

IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES N° IDB-WP-01519

Labor Market Turnover and Inequality in Latin America

Naercio Menezes-Filho
Renata Narita

Inter-American Development Bank

October 2023

Labor Market Turnover and Inequality in Latin America

Naercio Menezes-Filho
Renata Narita

Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Inter-American Development Bank
Felipe Herrera Library

Menezes-Filho, Naercio A.

Labor market turnover and inequality in Latin America / Naercio Menezes-Filho, Renata Narita.

p. cm. — (IDB Working Paper Series ; 1519)

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Labor market-Latin America. 2. Wages-Latin America. 3. Income distribution-Latin America. 4. Labor mobility-Latin America. 5. Informal sector (Economics)-Employees-Latin America. 6. Labor turnover-Latin America. 7. Human capital-Latin America. I. Narita, Renata. II. Inter-American Development Bank. Vice Presidency for Sectors and Knowledge. III. Title. IV. Series.

IDB-WP-1519

JEL codes: J6; J3; J46; O15.

Keywords: Mobility; Unemployment; Vacancies and Immigrant Workers; Wages; Compensation and Labor Costs; Human Resource Management; Income Distribution

<http://www.iadb.org>

Copyright © 2023 Inter-American Development Bank. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode>) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.

Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.

Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.

Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.



Labor market turnover and inequality in Latin America

Naercio Menezes-Filho*

Renata Narita**

Abstract

This paper describes the patterns of worker turnover in selected Latin American countries and their implications for wage inequality. It documents a higher positive annual wage growth rate for job-to-job changers compared to stayers, due to turnover capturing the immediate gains from search behavior in the short run. Younger workers benefit relatively more from the positive effects of job-to-job changes, as expected. We also show that transitions are relatively higher within the informal sector for most countries, and particularly so for workers without college education. Moreover, total job separations and transitions from formal into informal employment occur more often among low-skill and young individuals. Next, the paper analyzes wage growth by percentiles for all workers and job-to-job movers for each country over a more extended period. We find that job-to-job changes are inequality-reducing in the short run, consistent with search gains associated with turnover exhausting more rapidly for high-paid workers. In contrast, we find that human capital effects dominate the search effects in the long run, as human capital accumulates over time. Thus, long-run wage growth is lower for job changers than for stayers, so that, while in the short run the search effects tend to dominate those of human capital, in the long run the opposite occurs. As unskilled workers change jobs more frequently, this suggests that job changes are inequality-increasing in the long run. A potential explanation for limited wage growth in Latin American economies may include high informality rates. Policies to reduce wage inequality should focus on improving the conditions for positive turnover towards better investment and, thus, higher-quality jobs.

1. Introduction

Most economists agree that labor turnover in Latin America is very high, despite its strict labor regulations. Around 24-44% of the labor force separates from their jobs every year, with 50-70% of these exits going to another job.¹ This empirical phenomenon is primarily linked to the existence

* Insper and University of São Paulo, Brazil. E-mail: NaercioAMF@insper.edu.br.

** Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro and University of São Paulo, Brazil. E-mail: rnarita@econ.puc-rio.br.

We are extremely grateful for the comments from Francisco Ferreira, Julian Messina, Marcela Meléndez, Orazio Attanasio e many participants at the LACIR seminars. We would like to thank Eloiza Almeida for her excellent research assistance.

¹ Beccaria and Maurizio (2020), using data from six Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.

of an unregulated informal sector that accounts for a large share of the labor market.² Informal sector jobs last around three times less than formal sector jobs (e.g. Bosch and Maloney, 2010; Meghir, Narita and Robin, 2015; Narita, 2020), consistent with the lack of regulation and benefits in this sector.

High labor turnover may negatively affect the economy as it lowers on-the-job capital accumulation, leading to lower wage growth over the life cycle, as predicted by the human capital theory (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1958, 1974; and Ben-Porath, 1967). However, not all transitions are bad, as gains from reallocating workers from low to high-productivity jobs can be substantial. Search models study job mobility as an outcome of the arrival of a job that can be rejected or accepted and explain why mobility alone can be a source of wage growth (e.g. Burdett, 1978). Evidence suggests that job search is important at the early stages of the worker's career as it improves the matching with a suitable job in which workers can stay and get promoted over time (Topel and Ward, 1992; Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981).

More importantly, these different explanations have implications for wage inequality as workers are heterogeneous with respect to the level of investment in human capital, search intensity, job matching, and acceptance. For example, in many economies, less educated and young workers have the shortest job tenure, and thus face lower training rates and poor pay progression. Moreover, most of them face frequent transitions to the informal sector or out of the labor force. It is, therefore, likely that a high turnover in Latin American countries will exacerbate existing labor market inequalities in the long run, but whether this happens or not is an empirical question and depend on the labor market institution of each country.

This paper uses household data to produce original results about job turnover and associated wage changes for workers with varying human capital levels in five different Latin American countries. We start with a background discussion that will help interpret evidence on labor turnover and connections with wage inequality. Then, after briefly reviewing the literature on labor turnover in developed countries, this paper presents evidence on the patterns of labor mobility in Latin America. We investigate whether turnover is genuinely high in Latin America compared to rich countries and, if so, how this relates to the degree of stringency of labor market regulations. Then we provide detailed measures of job-to-job transitions, including switching of occupation, industry, firm size, and formality status using longitudinal labor force surveys of Argentina (2003-2019), Brazil (2012-2019), Mexico (2005-2019), Ecuador (2008-2019) and Chile (2010-2019). We assess the potential wage gains or losses from turnover by looking at the fractions of job-to-job changers and job stayers with a wage increase or decrease, and the corresponding average real wage variation.

We find that job-to-job changes involve greater annual wage growth than remaining in jobs. This remains true when analyzing the formal sector separately, even though we would expect higher investment in human capital and, therefore, higher returns for staying in the same job in this sector. We also find that younger workers benefit relatively more from the positive effects of job-to-job changes, as expected. Next, we show that transitions are relatively higher within the informal sector for most countries, and particularly so for workers without college education. Moreover,

² The share of informal employment is typically above 40% using survey data from Latin American countries (ILOSTAT, 2011-2019)

total job separations and transitions from formal into informal employment occur more often among low-skill and young individuals.

Next, we provide direct evidence of the relationship between labor turnover and wage inequality by looking at the distributions of wages over time. By comparing observed and counterfactual wage growth by percentiles for job-to-job movers in each country, we present a decomposition exercise to analyze the contribution of job-to-job transitions to changes in wage inequality. Unlike in the individual-level analysis, job separations seem to be inequality-reducing, as they harm individuals at the lowest percentiles relatively less. In contrast, we find that human capital effects dominate the search effects in the long run, as human capital accumulates over time. Thus, long-run wage growth is lower for job changers than for stayers, so that, while in the short run the search effects tend to dominate those of human capital, in the long run the opposite occurs. As unskilled workers change jobs more frequently, this suggests that job changes are inequality increasing in the long run.

Finally, going beyond wages as a measure of job quality, this paper also contributes to the literature by studying the role of nonwage compensation for job turnover and wages. We find causal evidence for Brazil that the formal sector is less likely to hire and more likely to fire workers after the introduction of private health insurance due to increased labor costs. To the extent that workers of different ages, education, and gender are similarly affected, we argue that the effect of such policy on wage inequality is ambiguous. As for publicly provided nonwage benefits to informal workers and non-employed, we find lower inflows to the formal sector from nonemployment for women and from the informal sector for men in Mexico. In addition, as less educated and female workers are more affected by the introduction of non-contributory insurance, this may have contributed to delaying the decline of wage inequality in Mexico.

2. Conceptual issues: Labor Turnover and Wage Inequality

Labor turnover may have effects on wage inequality due to workers' ex-ante heterogeneity implying that some workers benefit from mobility, while others do not. It can also affect inequality through workers' ex-post heterogeneity due to e.g., occupational or sectoral mobility leading to a different distribution of tenure and, thus, of human capital and wages. Finally, it may also reflect an environment where job-to-job transitions alone generate wage dispersion, as discussed below.

Negative turnover characterized by dismissals or instant transitions to worse jobs have negative implications for future wages. Following a dismissal, individuals face the risk of falling human capital accumulation and may be less likely to find a job paying the same or a higher wage. In this sense, negative turnover may increase wage inequality if the less paid or low educated and younger individuals are the ones who exit more often to unemployment or to worse jobs.

However, there are positive job-to-job separations, those involving transitions to better paid jobs, for example. In the search framework proposed by Burdett and Mortensen (1988), workers only change jobs if the pay exceeds their current wage. By paying higher wages, firms are thus able to attract workers from other firms offering lower wages. In equilibrium, since firms are homogeneous and thus have equal profits, firms that pay less employ fewer workers. As a result, even when workers are homogenous, the existence of search frictions and individuals searching

on the job generates wage dispersion in equilibrium. All other factors being equal, this means that in a setting where positive job-to-job transitions take place more often wage inequality is higher, entirely motivated by a market structure argument rather than individual or job heterogeneity.

In an extension of this model, Bontemps et al (2000) allow for heterogeneous job productivity showing that not only this implies a better fit of the wage data, but that productivity dispersion is an important determinant of the amount of wage inequality in the population. That said, job heterogeneity and selection of individuals across jobs imply that some individuals benefit more and some benefit less from job-to-job separations. Job changes in this case may increase wage inequality if for example low educated and younger individuals gain relatively less by moving jobs.

On the other hand, job search theories with learning suggest the importance of search especially for job-to-job moves at early stages of the worker's career and for workers with low education. Limited information about the match quality, which is only revealed after production takes place, emphasizes the role of experimentation especially for such workers (Pries and Rogerson, 2005). This mechanism implies that hazard of job separation rises then declines over the life cycle and with education (Jovanovic, 1979; Rubinstein and Weiss, 2007).

Job-to-job turnover may also involve mobility across occupations, industries, firm size, and formal and informal sectors. Structural evidence for the U.S. suggests that occupational mobility and wage inequality are highly associated (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009). An increase in occupational mobility accounts for over 90% of the increase in wage inequality between the 1970's and the 1990's. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) document that there was a considerable increase in the fraction of workers switching occupations over the same period, and find substantial returns to tenure in an occupation, consistent with the occupation specificity of human capital.³ Occupational transitions influence wage inequality because mobility at this level impacts the distribution of occupational tenure and, thus, of human capital. According to such evidence, the extent of occupation mobility and returns to occupation tenure are important determinants of wage inequality.

Existing empirical evidence shows that developing countries have steeper wage-tenure profiles due to higher information frictions and thus lower initial wages (Donovan, Lu and Schoellman, 2022). Evidence of this has also been provided by Marinescu and Tryiana (2016) who show substantially higher returns to tenure in the formal sector in developing countries than in the U.S. Regarding the intensity of mobility across occupations, sectors and firm size evidence for developing or Latin American (LAC) countries is scarce. The next sections of this paper will provide additional evidence on the types of job-to-job mobility for five LAC countries.

In the developing country context, with dual labor markets characterized by a formal and an informal sector, one could argue that job-to-job transitions favor a selected group of individuals that are able to move to the formal sector. In this sense, job-to-job transitions across formal and informal sectors tend to increase wage inequality if for example the low educated and younger individuals tend to move more often into informal jobs, that is, those that are less productive and

³ This finding is supported by a large literature (e.g. Shaw, 1984, 1987; McCall, 1990; Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom, 2014; Zangelidis, 2008; and Kambourov, Manovskii and Plesca, 2005).

pay less on average. A large literature has documented that the transitions from unemployment and formal jobs into informal employment are higher for the young, women, and low-skill workers in Latin America (see Ulyssea, 2020; Bosch and Maloney, 2010). For a large set of developing and developed countries, Donovan, Lu and Schoellman (2022) find that job-to-job switching rates are five times higher in poorer countries. These higher flows in poorer countries are driven by more frequent transitions within the informal sector rather from informal to formal sector.

As for job turnover induced by labor reforms in LAC, a reduction in job security is associated with an increase in employment exit rates in Colombia, Peru, and Argentina. Likewise, an increase in job security is linked to a decline in exit rates in Brazil. The evidence for Colombia shows that the rise in exit turnover is larger for middle-aged and older men employed in large firms, those who are more protected by security provisions (Kugler, 2000). Women and the young benefit more from higher entry rates from unemployment into the formal sector, however around 2/3 of formal hiring can be attributed to the use of temporary contracts. For Peru, blue-collar workers and, for Argentina, workers with college and those employed in large firms have a lower risk of job termination (Saavedra and Torero, 2000; Hopenhayn, 2000). In Brazil, an increase in job security, in particular the penalty paid by firms in case of unjustified dismissals, reduced fake layoffs (when the worker and the firm reach an agreement for a layoff so that the worker is entitled to collect the benefits of UI and severance savings however has to reimburse the firm for the firing penalty) with a greater decline for workers with more education (Gonzaga, 2003; Barros and Corseuil, 2004). In terms of UI reforms, the estimated negative effect of a stricter UI eligibility on formal sector layoffs is greater for workers in small firms, with low education and in their first job, groups that have a higher UI replacement rate (Carvalho et al, 2018). Evidence for Latin American countries are broadly consistent with that in OECD countries, reinforcing that a decrease in job security reduces income security of formerly protected workers but increase the job finding rate in the formal sector. It also suggests that job (as well as unemployment income) security provisions are inefficient and increase inequality (Heckman and Pages, 2000).

Regarding job turnover induced by trade reforms in LAC countries, early evidence using industry-level data provides little support for the view that trade openness would reduce inequality by enabling better labor reallocation of workers across sectors in developing countries (Goldberg and Pavnick, 2007). In contrast, microdata evidence shows that the increased reallocation of workers across occupations and industries due to trade liberalization played a major role in the reduction of wage inequality in Brazil during 1988-1995 (Ferreira, Leite and Wai-Poi, 2010). However, other works suggest that labor market responses following trade liberalization may take several years (e.g. Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017). In particular, Dix-Carneiro (2014) shows that trade reforms over the period 1995-2005 had important distributional effects with women, less educated, and older workers facing higher costs of switching sectors in Brazil. Such reforms also increased job displacement in Brazil (Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011) and Colombia (Cosar et al, 2016). Finally, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019) find that labor reallocation to informality acted as a buffer against nonemployment in regions facing larger tariff cuts.⁴

⁴ See Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (forthcoming) for a survey of these recent approaches, focusing on work that emerged from the late 2000s onward, and insights regarding the ways in which globalization can affect various dimensions of inequality.

3. Labor market dynamics: main facts

2.1. Turnover patterns in developed countries

Cross-country and cross-industry data show significant variation in job and worker flows (OECD, 2010)⁵ Using individual level data, Jolivet et al (2006) draw on a panel of 10 European countries and the U.S. that allows following both employed and nonemployed individuals yearly for up to 3 years or until their first change of status in the labor market which can correspond to a job-to-job, a job-to-nonemployment or a nonemployment-to-employment transition.⁶ Four main facts emerge from Table 1. First, across countries, job-to-job transitions are as important as transitions from job to nonemployment. Second, job-to-job turnover varies widely across countries, with high turnover in Denmark and the U.K., low turnover in Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and the remaining countries, including the US, falling between these two. Third, there is no strong correlation between job loss rates and the job-to-job transitions. Most job loss rates range from 9 to 17%, excluding France (4%) and Spain (23%), and including countries known to have less stringent labor regulations such as the U.S. Fourth, most job-to-job transitions are associated with a wage increase, even though part of job-to-job transitions is constrained, or the wage is not the sole reason why workers move jobs, an issue we attempt to address in a later section.

Table 1: Worker's turnover in Europe and the U.S.

Country	BEL	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	GER	IRL	ITA	NLD	PRT	USA
% of job-to-nonemployment transitions	9.8	12.3	22.5	4.0	16.5	11.2	17.0	14.1	8.8	15.2	12.6
% of job-to-job transitions	6.8	20.0	7.4	6.5	24.9	10.3	16.5	5.7	12.2	8.6	15.2
% with a wage increase	62.8	59.8	57.4	51.3	64.4	60.4	65.2	58.7	66.4	60.9	55.6

Source: Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006).

⁵ Job flows refer to job creation and job destruction while worker flows also include job-to-job flows. Since the variation and the ranking of job and workers flows have been shown to be closely related, this paper will focus on the second given that it gives a more complete picture of all labor market flows including job-to-job transitions.

⁶ The European data are from the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP) 1994-1997, and the U.S. data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1993-1996. The European data contain the ending dates of previous jobs and starting dates of current jobs, which allows them to construct an accurate measure of job-to-job or job-to-unemployment. For the US, the measure is bit more imperfect since the PSID has only a monthly calendar of activities (but not the exact dates of changes in individual job status) such that job-to-job transition can hide nonemployment spells of less than 3 weeks.

By taking advantage of large sources of U.S. data collected over several decades⁷, Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) conduct a separate analysis of mobility across employers, occupations and sectors. For sectoral and occupational mobility, transitions decline quickly with potential experience while the proportion of workers moving across employers initially increases in their first 2-3 years of experience and then declines, remaining at a relatively higher rate of about 15% per year at the end of worker's career. This suggests the importance of job search earlier in the career and of sector and occupation capital rather than firm-specific capital (see also, Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009)

2.2. Turnover in Latin America

As with developed countries data, a major challenge with analyzing transition patterns in Latin America is to have harmonized data. A recent contribution is Beccaria and Maurizio (2020) who use household surveys from six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.⁸ By looking at yearly job exit rates measured in two ways, including or excluding job-to-job changes, they find that the total exit rates for these countries range between 24 and 44 percent, with job exit rates to nonemployment being very similar between 11-13% for most countries, and slightly greater for Mexico and Peru. Comparing Table 1 and Table 2's rates, we observe that the job separations to nonemployment in Latin America are close to those obtained for Germany, U.S., Denmark, Italy, and Portugal. Unlike many developed countries, 50 and 70 percent of job exits were for another job, making these the most frequent types of employment transitions in these Latin American countries.⁹ These observed differences in the job-to-job turnover rates reveal an important feature in LAC countries' data given the pronounced low levels of social protection, skills, and other issues that we will examine in more detail in the next section. Compared to the job-to-job rates in Table 1, the average yearly job-to-job rates across most of these LAC countries is similar to that observed for the U.S. and Ireland.

Table 2. Worker's turnover in Latin America

Country	Argentina	Brazil	Ecuador	Mexico	Paraguay	Peru
% of job-to-nonemployment transitions	12.6	11.2	12.9	15.6	13.6	14.2
% of job-to-job transitions	15.1	13.2	17.7	14.6	21.1	30.0

Source: Beccaria and Maurizio (2020).

⁷ The data sources are the March Supplements from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the years 1964–2002 the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1968–1997 the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the years 1979–2000 the CPS outgoing rotation groups (ORG) for the years 1998–2002. The dates covered by the six countries are 2003–15 for Argentina and Brazil, 2004–15 for Ecuador, 2005–15 for Mexico, 2010–15 for Paraguay, and 2005–10 for Peru.

⁸ The dates covered by the six countries are 2003–15 for Argentina and Brazil, 2004–15 for Ecuador, 2005–15 for Mexico, 2010–15 for Paraguay, and 2005–10 for Peru.

⁹ In these six surveys, workers are asked how long they had been in their current jobs. This information allows identifying whether a person who was employed both in month t and month $t + 12$ remained in the same job or moved to another one.

