeated Lora and was re-elected president for another four years.

As Balaguer continued to consolidate his power, differences grew within his largest opposition, the PRD. Two main leaders of the PRD, Bosch and Jose Peña Gomez, "split irrevocably over the nature of party doctrine" (Atkins and Wilson, 1998) as well as over the nature of a relationship with the United States—which Peña Gomez supported (Hartlyn, 1998).

The crisis finally drew to a head when Bosch left the PRD in November 1973, several months before the scheduled 1974 elections. Without Bosch, the moderate members along with Peña Gomez of the PRD formed the Agreement of Santiago (Acuerdo de Santiago), a coalition of opposition parties, to participate the 1974 election, with Antonio Guzmán as presidential candidate and former general Wessin y Wessin, also leader of Quisqueyan Dominican Party (PQD), as vice-presidential candidate. Nevertheless, as violence and threats against political leaders resurged, the PRD and the coalition opted to withdraw their candidates from the elections. Balaguer again won the election by a margin of 85 percent, [but only] half of the registered voters bothered to turn out (Black, 1986).

Suffering from the defeat of the 1974 general election, the PRD under the new leadership of Peña Gomez adopted a new ideology in terms of "return[ing] to social democracy (Atkins and Faurioul, 1986). Internally, the PRD reinvented a "more responsive and democratic party structure by rejecting violence and foreseeing the next government as a gradualist and transitory one" (Hartlyn, 1998). By the late 1970s, a de-radicalized and more politically balanced PRD was better positioned to represent "the democratic aspirations of Dominicans" (Espinal, 1998) in the coming elections.

1978 Election

During Balaguer's rule from 1966 to the mid-1970s, the Dominican Republic enjoyed substantial growth industrialization, and urbanization, [which] had created new business sectors and expanded middle-sector and professional groups (Espinal, 1998). However, Balaguer alienated these new entrepreneurs by excluding them from advisory councils and state agencies, favoring "more-established interests with close ties to the regime" (Espinal, 1998). Consequently, new sectors and groups were more supportive of the opposition parties.

In addition, Balaguer's physical decline…became public knowledge in January 1977, thus emboldening the opposition and allowing "politically ambitious military personal [to] maneuver for power and influence" (Hartlyn, 1998).

The PRD's Antonio Guzmán was an ideal candidate for the 1978 presidential election, as he was known for his anti-Trujillista stance, known to business sectors as "a conservative landowner, [and] known to many U.S. policymakers" (Espinal, 1998). Guzmán also had substantial campaign experience during the 1974 election.

Elections for 1978 were regularly scheduled elections… followed the constitutionally scheduled plan laid out in the 1966 constitution (Marsteintretet). The voter turnout for the May 1978 election was a heavy 70 percent (Hagerty, 1991), suggesting that "there was a definite longing for a working democracy and a concern that the image created by Balaguer was a negative one" (Kryzanek et al., 1998). As the early election results were released, it became apparent that Guzmán would win, which led to an attempted coup by the followers of Balaguer to stop the ballot count.

This resulted in international pressure and open criticism (especially from the United States and Venezuela) (Kryzanek et al., 1998) "significant resistance to the plotters [of the raid] from most of their military colleagues" (Atkins and Wilson, 1998), and widespread "domestic social mobilization in defense of free elections." This situation pushed Balaguer to resume the bailout count and democratic process.

Finally, the results were released in July 1978, after "concessions granted to the 'Balagueristas' that included giving them majority control in the Dominican Senate" (Kryzanek, 1998). Guzmán was announced the winner of the election and took office in August 1978, signifying the Dominican Republic's transition to democracy.

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Ecuador (1979)

Synopsis

Ecuador has often been characterized as a fragmented country due to its ethnic, linguistic, and cultural cleavages. As a result, the country has a long history of inconsistent democratic governments, interrupted by sporadic military juntas and authoritarian dictators. The rapidly deteriorating economic situation in the 1960s soon brought about a split in the *velasquista* coalition. In spite of world oil prices, the regime's oil policy did not result in the anticipated resolution of mounting economic problems. As a consequence, social unrest increased (culminating with a nationwide 12-hour general strike on November 13, 1975). The armed forces, a discredited institution, had no choice but to transfer power to civilian actors once they perceived that there was no way to restore economic and political stability. On January 15, 1978, a referendum was held to decide between a reformed version of the 1945 Constitution or a new constitution, and on July 16, 1978 Jaime Roldós (from CPF) won the presidential elections.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 2/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three

Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Santiago Basabe-Serrano, Georg Foster Fellow of The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Post-Doctoral Resarcher at German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Associate Professor at Department of Political Studies at FLACSO Ecuador (on leave)
- Federico M. Rossi, Non-Resident Research Fellow, Tulane University

Chronology of Main Events

May 1944	***"Revolución Gloriosa."* Velasco Ibarra is proclaimed acting president (1944–1947)**.
September 1948	Galo Plaza Lasso is elected president.
1960s	Unstable decade with succession of regimes, military intervention, and the effects of the Cuban Revolution.
September 1968	Velasco Ibarra seizes control for the fifth and final time (1968–1972).
1967	Discovery of oil in the Amazon Region. Ecuador would later become a net petroleum exporter: real exports (1975 prices) rose from US$400 million in 1970 to US$1.1 billion in 1980
February 1972	Military junta takes power, overthrowing the populist administration of President Velasco Ibarra. General Rodriguez Lara ascends to power.
1973	Ecuador joins OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
November 1975	*General strike* to protest against the oligarchies, imperialism, fascism and for a wide away of concessions to labor.
January 1976	Bloodless coup coordinates by the commanders of the army, navy and air force. Vice Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano was designated as president
January 1978	The junta holds a *popular referendum* to decide between the 1945 Constitution and a new Constitution
July 1978	Jaime Roldós (from CPF) wins the presidential elections and assumes the presidency on August 10, 1979.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Socioeconomic Context, *"Revolución Gloriosa,"* and Galo Plaza Lasso

Ecuador has often been characterized as fragmented country due to its ethnic, linguistic, and cultural cleavages. These divisions between the indigenous population (constituting approximately a third of the national population) (Korovkin, 2001) and other sectors of society resulted in a highly unequal society and led to "a wide gamut of political parties that have been weakened…by the frailty of popular bases, opportunistic conflicts, and the tendency toward fragmentation.…The proliferation of parties has been incapable of resisting and providing an effective alternative to the populism and militarism that have dominated the political process" (Sanders, 1981).

As a result, Ecuador "has a long history of inconsistent democratic governments, interrupted by sporadic military juntas and authoritarian dictators. Compared to many other Latin American countries, Ecuador boasts an almost stable, relatively tranquil history, yet the legitimacy of its democracy has been under inconclusive attack (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010)." In fact, between 1925 and 1948, 27

governments rose to power, the overwhelming majority of which did not finish their constitutional period; and between 1959 and 1979, only two presidential elections were held (1960 and 1968), giving the military a reason to step in (Gutiérrez, 2004).

One of the first attempts to democratize the country occurred in May 1944, under what later became known as the *Revolución Gloriosa.* The movement was formed by coalition of workers, students, and some sectors of the military to overthrow Arroyo del Río. Among the elements that led to his toppling were his "dictatorial tendencies, his failures in foreign policy (such as the loss of half of Ecuador's territory in the Río Protocol with Peru), the increased repression, and the rise in the cost of living (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). Velasco Ibarra, who had already been president from 1934 to 1935, rose to power as a constitutional president through a Constituent Assembly. "Despite widespread popularity upon Velasco Ibarra's inauguration, and the newly created progressive constitution that would increase representation to historically marginalized populations, Valesco Ibarra's rhetoric soon changed as he consolidated power away from the newly incorporated members of society" (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). "Economic difficulties and repressive policies caused his liberal supporters to desert him, and again he was forced into exile in 1947" (Encyclopedia Britannica).

After several terms in power, Galo Plaza Lasso, from the National Democratic Civic Movement, won the presidential election of 1948. This initiated "what would become a 12-year period of relative stability and mild democratic transitions in Ecuador" (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). Among his various reforms, he gave "priority to productive development as a means to increase the standard of living of the Ecuadorian population" (Lopez), transforming Ecuador into being the world's largest banana exporter (between 1948 and 1952, banana exports increased by 421 percent) (Ledezma Garcia, 2009).

Unstable 1960s, *Velasquismo,* and Economic Crisis

During the 1960s, Ecuador underwent a social transformation, with a growing middle class and a process of urbanization. In 1962, the urban population was 36 percent while in 1974 this percentage rose to 41.4 (Donoso Pareja, 1997). However, "the elites, who traditionally controlled much of the government, proved incapable of modernizing or including new social and political organizations into political life. In turn, they lost control to military coups, mass revolts, and interim governments" (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010).

Throughout a period of succession between the leaders of the Velasquista National Front (Velasco Ibarra, 1960 and Arosemena Monroy, 1961), Ecuador's shaky economy was threatened by a declaration of hostilities against Peru and the guarantors of the Rio Protocol, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Sensing the direction of the political winds in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, Velasco magnified his anti-United States rhetoric and included leftists in his government. The rapidly deteriorating economic situation soon brought about a split in the *velasquista* coalition.…A series of new sales taxes imposed during the same month in order to raise desperately needed revenues then sparked a general strike and demonstrations and riots in several major cities" (Hanratty, 1989).

By 1961, "economic recession and mismanagement of the government brought military intervention, which gave way to an interim civilian government and an effort to restore electoralism in 1968" (Council

on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). From 1963 to 1968, Ecuador remained under military control. In addition, the country faced "a dramatic drop in its revenue from banana exports and, despite generous development assistance from the U. S. government and the Inter-American Development Bank, the junta suddenly faced an economic crisis of major proportions" (Hanratty, 1989). As a result, in 1968, the ever power-hungry Velasco Ibarra again seized control (for the fifth and final time, 1968–1972)" (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010).

From the Discovery of Oil to Military Regimes and Unsustainable Economic Reforms

Ecuador entered the 1970s as one of the poorest countries in Latin America. However, the discovery of oil in the Amazon region in 1967 and its subsequent exploitation in 1972 with the completion of the trans-Ecuadorian pipeline initiated a major economic boom, with Ecuador becoming a net petroleum exporter. In 1973, world oil prices quadrupled, and Ecuador became an OPEC member. During the 1970s, Ecuadorian income and output expanded at a rate unprecedented in the country's history. Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of almost 8 percent; real exports (1975 prices) rose from US$400 million in 1970 to US$1.1 billion in 1980; real manufacturing output increased 150 percent. All of this was fuelled by petroleum exports, which went up 100 times in value during the decade (World Bank, 1984).

The military junta took power on February 15, 1972, overthrowing President Velasco Ibarra's populist administration. "It had the sympathy of the leading economic groups and much of public opinion" (Sanders, 1981). At first, the military regime (led by General Rodriguez Lara) "was more nationalistic and leftist in its rhetoric…however, the legitimacy of the government was [eventually] undermined by Rodriguez Lara's lackluster leadership, indecisive administration, charges of corruption, a drop in petroleum sales and failure to follow through on reforms" (Sanders, 1981). "General Rodriguez Lara's government was perceived as one that had an impact over the national oligarchic classes through progressive reforms with ambiguous results (e.g., agrarian reform), an industry with an import substitution bias, and a tendency to increase state intervention both domestically (through CEPE, Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, later known as EP Petroecuador) and internationally (by increasing Ecuador's strategic position in OPEC)."(Escobar et al.).

In addition, "oil policy was the regime's vehicle for its most forceful expression of nationalism. The moderation of the regime's oil policy, however, did not solve the mounting economic problems. Oil exports rose only slightly, while imports, particularly of luxury items, continued to soar, aided by a low-tariff policy that had been designed to soak up petroleum earnings, and thus control inflation. In excess of 22 percent during 1974, inflation was rapidly eroding the real value of wages within the middle class" (Hanratty, 1989).

"On November 13, 1975, the three central labor groups jointly called a nationwide 12-hour general strike to protest against the oligarchies, against imperialism and fascism, and for a wide away of concessions to labor. Less than two months later, the Chauffeurs' Federation declared a general strike on February 5, 1976 to protest a 20 percent increase in bus fares. This event provided the excuse, three days later, for his fellow generals to depose President Rodriguez Lara" (Alaxander, 2007).

On January 11, 1976 a bloodless coup took place led by the commanders of the army, navy and air force. A Supreme Council designated the commander of the Ecuadorian navy, Vice Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano, as president (Lauderbaugh, 2012).

Popular Referendum and Transition de Democracy

Five years later, "the military felt the pressure to vacate power by common citizens and some elites" (Expert 2) mainly "due to deteriorating economic indices" (Basabe-Serrano). The armed forces had no other choice but to transfer power to civilian actors once they perceived that there was no way to restore economic and political stability" (Expert 2). "The generals decided to transition Ecuador to a civilian government in an attempt to reclaim esteem for their now discredited institution" (Lauderbaugh, 2012).

During the next three years and nine months, commissions were formed to draft two proposed constitutions and a new election law. A national referendum on January 15, 1978, resulted in a newly drafted national charter. The new constitution recognized the role of the State in economic development, created a unicameral legislature, limited the president to a four-year team with no immediate re-election, and provided for universal suffrage, including illiterates (Lauderbaugh, 2012). Shortly after, Jaime Roldós (from CPF) won the presidential elections (held on July 16, 1978) with 68.5 percent of the votes, and thus initiating the transition to democracy. In one of Roldós' first speeches, he said "the challenge ahead is to take a paralytic for a walk, making clear that economic growth had been unsustainable during the military rule because it had been built upon external debt and inefficiency (between 1970 and 1980, foreign debt grew by a factor of 19) and that civilian repression and political exclusion had left its mark on society" (Gutierrez, 2004).

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El Salvador (1992)

Synopsis

In 1979, General Romero, dictator in El Salvador, was overthrown by a coup d'état. However, military leaders of the coup failed to establish a representative government that "integrated the radical left" (Gonzalez). As a result, leftist guerrilla groups formed the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) to depose the new regime from the outside, leading to the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980. Under heavy U.S. influence, amid civil war, a Constituent Assembly election was imposed in 1982, which promulgated a new Constitution of El Salvador in 1983, which established a provisional government and institutional rules for the elections. During the late 1980s, the civil war continued and the waning of the Cold War foreshadowed "significant changes in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Central America (Expert 4), marking the diminishing willingness of the United States to continue financing the Salvadoran military and increasing pressure from the United States for a peace settlement. In addition, "after the Central American Peace Plan was signed in Esquipulas in 1987, regional pressures for a negotiated solution [also] increased" (Stahler-Sholk, 1994). At the same time, popular social organizations and movements joined forces despite ideological differences to press for a peaceful solution. In 1989, pro-peace Alfredo Cristiani of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) won the presidential election in a landslide victory. In January 1992, after a two-year peace negotiation with "strong international mediation" (Expert 4) involving the United Nations, the Salvadoran government, and the FMLN, reached a peace agreement in Chapultepec, Mexico, ending 12 years of civil war and military dominance in Salvadoran politics. Presidential, legislative, and municipal elections were held in 1994 with the participation of a demobilized FMLN as a recognized political party. Under international observers' supervision, Calderón Sol of ARENA was elected president while the FMLN won 21 percent of the national vote (Allison, 2006).

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 25 percent (as secondary cause)

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: four
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Abby Cordova, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky
- Ana S. Cardenal, Professor of Political Science, Open University of Catalonia and Universitat Pompeu Fabra
- Secundino Gonzalez, Professor of Political Science, Complutense University of Madrid

Chronology of Main Events

October 1979	**Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero is deposed by a coup d'état.**
March 1980	Death squad murders Archbishop Oscar Romero.
April 1980	Civil war begins.
October 1980	Guerilla coalition FMLN is formed.
December 1983	A new constitution is promulgated.
May 1984	José Napoleón Duarte is elected president.
March 1989	Alfredo Cristiani of ARENA is elected president.
November 1989	FMLN launches second final offensive in San Salvador.
December 1989	Six Jesuit priests are killed by U.S.-trained forces; U.S. Congress suspends military aid.
January 1990	Military personnel are charged with the killing of the six Jesuits.
April 1990	Government and FMLN agree to reopen dialogue.
July 1990	FMLN sign agreements on a human rights accord at San José, Costa Rica.
March 1991	Congressional, municipal, and Central American Parliament elections are held.
September 1991	New York Accords reached.
December 1991	Peace rally in San Salvador; Peace Agreement, the End of Armed Conflict Agreement is signed in Chapultepec, Mexico.
January 1992	Chapultepec Accord between ARENA and the FMLN is ratified.
December 1992	FMLN becomes a legal party and FMLN demobilizes.
March 1993	Amnesty law is passed.
July 1993	Supreme Electoral Tribunal announces massive voter registration drive.
March 1994	FMLN participates in elections for the first time; general elections are held.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Military Order, Archbishop Oscar Romero, and Death Squads

The political culture of El Salvador has been "characterized by a long history of brutal dictatorial repression [by the military] and successive attempts by citizens seeking a greater voice in civil affairs to achieve political representation" (Bland, 1992). In fact, prior to the 1980 civil war, Salvadorans attempted to democratize many times from the military dictatorships—in 1930, 1944, 1960, and 1972.

In October 1979, a group of young military officers deposed General Romero and the old regime—an alliance between the oligarchy and the military collapsed (Gonzalez). Although the coup d'état successfully incorporated civilian democrats into the new government, "it never seriously considered handing formal power over to a civilian president. This reflected not only a basic mistrust of civilian politicians, but also a conviction that the armed forces were the only institution capable of defending the state and preserving internal order" (Gonzalez). As a result, immediately after the coup, military-sponsored violence, including the use of the notorious death squads, escalated (Walter, 1993). On March 24, 1980, the outspoken human rights campaigner Archbishop Oscar Romero, who publicly condemned the political violence, was murdered during a mass. Shortly afterward, the massacres increased. From 1979 to 1981, army-backed right-wing death squads killed around 30,000 people (BBC, 2012).

FMLN and a Bloody Civil War (1979–1992)

Eventually, "when the resulting civilian-military juntas [from the coup] proved unable to alter the existing power configuration or to prevent wholesale repression" (Stahler-Sholk, 1994), in 1980 five active guerrilla forces in El Salvador formed a radical left-wing coalition, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional—FMLN), with the common purpose of overthrowing the junta in power. As a result, a civil war broke out between the Salvadoran military and the FMLN.

More than 75,000 Salvadorans were killed in the war, a majority of them civilians. Government forces were responsible for almost all of the deaths. Peace talks were attempted in 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1989, but in each case they failed largely because the government demanded the full surrender of the FMLN but refused to enact any of the political reforms demanded by the FMLN (Wilkerson, 2008).

In 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan provided military aid to the Salvadoran government, "with the intention of using El Salvador to demonstrate an easy victory over what is called 'international communism'" (Lamperti, 2006). Nevertheless, as the military-sponsored violence aggravated, "both parties realized that a military victory was unfeasible. Thus, the UN secretary-general was empowered by a Security Council mandate to facilitate negotiations (starting in April 1990) to find a political settlement to the conflict (Valle, 2006).

1982 Constituent Assembly and Duarte's Election

In March 1982, an election for Constituent Assembly was held with the absence of the center-left civilians (Revolutionary Democratic Front, FDR) since "they feared that they would be murdered if they returned from exile to run" (LeoGrande, 2009).

Under widespread electoral fraud and intimidation, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC) won 40 percent of the votes. Among the five rightist parties, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—ARENA), established by former death-squad leader Roberto D'Aubuisson, won the most seats. The five parties formed a majority coalition and managed to throw the PDC out of the government.

In the following month, "a combination of careful footwork and heavy pressure was exerted to ensure than an interim president, acceptable to the United States, the political right, and the army, was installed in place of the unacceptable D'Aubuisson. The new president would be Alvaro Magaña, a shrewd lawyer without a political party behind him but with close ties to the army (Whitfield, 1994).

In December 1983, the provisional government ratified a new constitution, which outlined that legislative and municipal elections were to be conducted every three years and a presidential election every five (Zamora, 1997). Months later, in May 1984 amid the ongoing civil war, José Napoleón Duarte of the PDC was elected president of El Salvador, defeating D'Aubuisson.

Although Duarte's government was "fatally dependent on U.S. support for military solution" (Stahler-Sholk, 1994), it "usher in a process of liberalized authoritarianism" and begins quest for negotiated settlement with the FMLN. The better political environment eventually created a new political space for oppositions to participate and compete in institutionalized elections.

1989 Presidential Election and Peace Negotiations

In March 1989, nine years into the civil war, Alfredo Cristiani of ARENA, "a U.S.-educated scion of the traditional landowning upper class" (Baloyra, 2014), won the presidential election in a landslide victory, although "the elections were widely believed to have been rigged" (BBC, 2012). The success of the 1989 presidential election "demonstrated to conservative forces that retaking the government was possible via politics" (Zamora, 1997).

At his inauguration in June 1989, Cristiani offered talks without a prior FMLN surrender (Dunkerley, 1994). Subsequently in September, Cristiani's government and the FMLN started negotiations. Nonetheless, the effort was sabotaged when the minister to the presidency and union leaders were assassinated. In November 1989, the FMLN launched an offensive, pushing deep into the wealthy suburbs of the capital city, San Salvador, demonstrating "that the military could no longer guarantee protection of its core supporters, let alone achieve a decisive win" (Wilkerson, 2008).

After almost a decade of war, "the army was war weary, especially many of its junior officers and soldiers who had borne the brunt of the fighting" (Bland, 1992). The mounting negative consequences for both the military and the FMLN forced leaders on both sides to "reassess the political cost of carrying on a protracted war" (Stahler-Sholk, 1994). Eventually, the attitudes towards negotiation gradually changed.

The 1990 San José Accord

By late 1989, the decline of the Cold War and the fall of communism (Cordova) meant that one of the most important ideological justifications for the Salvadoran civil war as well as for the stance taken by the United States and by international supporters of the revolution was disappearing. In addition, the U.S.

Congress, in the wake of the murder of the six Jesuit priests, “grew tired of financing the war and a ruthless military” (Bland, 1992).

Meanwhile, the Contadora Group, an initiative launched by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama to deal with the military struggles within the region, called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in El Salvador.

Under pressure from the United States and the regional powers, Cristiani’s government and the FMLN agreed to enter into a dialogue in April 1990. Popular demonstrations helped to press both sides to take the negotiations seriously. On May 1, 1990, “groups in the [Salvadoran] popular movement came together, rising above ideological differences” (Zamora, 1997) to mount the largest demonstration of the past decade as some 80,000 marched, calling for a peaceful settlement of the war (Brockett, 2005).

Under the United Nations, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN reached an agreement “in which both sides promised to guarantee human rights and agreed to the deployment of a UN mission to monitor human rights prior to any cease-fire” (Ladutke, 2004). Although the sporadic fighting between the military and the FMLN continued, the 1990 San José Accord was a major breakthrough in the negotiation process.

The Chapultepec Accord and the 1994 Elections

In March 1991, the FMLN declared a three-day truce during congressional, municipal, and Central American Parliament elections, where opposition parties were allowed to participate. The 1991 elections facilitated El Salvador’s transition to democracy since for the first time in 60 years, there was a parliament in which no political force had a majority and in which the left sat with its own legislative faction (Zamora, 1997).

In July 1991, in accordance with the San José Accord, the United Nations Observation and Verification Mission (ONUSAL) began to operate in El Salvador to observe human rights across the country. On September 25, 1991, the government and the FMLN reached several agreements, including the establishment of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (The Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz—COPAZ) composed of government, Church, military, and FMLN representatives, to oversee all the agreements reached by all parties.

Facilitated by friendly nations and institutions, such as Mexico, the United States, and the United Nations, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN agreed on a peace accord in December 31, 1991, in Chapultepec, Mexico. The Chapultepec Accord went into effect in January 1992, marking the end of the 12-year civil war and of 60 years of military dominance in El Salvador. The Chapultepec Accord included a broad spectrum of reforms in judicial, demilitarization, and human rights issues.

In compliance with the Chapultepec Accord, the FMLN formally registered as a political party in December 1992 after its demobilization. A new electoral code was approved to ensure fair and open general elections in 1994 as the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections were held at the same time in accordance with the 1983 Constitution.

Following the publication of the UN-sponsored Truth Commission Report, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly approved an amnesty law “for all those involved in political crimes committed during the civil

war" (Dunkerley, 1994). President Cristiani invited UN observers to ensure the 1994 elections would be democratic.

In March 1994, for the first time, the FMLN participated in the elections as a political party and captured 21 percent of the national vote…immediately transformed the FMLN into the country's second largest political party (Allison, 2006). In a presidential runoff, ARENA nominee Calderón Sol defeated Rubén Zamora of the FMLN. After more than a decade of struggle for democracy, the 1994 elections marked El Salvador's official transition to democracy.

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Estonia (1992)

Synopsis

Estonia's democratic transition was driven by the desire for independence from the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the fall of communism "enabled [Estonians] to restore the claims for [an] independent Estonia" (Pääbo). Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika policies, implemented in the 1980s, allowed Estonians to mobilize against environmental and around national identity issues, culminating in a "demand [for] greater autonomy and then independence" (Kasekamp). In March 1990, while still under Soviet rule, the Estonian Popular Front won approximately 40 percent of the seats in the Estonian Supreme Soviet. The Popular Front advocated for a pragmatic approach to independence. During the Estonian Supreme Soviet's first session in March 1990, they declared the restoration of Estonia's independence. Negotiations with Gorbachev resulted in a stalemate, but an August 1991 failed coup against his regime created the space for Estonia to unilaterally declare independence. The Soviet Union recognized Estonia's independence in September 1991. A new constitution was approved in a June 1992 referendum, marking Estonia's transition to democracy. The first elections under the new constitution were held in September 1992 with the election of Lennart George Meri as president of the Republic of Estonia.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Georg Sootla, Professor of Public Policy, Institute of Political Science and Governance, Tallinn University
- Heiko Pääbo, Director, Center for Baltic Studies, University of Tartu
- Andres Kasekamp, Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute and Professor of Baltic Politics, University of Tartu

Chronology of Main Events

March 1985	**Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union.**
October 1987	Following protests, the Soviet Union suspends plans to build a phosphate mine in northern Estonia.
April 1988	Estonian Popular Front is formed.
June 1988	Reformist Vaino Väljas replaces Estonian Communist Party chief Karl Vaino.
November 1988	Estonian Supreme Soviet passes a declaration on sovereignty.
August 1989	Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians form a human chain to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
October 1989	Estonian Popular Front endorses full independence from the Soviet Union.
February 1990	Elections for a Congress of Estonia organized by the Estonian Citizens' Committees; Estonian Supreme Soviet removes the Communist Party's leading role from the Constitution.
March 1990	Elections for the Estonian Supreme Soviet; declare intent to reestablish independence during the first session.
August 1991	Estonian Supreme Council declares independence from the Soviet Union following an attempted coup against Gorbachev.
September 1991	Soviet Union recognizes Estonia's independence.
October 1991	Constitutional Assembly completes a working draft of the Constitution.
June 1992	New Constitution is passed by a referendum.
September 1992	First free elections are held under the new Constitution.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Soviet and German Occupation

In 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Eastern Europe into "spheres of special interest" whereby the Baltic States were to become Russian territories.

Following nearly 20 years of independence, Estonia was officially incorporated into the USSR as a constituent republic in August, 1940.

The German and Soviet wartime occupations resulted in the loss of nearly a quarter of Estonia's population. Estonians were replaced with Russian speakers in top political, military, and administrative positions and its cultural institutions were abolished (Democracy Web).

Glasnost, Perestroika, and Estonia's Relationship with the Soviet Union

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he advocated for increased political openness through glasnost and perestroika under the existing communist regime. These policies "allowed [Estonians] to demand greater autonomy and then independence" (Kasekamp) and "led to a national renaissance in the country" (Spilling, 1999). For example, grassroots organizations were tolerated and began to develop in Estonia.

These grassroots organizations began to develop in late 1986 and the first issue to "[engage] an ever-wider public" (Arter, 1996) was about environmental issues. In the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine and against a Soviet plan to build a phosphate mine in northern Estonia, students arranged protests in the spring of 1987. Similarly, the Estonian Academy of Sciences and Tartu University (both establishment institutions) publicly opposed the mining project, and "green" meetings and campaigns were organized in Tartu and soon spread to other town all throughout the country. As a result, the Soviet Union decided to postpone the project in October 1987. In this way, environmental issues allowed the public to begin debating "who had the right to make decisions regarding Estonia and its natural resources, economy, culture, and other aspects of life" (Raun, 2001). "The significance of this victory was not lost on Estonian nationalists, who felt emboldened to try for more and [test] how far Gorbachev's glasnost policies would go" (Olson et al., 1994).

Also "essential to the independence movement" (Iwaskiw, 1996) was a rallying against the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the non-aggression agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union before the German invasion of Poland that triggered World War II. Secret protocols of the pact stated that Eastern Europe was to be divided into spheres of influence, with Estonia being allocated to the Soviet Union. In August 1987, Estonian dissidents organized a rally calling for the Pact's secret protocols to be published, "publicly question[ing] the legitimacy of Soviet rule for the first time" (Raun, 1997). The secret protocols were published in August 1988, and the offensive provisions only fueled Estonian's desire for independence. In August of the following year, millions of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians formed a human chain to draw international attention to the secret protocols and their struggle for autonomy. In addition, the more radical political movement Estonian Citizens' Committees now had a basis to argue that the Soviet Union was illegally occupying Estonia—again justifying the call for independence.

