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Diagnóstico Institucional del Sistema de Servicio Civil de México

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1. Focus of Study

The focus of this study is on public sector employment and administration in Mexico. Although the focus is national in scope, it also includes some data on state and municipal level employment. The focus on the public sector, rather than the civil service, is justified by the lack of a universal civil service law. For this reason, I emphasize the political reasons undermining the implementation of a career civil service throughout the study, as well as the traditional employment practices within the public sector. Clear understanding of such practices also helps to understand why some agencies that have chosen to adopt civil service regimes have been reluctant to force compliance with new measures.

The paucity of information about public employment and employment practices in the Mexico during single party rule, however, makes it difficult to conduct systematic quantitative or even qualitative analysis. Two things affect the availability of information: the political nature of public sector appointments and employment, and the newness of most public sector reforms. Even so, this study presents general observations about past and present public sector employment practices, as well as evaluates current civil service, relying on observations and research conducted by scholars studying the Mexican public administration, including those employed at public and private think tanks and the Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública in Mexico.

2. Executive Summary

The Mexican public sector has undergone a dramatic reorganization and professionalization since the initiation of economic crisis and reform in 1982. Though such reforms appear to have improved efficiency in the provision of public services, administrative changes did not include the implementation of a national career civil service. The few efforts initiated by the government were quickly thwarted by public agencies, including the ones instructed to develop civil service programs. Even so, several public agencies chose to adopt civil service reforms and to adapt them to their processes for hiring, promoting, training, and firing employees. The number of people now falling under civil service programs, however, is limited.

Despite governmental efforts, no national civil service program has gone beyond the proposal stage. That is, no program has been drafted into law. With the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, a new effort has been made to oversee the drafting of proposals for the implementation of a career civil service in the national public administration. These efforts have been tied to governmental efforts to increase transparency in state practices, as well as to reduce corruption. Even so, few agencies have been added to the list of those with civil service programs. The adoption of civil service still remains voluntary, that is, the decision of agency directors.

Since the decision to adopt civil service measures is voluntary, very few agencies chose to change their traditional ways. Even among those who chose such reforms, there is great variation in the effectiveness of new regimes. As adoption is voluntary, public agencies can tailor or adapt measure to fit their aims. The result has been very few agencies with civil service programs, and of these very few that have implemented them in an effective way.

It is not surprising that civil service reforms in Mexico have been limited in scope and application. Historic political control by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) meant that this party also controlled the state and its resources. As a result, politicians were encouraged to use of the state apparatus for short-term political gain. That is, the state and its resources were used to reward party members and party activists for political support rather than to craft public policy. Few had an incentive to introduce measure that stood the reduce political discretion of public goods and services. Now that politics is changing in Mexico we should expect parties to agree on civil service measures, if only as a means to limit the political resources available to those in power. Unfortunately, this has not occurred. Very few public agencies have adopted such measures, leaving most of the public sector either patronage based, or the domain of a powerful public sector union with traditional ties to the PRI. Even so, it is puzzling that a few agencies chose to adopt civil service measures, even if they have not all been equally effective. This puzzle, however, remains to be explained.

3. Background: Public Sector Employment in Mexico

There have been numerous laws governing the legal status, roles and responsibilities, salaries and other compensations, and government - employee relations of public employees since the early 20th century. Even so, the concept of a career civil service has been largely unknown or even discussed in Mexico (Sánchez González 1999). The first discussions about the merits of introducing a professional or career civil service occurred during the 1980s. These initiatives were largely the result of governmental projects to restructure and modernize the public sector in light of this country's growing economic crisis and adjustment program (Sánchez González 1998). Professional development and modernization was seen as a means to streamline the public sector, thereby helping the state to reduce expenditures through increased efficiency. This section discusses measures affecting Mexican public sector employees, concentrating on current legislation.

3.1 Legislation Governing Mexican Public Employees, 1917 – 1982

Governmental efforts to increase the level of professionalism in the Mexican public administration began soon after the introduction of a new constitution in 1917. These early efforts, however, were mostly aimed at specific areas in national or state public administrations. In 1922, for example, the federal government recognized the need to improve the process of selecting personnel and managing career paths in the Mexican foreign service (Servicio Exterior). To meet this goal, a system of public competitions (concursos) was introduced to announce and fill positions. This reform encouraged the state of San Luis Potosí to draft and adopt the Ley de Servicio Civil de Carrera in 1923 (Uvalle Berrones 2000).

In the 1930s the federal government began introducing legislation to regulate the national public administration more generally. In 1931, the administration of President Pascual Ortiz Rubio adopted the Ley Federal del Trabajo. A more specialized law was drafted in 1932 to regulate agrarian workers in the public sector: the Ley sobre Responsabilidades de los Funcionarios y Empleados Agrarios. In 1934, President Abelardo L. Rodríguez oversaw the passage of the Ley del Servicio Civil (Uvalle Berrones 2000).

Probably the most important legislation affecting the structure and responsibilities of public sector employees was introduced in 1938 during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas. The Estatuto de los Trabajadores al Servicio de los Poderes de la Unión was designed to regulate government – public employee relations by distinguishing between two basic types of public sector employment: empleo de base y empleo de confianza (base employment and patronage employment). A 1941 reform to this law established a system for regulating promotions (Pardo 1999).