2.3. The role of informality

One important feature of labor markets in developing countries is informality, which corresponds to more than 40% of jobs in LAC countries.¹⁰ Unlike the informal sector, the formal sector is subject to labor market regulations such as minimum wages and employment protection, which can induce labor force adjustments including transitions across sectors. An analysis of sectoral transitions and duration in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico shows that durations differ significantly across sectors but are very similar across these countries. On average, formal employment lasts 4.5 years, followed by informal self-employment which last for 2 years, and informal salaried jobs having the shortest duration of 1 year. Argentina shows relatively higher unemployment duration than Brazil and Mexico, consistent with stricter labor market rigidity (Bosch and Maloney, 2010). Across different measures, the most predominant fact is that flows between informal and formal salaried jobs are highly asymmetric with informal to formal flows being several times higher than the reverse flow. On the other hand, there is a high degree of symmetry in formal salaried-self-employment flows against the view of comparative advantage in formality, and supporting the idea that workers are taking advantage of profitable opportunities as they arrive (Bosch and Maloney, 2006, 2010). Also, mobility within the informal sector is significantly higher, around 3 times greater for informal than for formal salaried workers in Brazil (Meghir, Narita and Robin, 2015; Narita, 2020), again consistent with the lack of regulation and benefits in the informal sector.

Surprisingly, even when considering registered (formal sector) workers only, the total exit rates are not dissimilar across Argentina, Brazil and the U.S., with monthly exit rates around 4-4.5% for Argentina, 2% for Brazil and 3% for the U.S., respectively (Beccaria and Maurizio, 2000; Narita, 2020).¹¹ However one could expect much lower exit rates for Argentina and Brazil, given stricter labor regulations in LAC countries. Using the OECD employment protection index, job security of permanent workers against individual dismissals is very low in the U.S. (0.5) compared to Brazil (1.84), which is a little below the average of OECD countries (2.05). Regulation of temporary employment is stricter in Argentina (3.0) and Brazil (4.1) than in OECD countries (2.1), and one of the least strict in the U.S. (0.3).¹²

In fact, as highlighted above, yearly job exit rates to nonemployment across these six Latin American countries are very similar, even when compared to European countries known to have stricter labor market regulations such as Portugal, Italy, and Germany. But, if (average) worker turnover is not a distinguishing feature of LAC countries, does it imply that labor turnover has a limited role to explain the high levels of inequality in the region? In the next sections, we provide further evidence on detailed measures of turnover in LAC that will help rationalizing the main insights in Section 2 and allow a discussion of the connections between workers' mobility and wage inequality.

¹⁰ ILOSTAT, 2011-2019.

¹¹ Although they use different types of data: employment surveys (Brazil), registry from Ministry of Labor (Argentina), and registry from Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S.).

¹² OECD EPL. Index values range from 0 to 6 depending on several sub-indicators of strictness of the firing regulations for individual workers or regulations to hire workers under temporary contracts. Data for the U.S. and OECD average (2014) and Brazil (2012).

3. Further evidence for Latin America

In this section we add to the existing evidence by providing detailed measures of job-to-job transitions including switching of occupation, industry, firm size and formality status. In order to assess potential gains or losses from turnover, we report the fraction of for job-to-job transitions and job stayers with a wage increase, decrease or same wage, as well as the corresponding yearly average real wage variation.

3.1. Data sources

We study a subset of five Latin American countries, Argentina (2003-2019), Brazil (2012-2019), Mexico (2005-2019), Ecuador (2008-2019) and Chile (2010-2019). We use national household surveys containing a panel of individuals with which we are able to identify job-to-job transitions as they all have information on the job tenure¹³. We track individuals' employment status from their first interview until a year later and use the information on job tenure to verify whether the individual is in the same job or moved across different jobs.

We focus our main sample on males, unemployed or salaried workers working full-time (above 35 hours/week) and aged 18-65 years.¹⁴ For each country, we construct detailed measures of job-to-job transitions by wage variation, including switching of occupation, industry, firm size, and formality status.

3.2. Main results

Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 show a heterogeneous picture of labor market flows in such countries. At one end of the spectrum, Ecuador and Argentina show relatively low percentages of job-to-job transitions (7.2% and 8.2% of employment, respectively), while at the other end Brazil, Mexico and Chile show higher job-to-job transitions (respectively, 13.6%, 19.5% and 19.9%). When comparing wages before and after a job change, we observe a large share of job changes associated with a wage cut in Ecuador, Mexico, and Chile, 32%, 35%, and 38%, respectively.¹⁵ This is above the average fraction of wage cut observed for European countries and the U.S. (28%) as we observe in Table 1, which is similar to the fraction in Brazil and above that for Argentina, 17%. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 show that job stayers may also experience wage gains as well as losses, with a smaller fraction of gainers for most countries and a lower wage increase compared to that for job-

¹³ Data for Ecuador were taken from the *Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo* (ENEMDU). For Argentina, we used the *Encuesta Permanente de Hogares* (EPH). For Brazil, we drew on microdata from the *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua* (PNADC). Data for Mexico comes from the *Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo* (ENOE). Data for Chile are taken from the *Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos*.

¹⁴ We exclude individuals with any missing wage, those with nominal wage below the 2nd percentile or above the 98th percentile of the wage distribution in each year, as well as those with nominal wage variation below the 2nd percentile or above the 98th percentile of the nominal wage variation distribution in each year.

¹⁵ Wages time-corrected using the consumer price index for each country (March/2022 = 100).

to-job movers.¹⁶ This remains true even when analyzing separately the formal sector, in which we expect a larger investment in human capital and thus higher returns for job stayers.¹⁷

We also find higher gains for informal employees who have an opportunity to be employed in the formal sector but less so in the opposite direction (Tables A.6-A.10). However, how often do these transitions occur? The facts show that 24% and 29% of informal employees who move across jobs end up in the formal sector in Mexico and Argentina. This fraction is higher for Brazil, 53%, Chile, 55%, and even higher for Ecuador, 64%.

In Table 4, we analyze differences across individuals by education and age as we look for potential channels between job-to-job changes and inequality. One interesting finding is that there is much more turnover in low education groups in most countries. Also, the fraction of wage gainers among those who move is always between 40 and 60% and varies little with education in all countries, suggesting that gains of moving are in principle similar or even smaller for higher education workers as is the case in Brazil and Chile. Perhaps the differences by education arise from the types of job-to-job changes, whether in the formal sector, where jobs are more productive and better paid on average, or within the informal sector. This table shows that transitions are indeed relatively higher within the informal sector for most countries and particularly so for workers without college education, which could contribute to an increase in inequality, as returns to experience are higher in the formal sector of the economy.

Table 3: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job movers and stayers, by country

	JTJ		Stayers	
	Fraction (1)	Wage Var. % (2)	Fraction (3)	Wage Var. % (4)
Panel A - Ecuador				
Wage decrease	31.6%	-21%	34.1%	-19%
Same wage	8.5%	-3%	10.7%	-3%
Wage increase	59.9%	23%	55.2%	21%
Wage growth		6.7%		4.9%
N / Employed	7.2%		92.8%	
Panel B - Argentina				
Wage decrease	17.0%	-27%	13.9%	-27%
Same wage	9.8%	-14%	9.1%	-15%
Wage increase	73.2%	25%	77.0%	18%
Wage growth		12.3%		8.9%
N / Employed	8.2%		91.8%	
Panel C - Mexico				

¹⁶ Although we focus our analysis on the sample of men, we find similar patterns for women. Women however are less mobile than men as expected with job-to-job rates around 1 to 5 p.p. lower than for men. They have a little higher wage growth while staying in the same job or by moving jobs than men. This is because employed women are more gainers than losers in either situation.

¹⁷ Appendix Tables A.1-A.5.

Wage decrease	35.1%	-22%	32.5%	-22%
Same wage	15.7%	-4%	19.9%	-4%
Wage increase	49.2%	23%	47.6%	20%
Wage growth		2.8%		1.6%
N / Employed	19.5%		80.5%	
Panel D - Brazil				
Wage decrease	28.2%	-21%	22.0%	-20%
Same wage	13.8%	-5%	23.7%	-5%
Wage increase	58.0%	19%	54.3%	16%
Wage growth		4.1%		3.0%
N / Employed	13.6%		86.4%	
Panel E - Chile				
Wage decrease	38.1%	-22%	38.0%	-19%
Same wage	2.3%	-4%	2.3%	-4%
Wage increase	59.6%	22%	59.7%	19%
Wage growth		5.0%		4.1%
N / Employed	19.9%		80.1%	

Table 4: Annual rate of job-to-job changes and proportions of gainers among job movers, by country, education, and sector

	Total	Incomplete Secondary	Complete Secondary	Complete Tertiary
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A - Ecuador				
Total	7.2%	6.7%	8.7%	6.4%
With wage increase	59.9%	58.6%	60.3%	60.5%
Within Formal	5.7%	5.2%	6.4%	5.4%
With wage increase	58.4%	56.3%	58.7%	60.8%
Within Informal	8.8%	5.8%	11.1%	9.7%
With wage increase	63.4%	59.9%	65.7%	66.7%
Panel B - Argentina				
Total	8.2%	12.3%	7.5%	4.8%
With wage increase	73.2%	72.7%	73.8%	74.2%
Within Formal	2.9%	3.8%	2.9%	2.1%
With wage increase	69.9%	68.6%	70.9%	71.7%
Within Informal	13.5%	17.4%	13.3%	9.7%
With wage increase	76.4%	75.5%	78.0%	79.8%
Panel C - Mexico				
Total	19.5%	23.4%	20.0%	15.2%
With wage increase	49.2%	46.6%	51.0%	50.1%
Within Formal	12.8%	13.9%	13.5%	11.2%

	With wage increase	50.7%	50.5%	52.2%	48.5%
Within Informal		26.2%	28.0%	27.8%	22.9%
	With wage increase	47.8%	44.7%	49.7%	53.1%
Panel D - Brazil					
Total		13.6%	17.4%	14.9%	8.5%
	With wage increase	58.0%	58.4%	57.9%	54.4%
Within Formal		7.7%	9.4%	8.8%	5.0%
	With wage increase	57.3%	58.2%	56.8%	53.9%
Within Informal		19.4%	23.8%	22.0%	12.5%
	With wage increase	60.1%	58.9%	63.2%	56.5%
Panel E - Chile					
Total		19.9%	25.9%	20.9%	12.9%
	With wage increase	59.6%	60.3%	59.9%	54.2%
Within Formal		12.3%	15.4%	12.9%	8.5%
	With wage increase	58.8%	59.4%	59.0%	55.3%
Within Informal		27.6%	38.9%	31.9%	11.8%
	With wage increase	63.9%	63.9%	65.3%	41.4%

Table 5: Annual rate of job-to-job changes and proportions of gainers among job movers, by country, age and sector

	Total	Age 18-24	Age 25-44	Age 45-65
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A – Ecuador				
Total	7.2%	13.6%	5.9%	2.3%
	With wage increase	59.9%	64.1%	58.4%
Within Formal	5.7%	10.9%	4.6%	1.5%
	With wage increase	58.4%	64.3%	56.7%
Within Informal	8.8%	14.8%	7.1%	4.6%
	With wage increase	63.4%	64.5%	64.0%
Panel B - Argentina				
Total	8.2%	15.3%	6.3%	2.9%
	With wage increase	73.2%	74.3%	73.1%
Within Formal	2.9%	6.0%	1.9%	0.8%
	With wage increase	69.9%	66.9%	71.1%
Within Informal	13.5%	18.9%	12.9%	8.6%
	With wage increase	76.4%	78.6%	78.6%
Panel C - Mexico				
Total	19.5%	30.3%	16.6%	11.8%
	With wage increase	49.2%	55.3%	47.9%
Within Formal	12.8%	22.0%	10.4%	6.1%
	With wage increase	50.7%	50.7%	49.2%

Within Informal	26.2%	33.8%	24.1%	20.8%
With wage increase	47.8%	54.3%	46.5%	43.5%
Panel D - Brazil				
Total	13.6%	22.2%	12.1%	6.4%
With wage increase	58.0%	63.7%	56.4%	55.9%
Within Formal	7.7%	12.8%	6.9%	3.4%
With wage increase	57.3%	62.8%	55.6%	55.7%
Within Informal	19.4%	27.9%	18.2%	12.2%
With wage increase	60.1%	66.2%	58.8%	56.4%
Panel E - Chile				
Total	19.9%	30.4%	17.5%	11.9%
With wage increase	59.6%	64.7%	58.8%	59.0%
Within Formal	12.3%	19.1%	10.6%	7.2%
With wage increase	58.8%	64.9%	57.7%	58.2%
Within Informal	27.6%	33.1%	28.2%	21.3%
With wage increase	63.9%	63.5%	64.5%	63.2%

By age, Table 5 shows that a much higher fraction of young workers moves jobs in a year, 3 to 5 times higher than that for older workers, consistent with lower search gains over the life cycle. This is driven by the fact that young workers transit a lot within the informal sector. The wages of younger workers also rise more, consistently with their initial wages being low and with learning at early ages. Now, as transitions from the formal to the informal sector are associated with lower wage gains, we look at these changes by age and education in Table 6. We find strong evidence that transitions to informality are much more frequent for unskilled and young workers. All such evidence by education and age suggests a link between job-to-job turnover and higher wage inequality.

Table 6: Annual rate of formal to informal job changes, by country, education and age

	Ecuador	Argentina	Mexico	Brazil	Chile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
By age					
18-24	17.3%	7.2%	13.1%	4.9%	4.9%
25-44	10.6%	4.1%	8.8%	4.0%	3.3%
44-65	9.0%	2.7%	7.3%	3.5%	3.1%
By schooling levels					
Incomplete Secondary	18.5%	5.2%	14.4%	4.9%	4.6%
Complete Secondary	11.1%	3.1%	8.9%	3.1%	3.1%
Complete Tertiary	5.3%	2.2%	6.4%	3.3%	1.9%
N	2,368	2,420	10,473	5,771	877

Another negative aspect of turnover is when workers exit to nonemployment. It is also reasonable to expect considerable heterogeneity. In Table 7, we observe an inverted U shape of exit rates by age for most countries, starting high at 25-42% for young men then declining to 5.4-13% for those

aged 25-44, going back to 10-20% at later ages. For Chile, the exit rate to nonemployment declines sharply after ages 18-24. The differences in exit rates by schooling levels are also substantial and the evidence is quite mixed across countries. The job exit rate is relatively higher for low education workers in Argentina and Brazil, as well as for high education workers in Ecuador, Mexico and Chile. While these results suggest an unclear pattern with education, they show that job separations to nonemployment are higher for younger individuals in all these countries. To the extent that young workers tend to reallocate to worse paid jobs after unemployment or after being out of the labor force, exits to nonemployment are associated with higher wage inequality.¹⁸

Table 7: Annual exit rate from employment to nonemployment, by country, education and age

	Ecuador	Argentina	Mexico	Brazil	Chile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
By age					
18-24	24.8%	41.7%	26.3%	30.2%	33.7%
25-44	5.4%	9.8%	10.4%	13.3%	9.3%
44-65	9.5%	14.9%	19.8%	17.6%	7.8%
By schooling levels					
Incomplete Secondary	7.9%	17.9%	16.5%	20.5%	9.6%
Complete Secondary	9.8%	14.3%	11.6%	14.5%	10.3%
Complete Tertiary	11.8%	8.8%	18.8%	11.2%	15.5%
N	2,752	12,842	5,173	30,065	3,106

The first two panels of Table 8 display the proportions of workers that changed occupation and industry - at the 1-digit level - among all workers who changed jobs. Around 36% to 54% of job-to-job transitions involve occupation changes. Except in Chile, transitions with occupation changes have larger average wage gains compared to transitions without occupation switching. As we show in the appendix, wages gains are mostly driven by any move that involves a skill upgrade.¹⁹ Similarly, industry changes also correspond to high fractions, 34% to 50%, of all job-to-job transitions and wage gains are on average higher than for workers who do not switch industries except for Chile. Interestingly, we find that the wage gains from moving from manufacturing to almost all other sectors are substantial, suggesting that the experience accumulated in manufacturing is quite transferable, consistent with findings in the literature (Dix-Carneiro, 2014).²⁰

Occupation and industry changes in LAC countries are generally lower than those annual rates for the U.S., 13% and 10% of employment, respectively. Moreover, occupation and industry movers have more volatile income, there are more losses and more gains too. In all countries except Chile, wage growth is higher for switchers, contrary to arguments of specificity of occupation and industry human capital but also reflecting the fact that these workers are younger and more

¹⁸ Although we focus on the sample of males, the patterns we find for women are very similar but their job exit rates are much larger than for men.

¹⁹ Appendix Tables A.11-A.15.

²⁰ Appendix Tables A.16-A.20.

educated (Figures 1 and 2). Such facts imply an ambiguous role of occupation and industry mobility for wage inequality in LAC.

Figure 1: Occupation switching by schooling, age and country





Figure 2: Industry switching by schooling, age and country



Human capital accumulation may also be related to firm size due to a variety of factors, e.g. production processes and labor regulations. To the extent that large and formal sector firms are more productive, such factors imply higher opportunities for investment and pay progression in these firms. However, costly regulations may also prevent investment and reduce workers' compensation in formal sector firms, such that transitioning towards this sector or larger firms do not necessarily increase wages. The third panel in Table 8 displays transitions according to firm size defined in three categories,²¹ where we observe that 44% to 53% of all job-to-job transitions

²¹ 1 to 4/5, 5/6 to 40/50, and 40/50 or more workers, depending on the country.

involve changing firm size. There are generally lower or zero gains on average from moving across firm sizes compared to those who do not change it.

Workers in small firms, that are able to move to higher size firms, obtain wage increases more often than workers in medium and large firms who move to low size firms (Tables A.21-A.25) Chile is an exception again, where wages can go up more often for workers moving to smaller firms, likely due to a lower level of informality in this country.

By education and age, Figure 3 shows that the fraction of those workers who switch to larger firms is stable or goes down with college education and is greater for younger workers in all countries. The latter evidence is connected with the above findings that younger workers experience more wage growth.

Figure 3: Proportions of job-to-job movers switching to large firms by schooling, age and country




Table 8: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching of job characteristics, by country

	Ecuador				Argentina				Mexico				Brazil				Chile			
	With change		W/o change		With change		W/o change		With change		W/o change		With change		W/o change		With change		W/o change	
	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage	Frac.	Wage
	Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %		Var. %	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Occupations (1-dig)																				
Wage decrease	31.6%	-21%	31.7%	-20%	18.6%	-28%	15.7%	-27%	36.5%	-23%	33.9%	-22%	29.8%	-21%	27.0%	-21%	39.8%	-23%	37.2%	-21%
Same wage	6.7%	-3%	10.6%	-3%	8.9%	-14%	10.5%	-15%	13.2%	-4%	17.9%	-4%	11.3%	-6%	15.8%	-5%	1.9%	-4%	2.5%	-4%
Wage increase	61.7%	23%	57.7%	22%	72.5%	26%	73.8%	24%	50.4%	24%	48.3%	22%	58.9%	20%	57.2%	18%	58.3%	23%	60.3%	22%
Wage growth		7.5%		5.8%		12.7%		11.9%		3.4%		2.4%		4.5%		3.8%		4.4%		5.3%
N / Employed	3.9%		3.3%		3.7%		4.5%		9.0%		10.6%		6.0%		7.6%		7.1%		12.9%	
Industry (1-dig)																				
Wage decrease	31.5%	-21%	31.8%	-21%	18.2%	-28%	16.4%	-27%	36.5%	-24%	34.2%	-22%	29.9%	-21%	27.0%	-21%	37.1%	-23%	37.3%	-20%
Same wage	6.1%	-3%	10.9%	-3%	7.5%	-15%	11.0%	-14%	11.8%	-4%	18.0%	-4%	11.7%	-6%	15.3%	-5%	2.1%	-5%	2.1%	-3%
Wage increase	62.4%	23%	57.3%	22%	74.3%	28%	72.6%	24%	51.6%	25%	47.8%	22%	58.4%	20%	57.6%	18%	60.8%	22%	60.6%	25%
Wage growth		7.8%		5.5%		14.5%		11.1%		3.7%		2.3%		4.6%		3.8%		5.1%		7.4%
N / Employed	3.6%		3.6%		2.8%		5.4%		7.3%		12.2%		5.5%		8.0%		20.5%		9.9%	
Firm size																				
Wage decrease	33.8%	-21%	29.2%	-20%	16.9%	-28%	17.1%	-27%	36.6%	-23%	34.5%	-22%	29.3%	-21%	26.9%	-21%	35.9%	-22%	40.1%	-20%
Same wage	6.6%	-3%	10.7%	-3%	9.9%	-14%	10.0%	-15%	13.7%	-4%	17.4%	-4%	11.4%	-5%	15.8%	-5%	2.6%	-4%	2.0%	-3%
Wage increase	59.6%	22%	60.2%	23%	73.2%	26%	72.9%	25%	49.6%	23%	48.1%	23%	59.3%	20%	57.4%	19%	61.5%	23%	57.8%	22%
Wage growth		5.7%		7.7%		13.0%		11.7%		2.6%		2.6%		5.0%		4.4%		4.4%		4.3%
N / Employed	3.8%		3.4%		3.8%		4.1%		8.5%		10.5%		6.7%		8.7%		10.1%		12.5%	

4. Growth incidence curves

In this section we provide a second look at the data, by providing more direct evidence of the relationship between wage inequality and labor turnover, while stressing previous findings and the discussion above. We present a decomposition exercise that attempts to quantify the contribution of yearly job-to-job transitions to the change in wage inequality. Specifically, we compare observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves for job-to-job movers.²² We focus this analysis on the two largest LAC countries in their respective sample period: Brazil (2012-2019) and Mexico (2005-2019).