In June 1988, Gorbachev, partly under pressure from reformist communists, backed the replacement of Estonian Communist Party chief Karl Vaino with Vaino Väljas the first native leader of Estonia since 1950. At the September 1988 Estonian Communist Party (ECP) Central Committee Plenary, Väljas supported making Estonian the republic's official language and creating a federation treaty with the Soviet Union. In November 1988, he was instrumental in having the Estonian Supreme Soviet pass a

declaration on sovereignty that "gave Estonian laws precedence over Soviet legislation" (Arter, 1996). Though the Soviet Union rejected the declaration, the Estonian Supreme Soviet refused to annul it.

Citizens' Committees and the Popular Front

Estonia's transition to democracy "was clearly [a] bottom-up initiative and movement" (Sootla). Many issues, including "economic shortcomings, environmentalist concerns, [and fear of] losing [their] national identity mobilized masses to overthrow the Soviet regime and to restore national sovereignty in the form of democratic statehood" (Pääbo). Numerous organizations formed to advocate for Estonia's sovereignty and, later, independence. For example, in August 1988 the political organization Estonian Popular Front—whose primary goal was recognition of Estonia as a sovereign state—was founded under the leadership of Edgar Savisaar. Until late 1989, there were numerous personnel overlaps between the Popular Front and ECP (Estonian Coalition Party) as they both took a pragmatic, gradual approach to sovereignty and, later, independence. In contrast to the Popular Front and ECP, the Estonian Citizens' Committees movement was more radical. It was founded by Trivimi Velliste, chairman of the National Heritage Society, which served to politically mobilize national sentiments and encourage religious movements.

In March 1990, still under Soviet rule, and with the participation of 31 political parties, Estonia held "free and fair elections" (Kasekamp). The Popular Front won 40 of the 101 seats in the Estonian Supreme Soviet (later known as the Supreme Council). During their first session on March 30, 1990, the Supreme Council declared that the Soviet constitution was no longer valid and that they would restore Estonia's independence. The declaration "was an attempt to find a compromise between the radical Congress of Estonia and moderate Estonian Popular Front positions" (Iwaskiw, 1996). The Congress of Estonia, which was democratically elected although informally, served as a parallel legislature to the communist one. During this period, the Congress of Estonia agreed to cooperate with the Supreme Council on the transition.

Transition to Independence

At this time, similar movements were occurring in other Baltic states. Gorbachev refused to negotiate with Estonia and the other Baltic states on their independence, "clearly fearing the consequences of any territorial changes in the USSR, and a long stalemate occurred between Tallinn and Moscow to be ended only by the abortive August 1991 coup" (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997).

On August 19, 1991 the Committee for the Soviet Coup d'état (led by members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) declared itself in power of the Soviet Union. However, the coup failed a few days later. In the wake of the weakening of Soviet Control, the Supreme Council declared Estonia's independence, noting that, "the coup had rendered bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union impossible" (Raun, 1997). On September 6, 1991 the Soviet Union officially recognized Estonia's independence.

Both the Supreme Council and the Congress of Estonia sent representatives to a Constitutional Assembly, which was charged with drafting a new constitution. They decided that elections would be held under the new constitution in 1992. In October 1991, the Constitutional Assembly completed a working draft that gave Estonia an official parliamentary government. The draft was publicized in December 1991 and

accepted two suggestions. The first was to change the name of the head of state to “president” and the second was to allow the first presidential election to be a direct election. The constitution was passed by a referendum in June 1992, marking Estonia’s transition to democracy. The first free elections under the new constitution were held in September 1992 for the parliament and the presidency, in which Lennart Georg Meri won the election.

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Ghana (1996)

Synopsis

The majority of Ghanaians have always favored civilian democratic rule since its independence. However, the roots of the democratization process were both external and internal. “External factors include snowballing effects stemming from the democratic wind of change that blew across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another factor is the influence of the donor community on the Ghanaian political and economic scene, particularly of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through their structural adjustment loans […] and foreign aid in general” (Gyekye-Jandoh). External factors also added impetus to domestic groups in their struggle for democratic civilian rule. Internally, the prosperous civil society revitalized democratic culture in Ghana, and several prominent civil society groups sought the end of military rule through powerful social protests. Internal and external desire for democracy greatly constrained the choices of Jerry Rawlings and the PNDC, leading to its final decision to oversee the process of transition to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify “economic turmoil” as main or secondary cause: 1/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Bossman Asare, Senior Lecturer and Head of Political Science Department, University of Ghana
- Maame Adwoa A. Gyekye-Jandoh, Lecturer, University of Ghana
- Franklin Oduro, Head of Research and Programs and Deputy Director, The Ghana Center for Democratic Development

Chronology of Main Events

December 1981	**Overthrow of Constitutional PNP government by PNDC.**
January 1982	Rawlings suspends constitution.
December 1982	PNDC announces four-year Economic Recovery Program.
March 1984	Ghana Democratic Movement launched in London.
January 1986	PNDC announces second phase of Economic Recovery Program.
July 1987	NCD begins District Assembly election.
October 1988	Local Government Law is introduced.
August 1990	Movement for Freedom and Justice is launched.
March 1991	PNDC puts together a committee of experts to draft a constitutional proposal.
March 1992	PNDC presents timetable for the return to constitutional rule.
November, December 1992	Presidential and parliamentary elections.
February 1994	Violence breaks out.
December 1996	Parliamentary and presidential elections.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Rawlings and the Rise of Civil Society under the PNDC

Ghana was the first of all Sub-Saharan countries to achieve independence in 1957. Since then, the country alternated periods of authoritarian and civil rule. Apart from the First Republic under Kwame Nkrumah, the interlude of civilian government under the Second (1969–72) and Third Republics (1979–81) have been short-lived, unable to endure for longer than 30 months (Crawford).

On May 28, 1979, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led a coup d'état that ousted the ruling Supreme Military Council. Shortly after, on September 24, Rawlings handed over the baton of office to the constitutionally elected government of Dr. Hilla Limann and the People's National Party (PNP) (Gyimah-Boadi). With that, Ghana entered into its Third Republic, which lasted 27 months.

On December 31, 1981, the PNP was overthrown by another coup led by Rawlings, the then-chairman of the quasi-military Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). The PNDC then ruled Ghana for 11 years, during which significant changes took place in the political, economic, and social spheres.

In launching the military revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Rawlings emphasized socioeconomic rights while ignoring political and human rights. Rawlings maintained that "democracy is not realized by having machinery for registering voters and getting them to vote every four years but also by there being machinery for identifying the needs of those voters in between the election periods, and monitoring the realization of these needs" (Rawlings, 2011). It was this idea of the insignificance of civil rights in political participation that justified the PNDC suspending the constitution, banning political parties, detaining party leaders, and taking a number of extra-legal actions in its early years (Haynes, 1991).

Economic Recovery Program and World Bank Assistance

In terms of promoting socioeconomic rights, the PNDC initiated a four-year Economic Recovery Program (ERP) guided by the World Bank since 1983. The ERP involved rural development (including water, electrification, health, and roads), higher producer prices paid to cocoa farmers, a primary health care program, and educational reforms (including junior and senior secondary school programs) (Oqaye, 1995). These economic reforms not only improved the socioeconomic status of Ghanaians, but also gave birth to a vigorous civil society particularly through the widespread adoption of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) advocated by the IMF since 1984 that called for the privatization of multiple industries, which enlarged the space available for associational activities in multiple industries and regions.

Although Phase One of the ERP was a success, unemployment kept being alarmingly high. As a result, during the late 1980s and early 1990s "the socioeconomic situation worsened, particularly for workers and civil servants, many of whom had been laid off. Health and other subsidies that had been scrapped also made life more difficult for the ordinary Ghanaian" (Gyekye-Jandoh).

Consequently, "many civil society groups put pressure on the political authorities to adopt a more inclusive political system" (Asare). "Several prominent civil society groups, including those of the business and legal professions, nurses, students and workers, made clear the need to end military rule through demonstrations and strikes" (Gyekye-Jandoh).

As mentioned above, the World Bank played a significant role in shaping Ghana's economic restructuring process in the 1980s as a principal multilateral donor to the democratization process in Ghana. In particular, the emphasis on promoting the downward accountability of district authorities to local civil society encouraged the participation of nongovernmental organizations and private sector, and it "had undeniable democratic implications…through the deepening of a democratic culture" (Crawford, 2004).

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Western African Democratization

Ghana's democratic process was seen by many scholars as a "result of combination of domestic civil society push and general global trend on democratization following what Fukuyama calls 'the end of history'—the the fall of communism and the triumph of liberal democracy in the late 1980s/early 1990s" (Asare).

The Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 26, 1991 when it acknowledged the independence of its 12 republics. "The triumph of the Western liberalism made it increasingly difficult for African governments to defend a "no party" or populist forms of government" (Stoner, et al., 2013) At that time, in the mind of

Ghanaian leadership, “the demise of the Soviet Union suggested that the best way to be integrated into the global political economy was through democratization” (Asare).

“In the context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, [the West] dictated a systematic program of economic and political liberalization” (Chabal, 1998). This led to a wave of regime transitions across many Sub-Saharan African countries (like Benin, Sao Tome or Cape Verde) that put further pressure over the PNDC. Eventually, the PNDC “had no option but to begin the democratization process leading to the 1992 transitional election” (Oduro).

PNDC’s Effort to Promote Democratic Reform

In order to advocate for the return of a multi-party democracy in the country, a new organization, the Movement for Freedom and Justice, was launched in Accra. Aside from societal upheaval within the country, the Ghanaian democracy advocators in London held a demonstration demanding respect for human rights and multi-party constitutional rule. Faced with pressure from civil society, the PNDC announced its acceptance of a multi-party system in Ghana.

“In his broadcast to the nation on New Year’s Day, Rawlings outlined steps toward the next stages in the country’s political evolution, which included issuance of a report called the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) aimed at to determining the country’s economic and political future” (Berry, 1994) and at “formulating a program for more effective realization of true democracy” (Ghana Web).

On March 6, 1992, Chairman Rawlings presented the timetable for the return to constitutional rule, and the presidential election was held on November 3, 1992 under the supervision of the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) and Commonwealth Observers. Rawlings won the election with 58.3 percent of the votes. However, the opposition called the election results into question (Owusu-Ahsah, 2014).

As a result, political tensions and violence continued. Finally, in December 1996, Ghana had its second experience in multi-party elections which were considered free, fair, and peaceful elections. Once again, Rawlings won a second four-year term.

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Greece (1974)

Synopsis

Greece's democratization in the 1970s was deeply rooted in the country's long-lasting institutional and cultural aspiration of pursuing democracy. Such aspirations led to strong public antagonism against the junta's violation of civil rights. Aside from the junta's ineptitude and lack of legitimacy, other events, such as Papadopoulos' attempts at liberalization, internal division among junta leaders, and the Polytechnic incident, played a role in the overthrow of Papadopoulos by Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis in November 1973. In addition, the defeat of the Greek armed forces in Cyprus delegitimized Ioannidis' regime. Phaedon Gizikis (the junta-appointed president) called a meeting to appoint a national unity government that would democratize the country. In November 1974, a legislative election took place, signaling the return of democracy to Greece. Former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis won the election and became the first elected president of the Third Greek Republic.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/4

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: four
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- George Kaloudis, Professor of History, Political Science, and Criminal Justice, Rivier University
- Theodore Chadjipadelis, Professor of Applied Statistics at the Department of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Chronology of Main Events

July 1965	**Apostasia of 1965.**
April 1967	Generals' coup of 1967.
August 1968	Failed assassination of Papadopoulos.
October 1968	New constitution under military dictatorship passed.
March 1969	First open opposition to Junta by Giorgos Seferis, a Greek poet-diplomat.
December 1969	Greece opts to leave council of Europe because of junta.
March 1972	Papadopoulos becomes the Regent.
November 1973	Papadopoulos suppresses student strike and Ioannidis succeeds in counter-coup.
July 1974	Cyprus coup d'état and Greece's fiasco.
November 1974	Legislative elections are held and former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis becomes president.
January 1975	Trials of the junta are held.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

From Civil War to Papandreaou and Apostasia (Royal Coup) of 1965

The decade of the 1940s was one of the most devastating in modern Greek history due to a deadly civil war (1946–47). After the war, the political fight between left and right came to an end with the right's victory. As a result, the official Communist Party of Greece (KKE) remained legally banned for 27 years and many other prominent leftists were persecuted and incarcerated.

In addition, although the monarchy had been restored, "the constitutional questions regarding the role of the monarchy [started] rising to the surface of Greek political life... which inevitably drew the armed forces in as well" (Gallant, 2001). In June 1963, Karamanlis (prime minister from 1955–1963 and again from 1974–1980) resigned after a dispute with King Paul and went into exile in Paris. Shortly after, Papandreou's Center Union Party won elections and Papandreaou became prime minister. After several years, the right was out of power.

During the 1950s, Greece enjoyed a process of reconstruction with fast economic growth (mainly due to the Marshall Plan and close ties with the United States). However, starting in the early 1960s, the economy started declining, inflation increased, wages stagnated and unemployment rose, leading to frequent strikes and street protests.

Simultaneously, conflict in Cyprus arose due to incompatibilities between Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Given that "the likelihood of war with Turkey seemed high caused by the Cyprus conflict, many members of the military were convinced of the need to step up war readiness" (Gallant, 2001).

In March 1964, King Constantine II succeeded his father Paul. The king openly opposed and clashed with liberal reformers (such as Papandreaou) and caused a constitutional and political crisis later known as the Apostasia of 1965. On July 1965, Papandreou resigned.

Generals' Coup of 1967 and the Junta's Rule

After the Apostasia, greater political mobilization due to the political weakening and instability, posed a threat to the dominance of the military and its corporate interests. On top of this, the generals and colonels' resentment of the privileged political elite in Athens inevitably resulted in a successful coup d'état on April 21, 1967 led by Colonels Papadopoulos, Makarezos, and General Pattakos. Their regime later came to be known as the Junta, or the Colonels.

The military dictators attempted to justify the coup by declaring that they were protecting the country from a communist takeover. They also argued that they were rescuing Greece from chaos resulting from the conflict between the monarchy and parliament. (Kaloudis, 2000). "Initially, the Junta's main problem was legitimacy and so it tried to rule through the King and the existing political system. However, within a matter of days, 10,000 people were arrested, including all of the major politicians" (Gallant, 2001). On December 13, 1967, the king launched a counter-coup but failed. He went to exile on December 14 and Colonel Papadopoulos rose to the top of the regime until 1973.

After the 1967 coup, the Junta, the Greek military dictatorship, introduced martial law throughout the country and assumed constitutional, executive and legislative powers. It also began issuing a large number of legislative decrees in an assertion of "revolutionary legality" (Xydis, 1974). Under the Junta's rule, basic civilian rights were severely violated. For instance, individuals could be apprehended and arrested without charge, and it was forbidden to form a syndicate or group with labor union aims (Kaloudis, 2000). Because the Colonels were against the whole political spectrum in Greece, political dissidents were imprisoned, exiled, or under house arrest (Kaloudis, 2000).

A new constitution, drafted by the Junta, was adopted by plebiscite on October 29, 1968, and 91.87 percent of the voters were reported to favor its adoption. Despite the king's self-imposed exile, the constitution preserved the "crowned republic" but greatly limited the king's powers. It also provided for the restoration of the multi-party system, which, however, would be under strict state control (Xydis, 1974).

In order to justify the necessity of economic intervention, the Junta had a pressing need to produce immediate results of economic growth. The regime introduced a five-year development plan to achieve these objectives. It embarked on an all-out effort to attract foreign capital to be made available for beautification projects, such as parks and public squares, but the price was a lack of corresponding increase in consumer goods and services and heavy reliance on imports. Despite rising economic growth from 1968 to 1972, weaknesses in manufacturing and service industries and mounting external debt led the Greek economy to lose steam soon after 1972.

Anti-Junta Movements

Between 1968 and 1973, Anti-junta movements were scattered and disorganized. The Democratic Defence was formed to fight against the Junta. Among their resistance activities, they attempted to assassinate Papadopoulos. In January 1973, a student movement openly defied the regime which resulted in the Polytechnic incident that killed 24 civilians.

Although such anti-junta movements were important to diminish the prestige of the regime, "the real barriers to the legitimation of the junta were institutional and cultural rather than economic" (Kaloudis, 2000). In addition, the military's history of internal purges and divisions between high-ranking and low-ranking officers also explained its inability to legitimate and to consolidate around the Junta. In other words, "it was the Junta's own ineptitude and lack of legitimacy that led eventually to its downfall." The internal divisions among Junta leaders and the Polytechnic incident resulted in the overthrow of Papadopoulos by Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis in November 1973.

The Collapse of the Junta, the Ioannidis Regime, and 1974 Legislative Election

The Ioannidis Regime was characterized as "a repressive government that established censorship, exile of political opponents, and the torture of dissenters. [Ioannidis] was responsible for the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus that led to Turkey's invasion and the subsequent political division of that island republic" (Britannica).

In July 1974, Greece experienced a fiasco when Turkish forces invaded Cyprus and engaged in heavy fighting against Greek and Cypriot forces, leading to a Greek defeat on the island. "This episode signified the discrediting of the military regime and defined the transition of power to the old (pre-1967) political guard" (Expert 1). Ioannidis lost the support of senior Greek military officers and Phaedon Gizikis (the Junta-appointed president) called a meeting to appoint a national unity government that would democratize the country.

Finally, a legislative election took place in November 1974, indicating the return of democracy to Greece. At that time, "the harsh experiences under the dictatorship contributed to the political maturation of the Greek electorate" (Kaloudis, 2000). In that month, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis won the election and became the first elected president of the Third Greek Republic. "Metapolitefsi (the Greek term for transition) seemed to safeguard a smooth transition to the Third Greek Republic, but the contemporary crisis necessitates a reassessment of the transition itself and the legacy of authoritarianism in Greece" (Expert 1).

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Grenada (1984)

Synopsis

In March 1979, the revolutionary party New Jewel Movement (NJM) led by Maurice Bishop overthrew the long-time regime of Prime Minister Gairy in Grenada through a bloodless coup d'état. The NJM came to office as the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) (Williams, 1994) with Bishop as the new prime minister and Bernard Coard as deputy prime minister. Meanwhile, "concerns in the U.S. State Department had grown as the country moved closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union" (Cole, 1997) under Bishop's leadership. Relations between the United States government and Grenada were further worsened by "the PRG's virulent anti-imperialist/U.S. rhetoric and Grenada's consistently pro-Cuba and anti-U.S. stance at the United Nations and the Organization of American States" (Lewis, 1988). On October 19, 1983, when the internal divisions within the NJM between Bishop and Coard led to the murder of Bishop by his fellow revolutionary comrades, the United States and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) reached consensus that "a Marxist military government in the Eastern Caribbean was unacceptable" (Pastor, 1988). On October 25, 1983, under the pretext to protect American students in Grenada, the U.S. with the support of the OECS invaded the country, and eventually toppled the regime which set the stage for new elections" (Noguera). One year after the U.S. invasion, general elections were held in Grenada and a new government was formed, restoring the country to democracy on December 3, 1984.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/1

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: one
Name of expert (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Pedro Noguera, Peter L. Agnew Professor of Education, New York University

Chronology of Main Events

March 1973	**New Jewel Movement (NJM) is formed.**
February 1974	Grenada gains independence.
March 1979	NJM overthrows long-term regime of Gairy; People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) is established; the 1974 Constitution is suspended; Maurice Bishop becomes prime minister.
April 1979	Grenada establishes diplomatic relations with Cuba; Bishop delivers his "we're not in anybody's backyard" speech.
November 1979	Cuba offers Grenada a grant to build new international airport.
September 1982	Bishop delivers "Line of March for the Party" speech.
July 1983	First Plenary Session of the NJM Central Committee addresses internal party crisis.
September 1983	Central Committee meeting votes in favor of "joint leadership" between Bishop and Coard, the deputy prime minister.
October 1983	Central Committee places Bishop under house arrest; Coard becomes prime minister.
October 1983	Supporters of Bishop stage mass protest; Maurice Bishop is killed; PRG is dissolved; General Austin announces a curfew.
October 1983	The U.S. military invades Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury).
November 1983	The Governor General breaks Grenada's diplomatic relations with the USSR and Libya; reduces ties with Cuba. Interim administration is named.
December 1984	General elections are held; Herbert A. Blaize becomes prime minister after his center-left New National Party (NNP) wins the general election.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Long-standing Gairy Regime, the New Jewel Movement, and Independence

Grenada, formerly a British colony, is a small island country located in the southeastern Caribbean Sea, to the northeast of Venezuela. "The legacy of slavery, compounded by the limited population and geographic size of the colony, impeded the development of legitimate political institutions in this island state" (Will, 1991).

By 1973, one year before its independence (1974), Grenada's premier, Eric Gairy, had been in leadership roles in the country for approximately 22 years (Collins, 2012). Since the beginning of the 1970s, Gairy

had faced radical domestic oppositions "as the public rose up against economic, social, and political decay and paramilitary terror" (Williams, 1994). During this period, the New Jewel Movement (NJM), a revolutionary party formed in March 1973, emerged as serious challenger to the long-standing Gairy regime. The NJM was a merger of the Movement for Assemblies of the People, founded by two lawyers, Maurice Bishop and Kenrick Radix, and JEWEL (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) led by Unison Whiteman, Selwyn Strachan, Sebastian Thomas, and Teddy Victor (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). In August 1973, the movement issued a manifesto calling for participatory democracy and social justice, leading to increasing support and mass demonstrations. In fact, on May 6, 1973, the NJM convened 10,000 people (a quarter of the electorate) at a People's Conference on Independence. In response, Gairy unleash[ed] his 'Mongoose Gang' police force against NJM [leaders], activists and supporters (Rennebohm, 2011). Given the crackdown on the NJM leadership, in 1974, and under the leadership of Gairy, Grenada became an independent country as a member of Commonwealth of Nations.

The People's Revolutionary Movement and Ties with Cuba

After independence, "The NJM developed rapidly, organizing young people and attracting the support of those disaffected with Gairy's leadership" (Collins, 2012). Nevertheless, mass demonstrations supported by the NJM were not able to oust Gairy from power. On March 13, 1979, taking advantage of Gairy's absence from the country, the NJM with its own military force overthrew the Gairy-led government in Grenada in a bloodless coup d'état. Five days later, at a rally of 25,000 people, the People's Revolutionary Movement (PRG) was proclaimed, with Maurice Bishop as Prime Minister and Bernard Coard as Minister of Finance (Newland, 2013).

On March 25, 1979, Prime Minister Bishop suspended the 1974 Constitution and indicated that it would be replaced pending revision with a series of people's laws' (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). A People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) was also established. This marked a "shift from parliamentary governance—albeit inefficient and often corrupt—to a Marxist-Leninist model of 'guided' democracy" (Will, 1991) in Grenada.

The United States, worrying that Bishop could seek help from Cuba to consolidate the revolution, warned Bishop on April 10, 1979, in a statement that "we would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba" (Lewis, 1988). Nevertheless, Bishop responded to the United States' warning three days later, exclaiming "to approving crowds 'we're not in anybody's backyard!'" (Sandstrom, 1988). On the following day, Grenada established diplomatic relations with Cuba and developed a wide-ranging program of aid and assistance. In November 1979, Cuba offered a massive assistance grant to aid in the design and construction of Grenada's proposed new international airport (Lewis, 1988).

Meanwhile, the PRG also sought to broaden its network of diplomatic ties by establishing relations with a number of socialist bloc nations as well as countries with a stated socialist national policy (Lews, 1988). It was also reported that both Cuba and Soviet Union had delivered arms to Grenada under NJM's rule. Therefore, "it is important to note that from the outset that the first and foremost catalyst of the foreign policy tension…between the PRG and the U.S. government resulted from Grenada's conscious policy of challenging American 'hegemony' in the region" (Lewis, 1988).

The United States' Response, NJM Divisions, and Bishop's Assassination

"As the NJM/PRG became more overtly supportive of Cuba and the Soviet Union, the United States became more opposed to the Bishop regime" (Collins, 2012). Nevertheless, it was the murder of Bishop by his fellow comrades on October 19, 1983 that brought "the effectual end of the Grenada Revolution" (Lewis, 2014) and the U.S. invasion of Grenada.

Divisions had been developing within the NJM since 1982 when Bernard Coard, the minister of finance and deputy prime minister, resigned from the NJM's Central Committee and Politbureau. In July 1983, the First Plenary Session of the NJM Central Committee concluded that "the party was plagued by ideological, political, and organizational weaknesses" (Newland, 2013). However, documents required by the United States suggested that there was no "strong divergence of views…rather, the struggle appears to have been almost exclusively personal" (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1984). By August 1983, frictions were rising sharply between Prime Minister Bishop and a faction led by…Coard and his wife within the NJM. As the internal crisis was mounting, Lieutenant Colonel Liam James subsequently called for leadership to be shared between Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). Central Committee meetings convened in September 1983 "overwhelmingly endorsed a joint leadership proposal" (Sandstrom, 1988) proposed by James, "nullifying Bishop's theoretical power as Central Committee chairman" (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). Bishop voted in favor.

Nonetheless, after returning from Cuba on October 8, Bishop challenged the decision made by NJM Central Committee in direct contradiction to his earlier acceptance (Newland, 2013). "Bishop's bodyguard and confidant, Cletus St. Paul, and others of his closest adherents, reportedly began to circulate the rumor that Bernard Coard was seeking Bishop's assassination" (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). Supporters of Bishop began to mobilize since "confusion and suspicion were widespread" (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). The Central Committee, in its attempt to manage the internal crisis, put Bishop under house arrest after trying him for "allegedly instigating the assassination rumor" (Newland, 2013) on October 14, 1979. Coard was named prime minister. Five days later, NJM leaders and Ministers of the PRG who supported Bishop walked, at the head of a mass demonstration, to the Prime Minister's residence (Collins, 2012) to rescue him. Bishop and his supporters took control of the Fort Rupert. Nonetheless, they were soon attacked by the PRA troops. Eventually, Bishop and his close allies were captured and executed (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). In the wake of the murders and the resulting public furor, General Austin dissolved the civilian government…closed the airport, imposed a four-day, 24-hour curfew, and warned that violators would be shot on sight (Cole, 1997).

Militarization of the Region and U.S. Invasion

"After Bishop's murder, the Grenadian government lost all credibility in the Caribbean" (Pastor, 1988). "The continued threat posed by an ever increasing militarization of the region" (Lewis, 1988) had already constrained the relation between the United States and Grenada. "The massacre in Grenada on October 19 led to a convergence of thinking between the United States and the leaders of Caribbean countries that a Marxist military government in the Eastern Caribbean was unacceptable" (Pastor, 1988).

After the execution of Bishop and his supporters, specifically on October 25, 1983, the United States, with the help of the OECS, invaded Grenada via a military operation coded "Operation Urgent Fury." In

its defense, the United States justified its military intervention in Grenada by citing “the responsibility to protect U.S. citizens on the island, the request from the OECS nations, and the Governor General’s [Sir Paul Scoon] appeal” (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). Regardless of the motivations, “the October 25th invasion by US troops, supported by contingents of soldiers from some Caribbean territories, completed its [PRG’s] demise in dramatic style” (Lewis, 2014).

Following the end of PRG’s four-year rule, on November 1, 1983, the Governor General broke Grenada’s diplomatic relations with the USSR and Libya and reduced its ties with Cuba (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1983). In the coming days, Sir Paul Scoon established an interim administration governed by an Advisory Council to prepare for general elections. However, none of the individuals associated with the previous regime were allowed to participate (Noguera). After a year of preparation, on December 3, 1984, Grenada restored democracy and held elections (Pastor, 1988). The Grenada National Party won under Herbert Blaize, who served as prime minister until December 1989.

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GUYANA (1992)

Synopsis

After more than 20 years of control by an authoritarian regime led by the People's National Congress (PNC), Guyana's democratization "began with the ascendancy of Desmond Hoyte to the presidency" in 1985 (Burke). Facing both internal and external pressure, Hoyte was able to "acknowledge the need for political and economic reforms" (Griffith). The reforms "created some political space for the process of redemocratization to emerge. The influence of the international community in facilitating the enhancement of press freedom, electoral reform and the liberalization of the economy were also important elements in the process" (Expert 5). Ultimately, though, Guyana's economic decline was the primary contributor to the free and fair elections held in October 1992. For example, by 1988 Guyana's GDP totaled 68 percent of its level in 1976, external debt amounted to over 600 percent of its GDP, and arrears on its external debt were over five times the value of its exports. However, in 1983, the IMF had decided that Guyana did not meet the conditions for receiving additional loans. Thus, following a series of unsuccessful economic reforms, in 1987, the PNC voted to enact the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) "to radically adjust Guyana's economic structure and to implement a comprehensive program" (van Dijk, 2012). With support from the IMF, the World Bank, and the international community, the ERP was implemented in April 1989. In receiving international assistance, Guyana had agreed to schedule free and fair elections, which were held in October 1992. The opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) won the country's first free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections since independence, allowing Guyana to continue the democratization process.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 2/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: Five

Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Rickford Burke, President, Caribbean Guyana Institute for Democracy
- Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, President, Fort Valley State University
- Perry Mars, Emeritus Professor, Wayne State University

Chronology of Main Events

May 1966	**Guyana becomes independent from the United Kingdom.**
December 1968	People's National Congress (PNC) wins elections, marking the start of its authoritarian regime.
February 1970	Guyana is declared a cooperative, socialist republic.
July 1978	A referendum on keeping the incumbent assembly in power is held.
November 1978	Jonestown Massacre occurs.
February 1980	New constitution passes, allowing Forbes Burnham to gain more power in his new role as executive president.
December 1980	Presidential and parliamentary elections are held.
1983	The IMF rules that Guyana is ineligible for additional loans.
August 1985	President Burnham dies, leading to the appointment of Desmond Hoyte as his successor.
December 1985	Presidential and parliamentary elections are held, with the PNC regime remaining in place.
1986	PNC initiates a series of political and economic reforms.
1987	The PNC votes to implement the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) during the biennial congress.
1989	IMF and World Bank assist in eliminating external payment arrears.
October 1992	Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections are held.

