




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Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America

Robert Muggah, Ilona Szabó de Carvalho, Nathalie Alvarado, Lina Marmolejo and Ruddy Wang

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Introduction

Cities are where the policy and practice of citizen security are determined. Although national and subnational strategies are essential to scaling-up crime prevention, cities are where they are put into practice. Because of the way they bring opportunities and risks into focus, cities are natural laboratories of policy innovation to prevent and reduce violence. Some of the most remarkable progress in homicide reduction, crime prevention and public safety in recent decades has occurred in large and medium-sized cities, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹

It is not entirely surprising that Latin American city authorities are experimenting with new approaches to promoting safety and security. After all, the region's cities are among the most at-risk in the world. In 2015, 47 of the top 50 most murderous cities were located in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and South America.² The same year, one in three Latin American and Caribbean adults considered crime and violence to be their country's most pressing problem.³ Although some cities are getting safer, the situation is worsening in many others.⁴

Not all Latin American cities experience citizen security equally. Notwithstanding overall rising rates of urban violence in Latin America, trends across the region are uneven. El Salvador and Honduras are home to cities

with more than 180 murders per 100,000 people, whereas many Chilean and Costa Rican cities exhibit rates of less than 3 per 100,000. Caracas and Palmira are much more dangerous today than Rio de Janeiro and Lima. Acknowledging these inter and intra-country variations, as well the factors underlying them, can help uncover insights and possible ways to make cities safer.

The good news is that a growing number of cities – including in Latin America and the Caribbean – offer positive models of transformation. Once notoriously dangerous cities such as Belo Horizonte, Bogota, Ciudad Juarez, Kingston and Medellin have dramatically turned things around. Even San Pedro Sula, until recently the world's murder capital, lethal violence nearly halved, though it is not clear if this is due to a citizen security intervention or other factors.⁵

In some cities, the drip in murder has been nothing short of breathtaking. Cities like Medellin witnessed an 85% plunge in homicide from 2002 to 2014. Ciudad Juárez, once the world's most violent city, saw homicide drop by 93.6% between 2010 and 2015. It is difficult to pinpoint attribution with precision, but the ten case studies presented here indicate that citizen security interventions often contributed in significant ways to positive dividends.

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1 See Muggah (2015b).

2 See <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/03/daily-chart-18>.

3 LAPOP (2014) at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2014/AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_011315_W.pdf.

4 Though methodologies for counting vary. See <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/03/daily-chart-18>. Previously, 43 of top 50 most violent cities were reported to be in the LAC region. See Gurney (2014).

5 See <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/daily-chart-3>.

What are the ingredients of success? While every situation is different, the case studies demonstrate that successful citizen security interventions must be guided by a clear strategy, undertaken with short- and long-term horizons in mind, and highly focused on high-risk places, people and behaviors.⁶ A significant part of the solution requires addressing the specific risks of urban violence – persistent inequality, youth unemployment, weak security and justice institutions, and organized crime groups fueled by drug trafficking.⁷ At the same time, discrete measures – including focused deterrence strategies, cognitive therapy for at-risk youth, early childhood and parenting support and targeted efforts to reduce concentrated poverty – are also potentially part of the solution to generating sharp reductions in violence and improvements in safety.⁸

Citizen security is not a new theme or area of expertise. For more than two decades mayors and civic leaders across Latin America have supported innovative preventive measures to prevent crime and improve safety. A problem, however, is that many of these efforts have not been guided explicitly by evidence. Nor have lessons always been retained. There is an over-reliance on studies conducted outside Latin America and the Caribbean to determine external validity.⁹ If policies and practices are to improve there is a critical need to promote knowledge sharing, together with investments in strategic planning, service delivery and monitoring and evaluation. This is the only way Latin American leaders will be able to determine what works, and what does not.

Notwithstanding these gaps, municipal governments have devoted considerable resources to a wide array of programs and policies designed to reduce crime. There has been an explosion of initiatives since the late 1990s, including as many as 1,300 defined interventions.¹⁰ In most cases it has been exceedingly difficult to accurately determine the impact(s) of these measures to prevent violent crime or alter public perceptions of security. Only a small proportion of these interventions are backed with hard evidence of success. Put simply, the region lags behind in terms of the quality and coverage of evaluations. In a bid to fill these knowledge gaps, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and others have supported learning processes by generating and disseminating new knowledge.¹¹

There has been an explosion of citizen security activities since the late 1990s

This report explores the evidence of what works, and what does not, when it comes to promoting citizen security in Latin American and Caribbean cities. While not exhaustive, the report features a range of positive and less positive experiences of 10 municipalities and metropolitan areas across the region. The goal is to highlight the change in approach from hardline law and order approaches to ones that emphasize multi-sector and preventive measures.¹² The structure of the report is straightforward. Each case study includes a broad overview of the context and problem, a description of the intervention and how it was implemented, and some reflections on the outcomes and impacts.

An over-arching conclusion is that citizen security is challenging and can take time. There are no silver bullets. Not all of the interventions listed below were completely effective and impact evaluations were limited, even for many of those that did register signs of improved security and safety. Taken together however, the case studies present fascinating lessons for consideration. They underscore the importance of connecting formal institutions to vulnerable communities, addressing social and economic development, ensuring sustained political support, and robust analysis and monitoring throughout the life of discrete programs and projects.

⁶ See Abt and Winship (2016), p. 9.

⁷ See Muggah (2015c).

⁸ A recent meta-review on what works in reducing community violence found that most evidence-informed interventions concentrate on specific people, places and behaviors; requires legitimacy of authorities in the eyes of the community; and are proactive on prevention. In particular, interventions involving focused deterrence and cognitive-based therapy showed promising results. See full report at <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf>.

⁹ See IDB (2014)

¹⁰ See <https://igarape.org.br/en/citizen-security-dashboard/> and Muggah and Aguirre (2013).

¹¹ See Jaitman and Guerrero (2015).

¹² See Muggah (2014).



BOLIVIA: Local strategies to prevent and respond to gender-based violence

More than half of Bolivia's population is female and the country contends with high rates of gendered and domestic violence. Indeed, Bolivia has the second highest rates of sexual violence in Latin America: 1 in 3 women reportedly experience sexual violence each year, and 4 out of 5 are exposed to some kind of violence in their lifetime.¹³ The Observatorio Manuela del CIDEM estimates that a "femicide" (gender-motivated killing) occurs at least once every three days in Bolivia.¹⁴ A concentration of associated resources

and services in urban areas means that Bolivian women in the countryside are even more vulnerable, thereby experiencing double discrimination by virtue of being a rural resident.

A number of initiatives have been launched in Bolivia to prevent violence against women and improve access to effective services or recourse for victims. A prominent intervention launched by the Bolivian NGO Fundación

¹³ See "Estrategias Locales...", p. 4.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 4-8.

Construir included efforts to prevent domestic violence and femicide, increase service provision to rural areas of the country, and mobilize female empowerment groups to reinforce these efforts. From 2010-2011 the Estrategias Locales de Prevención y Atención de la Violencia Basada en Género was implemented in four rural Bolivian communities: Pucarani (department of La Paz), Punata (department of Cochabamba), Challapata (department of Oruro), and Uriondo (department of Tarija). The catchment area included 7,022 women and girls and 4,748 men and boys.

Construir's intervention began with a baseline to identify key risks and vulnerabilities affecting women in Bolivian society. This was immediately followed by an action plan setting out discrete measures to mitigate these risks. The diagnostic was premised on a series of household surveys, official statistics, and extensive desk research. Researchers also conducted field research with service providers and civil society. The overarching goals of the program were to increase awareness and change community attitudes towards gender based violence (GBV), increase institutional capacity to respond to incidents of GBV, and to empower women to become leaders for change in their communities while fighting against gendered violence.

Construir's intervention featured three basic components. First, there was a pillar devoted to education and training for communities and social organizations. The focus was on developing awareness campaigns with educational fairs, radio spots, and mobilization campaigns rejecting violence against women in the community.¹⁵ The second pillar set out a capacity building component for service provision to victims. Workshops were introduced to strengthen the capacities of municipal personnel, the health sector, judicial authorities and other community groups. The third pillar focused on empowering women to defend their rights. Leadership training for women's groups was launched alongside engagement with local governments to focus on gender-sensitive policies and to improve services to victims and survivors.

The Construir team developed and coordinated the overall initiative. It established relationships with pertinent local NGOs, conducted quality control and liaised with outside funders. It also helped establish the Citizen Networks for Violence Prevention (Redes Ciudadanas de Prevención de la Violencia) to raise

visibility and awareness on the issue. During the implementation of the program Construir trained service providers on issues of gendered violence. A major challenge was the lack of programmatic infrastructure in some of the target communities. For example, two program sites, Pucarani and Challapata, lacked a SLIM (Servicios Legales Integrales Municipales) office, requiring Construir engagement.¹⁶ Other obstacles related to the persistence of cultural norms that discriminated against women and normalized routine domestic violence.

An independent evaluation of the program was conducted by the Universidad de Chile, the IDB, and the Open Society Foundation in 2013. At the time of the evaluation, however, no concrete project outcomes were available, reducing the value of such an assessment. What was available was basic baseline data on outputs, including routine monitoring and evaluation. The University of Chile-led evaluation thus drew from participation lists from discrete initiatives supported by the initiative, as well as reports from local implementing organizations for events like training workshops. This data was supplemented with evaluation forms from events as well as small-scale surveys with service providers.

Although difficult to discern higher-order impacts, a number of outputs were reported. Specifically, some 11,770 people were trained in awareness of violence against women as a crime. Construir also supported five public awareness campaigns (including through radio announcements) reaching as many as 96,000 listeners, two mobilization marches protesting domestic violence, and more than 190 training workshops on women's rights and capacity building for addressing violence effectively.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the intervention also engaged almost 960 indigenous and local leaders in training, supported two national dialogues and 80 dialogues with a wide network of stakeholders and produced a training manual for service providers.

¹⁵ Workshops for community stakeholders including municipal governments, students, service providers, youth groups, parent/teacher associations, indigenous authorities, etc. also made up part of the training.

¹⁶ SLIMs are local municipal offices established to protect women from domestic violence and include on their staff lawyers, social workers and psychologists to provide adequate services to victims.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 22.

Figure 1. Femicide and Female Homicide Statistics in Bolivia 2009-2013¹⁸

Year	Femicides	Female Homicides (besides femicide)	Total Female Homicides
2009	98	45	143
2010	89	56	145
2011	96	61	157
2012	99	48	147
2013	110	64	174
Total	492	274	766

Source: Observatorio “Manuela” Violencia, Femicidio, y Mujeres en Riesgo - CIDEM

There is emerging evidence that the Construir-led initiative is effecting change in behavior and trends in violence. For example, 16 municipalities in Punata and Pucarani have adopted and adhered to the program since the beginning of the initiative. In addition, the University of Chile assessment cites the creation of four citizen networks for violence prevention; more than 4,700 women educated about their rights; the creation of a SLIM office in Pucarani and Challapata; and a marked increase in budgets for gender initiatives in Uriondo and Punata, among others. The central question remains, however, as to whether the initiative resulted in improved safety for women and girls. Accurate numbers on violence against women are notoriously underreported. While data are unavailable at the department level of Bolivia, figure 1 highlights femicides, female homicides (i.e. not necessarily gender-related female deaths) and total female deaths for 2009-2013, covering the period of the program’s implementation. Without subnational level data it is impossible to attribute statistics to project outcomes, but a superficial reading suggests that they have yet to decline.

¹⁸ See <http://www.cidem.org.bo/index.php/cidem/publicaciones/383-bastadefemicidio14.html>.



BRAZIL: Stay Alive in Belo Horizonte

Brazil features the world's highest number of homicides, and above-average rates of violence in its primary cities. Lethal violence is also on the rise: in 1996 the national homicide rate was 24.8 per 100,000 inhabitants and by 2015 it had risen to 28.5 per 100,000.¹⁹ To put Brazil in international perspective, the country is home to more than 10% of the world's total homicides²⁰ as well as 32 of the world's

top 50 most violent cities over 250,000 people.²¹ But murder is not evenly distributed. In the northeast region homicide rates have increased exponentially,²² rising 300% in state capital cities such as Natal between 2002 and 2012. Meanwhile, southern states like São Paulo²³ and Rio de Janeiro have managed to reduce their respective homicide rates by as much as 70% over the same period.²⁴

¹⁹ See Homicide Monitor at homicide.igarape.org.br.