In order to address the endogenous selection of workers into the sample of job-to-job changers, we follow the literature and estimate a discrete choice equation for the binary decision between changing and staying in the same job.²³ We allow a rich set of individual and job characteristics (age, squared age, cubic age, age and education interactions, industry, occupation, formal sector, household size and its square, head of household, and a year dummy) analogous to Ferreira and Barros (2005). The two panels of Figure 4 plot the observed wage growth incidence curve between the first year (T0) and last year (T1) of each country data series, $g(p) = (w^{T1}(p) - w^{T0}(p))/w^{T0}(p)$, and the counterfactual growth incidence curve: $g^s(p) = (w^s(p) - w^{T0}(p))/w^{T0}(p)$, where w^s correspond to the wage in T1 of the simulated job-to-job movers only.

The dark line in Figure 4 shows that wage inequality reduces in Mexico over the 2005-2019 period across all parts of the wage distribution. In Brazil, wages grow faster at lower percentiles and less so at the upper end, implying a reduction in the 90/10 differential in our sample for the 2012-2019 period. Importantly, the simulated growth incidence curves (gray lines) show that job-to-job turnover is inequality-reducing in both countries. In Mexico, job-to-job changers at the 10th percentile experience a wage growth of around 9% that is above the actual wage growth whereas those at the 90th percentile have lost more, almost 40%. For Brazil, the picture is similar with those at the 10th percentile obtaining a 10% increase in real wages whereas those at the 90th percentile having a wages loss of around 40%. However, the figure also shows a clear tradeoff. Mean wage growth over the considered time periods is lower among all job-to-job changers in Brazil and for the majority of those in Mexico, except the bottom 20%.

²² See Ferreira (2012) for a more recent review of such approaches.

²³ This is conditional to being employed in time t. We ignore non-participants and the unemployed in such exercises.

Figure 4: Observed and Simulated hourly wage growth incidence curves




Source: Author's calculations using the samples described in Section 3.1.

This apparent inconsistency with the analysis of turnover and wage growth at the individual level can be reconciled with the dynamic effects of turnover. The analysis of turnover and wage growth at the individual level can only be conducted within one year due to short panels, therefore it does not allow capturing long-run effects. In contrast, we are able to look at long-run effects by examining the incidence of growth at different points in the wage distribution over many years. Such differences we find in the relationship between wage growth and turnover in the short and long run can be rationalized by both the search theory and the theory of human capital. Search behavior implies that the decisions to accept or turn down new offers (transitions) are triggered by shocks that can happen at any point in time. In particular, positive shocks involve wage gains that are higher for the lowest paid. However, such gains tend to exhaust decreasing wage growth in subsequent periods, because high wage individuals are less likely to obtain greater offers. On the other hand, the human capital model would suggest that wage growth increases with experience (time) as individuals invest in training early in the career and collect gains later. These two complementary explanations imply that, in the short run, search effects tend to dominate those of human capital and, in the long run, the opposite. This in turn implies that annual wage growth constructed from short panels would be greater for job-to-job changers than for stayers, whereas the wage growth by percentile of the wage distributions over a longer period would be lower for job-to-job changers than for stayers. As younger and less educated workers change jobs more frequently, this suggests that job changes are inequality-increasing in the long run.

Finally, we complement our analysis by showing the contribution of total job separation including both job exits to nonemployment and job-to-job transitions. To do so, we consider workers with high job tenure (above the sample median) as a measure for lower total job separation. Both in Mexico and in Brazil, growth is higher among stayers for all workers as Figure 5 illustrates. Unlike before, the lowest paid workers do not gain from exiting to nonemployment in Mexico as expected

since negative turnover due to job-to-nonemployment transitions is more frequent among workers with low education, those at the bottom of the wage distribution. In this country, wage inequality falls within both groups, with low and high tenure, but more so among those workers with low tenure, whereas in Brazil the fall in wage inequality is driven by workers with low tenure. However, mean wage growth is lower for low tenure workers and, as less skilled workers tend to select into this group, it suggests that job separation increases inequality in the long run.

Figure 5: Observed and Simulated hourly wage growth incidence curves – according to tenure



Source: Author's calculations using the samples described in Section 3.1.

5. The role of nonwage compensation

Due to lack of data availability, it is hard to know how workers' transitions are related to broader measures of job quality going beyond wages. Evidence shows that workers value job amenities such as job security and distance to work in several European countries, working times in France (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009), work conditions (Gronberg and Reed, 1994) and health insurance in the U.S. (Dey and Flinn, 2008). In this sense, there is scope for nonwage attributes to improve job quality but the impact on welfare inequality is unclear as it depends on how wages and employment adjust. In theory, nonwage job characteristics can drive both labor turnover and wage dispersion due to compensating differentials (Rosen, 1986) However empirical evidence on the correlation between wages and job amenities is quite mixed.

Search models provide useful insights to explain such conflicting results. If mobility is imperfect, no or weak correlations may occur even if workers value job amenities. In particular, when workers are constrained to move to better jobs or subject to reallocation shocks, firms have no incentive to compete against offers from other firms (Hwang, Mortensen and Reed, 1998; Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009)²⁴ This is consistent with weak or lack of evidence of compensating wage

²⁴ Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) is a seminal article developing a general equilibrium search model with on-the-job search where jobs have a nonwage component and firms have different cost to produce it. A related

differentials. Overall, these results suggest that low opportunities for job upgrades and involuntary job changes may lead to higher inequality in job quality.

In this paper, we provide new evidence by exploiting within country variation in nonwage compensation such as the introduction of employment provided health insurance across firm in Brazil and the non-contributory health insurance across cities in Mexico to analyze the role of nonwage margins in job turnover and wages.

5.1 Employer provided health insurance

To examine whether and the extent to which private health insurance (PHI) have effects on labor turnover, we use data on transitions between, into and exiting firms of the Brazilian formal sector over a one-year period considering only surviving firms, 2004-2018. We then link this dataset to administrative information on private health insurance contracts at firm-level in the same period. By exploiting the variation in the timing of implementation of the private insurance benefit across firms, Figure 6 shows that formal firms hire 0.01p.p. (4.5%) less in Brazil since PHI increases labor costs.²⁵ This is driven firms hiring less from outside the formal sector than from other formal firms, as well as by workers with less than secondary education, across all ages and both genders (Figures A.1 – A.3) As for the exit turnover, we find that the exit rate from the formal sector increases by 4% while to other firms reduces by 6.6% (Figures 7 and 8). Most exits from the formal sector are driven by both genders, workers aged 25-44, and those with high school education, likely due to greater costs with PHI provision for them (Figures A.4 – A.6). In addition, the negative effects on job-to-job turnover are consistent with the introduction of amenity in the current work. This seems driven by workers with high school education and aged 24 to 44, for which we find some (weak) evidence that they move to jobs that pay higher wages likely due to an increase in their reservation wages. In sum, firms tend to hire less workers and to fire more due to the introduction of PHI. Workers also tend to become more reluctant to move across jobs. These results yield unclear predictions regarding wage inequality, to the extent that more and less-disadvantaged workers are affected.

contribution is Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) who estimate a partial equilibrium version of the above model and adding reallocation shocks, hence allowing for both voluntary and involuntary job-to-job transitions.

²⁵ As percent of the average control mean at the baseline year, 2004. Control firms are obtained by matching.

Figure 6: Hiring rate (fraction of employment)




Figure 7: Exit rate (fraction of employment)





Figure 8: Job-to-Job rate (fraction of employment)



5.2. Non-contributory health insurance

Mexico introduced a large non-contributory health insurance scheme in 2004, Seguro Popular, extending health coverage to the uninsured: nonemployed and informal sector workers. Using quarterly labor force panel data from Mexico 2000-2012, we follow Conti et al (2022) and exploit the variation in the timing of implementation of the policy across municipalities.

Table 9 presents the effects of the introduction of Seguro Popular on several measures of turnover including exits to nonemployment as well as transitions between formal and informal jobs. For both men and women, we find that introducing health amenity outside the formal sector reduces entry into this sector. For men, transitions from informal to formal jobs decline, driven by those with very low education and older (Tables A.26-A.27) Women however stay more in nonemployment as transitions from nonemployment to the formal sector reduces among those with low education (Tables A.28-A.29).

As the tables show, when we condition the job-to-job transitions on changing wages, less educated males in the informal sector are less likely to move to jobs in the formal sector involving a pay cut, consistent with the health policy in the informal sector having a relatively high value for these workers such that it increases their reservation wages.

Table 9: Effects of Seguro Popular Introduction on Quarterly Transitions in Mexico

From: To:	Nonemp. Formal (1)	Nonemp. Informal (2)	Formal Nonemp. (3)	Formal Informal (4)	Informal Nonemp. (5)	Informal Formal (6)
Panel A: Men						
SP	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.006)
Mean in 2001	.111	.358	.0214	.139	.0566	.0939
N	7763	7763	12823	12823	14709	14709
Panel B: Women						
SP	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.005 (0.006)
Mean in 2001	.014	.0684	.112	.0569	.375	.0522
N	15448	15448	8162	8162	10975	10975

Source: Author's calculations using ENE/ENOE 2000-2012 from Mexico aggregated at the municipality-quarter level.

*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

In sum, the above results show that nonwage benefits provided by formal sector firms lower formal demand reducing hiring in and increasing firing from the formal sector. As for nonwage benefits that are publicly provided to informal workers and the nonemployed, we expect supply responses to be of first order and we do find lower inflows to the formal sector from nonemployment for women and from the informal sector for men. To the extent that the formal sector is associated with more productive jobs on average, these results suggest that nonwage aspects of jobs such as health insurance reduce productive transitions in Brazil and Mexico. In addition, as less educated and female workers are more affected, the introduction of non-contributory health policies in Mexico may be linked to higher wage inequality.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of the paper is to provide an analysis of the alternative explanations for the relationship between turnover, wage growth and inequality. First, it adds to the existing literature by providing detailed measures of job-to-job transitions, including switching of occupation, industry, firm size, and formality status. In addition, the paper reports the fraction of job-to-job transitions and job stayers with a wage increase, decrease, or same wage, as well as the corresponding yearly average real wage variation to assess potential gains or losses from turnover. Using panels from five Latin American countries and following individuals over one year, the results suggest an ambiguous relationship between turnover and wage inequality. On the one hand, total job separations and transitions from formal into informal employment occur more often among low-skill and young individuals, suggesting an increase in wage inequality. On the other hand, as young individuals benefit relatively more from positive job-to-job changes, i.e. those involving wage gains, this tends to lower inequality. We argue that the higher positive annual wage growth we find for job-to-job changers compared to stayers is due to short-run effects of turnover capturing the immediate gains from search behavior.

Second, the paper provides more direct evidence of the relationship between wage inequality and labor turnover. We present a decomposition exercise to analyze the contribution of workers'

transitions to the change in wage inequality. We do so by comparing observed and counterfactual wage growth by percentiles for job-to-job movers for each country over a more extended period. We find that job-to-job changes are inequality-reducing, consistent with search gains associated with turnover exhausting more rapidly for the high-paid workers. These results remain valid even when looking at total job separations, including both job exits to nonemployment and job-to-job transitions.

However, these results also show a clear tradeoff. Mean wage growth over time is lower among all job exiters in Brazil and the majority in Mexico. This apparent inconsistency with the analysis of turnover and individual wage growth can be reconciled by the dynamic effects of turnover. Unlike the individual wage growth analysis using short panels, by following wage distributions over a more extended period, we are thus able to capture the long-run effects of turnover. As search gains tend to exhaust with experience or time, and because human capital accumulates over time, we expect that human capital effects dominate those of search in the long run. Thus, wage growth is lower for job changers than for stayers, so that, as unskilled workers change jobs more frequently, job-to-job transitions can be inequality-increasing in the long run.

A potential explanation for limited wage growth in Latin American economies includes the high levels of informality and the drivers behind it. Barriers to formalization impeding access to more productive jobs limit human capital gains from turnover. In this context, policies aimed at reducing wage inequality should focus on improving the conditions for positive turnover towards better investment and, thus, higher-quality jobs.

References

- Barros, R. P. de, & Corseuil, C. H. (2004). The Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance. In *Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean* (pp. 273–350). University of Chicago Press. <https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/law-and-employment-lessons-latin-america-and-caribbean/impact-regulations-brazilian-labor-market-performance>
- Beccaria, L., & Maurizio, R. (2020). Labour market turnover in Latin America: How intensive is it and to what extent does it differ across countries? *International Labour Review*, 159(2), 161–193. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12105>
- Becker, G. S. (1975). Investment in Human Capital: Effects on Earnings. In *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, Second Edition* (pp. 13–44). NBER. <https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/human-capital-theoretical-and-empirical-analysis-special-reference-education-second-edition/investment-human-capital-effects-earnings>
- Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings. *Journal of Political Economy*, 75(4), 352–365.
- Bonhomme, S., & Jolivet, G. (2009). The pervasive absence of compensating differentials. *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 24(5), 763–795. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.1074>

- Bontemps, C., Robin, J.-M., & Van den Berg, G. J., (2000). Equilibrium search with continuous productivity dispersion: theory and nonparametric estimation. *International Economic Review*, 41 (2), 305–358. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00066>
- Bosch, M., & Maloney, W. F. (2006). Gross Worker Flows in the Presence of Informal Labor Markets: The Mexican Experience 1987-2002, Policy Research Working Paper 3883, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Bosch, M., & Maloney, W. F. (2010). Comparative analysis of labor market dynamics using Markov processes: An application to informality. *Labour Economics*, 17(4), 621–631. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.01.005>
- Burdett, K. (1978). A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates. *The American Economic Review*, 68(1), 212–220.
- Burdett, K., & Mortensen, D. T. (1998). Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment. *International Economic Review*, 39(2), 257–273. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2527292>
- Carvalho, C. C., Corbi, R., & Narita, R. (2018). Unintended consequences of unemployment insurance: Evidence from stricter eligibility criteria in Brazil. *Economics Letters*, 162, 157–161. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.10.016>
- Conti, G., Ginja, R., & Narita, R. (2022). *The Value of Health Insurance: A Household Job Search Approach*, mimeo.
- Coşar, A. K., Guner, N., & Tybout, J. (2016). Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage Distributions in an Open Economy. *American Economic Review*, 106(3), 625–663. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20110457>
- Dey M., & Flinn C. (2008). Household search and health insurance coverage, *Journal of Econometrics*, 145, 43–63. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.05.013>
- Dix-Carneiro, R. (2014). Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Dynamics. *Econometrica*, 82(3), 825-885. <https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10457>.
- Dix-Carneiro, R., and Kovak, B. (2017). Trade Liberalization and Regional Dynamics. *American Economic Review*, 107, 2908–46. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20161214>
- Dix-Carneiro, R., and Kovak, B. (2019). Margins of Labor Market Adjustment to Trade. *Journal of International Economics*, 117, 125– 142. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.01.005>
- Dix-Carneiro, R., and Kovak, B. (forthcoming). Globalization and Inequality in Latin America. *The Latin America and Caribbean Inequality Review*. <https://lacir.lse.ac.uk/en-gb/publications/globalization-and-inequality-in-latin-america>
- Donovan, K., Lu, W. J. & Schoellman, T. (2022) Labor Market Dynamics and Development, mimeo, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567390>
- Ferreira, F. H. G. (2012). Chapter 13 Distributions in Motion: Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Dynamics. In Philip N. Jefferson (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Poverty* (pp.427-462). Oxford Handbooks. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195393781.013.0014>
- Ferreira, F. H. G. & Barros, R. P. (2005). Chapter 4 The Slippery Slope: Explaining the Increase in Extreme Poverty in Urban Brazil, 1976–96. In Bourguignon, F., Ferreira F. H. G. & Lustig, N. (Eds.), *The Microeconomics of Income Distribution Dynamics*. World Bank and Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5861-8>
- Ferreira, F. H. G., P. Leite, & M. Wai-Poi. 2010. Chapter 8 Trade Liberalization, Employment Flows and Wage Inequality in Brazil. In: M. Nissanke & E. Thorbecke (Eds.), *The Poor under Globalization in Asia*,

Latin America, and Africa. Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195393781.001.0001>

- Goldberg, P. K., & Pavcnik, N. (2007). Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45(1), 39–82. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.1.39>
- Gonzaga, G. (2003). Labor Turnover and Labor Legislation in Brazil. *Economía*, 4(1), 165–222.
- Gronberg T., & Reed W. (1994). Estimating workers' marginal willingness to pay for job attributes using duration data, *Journal of Human Resources*, 29, 911–931.
- Heckman, J. J., & Pages, C. (2000). The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets, NBER Working Paper #7773.
- Hopenhayn, H. (2004). Labor Market Policies and Employment Duration. The Effects of Labor Market Reform in Argentina. In *Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean* (pp. 497–516). University of Chicago Press. <https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/law-and-employment-lessons-latin-america-and-caribbean/labor-market-policies-and-employment-duration-effects-labor-market-reform-argentina>
- Hwang H., Mortensen D., & Reed W. (1998). Hedonic wages and labor market search, *Journal of Labor Economics*, 16, 815–847. <https://doi.org/10.1086/209907>
- Jolivet, G., Postel-Vinay, F., & Robin, J.-M. (2006). Chapter 12 The Empirical Content of the Job Search Model: Labor Mobility and Wage Distributions in Europe and the U.S. *European Economic Review*, 50, 877–907. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0573-8555\(05\)75012-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0573-8555(05)75012-4)
- Jovanovic, B. (1979). Firm-specific Capital and Turnover. *Journal of Political Economy*, 87(6), 1246–1260.
- Kambourov, G., & Manovskii, I. (2008). Rising Occupational and Industry Mobility in the United States: 1968–97. *International Economic Review*, 49(1), 41–79. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00473.x>
- Kambourov, G., & Manovskii, I. (2009). Occupational Mobility and Wage Inequality. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 76(2), 731–759. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00535.x>
- Kambourov, G., Manovskii, I., & Plesca, M. (2005). *Returns to Government-Sponsored Training*, mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
- Kugler, A. D. (2000). *The Incidence of Job Security Regulations on Labor Market Flexibility and Compliance in Colombia: Evidence from the 1990 Reform* (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1814666). Social Science Research Network. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1814666>
- Kwon, I., & Meyersson Milgrom, E. M. (2014). The significance of firm and occupation specific human capital for hiring and promotions. *Labour Economics*, 31, 162–173. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2014.07.003>
- Marinescu, I., & Triyana, M. (2016). The sources of wage growth in a developing country. *IZA Journal of Labor & Development*, 5(1), 2. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40175-016-0047-9>
- McCall, B. P. (1990). Occupational Matching: A Test of Sorts. *Journal of Political Economy*, 98(1), 45–69. <https://doi.org/10.1086/261668>
- Meghir, C., Narita, R., & Robin, J.-M. (2015). Wages and Informality in Developing Countries, *American Economic Review*, 105(4), 1509–1546. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121110>
- Menezes-Filho, N. A., & Muendler, M.-A. (2011). *Labor Reallocation in Response to Trade Reform* (Working Paper No. 17372; Working Paper Series). National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w17372>