Brief Background and Description of the Nature of the Democratization Process

From Forbes Burnham to Desmond Hoyte

Starting in 1968, two years after Guyana's independence from the United Kingdom, Forbes Burnham led the People's National Congress (PNC) under an authoritarian regime in which all government branches and institutions were controlled by the party. In August 1985, Burnham died; the PNC Central Committee and Cabinet subsequently appointed Desmond Hoyte as his successor. Hoyte thus became both the leader of the PNC and the Guyanese president (Griffith, 1997). Amid Hoyte's appointment was increasing pressure to democratize the country, respect human rights, and address the economic decline. Hoyte "acknowledg[ed] the need for political and economic reforms" (Griffith, 1997) and, in response to these demands, pursued "the politics of preservative adaptation" to retain control: reforms included electoral reforms that removed media restrictions for opposition parties, privatization, and measures to attract foreign direct investment (Griffith, 1997). Along with other reforms, these "were a foundation and prerequisite to 'free' elections in 1992" (Burke). The pressure contributed to "a shift in the political thinking by [Hoyte] who initiated social, economic, electoral, and political reforms which created some political space for the process of redemocratization to emerge" (Expert 5).

In addition to internal pressures, Hoyte faced external constraints. For instance, "international governmental and nongovernmental organizations played a key role in pushing for electoral change and free and [fair] elections" (Griffith, 1997). Similarly, the international community was influential in "facilitating the enhancement of press freedom, electoral reform and the liberalization of the economy which were also important elements in the [democratization] process" (Expert 5). Thus both internal and external pressures created an opening for Guyana's democratization.

Economic Turmoil

Ultimately, the primary cause of Guyana's democratic transition was "the economy that proved to be the Achilles heel of the [Guyanese] regime, with output declining over the greater part of [the] regime's existence." (Singh, 2008). From 1970 to 1988, the PNC implemented "cooperative socialism policies," under which the economy deteriorated into unsustainable conditions. While the country experienced real GDP growth from 1961 to 1975, consistent economic decline occurred after this period. By 1988 Guyana's real GDP was at 68 percent of its level in 1976, its external debt amounted to over 600 percent of its GDP, and the arrears on its external debt were over four times the value of its exports (Gafar, 1996). Furthermore, the average current account deficit was unsustainable, at 27 percent of GDP, from 1977 to 1994, suggesting "a 'crisis' in the making and a buildup in external debt" (Gafar, 1996). The effects of the economic decline were widespread, as "every sector of the economy showed evidence of decline, and every segment of the population felt the impact," including through food and water shortages, crimes, blackouts, and strikes (Singh, 2008).

Following a series of loans, in 1983, the IMF concluded that Guyana had not met its conditions for receiving additional loans. Despite Hoyte's attempts to reform the economy, including through measures aiming to increase output and exports, "the policies were insufficient in dealing with the severe economic situation." (Van Dijk, 1992). Under this pressure, the PNC, during its biennial congress in 1987, "affirmed the proposal to radically adjust Guyana's economic structure and to implement a comprehensive program which would restore the country's creditworthiness, reopen access to external

resources, achieve fiscal equilibrium, attract investment and generate economic growth and development" through the ERP (Van Dijk, 1992). With support from the IMF and the World Bank, the ERP was implemented in April 1989. Ultimately, while a number of factors contributed to Guyana's democratic transition, economic decline opened the most space for political liberalization.

1992 Elections

In the 1980s, economic turmoil and "the need for external aid rendered [Guyana] susceptible to foreign pressure for a return to open party competition and free and fair elections" (Singh, 2008). For example, Guyana's ability to receive assistance from countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada was conditional on holding free and fair elections (Singh, 2008). Under significant economic constraint, "the Hoyte administration capitulated to pressures for free and fair elections in 1992" (Mars). In October of that year, under supervision by the Carter Center, the opposition People's Progressive Party won both the presidential and parliamentary elections, with Cheddie Jagan sworn in as president. The legitimately free and fair elections, which largely resulted from increasing economic decline, thus signaled Guyana's transition to democracy.

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Honduras (1982)

Synopsis

Even though Honduras had…been governed by different authoritarian (civil or military) regimes (Boussard, 2003), "the longevity of its bipartisan party system (the National Party and the Liberal Party) sets Honduras apart from the rest of the Central American region" (Seider, 1996). In Honduras, "the return to constitutionalism had been on the agenda since at least 1977" (Boussard, 2003) after the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the National Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Nacional Electoral, or TNE) under the regime of General Melgar Castro, who pledged to hold elections in 1979. Nevertheless, before any democratization could take place, Melgar Castro's regime was overthrown in a coup d'état led by General Paz García in August 1978. The widespread corruption from the hands of the military led to increasing social unrest and the emergence of leftist guerrilla groups in the late 1970s. Although these groups "never constituted a serious challenge to state power" (Seider, 1995), transition to democracy was considered to be "a preemptive attempt by Honduran elites to stave off popular discontent" (Seider, 1996). Internationally, the rise of revolutionary armed struggles in Central America shifted the geopolitical circumstances around Honduras. The Carter administration in the United States, fearing that "revolutionary ideas would spread to the already conflict-ridden Guatemala and El Salvador" (Boussard, 2003) and facing the "embarrassment of working with another military despot," pressured General Paz García "to open a process of democratization" (Expert 1). As a result, the Constituent Assembly election was held in April 1980, which was in charge of drafting a new constitution and holding general elections. A year later, after negotiation among the military, the National Party and the Liberal Party, the general election was successfully held in November 1981. Roberto Suazo Córdova of the Liberal Party became the first democratically elected president.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Ernesto Paz Aguilar, Professor of Political Science, The National Autonomous University of Honduras
- Ramón Antonio Romero Cantarero, Research professor, The National Autonomous University of Honduras

Chronology of Main Events

December 1972	**Coup d'état led by General López Arellano.**
January 1975	Superior Council of the Armed Forces (COSUFFAA) is established.
March 1975	COSUFFAA declares separation of positions between civilian and military chiefs.
April 1975	President López Arellano is deposed due to bribery scandal; General Melgar Castro takes over the presidency through a coup.
January 1976	Elections are announced.
December 1977	New electoral law is passed.
January 1878	National Electoral Tribunal (TNE) is inaugurated.
August 1978	Melgar Castro is overthrown by coup d'état led by General Paz García.
July 1979	Paz García announces Constituent Assembly election.
April 1980	Elections to Constituent Assembly.
April 1981	The Laws on Elections and Political Organizations are promulgated; date for general election is set.
October 1981	Tegucigalpa Meeting of the military, the National Party, and the Liberal Party.
November 1981	Direct presidential election; Córdova of Liberal Party defeats Zuñiga of National Party.
January 1982	Roberto Suazo Córdova is inaugurated; new constitution is promulgated.

Brief Background and Description of Nature of the Democratization Process

Military Regime of General Oswaldo López and the Rise of COSUFFAA

The Republic of Honduras has "suffered from political instability and authoritarian governance for much of its history" (Meyer, 2013) since its independence from Spain in early 1800s, "with the exception of the liberal interlude 1957–1963" (Boussard, 2003). Unlike other Central American countries, Honduras had a long history of a bipartisan party system as the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de Honduras—PL) and National Party (Partido Nacional de Honduras—PN) have been constant features of the political landscape since the turn of the [20th] century (Seider, 1996).

Nevertheless, "the military has traditionally played a large role in domestic politics and essentially controlled the national government from 1963 until 1971" (Meyer, 2013). On December 4, 1972, General Oswaldo Enrique López Arellano, chief of the armed forces and also former president of Honduras, overthrew the government of the democratically elected president, Ramón Ernesto Cruz of the National

Party, through a coup d'état. General López was, again, installed as the head of state for at least five years (Schooley, 1987) and the military took control of the government.

In January 1975, two years after the coup, the Honduran military experienced a major power reshuffle because of the "growing demands for participation in decision making by other senior officials" (Rosenberg, 1996). As a result, a Superior Council of the Armed Forces (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas—COSUFFAA), formed mainly of lieutenant colonels, was established (Schulz et al., 1994), replacing the old governing body of the military, the Superior Council of National Defense. The rise of COSUFFAA revealed the internal division and the lack of homogeneity within the military establishment. Two months later in March, COSUFFAA declared a separation of positions of chief of the armed forces and chief of state, which meant that the chief of state, General López, lost his primary power base as Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro became the new military leader (Schulz et al., 1994).

In April 1975, amid the scandal that López had accepted a US$1,250,000 bribe from the United Brands Company (formerly United Fruit) (Busey, 1985), as concluded by a U.S. congressional investigation, a group of young dissident officers (Schooley, 1987) led by Melgar Castro removed López from power in "defense of the national honor" (Busey, 1985).

President Melgar Castro and the 1977 Electoral Law

Following the coup d'état in 1975, Melgar Castro became the president of Honduras. In January 1976, President Melgar Castro announced that the army would retain political power at least until 1979 to implement the policies it had promised. Elections would be held in 1979 (Schooley, 1987). In preparation for the 1979 elections, a new electoral law was passed in December 1977 by the administration and the COSUFFAA, which constituted an important institutional advance (Seider, 1995). The 1977 electoral law called for the establishment of the National Electoral Tribunal (TNE), composed of representatives from the PL, PN, the two smaller parties PINU (Partido de Innovación y Unidad) and PDCH (Partido Demócrata-Cristiano de Honduras), and the Supreme Court (Seider, 1995). The TNE began to be functional as the election came into effect in January 1978. In addition, it also encouraged the creation of new political parties by reducing the number of signatories necessary for registration from 15,000 to 10,000 (Seider, 1995). Nonetheless, in mid-1978, discontent was growing due to "a series of scandals among the ruling officer elite" (Anderson, 1982) and the halt of the preparation for the 1979 elections. Before the elections would be held, in August 1978, President Melgar Castro's government was toppled by a coup d'état, and Chief of the Armed Forces, General Policarpo Paz García, assumed power.

General Paz García and Changes in the International Context

Meanwhile, outside Honduras, the neighboring countries were confronted with escalating social unrest and revolutions (Boussard, 2003). "The rise of the revolutionary armed struggles in Central America placed an important geopolitical role on Honduras" (Paz Aguilar) as it became the "new linchpin of the United States' attempts to solve the problems in Central America" (Boussard, 2003). "Carter's administration in the United States initiated changes in U.S. foreign policy focused on human rights" (Paz Aguilar), which caused President Carter "'not [to] want the embarrassment of working with another military despot' (Boussard, 2003) in Honduras. As a result, "Honduras, [was] a U.S. ally in the region, [and] had pressure to open a process of democratization" (Expert 1). Pressed by the United States to return to constitutional rule, General Policarpo Paz García, in 1979, set the election date for a constituent

assembly on April 20, 1980, to write a new constitution and to call for general elections (U.S. House of Representatives, 2014).

What's more, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, "the height of the Cold War caused that the most radical sectors of the left [in Honduras] could justify the existence of the Honduran armed forces" (Seider, 1995). Moreover, "the military's popularity [among the public] was fading by the late 1970s" (Boussard, 2003) due to widespread corruption and a lack of political reforms. Within the Honduran military itself, there were different groups and divisions, struggling for power, thus weakening the military as an institution. As a number of regional guerilla groups became active, "there was increasing unrest in Honduran society at large" (Boussrd, 2003). Although "none of these groups succeeded in building a popular base comparable to that of the guerrilla movements in neighboring countries" (Seider, 1995), the decision to hold elections by Paz García's government "was an escape valve to avoid revolutionary violence" (Boussard, 2003) and "a preemptive attempt by Honduran elites to stave off popular discontent" (Seider, 1995).

1980 Constituent Assembly Elections and Roberto Suazo Cordova

In April 1980, the Constituent Assembly elections were held, which "were distinguished by a record of 81 percent turnout of eligible voters and little or no evidence of fraud according to a US congressional report" (U. S. House of Representatives, 2014). The Liberal Party gained 35 out of the 71 seats in the new assembly, while the National Party gained 33 seats (Schooley, 1987). The surprise loss by the National Party indicated that "the population was tired of corruption and military rule" (Boussard, 2003), since the National Party traditionally had strong ties with the armed forces. The 1980 elections were Honduras's first step to transition to civilian rule. Still, "in recognition of the military's important role in guaranteeing the electoral process, the pledges of neutrality and respect for its commander" (U.S. House of Representatives, 2014), General Paz García was named the Provisional President of Honduras in July 1980 by the Constituent Assembly. After a year of drafting, in April 1981, the Law on Elections and Political Organizations (La Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Politicas) were promulgated and the presidential election was set for August 1981.

After a postponement of the presidential election to November 1981, President Paz García signaled his intention to delay the election again. Nevertheless, a land scandal involving government officials forced Paz García to negotiate with the leaders of the main political parties. In October 1981, COSUFFAA and political leaders met in Tegucigalpa and agreed that "there would be no investigation into military corruption….the military would retain a veto over Cabinet appointments…and any matter relating to Honduran borders" (Lapper et al., 1985). The pact among the military, the Liberal Party, and the National Party might have facilitated the transition (Boussard, 2003), the general election was held according to schedule on November 29, 1981, as urged by the United States. Roberto Suazo Cordova of the Liberal Party was elected President of Honduras and was inaugurated in January 1982, marking Honduras's first transition from military to civilian rule in more than a century.

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Hungary (1990)

Synopsis

Hungary's democratic transition was the result of multiple factors. The Party's policy of incorporating intellectuals into its ranks in order to pacify reformists soon led to "the readiness of soft-liner communists to open up the regime, to enter reforms, and liberalization" (Bozóki). This trend coincided with the impact of Gorbachev (Bozóki) and specifically with his glasnost and perestroika policies, which weakened conservative communists' power and provided liberal leaders with a stronger position within the Party. These factors, in addition to the "decline of communism, rising economic problems, and rising opposition movements" (Bozóki) led to the 1989 Roundtable negotiations between the opposition and the regime. Although economic issues were "a necessary but not sufficient precondition of the political crisis that brought Kádár down" (Tokes, 1996), it was rather a combination of factors, particularly the "weakening Soviet rule" (Kis), that destabilized the regime and led to political reform. In September 1989, both sides agreed on free elections and a multi-party system. First and second-round parliamentary elections were held in March and April 1990, where MDF leader József Antall became prime minister in coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party and Independent Smallholders' Party, marking Hungary's transition to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/4

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: four
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- András Bozóki, Professor of Political Science, Central European University
- János Kis, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science, Central European University
- Zoltan Balazs, Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest
- Zsolt Boda, Senior Research Fellow, Head of Department, Institute of Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Chronology of Main Events

January 1968	**Implementation of the New Economic Mechanism.**
March 1985	Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union.
June 1985	Multi-candidate elections for Parliament and local governments are held.
September 1987	Founding meeting of the Hungarian Democratic Forum is held.
May 1988	*Károly* Grósz replaced *János* Kádár as Secretary General of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP).
November 1988	The first Reform Circle is established.
January 1989	Imre Pozsgay declares that the events of 1956 were a "popular uprising."
February 1989	HSWP votes for political pluralism.
March 1989	Opposition Roundtable convened.
June 1989	National Roundtable negotiations between the regime and the opposition begin.
September 1989	National Roundtable Agreement is signed.
October 1989	HSWP is dissolved and replaced by the Hungarian Socialist Party.
March 1990 and April 1990	First and second rounds of Hungary's first free elections are held.
May 1990	Parliament convened.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Hungarian Revolution, the HSWP and Gorbachev's Influence

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a revolt against the Hungarian People's Republic and its Soviet-influenced policies. It began as a student protest and expanded throughout the country. As a result, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, killing over 2,500 Hungarians.

Following the invasion, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev hand-picked former Minister of State János Kádár to be the communist leader of Hungary. In October 1956, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) was created and the country became a satellite state of the Soviet Union.

In 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in the Soviet Union, he advocated for increased political openness through glasnost and perestroika. This "dramatic change in the external environment enabled factors within the country to play a decisive role in formulating the system" (della Porta, 2014). Gorbachev's "primary objective was not to upset social peace in Hungary [as he] regarded social stability as more important than adherence to the Soviet model" (Bruszt and Horvath, 2012). Conservative communists in the HSWP were therefore weakened by this position. These policies caused splits within the regime and "accelerated the process of disintegration of the Communist regime in Hungary" (Kis). "By 1987, the question was not so much reform versus recentralization, but rather what sort of reform to implement and how fast it should proceed" (della Porta, 2015). All in all, "there was a readiness of soft-liner communists for opening up the regime" (Bozóki). Despite the Hungarian regime's implementation of economic reforms, particularly the New Economic Mechanism of 1968, which attempted to tackle the inefficiencies of central planning through decentralization, Kádár's "willingness to tolerate political reform narrowed with his extended tenure in office" (Tong, 1994).

Opposition Groups and "Reform Circles" within the Communist Party

The HSWP had traditionally hindered opposition groups from forming by bringing the intelligentsia into the party. The intellectuals "slowly began to develop as an internal party opposition" (O'Neil, 1996). Internal tensions arose between the conservatives and reformist communists, weakening the HSWP. Furthermore, Hungary's economic problems, particularly its high debt and decreasing living standards, helped to undermine the regime to which communism was unable to respond.

In May 1988, due to economic tensions and health issues, Kádár was ousted by the HSWP and replaced by Károly Grósz, a neoconservative communist. Kádár's ousting enabled the implementation of the economic and political liberalization sought by reformist communists.

In November 1988, the first "reform circle" was formed in the county of Csongrád, calling for radical political restructuring, for "Hungary's Stalinist model to be liquidated" (O'Neil, 1996) and for other party members to join the circle. By October 1990, influenced by the statement made by Imre Pozsgay in January 1989, the "reform circles" had become the largest Communist Party reformist wing. Pozsgay, a reformist and member of the HSWP Politburo, declared that the 1956 revolution had actually been an uprising, which both highlighted the existence of a reformist group within the HSWP and questioned the regime's legitimacy as the leading party. Following his statement and increasing dissension with the Party, the HSWP voted for a transition to parliamentary democracy. In April 1989, the Politburo was replaced by a smaller body. Shortly after, the Council of Ministers declared its independence from

HSWP. While Grósz remained as General Secretary, Rezső Nyers was elected as Charmain, acting as the caretaker of the state until free elections were held.

Political Parties, Roundtable Negotiations, and Elections

Hungary's transition to democracy "was mostly elite-driven" (Bozóki) with "little support for the opposition [parties]," (Sajó, 1996) except regarding environmental issues (like a Danube River dam project).

However, starting in early 1988, opposition groups became more active through debates and demonstrations. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was established in 1987 under the leadership of József Antall (he would later become the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary). This was followed by the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) and the League of Young Democrats (Fidesz) in 1988. These groups, as well as other organizations, formed the relatively and initially consensus-oriented democratic opposition (Balazs).

In 1989, the opposition groups met at the Opposition Roundtable, agreeing "on the importance of joint action by all opposition forces" (Sajó, 1996) and issuing a statement calling for bilateral negotiations with the HSWP. Preliminary talks began in April 1989, with an agreement approving trilateral Roundtable negotiations reached in June. Both the regime and the opposition were "interested in peaceful, nonviolent change" (Bozóki).

The Roundtable focused on the "determination of principles and rules governing democratic transition and strategic tasks of overcoming the social and economic crisis" (Sajó, 1996). The HSWP, the Opposition Roundtable, and a third side that included social organizations and movements with minimal influence participated in the talks. In September 1989, the opposition and the HSPW approved the Roundtable Agreement. Though it was not endorsed by all of the opposition groups, the Agreement called for free elections and a multi-party political system. It also resulted in six bills focused on the modification of the constitution; the formation of a Constitutional Court; the operation and administration of political parties; parliamentary elections; the modification of the criminal code and criminal procedures; and the implementation of a State Audit office.

In October 1989, the HSWP held a party congress and, due to the influence of the reform circles, decided to dissolve and refound the party under the name of Hungarian Socialist Party. During the same month, the name of the state was changed from the Hungarian People's Republic to the Republic of Hungary. The election campaign for parliament began in December 1989, with the first round of elections held on March 25, 1990. The second round took place on April 8; the MDF won the majority of seats. Hungary's first free parliamentary elections were held in May 1990. MDF leader József Antall became prime minister in coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party and Independent Smallholders' Party.

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Republic of Korea (1987)

Synopsis

Korea's democratization "resulted from long-term political and social unrest due to popular dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime" (Expert 1). The Chun Doo Hwan regime, which came to power through a coup d'état, violently suppressed civil protests in 1980, during the Gwangju Uprising and tried to eliminate opposition through "purification" campaigns. The economic growth in the mid-1980s gave birth to a rapidly expanding middle class that led to growing democratic consciousness among the population. Faced with pressure from the U.S. government, militant labor unionists, activists and the *minjung* (the masses) movement, Chun had no other option but to propose a set of constitutional revisions. Roh Tae Woo (Chun's successor) capitulated to the demands of the protestors by promising to revise and amend the Constitution of 1985. The new constitution explicitly guaranteed human rights, determined the schedule of direct presidential elections, and reduced the power of the president relative to the National Assembly of Korea. On December 1987, Korea's had its first direct presidential election, won by Roh. This election marked the beginning of the Sixth Republic and the transition of South Korea to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- WooJin Kang, Assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Angelo State University
- Chug Hee Lee, Professor, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
- Chung-in Moon, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University

Chronology of Main Events

October 1979	**Labor strikes against deep economic recession.**
October 1979	President Park Chung Hee is assassinated.
December 1979	Chun Doo Hwan takes power after launching a coup d'état.
May 1980	Gwangju massacre.
October 1980	Constitutional referendum sets seven-year term for presidents.
February 1981	Chun is indirectly elected president.
December 1983	Chun adopts appeasement policies on activists.
February 1985	New Korea Democratic Party emerged as the first opposition party.
June 1987	Student uprising forces Chun regime to adopt direct presidential election system.
June 1987	President Reagan writes letter to Chun asking for dialogue and compromise.
December 1987	The first free direct presidential elections are held.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Economic Recession and Assassination of President Park Chung Hee

During the 1960s and 1970s, Korean politics was dominated by the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung Hee. The two decades witnessed rapid economic growth—with a high rate of growth of 25.3 percent in 1975. At the same time, in the political sphere, Park imposed the *Yushin* (revitalizing reform) Constitution, a repressive dictatorial system that also permitted the re-election of the president for an unlimited number of six-year terms.

The Park dictatorship weakened in the late 1970s, especially after the economic turbulence caused by a global oil price spike: "the price of oil spiraled out of control, and it drove prices higher throughout the South Korean economy, damaging the welfare of millions of wage-earners who were ill equipped to deal with inflation" Adesnik et al., 2008). As a result, workers mobilized against the regime, and Park responded to the pro-democracy movement with greater force, which was opposed by the head of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)—who later in 1979 assassinated President Park.

Chun's Seizure of Power and Public Unrest

After the assassination of President Park by the chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency on October 26, 1979, Park was replaced by Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha in a caretaker role. Shortly after, Major General Chun Doo and Major General Roh Tae Woo (both from the Security Command), together with their secret military society, the *Hanahoe*, led a coup d'etat against the regime on December 12, 1979, and seized power to establish a military dictatorship.

On March 1980, Chun appointed himself head of the KCIA, which provoked a violent wave of student protests. As a result, Chun responded with martial law, suspension of all political activity, arrest of opposition leaders, and university shutdowns. Two months later, the military force brutally suppressed an uprising in the city of Gwangju with 20,000 military personnel, which turned into a massacre after estimates of nearly 200 killed and 850 injured. This event brought an end to the protests and helped Chun regain control. On June 1980, he resigned from the office as KCIA Director, removed interim president Choi Kyu-Ha, and two months later, the National Conference for Reunification elected him "indirectly" to become President of South Korea. This represented the start of the Fifth Republic.

One of Chun's inaugural promises was a new constitution approved by national referendum. On September 29, 1980, the government announced a draft constitution, according to which the president could only serve a non-renewable seven-year term. However, until the new National Assembly created by the constitution was inaugurated, the right to enact all laws remained in the hands of the Legislative Council for National Security, whose members were appointed by Chun. As a result, Chun had absolute control over Korea's political landscape, and his reign turned into a constitutional dictatorship in 1980 and 1981.

In addition, after becoming president, Chun established the Emerging Task Force for National Defense, which led to a large-scale purge and "purification" of government officials, journalists and workers based on the excuse of national security (Gu et al., 2009).

Chun's Appeasement Policy and the Emergence of Opposition Power

According to the new constitution, President Chun would have to step down from office in 1987. The public began to plan for democratic transition at the end of his term. In addition, "rapid economic growth" gave birth to the rise of middle class in Korea, which led to growing democratic consciousness among the population (Expert 2; Woo). The concept of *minjung* (the masses) became prominent in the thinking and rhetoric of radical students, militant labor unionists, activists, and progressive intellectuals. Such a new trend of thought put considerable pressure on Chun's regime, which had seized power through a coup d'état and imposed bloody suppression against the Gwangju Uprising.

In order to rule without coercion and oppression, the Chun regime adopted a so-called "appeasement policy," letting expelled students re-enter school and dismissed professors resume their positions. In addition, as part of the agenda, Chun pardoned or rehabilitated hundreds of political prisoners, [and] lifted the ban on political activity of more than 200 opposition figures (Adesnik and Kim, 2008). Ironically, the appeasement policy promoted the explosive growth of the democratization movement in multiple groups of the lower economic echelon including students, labor, urban poor and peasantry. More importantly, the February 1985 legislative election witnessed the establishment of the main opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party, which garnered 29 percent of the vote.

Chun's Compromise for Direct Presidential Election

The growing power of the opposition compounded the difficulties that Chun faced in manipulating the 1987 presidential election. Faced with pressure for a free and fair election, "Chun compromised by allowing the formation of a special committee in the National Assembly to propose a set of constitutional revisions" (Adesnik and Kim, 2008).

However, he soon suspended the process, claiming that consensus among the opposition parties was not possible. He later announced the nomination of his successor, Roh Tae Woo, to the presidency. These actions enraged the opposition and caused violent student protests in major cities in June 1987.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent a personal letter to Chun Doo Hwan, insisting that Chun find a peaceful solution to the prevailing crisis. Under strong U.S. pressure, Roh Tae Woo capitulated to the demands of the protestors by promising to revise and amend the Constitution of 1985 (Expert 1). The new constitution explicitly guaranteed human rights, determined the schedule of direct presidential elections, and reduced the power of the president relative to the National Assembly of Korea.

1987 First Direct Presidential Election

On December 1987, Korea had its first direct presidential election. The 1987 presidential election represented a milestone in Korea's democratic transition process. Roh Tae Woo remained Chun's chosen successor and had enough legitimacy and competiveness in the direct election. At the same time, a split existed between the two opposition candidates, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. As a result, Roh prevailed with a small plurality (35.9 percent of the votes), and the two Kims split the rest of the votes. This election marked the beginning of the Sixth Republic and South Korea's transition to democracy.

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Latvia (1993)

Synopsis

As Latvia was one of the republics of the Soviet Union, its democratic transition was prompted by "the fall of communism coupled with [the] struggle to regain independence" (Expert 1). Under Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika, Latvians were able to assert their opposition to the regime, starting with protests against the construction of a hydroelectric dam and demonstrations commemorating historical events. Most of Latvian society, including intellectuals and reformist communists, sought to end Soviet occupation and re-establish an independent democratic state (Karklins). In October 1988, the Popular Front of Latvia (LTF) was established as a "mass democratic movement" (Rozenvalds) and won the majority of seats in the March 1990 elections to the Latvian Supreme Soviet. Many reformist members of the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) were members or supporters of the LTF. As a result, "the LCP, desperately divided between reformist and hardline factions, decided to hold contest elections, although limited to Party members" (Purs). In April 1990, the reformists defected from the LCP, and formed an independent communist party, and altered electoral laws to allow future multi-party elections. The Latvian Supreme Soviet, subsequently renamed the Supreme Council, declared the start of its transition to independence in May 1990. Following a failed coup against Gorbachev by a group of prominent Soviet officials in August 1991 that was the result of large pro-democracy demonstrations in Russia, the Supreme Council declared its immediate independence from the Soviet Union. Free and fair parliamentary elections were held in June 1993, and the first session of Parliament was held the following month. During the first session, Parliament reinforced the foundations of the 1922 Constitution that was in effect during Latvia's earlier period of independence and elected Guntis Ulmanis (of the LFU) as president.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/4

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: four
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Rasma Karklins, Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago
- Feliciana Rajevska, Associate Professor, Vidzeme University College
- Juris Rozenvalds, Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia

Chronology of Main Events

March 1985	**Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union.**
October 1986	Letter criticizing a Soviet project to build a hydroelectric dam is published, leading to grassroots opposition against the dam.
June 1987	First calendar demonstration is held.
October 1988	Founding congress of the Popular Front of Latvia (LTF) is held.
February 1989	Founding congress of the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) is held.
December 1989	The constitution is amended, removing the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) as the leading party.
March 1990	Latvian Supreme Soviet elections are held; LTF candidates win the majority of seats.
May 1990	Latvian Supreme Soviet votes to begin transitioning to independence.
January 1991	Latvian residents defend themselves from Soviet attack by building barricades.
March 1991	Referendum on independence is held; 74 percent of voters support this position.
August 1991	Latvian Supreme Council declares independence from the Soviet Union following an attempted coup against Gorbachev.
September 1991	The Soviet Union recognizes Latvia's independence.
June 1993	First free elections are held following the restoration of independence.
July 1993	Parliament's first session is held; 1922 Constitution is accepted in its entirety.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Latvia's Relationship with the Soviet Union and the "Singing Revolution"

Latvia was annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940 following 20 years of independence, when the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia) as well as Finland fell under the Soviet spheres of interest described on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. The Nazi and Red Army invasion followed, deporting over 100,000 Latvians and causing another 150,000 to flee the country. "This left a completely Sovietized political and economic system, leaving the Latvian nation to struggle for its survival" (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011).