²⁰ See UNODC (2014).

²¹ See <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/03/daily-chart-18>.

²² The highest concentrations are in Pará and Amazonas. Likewise, lethal violence has also increased steadily in the south and central regions, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Goiás. See Waiselfiz (2013).

²³ Much has been made in media circles of the 'São Paulo miracle' which resulted in plunging violence rates over the past decade. Key lessons relate to the importance of restructuring the military police, investing in information systems to facilitate smarter operations, expanding the capabilities of the civil police homicide department and their ability to protect witnesses, arms control and local violence prevention initiatives. See Rizzo (2013).

²⁴ See Waiselfiz (2014).

The effectiveness of Brazilian cities in reducing violence is due to a number of factors at the policy, strategic and operational levels. At the policy level, the creation of a national policy framework and municipal strategies and coordination mechanisms for prevention helped set priorities and target resources. Meanwhile, at the strategic level, the sequencing of measures to recover urban space from non-state actors, followed by re-establishing state presence with basic services, also helped set the stage for preventive measures. Another critical innovation was the creation of integrated data systems designed to identify hot spots and target resources appropriately.²⁵ Finally, at the program level, measures addressing at-risk youth fostered an enabling environment for prevention. A community-orientation gave neighborhood residents a key role in prioritizing, implementing and monitoring programs in their areas.

Brazilian states and cities are experimenting with citizen security, especially innovative policing combined with social welfare programs.²⁶ Examples include interventions such as the Integration and Management and Public Security (IGESP), Group Specialized in Policing Risky Areas (GEPAR), Pacification Police Units (UPP), Pacto Pela Vida (Pact for Life), and Fica Vivo (Stay Alive).²⁷ Fica Vivo in Belo Horizonte, which has received comparatively less exposure than similar interventions in Rio de Janeiro, Recife and Sao Paulo.

During the late 1990s violence began diffusing from coastal cities such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Vitória to other Brazilian cities in the northeast and interior. Belo Horizonte, the capital of Brazil's second largest state Minas Gerais, suffered an explosion of criminal activity and social disorder as a result of the rapid penetration of the cocaine trade and the increasing use of crack and other derivatives. Gangs with an interest in retail and wholesale drug trade concentrated their activities in low-income informal settlements, or favelas. The homicide rate surged from 17 per 100,000 in 1998 to 33.9 per 100,000 by 2002.

In response, state and city authorities in Belo Horizonte initiated a number of innovative citizen security strategies. Arguably the most important of these was the creation of Fica Vivo. Its origins can be traced back

to a research study on homicide commissioned by the then-newly elected state governor, Aécio Neves. The review determined that homicidal violence, as well as the drug trade and gang conflict, was concentrated in six of the city's key favelas. Local policymakers actively sought to draw on good practices and target areas of high homicide, especially young people (12-24 years).

Fica Vivo's "weeds and seeds" approach was inspired by innovative community policing projects underway in Rio de Janeiro as well as elements of Boston's celebrated Ceasefire program.²⁸ On the basis of a review of international experience, the state's Social Defense Secretariat, with support from scholars²⁹ and foundations, designed a two-pronged community policing program to promote more effective and responsive law enforcement. At the same time, state and city authorities also implemented social programs to transform the relationship between affected communities and public entities through education, training and support from local business. A comprehensive strategy combining control and prevention measures was adopted: the focus was on "hot" areas and populations that were most at risk of perpetration or being victimized.³⁰

Fica Vivo has two operational pillars. It begins with a "strategic intervention" consisting of targeted policing actions in hotspot areas to apprehend hardened criminals, administer searches, seize guns and inhibit open drug trafficking. Monthly community forums were established to discuss security problems and coordinate strategic responses.³¹ Periodic meetings with criminal justice officials were also established to identify priority areas, analyze local dynamics and create joint strategies for selected territories. The second pillar involves social prevention and protection activities, providing 12-14 years olds, and especially those involved with criminal activities. Activities include educational and cultural events, professional training in specific trades, sports and recreation, professional psychological counselling, as well as workshops to discuss violence prevention.³²

A key feature of the program is the coordination among different government agencies, civil society and the academia.³³ A so-called General Coordination Group was created to manage the program's implementation.

25 These systems were accompanied with investments in strengthening management and oversight of the data collection architecture.

26 A study by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice detected over 168 prevention practices in 2005, with 56 per cent involving military police and firemen, 23 per cent civil police, and over 20 per cent divided between state secretaries and non-governmental organizations. The majority of the programs were oriented toward cities focused on 12-24 year olds.

27 See Beato and Silveria (2014) at <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/collections/special/citizen-security-dialogues-making-brazilian-cities-safer> for a review of innovations in Belo Horizonte, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

28 See Braga et al (2011).

29 The Fica Vivo program was developed in close collaboration with scholars at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, the main university in the region, as well as the Fundação João Pinheiro, an elite state funded public policy school. The program maintained detailed metrics, especially in its early stages, evaluating the progress of both the policing and social sides. These extensive and close observations helped to expose the program to both internal and external criticism that helped, over the years, to improve the program while it was in its early stages.

30 See Beato and Silveira (2014), World Bank (2013).

31 See Silveira et al. (2010), World Bank (2013).

32 Most workshop coordinators were from the community, had local credibility and assumed key roles in dialoging with local leaders and gang members to mediate conflicts and provide space for Fica Vivo. Moreover, they served as key interlocutors with the police to improve the quality of policing.

33 See Silveira et al. (2010), World Bank (2013), Beato and Silveira (2014).

It integrated representatives from two main groups in charge of operationalizing Fica Vivo: the “community mobilization group,” which included community leaders, local officials, NGO representatives, the private sector and UFMG university and the “strategic intervention group,” composed by law enforcement agencies (civil and military police forces), the judiciary, the public prosecutor’s office, and also representatives from UFMG.³⁴

The first trial of Fica Vivo was elaborated with community inputs in mid-2002 and launched in Morro das Pedras, a poorer neighborhood located in adjacent to a comparatively well-off section of the city. The policing component of the initiative was led by a detachment of police known as GEPAR.³⁵ The police deployment occurred in parallel with an array of social programs designed to reduce individual dependence on gangs and criminal activity and addressing the needs of at-risk populations. However, under the direction of the police, the social programs were poorly coordinated and by 2003 unraveled owing to internal problems and the replacement of the commander in charge.

In 2004, the Fica Vivo social programs were reorganized to scale up engagement and interaction with communities.³⁶ The community-based approach is emphasized from the design to the execution and monitoring stages. Local residents of targeted neighborhoods played a key role, from the development of local plans to improve citizen security, to the execution of specific activities and their overall monitoring and

supervision. Placing the community at center helped to strengthen “social control, social cohesion and trust among neighbors.”³⁷

The results were
breathtaking ... a 69
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homicides

The Fica Vivo pilot was subjected to several evaluations. Among them was a quasi-experimental study involving analysis of time-series data on homicide in Morro das Pedras between 2002-2006.³⁸ The homicide rates were compared against those in other violent and non-violent favelas in Belo Horizonte. In order to test whether homicides had decreased as a result of the intervention, a statistical model was established. The results were breathtaking. Silveira et al (2010, 2008) reported a 69% reduction in the mean number of homicides. And while the extent of the decreases fluctuated following the partial resumption of the program, the difference between coefficients over time did not register any statistical significance.³⁹

Figure 2. Fica Vivo / GEPAR Locations and Total Homicides 2001-2006

Fica Vivo / GEPAR Locations and Total Homicides 2001-2006 ⁴¹								
Location	Launched	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Alto Vera Cruz and Taquaril	2005	18	54	53	67	63	36	31
Cabana do Pai Tomás	2005	14	36	26	16	16	12	11
Paulo VI and Ribeiro de Abreu	2005	19	26	39	57	52	29	23
Pedreira Prado Lopes	2004	9	11	5	61	23	14	9
Morro das Pedras and Ventosa	2002	19	27	33	16	11	16	18
City of Belo Horizonte	-----	640	900	1174	1284	1100	998	1002

³⁴ See Silveira et. al (2010).

³⁵ GEPAR was led by a lieutenant connected to the local battalion of the Polícia Militar de Minas Gerais.

³⁶ The revised intervention was managed by civil servants with a background in social work and psychology and designed explicitly to expand services to young people at the highest risk of being murdered.

³⁷ See Beato and Silveira (2014), p. 11.

³⁸ See Silveira et al (2010) and Silveira (2008).

³⁹ Ibid.

The success of the pilot led to the expansion of the Fica Vivo program to four other areas around the city.⁴⁰ All of these new programs were jointly initiated with both a GEPAR policing unit and a Fica Vivo community center. They were guided by strategic working groups that included civil police, prosecutors, representatives of the state's child welfare agencies, and schools. The groups developed longer-term strategies to address persistent problems in the area and to bring recidivist criminals to justice.

Between 2004 to 2007, the combined Fica Vivo-GEPAR programs dramatically decreased lethal violence in affected communities. The five target communities experienced homicide reductions, on average, of more than 50% – much higher than for the city as a whole (see figure 2). Not surprisingly, these early successes led to a spike in demand for the expansion of the program into the wider metropolitan area and the interior of the state.

Today, there are 45 Social Crime Prevention Units in the State (up from 19 in 2005), 14 of which located in Belo Horizonte, which manage both Fica Vivo and the Conflict Mediation Centers at the territorial level. Fica Vivo has benefited more than 11,000 youth per year since 2005, and the Conflict Mediation Program has attended more 183,000 cases since its creation that same year. The percentage of cases that achieved a peaceful resolution went from 60% in 2005 (when about 4,000 were registered), to 90% in 2014, when over 23,000 were managed.⁴²

A close inspection of the Fica Vivo program in Belo Horizonte identified some challenges. The decline in homicidal violence required extensive engagement and was costly.⁴³ It also demanded strong political alignment at the state and city level, conditions that are not always present in other regions of the country.⁴⁴ Furthermore, changing the attitudes and behavior of the state military police was difficult.

In spite of doctrinal and institutional reforms, there were nonetheless publicized cases of police violence against the population and other misconduct. Interestingly, it was information gathered by Fica Vivo and community members that led to the removal of some police officers and contributed to improved dialogue on how to improve police behavior. Even so, the Fica Vivo program constitutes a major innovation in citizen security. It shaped debate and practice not just in Minas Gerais, but across Brazil, including with the more recently launched pacification police units in Rio de Janeiro.⁴⁵

40 These included Taquaril or Alto Vera Cruz, Pedreira Prado Lopes, Paulo VI or Rebeira de Abreu, and Cabana do Pai Tomás.

41 Data courtesy of the Centro de Estudos da Criminologia, Federal University of Minas Gerais.

42 Presentation made by Talles Andrade de Souza, Special Coordinator for the Prevention of Crime at SEDS from 2011 until 2015, at the IX Brazil Forum for Public Security Annual event in Rio de Janeiro, July 2015.

43 It involved police and social worker engagement together with grassroots leaders and other members of the local intervention team including prosecutors, investigative police, local public school officials, and child services workers.

44 For example, most other cities did not benefit from the unusually positive relationship between the state governor and mayor that had been a feature of the intervention in Belo Horizonte. The state government oversees the security forces while the city government maintains public services such as streets, lighting, and public schools. State and city collaboration, including in assignment of quality personnel, was therefore essential. Without this cooperation and commitment, gaps rapidly emerged.

45 See Muggah and Souza (2012) and Cano et al (2012).



BRAZIL: Pacification police units in Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro witnessed rising rates of homicidal violence for at least three decades. The country's political transition back to democracy in the 1980s (after a two-decade hiatus) coincided with a dramatic surge in criminal violence. This can be attributed for the most part to a transformation in the market for narcotics, especially cocaine, including growing demand within Brazilian cities. Drug trafficking and consumption surged in the 1990s and 2000s. In the process, homicide rates in the city spiked to more than 80 murders per 100,000.⁴⁶

Lethal violence in Rio de Janeiro, as elsewhere, is spatially and socially concentrated. Above-average rates of violent victimization are present in the metropolitan region's 800 or so irregular informal settlements, or favelas, where some 20% of the metropolitan population resides.⁴⁷ Many of these favelas are immediately adjacent to much wealthier neighborhoods. And yet owing to a combination of state neglect and rapid urbanization, they are socially and administratively segregated from the rest of the city, with more limited access to public and private services.