- Mincer, J. (1958). Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution. *Journal of Political Economy*, 66(4), 281–302.
- Mincer, J. (1974). *Schooling, Experience and Earnings*. Columbia University Press, New York.
- Mincer, J., & Jovanovic, B. (1981). Labor Mobility and Wages. In *Studies in Labor Markets* (pp. 21–64). University of Chicago Press. <https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/studies-labor-markets/labor-mobility-and-wages>
- Narita, R. (2020). Self-employment in developing countries: A search-equilibrium approach. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 35, 1–34. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2019.04.001>
- OECD. (2010). *OECD Employment Outlook 2010: Moving beyond the Jobs Crisis*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2010_empl_outlook-2010-en
- Pries, M., & Rogerson, R. (2005). Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and Labor Market Flows, *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(4), 811–839. <https://doi.org/10.1086/430333>
- Rosen S. (1986). The theory of equalizing differences. In *Handbook of Labor Economics*, 1(2), Ashenfelter O, Card D (eds). Elsevier: Amsterdam; 641–692.
- Rubinstein, Y., & Weiss, Y. (2006). Chapter 1 Post Schooling Wage Growth: Investment, Search and Learning. In E. Hanushek & F. Welch (Eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Education* (Vol. 1, pp. 1–67). Elsevier. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0692\(06\)01001-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0692(06)01001-4)
- Saavedra, J., & Torero, M. (2004). Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact over Formal Labor Demand and Job Market Turnover. The Case of Peru. In *Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean* (pp. 131–182). University of Chicago Press. <https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/law-and-employment-lessons-latin-america-and-caribbean/labor-market-reforms-and-their-impact-over-formal-labor-demand-and-job-market-turnover-case-peru>
- Shaw, K. L. (1984). A Formulation of the Earnings Function Using the Concept of Occupational Investment. *The Journal of Human Resources*, 19(3), 319–340. <https://doi.org/10.2307/145876>
- Shaw, K. L. (1987). Occupational Change, Employer Change, and the Transferability of Skills. *Southern Economic Journal*, 53(3), 702–719. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1058765>
- Topel, R. H., & Ward, M. P. (1992). Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107(2), 439–479. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2118478>
- Ulyssea, G. (2020). Informality: Causes and Consequences for Development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 12, 525–546. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082119-121914>
- Zangelidis, A. (2008). Occupational and Industry Specificity of Human Capital in the British Labour Market. *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 55(4), 420–443. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00460.x>

APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES

Table A.1: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers and stayers, by country and employment categories - Ecuador

	JTJ		Stayers	
	Fraction	Wage Var. %	Fraction	Wage Var. %
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total				
Wage decrease	31.6%	-20.7%	34.1%	-18.6%
Same wage	8.5%	-3.0%	10.7%	-2.6%
Wage increase	59.9%	22.5%	55.2%	20.9%
Wage growth		6.7%		4.9%
N / Employed	7.2%		92.8%	
Formal				
Wage decrease	34.0%	-21.0%	35.2%	-18.7%
Same wage	7.7%	-3.1%	9.5%	-2.6%
Wage increase	58.4%	22.0%	55.3%	20.7%
Wage growth		5.5%		4.6%
N / Employed	5.7%		94.3%	
Informal				
Wage decrease	26.0%	-19.2%	29.5%	-18.0%
Same wage	10.6%	-2.8%	15.7%	-2.7%
Wage increase	63.4%	24.3%	54.8%	21.9%
Wage growth		10.1%		6.3%
N / Employed	8.8%		91.2%	

Table A.2: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers and stayers, by country and employment categories – Argentina

	JTJ		Stayers	
	Fraction	Wage Var. %	Fraction	Wage Var. %
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total				
Wage decrease	17.0%	-27.4%	13.9%	-26.7%
Same wage	9.8%	-14.4%	9.1%	-15.0%
Wage increase	73.2%	25.1%	77.0%	18.1%
Wage growth		12.3%		8.9%
N / Employed	8.2%		91.8%	
Formal				
Wage decrease	20.2%	-26.6%	14.0%	-26.5%
Same wage	9.9%	-14.0%	8.7%	-15.1%
Wage increase	69.9%	23.1%	77.3%	17.5%
Wage growth		9.4%		8.5%

N / Employed	2.9%		97.1%	
Informal				
Wage decrease	13.9%	-28.7%	13.2%	-28.0%
Same wage	9.7%	-15.0%	11.1%	-14.8%
Wage increase	76.4%	27.8%	75.7%	23.2%
Wage growth		15.8%		12.2%
N / Employed	13.5%		86.5%	

Table A.3: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers and stayers, by country and employment categories – Mexico

	JTJ		Stayers	
	Fraction	Wage Var. %	Fraction	Wage Var. %
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total				
Wage decrease	35.1%	-22.4%	32.5%	-21.6%
Same wage	15.7%	-4.0%	19.9%	-4.0%
Wage increase	49.2%	23.0%	47.6%	19.8%
Wage growth		2.8%		1.6%
N / Employed group	19.5%		80.5%	
Formal				
Wage decrease	37.1%	-22.1%	33.3%	-21.4%
Same wage	12.2%	-4.1%	18.4%	-4.0%
Wage increase	50.7%	22.1%	48.3%	19.4%
Wage growth		2.5%		1.5%
N / Employed group	12.8%		87.2%	
Informal				
Wage decrease	33.2%	-22.7%	30.6%	-22.3%
Same wage	19.0%	-3.9%	23.5%	-3.9%
Wage increase	47.8%	23.9%	46.0%	21.0%
Wage growth		3.2%		1.9%
N / Employed group	26.2%		73.8%	

Table A.4: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers and stayers, by country and employment categories - Brazil

	JTJ		Stayers	
	Fraction	Wage Var. %	Fraction	Wage Var. %
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total				

Wage decrease	28.2%	-21.2%	22.0%	-20.0%
Same wage	13.8%	-5.5%	23.7%	-5.4%
Wage increase	58.0%	18.7%	54.3%	16.1%
Wage growth		4.1%		3.0%
N / Employed	13.6%		86.4%	
Formal				
Wage decrease	29.0%	-21.3%	22.2%	-20.0%
Same wage	13.7%	-5.5%	23.5%	-5.4%
Wage increase	57.3%	18.7%	54.3%	16.0%
Wage growth		3.8%		3.0%
N / Employed	7.7%		92.3%	
Informal				
Wage decrease	25.8%	-20.5%	20.2%	-20.6%
Same wage	14.1%	-5.2%	25.1%	-5.3%
Wage increase	60.1%	18.6%	54.7%	16.7%
Wage growth		5.1%		3.6%
N / Employed	19.4%		80.6%	

Table A.5: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers and stayers, by country and employment categories - Chile

	JTJ		Stayers	
	Fraction	Wage Var. %	Fraction	Wage Var. %
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total				
Wage decrease	38.1%	-21.7%	38.0%	-19.5%
Same wage	2.3%	-3.8%	2.3%	-3.8%
Wage increase	59.6%	22.4%	59.7%	19.5%
Wage growth		5.0%		4.1%
N / Employed	19.9%		80.1%	
Formal				
Wage decrease	38.9%	-21.7%	38.2%	-19.5%
Same wage	2.3%	-3.9%	2.3%	-3.9%
Wage increase	58.8%	22.3%	59.6%	19.3%
Wage growth		4.6%		4.0%
N / Employed	12.3%		87.7%	
Informal				
Wage decrease	34.0%	-22.1%	35.4%	-19.2%
Same wage	2.1%	-3.2%	3.4%	-3.4%
Wage increase	63.9%	23.2%	61.2%	23.2%
Wage growth		7.3%		7.3%
N / Employed	27.6%		72.4%	

Table A.6: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching employment categories – Ecuador

Employment category in t	Employment category in t+12			
	1		2	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Formal				
Wage decrease	33.0%	-21.1%	39.9%	-20.3%
Same wage	7.5%	-3.1%	8.5%	-3.0%
Wage increase	59.5%	22.6%	51.6%	16.9%
N (N/Employed)	1119 (4.37%)		188 (0.73%)	
2 - Informal				
Wage decrease	23.4%	-18.8%	30.8%	-20.0%
Same wage	9.6%	-3.1%	12.3%	-2.0%
Wage increase	66.9%	25.1%	56.9%	22.0%
N (N/Employed)	354 (1.38%)		195 (0.76%)	

Table A.7: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching employment categories - Argentina

Employment category in t	Employment category in t+12			
	1		2	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Formal				
Wage decrease	16.6%	-25.7%	28.9%	-28.4%
Same wage	9.2%	-13.9%	11.5%	-14.1%
Wage increase	74.2%	22.4%	59.6%	25.8%
N (N/Employed)	2006 (2.85%)		835 (1.18%)	
2 - Informal				
Wage decrease	9.6%	-28.9%	15.7%	-28.6%
Same wage	5.7%	-15.2%	11.3%	-15.0%
Wage increase	84.7%	33.3%	73.0%	24.8%
N (N/Employed)	854 (1.21%)		2082 (2.95%)	

Table A.8: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching employment categories - Mexico

Employment category in t	Employment category in t+12			
	1		2	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Formal				
Wage decrease	35.8%	-21.6%	40.3%	-23.5%
Same wage	11.3%	-4.0%	14.4%	-4.1%
Wage increase	52.9%	21.6%	45.2%	23.7%
N (N/Employed)	1948 (6.76%)		756 (2.62%)	
2 - Informal				
Wage decrease	34.3%	-22.8%	32.8%	-22.7%
Same wage	11.4%	-4.1%	21.3%	-3.9%
Wage increase	54.2%	27.4%	45.9%	22.6%
N (N/Employed)	690 (2.4%)		2233 (7.75%)	

Table A.9: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching employment categories – Brazil

	Employment category in t+12			
	1		2	
Employment category in t	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Formal				
Wage decrease	28.0%	-21.2%	33.8%	-21.7%
Same wage	14.2%	-5.5%	11.3%	-5.6%
Wage increase	57.7%	18.7%	54.9%	18.7%
N (N/Employed)	12523 (8.53%)		2546 (1.73%)	
2 - Informal				
Wage decrease	26.7%	-20.6%	24.8%	-20.4%
Same wage	11.2%	-5.4%	17.4%	-5.0%
Wage increase	62.1%	19.0%	57.8%	18.0%
N (N/Employed)	2617 (1.78%)		2275 (1.55%)	

Table A.10: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching employment categories – Chile

	Employment category in t+12			
	1		2	
Employment category in t	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Formal				
Wage decrease	38.4%	-21.6%	42.7%	-22.4%
Same wage	2.3%	-3.9%	2.7%	-3.5%
Wage increase	59.3%	22.3%	54.7%	22.6%
N (N/Employed)	3844 (15.02%)		483 (1.89%)	
2 - Informal				
Wage decrease	34.1%	-22.7%	36.3%	-21.7%
Same wage	2.4%	-3.4%	1.8%	-3.0%
Wage increase	63.4%	22.6%	61.9%	23.9%
N (N/Employed)	410 (1.6%)		328 (1.28%)	

Table A.11: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching occupations - Ecuador

Occupation in t	Occupation in t+12																	
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Directors and managers																		
Wage decrease	50.0%	-15.8%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	-17.2%	100.0%	-21.1%	100.0%	-25.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-20.6%	100.0%	-28.1%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	50.0%	-1.0%	100.0%	23.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	32.5%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0.01%)		3 (0.01%)		3 (0.01%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)		1 (0%)	
2 - Scientific and intellectual professionals																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	30.0%	-26.6%	14.3%	-25.1%	28.6%	-32.5%	50.0%	-34.7%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-18.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	-3.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	100.0%	12.0%	63.3%	35.2%	85.7%	25.5%	71.4%	12.4%	50.0%	23.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	54.8%	100.0%	27.2%
N (N/Employed)	5 (0.02%)		60 (0.23%)		14 (0.05%)		7 (0.03%)		4 (0.02%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)		1 (0%)		2 (0.01%)	
3 - Mid-level technicians and professionals																		
Wage decrease	33.3%	-34.1%	40.0%	-19.5%	40.0%	-21.9%	33.3%	-18.0%	30.4%	-28.1%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-26.0%	25.0%	-21.7%	63.6%	-22.5%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	-2.3%	11.4%	-3.8%	6.7%	-0.2%	4.3%	-0.4%	100.0%	-3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	-1.9%
Wage increase	66.7%	56.2%	40.0%	40.7%	48.6%	30.1%	60.0%	28.1%	65.2%	14.2%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	40.2%	75.0%	26.1%	18.2%	12.4%
N (N/Employed)	3 (0.01%)		20 (0.08%)		35 (0.14%)		15 (0.06%)		23 (0.09%)		1 (0%)		6 (0.02%)		8 (0.03%)		11 (0.04%)	
4 - Administrative support staff																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	-23.5%	35.0%	-22.2%	20.6%	-16.3%	22.2%	-22.2%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-26.7%	25.0%	-16.9%	55.0%	-13.8%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	-1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-0.4%	8.3%	-0.1%	5.0%	-3.4%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	71.4%	28.2%	60.0%	22.8%	79.4%	24.5%	72.2%	12.8%	100.0%	29.3%	33.3%	41.0%	66.7%	29.2%	40.0%	33.1%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		7 (0.03%)		20 (0.08%)		34 (0.13%)		18 (0.07%)		3 (0.01%)		6 (0.02%)		12 (0.05%)		20 (0.08%)	
5 - Service workers and shop and market vendors																		
Wage decrease	25.0%	-12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	-23.1%	41.7%	-17.3%	32.4%	-18.8%	50.0%	-22.3%	50.0%	-27.1%	60.0%	-23.1%	35.7%	-15.0%
Same wage	25.0%	-1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	-3.6%	8.3%	-5.7%	9.0%	-3.4%	25.0%	-4.4%	3.6%	-4.4%	6.7%	-7.3%	5.4%	-3.8%
Wage increase	50.0%	46.1%	100.0%	22.8%	50.0%	18.1%	50.0%	22.8%	58.6%	16.9%	25.0%	10.0%	46.4%	25.2%	33.3%	26.5%	58.9%	17.6%
N (N/Employed)	4 (0.02%)		3 (0.01%)		10 (0.04%)		24 (0.09%)		145 (0.57%)		4 (0.02%)		28 (0.11%)		15 (0.06%)		56 (0.22%)	

6 - Farmers and skilled agricultural

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-18.2%	20.0%	-30.7%	27.3%	-9.8%	14.3%	-10.0%	20.0%	-24.8%	25.0%	-18.8%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	-0.4%	14.3%	-1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	-1.3%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	9.1%	75.0%	34.2%	80.0%	22.5%	63.6%	9.0%	71.4%	26.2%	80.0%	26.6%	62.5%	16.7%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)		4 (0.02%)		5 (0.02%)		22 (0.09%)		7 (0.03%)		5 (0.02%)		32 (0.12%)	

7 - Officials, operators, and craftsmen

Wage decrease	100.0%	-10.1%	50.0%	-9.3%	50.0%	-18.3%	43.8%	-27.2%	25.8%	-20.8%	28.6%	-8.8%	26.9%	-19.4%	25.0%	-22.1%	27.8%	-21.6%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	-3.3%	9.7%	-2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	10.4%	-4.7%	12.5%	-2.2%	6.5%	-3.8%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.2%	50.0%	44.3%	50.0%	11.9%	64.5%	24.4%	71.4%	18.0%	62.7%	20.9%	62.5%	35.0%	65.7%	21.2%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		4 (0.02%)		4 (0.02%)		16 (0.06%)		31 (0.12%)		7 (0.03%)		134 (0.52%)		32 (0.12%)		108 (0.42%)	

8 - Plant and machine operators and assemblers

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-7.7%	9.1%	-38.3%	44.0%	-23.2%	40.0%	-27.1%	27.8%	-24.8%	36.9%	-23.0%	54.2%	-18.6%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	-3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.3%	-2.7%	12.5%	-3.0%
Wage increase	100.0%	59.4%	100.0%	11.2%	75.0%	11.1%	72.7%	19.7%	56.0%	34.4%	60.0%	16.0%	72.2%	15.5%	50.8%	19.2%	33.3%	18.4%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		1 (0%)		4 (0.02%)		11 (0.04%)		25 (0.1%)		5 (0.02%)		18 (0.07%)		122 (0.48%)		48 (0.19%)	

9 - Elementary occupations

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-7.5%	21.7%	-13.0%	19.0%	-17.2%	21.7%	-18.8%	34.8%	-15.5%	17.3%	-21.2%	32.2%	-19.4%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	-0.1%	13.0%	-3.1%	10.1%	-2.6%	1.9%	-4.4%	13.0%	-3.3%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	71.7%	66.7%	25.1%	78.3%	12.0%	79.8%	33.9%	65.2%	26.4%	55.1%	19.0%	80.8%	25.5%	54.8%	20.7%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		1 (0%)		12 (0.05%)		23 (0.09%)		84 (0.33%)		23 (0.09%)		69 (0.27%)		52 (0.2%)		301 (1.18%)	

Table A.12: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching occupations - Argentina