Many years later, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he advocated for political and economic openness through glasnost and perestroika. Similar to what had occurred in other Baltic countries, "the liberalization of the Soviet regime contributed to Latvia's subsequent demand for independence" (Rajevska). Under glasnost, Latvians first united around environmental issues. In October 1986, an article criticizing a plan to build a hydroelectric dam on the Duagava River was published. Its publication led to hundreds of letters and thousands of signatures against the project.

Resistance to the dam challenged "the centralized manner in which decisions were made" (Pabriks and Purs, 2001).

Demonstrations were held throughout the late 1980s with the support of Latvia's intellectuals, who provided "additional legitimacy in the eyes of the broad public as well as helping to protect the blue-collar participants from violent mass repression" (Pabriks and Purs, 2001). "The protests were primarily nationalist but also democratic and liberal" (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011). In 1986, Latvian-based Helsinki-86, a human rights watch group organized by three blue-collar workers, was the first openly anti-communist organization founded. They were later joined by other activists and prominent dissidents. The group was a major actor during the demonstrations that led to Latvia's regaining independence. These events were subsequently referred to as the "Singing Revolution" or the "awakening" of the Latvian nation (Karklins, 1994).

Further protests where held on June 14, 1987, the anniversary of mass deportations of Latvians to the Soviet Union in 1941, on November 18, the anniversary of Latvia's 1918 proclamation of independence, and on August 23, the date on which the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. The Pact, a non-aggression agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, contained secret protocols that were published in August 1988. The protocols confirmed that Eastern Europe was divided into spheres of influence, with Latvia going to the Soviet Union. This affirmation opened the door for Latvia to challenge the legitimacy of Soviet rule and its subsequent Russification.

Mavriks Vulfsons, an influential journalist, political commentator, and Party member, echoed that sentiment through televised remarks. He declared that the Soviet Union had taken power through an illegal occupation, and initiated "a broad discussion on the legality of Soviet authority in Latvia" (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011). "He was the first to blatantly make them publicly as a source from the inside. Soon, the national flag became commonplace at mass gatherings" (Purs, 2013).

The Popular Front of Latvia and LCP Tensions

In October 1988, the Popular Front of Latvia (LTF) was founded as an organization aimed at increasing the autonomy and eventual independence efforts for the country. The members included moderate intellectuals and reformist communists. The establishment of the LTF "as [a] mass democratic movement…may be regarded as a starting point [of Latvia's democratization]" (Rozenvalds). Many reformist members of the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) were members or supporters of the LTF. This reflected the "alienation of [the] ruling elite and corruption of [the] elite" (Rajevska). The LTF originally called for political and economic autonomy, but changed its demands to that of full independence in May 1989.

This was largely due to pressure from the more radical Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK), which held its first congress in February 1989. LNNK "managed to raise the issues of independence and national goals at a time when others were ambivalent and fearful. The movement immediately became the target of attacks by hardline Communists and the Soviet press, [who] tried to find pretexts for legal bans.... The movement served as a stimulus for public dialogue and the crystallization of new policy options" (Karklins, 1994).

By April 1989, LNNK, Helsinki 86, the Popular Front, and other opposing groups coordinated to form the Citizen's Committees, a political mobilization that pushed for independent political structures. Even though the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR banned it, thousands of citizens registered, "fostering mass consciousness of legal issues" (Karklins, 1994).

"The lack of systematic state oppression lifted the general public's veil of fear... As a result, the LCP, desperately divided between reformist and hardline factions, decided to hold elections, although still limited to Party members" (Purs, 2013). In April 1990, the reformists defected from the LCP, formed an independent communist party, and amended election laws to allow multi-party elections in the future.

In March 1990, still under Soviet rule, Latvia held elections to the Latvian Supreme Soviet. LTF-backed candidates won 134 out of 200 seats. In May, the Latvian Supreme Soviet, renamed the Supreme Council, passed a resolution "stating as the ultimate goal of its work the eventual achievement of full independence" (Plakans, 1997).

Transition to Independence and Democracy

During the period from May 1990 to September 1991, the Supreme Council drafted laws and regulations based on Latvia's coming independence. In effect, the government became "a de facto transitional government, to be changed at some time in the future when total separation from the USSR was achieved" (Plakans, 1997).

However, Gorbachev refused to negotiate with Latvia and the other Baltic states, who were undergoing similar transitions, on their independence. Following the Supreme Council's resolution on transitioning to independence, Gorbachev declared it null and void on the grounds that it violated the Soviet Union's constitution.

In January 1991, Latvians built and patrolled barricades around key government buildings and communications centers in Riga, the capital to defend themselves against the Soviet military. Soviet paramilitary units attacked the Ministry of Interior, killing five people. As a result, thousands of people gathered to defend the Popular Front government, exacerbating tensions.

On August 19, 1991, the Committee for the Soviet Coup D'état declared that it had taken power in the Soviet Union. The coup failed "due to poor planning, execution, and popular opposition in Moscow led by Boris Yeltsin" (Purs, 2013) and ended on August 22. As a result, the Supreme Council declared its immediate independence.

The Soviet Union recognized Latvia's independence on September 4. Following the August 1991 declaration, the Supreme Council continued to act as a transitional government. The Law on the Election of the Fifth Saeima (Parliament) was passed in 1992, and elections were held in June 1993. The party Latvia's Way (a conservative-liberal party founded by a group of former LTF activists) garnered 36 of the 100 seats and became the leading party in a coalition government with the Latvian Farmer's Union (LFU). During its first session in July 1993, the Parliament reinforced [its]…1922 Constitution (Rajevska) and elected Guntis Ulmanis (of the LFU) as president.

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Lithuania (1993)

Synopsis

As a republic within the Soviet Union, Lithuania's democratic transition arose due to "a broad Eastern European consensus that democratization…was the only way to get out of [the] geopolitical influence of Moscow and…[integrate] into the Western structures" (Gudzinskas). Under Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika, the reform movement Sąjūdis formed in June 1988. Advocating Lithuanian nationalism and independence from the Soviet Union, the movement attracted widespread support and the cooperation of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP). The LCP endorsed many of Sąjūdis' proposals, and numerous LCP members were also members of Sąjūdis. In the February 1990 elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Sąjūdis-backed candidates won the majority of seats. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, subsequently renamed the Supreme Council, declared independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990. In response, Gorbachev imposed a three-month economic blockade beginning the following month and sent additional troops to Lithuania in January 1991 in an attempt to restore Soviet rule. Despite pressure from the Soviet Union, Lithuanians maintained their determination for independence and democratic society (Expert 1). In August 1991, following an attempted failed coup against Gorbachev in Moscow by a group of prominent Soviet officials, Lithuania declared its immediate independence, which was recognized the following month by the Soviet Union. Free and fair parliamentary elections were held in October 1992, in addition to a referendum to adopt the new constitution.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 2/8

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: eight
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Renaldas Gudauskas, International Centre of Knowledge Economy and Management, Vilnius University
- Liutauras Gudzinskas, Lecturer, President at Lithuanian Political Science Association
- Algis Krupavicius, Professor, Department of Political Science, Vytautas Magnus University
- Alvidas Lukošaitis, Political Scientist, Vilnius University
- Irmina Matonyte, Professor of Political Science, University of Management and Economics in Lithuania
- Jurate Novagrockiene, Associate Professor, Lithuanina Military Academy
- Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Director, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University

Chronology of Main Events

March 1985	**Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union.**
June 1988	Communist and non-communist intellectuals establish Sąjūdis.
September 1988	Demonstration are held on the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in which the military uses force against protestors.
October 1988	Ringaudas Songaila, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) is replaced by Algirdas Brazauaskas.
March 1989	Elections to the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies are held.
December 1989	Lithuanian Supreme Soviet eliminates the LCP's leading role in Lithuanian society from the constitution.
February 1990	Elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; Sąjūdis-backed candidates win the majority of seats.
March 1990	Lithuanian Supreme Soviet votes to restore Lithuania's independence.
April 1990	Gorbachev imposes a three-month economic blockade on Lithuania.
January 1991	Soviet Union sends additional troops to Lithuania, resulting in 14 deaths.
August 1991	Lithuania declares independence from the Soviet Union following an attempted coup against Gorbachev in Moscow.
September 1991	The Soviet Union recognizes Lithuania's independence.
October 1992	Parliamentary elections are held; new constitution is adopted.
February 1993	Presidential elections are held under the new constitution.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Glasnost, Perestroika, and Lithuania's Relationship with the Soviet Union

In 1940, following 22 years of independence as a democratic republic, Lithuania became, after a coup d'état in 1926, an authoritarian state dominated by the Lithuanian Nationalist Union. During the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in 1939, Lithuania was incorporated into the Soviet Union, as stated under the protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In fighting the Soviets and later the Germans, Lithuania went through mass deportations and lost one-third of its prewar population.

During the return of the Red Army, Antanas Sniečkus, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party since 1940, created an atmosphere of terror by oppressing anti-Soviets dissents. However, as distinct from what happened in Estonia and Latvia, the LCP was dominated by Lithuanians (as opposed to Russians), "leading to a relatively high degree of legitimacy for the party on the domestic political stage, [receiving the] support of the opposition forces from the very beginning" (Krupavicius).

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he advocated for increased political and economic openness through glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev's reforms, "combined with the rise of [a] national movement for democracy and restoration of [the] nation-state" (Krupavicius), contributed to Lithuania's democratization and "inspired [the] rapid and spontaneous creation of new movements" (Novagrockiene). In other words, it reorganized the political and economic system through the introduction of contested elections to give slight political participation to people, and through the de-monopolization in order to allow semi-private businesses to operate.

"With the encouragement of Gorbachev, and the example of popular front movements in Estonia and Latvia, the Lithuanians formed their own reformist organization, the Sąjūdis" (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997), a political organization that paved the way for eventual Lithuanian independence. Shortly thereafter, some opposition movements started to emerge around two issues: one related to environmental concerns, specifically the government's plan to install a third nuclear reactor at the Ignalina nuclear power station. The other one centered on the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which contained secret protocols. Their publication by the Estonians in August 1988 increased pressure against the regime. The protocols confirmed that Eastern Europe was divided into spheres of influence, with Lithuania initially going to Germany and then changing to the Soviet Union. Demonstrations during the Pact's anniversary were held in August 1987, September 1988, and August 1989. The September 1988 demonstration ended in violence between the protestors and Lithuanian troops, which led to increased pressure on the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) leaders and "contributed to lowering their legitimacy" (Novagrockiene).

By "mid-1988 [the LCP's] participation [in Sąjūdis] became a political necessity" (Iwaskiw, 1996). In October 1988, the LCP Central Committee replaced Ringaudas Bronislovas Songaila (First Secretary at the time) with Algirdas Brazauskas, largely due to Songaila's handling of the violent September 1988 demonstration.

Brazuaskas supported the reform movement, Sąjūdis, and "identif[ied] his administration with the fundamental program of economic self-dependence" (Senn, 2002), a clear victory for the reform movement. Seventeen members of the Sąjūdis (out of the 36 founding supporters) were part of the LCP. Under his leadership, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet made Lithuanian the republic's official language and, in December 1989, legalized a multi-party system by amending the constitution to eliminate the LCP's leading role in Lithuanian society.

Sąjūdis and Independence

Sąjūdis was formed out of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, which had organized a commission with communist and non-communist intellectuals to propose constitutional changes supporting glasnost and perestroika. During its founding congress in October 1988, the movement affirmed its aim of gaining sovereignty within the Soviet Union. By April 1989, however, Sąjūdis became more radicalized, demanding full independence. In organizing mass rallies and demonstrations in 1988 and 1989…hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians were mobilized into a national resistance movement (Krickus, 1997). "Democratization in Lithuania was spurred by Sąjūdis" (Matonyte) as its widespread popularity throughout the country provided it with "factual legitimacy and political power…which the [LCP] could not afford to disregard." (Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997).

With this movement came thoughts of democracy. Independence and democratization were "very interconnected, and linked to the general wish of political elites and [the] population to 'return to Europe' and become a Western country" (Matonyte). As a result, and "to woo the voters" (Matonyte), Brazauskas largely supported Sąjūdis due to his realistic view of the existing developments in communism, and the LCP endorsed many of their proposals, which included economic autonomy and making Lithuanian the national language.

In February 1990, following the December 1989 amendment to the LCP's leading role in society, the first multi-party elections for the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were held. Sąjūdis representatives won an absolute majority, and its leader, Vytautas Landsbergis, became the head of the Supreme Soviet. In March 1990 the Supreme Soviet, now called the Supreme Council, voted to restore Lithuania as an independent democratic republic. They also restored the 1938 Constitution and annulled the Soviet Union and Soviet Lithuanian constitutions.

In response, Gorbachev imposed an economic blockade. Despite the blockade, the Lithuanian legislature and government spent 1990 attempting to restructure the state and transform the economy (Ashbourne, 1999). The blockade was lifted in June 1990 after the Supreme Council placed a 100-day moratorium on its declaration of independence.

Transition to Independence and Democracy

By the end of 1990, negotiations with the Soviet Union on Lithuania's independence had ended in a stalemate. On January 7, 1991 Gorbachev sent additional troops to Lithuania in an attempt to re-establish Soviet rule. On January 13, Soviet tanks and infantries attacked Lithuanian civilians guarding the Television Tower in Vilnius, the capital. Fourteen people were killed and hundreds were injured. The international community, particularly the West, was "appalled to discover that Gorbachev…would unleash the military to use tear gas, rifles, and tanks against unarmed people" (Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997). The contempt by the West prompted Gorbachev to resume negotiations. However, "Lithuanian-Soviet relations appeared to have reached an impasse, with neither Gorbachev nor Landsbergis prepared to compromise" (Ashbourne, 1999).

On August 19, 1991, the Committee for the Soviet Coup d'état declared itself in power in the Soviet Union. The coup failed and ended on August 22. During this period, the Supreme Council was able to immediately restore independence. The Soviet Union recognized Lithuania's independence on September 6. In May 1992 Landsbergis, the head of the Supreme Council, called for parliamentary elections, which were held on October 25, 1992. On the same day, Lithuania's new constitution was adopted in a referendum, which allowed a presidential election to be held in February 1993. Algirdas Brazauskas, of the LDLP, won with 60 percent of the vote.

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Republic of Mali (1992)

Synopsis

The landlocked West African nation of Mali is one of the world's poorest countries (Clark, 2000). In 1968, Moussa Traoré staged a coup d'état and established a military dictatorship in the country, which "evolved into a one-party autocratic system, [led by] the Union Democratique du Peuple Malien (UPDM)" (Drisdelle, 1997) with Traoré as the president. During the military regime, severe droughts devastated Mali's economy in the 1970s and 1980s. Poor government policies exacerbated the damage. Thus, "the Malian economy remained in dire straits and, despite the military government's efforts, there was no improvement in living standards for the Malian people" (Clark, 2000). In the 1980s, in compliance with the IMF's structural adjustment program to secure loans to Mali, Traoré started to trim the civil service, reduce government salaries, and deny students financial aid and jobs (Appiah et al., 2010). "Dissatisfied with the government's failure to reduce economic hardship, protesters [including students, unions, and intellectuals] began demanding multi-party democracy and free elections" (Appiah et al., 2010). In addition, the "fall of Mali's long-time patron, the Soviet Union, and Mali's subsequent reliance on France, which conditioned foreign aid on democratization in 1990" (Expert 1), contributed to internal social and political unrest. On March 22, 1991, "the death of over a hundred demonstrators in the capital…provoked the overthrow of the reigning autocrat" (Expert 1), as more riots and insurgencies broke out in many cities. In an effort to end the anarchy, "a reform-minded faction of the military led by Amadou Toumani Touré turned on the UDPM and arrested the intransigent Traoré" (Smith, 2001) on March 26, 1991. Subsequently, municipal, legislative and presidential elections were held in 1992. Alpha Konaré, a scholar, became the first democratically elected president of Mali after 23 years of military authoritarian rule.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/2

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: two
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Both prefer to remain anonymous.

Chronology of Main Events

November 1968	**General Moussa Traoré stages a coup d'état; President Keïta is deposed.**
1973–1974	Severe droughts hit Mali; Famine occurs.
June 1974	Traoré creates a new constitution to establish one-party rule.
September 1975	Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) is formed; Traoré becomes the general secretary of UDPM.
June 1979	Single-party general and presidential elections are held; Traoré is elected President; Mali returns to civilian authoritarian regime.
1984–1985	Another severe drought hits Mali, leading to desertification and famine. Structural adjustment program under an IMF loan is implemented.
March 1991	Government troops kill more than 100 protestors; demonstrations intensify.
March 1991	Major opposition leaders form the Committee for the Coordination of the Opposition.
March 1991	Nationwide strike led by National Workers Union of Mali.
March 1991	Lt.-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré arrests President Traoré. Coup d'état ends Traoré's regime.
March–April 1991	Military and civilian leaders form the Transition Committee for the Well-Being of the People.
Late 1991	National Conference is convened; new electoral code, charters for political parties, and governing institutions are passed.
February 1992	National referendum approves a new constitution; legislative elections are held; Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) wins the majority.
April 1992	Presidential elections are held and Alpha Konaré of ADEMA is elected president.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

From Modibo Keïta to Moussa Traoré and the 1974 Referendum

The Republic of Mali, formerly the Sudanese Republic, is a landlocked country located in West Africa that gained independence from France in June 1960, together with Senegal, to become the Mali Federation. However, the federation was short lived: Two months later, it broke apart and the Sudanese Republic became Mali. Modibo Keïta, premier of Mali Federation, became the first president of Mali.

Keïta held the presidency for eight years until he was deposed by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré in a coup d'état in November 1968. Traoré set up a military dictatorship in Mali, which was initially welcomed by most Malians, "because of the hardships caused by Keïta's socialist policies, and the contrasting prosperity of its neighbors" (Clark, 2000). At that time, "even by West African standards, Mali was desperately and perhaps perpetually poor, with per capita annual income around $250 (Clark, 2000).

Despite the people's initial hope, the military regime governed by the Military Committee for National Liberation (Comité militaire de libération nationale—CMLN) headed by Traoré failed to deliver those changes. Instead, Traoré's "corrupt leadership undermined his initial popularity and quickly eroded the military's reformist reputation" (Smith, 2001). "The Malian economy remained in dire straits and, despite the military government's efforts, there was no improvement in living standards for the Malian people. The appalling poverty of most people contrasted dramatically with the increasing wealth and opulence of Traoré, his relatives and associates" (Clark, 2000). In 1973 and 1974, a severe drought hit Mali, further worsening its economy.

In June 1974, a referendum approved a new constitution issued by Traoré. This new constitution "created a one-party state and was designed to move Mali toward civilian rule within a five-year framework" (Knecht et al., 1993). One year later, the CMLN, in preparation for the transition, created the Democratic Union of the Malian People (Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien—UDPM) with Traoré as general secretary. The UDPM became the only legal party in Mali upon its restoration to civilian rule in 1979, demonstrating that "the military leaders [still] remained in power" (Knecht et al., 1993).

Severe Drought and the IMF's Economic Reform Programs

Without any opposition candidate, Moussa Traoré was elected president of Mali in single-party presidential and legislative elections held in June 1979. During the second half of Traoré's regime, anti-government protests and demonstrations led by students were brutally suppressed and crashed. "The short-term economic improvements brought after the Keita years were, by the beginning of the 1980s, negated by an inflated bureaucracy and widespread government corruption. Pressure from external organizations such as the IMF and World Bank forced Traoré to make economic reforms. Mali abandoned the Mali franc and was readmitted to the West African Monetary Union in 1984 and privatization programmers" (Velton, 2009).

In addition, between 1984 and 1985, Mali was hit by another severe drought that "accentuated a process of desertification, which had been triggered by a combination of poor management, inappropriate government policies, and the growing population's demand for ever-scarcer resources" (Drisdelle, 1997). In rural areas of Mali, where 80 percent of the population lived, the economic situation deteriorated rapidly as people found "it harder and harder to farm smaller and smaller plots, as population growth out-paced productive resources" (Drisdelle, 1997).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mali was still among the five poorest nations in the world. Annual per capita income was estimated at $270 and life expectancy at 45 years; health services reached a mere 15 percent of the population (Drisdelle, 1997). To deal with the economic difficulties and its enormous international debt (Clark, 2000), Traoré's government reached agreement with the IMF to implement structural reforms in order to obtain future loans.

Anti-government Protests and the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition

"However, by 1990, there was growing dissatisfaction with the demands for austerity imposed by the IMF's economic reform programs and the perception that the president and his close associates were not themselves adhering to those demands" (Knecht et al., 1993), especially in the cities. "Both civil servants, who formed most of the country's salaried work force, and the rank and file soldiers in Mali's relatively

large military frequently went unpaid for weeks at a time" (Clark, 2000). In compliance with the structural adjustment program (SAP), many civil servants, young and educated in the cities, were sacked from government jobs. Under this tough economic situation, "civil associations began to emerge in Mali, armed with independent newspapers, multi-party politics, and full civil rights" (Drisdelle, 1997).

At the same time, the external political environment altered as well. The fall of Mali's long-time patron, the Soviet Union, and Mali's subsequent reliance on France which conditioned foreign aid on democratization in 1990, also played important role in stimulating internal social and political unrest (Expert 1) in Mali. To add to the political crisis, Traoré also "faced a rebellion by northern Tuareg [an ethnic group] who blamed the government for indifference to their plight during the drought" (Appiah and Gates, 2010).

In late March 1991, "students, labor unions, human rights organizations, members of the media, and other civil society groups united in opposition to Traoré's regime" (Smith, 2001). Anti-government protests and riots broke out in multiple cities: "The government came under pressure in the cities from mass demonstrations, as the democratic movement joined forces with thousands of students protesting against the lack of investment in education" (Smith, 2001). On March, 22 1991, the "death of over a hundred demonstrators in the capital…provoked the overthrow of the reigning autocrat" (Expert 1). In response to the killing of unarmed protesters, "hundreds of thousands of Malians took to the streets to demand an end to the UDPM's unresponsive and authoritarian rule" (Smith, 2001).

Two days later, on March 24 1991, opposition leaders formed the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition, which "endorsed the largely successful nationwide strike initiated by the National Workers Union of Mali" (Clark, 2000), the next day, where protests and demonstrations were mounted and were met by fire from government troops (Vaa, 2000).

Amadou Toumani Touré and the Transition to Democracy

After days of near-anarchy in Mali with civil unrest, Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (aided by a reform-minded faction of the military) arrested President Traoré on March 26, 1991, effectively putting an end to his 23 years of authoritarian rule.

In a compromise with civilian leaders, "Touré established a coalition of civilians and the military named the Transition Committee for the Well-Being of the People (CTSP)" (Clark, 2000). In late 1991, a National Conference was convened in Bamoko and successfully produced an electoral code and charters for the political parties. On January 11, 1992, a national referendum approved the new constitution of Mali. Municipal, legislative, and presidential elections were held in February 1992. Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali—ADEMA), led by Alpha Konaré, a scholar, won 73 of the 115 available seats in the National Assembly. On April 5, 1992, Konaré became the first democratically elected president of Mali after two decades of military rule, marking Mali's transition to democracy.

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Mexico (1997)

Synopsis

"Despite the sophistication of Institutional Revolutionary Party's (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) political structure, the system was beset by an economic crisis that challenged its hegemonic character and opened the door to fundamental political transformations" (Zubek and Gentleman, 1994). Aside from "the economic reversals of the 1980s and 1990s [which] most clearly brought pressures on the regime and contributed to an increased electoral opposition" (Levy and Bruhn, 1999), other factors contributing to the process were a "deepened role of the Church in addition to the proliferation of civic associations" (Chad, 2001) and the "emergence of the discontent of civil society from the 1988 election process. (Preciado Coronado). Hence, "democratization was a long process of reforming electoral laws and institutions in ways that made it possible for opposition parties to win" (Coppedge). On June 6, 1997, and for the first time since its creation in 1929, the PRI lost absolute power in the Lower House in the general election. That event eventually led to the election of PAN candidate Vicente Fox Quesada as the first president elected from an opposition party since 1910.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 3/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Michael Coppedge, Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
- Soledad Loaeza, Professor of Politics, El Colegio de Mexico and member of International IDEA's Board of Advisers
- Jaime Preciado Coronado, Head of the Department of Political Studies, Guadalajara University
- Veronica Baz, General Director, Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo (CIDAC) Mexico
- Kathleen Bruhn, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara

Chronology of Main Events

1929–1997	**Formation of Mexico's "official" single dominant party: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (initially called PRM).**
October 1968	Tlatelolco massacre.
November 1970	Luis Echeverría succeeds Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.
1970	"Mexican economic miracle" comes to an end.
November 1976	José López Portillo succeeds Luis Echeverría as president.
July 1977	1977 Reforma Política.
1980	Economic crisis: the beginning of Mexico's "lost decade."
1982	The government suspends payments on the principal of its $80 billion foreign debt, and the peso is steeply devalued.
September 1985	1985 Mexico City suffers a devastating earthquake.
August 1986	Mexico joins the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).
June 1997	Legislative elections (PRI fails to win a majority for the first time).

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Hegemonic Party System: Institutional Revolutionary Party

Since 1929, "as Latin America's most resilient political system, Mexico's political elite governed through a corporatist political order managed by the PRI-led party-government bureaucracy" (Zubek and Gentleman, 1994). The PRI was a "highly centralized political system with an extremely powerful president and a dominant state-sponsored political party.…The concentration of power in the hands of the president in Mexico City came at the expense of the legislature, the judiciary, and Mexico's far-flung provinces.…Yet, the system also possessed considerable flexibility in adapting to changing conditions. This peculiar mix of authoritarianism, political flexibility, and the constitutional ban on the re-election of the president explain the extraordinary longevity of the system" (Chad, 2001).

Eventually, this monopoly on government led to extraordinary party control: "Decades of one-party rule completely blurred the distinction between the PRI and the state and, as a result, the PRI eventually became 'the party of the government' rather than just 'the party in power.'" This official status meant that the PRI legally enjoyed tremendous advantages over opposition political parties by virtue of its vastly superior access to financial resources, media coverage, and state patronage. PRI candidates for elective office were designated by a narrow group of PRI leaders, starting with the Mexican president, who enjoyed the extraordinary privilege of nominating his own sucessor" (Chad, 2001).

The PRI's economic policies echoed this control. "In the economic sphere, where the regime served primarily as rector of the economy, a careful strategy had been pursued that promoted a state-centric approach to the development of a mixed economy that fostered a regime-dependent pattern of development for the private sector. This in turn ensured that the regime's political priorities were well served" (Zubek and Gentleman, 1994). The overall results were mixed, as the party developed high levels of corruption and fiscal inefficiency, but it also managed to maintain economic growth (the so-called Mexican miracle) and legitimate political power and influence for decades.

From the Tlatelolco Massacre to the end of the Diaz Ordaz Administration

The PRI's influence began to wane in the 1960s and 1970s, as "popular movements criticized the state's performance on welfare distribution…independent union organizers complained about the suppression of dissent…and the independent media defied intimidation and repression. In addition, the imposition of austerity during Mexico's repeated and fluctuating economic downturns generally undermined popular support for and confidence in the PRI's management" (Levy and Bruhn, 1999).

In addition, "the president of the Republic (Gustavo Díaz Ordaz Bolaños) had been a target for ruthless and offensive student attacks, which were seen as a major threat to the elite's legitimacy. These perceived dangers triggered the harsh government reaction based primarily on tactics of physical repression, the counter-delegitimizing campaign, and efforts to isolate the students from non-university publics" (Shapira, 1977). As a result, society experienced unprecedented levels of civil unrest in the form of rural insurgency, labor activism, and independent union organizing, together with student protests that culminated in the 1968 government assault at Tlatelolco that killed hundreds (Zubek and Gentleman, 1994).

Shortly afterward, Luis Echeverría was named the PRI's presidential candidate. He won the elections on July 5, 1970, and took office on December 1, 1970.

End of the Mexican Economic Miracle and the 1977 Political Reform

Between 1940 and 1970, Mexico experienced the so-called Mexican economic miracle, mainly thanks to the adoption of import-substitution industrialization in the 1940s. This protectionist regime recorded an average inflation rate of 3.5 percent per year and unprecedented rates of GDP growth. However, by 1970, major structural problems became evident. Agricultural output stagnated, internal savings were almost depleted, and Mexico's economy was heavily dependent upon foreign borrowing.

The end of the Mexican economic miracle pushed "President Echeverría's regime to embark upon a program of accelerated social spending and the expansion of the public sector…. Echeverría's costly reform projects, together with the impact of government policies upon private sector investment and foreign investment, generated alarming deficits that the regime

sought to cover through borrowing abroad and inflation.…The nation's public sector debt climbed from US$3.8 billion in 1970 to US$21 billion in 1976. Moreover, by 1976, service on the public external debt had already risen to approximately 15 percent of total federal expenditures. Mexico's situation had become so destabilized by 1976 that the country was forced to conclude a stabilization agreement with the IMF that in turn facilitated a US$1.2 billion dollar credit to support Mexico's deficits" (Chad, 2001).

By November 30, 1976, Mexico was in a state of economic crisis. This represented a challenge for newly elected President José López Portillo. "The disequilibrium in the balance of payments caused by the import-substitution trade policies led López-Portillo to rethink these policies. He attempted to take a moderate approach to liberalization. His new approach included replacing the existing licenses with tariffs, gradually removing official prices from imports and exports, and establishing incentives for foreign countries in the form of fiscal and trade credits in order to promote Mexico's exports" (Roberts, 2001).