⁴⁶ See LAV-UERJ (2012).

⁴⁷ See Zaluar and Barcellos (2013).

Owing to uneven state presence, criminal factions quickly filled the vacuum left in many favela neighborhoods. A parallel hybrid governance structure emerged, with drug trafficking organizations, militia groups and mafia entities involved in providing various forms of security, health and education, sanitation and electricity services. Their control over the favelas was financed by (and contributed to) the distribution of drugs (through what are colloquially known as *bocas do fumo*) and other forms of rent extraction. Predictably, various criminal groups violently disputed control over territory which in turn contributed to soaring rates of homicide, disappearances and displacement.⁴⁸

In Brazil, the state authorities oversee the two main law enforcement agencies—military and civil police forces—while cities are responsible for unarmed municipal guards. The military police are charged with maintaining order, while civil police are responsible for investigations. Rio de Janeiro's state and municipal governments have initiated a series of measures to tackle homicidal violence over the past two decades. One of the most well-known community-based approaches was the *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE)⁴⁹ which was prematurely ended owing to political disputes and accusations of graft. The uneven coordination between civil and military police, and state and municipal governments frustrated efforts to improve citizen security.

A change of approach occurred in 2008, however, with the launch of the so-called *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (police pacification units), or UPP, which was made possible due to a political convergence among federal, state and municipal parties. The UPPs were Rio de Janeiro state government's attempt to break the cycle of violence in the favelas and reintegrate their residents to the rest of the city. The large-scale community policing initiative centered on intensive police intervention component followed by a social and urban development strategy. Its goal was to decrease lethal violence in crime-affected neighborhoods through the assertion of territorial control, the formalization and delivery of services, recruitment of new police, and the introduction of doctrinal changes and new metrics of success.

The policing component included placing a much higher number of police officers per inhabitant (when compared with other regions of the city) in the most

crime-affected territories. More than 9,000 new UPP officers were deployed between 2009 and 2015 across 38 geographic areas (a catchment of over 500,000 residents).

The UPP initiative adopted the principles of proximity policing and planned to keep and integrate officers in favela territories, indicating an ambitious attempt to change Rio's history of brutal policing. All UPP officers were newly trained (especially in human rights and conflict mediation) and received bonuses depending on the extent of violence reduction in their areas of operation.⁵⁰ The implementation of the UPPs was also accompanied by the establishment of a system of goals and bonuses based on results, measured against strategic crime indicators.⁵¹

The UPP initiative drew inspiration from a range of public security models. Examples include Plan Cuadrantes in Colombia⁵² and experiments from Brazil to the United States.⁵³ The UPP initiative is essentially about reasserting physical control over territories alongside a hearts and mind campaign to strengthen trust and confidence among residents. In theory, it proceeds along a number of phases beginning first with the intervention of the Special Operations Battalion (BOPE) to displace traffickers and establish a base. Once the area is cleared, a second phase seeks to address a number of risk factors shaping social and economic disorder. The goal was to formalize and expand public service provision and provide economic and social opportunities to favela residents.

The development phase was to be achieved through UPP Social, as it was originally called, the "social arm" of the UPP program that aimed to consolidate peace and promote social development in these areas. Announced in 2010, two years after the pilot UPP was launched, this social component was another key difference between the UPP and previous policies targeted at favelas. The program's main role was to interact closely with the communities, gather information through tools such as participatory mapping and field agents, and coordinate with other agencies so they could provide the needed services. UPP Social thus held the promise of completing the integration of the favelas to the rest of the city by allowing those residents the same type of social services and economic and social opportunities provided to the rest.

48 See Muggah (2015a).

49 See Muggah and Szabo de Carvalho (2014).

50 See WOLA (2011), p. 4.

51 See Lima et al (2016).

52 See <http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/events/conferences/ebp/2012/policeformtrainingandcrime.pdf>.

53 See Dos Ramos and Muggah (2014).

However, though the UPP process has been effective in terms of reducing lethal and non-lethal violence, it has been less effective in engendering rapid improvements in development. UPP Social initiative was intended to harness community forums and undertake diagnostics to match supply and demand requirements for social and economic development.⁵⁴ But the initiative failed to define a clear set of priorities or effectively coordinate activities between the state and mayor's office. Instead, police were required not just to engage in law enforcement, but also assume the role of social worker. In order to jump-start the social side of the pacification initiative, the program was renamed Rio+Social in 2014.⁵⁵ Although the program is today present in all communities with UPPs,⁵⁶ criticisms continue concerning the lack of advancements in the local development agenda.

The overall impacts of pacification in relation to homicide reduction are impressive (see Figure 3). Between 2009

and 2014, the murder rate declined by more than 65% across the city, though started creeping back up in some areas in 2015 and 2016. The reductions are most pronounced in pacified areas and the displacement effects, while present, are marginal.⁵⁸ A comprehensive impact evaluation by the Laboratório de Análise da Violência (LAV) examined the extent to which the UPP affected criminality, the relationship between the police and the community, and resident perceptions regarding security, social inclusion, and economic activity.⁵⁹ Indicators were compared before and after the UPP intervention to assess their impact.⁶⁰ There was a significant reduction in the homicide rate in these areas, in the order of 75% when compared with the control communities. Researchers also found that the UPPs had facilitated an increase in public investment, as well as the formalization of economic activities in these territories, leading to greater social and political impacts (although the amount of investments and their respective impacts varied widely among different communities).⁶¹

Figure 3. Crime reported before and after UPP in selected communities: 2006-2011⁵⁷

	Average Monthly Cases per Community		Monthly Rate (Average) per 100,000 in each community	
	Pre UPP	Post UPP	Pre UPP	Post UPP
All violent deaths	0.94	0.25	10.03	2.21
Intentional homicide	0.36	0.15	3.37	0.87
"Resistance deaths" (Police shooting deaths)	0.50	0.01	5.70	0.12
Disappearances	0.32	0.71	3.60	6.92
Intentional injury	3.34	11.66	41.33	127.36
Domestic violence	2.17	8.47	27.12	84.66
Threats	2.30	7.97	29.45	99.24
Rape	0.14	0.37	1.35	4.84
Robbery	5.87	2.70	61.23	20.58
Pickpocketing	3.48	5.38	46.46	64.99
Drug related crime	1.91	5.83	24.13	63.93

Source: Instituto de Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro (ISP) and IBGE

NOTE: **Bold italic** numbers indicate increased incidence during period studied

⁵⁴ See WOLA, p. 4.

⁵⁵ See <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=17660>.

⁵⁶ In 2015, Rio + Social was operating in 41 communities with UPPs (some UPPs cover more than one community), reaching a total of 30 territories. According to IPP, between 2009 and 2014 approximately R\$ 1.8 billion (US\$ 460 million, based on the exchange rate of February 5th, 2016, with 1 US\$ at R\$ 3.91) was invested by the program in education, health, urbanization, elimination of areas at risk, and the provision of services such as installation of streetlights and garbage collection. <http://www.riomaissocial.org/mapa-riomaissocial/#sthash.8XeWYUxX.dpuf>, accessed on February 1st 2016.

⁵⁷ LAV-UERG (2012), Table 3, p. 32.

⁵⁸ According to studies by the World Bank, neighborhood effects are positive and adjacent communities actually benefit from this type of policing.

⁵⁹ To measure changes in crime rates, the study drew on quantitative data from primary sources including registries from the civil police. Resident and police perceptions were measured on the basis of 82 semi-structured interviews. See LAV-UERG (2012), p. 12.

⁶⁰ In addition, the LAV study looked only at the security portion of UPP, not UPP Social/Rio+Social.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 171.

The impacts of pacification on a wider range of non-lethal criminal indicators are more uneven. For example, the LAV assessment determined that while lethal crime decreased⁶² reported rates of rape, domestic violence, and local intimidation increased.⁶³ There are several arguments to explain these dynamics. For example, it is possible that pacification has undermined the power structures of criminal gangs, rendering them unable to enforce their internal codes of conduct. Others argue that the increase in reporting on criminality may be a function of increased confidence among residents to report to local authorities.⁶⁴ Another intriguing impact related to pacification is the decline and re-concentration of violent encounters and stray bullets. A review of recent UPP data suggests a high degree of concentration of encounter violence in a relatively small selection of areas. What is more, an analysis of the breakdown of stray bullets suggests they are concentrated during certain periods in the week and times of day. A key challenge for the UPP will be managing to ultimately contain and reduce violence in these specific areas and times.

The implementation of the pacification process was not welcomed by all residents. Semi-structured interview findings show that while in some UPP areas police-community relations had improved, in others relations were tense and marked by disagreements over the imposition of new rules. Young people in particular resent the requirement to turn down music during popular baile funk parties.⁶⁵ Others complain of continued harassment and violence by police. While 80% of respondents to a 2010 survey stated that police-community tensions persisted in the community, 68% of the same respondents stated that they were satisfied with the behavior of the police.⁶⁶

Another common criticism is that the UPPs did not pay enough attention to existing local leaders and associations prior to entering these areas. Meetings with community leaders and residents would be hosted, but they were not part of the design of solutions and there were no strong accountability mechanisms to allow a constant flow of information and feedback in all areas.⁶⁷ The lack of structure and systematization, combined with weak links with local

While the program continues to contribute to reductions in homicide, it courts controversy and presents operational dilemmas

leaders, led local UPP captains to act in some ways as local chiefs. Such captains effectively tried to occupy a function previously held by drug traffickers, but still with little legitimacy within the communities.⁶⁸

The UPP experiment will likely continue into 2016 and 2017. And while the program continues to contribute to sustained reductions in homicide, it also courts controversy and presents operational dilemmas. High-profile cases of disappearances, torture and stray bullets implicating the UPP in Cantagalo, Complexo do Alemão, Maré and Rocinha have strained the credibility of the military police.⁶⁹ There is growing recognition that the pacification project must also adapt to the changing realities of criminal gangs.⁷⁰ This includes better institutionalization of the initiative, improvements in doctrine and training, and more high-dosage investments in social welfare (Rio+Social) in hot spots.

In 2015 the government established, through two different decrees, a Pacification Policy and the Pacification Police Program, recognizing the need of further institutionalizing the program.⁷¹ The first is intended to incorporate the latter, which is supposed to be followed by the Social Occupation Phase. The overall Pacification Policy will thus provide a broader framework for the policing component, now better

62 The homicide rate dropped dramatically between 2009 and 2013, but experienced a slight increase in 2014 and 2015, albeit still more than 60% from the high in 2008.

63 Ibid., p. 32.

64 See World Bank (2012), p. 39.

65 These popular music parties tend to take place during weekends and are regularly underwritten by traffickers and organized crime groups.

66 See LAV-UERG (2012), p. 8.

67 See Lima et al (2016).

68 See Lima et al (2016) and World Bank (2013).

69 See <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=21350>, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-muggah/stray-bullets-are-no-acci_b_6593798.html.

70 See Complexo do Alemão: democracy is hard, <http://riorealblog.com/2015/04/11/complexo-do-alemao-democracy-is-hard/>.

71 The decrees were No 45.146, of February 5th 2015, and No 45.186, of March 17th 2015, respectively. In 2015, the State Government, in partnership with the International Association for the Administration of Cities and Municipalities (ICMA), the non-governmental organization ISER and USAID, also launched a toolkit about the UPPs, further systematizing the process to develop specific training materials for UPP officers at different ranks and with different responsibilities. In this document, the government not only reviews a series of lessons learned in the process, but also clarifies some of its earlier premises that had led to criticism. For instance, it acknowledges, explicitly, that the term used for the process – “pacified communities”, or “communities in the process of pacification” – only refers to a stage of the program in that area, and not to the fact that “peace has been taken to this place”. The document also acknowledges the importance of better understanding the local dynamics of crime in order to gain legitimacy (Secretaria de Estado de Segurança do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, SESEG. 2015. “UPP: da origem do programa à política de pacificação”. Available at <http://www.amuprev.org/biblioteca/publicacion.php?id=122>).

systematized and with proposed mechanisms of better monitoring and accountability; while also strengthening, at least normatively, the social component.