Occupation in t	Occupation in t+12																	
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Directors and managers																		
Wage decrease	25.0%	-21.5%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	-27.6%	100.0%	-18.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-31.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-20.2%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-9.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	75.0%	3.7%	100.0%	46.4%	85.7%	26.6%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	13.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	4 (0.01%)		2 (0%)		7 (0.01%)		2 (0%)		3 (0%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)	
2 - Scientific and intellectual professionals																		
Wage decrease	50.0%	-23.8%	11.9%	-23.1%	33.3%	-30.8%	27.3%	-16.9%	12.5%	-14.5%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	-31.1%	25.0%	-29.9%	50.0%	-26.5%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	-11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	-8.3%	25.0%	-7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-9.9%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	50.0%	82.9%	83.3%	11.0%	66.7%	11.2%	63.6%	56.9%	62.5%	31.7%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%	22.7%	50.0%	52.7%	50.0%	7.6%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0%)		42 (0.06%)		15 (0.02%)		11 (0.02%)		8 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		5 (0.01%)		4 (0.01%)		2 (0%)	
3 - Mid-level technicians and professionals																		
Wage decrease	33.3%	-36.2%	18.8%	-19.1%	13.2%	-30.5%	23.3%	-25.9%	20.0%	-29.4%	0.0%	0.0%	23.5%	-24.6%	18.5%	-20.7%	22.2%	-25.3%
Same wage	33.3%	-10.0%	12.5%	-11.8%	11.6%	-16.9%	3.3%	-8.9%	12.5%	-12.3%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	-9.1%	11.1%	-13.1%	11.1%	-19.5%
Wage increase	33.3%	35.1%	68.8%	29.7%	75.2%	19.5%	73.3%	24.3%	67.5%	21.6%	0.0%	0.0%	70.6%	46.5%	70.4%	19.3%	66.7%	17.3%
N (N/Employed)	3 (0%)		16 (0.02%)		121 (0.17%)		30 (0.04%)		40 (0.06%)		0 (0%)		17 (0.02%)		27 (0.04%)		9 (0.01%)	
4 - Administrative support staff																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%	-20.4%	17.2%	-19.6%	15.2%	-21.7%	19.7%	-29.7%	0.0%	0.0%	30.0%	-41.2%	22.0%	-25.5%	24.4%	-28.4%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.1%	-9.2%	9.8%	-15.4%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	-5.0%	6.0%	-8.7%	9.8%	-19.9%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	89.5%	20.5%	82.8%	42.5%	72.7%	25.5%	70.5%	38.0%	100.0%	14.3%	60.0%	41.4%	72.0%	36.0%	65.9%	20.9%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		19 (0.03%)		29 (0.04%)		132 (0.19%)		61 (0.09%)		1 (0%)		10 (0.01%)		50 (0.07%)		41 (0.06%)	
5 - Service workers and shop and market vendors																		
Wage decrease	20.0%	-35.7%	50.0%	-21.5%	16.3%	-16.6%	15.7%	-22.7%	13.8%	-26.6%	0.0%	0.0%	26.0%	-30.7%	12.3%	-29.0%	19.4%	-26.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.1%	-7.8%	8.4%	-7.8%	9.6%	-17.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.0%	-21.8%	4.3%	-15.1%	12.2%	-20.0%
Wage increase	80.0%	17.4%	50.0%	20.0%	77.6%	35.7%	75.9%	33.0%	76.6%	18.5%	100.0%	118.2%	68.0%	36.4%	83.3%	30.9%	68.3%	25.8%
N (N/Employed)	5 (0.01%)		2 (0%)		49 (0.07%)		83 (0.12%)		564 (0.8%)		1 (0%)		50 (0.07%)		138 (0.2%)		139 (0.2%)	
6 - Farmers and skilled agricultural																		

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-42.7%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-36.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	-32.4%	11.8%	-24.4%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-9.9%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	-9.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	72.3%	100.0%	18.6%	100.0%	16.6%	75.0%	40.4%	80.0%	-4.6%	82.4%	13.6%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		2 (0%)		0 (0%)		2 (0%)		3 (0%)		7 (0.01%)		4 (0.01%)		5 (0.01%)		17 (0.02%)	
7 - Officials, operators, and craftsmen																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.2%	-25.6%	18.8%	-16.7%	12.9%	-28.6%	33.3%	-40.8%	16.1%	-27.8%	14.8%	-27.8%	23.6%	-30.5%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-8.3%	14.6%	-11.0%	6.3%	-9.9%	11.4%	-13.6%	0.0%	0.0%	11.4%	-14.4%	6.7%	-9.4%	14.0%	-19.9%
Wage increase	100.0%	23.3%	0.0%	0.0%	73.2%	26.6%	75.0%	8.5%	75.7%	19.3%	66.7%	29.9%	72.5%	23.8%	78.5%	31.7%	62.4%	19.3%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0%)		1 (0%)		41 (0.06%)		16 (0.02%)		70 (0.1%)		3 (0%)		880 (1.25%)		135 (0.19%)		229 (0.32%)	
8 - Plant and machine operators and assemblers																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	17.6%	-20.0%	25.0%	-23.1%	25.3%	-30.2%	0.0%	0.0%	18.9%	-26.3%	18.0%	-27.3%	21.2%	-29.4%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-9.4%	5.9%	-9.0%	9.6%	-18.8%	11.1%	-8.9%	28.6%	-9.2%	6.1%	-9.6%	10.4%	-14.8%	10.9%	-13.1%
Wage increase	100.0%	12.4%	75.0%	44.4%	76.5%	20.5%	65.4%	26.6%	63.6%	23.3%	71.4%	26.3%	75.0%	31.5%	71.7%	28.8%	67.9%	27.0%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0%)		4 (0.01%)		34 (0.05%)		52 (0.07%)		99 (0.14%)		7 (0.01%)		132 (0.19%)		840 (1.19%)		165 (0.23%)	
9 - Elementary occupations																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.3%	-22.7%	13.9%	-22.1%	14.3%	-22.8%	11.1%	-28.5%	16.2%	-29.5%	17.4%	-30.4%	14.6%	-30.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	-36.0%	2.8%	-10.1%	10.1%	-16.2%	11.1%	-16.4%	8.9%	-10.5%	6.0%	-12.1%	10.3%	-14.7%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	62.0%	80.0%	17.8%	83.3%	29.2%	75.6%	27.2%	77.8%	20.9%	74.9%	23.1%	76.6%	30.9%	75.1%	28.6%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		2 (0%)		15 (0.02%)		36 (0.05%)		119 (0.17%)		9 (0.01%)		271 (0.38%)		167 (0.24%)		594 (0.84%)	

Table A.13: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching occupations - Mexico

Occupation in t	Occupation in t+12																	
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Directors and managers																		
Wage decrease	34.2%	-22.4%	17.6%	-31.1%	41.7%	-27.0%	58.8%	-32.1%	55.0%	-19.3%	100.0%	-34.4%	50.0%	-20.2%	35.0%	-26.3%	33.3%	-19.3%
Same wage	13.2%	-3.4%	11.8%	-4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	17.6%	-3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	-4.5%	10.0%	-3.4%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	52.6%	19.8%	70.6%	34.7%	58.3%	21.4%	23.5%	21.0%	45.0%	36.8%	0.0%	0.0%	41.7%	16.0%	55.0%	10.2%	66.7%	33.4%
N (N/Employed)	38 (0.13%)		17 (0.06%)		12 (0.04%)		17 (0.06%)		20 (0.07%)		2 (0.01%)		12 (0.04%)		20 (0.07%)		9 (0.03%)	
2 - Scientific and intellectual professionals																		
Wage decrease	50.0%	-29.7%	33.8%	-20.7%	40.0%	-21.9%	33.3%	-25.6%	50.0%	-23.6%	0.0%	0.0%	83.3%	-20.4%	60.0%	-19.7%	50.0%	-25.1%
Same wage	33.3%	-5.7%	16.2%	-4.0%	6.7%	-4.7%	16.7%	-3.3%	10.7%	-3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	-4.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	16.7%	51.4%	50.0%	30.3%	53.3%	41.4%	50.0%	11.9%	39.3%	21.7%	100.0%	58.9%	16.7%	10.1%	30.0%	13.0%	50.0%	1.6%
N (N/Employed)	12 (0.04%)		68 (0.24%)		15 (0.05%)		18 (0.06%)		28 (0.1%)		1 (0%)		6 (0.02%)		10 (0.03%)		4 (0.01%)	
3 - Mid-level technicians and professionals																		
Wage decrease	18.2%	-35.9%	18.8%	-17.4%	43.0%	-23.7%	34.8%	-14.8%	43.3%	-20.8%	66.7%	-36.2%	48.3%	-26.4%	40.5%	-19.2%	46.9%	-17.1%
Same wage	27.3%	-3.9%	6.3%	-2.6%	10.1%	-4.6%	17.4%	-4.0%	6.7%	-4.0%	33.3%	-4.7%	13.8%	-5.1%	8.1%	-4.2%	15.6%	-4.6%
Wage increase	54.5%	20.4%	75.0%	31.2%	46.8%	19.2%	47.8%	22.3%	50.0%	27.1%	0.0%	0.0%	37.9%	11.2%	51.4%	23.9%	37.5%	15.5%
N (N/Employed)	11 (0.04%)		16 (0.06%)		79 (0.27%)		23 (0.08%)		30 (0.1%)		3 (0.01%)		29 (0.1%)		37 (0.13%)		32 (0.11%)	
4 - Administrative support staff																		
Wage decrease	20.0%	-13.7%	14.3%	-35.8%	9.1%	-18.3%	32.5%	-24.0%	44.4%	-16.4%	80.0%	-28.5%	16.7%	-26.5%	33.3%	-17.7%	48.7%	-23.9%
Same wage	13.3%	-3.9%	35.7%	-4.6%	0.0%	0.0%	15.7%	-3.8%	11.1%	-4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-5.0%	7.7%	-3.5%	10.3%	-3.9%
Wage increase	66.7%	25.7%	50.0%	38.3%	90.9%	25.3%	51.8%	29.5%	44.4%	24.0%	20.0%	53.4%	66.7%	28.0%	59.0%	24.0%	41.0%	15.3%
N (N/Employed)	15 (0.05%)		14 (0.05%)		11 (0.04%)		83 (0.29%)		45 (0.16%)		5 (0.02%)		12 (0.04%)		39 (0.14%)		39 (0.14%)	
5 - Service workers and shop and market vendors																		
Wage decrease	22.7%	-18.3%	35.0%	-22.7%	25.0%	-28.2%	28.9%	-26.2%	37.0%	-21.8%	28.6%	-30.0%	35.3%	-23.0%	42.9%	-27.5%	28.2%	-27.7%
Same wage	9.1%	-3.1%	15.0%	-5.6%	6.3%	-4.7%	11.1%	-3.9%	12.8%	-4.0%	14.3%	-3.8%	11.8%	-4.3%	8.8%	-3.5%	16.1%	-3.6%
Wage increase	68.2%	27.5%	50.0%	15.0%	68.8%	35.3%	60.0%	28.4%	50.2%	21.7%	57.1%	31.8%	52.9%	24.4%	48.4%	17.1%	55.6%	20.7%
N (N/Employed)	22 (0.08%)		20 (0.07%)		16 (0.06%)		45 (0.16%)		486 (1.69%)		14 (0.05%)		51 (0.18%)		91 (0.32%)		124 (0.43%)	
6 - Farmers and skilled agricultural																		

Wage decrease	25.0%	-26.9%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	-10.3%	20.0%	-9.8%	50.0%	-30.2%	31.0%	-21.2%	20.8%	-24.3%	23.1%	-20.2%	19.4%	-24.6%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	-3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	-3.7%	26.6%	-4.1%	8.3%	-3.3%	15.4%	-4.2%	16.3%	-3.8%
Wage increase	75.0%	18.7%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	8.4%	80.0%	10.1%	40.0%	12.2%	42.4%	21.6%	70.8%	35.2%	61.5%	39.4%	64.3%	20.8%
N (N/Employed)	4 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		5 (0.02%)		5 (0.02%)		10 (0.03%)		229 (0.79%)		24 (0.08%)		26 (0.09%)		98 (0.34%)	
7 - Officials, operators, and craftsmen																		
Wage decrease	20.0%	-27.4%	57.1%	-18.5%	40.7%	-17.9%	28.6%	-9.2%	48.8%	-17.9%	71.4%	-30.0%	34.3%	-23.1%	30.9%	-23.8%	44.4%	-25.0%
Same wage	20.0%	-3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	-4.4%	14.3%	-3.3%	14.0%	-3.7%	21.4%	-4.6%	21.4%	-4.2%	13.8%	-4.0%	20.7%	-3.8%
Wage increase	60.0%	41.5%	42.9%	22.6%	48.1%	24.0%	57.1%	42.7%	37.2%	17.6%	7.1%	11.2%	44.3%	22.2%	55.3%	28.4%	34.9%	18.4%
N (N/Employed)	5 (0.02%)		7 (0.02%)		27 (0.09%)		7 (0.02%)		43 (0.15%)		14 (0.05%)		557 (1.93%)		94 (0.33%)		232 (0.81%)	
8 - Plant and machine operators and assemblers																		
Wage decrease	28.6%	-14.7%	40.0%	-26.8%	36.0%	-15.2%	35.3%	-24.7%	47.3%	-24.3%	42.9%	-19.4%	36.8%	-22.3%	37.0%	-21.8%	39.3%	-17.8%
Same wage	14.3%	-3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	12.0%	-4.2%	2.9%	-3.9%	5.4%	-4.4%	3.6%	-3.7%	13.8%	-3.5%	13.0%	-4.0%	14.8%	-3.9%
Wage increase	57.1%	33.1%	60.0%	21.1%	52.0%	21.7%	61.8%	18.8%	47.3%	23.7%	53.6%	27.7%	49.4%	23.3%	50.0%	22.4%	45.9%	21.1%
N (N/Employed)	7 (0.02%)		5 (0.02%)		25 (0.09%)		34 (0.12%)		74 (0.26%)		28 (0.1%)		87 (0.3%)		662 (2.3%)		135 (0.47%)	
9 - Elementary occupations																		
Wage decrease	57.1%	-18.4%	40.0%	-25.4%	18.8%	-21.9%	45.7%	-26.9%	44.3%	-23.3%	33.8%	-22.7%	24.0%	-19.5%	34.9%	-20.7%	29.2%	-21.1%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	-3.0%	8.6%	-4.6%	13.0%	-3.5%	18.9%	-4.1%	16.1%	-3.6%	10.9%	-4.1%	21.3%	-3.9%
Wage increase	42.9%	20.6%	60.0%	22.3%	75.0%	26.2%	45.7%	14.2%	42.7%	22.8%	47.3%	30.7%	59.9%	26.1%	54.3%	25.7%	49.5%	20.4%
N (N/Employed)	7 (0.02%)		5 (0.02%)		16 (0.06%)		35 (0.12%)		131 (0.45%)		74 (0.26%)		242 (0.84%)		129 (0.45%)		839 (2.91%)	

Table A.14: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching occupations - Brazil

Occupation in t	Occupation in t+12																	
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Directors and managers																		
Wage decrease	30.8%	-23.2%	42.4%	-22.9%	45.2%	-23.6%	38.0%	-23.7%	42.9%	-24.0%	50.0%	-11.8%	36.6%	-23.6%	37.0%	-24.0%	57.1%	-26.9%
Same wage	17.1%	-5.8%	18.2%	-4.9%	12.9%	-6.1%	20.0%	-6.9%	22.1%	-6.6%	0.0%	0.0%	22.0%	-5.2%	14.8%	-4.8%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	52.1%	21.3%	39.4%	23.2%	41.9%	23.7%	42.0%	16.5%	35.1%	19.9%	50.0%	26.2%	41.5%	11.7%	48.1%	7.4%	42.9%	21.9%
N (N/Employed)	146 (0.1%)		33 (0.02%)		62 (0.04%)		50 (0.03%)		77 (0.05%)		2 (0%)		41 (0.03%)		27 (0.02%)		28 (0.02%)	
2 - Scientific and intellectual professionals																		
Wage decrease	40.6%	-21.5%	23.7%	-20.2%	28.1%	-19.0%	43.9%	-23.9%	34.3%	-22.0%	0.0%	0.0%	26.3%	-14.9%	44.4%	-31.2%	28.6%	-16.4%
Same wage	12.5%	-5.1%	22.7%	-5.4%	17.2%	-5.0%	17.1%	-6.5%	11.4%	-4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	21.1%	-4.6%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	-9.9%
Wage increase	46.9%	17.6%	53.5%	20.6%	54.7%	28.3%	39.0%	20.3%	54.3%	17.4%	0.0%	0.0%	52.6%	24.2%	55.6%	18.4%	57.1%	11.3%
N (N/Employed)	32 (0.02%)		299 (0.2%)		64 (0.04%)		41 (0.03%)		35 (0.02%)		0 (0%)		19 (0.01%)		9 (0.01%)		7 (0%)	
3 - Mid-level technicians and professionals																		
Wage decrease	13.2%	-20.7%	21.1%	-19.8%	27.3%	-22.4%	38.9%	-23.7%	38.0%	-23.1%	0.0%	0.0%	37.4%	-22.4%	38.3%	-23.1%	44.3%	-20.9%
Same wage	15.1%	-6.1%	17.1%	-5.8%	15.9%	-5.2%	11.5%	-6.9%	14.6%	-6.6%	16.7%	-2.6%	15.6%	-5.5%	15.8%	-4.8%	13.9%	-5.9%
Wage increase	71.7%	24.2%	61.8%	24.4%	56.8%	20.4%	49.6%	18.8%	47.5%	20.1%	83.3%	6.1%	46.9%	21.3%	45.8%	18.7%	41.7%	15.5%
N (N/Employed)	53 (0.04%)		76 (0.05%)		622 (0.42%)		131 (0.09%)		158 (0.11%)		6 (0%)		211 (0.14%)		120 (0.08%)		115 (0.08%)	
4 - Administrative support staff																		
Wage decrease	16.1%	-28.4%	25.0%	-22.7%	31.6%	-24.0%	25.6%	-21.1%	28.0%	-21.0%	16.7%	-10.8%	30.8%	-18.7%	26.3%	-23.3%	24.9%	-21.7%
Same wage	14.3%	-6.3%	11.1%	-5.6%	11.0%	-5.4%	15.9%	-5.8%	11.0%	-4.6%	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	-5.9%	16.1%	-6.4%	13.6%	-4.5%
Wage increase	69.6%	20.7%	63.9%	32.5%	57.4%	20.5%	58.4%	17.1%	61.0%	17.6%	83.3%	20.7%	59.4%	20.4%	57.6%	18.4%	61.5%	13.0%
N (N/Employed)	56 (0.04%)		36 (0.02%)		136 (0.09%)		577 (0.39%)		236 (0.16%)		6 (0%)		143 (0.1%)		118 (0.08%)		169 (0.12%)	
5 - Service workers and shop and market vendors																		
Wage decrease	25.8%	-25.9%	16.1%	-21.8%	17.9%	-24.4%	29.0%	-24.1%	29.5%	-21.5%	30.4%	-24.7%	32.2%	-19.1%	28.0%	-20.1%	31.4%	-19.5%
Same wage	11.3%	-4.6%	6.5%	-6.0%	10.9%	-5.1%	8.3%	-4.7%	14.3%	-5.2%	8.7%	-4.7%	10.1%	-5.6%	8.5%	-6.3%	9.2%	-4.6%
Wage increase	62.9%	23.7%	77.4%	29.2%	71.2%	22.7%	62.7%	22.8%	56.2%	16.2%	60.9%	15.2%	57.7%	21.2%	63.5%	23.2%	59.5%	17.2%
N (N/Employed)	62 (0.04%)		31 (0.02%)		156 (0.11%)		193 (0.13%)		1696 (1.15%)		23 (0.02%)		208 (0.14%)		211 (0.14%)		306 (0.21%)	
6 - Farmers and skilled agricultural																		