In the political arena, "the 1977 political reform increased the number and ideological diversity of officially registered political parties participating in the electoral process. It also altered the rules governing elections, augmented opposition parties' representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies and in state and local governments, and expanded opposition parties' access to the media" (Middlebrook, 1986). These reforms were initially seen as beneficial in terms of political progress, as they tried to modernize the current system.

The Impact of the Economic Crisis of the 1980s

During López Portillo's administration, "Mexico's capital stock had aged rapidly because capital investment had declined; the private savings rate was low and fell further in the 1980s. Real wages in manufacturing and per capita GDP performed badly in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.…Mexico's longer-standing structural economic and social problems also lingered, including high rates of poverty and inequality and deficient services in health and education" (Domínguez, 2004). "By 1982, the imbalance in Mexico's external sector had reached crisis proportions, leading to a suspension of payments on Mexico's US$88 billion foreign debt and ultimately the provision of a new US$4 billion rescue package from the international financial community. The state's miscalculations and mismanagement of the development project had rendered the economy critically vulnerable to external shocks and had brought the nation to the brink of economic collapse, despite the spectacular 8 percent average annual growth rate achieved between 1977 and 1981" (Zubek and Gentleman, 1994).

"The economic crisis of the 1980s was the pivotal factor affecting the timing of the political awakening of society" (Chad, 2001). The sudden collapse of a petroleum-led economic boom in 1982 and the accumulated influence of the chronic economic crisis "exposed the fragility of the PRI's governing coalition, fracturing it beyond repair. Some of the economic elite began to break

away and support the conservative National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional, or PAN), pushing the PRI toward neoliberal reforms" (Bruhn).

López Portillo's successor, President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), "inherited an economy in ruins and was compelled to follow a course of drastic economic restructuring" (Chad, 2001). Fiscal and trade imbalances coupled with high levels of external debt triggered a series of political reforms. "The Mexican economy entered the 1990s severely weakened—rather than strengthened—by the adjustment process of the 1980s" (Ros, 1994).

Emerging Opposition and Legislative Elections

The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a dramatic increase in the strength of the opposition PAN. By the late 1990s, the PAN had emerged as a serious democratic alternative to the PRI at the national level. The rise of PAN wasn't the only threat to PRI dominance: One part of the PRI left the party for the former Communist Party, creating the current Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, or PRD). This event "eventually pushed the PRI to enact fairer electoral rules. In the past, the PRI had been able to buy off or suppress dissent, but the stark economic conditions left them unable to buy off dissent, and the size of the newly emerging opposition (as well as its greater material support and education) made it more difficult to suppress" (Bruhn).

Stronger opposition was not the only threat to the PRI. On the early morning of September 19, 1985, the Greater Mexico City Area was hit by an earthquake, causing the death of at least 10,000 people. The government's failed reaction to this catastrophic event "serv[ed] as an additional catalyst for Mexico's democratization" (Levy and Bruhn, 1999) as it "cost the PRI some additional legitimacy" (Coppedge).

Not only was the PRI losing legitimacy; it was also losing its ability to adequately represent the people. "Socioeconomic development in Mexico had produced a significantly more educated, wealthy, and complex society that was no longer captured by the corporatist structures of the PRI" (Bruhn).

With no other option remaining, "the Mexican regime showed considerable political flexibility in responding to growing pressures for democratization. By the late 1990s, the regime had initiated wide-ranging electoral reforms and recognized opposition victories in gubernatorial elections in several major states, Mexico City, and a host of municipalities around the country" (Chad, 2001). On June 6, 1997, legislative elections were held, and for the first time, the PRI lost the absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

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Mongolia (1993)

Synopsis

Throughout the 1980s, criticism of party policies had been slowly growing in Mongolia (Dierkes). This situation, combined with new openness reforms modeled after the Soviet Union's glasnost and perestroika initiatives, led to numerous demonstrations by opposition forces in the winter of 1989–1990. Mass protests, which called for multi-party elections and other democratic reforms, culminated in the resignation of the communist head of state, Jambyn Batmönkh, and the Politburo in March 1990. Following the resignations, the Great Hural, Mongolia's Unicameral Parliament, amended the Constitution and abolished the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's role as the highest organ of state and legislative power in the country. Multi-party elections were held in July 1990 and, in January 1992, the Great Hural adopted a new Constitution. Free and fair elections followed; elections for the General Assembly were held in June 1992, and presidential elections took place in June 1993, resulting in victory by the opposition candidate, Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Byambajav Dalaibuyan, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Queensland Australia
- Julian Dierkes, Associate Professor, University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research
- Damba Ganbat, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, Advisor to the President of Mongolia and a member of the Advisory Council to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Bolormaa Purevjav, Senior Advisor, The Asia Foundation's Engaging Stakeholders in Environmental Conservation Project
- Paula L.W. Sabloff, External Professor, Santa Fe Institute

Chronology of Main Events

December 1984	**Jambyn Batmönkh replaces Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal as Mongolia's head of state.**
December 1988	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) plenum is held, leading to implementation of political and economic reforms.
June 1989	MPRP forms four councils to continue working on reforms.
December 1989	Mongolian Democratic Association (MDA) is formed and holds two large rallies in Ulaanbaatar.
February 1990	Following more protests, Batmönkh announces that the MPRP would hold talks with the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU).
March 1990	Batmönkh and the MPRP Politburo resign; Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat becomes head of state.
April 1990	Additional protests erupt against the MPRP.
May 1990	People's Great Hural adopts constitutional amendments providing for multi-party elections.
July 1990	People's Great Hural elections are held.
September 1990	Small Hural's first session begins. People's Great Hural elects P. Ochirbat as president.
February 1991	A convention is formed to draft a new constitution.
January 1992	The State Great Hural adopts the new constitution.
June 1992	Elections to the State Great Hural are held under the new constitution.
June 1993	Presidential elections are held.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Opposition Movement

The main roots of Mongolia's democratization process were a combination of "the creation of the key political institutions that decentralized power and the will of the nation for sovereign statehood and freedom" (Dalaibuyan). The Mongolian People's Republic, considered a client state of the Soviet Union due to its close political alignment with the USSR, was "sometimes known as the unofficial 'sixteenth republic' of the USSR" (Ginsburg, 1995). Since 1921, Mongolia had been ruled by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), an authoritarian communist government founded in 1920.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he advocated for increased political openness. Thus, "Mongolian officials as well as academics were exposed to Gorbachev's glasnost reforms and merged some of these ideas with broader domestic demands for reform" (Dierkes). Students were influenced by Soviet policies as well, and, "as the winds of change and transparency swept through the Communist world, the youth of Mongolia began the democratic revolution" (Ganbat). In fact,

in a November 1989 speech at the Young Artists' Second National Congress, Elbegdorj Tsakhia, a leader of the democratic movement, called for Mongolia's youth to work to create democracy. The following month, the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) was formed, "and with it the start of Mongolia's democratization process" (Ganbat). Other movements formed as well, including the Mongolian Democratic Association (MDA) during the same month.

All in all, as "signs of change in the USSR under Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika reforms led the MPRP in 1984 to replace [Head of State] Tsedenbal with the younger Jambyn Batmönkh, who was more aligned with the new wave of Soviet reforms" (Ginsburg, 1995).

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Reforms

In the late 1980s, Mongolia had developed into an agricultural-industrial system, and soon the economy started facing some problems. As a result, reforms were initiated "as the economy deteriorated further, and in 1988 a program of 'renewal' was initiated, paralleling…glasnost and perestroika. Following the Russian example, the initial objective of Mongolia's reform process was to revitalize the socialist economy rather than replace it" (Ginsburg, 1995). Therefore, while the reforms were instigated by economic turmoil, democratization was not implemented until the opposition had significantly pressured the MPRP for substantive democratic reforms.

Initially, as demonstrated by the government newspaper, *Unen*, MPRP reforms "remained largely confined to a fairly narrow spectrum of low-level problems arising in the daily life and work of individuals" (Sanders, 1990). The MPRP equivalents of glasnost and perestroika were "acting at home as a safety valve through the party-controlled media, but nonetheless a public debate was gradually developing over a broader range of issues…which could eventually lead Mongolia toward democracy."

While the communist leadership of the MPRP had started to implement reforms in the 1980s, there were some divisions among the government between those officials pushing for democratic changes and others that preferred the status quo (Rossabi, 2005). As a result, "young Mongolians started showing signs of impatience at the government's inability to move more quickly and radically" (Sanders, 1990).

"Relations with foreign countries also spurred changes in the government....The USSR brought home 8,000 troops from Mongolia. Meanwhile, trade with China increased at a rapid clip. Finally, the foreign minister asserted that the MPRP should increase its ties with Western countries, which would, of necessity, lead to greater openness" (Rossabi, 2005).

In December 1989, protestors calling for open, multi-party elections demonstrated throughout Mongolia (Sabloff). During that demonstration, Elbegdorj (who became president in 2009) announced the creation of the Democratic Union Coalition, which, among others, included the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) and the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP).

Furthermore, "the opposition demanded a multi-party system, free elections with universal suffrage, the replacement of the centrally planned economy with a market system, private property, reorganization of the government, and protection of human rights" (Heaton, 1991). While the MPRP indicated its willingness to begin a dialogue, the opposition continued to hold demonstrations throughout 1990. Following protests, as well as a hunger strike, in March 1990, the MPRP capitulated (Sabloff). In the face of the broad movement for democracy, members of the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries of

the MPRP (including Secretary General Jambyn Batmönkh) resigned and announced that the MPRP would give up its "guiding role" in Mongolian society and hold multi-party elections (Sanders, 1989).

Transition to Democracy

Following Batmönkh and the Politburo's resignations, the People's Great Hural, the unicameral Mongolian Parliament that represents the highest organ of state and legislative power, announced that it would amend the Constitution to allow free elections. By then, the Great Hural was a national assembly elected by districts and accountable to the communist hierarchy (and not to the people).

Opposition groups began to form political parties, in addition to demanding that the MPRP relinquish its control over funds and the media to allow fair elections. In April 1990, the MPRP agreed to meet with the opposition led by the Democratic Union Coalition to discuss constitutional amendments. In May, the People's Great Hural amended the constitution "to make the Hural a freely elected supervisory body and to create a Small Hural that would become a "legislative and supervisory standing parliament" (Heaton, 1991).

Elections to the People's Great Hural were held in July 1990, and a new bicameral parliament was created. The MPRP garnered 86 percent of the seats, while the opposition took 14 percent. Shortly after, the Constitutional Drafting Commission, chaired by Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat (leader of the MPRP at the time) and composed of a 20-member multi-party group, was formed, and the first draft was published in June 1991. Following the Small Hural's amendments, the draft constitution was given to the Great Hural for ratification.

After several revisions, the Great Hural ratified it in January 1992, and the new constitution took effect the following month. Both Hural bodies were consolidated into the State Great Hural. In April 1993, a special MPRP congress refused to nominate President Ochirbat for re-election and appointed Lodongiyn Tudev, *Unen*'s editor, instead. As a result, Ochirbat decided to run as a joint candidate of the MSDP and MNDP. Presidential elections took place in June 1993, and Ochirbat retained the presidency with 57.8 percent of the vote (Lansford, 2012). This marked MPRP's first defeat and Mongolia's transition to democracy.

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Republic of Panama (1994)

Synopsis

In the aftermath of the 1968 coup, General Omar Torrijos became the de facto leader of the military authoritarian regime ruling Panama. As part of the deal to hand over the management of the Panama Canal to Panama by 2000, General Torrijos promised to return Panama to civilian rule (Millett, 1993). In 1978, a six-year "civilianization" schedule was set (Scranton, 1991). However, the democratic transition process was disrupted by Torrijos death in a plane crash in 1981 and the rise to power of Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Antonio Noriega. Under Noriega's rule, "the transition process in Panama began with social unrest resulting from revelations of institutional corruption and political repression by the military-dominated regime in 1987" (Pérez). "The resulting turmoil distanced the United States from the military regime and opened the doors to social sectors opposing the military regime" (Pérez). The growth of internal opposition to militarization helped to pave the way for democratization in Panama. In an attempt to keep Noriega in power, the National Assembly granted him the title of "Maximum Leader" and went further to declare "the republic 'in a state of war' with the United States" (Musicant, 1990). On December 20, U.S. military forces invaded Panama (Furlong, 1993). "The goal was to bring Noriega to trial for drug trafficking...and to restore democracy after 21 years of military rule" (Pérez, 2000). In essence, "(t)he 1989 elections…were generally viewed as a plebiscite against the continued rule of General Noriega" (Furlong, 1993). Internally, "the experiences of the political institutions, elections, the evolution of the political parties, and the disastrous Noriea dictatorship all helped lay the foundation of the democratization process in Panama" (Furlong) in the late 1980s. Guillermo Endara, the previously declared winner of the elections earlier that year, assumed the presidency and prepared the country for the first free and fair elections on May 8, 1994.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Namse of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Marco A. Gandásegui, Jr., Director of the Department of Sociology, University of Panama
- William L. Furlong, Professor of Political Science, Utah State University
- Orlando J. Pérez, Chairperson, Department of Political Science, Central Michigan University
- Margaret E. Scranton, Department of Political Science, University of Arkansas at Little Rock
- Peter M. Sanchez, Professor, Department of Political Science, Loyola University, Chicago

Chronology of Main Events

October 1968	**General Omar Torrijos rises to power in Panama.**
September 1972	Assembly of Corregimientos replaces National Assembly; new constitution approved.
September 1977	President Carter and General Torrijos sign the Panama Canal treaties; Torrijos promises a return to civilian rule.
October 1978	New constitution is approved. Aristedes Royo becomes president. Torrijos announces his intention to step down after six years.
July 1981	Torrijos is killed in a plane crash.
April 1983	Constitutional referendum passes.
August 1983	Electoral Tribunal is created; Noriega becomes leader of the National Guard.
May 1984	Nicolás Ardito Barletta is elected president in general elections.
September 1985	Hugo Spadafora is killed; General Noriega forces Ardito Barletta from office.
July 1987	Nationwide strike is called. The National Civic Crusade is formed following Colonel Díaz Herrera's accusations against Noriega.
February 1988	President Delvalle is removed from office. Two U.S. grand juries indict Noriega as a drug trafficker; U.S. Senate follows suit.
May 1989	General election is held. Catholic Church publishes parallel results of the vote count, indicating that Noriega's nominee was defeated. Noriega annulls the election results.
December 1989	National Assembly declares the country to be in a "state of war" with the United States. U.S. "Operation Just Cause" removes Noriega from power. Guillermo Endara becomes president.
January 1991	Partial congressional elections are held.
November 1992	Referendum on constitutional reforms is held.
June 1993	New electoral code governs 1994 elections.
May 1994	General election is held. Balladares of the PRD wins the presidential election.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Authoritarian Regime, Panama Canal, and Aristides Royo

"Throughout the 20th century, Panama's social structure changed permanently, opening its political activities to a wider range of social groups. Nevertheless, this process collapsed in 1968" (Gandásegui) with a military coup that overthrew Arnulfo Arias, the democratically elected president. In the aftermath, General Omar Torrijos Herrera became de facto ruler of Panama, marking the beginning of the military authoritarian regime.

In September 1972, the National Guard of Panama, commanded by General Torrijos, created a new constitution, which replaced the National Assembly with the Assembly of Corregimientos (Asamblea Nacional de Representantes de Corregimiento) composed of 505 elected representatives from small communities in Panama. This Assembly subsequently acclaimed Torrijos "the Maximum Leader of the Revolution."

Five years later, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and General Torrijos signed an agreement regarding the management of the Panama Canal, a significant pathway for international maritime trade. The Torrijos-Carter Canal Treaties, which "guaranteed [Panamanian] full control of the canal by the year 2000" (Ardito Barletta, 1997), were ratified by a national referendum in Panama in October 1977 and by the U.S. Senate in February 1978. "As part of the negotiations leading up to the new canal treaties, Torrijos promised Carter that he would return Panama to civilian rule" (Millett, 1993), which subsequently led to constitutional amendments to provide for a transition… and a six-year civilianization schedule in 1978 (Scranton, 1991). In October 1978, Aristides Royo was selected as the civilian president by the newly elected Assembly of Corregimientos.

In 1978, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Democrático—PRD) was founded. There was "wide speculation that the PRD would nominate Torrijos as its candidate for the presidential race planned for 1984. Moreover, many assumed that with government backing, the PRD would have a substantial advantage in the electoral process" (Meditz and Hanratty, 1987).

Under the transition to civilian rule, a coalition of eight parties, known as the National Opposition Front (Frente Nacional de Oposición, or FRENO), was established to run against the PRD in the legislative elections in September 1980. The PRD won 12 of the available 19 seats, demonstrating that "Panama's political party system was too fragmented to form a viable united front against the government" (Meditz and Hanratty, 1987).

The Death of Torrijos and Noriega's Rule

After Torrijos's death in a plane crash on July 31, 1981, "the political power structure that he had built began to disintegrate" (Ardito Barletta, 1997). In fact, the peaceful democratization schedule for Panama was disrupted by Torrijos sudden death. In July 1982, President Royo was forced out of office by the National Guard and was succeeded by Ricardo de la Espriella, the vice president.

In that same year, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Antonio Noriega became the chief of staff of the National Guard and eventually restructured the National Guard into the Panama Defense Forces (Fuerzas de Defensa de Panamá, or PDF). In April 1983, under Noriega's leadership, some reforms to the 1972

Constitution were approved in a national referendum. Namely, the residential term of office was reduced from six to five years, and a system of direct elections of all members of the Legislative Council was introduced. In August of that year, an Electoral Tribunal representing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches was established to interpret and implement electoral rules. In May 1984, the first presidential election since 1968 was held in Panama, and PRD candidate Nicolás Ardito Barletta took office in September (Scranton, 1991).

In September 1985, after serving only nine months as president, Ardito Barletta resigned from office, pressured by Noriega, who claimed that the situation was "total anarchy and out of control." Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle replaced him the following day.

Another reason for his removal was Ardito Barletta's insistence on investigating the murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora, "a long-time opponent of Noriega" (Scranton, 1991). "The brutal slaying of Noriega's rival, Hugo Spadafora, in 1985 was a major turning point… and in the United States, anti-Noriega sentiment was aroused" (Drohan, 1991). In fact, "in June (1987), retired Colonel Roberto Díaz claimed that Noriega had rigged the 1984 presidential elections, ordered Spadafora's murder, and engineered Torrijos' death" (Mabry, 1991). "Díaz Herrera's accusations touched off an eruption of opposition political activity…. Business, professional, and civic organizations organized themselves under the banner of the National Civic Crusade (la Cruzada Civilista Nacional). There were daily public demonstrations" (Ardito Barletta, 1997), and in August 1987, "the United States imposed economic sanctions aimed at toppling the military from power. The sanctions hurt but did not bring down the military government" (Perez).

Election of 1989 and U.S. Invasion

In the United States, preventing international drug trafficking "became a full–blown, salient national priority in 1988; Noriega was not just on the wrong side of the issue, but he was in the enemy camp" (Scranton, 1991). In February 1988, President Delvalle was overthrown by the Legislative Assembly for trying to remove Noriega from the PDF.

Before the election of 1989 could be held, both U.S. parties asked Noriega to leave Panama (Ardito Barletta, 1997) to ensure a democratic process, but Noriega remained in control. On May 7, 1989, general elections were held in Panama, as scheduled in the 1983 Constitution, under the supervision of international observers led by former President Jimmy Carter. Panamanians went to the polls to show their discontent with the military regime. "Not only was Duque [the official candidate for the regime] defeated, but the anti–Noriega forces had won by a margin of more than two to one" (Furlong, 1993). Nevertheless, "the military regime was determined to hold on to power, and it resisted parallel vote counts, mediation, compromise, and media pressure" (Scranton, 1998). Three days later, on May 10, Noriega and the Electoral Tribunal annulled the election results, "blaming U.S. intervention" (Scranton, 1998), which triggered massive protests.

In essence, "(t)he 1989 elections…were generally viewed, by most who participated in them, as a plebiscite against the continued rule of General Noriega" (Furlong, 1993). Internally, "the experiences of the political institutions, elections, the evolution of the political parties, and the disastrous Noriega dictatorship all helped provide for the foundation for the democratization process in Panama" (Furlong) in the late 1980s.

Externally, however, it was “the U.S. invasion in 1989 [that] helped clear the way [for the democratic transition process] by destroying the power of the PDF” (Furlong), which ended the military regime of Noriega. “The manipulation and nullification of the scheduled 1989 presidential elections by the military deepened the crisis, and led to a further break with the United States” (Pérez).

On December 15, 1989, seven months after Noriega annulled the general elections, Noriega assumed full control of Panama, naming himself the head of state before a National Assembly of Representatives he had appointed (Ardito Barletta, 1997). At the same time, the Assembly also passed a declaration finding Panama to be “in a state of war so long as the United States continues its policy of aggression” (Scranton, 1991). This power play made by Noriega “whipped up so much anti-U.S. hostility that some of his military forces lost control” (Scranton, 1991), which led to the killing of a U.S. soldier, Lt. Robert Paz. Thus, Noriega’s provocation sealed his own fate. As a result, the United States intervened militarily on December 20, 1989 (“Operation Just Cause”), and toppled the military regime, giving power to the opposition leaders that had contested the May 1989 elections (Pérez). “The aims of the invasion were to bring Noriega to trial for drug trafficking, to hand power over to the civilian candidates who had won the May 1989 elections annulled by Noriega, and to restore democracy after 21 years of military rule” (Pérez).

Guillermo Endara, the previously declared winner of the elections earlier that year, assumed the presidency. Between 1990 and 1994, “the new government dismantled the military and strengthened the Electoral Tribunal and other electoral rules in preparation for the 1994 elections, which were characterized as free, fair, and competitive” (Furlong).

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Peru (1980)

Synopsis

Peru has long been considered "one of Latin America's least stable democracies" (Cameron, 1994), with no regime since 1919 lasting longer than 12 years. "After several years during which economic growth averaged 5 percent per year, the military regime was unable to continue its anti-oligarchic and redistributive reforms because of the eruption of the economic crisis and the exacerbation of powerful social tensions (Panfichi, 1997). As a result, public opinion increasingly turned against the rule of the armed forces, which it blamed for the country's economic troubles, widespread corruption, and government mismanagement" (Hudson, 1992). Democratically elected representatives drafted a new constitution in 1979, and in July 1980, after 12 years of military rule**,** Fernando Belaúnde was once again elected president.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/2

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: two
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Fernando Tuesta, Professor of Political Science, Catholic University of Peru
- Cynthia McClintock, Professor of Political Science, George Washington University

Chronology of Main Events

July 1963	**Fernando Belaúnde is elected president.**
August 1968	"Act of Talara" is signed between Acción Popular and the International Petroleum Company (IPC).
October 1968	General Velasco stages a military coup.
June 1969	Agrarian Reform is passed.
October 1973-January 1974	Oil crisis: world oil prices quadruple, deteriorating Peru's terms of trade.
August 1975	"El Tacnazo:" General Bermúdez stages a coup d'état against General Velasco.
December 1977	General Velasco dies.
June 1976	The *sol*, Peru's currency, is devalued 30.8 percent.
July 1977	The General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) organizes a general strike.
July 1978	The Constituent Assembly is formed, led by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre (APRA).
July 1979	The new constitution is enacted and promulgated.
May 1980	The Popular Action party, headed by Belaúnde, wins the elections; "Sendero Luminoso" launches its armed revolution.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

The Roots of Precarious Regimes

"Peru stands out as a country where both democratic and authoritarian regimes have been precarious" (McClintock, 1999). Indeed, Peru has long been considered "one of Latin America's least stable democracies" (Cameron, 1994), with no regime since 1919 lasting longer than 12 years.

Importantly, "Peru's history of failure with democracy is not surprising. Considerable blame can be placed on Peru's historical legacy: ethnic, class, and geographic cleavages were unusually sharp and overlapping in Peru, provoking a mixture of scorn and fear among elites, resignation and rebellion among the peasants, and mistrust on all sides" (McClintock, 1999).

Fernando Belaúnde, Act of Talara, and Coup d'Etat

Constitutionally elected by Congress, Fernando Belaúnde Terry took office on July 28, 1963. "Belaúnde's political party was seen as a young party with new and strong ideas. Its name, Acción Popular (Popular Action), was very descriptive as it meant that self-help and popular

participation were the core of its doctrine. President Belaúnde launched an aggressive campaign of development (El Perú Construye—Peru Builds)" (Baigorria Pera, 1983). This campaign was mainly successful in terms of poverty reduction.

"In August 1968, the Belaúnde Administration signed the Act of Talara, by which Peru took control of the disputed La Brea y Parinas oil fields and in return dropped its claim to some US$144 million in "unjust profits." The settlement with the International Petroleum Company (IPC) was immediately attacked as a "sellout" because it failed to obtain payment for the "unjust profits" and because it left the refinery at Tolara in the hands of the company. The controversy over the settlement ultimately split Belaunde's Popular Action party" (Baigorria Pera, 1983). Two days later, on October 3, 1968, a military coup led by General Velasco ended Fernando Belaúnde's term.

Velasco's Regime and an Unresolved Economic Crisis

Once in power, "the Peruvian military, unlike its counterparts in other Latin American countries, was committed to radical reforms, redistributive policies, and the wish for faster economic development" (Baigorria Pera, 1983). "Velasco's first act was to expropriate the large agro-industrial plantations along the coast. The Agrarian Reform of 1969 was the most extensive in Latin America outside of Cuba…. The overall development strategy was to shift from a laissez-faire to a mixed economy and to replace export-led development with import-substitution industrialization. At the same time, the state implemented a series of social measures designed to protect workers and redistribute income in order to expand the domestic market" (Baigorria Pera, 1983). These policies were mainly unsuccessful and led to economic and social unrest in the early 1970s.

At the end of 1974, "the government (which had nationalized the fishing industry) found itself maintaining thousands of workers who were not earning their expenses. Meanwhile, copper prices also skidded to their lowest levels in years…and the petroleum boom finally turned into a bubble.…By 1975, the downward trend was even more pronounced: agriculture was stagnant, mining declined 10.9 percent, fishing declined 15.2 percent, and inflation jumped from 9.5 percent in 1974 to 16.9 percent in 1975" (Handelman and Sanders, 1981).

"The economic crisis played an important role in the political exhaustion of the reformist military regime and the search for a negotiated transition to democracy. In effect, after several years during which economic growth averaged 5 percent per year, the military regime was unable to continue its anti-oligarchic and redistributive reforms because of the eruption of the economic crisis and the exacerbation of powerful social tensions" (Panfichi, 1997).

Thus, the military intervention and its reformist orientation "faced intense opposition from both elites and lower strata" (McClintock). Such opposition was due to an economic downturn and to the military's having worn out its welcome. As a result, "the military abandoned further attempts at participation and took repressive measures against the very same people whose mobilization

they had encouraged years earlier" (Baigorria Pera, 1983). In addition, "amid the leftist policies of General Velasco (1968–1975), various military factions had emerged" (McClintock).

"El Tacnazo" and the 1979 Constitution

On August 29, 1975, due to economic mismanagement and authoritarian abuses by Velasco's regime, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez led "El Tacnazo," a military coup against General Velasco. Morales Bermúdez "adopted a harsh structural adjustment program that led to an increase of approximately 45 percent in the price of basic food products and to a dramatic deterioration in living standards. A general strike was called to protest increasing poverty and the repressive tactics of the government" (Youngers and Peacock, 2002).

"The situation worsened in 1976 when, in the face of no sign of recovery in the country's economic situation, foreign financial institutions refused to provide more credit. Attempts to sell government bonds on the domestic market yielded relatively meager results…. The printing of money (the only available alternative) had already accentuated the inflationary process, and the economic crisis was severe. At the end of 1977, the nation's foreign debt was US$ 8.2 billion, representing around 60 percent of GNP, while the balance of payments deficit amounted to US$1.3 billion (negative net foreign reserves). By mid-1978, Peru was on the verge of defaulting on its international debt obligations" (Morillo, 1984).

General Bermúdez "spent most of his term implementing an economic austerity program to stem the surge of inflation. Public opinion increasingly turned against military rule, which it blamed for the country's economic troubles, widespread corruption, and mismanagement of the government" (Hudson, 1992).

As a result, "General Bermúdez was not unhappy to preside over a return to democracy" (McClintock). A new Constitution was written by representatives democratically elected in 1979 and in July 1980, after 12 years of military rule, Fernando Belaúnde was once again elected President, this time under the promise of creating one million jobs (Baigorria Pera, 1983).