Regardless, the UPP experiment is considered a tentative success in terms of homicide reduction. It has also initiated a much needed process of linking the informal and formal areas of the city. And the pacification process has been multi-directional and dual-use; it stabilizes violence-prone neighborhoods as well as pacifying the police.⁷² Further efforts to strengthen social components of program seek to address identified deficiencies and produce further learnings to improve the balance and sustainability of the initiative.

⁷² See <http://riorealblog.com/2012/07/29/pacification-saves-lives-the-first-full-blown-impact-study/>.



CHILE: Targeted program to improve human wellbeing in Valparaíso

Chile is routinely singled-out as a high achiever when it comes to human development in Latin America. More neoliberal and pro-market than its immediate neighbors, the country features a robust economy and progressive approach to social issues. Despite (or perhaps because of) these impressive achievements, the country is also struggling with issues facing other high-income settings, including growing consumption of illicit substances. Substance abuse by at-risk Chilean youth and adolescents is a growing challenge and can negatively impact development outcomes.

Chile regularly registers amongst the highest levels of prevalence for substance use among secondary school students in the region. These rates have spiraled upward owing to the increasing popularity of inhalants and cocaine derivatives. In 2009, for example, the country reported the highest prevalence of cocaine use among secondary school students in the Americas at 6.7% (trailed by the U.S. at 4.6%).⁷³ As part of a harm reduction approach to this issue, Chile has been working with youth drug offenders to provide appropriate counseling and services in order to promote healthy behaviors, decrease violence and improve opportunities for social and familial reinsertion.

⁷³ See OAS (2011b), p. 39.

The Programa Aplicación del Enfoque del Modelo de Ocupación Humana en Programa de Tratamiento de Drogas y Alcohol para Adolescentes Infractores de Ley (PAMOH) is a rehabilitation and social reinsertion program for youth and young adult drug offenders in the city of Valparaíso. Launched in 2010, it applies the Model of Human Occupation (MOHO) therapy approach. PAMOH is designed to offer substance abuse treatment for young offenders between 14 and 18 years of age, but also of offenders up to the age of 20. The MOHO approach relies on buy-in from core beneficiaries, positive habit-forming behavior, and improved mental and physical capacities.

PAMOH was established on the basis of Law 20.0841 which set out broad principles for treating adolescent drug offenders and encouraged coordination between the Ministries of Health, Justice, and the Interior. PAMOH advocates a holistic and health-centered approach (as opposed to a law enforcement and punitive emphasis) to dealing with young drug users. Prior to the launch of PAMOH, a link between drug use and youth crime was detected; approximately 80% of youth charged with delinquency reported marijuana use, while 50% reported using cocaine derivatives.⁷⁴ However, youth offenders using marijuana only received treatment in 27% of cases, while youth offenders reporting cocaine use received treatment in just 46% of cases.

The PAMOH program conducted a lengthy diagnostic to identify risk factors for youth beneficiaries. In the process, it constructed participant profiles that included family and health histories, daily patterns of activities, interests, values and needs.⁷⁵ The treatment portion of the program focused heavily on developing healthy routines, as well as group and individual therapy sessions.⁷⁶ Free time activity included visits to public places, sports training, team building, and other activities to improve social skills of participants. All of these activities were tailored to the customs and habits found in Valparaíso in order to make the program more accessible to participants.

A critical component of PAMOH related to reinsertion of participants into the (formal) labor force. A key partnership was with the Colegio Técnico Industrial de Valparaíso. PAMOH was able to provide newly enrolled students with information on possible career paths offered through courses at the institution. A number of candidates at the college emerged as mechanics,

electricians, and welders. The hope was that the provision of meaningful career options could – by offering long-term horizons – encourage young people to avoid relapse or worse.

Figure 4. Crime in Valparaíso⁷⁷

Year	Arrests for Serious Crimes	Homicides	Homicide Rate
2005	3,930	17	2.00
2006	3,823	18	2.09
2007	4,436	18	2.06
2008	4,306	23	2.59
2009	4,418	17	1.89
2010	3,904	23	2.52
2011	3,848	19	2.05
2012	3,527	17	1.83
2013	3,487	22	2.33
2014	3,357	N/A	N/A

The PAMOH program also invested heavily in monitoring and evaluation tools, including a daily journal maintained by program coordinators on daily participant performance together with workshop evaluations. A program assessment was also conducted as part of the Buenas Practicas en Prevención del Delito en América Latina y el Caribe initiative, a joint program between the Universidad de Chile, the IDB and the Open Society Foundation in 2012.⁷⁸ Observed outcomes include improvements in mental, sexual, and physical health of participants. Improvements in their capacity to relate to others and adapt to challenging circumstances were also noted, contributing to improved prospects for social and labor reinsertion. At the time of the evaluation, however, no participants were discharged from the program, so it was impossible to evaluate individual outcomes post-intervention.

While still lacking a hard experimental or quasi-experimental impact evaluation, PAMOH appears to offer a positive approach for treating substance abuse as a socio-health issue rather than a criminal

⁷⁴ See Cárdenas, p. 6.

⁷⁵ A major tenet of MOHO requires constructing healthy and positive routines, so obtaining a baseline of the participant's routine and habits prior to participation was considered essential.

⁷⁶ Following the MOHO model, these routines focused on the realms of daily life, productivity, and free time. Daily life activities included personal hygiene and nutrition. The productivity activities included sexual health, vocational training, and goal setting.

⁷⁷ Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, Secretaría de Prevención del Delito, <http://seguridadpublica.gov.cl/estadisticas/>.

⁷⁸ See Cárdenas.

one. It is still difficult to evaluate effectiveness without knowing the social and labor outcomes of former participants. While options for scaling up are feasible in the Chilean context, it is important to first investigate the outcomes of former participants, including rates of recidivism, employment status, and familial and social relationships.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, PAMOH is a good example of how governments can proactively address youth violence and substance abuse, transforming outcomes for vulnerable segments of the population.

⁷⁹ A qualitative evaluation to learn more about these outcomes, as well as perceptions of the program from facilitators, participants, and family members, could be worthwhile.



COLOMBIA: Plan Cuadrante

Few countries in the world have suffered from more intense and enduring violence over the last century than Colombia. The country experienced a civil war in the 1940s and 1950s known obliquely as “La Violencia”. Since the 1960s, Colombia has been seized by a protracted conflict pitting multiple left-wing guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary groups against one another and the military and police. The conflict was exacerbated by cocaine and heroin production and trafficking since the 1970s, with homicide and victimization rates increasing by almost 160% in less than 10 years, between 1985 and 1995.⁸⁰ Despite some advances against organized crime high levels of violence continued through the next decade.

Although the country’s cities still have among the highest murder rates in Latin America, in recent decades Colombia has become a major reference point for the field of urban violence reduction and prevention. In a process that involved a shift from control toward prevention, significant national and metropolitan-led efforts (in partnership with academics and business people) contributed to sharp and steady reductions in crime rates. In 2015, Colombia registered 22.8 murders per 100,000 — its lowest rate in thirty years.⁸¹

⁸⁰ See Heinemann and Verner (2006), p. 5.

⁸¹ See Gagne (2016).

Colombia has legitimate claims as the birthplace of citizen security. Its government was the first in Latin America and the Caribbean to introduce new thinking on ways to contain, prevent and reduce violence. The Colombian experience with successful reduction in urban violence is essentially a story about strong and consistent leadership by local governments, within a context of national reform. It began with the 1991 constitutional reforms that devolved more decision-making authorities to the municipal level, allowing mayors to take strong leadership in violence prevention.

Other factors explaining the Colombian success in citizen security include the establishment of crime and violence surveillance systems that facilitated the targeting of resources to geographic areas and high-risk populations where they could be most effective. What is more, the combination of control measures with a strong focus on social and situational prevention that addressed key risk factors helped build resilience to violence. These measures assembled a broad base of stakeholders, including researchers, non-profits and community leaders, to ensure that the interventions were mindful of local context, and provide feedback to make needed changes throughout implementation.

The 1991 constitutional changes devolved power to cities by redefining the role of mayors, giving them a stronger role in monitoring and guiding police activities. Newly empowered mayors, working within their own popular political mandates, began developing innovative approaches to the persistent criminal justice challenges facing Colombian cities. These mayors quickly introduced a range of innovative citizen security innovations. For example in Cali, Mayor Rodrigo Guerrero pursued data-driven crime control measures, drawing on epidemiological evidence.⁸² Although generating only modest gains owing to a lack of political support, it profoundly shaped the debate on citizen security in the country. In Bogota a succession of mayors, beginning in 1997 with Antanas Mockus and including Enrique Peñalosa and Luis Eduardo Gazon, all re-imagined citizen security policies and programs.

Some of Latin America and the Caribbean's most exciting citizen security interventions grew out of these early experiences. For the first time, cities supported more effective and efficient community policing programs (focused on hot spots and with clear metrics

Many of these interventions combined prevention with more effective and efficient local policing

of success) together with temporary bar closing times and alcohol restrictions focused on decreasing crime in the late night hours. Mayors also launched a women's night out to raise awareness of gender based violence, improved mobility and maintenance and use of public space, including through the improvement of lighting and the asphaltting of streets.

Meanwhile, Medellin Mayor Luis Perez (2001-2003) and Sergio Fajardo (2003-2009) introduced social urbanism and "urban acupuncture", together with principles of transparency and zero tolerance for corruption.⁸³ There, integrated urban projects included efforts to improve relations between the local administration and the national police force as well as investment in improving public spaces in those wards or comunas experiencing the highest levels of poverty and violence. A priority was providing basic public services – especially schools and libraries – throughout the city in both wealthy and central areas as well as in poor and outlying areas.⁸⁴

A focus of many of these interventions combined prevention with more effective and efficient local policing. The mayors aligned priorities defined by localities with those of the police, who fall under the control of the national authorities. While mayors can in principle define public safety policies, local police commanders do not exclusively report to them. Since the early 1990s, strong mayors have articulated strategies to work effectively with the police, including using greater levels of local funds to help support police in initiatives advocated by local leaders.

These shifts in the national and local policy environment were accompanied by major reforms within the police. These have included reforms in how the forces

⁸² See Guerrero and Concha-Eastman (2001). See also <http://www.bancomundial.org/es/events/2013/05/31/colombia-cali-crime-violence-prevention> and Rosenberg (2014) at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/colombias-data-driven-fight-against-crime/?_r=0.

⁸³ See <http://www.citiscopes.org/story/2014/how-medell%C3%ADn-revived-itself-part-4-road-%E2%80%9Cmost-innovative-city%E2%80%9D>.

⁸⁴ See Opinião e Notícia (2008). Worth noting that in Medellin, as in other cities, local government had been instable and weak. Indeed, Medellín had 49 mayors in 40 years, from 1948 to 1988 — this for a city that was nearing a population of two million.

⁸⁵ See Mansilla (2012) and Beato (n/d).

⁸⁶ With the support of academia (specifically Los Andes University), the reform also involved the development of a more business and results oriented policing system.

interact with the population, disciplinary measures, and approaches to using data to control crime.⁸⁵ There was a major reorganization of the police forces. Remarkably, these reforms were led by the institution itself rather than compelled by external political interventions. It began with a crackdown on corruption that resulted in the discharge of over 7,000 officers in 1994, and continued in 1995 with the creation of the National Police Integrated Management System (Sistema de Gestión Integral).⁸⁶ In spite of continued challenges, Colombia's police now operate much more effectively and consistent with international norms than in previous decades.