Wage decrease	16.7%	-17.5%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-22.5%	33.3%	-16.9%	22.7%	-20.9%	18.8%	-20.2%	22.7%	-24.8%	38.5%	-21.0%	24.9%	-17.8%
Same wage	16.7%	-7.9%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	-7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	-5.3%	16.2%	-4.6%	9.1%	-5.3%	5.8%	-6.9%	16.2%	-5.7%
Wage increase	66.7%	5.9%	100.0%	3.2%	55.6%	19.5%	66.7%	28.0%	59.1%	21.0%	65.0%	11.1%	68.2%	19.2%	55.8%	25.0%	58.9%	17.5%
N (N/Employed)	6 (0%)		1 (0%)		9 (0.01%)		6 (0%)		22 (0.01%)		234 (0.16%)		44 (0.03%)		52 (0.04%)		185 (0.13%)	
7 - Officials, operators, and craftsmen																		
Wage decrease	26.1%	-20.4%	38.5%	-19.4%	32.7%	-20.0%	34.9%	-24.3%	34.5%	-25.1%	29.4%	-13.9%	28.7%	-20.9%	28.1%	-19.1%	37.6%	-22.8%
Same wage	8.7%	-2.6%	7.7%	-6.6%	13.0%	-5.4%	11.9%	-5.7%	11.7%	-5.9%	2.9%	-1.3%	16.7%	-5.5%	10.0%	-5.7%	10.1%	-5.5%
Wage increase	65.2%	17.9%	53.8%	19.1%	54.3%	25.3%	53.2%	16.7%	53.8%	18.2%	67.6%	18.6%	54.6%	19.6%	61.9%	22.1%	52.3%	16.2%
N (N/Employed)	23 (0.02%)		13 (0.01%)		208 (0.14%)		126 (0.09%)		223 (0.15%)		34 (0.02%)		2624 (1.79%)		462 (0.31%)		553 (0.38%)	
8 - Plant and machine operators and assemblers																		
Wage decrease	23.1%	-14.0%	22.2%	-10.8%	20.5%	-25.1%	28.3%	-23.0%	34.4%	-20.6%	50.0%	-21.0%	30.0%	-20.9%	28.8%	-21.0%	34.4%	-19.8%
Same wage	11.5%	-8.2%	11.1%	-5.1%	15.2%	-7.0%	10.8%	-5.3%	12.6%	-5.6%	7.5%	-4.0%	10.0%	-5.1%	17.2%	-5.4%	9.8%	-5.1%
Wage increase	65.4%	24.3%	66.7%	6.3%	64.3%	23.8%	60.8%	15.2%	53.0%	18.9%	42.5%	24.7%	60.0%	19.8%	53.9%	19.4%	55.8%	14.8%
N (N/Employed)	26 (0.02%)		9 (0.01%)		112 (0.08%)		120 (0.08%)		215 (0.15%)		40 (0.03%)		380 (0.26%)		2545 (1.73%)		398 (0.27%)	
9 - Elementary occupations																		
Wage decrease	14.3%	-18.9%	0.0%	0.0%	15.3%	-18.0%	26.3%	-19.6%	24.4%	-19.2%	24.0%	-20.0%	22.9%	-20.6%	23.1%	-16.9%	22.6%	-19.3%
Same wage	14.3%	-5.4%	20.0%	-5.2%	12.2%	-5.8%	7.3%	-6.0%	7.8%	-6.7%	16.7%	-5.2%	10.9%	-5.6%	8.8%	-4.8%	13.2%	-5.3%
Wage increase	71.4%	15.1%	80.0%	14.3%	72.4%	23.1%	66.3%	15.7%	67.8%	17.1%	59.4%	15.4%	66.2%	18.4%	68.1%	19.4%	64.2%	13.2%
N (N/Employed)	21 (0.01%)		15 (0.01%)		98 (0.07%)		205 (0.14%)		307 (0.21%)		192 (0.13%)		586 (0.4%)		476 (0.32%)		2371 (1.61%)	

Table A.15: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching occupations – Chile

Occupation in t	Occupation in t+12																	
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Directors and managers																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	-37.8%	50.0%	-24.7%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-21.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-20.2%
Same wage	50.0%	-2.3%	14.3%	-2.2%	25.0%	-2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	50.0%	39.0%	57.1%	38.3%	25.0%	54.9%	100.0%	11.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	4 (0.02%)		7 (0.03%)		4 (0.02%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		1 (0%)	
2 - Scientific and intellectual professionals																		
Wage decrease	50.0%	-30.7%	28.7%	-19.7%	44.4%	-17.1%	42.9%	-15.3%	66.7%	-15.7%	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	-15.5%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-12.0%
Same wage	16.7%	-2.2%	6.9%	-4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	33.3%	13.6%	64.4%	18.4%	55.6%	27.1%	57.1%	19.9%	33.3%	69.5%	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	29.8%	100.0%	5.8%	66.7%	24.9%
N (N/Employed)	6 (0.02%)		87 (0.34%)		18 (0.07%)		7 (0.03%)		3 (0.01%)		(0%)		7 (0.03%)		2 (0.01%)		3 (0.01%)	
3 - Mid-level technicians and professionals																		
Wage decrease	66.7%	-19.0%	31.8%	-19.3%	31.6%	-26.6%	63.9%	-14.6%	64.7%	-11.6%	75.0%	-11.5%	39.4%	-23.1%	36.4%	-25.0%	36.0%	-18.1%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.5%	-3.4%	2.8%	-4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	-3.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	33.3%	64.6%	68.2%	23.2%	64.9%	34.3%	33.3%	32.7%	35.3%	28.4%	25.0%	4.6%	57.6%	8.5%	63.6%	29.0%	64.0%	22.2%
N (N/Employed)	3 (0.01%)		22 (0.09%)		114 (0.44%)		36 (0.14%)		17 (0.07%)		4 (0.02%)		33 (0.13%)		11 (0.04%)		25 (0.1%)	
4 - Administrative support staff																		
Wage decrease	100.0%	-30.2%	14.3%	-23.5%	26.9%	-15.3%	40.9%	-19.0%	61.9%	-10.5%	100.0%	-17.5%	38.5%	-19.6%	39.4%	-25.4%	26.2%	-24.7%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	-10.5%	2.3%	-3.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.8%	-1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	-4.3%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	85.7%	22.1%	65.4%	32.1%	56.8%	18.0%	38.1%	29.4%	0.0%	0.0%	57.7%	20.3%	60.6%	18.3%	71.4%	21.9%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		7 (0.03%)		26 (0.1%)		88 (0.34%)		21 (0.08%)		1 (0%)		26 (0.1%)		33 (0.13%)		42 (0.16%)	
5 - Service workers and shop and market vendors																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-15.6%	41.2%	-16.8%	39.3%	-22.8%	40.0%	-13.8%	17.6%	-23.5%	46.2%	-15.1%	35.7%	-21.6%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	-3.0%	4.1%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%	-3.8%
Wage increase	100.0%	5.6%	100.0%	44.9%	75.0%	32.0%	52.9%	23.2%	56.6%	19.6%	60.0%	17.4%	82.4%	23.7%	53.8%	11.2%	62.5%	20.5%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		3 (0.01%)		12 (0.05%)		17 (0.07%)		122 (0.47%)		5 (0.02%)		17 (0.07%)		13 (0.05%)		56 (0.22%)	
6 - Farmers and skilled agricultural																		

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-9.5%	25.0%	-5.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-20.7%	15.4%	-24.7%	55.6%	-22.5%	35.3%	-23.5%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	-2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	-4.3%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	14.0%	100.0%	56.4%	100.0%	2.8%	64.4%	20.0%	84.6%	22.0%	44.4%	42.6%	63.2%	17.4%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		1 (0%)		4 (0.02%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)		45 (0.17%)		13 (0.05%)		9 (0.03%)		68 (0.26%)	
7 - Officials, operators and craftsmen																		
Wage decrease	50.0%	-31.9%	50.0%	-30.2%	26.7%	-20.0%	40.9%	-22.4%	33.3%	-19.7%	42.9%	-17.3%	38.5%	-21.4%	35.5%	-24.7%	45.4%	-26.6%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.4%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	-4.0%	1.3%	-2.2%	1.4%	-2.5%
Wage increase	50.0%	34.4%	50.0%	22.0%	68.9%	17.7%	59.1%	25.1%	66.7%	20.1%	57.1%	19.7%	59.3%	24.1%	63.2%	19.0%	53.1%	25.9%
N (N/Employed)	4 (0.02%)		6 (0.02%)		45 (0.17%)		22 (0.09%)		30 (0.12%)		7 (0.03%)		805 (3.13%)		76 (0.3%)		207 (0.8%)	
8 - Plant and machine operators and assemblers																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-16.4%	55.6%	-20.0%	50.0%	-14.3%	50.0%	-7.4%	37.3%	-20.6%	41.3%	-22.3%	51.9%	-22.5%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	-4.4%	0.8%	-3.6%	2.2%	-10.4%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-3.4%	62.5%	15.8%	44.4%	23.6%	50.0%	13.4%	50.0%	14.0%	61.2%	36.7%	57.9%	22.5%	45.9%	20.4%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		1 (0%)		8 (0.03%)		27 (0.1%)		14 (0.05%)		6 (0.02%)		67 (0.26%)		523 (2.03%)		135 (0.52%)	
9 - Elementary occupations																		
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-18.7%	25.0%	-16.5%	45.3%	-15.9%	43.6%	-24.0%	35.2%	-17.8%	31.2%	-18.7%	35.8%	-19.7%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	4.7%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	-9.6%	0.7%	-1.8%	2.7%	-4.3%
Wage increase	100.0%	18.8%	100.0%	68.7%	63.0%	33.1%	75.0%	30.8%	50.0%	24.3%	56.4%	14.3%	62.6%	22.9%	68.1%	24.1%	61.5%	18.9%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		1 (0%)		27 (0.1%)		32 (0.12%)		64 (0.25%)		55 (0.21%)		227 (0.88%)		138 (0.54%)		1527 (5.93%)	

Table A.16: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching industries
- Ecuador

Industry in t	Industry in t+12																			
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Agriculture																				
Wage decrease	29.9%	-18.8%	11.1%	-10.5%	17.9%	-23.5%	36.4%	-23.4%	22.2%	-23.3%	0.0%	0.0%	13.6%	-20.1%	25.0%	-13.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	12.7%	-3.1%	11.1%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	-3.3%	11.1%	-3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	-1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	57.4%	18.1%	77.8%	19.4%	82.1%	22.9%	59.1%	23.8%	66.7%	8.8%	100.0%	28.4%	81.8%	38.5%	75.0%	33.6%	100.0%	12.4%	100.0%	1.4%
N (N/Employed)	197 (0.77%)		27 (0.11%)		39 (0.15%)		22 (0.09%)		9 (0.04%)		2 (0.01%)		22 (0.09%)		8 (0.03%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)	
2 - Manufacturing																				
Wage decrease	23.8%	-27.6%	32.7%	-19.8%	32.0%	-17.8%	33.9%	-28.7%	22.2%	-29.3%	100.0%	-16.4%	22.2%	-11.4%	16.7%	-24.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	9.5%	-3.6%	9.2%	-3.7%	4.0%	-4.4%	7.1%	-1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	66.7%	21.2%	58.2%	18.3%	64.0%	31.3%	58.9%	20.4%	77.8%	25.3%	0.0%	0.0%	77.8%	18.5%	83.3%	24.5%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	11.2%
N (N/Employed)	21 (0.08%)		153 (0.6%)		25 (0.1%)		56 (0.22%)		9 (0.04%)		1 (0%)		27 (0.11%)		6 (0.02%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)	
3 - Construction																				
Wage decrease	33.3%	-15.9%	32.5%	-16.0%	32.3%	-21.3%	23.3%	-17.5%	42.9%	-25.2%	33.3%	-13.9%	38.5%	-15.0%	20.0%	-35.4%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	-11.0%
Same wage	4.8%	-0.9%	7.5%	-0.7%	15.8%	-3.6%	11.6%	-2.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	-0.8%	20.0%	-3.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	61.9%	24.9%	60.0%	28.2%	51.9%	25.3%	65.1%	15.8%	57.1%	28.8%	66.7%	44.5%	53.8%	29.9%	60.0%	16.7%	100.0%	15.9%	25.0%	2.4%
N (N/Employed)	42 (0.16%)		40 (0.16%)		158 (0.62%)		43 (0.17%)		21 (0.08%)		3 (0.01%)		26 (0.1%)		10 (0.04%)		1 (0%)		4 (0.02%)	
4 - Trade																				
Wage decrease	30.0%	-22.4%	36.7%	-19.8%	35.7%	-24.5%	32.2%	-20.2%	27.3%	-19.3%	12.5%	-33.0%	36.2%	-14.6%	22.2%	-24.2%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-31.2%
Same wage	15.0%	-4.2%	4.1%	-3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	8.4%	-3.6%	4.5%	-7.3%	12.5%	-0.8%	6.4%	-2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	55.0%	19.5%	59.2%	27.2%	64.3%	16.4%	59.4%	21.5%	68.2%	23.1%	75.0%	31.5%	57.4%	22.0%	77.8%	25.2%	100.0%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	20 (0.08%)		49 (0.19%)		28 (0.11%)		202 (0.79%)		22 (0.09%)		8 (0.03%)		47 (0.18%)		18 (0.07%)		2 (0.01%)		2 (0.01%)	
5 - Transportation																				
Wage decrease	44.4%	-26.8%	28.6%	-17.6%	17.6%	-21.0%	29.4%	-16.0%	33.3%	-23.3%	66.7%	-17.6%	33.3%	-24.0%	75.0%	-15.5%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-30.5%
Same wage	22.2%	-2.3%	7.1%	-0.8%	11.8%	-0.9%	5.9%	-4.4%	17.6%	-2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	33.3%	18.1%	64.3%	26.6%	70.6%	13.5%	64.7%	26.4%	49.0%	24.1%	33.3%	59.4%	66.7%	16.4%	25.0%	19.5%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	20.0%
N (N/Employed)	9 (0.04%)		14 (0.05%)		17 (0.07%)		17 (0.07%)		51 (0.2%)		3 (0.01%)		9 (0.04%)		4 (0.02%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)	
6 - Financial services																				

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	-24.6%	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	-22.9%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	-20.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	13.2%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	10.3%	66.7%	26.1%	33.3%	29.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		1 (0%)				3 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		10 (0.04%)		3 (0.01%)		3 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		0 (0%)	
7 - Personal services																				
Wage decrease	54.5%	-18.9%	33.3%	-16.9%	60.9%	-25.6%	43.2%	-21.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	31.5%	-20.3%	22.7%	-15.8%	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	-19.8%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	-1.9%	13.0%	-3.8%	11.4%	-4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-3.4%	6.5%	-2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	45.5%	22.4%	57.1%	28.1%	26.1%	33.1%	45.5%	19.8%	100.0%	14.1%	83.3%	13.7%	62.0%	27.4%	77.3%	27.4%	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%	2.9%
N (N/Employed)	11 (0.04%)		21 (0.08%)				23 (0.09%)		44 (0.17%)		3 (0.01%)		6 (0.02%)		108 (0.42%)		22 (0.09%)		0 (0%)	
8 - Public Sector																				
Wage decrease	66.7%	-17.7%	42.9%	-19.8%	100.0%	-25.0%	33.3%	-13.1%	100.0%	-19.3%	100.0%	-10.8%	27.3%	-12.9%	32.6%	-28.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.7%	-3.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	33.3%	24.3%	57.1%	22.6%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	19.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	72.7%	24.3%	58.7%	21.9%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	61.9%
N (N/Employed)	3 (0.01%)		7 (0.03%)				3 (0.01%)		3 (0.01%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)		11 (0.04%)		46 (0.18%)		0 (0%)	
9 - Domestic Services																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-38.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-7.3%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	32.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	11.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	6.6%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)				0 (0%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)		3 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)	
10 - Other Sectors																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	32.5%	100.0%	25.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.1%	100.0%	21.5%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	11.6%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		0 (0%)				1 (0%)		2 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)	

Table A.17: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching industries
- Argentina

	Industry in t+12																			
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	
Industry in t	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Agriculture																				
Wage decrease	16.7%	-29.9%	7.7%	-24.8%	25.0%	-38.4%	6.3%	-16.9%	60.0%	-24.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-34.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	11.5%	-13.8%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	-8.4%	12.5%	-12.5%	20.0%	-10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	71.8%	26.0%	92.3%	4.7%	66.7%	5.2%	81.3%	17.5%	20.0%	88.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	17.4%	50.0%	46.5%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	58.3%
N (N/Employed)	78 (0.11%)		13 (0.02%)		24 (0.03%)		16 (0.02%)		5 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		3 (0%)		2 (0%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)	
2 - Manufacturing																				
Wage decrease	5.0%	-33.5%	16.3%	-27.3%	29.9%	-31.3%	22.8%	-27.3%	23.3%	-26.7%	75.0%	-17.4%	17.5%	-38.3%	33.3%	-34.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-26.1%
Same wage	5.0%	-19.5%	10.2%	-13.6%	6.8%	-14.8%	9.7%	-15.6%	11.6%	-9.5%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	-15.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-8.7%
Wage increase	90.0%	36.6%	73.5%	24.6%	63.2%	28.1%	67.6%	15.7%	65.1%	45.4%	25.0%	44.7%	73.0%	20.3%	66.7%	19.8%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	18.6%
N (N/Employed)	20 (0.03%)		608 (0.86%)		117 (0.17%)		145 (0.21%)		43 (0.06%)		4 (0.01%)		63 (0.09%)		9 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		12 (0.02%)	
3 - Construction																				
Wage decrease	20.0%	-36.4%	15.0%	-28.2%	16.7%	-27.9%	17.9%	-28.5%	36.1%	-32.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	-35.3%	13.3%	-18.9%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	-17.1%
Same wage	5.0%	-36.1%	5.3%	-11.1%	11.5%	-16.2%	8.9%	-9.8%	2.8%	-7.2%	0.0%	0.0%	13.5%	-12.6%	6.7%	-5.8%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	-10.0%
Wage increase	75.0%	55.0%	79.6%	34.2%	71.8%	22.6%	73.2%	11.0%	61.1%	42.3%	100.0%	15.2%	78.8%	25.9%	80.0%	24.3%	100.0%	-2.4%	83.3%	7.5%
N (N/Employed)	20 (0.03%)		113 (0.16%)		1537 (2.18%)		112 (0.16%)		36 (0.05%)		1 (0%)		52 (0.07%)		15 (0.02%)		1 (0%)		12 (0.02%)	
4 - Trade																				
Wage decrease	16.7%	-19.5%	17.3%	-28.3%	20.6%	-31.9%	14.8%	-27.5%	18.6%	-25.6%	13.3%	-21.1%	21.4%	-16.8%	10.7%	-12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	10.8%	-15.6%	5.6%	-23.1%	10.3%	-14.6%	2.9%	-17.4%	6.7%	-10.0%	4.8%	-17.5%	7.1%	-13.9%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-19.0%
Wage increase	83.3%	24.1%	71.9%	30.7%	73.8%	37.2%	74.9%	22.6%	78.4%	25.0%	80.0%	42.2%	73.8%	33.9%	82.1%	21.9%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	35.7%
N (N/Employed)	12 (0.02%)		185 (0.26%)		107 (0.15%)		861 (1.22%)		102 (0.14%)		15 (0.02%)		84 (0.12%)		28 (0.04%)		0 (0%)		9 (0.01%)	
5 - Transportation																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	-30.7%	29.6%	-21.5%	13.1%	-24.7%	19.2%	-27.1%	20.0%	-30.7%	19.0%	-24.6%	20.0%	-39.4%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-18.9%
Same wage	25.0%	-9.1%	11.9%	-14.0%	3.7%	-8.9%	4.8%	-10.2%	10.4%	-10.4%	20.0%	-8.5%	9.5%	-8.8%	20.0%	-33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	75.0%	19.6%	83.3%	41.1%	66.7%	38.0%	82.1%	21.1%	70.4%	29.3%	60.0%	15.5%	71.4%	28.3%	60.0%	21.5%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	49.0%
N (N/Employed)	4 (0.01%)		42 (0.06%)		27 (0.04%)		84 (0.12%)		338 (0.48%)		5 (0.01%)		21 (0.03%)		5 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		6 (0.01%)	
6 - Financial services																				