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Philippines (1986)

Synopsis

"Roots of the democratization process [of Philippines] were the de-legitimation of the regime due to corruption, cronyism, and economic crisis" (Thompson). "For a variety of reasons, of which the economic wreckage caused by rampant corruption was central, the Filipino economy began to deteriorate in the late 1970s. The 1979 oil shock exacerbated the crisis, and by the early 1980s local economic elites began to defect from the regime" (Smith, 2005). "By the beginning of 1983 the economy was weak, its finances perilous, and its political support nearly gone. The government was running huge deficits to finance the bankrupt companies of its cronies" (Overholt, 1986). At the same time, the regime faced growing communist insurgencies, Muslim separatists and urban terrorism. "Bolstered by people's anger when Benigno Aquino [leading opponent of Marcos's regime] was assassinated in 1983 and culminating in people power in 1986 with large sections of the military also siding with the people" (Expert 1), the nonviolent popular demonstrations after "the clearly manipulated snap election" (Expert 2) in February 1986, supported by the Catholic Church and business elites, eventually brought down the 14-year authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 4/7

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: seven
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Edna E. A., Dean of the National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman
- Mark R Thompson, Professor of Politics and Acting Head, City University of Hong Kong

Chronology of Main Events

July 1946	**The Philippines gains independence from the United States.**
December 1965	Ferdinand Marcos is sworn in as president.
December 1969	Marcos is re-elected president for a second term.
September 1972	Democracy ends; martial law is imposed.
January 1973	New constitution is promulgated.
1979–1981	Second oil shock; global economic recession; agricultural commodity prices sink.
January 1981	Martial law is lifted.
June 1981	Marco wins a third term as president. Opposition boycottes the election.
August 1983	Assassination of Benigno S. Aquino Jr.
September 1983	Anti-Marcos protest, the "confetti revolution" occurs.
November 1985	President Marcos announces presidential elections for February 7, 1986.
December 1985	Aquino and Laurel decide to run together as presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
February 1986	Elections are held with massive electoral fraud.
February 1986	Marcos is proclaimed president-elect by the National Assembly.
February 1986	Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos rebelled against Marcos; the nonviolent "People Power" demonstration begins.
February 1986	Both Marcos and Aquino are sworn in as president; the Marcos dictatorship collapses. Aquino is installed as president.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Collapse of Democracy, Crony Capitalism, and Urban Terrorism

In 1946, the Republic of the Philippines became independent, with a democratic system of free elections after a half-century rule by the United States. In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos was elected the sixth president of the Philippines and then won a second term in 1969. However, "faced with a constitutional bar to a third term, he initiated a revision of the 1935 Constitution, with a view to shifting to a parliamentary form of government. Marcos declared martial law in 1972, ostensibly to respond to threats from communist groups" (Gatmaytan) even though "[the communist groups] posed a local threat only in limited areas and had no real ability to jeopardize the central government" (Smith, 2005). Subsequently, "the Congress was abolished, the court system was debased, citizens' rights were violated, and power was substantially transferred to the military" (Hooley, 1991), marking the demise of democracy in the Philippines and the rise of Marcos' authoritarian rule.

"Marcos sought to strengthen and centralize state powers in the Office of the Presidency as the political underpinning for an ambitious project to jump-start economic development through a debt-driven strategy of growth (accessing cheap foreign loans) and crony control of selected key industries, such as the sugar and coconut industries" (Rivera, 2002). Due to the rise in world commodity prices and agricultural exports, Marco's economic plan was initially successful and "gross national product (GNP) had increased by an average of 7 percent per year" (Wright, Martin, and Bell, 1998) during the 1970s.

After 1975, the reform (economic) drive stagnated, and even reversed" (Overholt, 1986) "for a variety of reasons, of which the economic wreckage caused by rampant corruption was central" (Smith, 2005). Other reasons included "government meddling, powerful business sectors that reaped windfall gains from government largesse, and incompetent civil servants" (Kang, 2002). "For example, "land reform became bogged down in corruption and red tape…Many Marcos cronies, including General Ver [Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], became wealthy by accumulating supposedly land-reformed land for their own crops or fishponds" (Overholt, 1986).

Second Oil Shock, Economic Depression

The 1980s brought a wave of external economic shocks. For example, in 1979, oil prices skyrocketed due to reductions in output because of the Iranian Revolution, which triggered a worldwide energy crisis and subsequent global economic recession in 1980. Overall, because the world's economy had slowed down, interest rates had increased, and commodity prices had fallen the Philippines—whose exports depended heavily on coconuts, sugar, and copper—suffered a 42 percent deterioration in its terms of trade (Overholt, 1986). Notably, the collapse of coconut industry, caused by poor economic calculations of the National Coconut Authority in Philippines, affected 16 million Filipinos, a third of the nation (Overholt, 1986).

Another factor was the fleeing of Dewey Dee, a dominant corporate actor in the Philippines textile and apparel, "leaving in his wake a tangled web of unpaid debts amounting to nearly $90 million" (Broad et al., 1993). The Dewey Dee scandal set off a chain reaction, raising doubts about the credibility of the financial institutions and the creditworthiness of the corporate sectors, which further worsened Philippines's economic performance.

Not all of the country's woes were external: "The root causes of the crises [in early 1980s] were Central Bank mismanagement and corruption; over-borrowing by manufacturing and construction firms which hid high proportions of the borrowed, government-guaranteed funds in foreign accounts; underbidding by major firms which later had difficulty delivering; the inefficiency of gigantic monopolies; loss of political confidence; and a series of interlocking management and financial arrangements" (Overholt, 1986). Furthermore, "the depression was exacerbated by the rising tide of cronyism (Wright, Martin, and Bell, 1988), since "Marcos ordered a bailout of crony firms, which sparked criticism from Benguet Corporation president Jaime Ongpin and the Makati Business Club" (Thompson, 1995). Anti-Marcos sentiment started to grow among local business leaders as "[the regime] could no longer deliver that one thing that held them to it: profit" (Smith, 2005).

Rising Insurgencies

At the same time, martial law did little to curb the communist insurgencies led by the New People's Army, the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Muslim separatists organized under the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). "As martial law and the dictatorship progressed, the two insurgencies also grew. The New People's Army expanded from 300 members in 1972 to an estimate topping 26,000 and a presence in 60 percent of the country's 73 provinces and in 20 percent of the barangays by 1985. The MNLF tied up over 60 percent of the military's fighting force at its height in the mid-1970s (Hernandez, 1991).

As the political-economic crisis progressed, Marcos officially lifted the martial law in January 1981 and announced a presidential election for June. Nevertheless, "electoral participation [by traditional oppositions] was ruled out after Marcos made sure that the 1981 presidential election would be rigged as the polls during martial law had been" (Thompson, 1995). Even though "most businessmen disliked the regime, in the absence of stable institutions they were terrified of a post-Marcos upheaval, so business confidence deteriorated" (Overholt, 1986). Hence, although the election was boycotted by a united front of the democratic opposition and the communists, Marcos was declared the winner for another term.

Assassination of Benigno S. Aquino, 1986 Election, People's Power, and Collapse of the Regime

At the beginning of his third term, it became public knowledge that Marcos had suffered from lupus erythematosus, a kidney ailment that forced him to undergo a kidney transplant. At this time, the opposition found the opportunity to reenter the scene: "The emerging financial crisis, the shift of business and the Church into active opposition, and advance knowledge of Marcos' emerging health crisis persuaded the Philippines' principal exiled opposition leader, Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., to return home [on August 21, 1983]" (Overholt, 1986) after three years of self-imposed exile in the United States. He was one of the most powerful challengers against the Marcos regime, and, upon arrival, he was shot in the head at Manila International Airport. His assassination triggered unprecedented massive public protests and demonstrations (Hernandez, 1995). "Just as the assassination of Aquino did not cause the financial crisis, it also did not cause the political and moral crises… The assassination focused attention on the pre-existing crises and precipitated broader public involvement and more explicit political action. Most notably, it drew the business elite and the clergy into the streets" (Overholt, 1986). Protest demonstrations continued into the following year, with more than 100 held between October 1983 and February 1984" (Thompson, 1995).

"From August 1983 to 1985, the economic and political situation became more and more unstable as capital flew out of the country and anti-government demonstrations involving more and more people across the social divide became more common occurrences" (Curaming and Lisandro, 2010). Facing mounting domestic pressure to demonstrate his legitimacy, in November 1985, Marcos announced that presidential elections would be held in February 1986 (Thompson, 1995). By 1986, Corazon Aquino, widow of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., had attracted a broad spectrum of supporters, including "the middle and upper classes, which had despaired of Ferdinand Marcos' ability to manage the economy. They also included a large underclass of rural and urban workers who saw Aquino as their only hope of escaping from the prospects of increasing poverty" (Hooley, 1991).

On election day, the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), an independent electoral monitoring organization) reported many irregularities and acts of violence throughout the country (Wright, Martin, and Bell, 1988). Despite these reports, the National Assembly announced the re-election of Marcos as president for another term. Corazon Aquino and her running mate, Salvador Roman Hidalgo Laurel, challenged the results and people began to rally behind them.

On February 22, 1986, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Lt.-General Fidel Ramos, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, staged a coup d'état, demanding the resignation of President Marcos while "announcing that Aquino had been cheated of victory in the election" (Wright, Martin, and Bell, 1988). At the same time, "Cardinal Sin [Manila Archbishop], broadcasting over the Catholic-run Radio Veritas (which became the voice of the revolution), appealed to the people to bring food and supplies for the rebels and to use nonviolence to block pro-Marcos troop movements" (Dolan, 1991). This marked the start of the "people power" demonstration, a four-day popular protest that eventually persuaded President Marcos to step down and go into in exile in the United States, ending his 14-year rule. Corazon Aquino was sworn in as the democratically elected president of the Philippines on February 25, 1986.

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Poland (1990)

Synopsis

While Poland's economic crises contributed to its democratization in the late 1980s, the transition was the result of multiple factors beyond the economy. In addition to "economic turmoil," the "[wearing] out of communist leaders, rapidly diminishing legitimacy to govern, [the] rise of change[s]…in [the] USSR, growing mental resistance of new generations, and personal encouragement…from Pope John Paul II" played a role (Tanski). Furthermore, the "weakness of the Soviet Union was the basis for democratization in Poland" (Burdelski). The emergence of the opposition movement, Solidarity, in 1980 also facilitated the country's transition to democracy. The movement attracted 10 million members by 1981, revealing widespread discontent with the communist regime. Under both internal and external pressure, in February 1988, the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PWUP) entered roundtable negotiations with the opposition. The discussions were largely motivated by the "perestroika policy of Gorbachev" (Burdelski), in addition to the powerful Solidarity movement. As a result of the roundtable negotiations, the PWUP agreed, inter alia, to make its scheduled June 1989 elections democratic. In these elections, Solidarity won the majority of contested seats, and the movement's leader became president in December 1990 following the resignation of a former PWUP figure. In addition, free elections were held in October 1991 for a new parliament, allowing increased openness for Poland's opposition parties.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 66.67 percent

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Maciej Transki, Director, Partners Poland Foundation
- Roman Baecker, Associate Professor, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
- Marceli Burdelski, Professor, University of Gdansk

Chronology of Main Events

June 1956	**Poznan Uprising demands higher wages and lower prices.**
March 1968	Peaceful protests held in response to the Prague Spring.
December 1970	Series of strikes held in response to the government's decision to change retail prices of various products.
July 1976	Mass protests held in response to planned price increases.
June 1979	Pope John Paul II visits Poland, becoming a symbol of the opposition movement.
August 1980	Solidarity is officially formed and presents its official manifesto.
July 1988	Gorbachev visits Poland and advocates for reform.
January 1989	Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) Central Committee votes to support pluralism.
February 1989	Roundtable negotiations between the PUWP and opposition begin.
April 1989	Roundtable talks conclude, allowing political reforms.
June 1989	Elections held, in which Solidarity wins the majority of seats.
January 1990	PUWP votes to dissolve.
December 1990	Leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, becomes president.
October 1991	Free and fair parliamentary elections take place.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

The Rise of Solidarity and PUWP Reform

Despite being a member of the Soviet bloc, Polish society maintained a relatively robust "political counterculture" through institutions such as the Catholic Church. Thus, space remained for the emergence of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, also known as Solidarity. In August 1980, Anna Walentynowicz, a crane operator who had worked for 30 years at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, was fired for participating in a trade union, months before her planned retirement date. In response, her coworkers went on strike. This event eventually evolved into the Solidarity movement. In the same month, Solidarity announced its demands through a manifesto. These included: the State accepting free trade unions separate from the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), allowing the right to strike, and recognizing the right to freedom of speech that was already enshrined in the Constitution. Though Solidarity originated out of economic issues, the movement defined itself as being "not only bread, butter, and sausage but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of convictions, and the repair of the Republic….Thus, the economic protest had to be simultaneously a social protest, and the social protest had to be simultaneously a moral protest" (Kubow, 2003).

By 1981, Solidarity had 10 million members, a mix of workers and intellectuals united in their opposition to communism. Stripped of its legality in 1981 under martial law, Solidarity stayed relatively quiet until May 1988, when workers went on strike at the Lenin Shipyards, the Nowa Huta Lenin steel mill near

Krakow, and numerous other factories. The series of strikes led to negotiations between Solidarity and the regime, in which the latter agreed to re-legalize Solidarity and introduce electoral reforms.

Economic Factors

Although Poland faced a series of short-term economic crises in the decades leading up to its 1990 democratic transition (Castle and Taras, 2002), they alone cannot explain its subsequent democratization. However, it is important to describe the economic context to understand the wider transition process. From 1979 to 1980, for example, Poland experienced a recession, characterized by a drop in GDP and increases in the prices of consumer goods. In response to the crisis, which was primarily caused by the suspension of around 200 construction projects related to consumer goods, workers held a series of strikes. Their activism led to the resignation of the First Secretary of the PUWP, Edward Gierek, and the establishment of Solidarity (Oyrzanowski and Paleczny-Zapp, 1993). Economic crises continued throughout the 1980s, culminating in a series of strikes during the summer of 1988, during which "communist leaders realized there was no 'final solution' available to prop up the discredited system" (Castle and Taras, 2002). The PUWP's realization, combined with broader Soviet policy, created the conditions for subsequent negotiations with the opposition.

Events within the wider Soviet bloc provide a key explanation for PUWP's willingness to compromise. When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he advocated for increased political openness through glasnost and perestroika. Primarily, Gorbachev's advocacy for perestroika became the "reason for [the regime] to enter [into] dialogue with Solidarity, Roundtable Talks and constitution[al] change." (Burdelski). Furthermore, the change in Soviet policy allowed a small group of reformists within the PUWP to assert power over the conservatives. Thus, while economic turmoil did play a role in Poland's transition, "without the rise of Gorbachev in 1985, it is hardly possible to imagine the transition to democracy in the Eastern Bloc" (Lee, 2001). Thus, what was critical to Poland's democratization was the "perestroika policy of Gorbachev in [the] Soviet Union" (Lee, 2001). Additional external factors worked to undermine the PUWP's legitimacy. For example, the United States and Western Europe exerted pressure on Poland for its dismal human rights record through, inter alia, U.S. sanctions in December 1981.

Roundtable Negotiations

In January 1989, during the PWUP Central Committee's Tenth Plenum, a majority of the members voted in favor of pluralism. A month later, roundtable discussions between the regime and the opposition began, with sub-tables focusing on topics such as socioeconomic policy, trade unions, and political reform. The roundtable accord was reached in April 1989, and "essentially…constituted a framework for power-sharing rather than for the transfer of power from the ruling party to the democratic transition" (Wiatr, 1997). In addition to the creation of a presidential office and transforming the parliament into a bicameral institution, the accord allowed democratic elections. Parliamentary elections for vacant seats were held in June 1989, with Solidarity winning the majority. The opposition continued to consolidate its power with Solidarity leader Lech Walesea becoming president following the resignation of former PWUP leader and subsequent president Woiciech Jaruzelski in December 1985. Furthermore, an entirely new parliament was freely elected in October 1991, further solidifying Poland's transition to democracy.

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Portugal (1976)

Synopsis

"Widespread discontent with the authoritarian regime that had ruled Portugal since 1926 and with the ongoing war in the African colonies led to a bloodless coup conducted by the military on April 25, 1974" (Veiga), later known as the "Carnation Revolution." The coup d'état was organized by the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) composed of "middle-ranking military who really wanted a political solution to the colonial question" (Magone). However, "from April 25, 1974, until July 1976…Portugal experienced an intense period of anarchy and disorder as various factions jockeyed with one another for power" (Opello, 1991) caused by "divergent political views" (Maxwell, 1995) with the MFA itself. "The first phase of the transition (May–September 1974) was dominated by the struggle between President Spínola and the MFA's coordinating commission on the issue of decolonization" (Rezola, 2008). The conflict ended with Spínola's being blocked by COPCON from taking power and being replaced by General Costa Gomez, who "committed to rapid decolonization" (Opello, 1991) and the ascension of Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, who was close to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) (Maxwell, 1995), to the premiership. Immediately after a failed 1975 coup led by Spínola, a new governing institution, the Council of Revolution, was created by radical elements of the military. After the Council "forced the political parties to sign a pact with the MFA that guaranteed military supremacy for at least three years" (Maxwell, 1995), the "first truly free, fair and competitive multi-party" (Baum) elections of the Constituent Assembly were held on April 25, 1975. They resulted in the victory of the Socialist Party, which "stood firmly on the basic principles of representative democracy" (Harsgor, 1976). The elections revealed strong public support for moderate socialists, which strengthened the moderate socialists within the MFA. "By August 1975, the MFA had become deeply divided and its authority weakened" (Rezola, 2008) as "democratic socialists, populists, and Marxists-Leninists" (Maxwell, 1995) were struggling for power. On November 25, 1975, a left-wing coup attempt was put down by a countercoup which was successfully commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ramalho Eanes and led by the Group of Nine. After the countercoup, "the government of Pinheiro de Azevedo, backed by the Group of Nine, steered a middle course toward a Western European-style democracy" (Opello, 1991). On April 2, 1976, the Constituent Assembly approved a new constitution and elections for the Assembly of the Republic were held on April 25. General Ramalho Eanes took office on June 23, 1976.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Michael Baum, Professor of Political Science, Dartmouth University
- José M. Magone, Professor of Regional and Global Governance, Berlin School of Economics and Law
- Antonio Costa Pinto, Research Professor at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, and Professor of Politics and Contemporary European History at ISCTE, Lisbon University Institute
- Tiago Fernandes, Professor at Social Science Department, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
- Francisco José Veiga, Professor of Economics, Escola de Economia e Gestão (EEG) da Universidade do Minho

Chronology of Main Events

September 1968	**Long-time Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar becomes physically incapacitated and is succeeded by Marcelo Caetano.**
February 1974	*Portugal and the Future* by Spínola is published.
March 1974	Armed Forces Movement (MFA) is formally established in secret.
April 1974	Bloodless coup is staged; Junta of National Salvation (JSN) is established.
July 1974	Commando for Continental Portugal (COPCON) is created.
September 1974	Spínola resigns. Costa Comes becomes president of the third provisional government.
March 1975	A coup led by Spínola failed; Spínola flees the country; JSN is abolished. Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução, CR) is established.
April 1975	Election for Constituent Assembly is held.
July 1975	MFA declares itself a liberation movement; Mozambique declares independence; Cape Verde Islands declare independence.
August 1975	Group of Nine (Grupo dos Nove) publish a document calling for democratic socialism; Gonçalves resigns; Admiral José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo becomes prime minister; new provisional government (sixth).
November 1975	Coup by the extreme left, Countercoup commanded by Ramalho Eanes; COPCON is abolished.
February 1976	The FMA formulates a new pact with the political parties.
April 1976	New constitution is passed by the constituent assembly; Elections for the AR (Assembleia da República, or Assembly of the Republic).
June 1976	Presidential election; General António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes became the president.

Brief background and Description of the Democratization Process

Estado Novo, Colonial War and the Armed Forces Movement

The New State of Portugal (Estado Novo), established by civilian dictator António de Oliveira Salazar in 1933, was an authoritarian regime that had controlled an enormous colonial empire in Africa, covering Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In the 1960s, under the global wave of decolonization, a war between Portugal and its colonies eventually broke out. In 1968, Salazar fell ill and was incapacitated to continue in power. Marcello Caetano succeeded Salazar as prime minister. "The colonial war on three fronts that was being waged by the regime in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau from 1961 onward made the armed forces protagonists in the country's process of democratization" (Costa Pinto), as there was "growing dissatisfaction within the middle-ranking military, who wanted a political solution to the conflict" (Magone). After more than a decade of fighting, "the African wars gradually transformed the armed forces from a reliable instrument of the New State to a dissatisfied and discontented force" (Opello, 1991).

In September 1973, the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas—MFA) was formed among the lower levels of the officer corps. Later, in February 1974, General António de Spínola, an MFA sympathist published *Portugal and the Future* (*Portugal e o Futuro*), "in which he advocated a 'political solution' to the colonial question" (Harsgor, 1996). "On March 5, 1974, the conspiracy to overturn the regime developed a formal structure" (Opello, 1991), led by the MFA coordinating committee headed by Major Otelo de Carvalho, Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, and Major Melo Antunes.

On April 25, 1974, the MFA led a leftist military coup and made "the New State collapse like a house of cards without a shot being fired in its defense. The *golpe* was greeted by the Portuguese people with euphoria" (Opello, 1991) and later came to be known as the "Carnation Revolution."

Junta of National Salvation and Division of the Military

Immediately after the coup, the MFA appointed a seven-member Junta of National Salvation (Junta de Salvação Nacional—JSN), headed by General Spínola. As part of the MFA's new political program, Spínola was chosen as the first provisional president of Portugal's new government. The program called for an "election of a constituent assembly…[and] the right to freely form political association" (Opello, 1991).

However, the euphoria did not last long. Soon thereafter, political differences among the military officers began to emerge. In part because their "coalescence was less the result of any uniform conspiratorial objective than of a convergence of resentments, loss of a sense of purpose, and emotional and intellectual estrangement from the long colonial wars" (Maxwell, 1995). While President Spínola represented high-ranking conservative officers (Opello, 1991), the MFA represented "low-ranking liberal and radical officers (Opello, 1991). Their disagreements concerned the nature of decolonization (Pinto, 2008) in Africa.

COPCON, Spínola's Resignation and the Revolution Council

In July 1974, the power struggle between the JSN and the MFA and the need to strengthen the revolutionary conditions led to the founding of the Continental Operations Command (Comando

Operacional do Continente—COPCON), an armed intervention unit under Otelo, which weakened Spínola's influence in the military.

Shortly afterward, Prime Minister Palma Carlos (along with President Spínola) proposed that the prime minister's powers be expanded. The proposal was rejected and, as a result, he resigned and was replaced by Army Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, close to the Communits Party (Partido Comunista Português, or PCP) (Maxwell, 1995). In an attempt to undermine the MFA's influence, Spínola called for a demonstration among several right-wing parties (known as the "silent majority") in support of him on November 28, 1974. This was subsequently stopped by the MFA and led to Spínola's resignation. General Costa Gomes, committed to rapid decolonization (Opello, 1991), was nominated by the Junta, and succeeded Spínola as president.

With Gonçalves leading the provisional government as prime minister, "the general tendency after Spínola's resignation was a rapid shift to the left" (Opello, 1991) and "increased anarchy" (Opello, 1991). Following a failed coup led by General Spínola with the support of paratrooper units in March 1975, the Revolutionary Council (Conselho da Revolução, CR) was established by radical members of the MFA as "a new top governmental institution" (Harsgor, 1976).

After CR "forced four political parties to sign a pact with the MFA that guaranteed military supremacy for at least three years" (Maxwell, 1995), the announcement of the date for the first truly free, fair, and competitive multi-party elections happened on March 19, 1975, and it scheduled the elections for the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975 (Baum). The Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, or PS) that "stood firmly on the basic principles of representative democracy, as understood in the West" (Harsgor, 1976) polled 37.87 percent of the total vote; the Democratic People's Party (Partido Popular Democrático, or PPD) 26.38 percent; and the PCP 12.53 percent (Harsgor, 1976).

Group of Nine, counter-coup and Assembly of the Republic

During the summer of 1975, "conflict was fed by the development of strong grassroots political organizations such as the workers' commissions, the growing challenge posed by the extreme left during the crisis, and its influence within the military" (Pinto, 2008). "By August 1975 the MFA had become deeply divided and its authority weakened" (Rezola, 2008), as "democratic socialists, populists, and Marxists-Leninists" (Maxwell, 1995) within the MFA struggled for power. Melo Antunes, one of the original leaders of the MFA, and eight other moderate socialist military officers known as the Group of Nine (Grupo dos Nove) published a manifesto, calling "for a middle way between Russian-style communism and Western European social democracy, but also for a greater respect for public opinion" (Harvey, 1978). In late August 1975, the "powerful 'revitalization of civil society'" (Pinto, 2008) and "formidable coalition…around Melo Antunes" (Maxwell, 1995) forced Prime Minister Gonçalves to resign. Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo (who helped overthrow Caetano in 1974 as part of the MFA) became prime minister, forming the sixth provisional government of the Republic.

Following the elections, this period showed that "Portugal had had no leader but had been buffeted about between rival groups of soldiers, none of them strong enough, apparently, to grasp absolute power" (Harvey, 1978). On November 25, 1975, a left-wing coup attempt was put down by a countercoup successfully commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ramalho Eanes and led by the Group of Nine.

“As a result of the events of 25 November, a new political moment opened: the transition from the revolutionary process of 1974–75 to the institutionalization of democracy” (Rezola, 2008). Moderate socialists within the military triumphed. COPCON was abolished immediately after the coup and in December, Ramalho Eanes was appointed chief of staff of the army.

On April 2, 1976, a new constitution was passed by a constituent assembly, creating an Assembly of the Republic (Assembleia da República—AR) with 250 seats. On June 27, 1976, Colonel Ramalho Eanes, “supported by a broad coalition of political parties, excluding only the communists” (Maxwell, 1995), was elected president of Portugal, and marked Portugal’s transition to democracy.

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Romania (1990)

Synopsis

Romania's transition to democracy was partly the result of "changes in the entire region [and the] democratization of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism" (Ghinea). In 1965, Nicolae Ceaușescu (of the Romanian Communist Party, RCP) established a"neo-Stalinist personal dictatorship" (Tismaneanu, 1991), creating many restrictions in a struggling, impoverished economy with austerity and brutally repressive measures. Ceaușescu's ouster and subsequent execution were ignited by the December 1989 eviction of the Hungarian pastor, László Tőkés, from his residence in Timișoara. Protests against his removal led to demonstrations in Timișoara and soon after expanded across the country. While the "unrest in December 1989 was [essentially] an anti-Ceaușescu movement, [it] found its anti-communist and pro-democratic articulation in January 1990" (Tanasoiu). Following Ceaușescu's execution, the National Salvation Front led by Ion Iliescu was formed, admittedly with an objective to contain the pro-democracy and anti-communist opposition. Eventually, the NSF led the government until elections were held. The first free presidential and parliamentary elections were held in May 1990, with Iliescu (from the NSF) winning 85 percent of the vote and gaining the majority in Parliament, establishing Iliescu as the person in charge of leading Romania toward full democracy. After 1990, the democratic system was reformed and the parliamentary system and the free press were reinstated in Romania. The new constitution was adopted in 1991, reshaping the country into a semi-presidential democratic republic.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/2

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: two
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Cristian Ghinea, Director, Romanian Center for European Policies
- Cosmina Tanasoiu, Associate Professor, European Politics, American University in Bulgaria

Chronology of Main Events

March 1965	**Nicolae Ceaușescu becomes General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).**
March 1989	Open letter written by six RCP veterans criticizing Ceaușescu is published.
August 1989	Ceaușescu proposes intervening in Poland.
November 1989	Ceaușescu is reelected as General Secretary of the RCP during its Fourteenth Congress.
December 1989	Demonstration held in Timișoara against the eviction order of Pastor László Tőkés.
December 1989	Thousands protest against Ceaușescu, leading to a massacre by regime forces.
December 1989	Anti-regime protests spread beyond Timișoara.
December 1989	Romanian army, militia, and secret police begin to crack down on demonstrators in multiple cities, including Bucharest.
December 1989	Ceaușescu and his wife, Elena, flee from Bucharest's Central Committee building; National Salvation Front (NSF) is founded.
December 1989	After capture, the Ceaușescus are executed.
January 1990	December 1989 movement participants articulate their desire for democracy during a speech by new President Iliescu.
May 1990	Presidential and parliamentary elections are held.
September, 1990	Elected government is ousted.
November 1991	Constitution of Romania is adopted.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

The Ceaușescu Dictatorship

Romania's democratic transition occurred partly due to "changes in the entire region [and the] democratization of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism" (Ghinea). In terms of specific events, democratization was a result of the unrest that started in Timișoara and expanded across the country in December 1989, which was characterized by "a mix of street protests, popular protests, and civil society

pressure and the need of the former communist elite to secure legitimacy for its ruling program and control of institutions" (Tanasoiu).

Nicolae Ceaușescu had become the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in 1965. He created a "neo-Stalinist personal dictatorship" (Tanasoiu), which hindered organized dissident groups from forming and created many restrictions to a struggling impoverished economy with austerity and brutally repressive measures. "In the years leading up to 1989, Romania was a police state steeped in a moral crisis. It was a country that [due to the oil crisis of the 1970s] had reached a point of economic stagnation....Poverty spread slowly and pervasively, the state of the nation worsened...and all socioeconomic debate was stifled as a result of repressive party measures" (FRIDE, 2002). As a result, the December 1989 revolution was also "an anti-Ceaușescu centered movement" and "the focus of popular discontent was initially focused upon the person of the leader and its clan" (FRIDE, 2002).

Though Mikhail Gorbachev, upon becoming the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, advocated for glasnost and perestroika, Ceaușescu criticized the reforms as "a right-wing deviation" (FRIDE, 2002). Nevertheless, Romanians were affected by anti-communist events taking place in other Eastern European states, including East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Therefore, "what happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe had implications for domestic Romanian politics…because of the strong degree of real and perceived ideological, institutional, and historical similarity among East European communist regimes" (Hall, 2000).

December 1989 Revolution

In March 1989 the government through the Reformed Calvinist Church decided to suspend the Hungarian pastor, László Tőkés, from his parish in Timișoara and relocate him to the village of Mineu. The government alleged that he had openly opposed the Romanian national government (and its systematization program) during his sermons.