In parallel with these reforms, Colombia was also benefitting from improvements at the national level as well as a rethinking of broader security policy. In the 1990s and early 2000s the government made considerable advances against large-scale criminal enterprises such as the Medellín and Cali drug trafficking organizations.⁸⁷ While at times controversial, policies undertaken under the administrations of Alvaro Uribe and his successor Juan Manuel Santos from 2003 onwards also contributed greatly to public safety. Under the Uribe Administration the government focused on providing basic security in urban areas and securing transportation corridors between cities from attacks by non-state actors.⁸⁸ The result of the convergence of political restructuring, police reform and improvements in the security situation has been a marked decrease in violence in Colombia.⁸⁹

A number of high-level principles and policies were developed at the national level to guide violence reduction in cities throughout the country. Beginning in 2010, violence prevention took a prominent role at the national front. In that year, a Presidential Advisory Board on Safety (Alta Consejería Presidencial para la Seguridad) was created with the goal of defining a national and integrated policy that would respond to the main crime and violence challenges faced by Colombia's cities. The Advisory Board led the formulation of a National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy (Política Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Coexistencia, PNSCC). Officially launched in 2011, this policy, the first of its kind in Colombia's history, was created with the main goals of breaking the cycle of violence, strengthening the social environment and empowering local communities, and building capacity of scientific and judicial institutions.⁹¹

The Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes (PNVCC) was launched in 2010 by the national police as part of these national efforts and based on the same principles. The plan targeted the country's eight largest cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Bucaramanga, Pereira, and Cúcuta (see figure 6). The program used insights and strategies from community- and problem-oriented policing (COP and POP) to focus on building collaborative micro-level strategies to address challenges at the neighborhood level.

Figure 5. Homicide Rates in Colombia 2002-2015⁹⁰

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Rate	68.9	53.8	44.8	39.6	36.8	34.7	33	33.7	32.3	33.6	30.8	30.3	26.5	22.8
Count	28,387	22,526	19,036	17,086	16,119	15,423	14,911	15,454	15,013	15,803	14,670	14,294	12,626	11,000

87 In breaking the power of these major organizations, however, Colombia also displaced some of the control of the international narcotics trade and, as a result, some of the violence and conflict associated with that, to Mexico.

88 The government also pursued an intense campaign against guerilla forces in both urban and rural areas, significantly weakening and limiting the scope of activities of these groups over the years. The Uribe administration developed a controversial demobilization policy to control the activities of right-wing paramilitaries that served to decrease politically organized anti-guerilla activities in cities, but with their operational structures left largely intact, many of these organizations remobilized quickly to become medium-scale criminal enterprises across different regions of Colombia.

89 National homicide rates have declines from nearly 90 per 100,000 in 1991 to 22.8 per 100,000 in 2015. This level is high by international levels with some cities experiencing homicide rates well over 50 per 100,000 and, despite some improvements, continuing high levels of insecurity, often across a range of criminal activities not directly related to conflict including violent assaults, burglaries, and auto theft, in the country's largest cities.

90 See Homicide Monitor at homicide.igarape.org.br and UNODC at <http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html>.

91 At a conference held in Cali, in 2013, Francisco Lloreda, then head of the Advisory Board, explained that the national policy had been based on several evidence-based principles, including: "a) preventing violence is more effective and less costly than addressing its consequences, b) violence has multiple causes but also multiple intervention points, c) interventions should be comprehensive, but with focused implementation, d) and interventions should occur early in life and be prolonged. See World Bank (2014), p. 18.

Figure 6. Homicide rates per 100,000 for Colombia's eight largest cities⁹²

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Barranquilla	45	38	32	35	32	30	32	33	28	29	27	35
Bogota	30	18	15	10	10	15	20	20	22	17	17	17
Medellin	75	72	75	60	59	57	56	56	58	53	38	20
Cali	105	105	75	70	65	63	75	74	72	81	86	58
Bucaramanga				32	22	20	18	19	19	19	17	
Cucuta					78	60	53	47	50	57	44	28
Pereira					90	100	77	65	55	37	39	33
Cartagena								28	24	29	28	28

Figure 7. Crime per 100,000 people in 2010 and 2011

Municipality	Homicide		Home burglaries		Vehicle theft		Brawls	
	2010	2011	2010	2011	2010	2011	2010	2011
Barranquilla	52.7	47.7	36.3	33.7	139.5	80.4	234.4	258.1
Bogota	52	63.3	288.4	238.7	352.9	199.3	178.6	252.2
Medellin	62.8	74.5	6.2	5.3	92.9	88	58	16.1
Cali	95.7	70.5	82.3	55	375.5	212.3	308.8	253.4
Bucaramanga	23	20.9	129.3	199.9	44	30	532.2	368.8
Cucuta	2.8	2.3	2.1	8.1	2.5	4.7	25.8	0.7
Pereira	9.4	13.8	25.2	29.8	3.4	4.2	0	0

A key innovation of the PNVCC, or Plan Cuadrantes, was its divesting of autonomy to local units. The program divided the regions overseen by police stations into sub-stations known as Centros de Atencion Inmediata (CAIs) that were charged with developing integrated public safety strategies for cuadrantes (quadrants), themselves composed of a handful of neighborhoods that a small group of police can patrol on foot and engage directly with the population.⁹³ Each unit was provided with a new patrolling protocol incentivizing more community contact and holding officers accountable for crime. The plan involved the training of more than 9,000 police officers in the new protocols, and also improved interpersonal skills.

The patrol units assigned to specific neighborhoods were provided with the discretion and flexibility to work

with communities to gather information and develop tailored programs depending on local needs. A key principle, building on Colombia's wider ideological shift under the Democratic Security Plan during the Uribe administration, was the concept of co-responsibility between police and local authorities in addressing security concerns.⁹⁴

The Colombian government already had a sophisticated awareness of contemporary policing technologies and techniques. Plan Cuadrantes was based in part on the national police's already extensive system of geo-referenced crime data. Such data allowed station and sub-station commanders to generate detailed knowledge of the dynamics of crime in their areas of operation. Police thus acquired real-time insights into the political, social and economic dynamics of each cuadrante. Patrolling police were

⁹² See Garcia et al (2013), p. 26.

⁹³ See Policía Nacional de la Republica de Colombia (2010).

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 16.

better equipped to help control crime and to build relations with locals to elaborate preventative programs tailored to local needs. Local patrols establish minimum guidelines and reporting systems tailored to each specific cuadrante. This information contains the locations and times of crimes that have occurred in the area over the previous week so that police can work to prevent future crimes through more effective patrol routines and public engagement.⁹⁵ Team members are expected to work with commanders at the station and sub-station levels to maintain a series of short, medium, and long-term goals for the area and evaluate the achievement of those goals. Police assigned to the area also seek to work with other state officials and to help build ties between those officials and leaders of the area to help improve government services and advance crime prevention goals. A key actor in the Plan Cuadrante is the executive officer of the police station. This officer maintains detailed statistical data on the station's cuadrante and works with sub-station commanders in utilizing this data to deploy personnel and develop preventative programs for the area.

Plan Cuadrante was subjected to an experimental impact assessment in 2010.⁹⁶ The training schedules between three randomly selected cohorts of police stations were staggered, thus allowing for experimental variation in the exposure to training and protocol deployment. The evaluators compared the four months immediately following training with the same months from the previous year. They detected a significant reduction in several types of crime.⁹⁷ These impacts were driven by very large effects in high crime affected areas and very small (or even zero) effects in low crime neighborhoods. After accounting for the spatial concentration of crime, the estimated effects account for up to a 22% reduction in homicide. Training also improved police accountability and morale.

95 Policía Nacional de la Republica de Colombia (2010), Homicide Monitor at homicide.igarape.org.br.

96 See Garcia et al (2013). See also the evaluation of Llorente et al (2011).

97 The effects ranged from around 0.13 standard deviation for homicide to 0.18 of a standard deviation for street fights.



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:

Democratic Security Plan

The Dominican Republic is rarely singled out as a case for citizen security innovation. The country experienced rapid economic growth over the last fifty years, though registering much slower improvements in human development.⁹⁸ The combination of high growth, weak social investment, sharp inequality and geographic proximity with the United States created the conditions for a sharp uptake in violent crime related to drug transshipment.⁹⁹ The Dominican Republic's homicide rate doubled over the past decade. With a murder rate in 2002 of 14 per 100,000 inhabitants, by 2006 homicide rates shot-up to 26 per 100,000. Homicide rates in the capital region, which includes the city of Santo Domingo, exceeded 40 per 100,000 in 2005.¹⁰⁰

The Dominican Republic authorities have tended to reproduce law and order-oriented iron fist policing policies. As in certain Central American countries, this has resulted in high rates of police misconduct: police accounted for 16% of all murders, contributing to a crisis of confidence in law enforcement particularly among poor populations living in high crime areas, and consequently to low crime reporting rates.¹⁰¹ In 2014, in response to concerns with rising transshipment of drugs to and from the United States, the government resorted to deploying the armed forces to back the military police. According to the attorney general's office, this resulted in a sharp reduction in homicide to some 20 homicides per 100,000.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ See Bobea (2011).

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 159, 168-169, 173.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 442.

¹⁰¹ See Howard (2009) and Bobea (2012).

¹⁰² See Fieser (2014).


Rising crime rates had generated popular anxiety and encouraged national leaders to identify public safety and security strategies. Taking office amid rising violence, President Fernandez, elected in 2004, developed the Plan de Seguridad Democratica (PSD) as an overarching strategy that purportedly drew inspiration from the Colombian program of the same name as well from Brazil.¹⁰³ Citizen security was framed as a participatory enterprise in which police, local authorities, and the public work would together to make neighborhoods safer.¹⁰⁴ The program sought to recast citizenship and security as mutually constitutive in that increasing responsible citizen participation in security would also transform the security services and ensure they were more responsive to the concerns of the population of the country.¹⁰⁵

The PSD consisted of internal reforms in the criminal justice system to improve police monitoring and investigation as well as police professionalism. It also entailed substantial efforts to improve relations between state and society with social programs targeted at high-risk areas. The effort included Barrio Seguro, a focused policing program that sought to control crime in what many considered to be one of the more violent localities of the capital city, Santo Domingo.¹⁰⁶ Barrio Seguro was a two-pronged approach, initially piloted in the Capotillo neighborhood in August 2005 and in 2006, and was gradually extended to 13 contiguous neighborhoods with a combined population of approximately 170,000 (or about five per cent of northern Santo Domingo)¹⁰⁷ and was later expanded beyond the capital city.

The first component of the program entailed police deployment to selected neighborhoods. Police were also encouraged to adopt problem solving activities similar to problem-oriented policing (POP), with a focus on street patrolling. The second axis of Barrio Seguro focused on diminishing social risks, restoring confidence in law enforcement among the local population and building more positive engagement with the police. The program sought to build community organizations in the targeted areas so that these groups could serve as interlocutors and co-protagonists in public safety efforts. Social initiatives included a “Banco de mi barrio” (micro-credit), “Becas para mi barrio” (scholarships) “techo para me barrio” (aid to repair homes), and some support for young entrepreneurs.

The central goal of Barrio Seguro was to significantly expand the number of police assigned to insecure neighborhoods. The government said that the number of patrolling officers increased from 900-1,000 a day in 2005 to between 9,000-11,000 a day in 2006.¹⁰⁸ Importantly, there appears to have been a meaningful effort to exclude police with a history of corruption or abuse from the program. The police assigned to the program received fifteen days of training, though the initial plan had been for the police to receive three months of training. Depending on rank police assigned to the area received a salary bonus of \$31 to \$413 a month as well as a food supplement.¹⁰⁹

Figure 8. Dominican Republic Homicide Rates 1999-2012



¹⁰³ Beyond the clear influence of Colombia, the Dominican PSD Program also reflected the underlying understanding, built out of experiences in the Brazilian states of Minas Gerias and São Paulo, that crime was a multi-dimensional phenomena requiring a complex set of responses with special attention given to socially excluded and vulnerable populations. See Bobea (2012), pp. 334-337.

¹⁰⁴ See Howard (2009), pp. 303-304.

¹⁰⁵ See Bobea (2012), pp. 396-388.

¹⁰⁶ See Howard (2009), pp. 305 and Cano (2007), pp. 5, 14.

¹⁰⁷ See Howard (2009), pp. 305.

¹⁰⁸ See Cano (2007).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

The commander of the intervention played a particularly prominent role that was atypical for a community-oriented policing model, which seeks a diffusion of policing power to the patrol officer. The commander was the prime interlocutor with the community, with lower ranking police only slowly incorporating themselves into this process. This reduced the interaction that is typical to community-oriented policing models and may have reduced its impact.¹¹⁰ Residents also reported that while policing had improved in the target communities, some corruption continued and residents suspected that over time police corruption would return to higher levels.¹¹¹

Although Barrio Seguro was subjected to an impact evaluation, the data supplied by the Dominican government for the assessment was limited.¹¹² Indeed, UNDP reports from 2006 and 2007 criticized the program for a lack of clarity in its conceptual framework.¹¹³ Nevertheless, roughly 60% of the residents of targeted communities indicated that the program was generally successful in its first years in changing the quality of policing. They distinguished between a pre-Barrio Seguro police who they saw as part of the crime problem and post-program implementation police who they saw as more cordial and helpful.