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-14.5%	20.0%	-31.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	17.6%	-29.2%	14.3%	-31.6%	50.0%	-18.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	-9.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.8%	-8.6%	28.6%	-8.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	83.3%	45.3%	60.0%	41.9%	100.0%	46.2%	100.0%	22.8%	70.6%	14.0%	57.1%	5.5%	50.0%	70.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		6 (0.01%)		5 (0.01%)		4 (0.01%)		1 (0%)		17 (0.02%)		7 (0.01%)		2 (0%)		0 (0%)		0 (0%)	
7 - Personal services																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	12.0%	-19.7%	33.3%	-27.0%	10.4%	-28.6%	16.1%	-38.1%	11.1%	-32.2%	16.2%	-23.2%	8.3%	-36.1%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-12.7%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	-7.7%	3.1%	-14.2%	3.2%	-7.2%	22.2%	-7.1%	9.3%	-10.6%	12.5%	-8.4%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-10.0%
Wage increase	100.0%	111.0%	88.0%	42.2%	57.1%	39.0%	86.5%	34.0%	80.6%	36.4%	66.7%	13.2%	74.5%	20.7%	79.2%	32.2%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	31.5%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		50 (0.07%)		42 (0.06%)		96 (0.14%)		31 (0.04%)		9 (0.01%)		247 (0.35%)		24 (0.03%)		0 (0%)		6 (0.01%)	
8 - Public Sector																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	-36.5%	14.3%	-14.2%	18.2%	-20.1%	50.0%	-31.3%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	-15.0%	17.3%	-24.6%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-19.2%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	-5.9%	18.2%	-9.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	-5.0%	19.2%	-18.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	100.0%	33.5%	88.9%	51.8%	78.6%	43.8%	63.6%	50.6%	50.0%	82.9%	100.0%	33.2%	78.6%	5.4%	63.5%	16.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0%)		9 (0.01%)		14 (0.02%)		11 (0.02%)		2 (0%)		3 (0%)		14 (0.02%)		104 (0.15%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)	
9 - Domestic Services																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	31.6%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	55.5%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	33.4%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	80.3%	100.0%	72.4%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		0 (0%)		3 (0%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)		1 (0%)		1 (0%)	
10 - Other Sectors																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	-16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	-42.1%	20.0%	-32.5%	50.0%	-18.0%	50.0%	-33.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	-27.6%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	-24.5%	0.0%	0.0%	18.8%	-27.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	-8.3%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	77.8%	18.4%	100.0%	65.2%	68.8%	17.7%	80.0%	27.7%	50.0%	-1.3%	50.0%	36.2%	100.0%	9.7%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%	68.3%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		18 (0.03%)		5 (0.01%)		16 (0.02%)		5 (0.01%)		2 (0%)		6 (0.01%)		3 (0%)		0 (0%)		10 (0.01%)	

Table A.18: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching industries
- Mexico

Industry in t	Industry in t+12																			
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Agriculture																				
Wage decrease	29.9%	-20.5%	37.2%	-21.2%	14.4%	-21.5%	35.7%	-32.4%	27.3%	-29.9%	100.0%	-15.9%	28.6%	-24.1%	50.0%	-20.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-12.4%
Same wage	23.8%	-3.9%	11.6%	-5.0%	18.9%	-3.8%	7.1%	-4.8%	18.2%	-4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	-3.5%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-5.0%	8.3%	-3.0%
Wage increase	46.3%	22.6%	51.2%	17.6%	66.7%	27.3%	57.1%	29.2%	54.5%	39.6%	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%	21.9%	50.0%	41.9%	0.0%	0.0%	58.3%	19.2%
N (N/Employed)	361 (1.25%)		43 (0.15%)		90 (0.31%)		28 (0.1%)		11 (0.04%)		1 (0%)		14 (0.05%)		12 (0.04%)		1 (0%)		12 (0.04%)	
2 - Manufacturing																				
Wage decrease	37.5%	-24.5%	34.7%	-20.3%	23.3%	-26.8%	37.0%	-19.9%	51.7%	-16.2%	0.0%	0.0%	34.7%	-17.7%	22.2%	-24.5%	33.3%	-32.3%	50.0%	-18.7%
Same wage	9.4%	-5.7%	12.9%	-4.3%	23.3%	-4.0%	7.9%	-3.5%	3.4%	-3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.7%	-3.1%	11.1%	-5.8%	33.3%	-4.5%	6.3%	-3.1%
Wage increase	53.1%	24.5%	52.3%	20.2%	53.5%	22.7%	55.1%	25.3%	44.8%	36.6%	100.0%	18.9%	55.6%	26.4%	66.7%	24.5%	33.3%	60.1%	43.8%	17.0%
N (N/Employed)	32 (0.11%)		726 (2.52%)		86 (0.3%)		127 (0.44%)		29 (0.1%)		2 (0.01%)		72 (0.25%)		9 (0.03%)		3 (0.01%)		32 (0.11%)	
3 - Construction																				
Wage decrease	40.9%	-24.5%	45.7%	-25.7%	32.6%	-21.8%	49.2%	-27.8%	37.9%	-19.9%	50.0%	-38.9%	47.8%	-20.3%	33.3%	-22.3%	57.1%	-27.6%	33.3%	-18.7%
Same wage	15.2%	-3.8%	10.6%	-4.3%	22.7%	-3.8%	13.1%	-4.1%	10.3%	-4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	6.0%	-3.8%	16.7%	-3.9%	14.3%	-2.6%	26.7%	-3.7%
Wage increase	43.9%	23.8%	43.6%	19.9%	44.7%	20.9%	37.7%	20.5%	51.7%	17.6%	50.0%	10.2%	46.3%	15.4%	50.0%	12.0%	28.6%	8.6%	40.0%	15.8%
N (N/Employed)	66 (0.23%)		94 (0.33%)		1072 (3.72%)		61 (0.21%)		29 (0.1%)		2 (0.01%)		67 (0.23%)		18 (0.06%)		7 (0.02%)		30 (0.1%)	
4 - Trade																				
Wage decrease	24.0%	-20.7%	38.5%	-25.6%	26.8%	-28.3%	35.8%	-21.8%	35.4%	-24.9%	58.3%	-25.2%	47.6%	-22.5%	31.3%	-24.1%	0.0%	0.0%	38.2%	-25.4%
Same wage	16.0%	-4.0%	11.2%	-3.7%	7.0%	-4.0%	15.4%	-4.4%	10.4%	-3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	-3.1%	12.5%	-2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	8.8%	-4.2%
Wage increase	60.0%	34.5%	50.3%	18.3%	66.2%	25.8%	48.8%	23.5%	54.2%	23.1%	41.7%	46.4%	45.2%	22.6%	56.3%	27.5%	100.0%	6.2%	52.9%	21.2%
N (N/Employed)	25 (0.09%)		143 (0.5%)		71 (0.25%)		506 (1.76%)		48 (0.17%)		12 (0.04%)		84 (0.29%)		16 (0.06%)		2 (0.01%)		34 (0.12%)	
5 - Transportation																				
Wage decrease	22.2%	-36.0%	31.3%	-27.2%	29.6%	-14.4%	26.8%	-19.3%	39.9%	-24.4%	0.0%	0.0%	41.7%	-29.6%	16.7%	-24.0%	0.0%	0.0%	46.2%	-26.4%
Same wage	11.1%	-5.0%	6.3%	-3.9%	3.7%	-5.0%	17.1%	-3.9%	17.1%	-4.1%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	66.7%	30.7%	62.5%	24.0%	66.7%	25.5%	56.1%	21.8%	43.0%	23.5%	100.0%	5.2%	41.7%	20.7%	83.3%	18.0%	0.0%	0.0%	53.8%	32.0%
N (N/Employed)	9 (0.03%)		16 (0.06%)		27 (0.09%)		41 (0.14%)		228 (0.79%)		2 (0.01%)		12 (0.04%)		6 (0.02%)		0 (0%)		13 (0.05%)	
6 - Financial services																				

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	-19.5%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-19.6%	0.0%	0.0%	44.4%	-23.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-28.4%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-4.1%	0.0%	0.0%	22.2%	-4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	43.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	35.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	23.1%	100.0%	60.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	0 (0%)		3 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		12 (0.04%)		0 (0%)		18 (0.06%)		2 (0.01%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)	
7 - Personal services																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	40.6%	-24.6%	31.1%	-22.6%	38.0%	-17.8%	26.1%	-24.8%	14.3%	-14.1%	37.1%	-23.2%	10.0%	-15.8%	33.3%	-11.4%	43.5%	-19.4%
Same wage	50.0%	-3.4%	14.5%	-3.6%	11.1%	-4.0%	7.6%	-4.4%	4.3%	-3.3%	14.3%	-4.7%	10.4%	-4.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	26.1%	-5.0%
Wage increase	50.0%	43.6%	44.9%	19.0%	57.8%	36.5%	54.3%	22.4%	69.6%	9.2%	71.4%	43.1%	52.5%	20.9%	90.0%	35.5%	66.7%	13.1%	30.4%	24.1%
N (N/Employed)	10 (0.03%)		69 (0.24%)		45 (0.16%)		92 (0.32%)		23 (0.08%)		7 (0.02%)		394 (1.37%)		20 (0.07%)		3 (0.01%)		23 (0.08%)	
8 - Public Sector																				
Wage decrease	50.0%	-34.6%	61.5%	-30.6%	64.7%	-23.5%	52.9%	-28.3%	33.3%	-16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	31.3%	-27.8%	32.1%	-19.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	-12.4%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%	-5.2%	5.9%	-3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	18.8%	-5.6%	19.0%	-3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	50.0%	37.4%	23.1%	40.2%	29.4%	25.3%	47.1%	22.6%	33.3%	6.6%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	40.0%	48.8%	22.2%	100.0%	30.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	6 (0.02%)		13 (0.05%)		17 (0.06%)		17 (0.06%)		6 (0.02%)		0 (0%)		16 (0.06%)		84 (0.29%)		3 (0.01%)		1 (0%)	
9 - Domestic Services																				
Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	36.4%	-29.2%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	-27.6%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-25.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	-15.5%
Same wage	50.0%	-4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	-4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	-3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	44.4%	-3.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	50.0%	16.4%	0.0%	0.0%	45.5%	49.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	21.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	10.2%	0.0%	0.0%	55.6%	13.6%	25.0%	10.5%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		11 (0.04%)		0 (0%)		2 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		3 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		9 (0.03%)		4 (0.01%)	
10 - Other Sectors																				
Wage decrease	57.1%	-24.9%	42.9%	-22.9%	23.5%	-29.0%	31.7%	-23.0%	27.3%	-28.1%	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	-25.6%	50.0%	-15.3%	75.0%	-21.9%	32.8%	-22.1%
Same wage	14.3%	-3.6%	14.3%	-4.4%	14.7%	-3.1%	19.5%	-3.9%	18.2%	-4.6%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	-5.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-4.2%
Wage increase	28.6%	12.1%	42.9%	18.7%	61.8%	22.5%	48.8%	27.7%	54.5%	19.1%	0.0%	0.0%	55.0%	23.2%	50.0%	39.8%	25.0%	44.0%	42.2%	35.8%
N (N/Employed)	7 (0.02%)		42 (0.15%)		34 (0.12%)		41 (0.14%)		11 (0.04%)		0 (0%)		20 (0.07%)		2 (0.01%)		4 (0.01%)		116 (0.4%)	

Table A.19: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching industries
– Brazil

Industry in t	Industry in t+12																			
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - Agriculture																				
Wage decrease	22.8%	-20.6%	27.1%	-21.5%	26.3%	-19.8%	34.6%	-22.2%	34.9%	-24.0%	25.0%	-27.3%	26.4%	-24.9%	27.6%	-19.2%	30.0%	-23.5%	28.6%	-28.0%
Same wage	15.3%	-5.4%	11.1%	-6.1%	12.3%	-6.3%	10.5%	-5.6%	15.9%	-5.2%	0.0%	0.0%	15.1%	-6.5%	10.3%	-4.4%	20.0%	-5.7%	14.3%	-3.0%
Wage increase	61.9%	15.5%	61.8%	20.0%	61.5%	22.7%	54.9%	19.6%	49.2%	15.2%	75.0%	38.7%	58.5%	15.3%	62.1%	25.3%	50.0%	15.5%	57.1%	38.6%
N (N/Employed)	1611 (1.1%)		207 (0.14%)		179 (0.12%)		133 (0.09%)		63 (0.04%)		4 (0%)		53 (0.04%)		29 (0.02%)		30 (0.02%)		7 (0%)	
2 - Manufacturing																				
Wage decrease	30.7%	-19.7%	29.2%	-21.0%	26.5%	-22.6%	31.2%	-21.0%	26.5%	-22.0%	33.3%	-26.4%	35.6%	-22.2%	31.4%	-22.9%	18.2%	-21.6%	30.0%	-18.5%
Same wage	13.3%	-5.2%	15.2%	-5.4%	11.6%	-5.7%	12.9%	-5.9%	18.0%	-4.7%	22.2%	-5.6%	9.5%	-5.6%	11.4%	-6.1%	9.1%	-4.1%	20.0%	-4.6%
Wage increase	56.0%	21.6%	55.6%	18.4%	61.9%	20.7%	55.9%	16.4%	55.5%	18.3%	44.4%	53.6%	54.9%	18.8%	57.1%	18.7%	72.7%	37.5%	50.0%	14.0%
N (N/Employed)	218 (0.15%)		2330 (1.59%)		362 (0.25%)		660 (0.45%)		200 (0.14%)		9 (0.01%)		253 (0.17%)		35 (0.02%)		11 (0.01%)		30 (0.02%)	
3 - Construction																				
Wage decrease	24.5%	-19.0%	34.0%	-22.6%	29.0%	-20.2%	37.7%	-22.9%	35.8%	-21.1%	40.0%	-15.9%	36.2%	-21.8%	38.6%	-19.9%	36.4%	-15.5%	37.5%	-23.9%
Same wage	9.8%	-4.8%	12.4%	-6.0%	14.6%	-5.4%	9.2%	-5.5%	11.6%	-4.4%	40.0%	-4.1%	14.0%	-5.2%	4.5%	-5.1%	9.1%	-8.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	65.6%	21.4%	53.6%	19.8%	56.5%	18.1%	53.2%	16.1%	52.6%	21.5%	20.0%	22.9%	49.8%	20.0%	56.8%	11.4%	54.5%	9.3%	62.5%	18.5%
N (N/Employed)	163 (0.11%)		394 (0.27%)		1902 (1.3%)		284 (0.19%)		95 (0.06%)		5 (0%)		221 (0.15%)		44 (0.03%)		11 (0.01%)		16 (0.01%)	
4 - Trade																				
Wage decrease	23.0%	-20.9%	25.6%	-21.2%	23.9%	-20.5%	26.2%	-20.9%	26.1%	-21.1%	23.9%	-25.0%	31.7%	-22.0%	26.9%	-21.5%	11.1%	-32.3%	34.8%	-21.9%
Same wage	9.8%	-4.3%	11.0%	-4.7%	10.4%	-5.1%	15.3%	-5.4%	9.6%	-5.5%	15.2%	-6.8%	6.6%	-5.8%	3.8%	-2.8%	33.3%	-7.4%	15.9%	-5.8%
Wage increase	67.2%	21.9%	63.4%	18.9%	65.7%	19.7%	58.5%	18.6%	64.3%	19.0%	60.9%	29.0%	61.7%	23.3%	69.2%	27.5%	55.6%	5.8%	49.3%	17.8%
N (N/Employed)	122 (0.08%)		626 (0.43%)		289 (0.2%)		3383 (2.3%)		280 (0.19%)		46 (0.03%)		394 (0.27%)		78 (0.05%)		9 (0.01%)		69 (0.05%)	
5 - Transportation																				
Wage decrease	21.9%	-20.6%	30.3%	-20.8%	41.7%	-21.8%	34.3%	-20.3%	29.4%	-22.5%	40.0%	-28.6%	29.6%	-23.4%	30.0%	-22.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	-15.5%
Same wage	15.6%	-5.4%	13.0%	-7.0%	5.0%	-5.8%	16.3%	-5.4%	18.3%	-5.5%	20.0%	-3.5%	13.9%	-5.5%	3.3%	-4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	62.5%	-5.7%
Wage increase	62.5%	16.2%	56.8%	26.3%	53.3%	19.3%	49.4%	16.6%	52.3%	18.5%	40.0%	31.2%	56.5%	19.1%	66.7%	19.4%	100.0%	3.6%	25.0%	10.9%
N (N/Employed)	64 (0.04%)		185 (0.13%)		60 (0.04%)		245 (0.17%)		815 (0.55%)		5 (0%)		108 (0.07%)		30 (0.02%)		4 (0%)		8 (0.01%)	
6 - Financial services																				

Wage decrease	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%	-19.2%	20.0%	-11.1%	33.3%	-17.1%	40.0%	-29.0%	32.1%	-24.6%	14.8%	-25.4%	100.0%	-14.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	-2.8%	7.4%	-6.1%	20.0%	-4.3%	17.0%	-5.2%	14.8%	-7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	100.0%	1.8%	57.1%	19.0%	60.0%	24.7%	59.3%	26.7%	40.0%	41.1%	50.9%	18.2%	70.4%	26.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0%)		7 (0%)		5 (0%)		27 (0.02%)		5 (0%)		53 (0.04%)		27 (0.02%)		1 (0%)		0 (0%)		0 (0%)	
7 - Personal services																				
Wage decrease	38.5%	-22.5%	23.2%	-21.2%	32.3%	-20.6%	31.3%	-22.6%	37.0%	-18.1%	20.7%	-25.8%	27.4%	-20.7%	24.4%	-24.4%	40.0%	-19.2%	25.0%	-15.8%
Same wage	11.5%	-5.0%	18.9%	-5.9%	12.9%	-6.2%	10.5%	-5.4%	15.0%	-5.8%	24.1%	-6.3%	14.7%	-5.4%	9.4%	-6.0%	20.0%	-7.3%	8.3%	-8.2%
Wage increase	50.0%	26.0%	57.8%	19.6%	54.8%	19.6%	58.2%	20.1%	48.0%	15.2%	55.2%	29.8%	57.9%	16.2%	66.1%	24.1%	40.0%	6.3%	66.7%	21.8%
N (N/Employed)	52 (0.04%)		185 (0.13%)		217 (0.15%)		352 (0.24%)		100 (0.07%)		29 (0.02%)		1215 (0.83%)		127 (0.09%)		15 (0.01%)		24 (0.02%)	
8 - Public Sector																				
Wage decrease	18.5%	-12.7%	26.8%	-20.1%	36.2%	-18.0%	37.0%	-23.5%	33.3%	-21.5%	0.0%	0.0%	32.7%	-18.3%	26.6%	-20.3%	14.3%	-22.5%	16.7%	-17.2%
Same wage	3.7%	-5.2%	4.2%	-5.8%	8.5%	-4.2%	4.3%	-5.6%	13.3%	-6.5%	50.0%	-7.2%	7.1%	-6.1%	13.2%	-4.9%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-7.1%
Wage increase	77.8%	21.8%	69.0%	21.3%	55.3%	25.7%	58.7%	20.9%	53.3%	21.1%	50.0%	0.4%	60.2%	18.0%	60.3%	18.3%	85.7%	20.5%	66.7%	5.6%
N (N/Employed)	27 (0.02%)		71 (0.05%)		47 (0.03%)		92 (0.06%)		45 (0.03%)		2 (0%)		113 (0.08%)		380 (0.26%)		7 (0%)		6 (0%)	
9 - Domestic Services																				
Wage decrease	25.0%	-20.8%	25.0%	-21.6%	11.1%	-37.9%	19.0%	-16.7%	25.0%	-32.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.3%	-12.4%	0.0%	0.0%
Same wage	15.0%	-6.3%	8.3%	-5.4%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	-6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.8%	-5.2%	0.0%	0.0%	20.8%	-3.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Wage increase	60.0%	12.5%	66.7%	22.0%	88.9%	13.7%	71.4%	15.7%	75.0%	36.4%	0.0%	0.0%	88.2%	12.1%	0.0%	0.0%	67.9%	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%
N (N/Employed)	20 (0.01%)		12 (0.01%)		9 (0.01%)		21 (0.01%)		4 (0%)		0 (0%)		17 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		53 (0.04%)		0 (0%)	
10 - Other Sectors																				
Wage decrease	37.5%	-19.7%	35.0%	-25.1%	11.8%	-32.0%	37.0%	-16.1%	50.0%	-33.4%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	-28.0%	30.8%	-25.1%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	-24.9%
Same wage	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	23.5%	-4.5%	17.4%	-6.8%	25.0%	-9.0%	0.0%	0.0%	17.9%	-6.0%	7.7%	-3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	25.6%	-5.4%
Wage increase	62.5%	20.2%	65.0%	6.5%	64.7%	32.0%	45.7%	10.1%	25.0%	31.2%	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	13.1%	61.5%	21.6%	0.0%	0.0%	57.7%	19.1%
N (N/Employed)	8 (0.01%)		20 (0.01%)		17 (0.01%)		46 (0.03%)		4 (0%)		0 (0%)		28 (0.02%)		13 (0.01%)		0 (0%)		78 (0.05%)	