On December 16, 1989 the police attempted to evict Tőkés from the parish residence. His supporters, who consisted of members from his congregation and expanded to include the city's Romanian citizens, protested the eviction. Regime forces opened fire during the protests, causing nearly 100 deaths and hundreds of injuries. By December 20, anti-regime protests had spread to other areas of Romania; Ceaușescu denounced the Timișoara protests as "terrorist actions" and, from December 21 to December 22, ordered the Romanian army, militia, and secret police to crack down on demonstrators in Bucharest and other cities (Hall, 2000). "The decision to respond to the strike by calling a pro-Ceaucescu demonstration in Bucharest, on December 21, only spiralled into further confusion, leading to an intervention of quite disproportionate and uncalled-for brutality" (FRIDE, 2002). In addition, "the disaffected party and Securitate cadres (secret policy agency) were isolated, fearful, and with very few exceptions, unable to articulate even a minimal alternative program to Ceausescu's disastrous course. The Romanian Communist Party, proportionately one of the largest in the world, had no collective leadership, no inner party life, and no genuine feedback from lower to higher echelons" (Tismaneanu, 2011).

Amid the crackdown, demonstrators were able to occupy the Central Committee building, which prompted the Ceaușescus to flee from the roof of the building in an overloaded helicopter (Hall, 2000). Ceaușescu, his wife, and second-in-command, Elena, were captured and subsequently executed on December 25.

During these events and in the middle of this confusion, a political organization called the National Salvation Front (NSF) was founded, and its leader: Ion Iliescu became president. Led by many RCP veterans and apparatchiks, as well as some opposition figures, the NSF's "first statement announced its commitment to democratic principles, including the multi-party system and the need to organize free elections as soon as possible" (Tismaneanu, 1991).

Democratic Transition

In January 1990, during a speech by Iliescu in Bucharest, the crowd shouted, "We are not comrades" (Tanasoiu). Demonstrations followed, with protesters accusing Iliescu and the other NSF leaders of attempting to preserve communism; as a result, the government announced that it would ban the RCP. The reason that reforms were not quickly and irreversibly launched in Romania was because "the Ceaucescu regime had succeeded in imposing a strongly dissuasive image of any possible opposition activity, and had, as well, had previous experience of economic opening which, at the time, had succeeded in securing a certain level of social consensus" (FRIDE, 2002). This had impeded any debate on ideas about Romania's prospects and an improvised leadership of the NSF. As a result, and despite the NSF's first statement promising democracy, "the democratic emphasis followed after and consolidated in opposition to the new [NSF] government and the Iliescu presidency" (FRIDE, 2002).

"Political parties, movements, and civic associations emerged. Critical intellectuals became vocal and called for rapid de-communization. They lambasted the Iliescu team's efforts to stay in power, accusing the NSF of having hijacked the revolution and established a "crypto-communist" regime. Confrontation between the anti-communist and post-communist groups and movements was fierce, particularly during the miners' raid on Bucharest in June 1990" (FRIDE, 2002). "The most relevant protest event was the occupation of the square in front of the NSF headquarters to claim for elite renewal, pushing the NSF to renounce participation in the first free and open elections. Even though Iliescu received them and discussed their claims, the NSF finally decided to participate in elections. This protest was one of the main events of the cycle of mobilizations against the neo-communist elites" (Rossi, 2012).

In early 1990, the Front declared its intention to hold early elections and to compete in them. In March of that same year, the Timişoara participants issued the Proclamation of Timişoara. The 13-point document emphasized the 1989 revolution's anti-communist nature and proposed banning former RCP officials from public life until the democratic system was stable. During the following months, students, workers, and intellectuals organized a sit-in to protest the government's refusal to consider the Proclamation's demands.

The first free presidential and parliamentary elections were held in May 1990, with Iliescu (from the NSF) winning 85 percent of the vote and gaining the majority in Parliament, establishing Iliescu as the person in charge of leading Romania toward full democracy. After 1990, the democratic system was reformed and the parliamentary system and the free press were reinstated in Romania. The new constitution was adopted in 1991, reshaping the country into a semi-presidential democratic republic.

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São Tomé e Príncipe (1991)

Synopsis

In 1975, São Tomé e Príncipe (STP) became a socialist one-party state modeled on the Soviet example. "The first signs of political liberalization appeared in 1984 [during Pinto da Costa's socialist regime (1975–1991)] due to the economic failure of the regime. The regime began a gradual rapprochement with Western donors and shifted away from the former socialist allies" (Seibert, 2003). "Within a few years, the nationalization of the entire economy and the socialist policies brought about total economic failure. From 1985 onwards, the regime therefore dropped the socialist dogmas and gradually liberalized the economy" (Seibert, 2003). All in all, the transition of São Tomé e Príncipe (STP) to democracy from its independence in 1975 was driven by a variety of factors, including the collapse of coca prices, political turmoil, and pressure from international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Underlying these issues was the economic collapse of STP driven by the government's mismanagement of the economy and the breakdown of the labor market (Frynas et al., 2003). "Economic collapse led to negotiations with the World Bank and the IMF in 1987–1989, and the structural adjustment program had as one of its conditions the liberalization of the political process and constitutional reform. The removal of Angolan troops [dispatched in 1978 to guard against what President da Costa claimed to be a series of coup plots] and subsidies became conditions insisted on by the political opposition" (Newitt, 2003). Even Pinto da Costa later admitted "responsibility for the mismanagement and economic collapse of his country during the repressive socialist one-party rule" (Siebert, 2011). In the end the regime failed to "undertake any significant economic reform or to adopt any effective measure to halt economic decline" (Newitt, 2003). It was this mismanagement and economic decline that forced Pinto da Costa's regime to give in to calls for a new, open, and democratic government.

Categorization

- Main category: Endogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 3/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Malyn Newitt, Emeritus Professor of History, King's College, London
- Gerhard Seibert, Researcher, the Center for International Studies, University Institute of Lisbon
- Jan Hartman, Advisor to President Menezes

Chronology of Main Events

July 1975	**Independence from Portugal, beginning of one-party state.**
1975	Manuel Pinto da Costa is president, nationalizes farms and plantations.
1978	Defeat of coup attempt. Angolan troops arrive for support.
1981	Price of cocoa collapses, income from exports falls by 75 percent.
1986	Pinto da Costa approaches World Bank and IMF for support. Faces pressure to democratize.
1988	Foreign-launched coup organized by exiles fails.
1990	New Multi-party constitution adopted.
1991	First elections are held and Angolan troops are withdrawn.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Independence, Pinto da Costa, and Nationalization

Following the collapse of its own government in 1974, Portugal witnessed the collapse of its colonial power in Africa. For Sao Tome e Principe (STP), independence from Portugal came in 1975, and power was handed over to Manuel Pinto da Costa (co-founder of the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé e Príncipe/Social Democratic Party, MLSTP/PSD). It was not an easy transition for STP. "At independence, São Tomé faced severe budgetary problems, an economy that had been plunged into chaos by the departure of the Portuguese, and a shortage of professional expertise in almost every department of government" (Newitt, 2003). At his taking of power, Pinto da Costa declared STP a socialist state and began a rapid process of nationalization, including of the domestic farms, *rocas*, which produced the country's main export of cocoa (Newitt, 2003). The government went on to set up state-run retail shops, nationalize the country's banks and financial companies, and establish state-run companies to handle all imports and exports (Newitt, 2003).

Angola's Support and Political Oppression

STP received little support or much interest from other countries with the exception of Angola, which was another ex-Portuguese colony that shared a common language, tradition, and colonial experience (International Business Publications, 2013). Angola offered economic and later military support to Pinto da Costa's government. Another of the benefits offered by Angola was a discounted price for importing oil; while the world price was $20 a barrel, STP was able to import at $4 a barrel (Newitt, 2003). Later in 1978, the government faced a coup attempt by a group of mercenaries that was successfully defeated after receiving military support from Angola. In order to maintain control for Pinto da Costa's government, Angola kept a garrison of troops permanently stationed on the island (Newitt, 2003).

Not long after taking power, Pinto da Costa's regime became increasingly centralized and politically oppressive. His continued policy of nationalization and state control was "strongly opposed by Carlos Graça (Minister of Social Affairs) who resigned from the government." Graça opposed the move of the regime towards a dictatorial Marxist-Leninist regime and as a result was sentenced to 24 years in prison by Pinto da Costa but went into exile in 1977.

Graça's exile was soon followed by Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada's, who was accused of plotting a coup and was arrested and detained in 1979 before eventually going into exile as well. After Trovoada, the next Prime Minister, Leonel d'Alva, was also forced into exile for "objecting to the political and economic stance of the government" (Newitt, 2003).

With the exception of the internal turmoil of Pinto da Costa's government, STP's civil society was relatively peaceful: "There were no strong ethnic divisions in the islands and the close-knit, interlinked families were unlikely to indulge in violence toward one another" (Newitt, 2003).

Collapse of Cocoa Prices and Foreign Assistance

Although STP was relatively free from foreign influence, the country was subject to global market forces through its dependence on cocoa as its primary export: "If the departure of the Portuguese and the problems of running state-owned farms were not enough, STP was also hit by the collapse of cocoa prices in 1979, which left it without sufficient foreign exchange to pay for vital inputs for the industry such as fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, and machinery" (Frynas et al., 2003). This collapse forced the government to seek foreign assistance (mainly from Portugal), and STP became increasingly dependent of foreign debt and aid. In fact, at its peak in 1995, net official development assistance to STP amounted to US$84 million (of which more than half came from Portugal)—almost twice the country's GDP (Frynas et al., 2003).

Beyond the fall in cocoa prices, STP also suffered from a steady decline in cocoa production, likely due "to the nature of plantation labor systems and the waning of forced labor" (Frynas et al., 2003). The government also failed to adequately generate income tax from its cocoa exports: Only some US$9,153 were paid as official customs duties for a total of imports worth some US$7.6 million; if customs officers had refrained from granting excessive exemptions, US$3.5 million would have accrued to the state coffers (Frynas et al., 2003). STP was also unable to diversify its economy beyond cocoa. By1999, cocoa still constituted 75 percent of the country's exports (Frynas et al., 2003).

To keep support for his government, Pinto da Costa expanded the payroll. "Under Pinto da Costa's management, the numbers employed in the civil service and the administration of economic institutions mushroomed, all of them paid directly out of state revenues" (Newitt, 2003). In order to maintain the increasingly state-run economy, Pinto da Costa resorted to borrowing more and more. Businesses and cocoa farms borrowed from state banks, and the state kept attempting to renegotiate foreign debt (Newitt, 2003).

Structural Adjustment Package and Democratic Transition

Pinto da Costa finally abandoned his socialist position in 1986 and reached out to the World Bank and the IMF for assistance. The result was "a structural adjustment package to which the government had to agree in order to secure IMF funding and World Bank loans" (Newitt, 2003). The package required significant economic reform for STP and "the president also came under pressure to liberalize the constitution and to allow multi-party elections." Under this pressure the government also faced a very short-lived coup attempt from a group of exiles that attempted to storm the police headquarters of STP.

STP continued to be increasingly dependent on foreign assistance throughout the 1980s, becoming an "unviable state." Well into the 1990s, external development aid totaled some US$38 million, while STP's exports of goods totaled US$4.9 million (Frynas et al., 2003) and that "a staggering 97.3 percent of STP's public investment program was funded from external sources" (Frynas et al., 2003).

Eventually STP's constitution was changed in 1990 and elections were held in 1991, as Pinto da Costa "realized that it was time to open the political system to opposition political parties, and they developed a new constitution to accommodate this." The result led to the Pinto da Costa losing to Miguel Trovoada, the former exiled prime minister" (Newitt, 2003).

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Senegal (2000)

Synopsis

"Senegal stands out as one of the few countries which has in the 40 years since independence sustained a record of relatively peaceful evolution towards full-scale democracy" (Vengroff and Magala, 2001). "Senegalese elites have a well-established electoral process" (Bingol and Vengroff, 2001) and "a long electoral [tradition] and participation in the political and electoral process" (Diouf) during French colonial rule, which also contributed to cultivate a "democratic and civic culture" (Diouf) in Senegal. It was "an evolutionary process of electoral reform, party change and coalitional configurations, [which] led to an eventual turnover of power over a period of three decades" (Creevey et al., 2005) from the hegemonic ruling party, the Socialist Party (PS) established by President Senghor, to the largest opposition party, Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) founded by Abdoulaye Wade in March 2000. President Senghor, "wishing to leave a democratic legacy" (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002), voluntarily stepped down before the end of his term in 1981. President Diouf, successor and protégé of Senghor, conceded to reform the electoral code for National Assembly, calling for municipal elections. However, he was faced with constant "domestic and international criticism" (Beck, 1999) of alleged electoral fraud and "growing factional battles in the PS" (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002). Taking advantage of the fractioned ruling party and the reformed institutional framework, opposition parties "thus were able to deny the ruling party candidate, [incumbent president Diouf], a first round majority" (Vengroff). Then, the opposition formed "a coalition around the leading vote getter among themselves" (Vengroff). Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS, to secure the victory in second round against long-serving President Diouf, peacefully ending the 40-year dominant rule of the PS in Senegal.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 2/3

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: three
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Mamadou Diouf, Leitner Professor of African Studies, Columbia University
- Richard Vengroff, Professor Emeritus, University of Connecticut

Chronology of Main Events

September 1960	**Senegal gains independence from France; Leopold Senghor of the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) was elected President of Senegal.**
1966	UPS is declared the only legal party in one-party state.
February 1970	1970 Constitution restores the position of Prime Minister; Abdou Diouf is appointed to the post.
July 1974	Abdoulaye Wade founds Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), the first opposition party in Senegal.
April 1976	Constitutional amendment creates de jure three-party system; National Assembly elections are held.
January 1981	Senghor ends his term as president; Abdou Diouf becomes president of Senegal.
April 1981	All political parties are legalized.
February 1983	Incumbent Diouf wins the presidential election.
April 1983	The office of Prime Minister is eliminated.
February 1988	Incumbent president Diouf wins the presidential elections again.
November 1990	Municipal and local elections are held; protests against alleged electoral fraud; opposition party boycotts.
March 1991	Opposition parties are invited to join coalition government.
September 1991	New electoral code is established.
March 1993	Incumbent president Diouf wins a third term as president.
November 1996	Socialist Party (PS) sweeps local elections; opposition calls for an independent electoral commission.
January 1997	Independent Observatoire National des Elections (ONEL) is established.
May 1998	Legislative elections held for National Assembly; the PS wins 50.4 percent of the votes.
March 2000	President Diouf fails to secure a majority; a presidential runoff is scheduled; Wade of the PDS wins the runoff and becomes president of Senegal.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

1960–1978: Independence, One-Party State, Three-Party System

The Republic of Senegal, an ethnically diverse West African state, gained independence from France in September 1960. Unlike other African countries, Senegal had experienced "a long electoral [tradition] and participation to the political and electoral processes in the 4 Communes" (Diouf) (Dakar, Goree, Rufisque, and St. Louis) since "a select group of Senegalese males…were given the right to vote by France in 1848," (Bingol and Vengroff, 2012) established during the French colonial rule. So, immediately after Senegal's independence, Leopold Senghor, the founder of Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (Senegalese Progressive Union Party—UPS), was elected its first president, thanks to this "well-settled electoral process" (Bingol and Vengroff, 2012).

In 1962, President Senghor crushed an attempted coup d'état by Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, his long-time ally with which he shared a personal and political rivalry. Subsequently, Senghor abolished the office of prime minister. Eventually, after the coup and due to the lack of formal opposition parties, Senegal was changed into a de facto one-party state from the mid-1960s to mid- 1970s as UPS held all seats in the National Assembly (Gellar, 1982) and became a hegemonic party.

"In the mid to late 1960s, the heady independence-era dream of rapid economic growth, state-led industrial transformation, and stable pluralism was already beginning to fade" (Galvan, 2001). As the economy stagnated, President Senghor faced general discontent and public protests from students, trade unions, and people in rural areas, who demanded social change. Nevertheless, he "managed to survive by making timely concessions" (Gellar, 1982). For example freedom of express (although restricted) was never entirely eliminated.

In 1970, "in response to pressure from the post-independence generation of technocrats in the party" (Gellar, 1982), President Senghor restored the office of prime minister and appointed his protégé, Abdou Diouf, the new prime minister. In July 1974, Abdoulaye Wade, a professor of law and economics, founded Senegal's first opposition party, the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party—PDS). Facing "continuing demand for political liberalization from domestic actors and wishing to leave a democratic legacy" (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002). Senghor issued a revision of constitution in April 1976 to allow three parties—the UPS, the PDS, and a small Marxist party—to participate in elections, creating a de jure three-party system. In the same year, UPS was renamed to the PS. In 1978, under the revised 1976 Constitution, a National Assembly was elected by proportional representation of the three parties, a first for an African national legislature (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002). The very short lived one party postcolonial state (Diouf) of Senegal came to an end under the pressure of "a democratic and civic culture" (Diouf).

1981–1990: Competitive Elections, Electoral Fraud, Coalition Government

In January 1, 1981, President Senghor, after being president of Senegal for 20 years, voluntarily stepped down and peacefully transferred power to his constitutionally designated successor, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002). Three months into office in April, President Diouf and the National Assembly removed the limit on the number of political parties that were allowed to participate in elections. In February 1983, incumbent President Diouf won the presidential election, with 83.45 percent

of the vote (Gellar, 1982) against Wade of the PDS. During the elections, independent observers reported widespread electoral irregularities (Encyclopedia, 2007). Two months later, President Diouf abolished the office of prime minister in order to strengthen his presidential power. Nevertheless, "in consolidating his own personal power, Diouf became increasingly isolated within the country and within his own party" (Gellar, 1982), which "was a loose coalition of factions that was forged and held together by Leopold Senghor… through patronage and an extensive rural-based cliente list network through which it secured political support in exchange for state revenues" (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002). Benefitting from a boycott by and division of the opposition parties in 1988, Diouf once again won the presidential election, which was also "plagued by accusations of electoral fraud" (Beck, 1999). Violent demonstrations broke out against the electoral result in Senegal.

In the absence of a new electoral code, the opposition parties boycotted the 1990 municipal elections, refusing to participate in what they saw as a flawed electoral process (Beck, 1999). At the same time, international aid donors became more and more concerned "about the impact of 'governance' on economic development" (Beck, 1999) in Senegal,—one of the largest foreign aid recipients in Africa at the time. In 1991, President Diouf, besieged by domestic and international criticism, was forced to invite Wade and other opposition members to join the Enlarged Presidential Majority (majorité présidentielle élargie), a government of national unity. The "main impact [of the Enlarged Presidential Majority] was to divide the opposition, while attracting two out of the twelve or so opposition parties in government, by giving them access to political resources for enhancing their ability to distribute patronage" (Beck, 1999).

At the same time, the office of prime minister was restored. The PDS and the Parti de l'Indépendence et du Travail (PIT) agreed to participate in Diouf's government after President Diouf conceded to reform the electoral code for National Assembly and municipal elections. In May 1991, members of the PS and opposition parties formed a commission to review the electoral rules and adopted a new electoral code in September. As a result, many reforms were achieved such as representation of all parties at polling stations, a guaranteed secret ballot, a lowered voting age, an easier and expanded system of voter registration, and a guaranteed access to the state media for all parties (Mozaffar and Vengroff, 2002).

1991–2000: International Pressure, Party Divisions, Electoral Reforms, Fair Election in 2000

In March 1993, Diouf was elected the president of Senegal for the third time and, in May, the PS won the majority of the seats in National Assembly. Most importantly, Wade and two members of the PDS were implicated in the assassination of the vice president of the Constitutional Council after the legislative election. Nevertheless, they were soon released, and Wade accepted President Diouf's invitation to join the coalition government once again. In November 1996, the PS won majorities in all of the regional assemblies, 300 out of 320 rural councils, and 56 out of 60 mayoralties (Beck, 1999).Suspecting electoral fraud, the opposition called for the annulment of the election and an international investigation. The government rejected the requests and prohibited demonstrations. In January 1997, 13 opposition parties, including the PDS, issued a public statement, "requesting that the international community cease all financial contributions to the Senegalese government' (Beck, 1999) and demanding that a truly independent electoral commission be established. Upon receiving the information that opposition leaders were meeting with major international aid donors, President Diouf accepted the demands and "the mediating role he played between the various political parties" (Vengroff and Magala, 2001) and

established an “all-party independent conferenced called Observatoire National des Elections (ONEL)” (Vengroff and Magala, 2001).

Because President Diouf showed little intention of retiring after over 15 years of rule, “the key political actors in the ruling party of Senegal became ‘disaffected’… [And] the lack of upward mobility for party elites led to splits within the ruling party” (Bingol and Vengroff, 2012). Djibo Ka, former minister of the interior, and Moutapha Niasse, former foreign minister, both left the PS and established their own political parties in order to run against Diouf in the scheduled 2000 presidential election.

On February 19, 2000, Senegalese voters “took part in what have been among the fairest and freest elections ever to take place in Africa” (Vengroff and Magala, 2001). Failing to secure a required majority, incumbent president Diouf was forced into a runoff against his long-time opponent, Wade. Opposition parties, including former members of the PS, then formed a coalition around the leading vote getter among themselves (Vengroff), Mr. Wade of the PDS, and successfully helping him to win over President Diouf in the second election with 58.7 percent of the vote (Vengroff and Magala, 2001). This democratic election, as the fruit of incremental and stable institutional reforms over decades, marked the end of the PS’s 40-year hegemonic rule and Diouf’s 20-year presidency in Senegal, transforming Senegal into a full democracy.

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Slovenia (1992)

Synopsis

Slovenia's democratic transition was the result of "an outgrowth of the new social movements that emerged in the late 1970s in Slovenia" (Expert 2). As new social movements developed in the 1970s and 1980s, they began to call for democracy and political pluralism. Furthermore, in 1986, primarily in an effort to preserve the League of Communists of Slovenia's (LC-Slovenia) legitimacy, the liberal wing of the party ousted the conservative leadership. Led by Milan Kučan, the reformist leadership chose to support the new social movements over Yugoslav demands to preserve the single-party status quo. In 1988, Slovene Sergeant Ivan Borstner, the editor of the left-wing magazine *Mladina*, and two of its journalists were arrested for "betraying military secrets" after publishing articles against the Yugoslav People's Army. The trial (later known as the JBTZ trial) "electrified the Slovenian public" and gave rise to the formation of strong civil society movements (a period known as the Slovenian Spring). "As a consequence of the JBTZ trial, understanding of pluralism had extended and numbers of parties were formed" (Pandir, 2005). In response, the Slovene parliament adopted a constitutional amendment in December 1989 allowing a multi-party system. Democratic elections were held in April 1990. In addition, tensions between Slovenia and Serbia over reorganizing the Yugoslav political structure contributed to increased calls for secession. In June 1991, after failing to reach an agreement to reorganize Yugoslavia into a confederation, Slovenia officially seceded. A new democratic constitution was adopted in December 1991. Following this, in December 1992, presidential and parliamentary elections were held for the first time since independence, thus cementing Slovenia's transition to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause**:** 1/4

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: four
Name of expert (not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Erika Harris, Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool

Chronology of Main Events

1986	**Liberal wing of the League of Communists of Slovenia ousts the conservative leadership.**
June 1988	Protests in Ljubljana are held over the *Mladina* trial.
January 1989	Democratic Alliance, an opposition party, is formed.
May 1989	New political parties issue a joint declaration calling for Slovene sovereignty.
September 1989	Slovenia's parliament passes amendments underscoring Slovene sovereignty.
December 1989	Parliament adopts laws allowing a multi-party political system.
April 1990	First democratic elections are held.
July 1990	Parliament declares independence from Yugoslavia.
December 1990	Referendum on independence is held.
January 1991	Parliament adopts the Action Programme for the Realisation of the Goals of the Referendum.
June 1991	Slovenia secedes from Yugoslavia.
July 1991	Following attacks, Yugoslav forces agreed to withdraw from Slovenia.
December 1991	Democratic constitution is adopted.
December 1992	Presidential and parliamentary elections held for the first time since independence.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

New Social Movements and the League of Communists

In the aftermath of World War I, Slovenia became part of the state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs that eventually formed the old Yugoslavia. "By joining [Yugoslavia], the Slovenes got what they were seeking: sovereignty, self-determination and statehood, albeit in the context of communist rule" (Pandir, 2005). In general, "Slovenian communism did not leave behind a devastated country, but one which was

economically relatively advanced, with a strong national consciousness and self-confidence of the politically and economically most developed republic within the Yugoslav federation" (Harris, 2002).

"During the late 1970s, an outgrowth of new social movements emerged" (Expert 2) and civil society began to develop. "Central to their critique of Communism was the concept of 'civil society,' a political rather than a theoretical concept that demanded that the Communist state withdraw from parts of the social and political life of citizens" (Hansen, 1996). Tito's death in May 1980 also amplified a generalized nationalist sentiment (Bukowski, 1999).

In 1986, the liberal wing of the League of Communists of Slovenia (LC-Slovenia) (the Slovenian branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) ousted the conservative leadership. "The ascent of the liberal wing was a key development in the Slovenian 'proto-transition' that shaped later reforms" (Boduszyński, 2010). Under Milan Kučan, the new president of LC-Slovenia, the "leadership pursued a more liberal path, and in the succeeding years public debate became steadily more lively" (Bukowski, 1999). "The group declared itself to be a modern political party of the left and a supporter of democracy, basic human rights, and the market economy" (Boduszyński, 2010). LC-Slovenia "faced calls from Slovenia's emerging civil society for greater political openness and for market-style reforms" as well as "pressure from the [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] and the federal governing party to preserve the monistic structure of the political system" (Bukowski, 1999). In an effort to preserve its legitimacy within Slovenia, LC-Slovenia chose to support the new civil society organizations and eventually changed its name to the Party of Democratic Renewal (Stranka Demokratične Prenove, or SDP).

Mladina, the JBTZ trial and the Slovenian Spring

In 1988, Slovene Sergeant Ivan Borstner, editor of the left-wing magazine *Mladina,* and two of its journalists were arrested for "betraying military secrets" after publishing articles against the Yugoslav People's Army. The trial (later known as the JBTZ trial) "electrified the Slovenian public" due to the poor treatment of the accused and the decision to conduct the trial in Serbo-Croatian, despite its being held in the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana (Ramet, 1997). Approximately 40,000 people protested the trial in Ljubljana's Liberation Square and "thus was born the 'Slovenian Spring,' the formation of strong civil society movements eventually responsible for giving birth to Slovenia's nascent multi-party system" (Ramet, 1997).

"As a consequence of the JBTZ trial, understanding of pluralism had extended and numbers of parties were formed: the Social Democratic Alliance, a Slovenian Democratic Union, a Christian Socialist Movement, a Green Party and the Slovenian Farmers Union. Existing organizations, such as the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (later renamed Liberal Party) and the Socialist Alliance of Working People, previously affiliated to the LCS, became new, independent parties" (Pandir, 2005).

In May 1989, the newly founded political parties called for a new constitution that would allow political pluralism. As a result, in September 1989 the Slovenian parliament adopted constitutional amendments underscoring the republic's sovereignty. Three months later, the parliament passed an amendment establishing a multi-party system. The first democratic elections were held in April 1990, in which Kučan was elected president and the anti-communist center-right coalition, DEMOS, won the majority of parliamentary seats. However, this first coalition did not last long after independence.

Independence from Yugoslavia, Ten-Day War, and 1992 Elections

In the early 1980s, a divide emerged between Serbia and the southern Yugoslav republics, which sought strong centralization, and Slovenia and Croatia, who preferred to reorganize into a confederation. In November and December 1989, relations between Slovenia and Serbia weakened, leading to reciprocal economic sanctions and each side closing its border. At the same time, Yugoslavia overall was experiencing economic turmoil due to the oil crisis of the 1970s and extreme external debt.

Slovenia, however, remained relatively wealthy and "many Slovenes felt growing resentment toward a perceived threat to their prosperity" (Ramet, 1993). This tension was an additional cause of Slovenia's democratization (Expert 1). A combination of the aforementioned factors led to the Slovenian parliament's declaration of independence in July 1990. Slovenia's democratic transition and subsequent independence from Yugoslavia was the result of a "strong belief in liberalization and growing sense of national identity from [the] late 1980s onwards" (Harris).

The Slovenian parliament set June 26, 1991, as the deadline for reaching an agreement. While the Yugoslav republics attempted to find a solution, "as June approached, it was clear that Slovenia's only acceptable option was unilateral secession" (Ramet, 1993) as "from Slovenia's perspective, to continue the status quo was tantamount to 'national suicide' for [political and economic] reasons" (Pandir, 2005). Slovenia therefore seceded on June 25, 1991. In response, the Yugoslav army invaded, leading to the Ten-Day War and leaving about 70 dead. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire the following month.

In December 1991, a new Slovenian constitution was adopted. In April 1992, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted a constitution for a new Yugoslav state, comprising Serbia and Montenegro. This "effectively acknowledged the separate existence of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia" (Poonawala, 1993). The European Community agreed to recognize Slovenia and the other former Yugoslav republics in December 1991. The United States followed in April 1992. Eventually, in December 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections were held for the first time under Slovenian independence. Milan Kučan (64 percent of the vote) was elected President of the Republic, and Liberal Democrats of Slovenia won the parliamentary elections (23.5 percent of the vote).