The Barrio Seguro program appears to have contributed to a marked improvement in real and perceived security. While data is still patchy, there seems to be a downward secular trend in homicides from 26 per 100,000 (in 2005) to 22 per 100,000 (2007).¹¹⁴ Rates of violent victimization also reportedly declined by 30%, though longitudinal data is limited. Beyond crime statistics, evaluations also reveal other improvements. For example, the increased police presence in key neighborhoods appeared to increase residents' confidence in the criminal justice system. This is evident by the increasing number of complaints to local Fiscalia offices, growing from around 900 to nearly 1,200 in neighborhoods where interventions were underway.¹¹⁵

There are other indicators that reveal some of the outcomes and impacts of Barrio Seguro. A survey of the target communities showed a dramatic shift with all target groups reporting a perceived decrease in crime.¹¹⁶ Focus groups conducted for the evaluation noted a drastic decrease in gunfights and, as a result, increasing feelings of security. However, some criminal activities and police corruption continued.¹¹⁷ Ultimately the longer term effects are difficult to ascertain since there does not appear to have been a rigorous, consistent, and public evaluation of the impact of these programs.

It also appears that the program faced some internal headwinds that caused it to lose some support within the state.¹¹⁸ In late 2012 the Minister of the Interior announced that a new program, called "Viver tranquilo" ("Live peacefully") that had similar goals would replace Barrio Seguro.¹¹⁹ As is the case with many moderately successful public safety programs, changing politics both within the police, the executive, and the legislature can create difficulties and those challenges accumulate over time.¹²⁰ At the same time, it appears that the experience of Barrio Seguro will serve as a basis for new programs. Serious challenges, particularly deeper problems relating to corruption, remain and act as a constraint on the success of future programs.

110 See Arias and Ungar (2009), pp. 409-430.

111 See Cano (2007), pp. 17-20.

112 See UNDP (2006).

113 Ibid., p. 5.

114 The evaluation team contracted by the UNDP received relatively little statistical information from the Dominican government regarding crimes in the areas. They did, however, receive neighborhood-level homicide data that was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the program as compared to other similar neighborhoods that were not program sites and against each neighborhood's own year-on-year cyclical levels of homicides. Their data suggested a decrease over the period of program implementation, though homicide rates often began their downward trend prior to program implementation in the particular neighborhood. Further investigation showed, however, that year-on-year homicide rates had showed a decline over time. The data also showed a decrease compared to other similar neighborhoods in the city. See Cano (2007), pp. 20-30.

115 See Cano (2007), pp. 38.

116 See Departamento de Seguridad Pública (n.d), pp. 19.

117 See Cano, (2007), pp. 38-39.

118 See Hoy Digital (2013).

119 See Apoinar (2013).

120 See Ungar and Arias (2012).



HONDURAS: Peace and citizen co-existence project for the municipalities of the Sula Valley

Honduras is one of Latin America's poorest and most violent countries. Several factors contributed to a rise in violence in recent years, including the destabilizing effects of the 2009 coup, an increased presence of drug trafficking organizations and youth gangs like the MS-13 and the Barrio 18. No city is more afflicted than San Pedro Sula. As Honduras' second largest urban area (behind Tegucigalpa, the capital), San

Pedro Sula sits near the northern Caribbean coast and is considered the industrial hub of the country, hosting many of the country's maquiladora factories. Until recently, the city had been cited for four consecutive years as the most violent in the world, with a murder rate 187 per 100,000 in 2014.¹²¹

¹²¹ See <http://www.seguridadjusticiapaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/1165-por-cuarto-ano-consecutivo-san-pedro-sula-es-la-ciudad-mas-violenta-del-mundo>.

As part of a wider effort to mitigate the underlying problems associated with rising violence, the IDB provided a \$20 million loan for the Peace and Citizen Coexistence project in the Sula Valley, beginning in 2003. Beyond San Pedro Sula, it covered the broader region and covered 17 nearby municipalities. The early objectives were ambitious, seeking to improve levels of peace, coexistence, and citizen security in the targeted municipalities with a focus on young people aged 17-25. These goals were to be achieved through institutional strengthening, social prevention of violence and delinquency, promotion of community policing within the National Police, and a broad communication and social awareness strategy.¹²²

The entire program was run out of the San Pedro Sula mayor's office through the Office of Peace and Coexistence. Discrete projects were proposed at the local level, ensuring that initiatives were appropriately targeted and had secured community buy-in. In practice this decentralized approach proved exceedingly challenging. Although 17 committees chaired by local mayors were eventually formed by the end of the project in 2011, their roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined in relation to the executing agency (the Office of Peace and Coexistence), leading to a lack of leadership and coordination.¹²³

The Peace and Citizen Coexistence project faced several other hurdles during implementation. Some of them were entirely unforeseen. For example, Tropical Depression Sixteen generated major flooding in the area in October 2008, requiring \$8 million of the originally mandated \$20 million to be diverted towards emergency recovery and reconstruction efforts. Making matters worse, the following year the country experienced a constitutional crisis and coup, causing the IDB to place a freeze on fund disbursements for 10 months. The project closed in 2012, having spent \$13.2 million out of a \$22.2 million budget (which in addition to the \$20 million IDB loan included \$2.2 million in national funds).

In 2013 the IDB's Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) conducted an evaluation of the Peace and Citizen Coexistence project in conjunction with four other citizen security programs in the LAC region.¹²⁴ The report found major difficulties in implementation, which along with poor recording keeping and the

abovementioned challenges, led to weak evidence of results. In fact, between 2003 and 2011 the program lacked any results monitoring or tracking. The OVE report determined that program outcomes were probably not achieved.

As part of the OVE's evaluation of the project, the group performed a diagnostic of existing services related to violence and crime prevention at the local level. Researchers determined that local municipalities in the Sula Valley exhibited limited infrastructure or public services related to violence prevention, which hampered the ability of the Peace and Citizen Coexistence intervention to rely on and build upon these existing services when implementing initiatives such as job training for at-risk youth. Furthermore, the OVE study found that the project had not identified the gap in local programming or infrastructure prior to implementation, displaying weak organization and planning.¹²⁵

OVE identified an additional flaw with the project design in identifying appropriate practitioners and implementers for local programs in the Sula Valley. For example, two foundations, the Fundación Rieken and the Instituto Centroamericano, charged with establishing community libraries and providing technical training for at-risk youth, lacked accountability. Contracts for specific projects were not binding, allowing the partners to disengage at will.¹²⁶ The same lack of accountability extended to the municipalities themselves; local mayors were able to pull out of the project. Making matters worse, OVE reported there was little if any community involvement, generally only occurring on an ad hoc basis in larger municipalities like El Progreso. There was also comparatively little continuity of leadership, as project team leaders changed five times in the first six years of the program.¹²⁷

The Peace and Citizen Coexistence project was deeply flawed, lacking accountability mechanisms, community buy-in, any sort of results monitoring or any public communications strategy. Mayors and other local stakeholders reported that they were unaware of the program or its various components, which further exacerbated distrust and poor coordination.¹²⁸ Aside from inconsistencies in projects design, the lack of continuity in leadership resulted in poor implementation.

¹²² See IDB (2014b), p. 9.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 31.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 26.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

Without monitoring and evaluation, it is difficult to measure any impacts associated with the Peace and Citizen Coexistence program. Indeed, homicide rates rose during the project period, though it is not possible to disaggregate these effects from external factors like the 2009 coup and the increasing strategic importance of Honduras as a transit country for drug trafficking organizations. However, seen in light of the OVE's withering assessment of the program's failures, it's safe to say that the Peace and Citizen Coexistence program yielded few tangible returns.

Figure 9. Homicides in Honduras 2005-2013

Year	Homicide Count	Homicide Rate
2005	2417	36.98
2006	3018	46.18
2007	3262	49.91
2008	4473	57.89
2009	5265	66.84
2010	6239	77.54
2011	7104	86.47
2012	7172	85.53
2013	3547	41.46

Source: Observatorio de la Violencia, Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad (IUDPAS), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH)



JAMAICA: Reaching Individuals through Skills and Education

Jamaica has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Since 2000, there were just two years in which the country had fewer than 1,000 annual murders – in 2000 (887) and 2003 (975). These figures are exceedingly high for a country of roughly 2.7 million (see Figure 10).¹²⁹ The spike in violence is commonly associated with a deterioration in economic

opportunity, persistent impunity and the displacement effects of drug trafficking and counternarcotic activities from Central America to the Caribbean. Over the past two decades, government, private and civil society groups have experimented with a number of approaches to promoting citizen security.

¹²⁹ See UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2013; UN DESA Population Estimates 2012 Revision.

Figure 10. Homicides in Kingston, 2000-2013¹³⁰

Year	Murders	Murder Rate
2000	493	75.6
2001	659	101.1
2002	511	78.3
2003	433	66.3
2004	651	99.2
2005	829	125.8
2006	565	86.0
2007	727	110.4
2008	641	97.2
2009	632	95.7
2010	441	66.7
2011	328	49.5
2012	357	53.7
2013	371	55.6

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Police Force (2015)

Many interventions tend to focus on the “hot spots” and “hot people” involved in crime perpetration, not least local gangs and at-risk youth. In the capital, Kingston, a number of neighborhoods are literally controlled by criminal “dons” who establish hybrid parallel governance structures and capture both rents and basic service provision functions. For decades, dons have exerted a high degree of control over residents through a mixture of coercion, intimidation and direct engagement, including stepping in to improve social welfare and invest in security in areas where the federal and municipal government have manifestly failed to do so. There is also a long-standing and insidious relationship between elected officials and business people with specific gangs.

An innovative citizen security intervention was launched in 2003 – the Reaching Individuals through Skills and Education, or RISE, initiative. RISE consisted of a youth development program installed in three Kingston communities (i.e. Waterhouse, Towerhill, and Drewsland) in 2003. By 2005, the program expanded to three additional neighborhoods — Parade Gardens, Fletchers Land and Allman Town. RISE involved afterschool assistance, providing at-risk

students with homework assistance, reading tutorials and recreational activities to improve leadership, communication and life skills. The program sought to provide a controlled environment to promote continued education while avoiding early dropout, youth gang recruitment, drug use, and other risky behaviors.¹³¹ By its completion in 2012, a total of 3,582 young adolescents and 2,708 youth had passed through the program.¹³²

Although the RISE intervention was prematurely scaled-back, it was subjected to an impact evaluation in 2011. That year, a restructuring of zoning and funding from Jamaica’s Citizen Security Program (CSJP) led to the closure of three of the six RISE programs. Researchers used the occasion as a natural experiment to measure outcomes of the RISE program by examining the effects on communities where the program had been continued and discontinued. In 2013, a total of 665 Kingston adolescents (568 RISE and 97 non-RISE participants) were surveyed to measure risks such as substance abuse, gang behavior, educational attainment, labor outcomes, and beliefs (self-esteem). Since the study measured neighborhoods where the program continued and others where it was canceled, four subgroups emerged: treatment group one and two (RISE-continued and RISE-cancelled) and control group one and two (non-RISE participants in communities where the program continued and was cancelled).¹³³

The impact assessment determined that RISE generated a number of positive impacts (see Figure 11). For example, probability of early dropout improved was 16% lower in comparison to non-RISE participants.¹³⁴ Labor outcomes also improved for RISE students, who were 10% more likely to be working when compared to non-RISE students. Despite clear social welfare benefits, the RISE program did not appear to disrupt a range of other behaviors related to gang membership and substance abuse. Moreover, the evaluation detected some negative impacts on education outcomes for RISE participants where the program was prematurely terminated. The evaluators speculated that this may have been due to frustration or disillusionment.¹³⁵ The probability of dropping out increased by 14% among former RISE participants when the program was cancelled. Gang behavior and substance abuse were not impacted by the ending of the program.

¹³⁰ See <http://www.jcf.gov.jm/>.

¹³¹ See Soares and Sviatschi, (2013), p. 8.

¹³² Enrollees were selected on the basis of consultation with school authorities to target the most disadvantaged students in the class.