Table A.20: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching industries – Chile

	Industry in t+12																			
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	
Industry in t	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var.%	Share	Var.%	Share	Var. %	Share	Var.%	Share	Var. %	Share	Var.%	Share	Var.%	Share	Var. %
1 - Agriculture																				
Wage decrease	43%	-27%	0%	0%	38%	-22%	100%	-20%	50%	-27%	0%	0%	35%	-18%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	57%	13%	100%	40%	63%	30%	0%	0%	50%	69%	0%	0%	65%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	60 (1.37%)		2 (0.05%)		8 (0.18%)		1 (0.02%)		2 (0.05%)		(0%)		20 (0.46%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)	
2 - Manufacturing																				
Wage decrease	0%	0%	56%	-29%	33%	-24%	100%	-19%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	-12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	-7%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	-2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	0%	0%	44%	30%	67%	20%	0%	0%	100%	63%	0%	0%	58%	20%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		18 (0.41%)		21 (0.48%)		2 (0.05%)		1 (0.02%)		(0%)		12 (0.27%)		(0%)		(0%)		1 (0.02%)	
3 - Construction																				
Wage decrease	71%	-21%	35%	-13%	44%	-19%	0%	0%	17%	-30%	0%	0%	34%	-22%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	-4%	0%	0%	33%	-10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	29%	26%	65%	17%	53%	26%	0%	0%	50%	16%	0%	0%	66%	24%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	36%
N (N/Employed)	7 (0.16%)		20 (0.46%)		132 (3.01%)		(0%)		6 (0.14%)		(0%)		29 (0.66%)		2 (0.05%)		(0%)		2 (0.05%)	
4 - Trade																				
Wage decrease	0%	0%	25%	-21%	0%	0%	60%	-22%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	0%	0%	75%	43%	100%	40%	40%	56%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		4 (0.09%)		3 (0.07%)		5 (0.11%)		(0%)		(0%)		1 (0.02%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)	
5 - Transportation																				
Wage decrease	50%	-34%	0%	0%	67%	-24%	0%	0%	40%	-17%	0%	0%	57%	-12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	50%	69%	100%	23%	33%	15%	0%	0%	60%	43%	0%	0%	43%	34%	100%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	2 (0.05%)		2 (0.05%)		6 (0.14%)		(0%)		15 (0.34%)		(0%)		7 (0.16%)		1 (0.02%)		(0%)		(0%)	
6 - Financial services																				

Wage decrease	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)	
7 - Personal services																				
Wage decrease	47%	-22%	43%	-17%	34%	-26%	100%	-22%	40%	-11%	0%	0%	28%	-18%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	-23%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	-3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	53%	23%	57%	28%	66%	17%	0%	0%	60%	14%	0%	0%	69%	22%	100%	5%	0%	0%	67%	51%
N (N/Employed)	38 (0.87%)		7 (0.16%)		38 (0.87%)		1 (0.02%)		5 (0.11%)		(0%)		195 (4.45%)		2 (0.05%)		(0%)		6 (0.14%)	
8 - Public Sector																				
Wage decrease	100%	-8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	44%	-17%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	-6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	44%	56%	38%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	1 (0.02%)		(0%)		(0%)		1 (0.02%)		(0%)		(0%)		1 (0.02%)		9 (0.21%)		(0%)		(0%)	
9 - Domestic Services																				
Wage decrease	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)	
10 - Other Sectors																				
Wage decrease	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	-8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Same wage	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wage increase	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	16%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	67%	29%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
N (N/Employed)	(0%)		(0%)		1 (0.02%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)		3 (0.07%)		(0%)		(0%)		(0%)	

Table A.21: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching firm size – Ecuador

Firm size in t	Firm size in t+12					
	1		2		3	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - 1 to 5 employees						
Wage decrease	29.2%	-18.5%	27.4%	-23.1%	19.9%	-18.4%
Same wage	13.7%	-2.2%	11.1%	-2.6%	5.3%	-3.7%
Wage increase	57.1%	24.5%	61.5%	21.0%	74.9%	27.6%
N (N/Employed)	226 (0.88%)		208 (0.81%)		171 (0.67%)	
2 - 6 to 50 employees						
Wage decrease	40.4%	-20.7%	28.0%	-17.4%	27.5%	-20.0%
Same wage	6.4%	-1.9%	11.7%	-3.2%	4.2%	-3.3%
Wage increase	53.2%	20.0%	60.3%	18.7%	68.2%	23.3%
N (N/Employed)	141 (0.55%)		257 (1%)		236 (0.92%)	
3 - Above 50 employees						
Wage decrease	59.3%	-22.7%	48.6%	-22.8%	29.9%	-21.5%
Same wage	4.9%	-4.4%	6.2%	-2.1%	8.2%	-3.5%
Wage increase	35.8%	20.0%	45.2%	14.9%	61.9%	24.7%
N (N/Employed)	81 (0.32%)		146 (0.57%)		388 (1.52%)	

Table A.22: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching firm size – Argentina

Firm size in t	Firm size in t+12					
	1		2		3	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - 1 to 5 employees						
Wage decrease	16.0%	-28.4%	10.5%	-28.8%	6.9%	-27.7%
Same wage	11.0%	-16.8%	9.3%	-13.0%	4.0%	-15.3%
Wage increase	73.0%	27.4%	80.3%	28.9%	89.1%	29.6%
N (N/Employed)	845 (1.39%)		593 (0.97%)		202 (0.33%)	
2 - 6 to 40 employees						
Wage decrease	23.5%	-28.4%	17.0%	-28.6%	15.4%	-28.5%
Same wage	11.5%	-12.6%	10.5%	-14.0%	8.0%	-13.4%
Wage increase	65.0%	22.4%	72.5%	25.0%	76.6%	30.7%
N (N/Employed)	514 (0.84%)		1080 (1.77%)		461 (0.76%)	
3 - Above 40 employees						
Wage decrease	23.1%	-28.6%	22.2%	-25.9%	18.7%	-24.7%
Same wage	14.4%	-14.3%	12.0%	-15.0%	7.9%	-15.2%
Wage increase	62.5%	32.9%	65.8%	15.9%	73.4%	22.2%
N (N/Employed)	160 (0.26%)		415 (0.68%)		593 (0.97%)	

Table A.23: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching firm size – Mexico

Firm size in t	Firm size in t+12					
	1		2		3	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - 1 to 5 employees						
Wage decrease	31.7%	-22.9%	31.8%	-22.7%	33.9%	-21.2%
Same wage	22.4%	-3.8%	15.5%	-3.9%	12.4%	-4.1%
Wage increase	45.9%	21.6%	52.7%	25.3%	53.8%	25.3%
N (N/Employed)	1029 (3.92%)		509 (1.94%)		186 (0.71%)	
2 - 6 to 50 employees						
Wage decrease	41.5%	-23.5%	35.0%	-22.2%	36.0%	-22.9%
Same wage	19.2%	-4.0%	16.7%	-4.1%	10.1%	-4.4%
Wage increase	39.2%	21.6%	48.2%	23.8%	53.9%	22.5%
N (N/Employed)	520 (1.98%)		956 (3.64%)		414 (1.58%)	
3 - Above 50 employees						
Wage decrease	40.1%	-24.4%	36.8%	-22.3%	37.5%	-21.1%
Same wage	11.5%	-3.6%	9.9%	-3.9%	11.4%	-4.0%
Wage increase	48.4%	20.6%	53.4%	23.6%	51.1%	22.8%
N (N/Employed)	182 (0.69%)		416 (1.58%)		761 (2.9%)	

Table A.24: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching firm size – Brazil

Firm size in t	Firm size in t+12					
	1		2		3	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - 1 to 5 employees						
Wage decrease	25.8%	-21.3%	23.3%	-19.9%	26.5%	-19.9%
Same wage	18.7%	-4.7%	11.8%	-5.1%	10.5%	-4.9%
Wage increase	55.6%	17.5%	64.9%	19.2%	63.0%	23.6%
N (N/Employed)	1179 (1.22%)		871 (0.9%)		667 (0.69%)	
2 - 6 to 50 employees						
Wage decrease	30.4%	-20.7%	25.6%	-20.3%	27.9%	-21.8%
Same wage	10.7%	-5.3%	16.2%	-5.1%	11.7%	-5.3%
Wage increase	58.9%	19.2%	58.2%	18.9%	60.4%	21.8%
N (N/Employed)	914 (0.95%)		2555 (2.65%)		1644 (1.71%)	
3 - Above 50 employees						
Wage decrease	35.1%	-20.1%	31.9%	-21.9%	27.8%	-21.2%
Same wage	11.0%	-5.2%	11.8%	-4.9%	14.8%	-5.1%
Wage increase	53.9%	17.8%	56.3%	17.6%	57.4%	19.0%
N (N/Employed)	647 (0.67%)		1683 (1.75%)		4666 (4.85%)	

Table A.25: Annual real wage growth rates and proportions of gainers and losers among job-to-job movers with/out switching firm size - Chile

Firm size in t	Firm size in t+12					
	1		2		3	
	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %	Share	Var. %
1 - 1 to 4 employees						
Wage decrease	35.4%	-18.9%	32.4%	-22.6%	30.6%	-22.4%
Same wage	1.2%	-3.2%	3.5%	-2.2%	1.4%	-2.4%
Wage increase	63.4%	18.5%	64.2%	22.5%	68.1%	23.3%
N (N/Employed)	164 (1.35%)		173 (1.42%)		72 (0.59%)	
2 - 5 to 49 employees						
Wage decrease	38.6%	-16.4%	40.7%	-20.4%	33.1%	-21.6%
Same wage	2.3%	-2.9%	1.9%	-3.4%	3.3%	-6.6%
Wage increase	59.1%	22.5%	57.4%	21.2%	63.6%	23.3%
N (N/Employed)	176 (1.45%)		949 (7.81%)		390 (3.21%)	
3 - Above 49 employees						
Wage decrease	39.0%	-26.4%	40.1%	-23.3%	40.8%	-20.1%
Same wage	1.7%	-2.2%	2.0%	-2.6%	2.7%	-3.6%
Wage increase	59.3%	24.6%	58.0%	21.5%	56.5%	23.0%
N (N/Employed)	59 (0.49%)		357 (2.94%)		407 (3.35%)	

Table A.26: Effects of Seguro Popular Introduction on Quarterly Transitions in Mexico, for men – by education

From: To:	Nonemp. Formal (1)	Nonemp. Informal (2)	Formal Nonemp. (3)	Formal Informal (4)	Informal Nonemp. (5)	Informal Formal (6)	Formal Informal (w↑) (7)	Formal Informal (w↓) (8)	Informal Formal (w↑) (9)	Informal Formal (w↓) (10)
Panel A: Total										
SP	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)
Mean in 2001	.111	.358	.0214	.139	.0566	.0939	.0432	.0953	.0465	.0475
N	7763	7763	12823	12823	14709	14709	12823	12823	14709	14709
Panel B: Incomplete Primary										
SP	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.031)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.008 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.006)
Mean in 2001	.0605	.434	.0224	.173	.0696	.0714	.0586	.115	.0338	.0375
N	3400	3400	4898	4898	9152	9152	4898	4898	9152	9152
Panel C: Complete Primary										
SP	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.009)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Mean in 2001	.106	.372	.0272	.173	.0591	.0896	.0619	.111	.0482	.0414
N	3917	3917	7447	7447	10761	10761	7447	7447	10761	10761
Panel D: Complete Secondary										
SP	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.008)
Mean in 2001	.19	.28	.0192	.113	.0468	.13	.0386	.0742	.0597	.0706
N	3658	3658	9648	9648	10273	10273	9648	9648	10273	10273
Panel E: Higher Education										
SP	0.001 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.029)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.015 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.017*** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.010)
Mean in 2001	.168	.225	.0163	.084	.0545	.151	.0268	.0573	.0754	.0751
N	2962	2962	8439	8439	6862	6862	8439	8439	6862	6862

Source: Author's calculations using ENE/ENOE 2000-2012 from Mexico aggregated at the municipality-quarter level.
 *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.27: Effects of Seguro Popular Introduction on Quarterly Transitions in Mexico, for men – by age

From: To:	Nonemp. Formal (1)	Nonemp. Informal (2)	Formal Nonemp. (3)	Formal Informal (4)	Informal Nonemp. (5)	Informal Formal (6)	Formal Informal (w↑) (7)	Formal Informal (w↓) (8)	Informal Formal (w↑) (9)	Informal Formal (w↓) (10)
Panel A: Total										
SP	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)
Mean in 2001	.111	.358	.0214	.139	.0566	.0939	.0432	.0953	.0465	.0475
N	7763	7763	12823	12823	14709	14709	12823	12823	14709	14709
Panel B: Age 20-30										
SP	-0.034 (0.038)	-0.064 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.016* (0.009)
Mean in 2001	.363	.427	.0211	.147	.0358	.137	.0511	.0955	.06	.0768
N	1999	1999	7781	7781	8845	8845	7781	7781	8845	8845
Panel C: Age 30-40										
SP	-0.029 (0.028)	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Mean in 2001	.191	.481	.02	.118	.0487	.11	.0405	.0773	.0515	.0584
N	3107	3107	9593	9593	11108	11108	9593	9593	11108	11108
Panel D: Age 40-50										
SP	-0.011 (0.020)	0.015 (0.029)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.009)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)
Mean in 2001	.128	.396	.0198	.117	.0585	.0889	.0402	.0764	.0469	.042
N	3579	3579	8364	8364	10173	10173	8364	8364	10173	10173
Panel E: Age 50-60										
SP	0.008 (0.010)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
Mean in 2001	.0381	.231	.0294	.109	.0976	.0749	.0407	.0687	.0414	.0335
N	4839	4839	5984	5984	8235	8235	5984	5984	8235	8235

Source: Author's calculations using ENE/ENOE 2000-2012 from Mexico aggregated at the municipality-quarter level.
 *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.28: Effects of Seguro Popular Introduction on Quarterly Transitions in Mexico, for women – by education

From: To:	Nonemp. Formal (1)	Nonemp. Informal (2)	Formal Nonemp. (3)	Formal Informal (4)	Informal Nonemp. (5)	Informal Formal (6)	Formal Informal (w↑) (7)	Formal Informal (w↓) (8)	Informal Formal (w↑) (9)	Informal Formal (w↓) (10)
Panel A: Total										
SP	-0.005*	-0.003	0.001	-0.005	-0.018	0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.001	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mean in 2001	.014	.0684	.112	.0569	.375	.0522	.0104	.0465	.0323	.0199
N	15448	15448	8162	8162	10975	10975	8162	8162	10975	10975
Panel B: Incomplete Primary										
SP	-0.002	0.009	0.031	0.034	0.021	0.001	0.039*	-0.005	-0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Mean in 2001	.0092	.0756	.132	.0844	.366	.0306	.0294	.055	.014	.0166
N	9530	9530	1744	1744	5095	5095	1744	1744	5095	5095
Panel C: Complete Primary										
SP	-0.006*	0.005	0.015	-0.014	-0.021	0.010	-0.008	-0.006	0.011**	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Mean in 2001	.0135	.0718	.153	.0741	.381	.0491	.0179	.0563	.038	.011
N	11465	11465	3445	3445	6329	6329	3445	3445	6329	6329
Panel D: Complete Secondary										
SP	-0.000	-0.018**	-0.024	-0.027**	-0.011	-0.008	-0.015**	-0.012	-0.010	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Mean in 2001	.0149	.0698	.12	.0585	.354	.0486	.00885	.0496	.0279	.0207
N	11715	11715	5099	5099	6681	6681	5099	5099	6681	6681
Panel E: Higher Education										
SP	0.001	-0.004	0.005	0.003	-0.019	0.026*	-0.002	0.006	0.024**	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Mean in 2001	.0238	.0706	.0891	.0404	.361	.0777	.0105	.0299	.0449	.0328
N	8824	8824	5373	5373	4852	4852	5373	5373	4852	4852

Source: Author's calculations using ENE/ENOE 2000-2012 from Mexico aggregated at the municipality-quarter level.

*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.29: Effects of Seguro Popular Introduction on Quarterly Transitions in Mexico, for women – by age

From: To:	Nonemp. Formal (1)	Nonemp. Informal (2)	Formal Nonemp. (3)	Formal Informal (4)	Informal Nonemp. (5)	Informal Formal (6)	Formal Informal (w↑) (7)	Formal Informal (w↓) (8)	Informal Formal (w↑) (9)	Informal Formal (w↓) (10)
Panel A: Total										
SP	-0.005*	-0.003	0.001	-0.005	-0.018	0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.001	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mean in 2001	.014	.0684	.112	.0569	.375	.0522	.0104	.0465	.0323	.0199
N	15448	15448	8162	8162	10975	10975	8162	8162	10975	10975
Panel B: Age 20-30										
SP	-0.005	-0.013	-0.006	0.002	-0.068**	0.031**	-0.006	0.009	0.017	0.015
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Mean in 2001	.0213	.0506	.17	.0579	.402	.0954	.00664	.0512	.0514	.044
N	10461	10461	3780	3780	4472	4472	3780	3780	4472	4472
Panel C: Age 30-40										
SP	0.001	-0.010	-0.001	-0.011	0.013	-0.009	-0.005	-0.006	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Mean in 2001	.0135	.0849	.106	.0593	.365	.0499	.0169	.0424	.0302	.0197
N	12161	12161	5357	5357	7070	7070	5357	5357	7070	7070
Panel D: Age 40-50										
SP	-0.004	0.013	0.024*	-0.007	-0.011	0.011	-0.000	-0.007	0.008	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mean in 2001	.0135	.0886	.0934	.0476	.36	.0442	.00753	.0401	.0334	.0108
N	10960	10960	4757	4757	6618	6618	4757	4757	6618	6618
Panel E: Age 50-60										
SP	-0.002	-0.002	-0.016	-0.004	-0.009	0.002	0.008	-0.012	-0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mean in 2001	.01	.0619	.113	.0694	.39	.0256	.0182	.0512	.0146	.011
N	9626	9626	2812	2812	4870	4870	2812	2812	4870	4870

Source: Author's calculations using ENE/ENOE 2000-2012 from Mexico aggregated at the municipality-quarter level.

*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Figure A.1: Hiring rate (fraction of employment), by gender




Figure A.2: Hiring rate (fraction of employment), by schooling




Figure A.3: Hiring rate (fraction of employment), by age




Figure A.4: Exit rate (fraction of employment), by gender




Figure A.5: Exit rate (fraction of employment), by schooling




Figure A.6: Exit rate (fraction of employment), by age




Figure A.7: Job-to-Job rate (fraction of employment), by gender




Figure A.8: Job-to-Job rate (fraction of employment), by schooling




Figure A.9: Job-to-Job rate with a wage increase (fraction of J2J rate), by schooling




Figure A.10: Job-to-Job rate (fraction of employment), by age




Figure A.11: Job-to-Job rate with a wage increase (fraction of J2J rate), by age