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South Africa (1994)

Synopsis

"There is good reason, in hindsight, to reaffirm that the transition to democracy in South Africa was an essentially endogenous process of pact-making to exit a costly civil conflict" (Sisk). The apartheid system of complete racial segregation had met strong resistance from the black majorities in South Africa since its formal commencement in 1950. "Each successive period of resistance—1952 [Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign], 1960 [Sharpeville Massacre], 1976–77 [Soweto Uprising], and 1984–88 [township revolts]—was more intense and widespread, and the regime's efforts to contain revolution through repression were less and less effective" (Sisk). "As a result of an escalating conflict that ended in stalemate…democratization negotiations became a strategy for exit" (Sisk) since "it became clear to the government that its coercive security option would not provide lasting solutions, and the ANC [African National Congress, the main opposition body] realized that its armed struggle was incapable of delivering victory" (Gastrow, 1995). Political stalemate, "increased resistance internally and the increased isolation of White South Africans by the international community" (Steyn-Kotze) eventually led to the successful conclusion of negotiations between President F.W. de Klerk of the ruling National Party (NP) and Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC, on the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a government of national unity (GNU). "The first truly democratic election in the history of South Africa" (Magubane, 2000), in which South Africans of all races participated, was held on April 28, 1994. Nelson Mandela was elected president.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/5

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: five
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Robert Mattes, Professor of Political Studies and Director of the Democracy in Africa Research Unit, University of Cape Town
- Joleen Steyn-Kotze, Associate Professor of Political Science, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
- Lorenzo Fioramonti, Full Professor of Political Economy at the Department of Political Sciences of the University of Pretoria, South Africa, and Director of the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation
- Timothy D. Sisk, Associate Dean for Research and Professor of International and Comparative Politics, University of Denver
- Roger Southall, Staff Associate and Head of the Department of Sociology at The Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the Witwatersrand

Chronology of Main Events

July 1950	**Population Registration Act goes into effect; apartheid in South Africa formally started.**
June 1952	Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign.
March 1960	Sharpeville massacre; The African National Congress (ANC) is outlawed.
August 1962	Nelson Mandela is arrested.
June 1976	Soweto uprising.
May 1979	African trade unions are legalized.
August 1984	Tricameral Parliament election.
September 1985	Township revolts break out; the United States imposes sanctions on South Africa.
July 1989	South-African President P.W. Botha meets with Nelson Mandela in prison.
August 1989	P.W. Botha resigns presidency after stroke; F.W. de Klerk sworn in as acting president.
September 1989	Parliamentary election; Desmond Tutu leads anti-apartheid protests.
December 1989	F.W. de Klerk meets Mandela in Cape Town.
February 1990	F.W. de Klerk announces lifting of the ban on ANC and release of Mandela. Mandela is released after being detained for 27 years.
June 1991	Population registration act is abolished.
December 1991	Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I) is held.
March 1992	White voters pass a referendum on negotiations.
May 1992	CODESA II commenced.
June 1992	Boipatong massacre; CODESA II breaks down.
September 1992	Record of Understanding is released; negotiations resume.
February 1993	Agreement on government of national unity (GNU).
April 1994	National election; Nelson Mandela is elected president; apartheid ends.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Apartheid, Sharpeville Massacre, Ban on ANC, and Mandala's Imprisonment

On July 7, 1950, South Africa's white-dominated government passed the Population Registration Act, requiring all South Africans to be classified and registered according to their race—White, Black, Coloured and Indian—and formally creating the apartheid system of racial segregation. Over the years, a series of laws were passed to separate mainly the black majority—about 68 percent of the population in the 1950s—and the white minority—about 21 percent of the population (Khalfani et al., 2005) "geographically, politically, economically, sexually, and educationally" (Downing, 2004). Apartheid evoked strong resistance from the Black and Colored communities in South Africa from the very beginning. The African National Congress (ANC) was established in 1912 by the representatives of African people, after the Act of Union… had excluded Africans from political participation (Magubane, 2000). In response, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) launched the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign (a nonviolent passive resistance campaign) in 1952, which was met with brutal repression from the police. Although the campaign was suspended at the end of the year, it boosted the growth in membership of ANC (Global Nonviolent Action Database) and the resistance movements.

A second wave of protests initiated by the anti-apartheid campaign started in 1960. On March 21, 1960, police opened fire on black Africans who were protesting the Pass Law, which restricted migration, in front of the police station in Sharpeville, killing 69 of the demonstrators. The Sharpeville Massacre triggered immediate uproar among Black and Colored South Africans. Protests, strikes, and riots broke out throughout the country, leading to the imposition of a state of emergency by the South African government on March 30. The international community was also enraged by the Sharpeville Massacre, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 134, condemning the shootings. Following the massacre, the apartheid government outlawed the ANC and other anti-apartheid organizations. Two years later, Nelson Mandela, leader and co-founder of ANC's military wing "Umkhonto we Sizwe" (The Spear of the Nation), was arrested on August 5, 1962 and sentenced to five years in prison for leaving the country without a passport and incitement in November. In 1964, Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment. During the next 10 years, some Western nations and organizations isolated the country because of its controversial policies. International sanctions and divestment followed, which created growing instability and oppression within the country.

Soweto Uprising, Tricameral Parliament, Township Revolt, Stalemate

On June 16, 1976, thousands of black students in Soweto, an African township outside Johannesburg, the largest city in South Africa, marched to "protest against using Afrikaans in black schools" (Louw, 2004) since "blacks in general associated Afrikaans [a West Germanic language] with apartheid" (Mwakikagile, 2008). The peaceful march, planned by the Soweto Students' Representative Council's Action Committee with support from the wider Black Consciousness Movement (Mwakikagile, 2008), was met with police brutality, causing the death toll [of students] to be… over 200 (Mwakikagile, 2008). The Soweto uprising spread to urban centers, rural areas, and homelands (Ndlovu, 2004). The government eventually suppressed the uprising. The murder of the black youths in Soweto and the oppression by the South African apartheid government drew international criticism. The UN Security Council passed yet another resolution condemning the government of South Africa and calling for the end of apartheid, which

"increased isolation of White South Africans by the international community" (Steyn-Kotze). During this period, the ANC was largely operating underground and abroad.

Following the Soweto uprising, African trade unions were legalized in 1979, as recommended by the Wiehahn Commission (dedicated to regulate labor legislation) on the revamping of the apartheid state's industrial relations" (Lichtenstein, 2013). Prime Minister P.W. Botha, leader of the ruling National Party's (NP) Verligte faction, which supported some liberation of apartheid system, advocated a tricameral parliament system in which the Whites, the Indians and the Coloured would share power. Nonetheless, the first election of the new parliament in August 1984 "was clearly a failure… [as] [i]ts fundamental flaw was the continued reliance of the system on the basic criterion of race and the exclusion of Africans" (Sisk, 1995). The creation of a tricameral parliament brought another cycle of the anti-apartheid movement led by the UDF (United Democratic Front), a coalition of anti-apartheid organizations. "On 3 September 1984, the townships once again erupted in a campaign of violent resistance" (Sisk, 1995), which was marked as "the key root of the [democratic transition] process… which in the government could never quell, or put back in the bottle" (Mattes). "By mid-June (1985), the upsurge of unrest had engulfed virtually every region of the country" (Sisk, 1995). At the same time, "political organizations began to openly identify with the banned ANC and its imprisoned and exiled leadership" (Sisk, 1995).

"By the mid-1980s, the "stalemate between the Botha government and the black opposition seemed unbreakable, as the former lacked the will, if not the means, to repress its black opponents into permanent extinction; by contrast, the UDF and its allies abroad (the ANC in particular) could not topple the state, whether by mass demonstration and protest or by armed struggle" (Spence, 1994). In early 1989, President Botha unexpectedly suffered a stroke, which caused his resignation from the presidency. F.W. de Klerk, a more flexible politician from the NP, replaced Botha as the president of South Africa in August 1989. In the following month, the NP lost almost a quarter of its seats in parliament due to a loss in overall popularity. "For de Klerk, the lessons of the 1989 election were clear: if he wanted to prevent the further erosion of support on both the right and left, he could no longer ride the horns of the reformer's dilemma" (Sisk, 1995). "As a result of an escalating conflict that ended in stalemate… [for de Klerk,] democratization negotiations became a strategy for exit" (Sisk).

Mandela's Release, Negotiations, CODESA I

In December 1989, de Klerk met with Mandela for the first time. On February 2, 1990, de Klerk, at the opening of parliament, announced that Nelson Mandela would be released from his life term prison sentence and that the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and other organizations would be unbanned (Magubane, 2000). In his speech, de Klerk also proclaimed that the time for negotiation has arrived (de Klerk, 1990). "The decision was a reasoned, calculated one based on three primary considerations: apartheid 'would never work as it was intended'; in the wake of the collapse of communism in Easter Europe, the time was 'ripe'; and the argument of de Klerk… that 'if it is necessary to take the decision, let's do it now'" (Sisk, 1995). Nine days later, on February 11, Mandela was formally released after 27 years of imprisonment.

The ANC, in its agreement to negotiate with the government, also recognized that "while the 'apartheid power bloc' had been weakened, 'the liberation movement did not have the immediate capacity to overthrow the regime'… it suffered persistent weaknesses of capacity while 'the regime' could 'endlessly

delay while consolidating its hold on power and restructuring in order to undermine future democratic transformation'" (Welsh, 1994). The National Peace Accord was signed by the government and political organizations, committing that "the establishment of a multi-party democracy in South Africa is our common goal" (National Peace Accord). In June, the Population Registration Act, which classified citizens based on their race and ethnic group, was abolished. On December 20, 1991, outside Johannesburg, the first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I) was held, in which government, the ANC, and other organizations participated. Although a Declaration of Intent to investigate the establishment of a democratic structure was agreed upon by participants, "CODESA I ended in a deadlock over these conflicting visions of a political settlement" (Schneidman, 1994). In March 1992, the majority of white voters in South Africa endorsed CODESA through a national referendum, "provid[ing] a clear sign that the process of change that started more than two years ago is finally irreversible" (Ottaway, 1994).

CODESA II, Record of Understanding, 1994 Election

CODESA II commenced in May 1992 but "broke down because of deadlock on the scope, structure, role, and duration of the proposed interim government, and any resumption of the negotiations in the short term proved impossible following the Boipatong massacre on 17 June" (Spence, 1994) in which "46 township dwellers were massacred by a group of Inkatha [Inkatha Freedom Party] supporters" (Schneidman, 1994) whose aim was to undermine the delicate negotiation process between the Nationalist Party and the ANC. Yet, the negotiations between government and ANC resumed in September 1992, since both parties understood that "the alternative to negotiating was civil war" (Welsh, 1994). "A further incentive to keep the enterprise underway was provided by external pressure from the UN and Western governments" (Spence, 1997), considering the economic and political sanctions imposed against South Africa. Mandela and de Klerk, on September 26, 1992, reached an agreement called "Record of Understanding," which committed both the NP and ANC to an interim government and a new constitution.

In February 1993 the ANC and the government announced an agreement that a government of national unity (GNU)… could share power for five years on the basis of a democratic election, to be held in early 1994 (Schneidman, 1994). The government and the ANC reached agreement on the establishment of an interim constitution, a Transitional Executive Council, and an Independent Electoral Commission in September 1993. On April 28, 1994, South Africans, regardless of race, went to the polls to vote in the "the first truly democratic election in the history of South Africa" (Magubane, 2000). The ANC received 62.6 percent of the national vote, the NP 20.4 percent, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 10.5 percent (James et al., 1999), and Nelson Mandela was elected president of South Africa, marking the official end of apartheid and South Africa's transition to a full democracy.

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Spain (1978)

Synopsis

The increasingly politicized society that claimed amnesty and freedom rights accompanied by a deeply divided army between those who remained faithful to Franco's regime and those supporting reforms; a Church—led by Cardinal Enrique Tarancón—that gradually moved away from the regime; and an external environment that was pushing to create an integrated Europe were factors that intensified the latent divisions and struggle for power within Franco's regime. Once the weakness of the regime was made evident by the rising number of political mobilization activities, ETA's terrorist attacks and political uncertainty, the elites were "forced" to negotiate an exit with opposition forces. After Franco's death on November 20, 1975, the restoration of the monarchy under King Juan Carlos I, the appointment of Adolfo Súarez as Prime Minister, and the Political Reform Law were the milestones that marked the early years of the transition and that led to the enactment of the 1978 Constitution, which represented a furtherance of the Spanish transition to democracy.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 0/6

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: six

Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Jose Fernandez-Albertos, Permanent Research Fellow, Institute for Policies and Public Goods of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)
- Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, President, Elcano Royal Institute
- Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, Associate Professor of Political Science, Carlos III University of Madrid, Director, Carlos III-Juan March Institute of Social Sciences
- William Chislett, Associate researcher at Madrid's Elcano Royal Institute and former correspondent of *The Times* of London in Madrid

Chronology of Main Events

June 1969	**Franco proclaims King Juan Carlos I as his official successor.**
May 1971	Cardinal Enrique y Tarancón is elected president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference.
June 1973	Franco appoints Carrero Blanco as prime minister.
December 1973	Assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco by terrorist group ETA.
December 1973	Arias Navarro is appointed as prime minister.
March 1974	Salvador Puig Antich is executed.
September 1974	"Cafetería Rolando" bombing.
November 1975	Franco dies.
December 1975	King Juan Carlos I appoints his first government.
July 1976	King Juan Carlos I appoints Adolfo Suarez as prime minister.
December 1976	Political Reform Law is approved by referendum.
April 1977	Communist Party is legalized.
June 1977	First democratic, general elections.
December 1978	Constitution is approved by referendum.

Brief Bckground and Description of the Democratization Process

Socioeconomic Instability and Franco's Succession

During the 1960s and 1970s, Spain underwent a deep social transformation, marked by progressively more politicized strikes as "young leaders acquired a democratic political culture in the university" (Lamo de Espinosa). In addition, the country was experiencing a rising "demand for democratization among the growing and increasingly organized middle and working classes" (Fernandez-Albertos).

Many factors accompanied this phenomenon, including "a fear among the groups closed to the regime about the potential consequences of democracy" (Fernandez-Albertos); an army deeply divided between those faithful to Franco's regime and those supporting reforms; a Church—led by Cardinal Enrique Tarancó—that was gradually moving away from the regime; a population that claimed amnesty and freedom and an "external environment, notably the existence of a democratic and increasingly integrated Europe, that facilitated a convergence in expectations as to the benefits of democracy," (Fernandez-Albertos) and a feeling that if Spain were to remain authoritarian it would exacerbate its isolation from Europe. "Spain was the last Western European country to become democratic after the democratization of Greece and Portugal" (Sanchez-Cuenca).

The increasing socioeconomic instability raised concern regarding Franco's succession. Apart from his personal reluctance to abandon power, he decided to appoint a successor who was fully committed to the perpetuation of his regime. Franco had postponed his final decision in order to retain the support of all the various monarchist factions and avoid opposition from the (far-right) Falangists. On June 22, 1969, Franco proclaimed King Juan Carlos I as his official successor. This solved the succession problem but not the emerging power struggle within the future regime. The divisions within the regime produced disagreement on the problem of political associations.

Assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco and the Struggle for Power

The assassination of Prime Minister and long-time Franco confidant Luis Carrero Blanco, perpetrated by the terrorist group, ETA, on December 20, 1973, marked a turning point inside Franco's regime. ETA clearly stated that the assassination was aimed at intensifying the latent divisions between the regime's forces. Torcuato Fernández Miranda temporarily assumed the presidency, causing a power struggle within the regime, a resurgence of nationalism, and ultimately the appointment of Carlos Arias Navarro as the new prime minister on December 31, 1973.

Arias Navarro's mandate was largely a retrograde one, ranging from some liberalizing initiatives to violent repression. With Franco's unstable health, a sense of panic was perceived within the regime. Government action, lacking conviction and initiative, reacted harshly by executing the notorious member of the Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL) Salvador Puig Antich (following his conviction of the murder of a police officer) and also by trying to expel from Spain Bilbao's bishop, Añoveros. This confrontation removed any hope of reconciliation with the Church.

Politicized Society and Terrorists Attacks

Because of Franco's deteriorating health, King Juan Carlos I assumed the role of interim head of state. Given the weakness of the regime, the opposition redoubled and reorganized its political activism.

A reinvigorated Socialist Party run by Felipe González started to reorganize. Similarly, the Communist Party responded to the news of Franco's illness by launching the Democratic Board on July 30, 1974, which brought together a large number of socialist and independent parties. As a result, labor militancy and political uncertainty were on the rise.

The attempt by the regime to resolve the crisis with repression led to widespread political strikes that had deep political implications. On April 25, 1974, the government declared a state of emergency in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, culminating in random arrests, imprisonment, and torture. Eventually, the bombing of Cafeteria Rolando by ETA on September 13, 1974, which killed 13 and wounded 71, had severe policy implications: it gave the government an excuse to restrain the process of liberalization. It discredited the Communist Party, which was accused of collaboration with terrorism, and it marked ETA as a terrorist organization.

Franco's Death, Adolfo Suárez, and the Political Reform Law

After Franco's death in November 1975, there were three possible paths for Spain: continuity of Franco's political system, the immediate dissolution of Franco's institutions, and gradual reform of the political system and laws to achieve a democratic transition.

The democratic opposition launched strong political pressure against Arias Navarro's government while pushing for elections and amnesty. The repression of a workers' strike in Vitoria delegitimized the government, which felt increasingly besieged. "Once the weakness of the regime was made evident by the generational change and the rising number of opposition mobilization activities (especially in Catalonia) and to protect the interests of the regime's elites, the elites were "forced" to negotiate an exit with opposition forces, which rapidly agreed. The agreement reflected the balance of powers between these groups and was largely conditioned by the threat of the military to re-intervene in politics" (Expert 1).

"With the monarchy restored under King Juan Carlos I, there was a deep desire to overcome the violent and divisive past among all shades of political opinion (except at the extremes of the spectrum) and see Spain as part of a democratic Europe" (Chislett). On July 3, 1976, supported by Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, president of the Episcopal Conference, King Juan Carlos appointed attorney Adolfo Súarez as prime minister because of his prominence and his capacity to persuade Franco's parliament politicians to agree to the democratic transition, and Torcuato Fernández Miranda (a man with great political skills and vast familiarity with Franco's constitutional laws) as president of Las Cortes, the Spanish Parliament.

In November, 1976, the Political Reform Law was passed and approved by referendum on December 15. It was the legal instrument that enabled a move away from Franco's dictatorship and toward a constitutional democracy. Among several reforms were the legalization of labor unions and political parties and an amnesty law passed in 1977. General elections were held on June 15, 1977. The outcome of the general election clarified the political landscape, with Adolfo Suarez's party (UCD) obtaining 34 percent of the vote, followed by the left-wing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) with 28 percent. The Communist Party garnered 9 percent and the Popular Alliance party founded by Manuel Fraga, 8 percent.

These events were the milestones that marked the early years of the transition. The end of this intensive political transition arrived in 1978 with the approval of the Constitution, which consolidated the permanent transition to democracy.

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Uruguay (1984)

Synopsis

"Uruguay has a long-standing democratic tradition, and the dictatorship (1973–1984) was always viewed as an exceptional situation" (Buquet). Therefore, "it is necessary to emphasize that Uruguay's transition is really a case of redemocratization—that is, a return to democracy" (Gillespie, 1991). In June 1973, the Uruguayan military as an institution came to power through a coup, "blam[ing] the civilian politicians and their inaction in the face of the revolutionary and economic crises" (McDonald, 2014). However, from the very beginning, the armed forces "realized that, within the traditional political culture of Uruguay, military rule would ultimately become untenable" (McDonald, 2014). In August 1977, the military announced a political timeline and "tried to install a tutorial and restricted democracy through a new Constitution" (Mieres) drafted by the Commission on Political Affairs of the Armed Forces (COMASPO). Nevertheless, the citizenry voted against [the] constitutional reform proposal in a plebiscite held in 1980 (Buquet). Suffering the defeat of the 1980 Plebiscite, the military promulgated a new cronograma in 1981 (Lessa, 2013), under which major political parties, the Colorado, Blanco, and Civic Union, were re-legalized and political activities were partially allowed. "In the face of a united and mobilized opposition, the military underwent a process of internal reorganization" (Barahona de Brito, 2003) and pro-negotiating faction of the military emerged triumphant. The impact of social upheaval, the Argentinian democratization (Chasquetti) and the "increased political isolation of the Uruguayan military both domestically and internationally" (Weinstein, 1988) strengthened the negotiating position of the civilian opposition, which led to the Navy Club Agreement (Pacto del Club Naval) between the military, the Colorado Party, the Civic Union and the leftist Broad Front in August 1984. Following the agreement, the military regime issued Institutional Act No.19 that "represented a restoration of the pre-authoritarian political system" (Barahona de Brito, 2003) and set the national elections on November 25, 1984. Julio Maria Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party won the presidency in a free and fair election in 1984 (Buquet), thus ending the 12-year military regime.

Categorization

- Main category: Exogenous
- Proportion of experts that identify "economic turmoil" as main or secondary cause: 1/7

Democracy Experts

Number of experts: seven
Names of experts (those not requesting to remain anonymous):

- Juan A. Bogliaccini, Assistant Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Catholic University of Uruguay
- Pablo Mieres, Senator and President of the Independent Party

- Daniel Buquet, Professor and Researcher in political science at the Instituto de Ciencia Política, University of the Republic
- Daniel Chasquetti, Professor and Researcher, Institute of Political Science, University of the Republic
- Antonio Cardarello, Professor and Researcher, Institute of Political Science, University of the Republic
- Rosario Queirolo, Associate Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Catholic University of Uruguay

Chronology of Main Events

June 1973	Military coup; National Assembly is dissolved. President Bordaberry remains in power.
December 1973	Council of State replaces National Assembly.
June 1976	President Bordaberry resigns.
August 1977	The military announces a timetable.
November 1980	Plebiscite on a draft constitution is held.
July 1981	New timetable is announced; national elections are announced for November 1984; traditional political parties are legalized.
November 1982	Internal Party Election is held.
May 1983	Parque Hotel negotiations begin.
Jul 1983	Parque Hotel negotiations collapse.
Nov 1983	One of the largest demonstrations in Uruguay's history is held in Montevideo.
Jun 1984	General strike in Montevideo.
Aug 1984	Pacto de Club Naval (Navy Club Pact) is announced; National Policy Accord (Concertación Nacional Programátic, or CONAPRO) is established; election is announced for November 1984.
Nov 1984	General elections are held.

Brief Background and Description of the Democratization Process

Tupamaro Insurgency and Civil-military Dictatorship

"Uruguay has a long-standing democratic tradition, and the dictatorship (1973–1984) was always viewed as an exceptional situation" (Buquet). In fact, Uruguay's two traditional political parties, the Colorado Party (Partido Colorado) and the Blanco Party (Partido Blanco)—also known as National Party (Partido Nacional), are the oldest in the southern cone of Latin America and among the oldest in the world (Gillespie, 1991). In addition, until the early 1970s, the armed forces "were always separated from civil society" (Weinstein, 1988) and "considered marginal to political life in Uruguay" (Weinstein, 1988).

In 1973, for the first time in Uruguay's history (Gillespie, 1991), the military carried out a coup in the face of economic decline and an urban revolutionary movement, the Tupamaros, that threatened internal security, because "civilian politicians and their traditional processes seemed paralyzed" (McDonald, 2014). In June 1973, President Bordaberry, in collaboration with the military, dissolved the National Assembly and replaced it with the Council of State. Believing that "if he could not beat them [the military], he would join them" (Gillespie, 1991), the president governed in alliance with the military until 1976. This marked the start of a decade of military rule in Uruguay. During the military regime, "many political leaders were stripped of their political rights, some were imprisoned, and others went into exile. The military banned the National Confederation of Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores, or CNT), the Socialist Party of Uruguay (Partido Socialista de Uruguay, or PSU), and other suspected Marxist-Leninist organizations. It also interfered in the university to suppress dissident activities by the students (Hudson, 1992). In fact, according to Amnesty International, Uruguay had more political prisoners per capita in 1976 than any other nation on earth.

Bordaberry Resignation and the Plebiscite

In June 1976, President Bordaberry submitted a proposal to the military to create a permanent dictatorship with himself as president. He also demanded new institutions and the elimination of political parties (Lessa, 2013) that could establish an institutionalized authoritarian regime (Gillespie, 1991). The armed forces rejected his proposal as "the generals were reluctant to break the line that they were cleaning up democracy, rather than killing it" (Gillespie, 1991) and "did not want to share 'the historical responsibility of suppressing the traditional political parties'" (Lessa, 2013). As a result, Bordaberry was forced to resign later in the month and was replaced briefly by Alberto Demichelli Lizaso. Within two months, Aparicio Méndez took over for a five-year term (1976–1981). On the day of his inauguration, a decree was signed where all politicians (with very few exceptions) who had participated in the 1966 and 1971 elections lost all political rights for 15 years (Kaufman, 1989).

In August 1977, the military regime announced a political *cronograma* (timetable), calling for a national plebiscite on a draft constitution in November 1980, and seeking "to install a tutorial and restricted democracy through a new Constitution" (Mieres). The proposed constitution, "drafted by the Commission on Political Affairs of the Armed Forces (Comisión de Asuntos Políticos, or COMASPO) without consultation with political parties, their leaders, and the public" (Weinstein, 1988), would "institutionalize the political power they (the military) had acquired…and ensure indirect political control over future civilian governments" (Barahona de Brito, 2003).

On November 30, 1980, the plebiscite was held as promised, since the armed forces expected to win (Weinstein, 1988). Nonetheless, "the military government failed to get [the] new authoritarian constitution approved by the plebiscite" (Bogliaccini). The constitutional project was rejected by 57.9 percent of voters (Lessa, 2013), which was considered to be "the origin of the [democratic] transition" (Cardarello). "The defeat of the military's project was a testament to Uruguay's democratic political culture and the power of civilian political leaders who… had almost unanimously counseled to a 'no' vote on the plebiscite" (Weinstein, 1988). After the defeat of the 1980 plebiscite, the military regime realized that it would eventually have to restore the civilian government and political rights (McDonald, 2014).

The 1982 Political Parties Law and the Interpartidaria

In 1981, the armed forces designated retired General Gregorio Alvarez as president "after a bitter internal power struggle (Barahona de Brito, 2003). In July, the regime announced a new *cronograma* and the approval of a new Political Party Law of 1982, "which placed political parties at the nucleus of the transition" (Lessa, 2013) but kept the military in control. This *cronograma* allowed the non-proscribed political parties to "choose new leaders through primaries, who would then negotiate with COMASPO and agree on a constitution that would guarantee the military's position as the guardians of national security" (Barahona de Brito, 2003). It set the date of national elections for November 1984 (Lessa, 2013).

In November 1982, internal party elections were held, and the two major parties, the Colorado Party and the Blanco Party, in addition to the Civic Union (Union Cívica), elected officials. In both traditional parties, the option most clearly opposed to militarism won, which "resulted in a disastrous political defeat for the military" (Weinstein, 1988) and "reconfirmed the military's isolation" (Barahona de Brito, 2003).

In that context, negotiations were restarted between the military and political parties (Buquet). After the large mobilization of the political parties on May 1, 1983, the first formal negotiations (Barahona de Brito, 2003) between the military and the political parties took place at the Parque Hotel. The talks eventually collapsed over issues of national security in July 1983 (Lessa, 2013), and formal talks and contacts were abandoned (Barahona de Brito, 2003).

As a result, the Interpartidaria, a coalition of the Blanco Party, the Colorado Party, and Civic Union was formed. They called for "civic action against the regime" (Weinstein, 1988), which mobilized the public, and "prompted the military to reconsider its negotiating strategy" (Barahona de Brito, 2003).

Economic Crisis, Internal Conflicts, and Demonstrations

Beginning in 1980, the military's economic program began to unravel. The economic recession in the United States worsened the situation. Between 1981 and 1983, GDP fell by around 20 percent, and unemployment increased to 17 percent. The foreign debt burden, aggravated by rising oil prices, grew exponentially, reaching US$3 billion by 1984 (Hudson, 1992).

In addition, facing public demonstrations, internal conflicts within the military began to appear "between those who were determined to take a hard stand against party elites and those who left that some solution was essential for national stability" (McDonald, 2014). The internal dissension among the leaders in the military eventually led to the "rise of the pro-negotiating faction" (Barahona de Brito, 2003) within the armed forces.

At the same time, the opposition coalition continued its mobilization efforts. On November 27, 1983, one of the largest demonstrations in the history of the country took place (Weinstein, 1988). Around 400,000 Uruguayans gathered at the feet of the Obelisk in Batlle Park, Montevideo, calling for a "democratic Uruguay, without exclusions, and free and fair elections" (Lessa, 2013). Another demonstration took place in January 1984 that paralyzed Montevideo.

Pacto del Club Naval and 1984 Elections

The "increasing isolation [of the military] both domestically and internationally" (Weinstein, 1988) and the effects from the "Argentinian democratization" (Chasquetti) "stacked all cards against the military" (Galván, 2012). In March 1984, representatives of the Colorado Party, the Civic Union, and the Broad Front and three military leaders led by General Hugo Medina Ferrer, who was Commander-in-Chief, held secret meetings in Club Naval in the hopes that they could reach consensus.

After intense negotiations, they forged an agreement known as the Pacto del Club Naval. It established a timetable for the return of democracy (Lessa, 2013) in August, which paved the way for the November 1984 national elections (González, 1991).

As agreed, the military regime promulgated Institutional Act No. 19 in August 1984, promising the "restoration of the pre-authoritarian political system…giving the military no greater formal power than they had possessed before the breakdown of democracy" (Barahona de Brito, 2013). The Blanco Party did not participate in the Pacto del Club Naval because their leader, Ferreira Aldunate, was arrested by the regime upon his return to Uruguay in June 1984. Nevertheless, "confronted with the fait accompli, though, they (the Blancos) reluctantly took part in the resulting election" (González, 1991) on November 25, 1984.

Julio Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party won the presidency of Uruguay. The election results gave the Colorados 39 percent, the Blancos 33 percent, and Frente Amplio 21 percent of the vote (McDonald, 2014). On March 1, 1985, Sanguinetti was sworn in as president and played a key role in Uruguay's transition to democracy.

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