¹³³ The sample was not randomized, but the RISE participants were compared against non-RISE participants that were identified both by RISE officials and school authorities as students who were similar to RISE students.

¹³⁴ Soares and Sviatschi, p. 11.

¹³⁵ Soares and Sviatschi, p. 12.

It is not entirely clear what shaped RISE's limited successes. Evaluators identified a possible relationship between parental engagement and student participation in the RISE program. Specifically, student enrollment may have caused parents to recognize the potential benefits of investing in their children. Indeed, the negative effects of cancelling RISE on children's educational attainment was reduced among families where parents were determined to be more engaged. The impact assessment detected a 23% reduction in drop-outs among former RISE participants with engaged parents. The evaluation found that the program did not need to be permanent for students with engaged parents (who retained the benefits of RISE), underlining the feasibility of discontinuing such programs once they have achieved specific goals.

Figure 11. Outcomes of RISE Participation

Factor	RISE Participant (continued)	RISE Participants (cancelled)
Educational Outcomes	16% DECREASE in dropout	14 % INCREASE in dropout
Gang Behavior	No effect	No effect
Substance Abuse	No effect	No effect
Labor Outcomes	10% increase in work	No effect
Beliefs ("things to be proud of")	Positive effects	No effect



MEXICO: Todos somos Juarez

Mexico experienced a sharp escalation of homicidal violence and victimization over the past decade. Although the numbers are disputed, since 2006 violence has claimed at least 120,000 lives with most intentional deaths concentrated in a small number of states and municipalities. It is useful to place the security situation in historical perspective. The country's homicide rate was in fact steadily decreasing from 19 per 100,000 (1990) to 9 per 100,000 (2007), before climbing back up to earlier rates by 2010.¹³⁶ Some medium and large cities in northern and eastern Mexico witnessed rates of up to 150 homicides per 100,000.

The escalation is linked to deployment of more than 60,000 soldiers by former President Calderon and an intensification of inter-cartel violence and counter-narcotics operations. Indeed, drug-related homicides accounted for 73% of all homicides in Mexico in 2011, after a 55% annual increase since 2007. Non-drug related homicides, on the other hand, decreased by an average of 4% per year between 2007 and 2011.¹³⁷ The increase in violent crime rates over the 2007-2011 period was also concentrated in selected areas. In 2011, approximately 70% of all drug-related homicides occurred in just eight out of 32 states, and 24% in just five cities.¹³⁸ The most violent state was Chihuahua, with the city of Ciudad Juarez driving the numbers.

¹³⁶ See Muggah et al (2013).

¹³⁷ See Enamorado et al (2013).

¹³⁸ See Rios (2012).

In 2008, the Sinaloa Cartel declared war against its one-time business ally, the Juárez Cartel, in an attempt to gain full control over that area.¹³⁹ In just one year, the total number of homicides jumped by more than 700%, going from 192 in 2008, to 1589 in 2009, to then reach a peak of 3,766 in 2010. Between 2009 and 2011 the border city was considered the most violent in the world, with a homicide rate reaching 271 per 100,000 people. Few cities epitomized the crisis of citizen insecurity as intensely as Ciudad Juárez.

It was also in Ciudad Juárez in 2010 that the Mexican government launched one of the most far reaching citizen security programs in Latin America. It is worth stressing that violence in Ciudad Juárez is both organized and disorganized. On the one hand, industrial policies and resultant labor migration may have contributed to social strains and disorganization. Ciudad Juárez is one of Mexico's economic engines and a classic "gateway" city. Literally millions of migrants passed through its perimeter or stayed on as residents over the past half century.¹⁴⁰ With an estimated population of 1.3 million, and located in the border between the Mexican state of Chihuahua and Texas, it supports a massive manufacturing sector and extensive informal and black market trade.¹⁴¹

On the other hand, the sharp rise was strongly correlated with organized crime, inter-cartel rivalries and counter-narcotics programs. After 2006, Ciudad Juárez emerged as one of the most hotly disputed transit points between competing cartels. The city's 1,500 police were woefully inadequate and rife with corruption with some involved in La Linea, the enforcement arm of the Juárez Cartel.¹⁴² The former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, El Chapo Guzman, decided to take control of the city from the Juárez Cartel to consolidate a hold over drug transit routes and local markets for consumption of marijuana and cocaine, provoking increased violence.¹⁴³

Confronted with acute violence in Ciudad Juárez and the failure of law and order interventions, the government rapidly adopted a new approach to promoting citizen security. The first phase could be termed the occupation and purge. Beginning in 2008,

the Mexican government deployed more than 2,000 soldiers and some federal police to the city. In 2009, the city's municipal police were completely disbanded, with another 8,000 soldiers and 2,000 federal police deployed. Amid growing human rights concerns, control was handed over to the federal police in 2010 and a new municipal force deployed with officers sourced from across Mexico.

In 2010, spurred by the high-profile massacre of 15 people in Villa Salvarcar, the federal authorities together with the state government of Chihuahua launched Todos Somos Juárez (We are all Juárez). The program was unprecedented and ambitious, with \$ 380 million of investments made in just two years, from 2010 to 2011.¹⁴⁴ The strategy focused on six core sectors – public security, economic growth, employment, health, education and social development – and 160 pledges aimed at providing more opportunities to the city's residents in order to address social factors that lead to violence. Drawing inspiration from Colombian efforts in Medellín, the initiative was conceived as a comprehensive intervention intended to reduce violence and territorial disputes between competing cartels and literally hundreds of street gangs.¹⁴⁵

At the center of the Todos Somos Juárez strategy were several overarching principles. First, the program was multi-sectoral in orientation. It purposefully moved beyond a narrow law enforcement approach to one that more comprehensively addressed persistent social and economic risks associated with vulnerability and insecurity. Second, the intervention emphasized public participation. Citizens were expected to play a central in all aspects of the design, implementation and monitoring of interventions. Residents were mobilized into working groups across all six policy sectors and met regularly with designated government authorities. Third, the program was executed at three levels of government. Federal agencies were ordered to work and coordinate with state and municipal counterparts. At the national level, line ministries also had to report to the president's office every week on the progress of their respective initiatives being carried out as part of Todos Somos Juárez.

139 See Dudley (2013b).

140 Between 1942 and 1965 under the Bracero program, for example, hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers migrated to the US from Ciudad Juárez. By the time the program had ended, the city ballooned to almost 400,000 inhabitants. The state and city's industrial policy was redirected toward industrialization for the US consumer market including the recruitment of low skilled labor, particularly women to work in maquilas. Unlike the Bracero program, however, the maquila initiative has continued to attract young workers – particularly women. It has also contributed to socially stratification, including the rapid growth of poorly serviced slums, sustained male unemployment, low-paid working mothers and children reared in single parent households.

141 During the US prohibition of the 1930s, for example, bars and clubs multiplied in the downtown area just across the border bridge of Juárez-El Paso contributing at the time to what was regarded as a form of social break-down.

142 When the Sinaloa Cartel launched its offensive in Juárez, among its first targets were police officers assumed to be part of La Linea. In the spring of 2008, 71 police officers were executed, 67 in 2009, and 149 in 2010.

143 For more on the underlying social fabric of the city, consult Jusidman and Almada (2007) and Vilalta and Muggah (2014).

144 See International Crisis Group (2015).

145 See InSight Crime (2013).

During the initial design and planning phase of Todos Somos Juárez, a diagnostic was undertaken on security and safety, socioeconomic conditions, social capital and crime-related behavior. A team of 25 – a Mesa de Seguridad – met with counterparts to prioritize risks and responses.¹⁴⁶ The Mesa included officials from all three levels of government; representatives of the security forces including the army, federal, and municipal police, and the attorney general's office together with a range of civil society stakeholders.¹⁴⁷ Program supporters understood that targeted law enforcement and financial investment would be necessary but insufficient, and that meaningful citizen participation was essential. Thus, it was critical to gather civil society and public officials to review priorities on the basis of evidence, discuss intervention options and locations, determine the investments required across each policy sector, establish appropriate benchmarks, and elaborate monitoring mechanisms.

The implementation phase was overseen by newly created citizen councils, with assistance from the private sector. Private actors with activities in Ciudad Juárez routinely met in private for fear of being compromised by corrupt police.¹⁴⁸ The expectation was to convert all 160 pledges into results in less than 100 days. For example, one public security pledge set a goal of “decreasing the response times of emergency and law enforcement personnel to crime scenes” and a target of seven minutes or less. The implementation strategy involved establishing a geo-referenced tracking system in 760 police vehicles.¹⁴⁹ All actions were monitored and evaluated on a regular basis with results communicated to ensure a virtuous cycle.

A key priority of the program was investment in education and the refurbishment of public space. At least five new schools and one university were created in under-served areas to address shortfalls and reduce school dropouts.¹⁵⁰ Another 19 public spaces – parks, sports facilities, community centers – were established in lower-income neighborhoods. Harm reduction initiatives for drug addicts and a federal anti-poverty program – Oportunidades – was expanded to cover more than 21,800 families. Furthermore, credit and loan schemes were introduced for small businesses and job retraining.

The financial costs of Todos Somos Juárez were exceedingly high, though these need to be put in perspective given the sheer size and economic importance of the city. By 2010 the total budget set by the federal government for the intervention amounted to \$263 million. In 2011, after a year of implementation, 118 additional actions were included in the program, requiring an additional investment of \$138 million.¹⁵¹ The total costs, excluding private investment, exceeded \$400 million or roughly \$266 dollars per resident per year (assuming a population of 1.5 million).¹⁵² A noteworthy aspect of the budget, however, is the level of spending devoted to health, education, culture, recreation and social development interventions – almost three quarters (74%) of the total, with the remainder spent on security promotion and economic development.¹⁵³

Given its high costs, the extent to which the intervention is replicable or transferable to other lower-income settings is an open question. However, the initiative did result in the discovery of innovations and best practices that were then implemented throughout Mexico. In recent years, interventions have shifted from piecemeal and dispersed interventions to integrated and cross-cutting approaches, which was pioneered in Juárez. Juárez's experience has also inspired the implementation of several other mesas de seguridad across the country, which in Juárez had helped to build trust between residents and authorities, contributing to improve a system of intelligence information sharing that has helped to solve cases.¹⁵⁴

It is difficult to measure the impacts of Todos Somos Juárez with certainty. For one, rates of violence were certainly influenced not simply by the program but also by the initiation and conclusion of the cartel rivalry instigated by El Chapo. Another part of the problem is the sheer scale of the program, which spans six domains and 160 specific goals. Finally, there were no controlled assessments, experimental or otherwise. The priority was on ensuring that the program was rolled out quickly, thus limiting the time to set up any serious impact evaluations.

146 According to Conger (2014), “The Mesa de Seguridad, and several social initiatives of other Todos Somos Juárez task forces, are considered by analysts to have improved conditions for reducing violence and high-impact crimes. Of all the task forces created by Todos Somos Juárez, the Mesa de Seguridad is widely recognized as the most successful and enduring.”

147 See Conger, J. (2014), p. 8-9.

148 Ibid.

149 See TSJ (2010).

150 Another 205 schools received infrastructure improvements and “latch key” initiatives were introduced to 71 education facilities to extend the school day. USAID support also provided summer program and another 1,000 schools were included in the “safe school” initiative.

151 See Calderon (2012).

152 This translates into the equivalent of roughly 53 days of an average resident's minimum wage. Observation of Carlos Vilalta, April 2015.

153 See Calderon (2012).

154 See Conger (2014).

Nevertheless, there is a sense that the impacts of Todos Somos Juárez were largely positive. While surely influenced by the victory of the Sinaloa Cartel over the Juárez Cartel and changes in the overall security and economic situation, the city's homicide rate dropped precipitously between 2007 and 2014. Indeed, it fell by some 89% between October 2010 and October 2012 – as did the rate of car-jackings, kidnappings and other types of victimization. Altogether, the number of violent deaths declined dramatically from a high of more than 271 per 100,000 in 2010 to just under 19 per 100,000 in 2015.¹⁵⁵

Figure 12. Homicide: 2007-2015¹⁵⁶

Year	Homicides	Estimated homicide rate per 100.000
2015	269	18.9
2014	299	22.4
2013	535	40.1
2012	786	59
2011	2086	156.6
2010	3622	271.9
2009	2754	206.7
2008	1623	121.8
2007	301	22.5

There are other signs that Todos Somos Juárez may have generated positive dividends. Rates of school performance (as measured by passing grades and elementary and middle school retention) improved considerably. By the end of 2012 the city had effectively transformed; residents were out on the streets and service industries resumed. Many of the displaced were returning to their homes.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, the program is being carefully appraised by researchers and analysts, including those aligned to the Peña Nieto administration, to determine its potential for replication in other settings across Mexico such as Nuevo Laredo in Tamaulipas.

Although many of the original benchmarks were achieved, there was nevertheless some criticism. For example, observers contended that key projects were not fulfilled, funds were not appropriately disbursed and the rushed nature of a complex and ambitious program

There is a sense that the impacts of Todos Somos Juárez were largely positive

could undermine long-term prospects.¹⁵⁸ There is some evidence that not all of the pledged interventions yielded the desired outcomes, but may be due to the long lead that investments in preventive measures – including health, education and social welfare – often require before their impacts are felt.

Other critics say that Todo Somos Juárez may have overpromised and generated unrealistic expectations. Indeed, a 2010 poll of residents after the intervention asked if they felt security had improved; more than 78% claimed it had not, though by 2011 the rate had dropped to 55.5%. What is more, just 31% of people agreed with the statement that Todo Somos Juárez was working effectively.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the forceful “violent pacifications”¹⁶⁰ often involved dramatic arrests for minor charges (such as failing to carry appropriate identification) and provoked accusations of rights violations.¹⁶¹

A key insight from Todo Somos Juárez is the importance of promoting both security and development solutions to complex situations of urban violence. Rather than focusing on short-term gains through enhanced policing and focused deterrence, the intervention emphasized durable investments in social development infrastructure. Additionally, the emphasis on generating rapid diagnostics and implementation – setting locally developed targets to be achieved in 100 days – was notable. Finally, the promotion of a model of citizen participation across the entire project cycle, together with joint planning across all three levels of government, was critical to ensuring sustainability and coordinated implementation.

¹⁵⁵ See Ainslie (2014) and ICG (2013).

¹⁵⁶ Homicide data from El Diario de Juárez 2008-2014 and the Homicide Monitor at <http://homicide.igarape.org.br>.

¹⁵⁷ See InSight Crime (2013) and Ainslie (2014).

¹⁵⁸ See Wilson Center (2012).

¹⁵⁹ See Universidad Autonoma (2011).

¹⁶⁰ See InSight Crime (2013).

¹⁶¹ See Processo (2012).



VENEZUELA: Integrated system for crime statistics for Metropolitan Caracas

An improved awareness of the dynamics of criminal violence at the hyper-local scale can usefully inform decision-making and police deployment. So-called “hot spot” mapping permits authorities to use historical data to decide how, when, and where to focus their efforts and implement interventions. Due to the contagious or migratory dynamics of crime, standardized statistical coverage needs to extend beyond the jurisdiction of single police departments to also include sharing across police forces and among other stakeholders, including the community. Some of the world’s most violent cities have yet to integrate temporal and spatial

data collection and analysis as part of their larger crime and violence prevention strategies. Recent developments in Caracas, Venezuela show that there have been promising early steps towards integrating standardized crime data, police operations, and ultimately policymaking to improve citizen security.

Venezuela is currently ranked as one of the most dangerous countries in Latin America, with Caracas considered one of the most violent cities in the world. In 2015, the city’s homicide rate exceeded 120 per

100,000 and it shows signs of worsening.¹⁶² It is also exceedingly difficult to accurately gauge the dynamics of violence because the national authorities have declined to publish official crime data for roughly a decade. In a highly politicized and polarized climate, the primary agency responsible for collecting crime data, the Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC), does not actively share crime statistics with local Venezuelan police and security agencies.¹⁶³ As a result, each local agency generates its own statistics without any form of uniform standardization. Data sharing is not common practice between departments, and when it does occur, it is often of limited value because of varying collection practices and definitions for categories of crime.¹⁶⁴

Notwithstanding this challenging context, there have been important steps taken to improve the gaps in data collection and sharing at the metropolitan scale. In early 2011, the mayor's office created the Metropolitan Council on Citizen Security (Consejo Metropolitano de Seguridad Ciudadana) and with it, the Integrated System of Crime Statistics for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas (Sistema Integrado de Estadísticas Delictivas para el Área Metropolitana de Caracas). The Metropolitan Region of Caracas is composed of five municipalities (Libertador, Sucre, Baruta, El Hatillo, and Chacao), each with its own autonomous police department. Without a standardized system of data collection and sharing for crime statistics, these municipalities operate in a vacuum, sharing data and planning countermeasures to crime on an ad hoc basis.

The Integrated System of Crime Statistics is a consolidated effort to gather data and disseminate information across the security sector. The intervention adopted a three-prong approach to promoting an evidence-based approach to law enforcement and public security in Caracas. First, the initiative supported a diagnostic of participating police institutions currently managing crime data, provided training to police staff in data management and analysis, and collected and systematized crime information into a technical report to be shared among the institutions. Second, the program established institutional agreements and formalized protocols for cooperation on crime statistics between agencies. Third, the project issued periodic reports on homicides, injuries, robbery and theft in the metropolitan region. The latter will require agreements on the frequency for producing the reports, systematizing the data across institutions, and of course exchanging the data between police departments. Beyond these activities, the initiative intends to incorporate additional criminal indicators (as well as standardized methodologies for collection) into the Integrated System.

The Integrated System also intends to develop a digital platform as a central repository for crime statistics in the Caracas metropolitan area. An initial assessment published in mid-2012 by the Chilean organization Fundación Paz Ciudadana established the following indicators for evaluation of the program: (1) the number of consolidated criminal statistics available for the Caracas Metro Area; (2) the number of citizen security policies, programs, and projects created using consolidated crime statistics; and (3) the number of periodic data exchanges conducted between police agencies via the digital platform.¹⁶⁶

Figure 13. Homicide Counts and Rates in the Metropolitan Region of Caracas, 2010-2011¹⁶⁵

Municipality	2010 Homicide Count and Rate		2011 Homicide Count and Rate	
	Homicides	Homicide Rate	Homicides	Homicide Rate
Libertador	1700	81	2800	133
Sucre	496	76	580	88
Baruta	70	22	84	26
El Hatillo	10	14	15	21
Chacao	10	14	9	13

¹⁶² See Yagoub (2016).

¹⁶³ See Speri (2014).

¹⁶⁴ See Ilovaca and Cedeno (2012).

¹⁶⁵ See Observatorio Metropolitano de Seguridad Ciudadana http://images.eluniversal.com/2012/03/12/informe%20de%20violencia_2011_omsc.pdf.

¹⁶⁶ See Ilovaca and Cedeño, 2012, pp. 68-69.

At the time of the assessment in 2012, four of the five municipalities in the region¹⁶⁷ were involved in the initiative, as well as the state police for the state of Miranda.¹⁶⁸ In order to consolidate progress, police agencies also agreed to use the Regional System of Standardized Indicators for Coexistence and Citizen Security (Sistema Regional de Indicadores Estandarizados de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana) as the basis for data collection and definitions for the crimes of homicides, injuries, car theft, and car robbery. Using the regional system has the added benefit of not only promoting standardized data sharing and analysis within Caracas, but also with other urban areas in Latin America and the Caribbean that experience high levels of crime and violence.

So far, the initiative has yielded modest yet promising results. The four police departments mentioned above, plus the state of Miranda and the Comisión de Seguridad Ciudadana y Derechos Humanos de Cabildo Metropolitano de Caracas all signed a cooperation agreement committing to the exchange of crime data regarding homicides, injuries, robbery and theft of vehicles. The program also provided a specialized course in statistical crime analysis to agents responsible for the data in each department, consisting of 48 hours of total instruction time, and published an accompanying instructional manual.

While the establishment of the Sistema Integrado de Estadísticas Delictivas is promising, there are several implementation challenges. For one, the central government's decision against publishing crime statistics has clearly affected the initiative; after four years of running the program, the Caracas metropolitan region still lacks an integrated criminal data sharing system. As a federal district, the Libertador municipality is strongly influenced by the central government and has thus far declined to participate. Similarly, the Policía Nacional Bolivariana (PNB), established in 2007 by the central government, has also remained outside the program. Furthermore, it has been difficult to enact change in hierarchical police bureaucracies. The task of data gathering and management is often relegated to an officer with an overloaded workload. The meetings and subsequent tasks associated with the Integrated System are considered "extra work" and unpaid, leading to further delays in implementation.¹⁶⁹

Despite indications of positive developments, it remains difficult to measure the impact of the Sistema Integrado de Estadísticas Delictivas. Given the delays in what is already an inherently slow process of institutional strengthening and change, it may yet be some time before the benefits of the program are measurable. As the 2012 report suggests, the best way to measure the long-term effects and impacts of the program will be by examining the change over time in the statistics the program is able to produce, which could reveal progress in police operations, strategy, and inter-agency cooperation. However, until these outputs are produced, the project merely remains one of immense potential in a troubled city.

¹⁶⁷ This included the police agencies for Sucre, Baruta, Chacao, and El Hatillo.

¹⁶⁸ Miranda state contains all Metro Caracas municipalities apart from Libertador.

¹⁶⁹ See Ilovaca and Cedeño (2012), p. 71.

Conclusions

The experiences presented above offer a range of insights and entry-points for the promotion of citizen security. They highlight the importance of data-driven interventions, including the critical importance of prioritizing hot spots, people and high-risk behaviors. They also underline how targeted efforts to integrate informal and formal urban spaces can bring down criminality. A number of successful interventions involved assumption of territorial control by authorities, followed by interventions focused on socioeconomic risk factors. The underlying thrust is that city authorities must move beyond a narrow focus on law enforcement to address the wider array of social and economic factors that give rise to real and perceived insecurity. Moreover, since violence is often part and parcel of a restructuring of relations and resistance to power and authority, an essential ingredient of positive citizen security is positive leadership over time, inclusive governance and legitimate security and justice service institutions.

As citizen security initiatives proliferate across the Latin America and the Caribbean, cities are ideally situated to share experiences and replicate success. Mayors are closer to the ground; they have more direct contact with constituents, wield the tools and platforms to execute prevention, and have clear administrative and geographic priorities by which to target resources efficiently. That said, there must be coordination across all levels of government, with strategies aligned among national, state and city authorities. Likewise, metropolitan officials also need to be honest about what does not work, and not be afraid of sharing failure. The cases of Bolivia, Honduras and Venezuela above generated mixed results, and it is important that leaders in these countries and outside them learn from past mistakes.

There is no perfect formula for achieving citizen security in cities. There are, however, a number of factors that appear to positively influence the likelihood of success. At a minimum, proactive leadership and cross-sectoral cooperation across different agencies is essential. Harnessing new technologies – including data collection systems that geo-reference “hot spots” – and innovation from the research and non-government community is also key. Very targeted and well-resourced micro-level police deployments in high crime areas, the strategic use of neighborhood forums, specific social investments, and anti-school violence programs that include therapy for at-risk youth also

tend to yield positive outcomes. Finally, the process matters – program and project coordinators need to be flexible and replicate success.

For citizen security to ensure, city leaders – both public and private – must work toward both short and long-term priorities. Quick wins can generate political capital, but there must be a commitment to the consolidating citizen security over time. Notwithstanding the importance of flexibility, proponents of citizen security must also be prepared to stick to a plan across successive election cycles and multiple administrations. To be genuinely effective, interventions must be institutionalized at the municipal scale.

Now, more than ever, courageous leadership is required to galvanize multi-sectoral investments in citizen security, while leveraging resources through strategic partnerships with private sector stakeholders. Criminal violence is in fact increasing across the region. The good news is that the knowledge base of what works is growing. New research is under way to fill various knowledge gaps in the region, in Uruguay¹⁷⁰, Ecuador, Panama¹⁷¹ and Honduras.¹⁷² Policy makers and practitioners cannot claim that there are no models. Such experiences also give strength to communities long beset by violence, and occasion to believe that a safer and more secure urban future is possible.

¹⁷⁰ See Jaitman and Galiani (2015).

¹⁷¹ See Sin Miedos (2015).

¹⁷² See Bachelet (2015).

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