Though most of the minor points in the Estatuto de los Trabajadores al Servicio de los Poderes de la Unión (1938) have since been modified many times, the basic structure of public sector employment (base and patronage) is still in use today. Subsequent legislation, including the Ley de Responsabilidades de los Funcionarios (1940), the Ley de Estímulos y Recompensas a los Funcionarios y Empleados de la Federación (1957), the Ley Federal de los Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (1963), the Ley de Premios, Estímulos y Recompensas Civiles (1975), and the Ley de Responsabilidades de los Funcionarios y Empleados de la Federación y del Distrito Federal modified several rules governing public administration, public sector employment responsibilities, and salaries but kept the basic structure of employment (base and patronage) intact. Most employees in the Mexican public sector continue to be categorized as either base employees (empleados de base) or patronage appointees (empleados de confianza).

3.2 Public Agencies, Legislation, and Programs Affecting Mexican Public Employees, 1982 – 2002

3.2.1 Public Agencies, 1982 – 2002

3.2.1.1 Secretaría de Controlaría General de la Federación (SECOGEF) (1982)

As a step toward professionalizing and strengthening governmental control over the public sector and its employees, SECOGEF was created in 1982. SECOGEF's official goals included promoting an efficient, transparent, and law abiding public sector. In 1994, SECOGEF was replaced by SECODAM. See <http://www.secodam.gob.mx>.

3.2.1.2 Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM) (1994)

SECODAM was created in 1994 and is charged with modernizing, overseeing, and managing administrative processes in the Mexican public sector and government. SECODAM is also expected to identify ways to professionalize public employment. Since 2000, SECODAM has become part of President Vicente Fox's Gabinete de Orden y Respeto and has participated in the Programa de Transparencia en la Administración Pública Federal. Its present mission is to develop and oversee programs to increase administrative transparency in the public sector and central government, and prevent and combat corruption among public employees.

SECODAM is organized into several subsections, each responsible for separate aspects of this policy objective, including administrative modernization and employee professionalization. These sections include a Subsecretaría de Control y Auditoría, a Subsecretaría de Atención Ciudadana y Normatividad, a Subsecretaría de Desarrollo y Simplificación Administrativa, a Comisión de Avalúos de Bienes Nacionales, divisions governing Asuntos Jurídicos, Contraloría Interna and Comunicación Social, and an Oficialía Mayor charged with budgetary, modernization, and informational issues.

SECODAM also participates in an inter-secretary commission designed to improve transparency and reduce corruption. See <http://www.secodam.gob.mx>.

3.2.1.3 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP)

In 1983 the General Bureau of the Civil Service was created within the SHCP and was empowered to propose policies for the more efficient management of public sector employees. This is largely considered to be the first national attempt to establish a general career civil service. The impetus behind the effort was the need to reduce government expenditures on salaries.

In 1984, an intersecretary commission was created to help the General Bureau formulate a civil service proposal. Though the commission was empowered to encourage the implementation of a civil service, and to standardize administrative methods across the public sector, it was given no formal mandate to implement its project or deadlines (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). In 1984, the commission finished its civil service program, which called for a centrally controlled civil service (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). The centralization proposal, however, was rejected by the public sector union (FSTSE) for its noncompliance with the rights of governmental workers as stated in the Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos (1983) which protects unionized employees from being fired. Mostly as a result of union opposition, the commission's task was placed on hold.

With the drafting of PROMAP (discussed below) during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) the SHCP once again began to play a role in the formation of a national career civil service. Within the SHCP, the Unidad de Servicio Civil (USC) was created and empowered to design civil service legislation, to be endorsed later by SECODAM (discussed below) before being presented to the president. As will be discussed in section 6, the efforts of the USC and SECODAM to oversee a civil service reform largely failed, mostly due to disagreements over the level of centralization of the public sector.

Since 2000, the SHCP has been participating in the Programa de Transparencia en la Administración Pública Federal. As a part of this mission, the SHCP has made publicly available information regarding public works projects, goods and services contracted by the federal government, public licenses issued, competitions for government contracts, and all budget information. See <http://www.shcp.gob.mx>.

3.2.1 Legislation and Programs, 1982 – 2002

3.2.1.1 The Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos (1983)

Between 1983 and 2002, Mexican public employees have been governed by the Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos, though various reforms to

this legislation have been introduced along the way, particularly in the 1990s. Although treating the general responsibilities and obligations of public employees vis a vis the state, the law does not include measures to introduce a career civil service. See Appendix 1 for the text of this law.

3.2.1.2 The Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos (2002)

In 2002, the Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos replaced the first, third, and fourth sections of the 1983 Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos. Although the law provides new rules and guidelines for public employees, including a list of general obligations and responsibilities, actions meriting sanction, and authorities responsible for applying sanctions, it does not include measures for implementing a career civil service. See Appendix 2 for the text of this law.

3.2.1.3 Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública (PROMAP) (1995-2000)

A major, comprehensive administrative reform project was undertaken during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). The SHCP and SECODAM were the main actors involved in developing this proposal. The SHCP was responsible for drafting the initial proposal, with SECODAM charged with endorsing it before delivering it to the President of Mexico for discussion.

PROMAP had two principal objectives: transform the federal public administration into an efficient and effective organization, and combat corruption and impunity through the introduction of better systems for promotion and development of human resources and employee skills. To achieve these ends, the PROMAP project was divided into four subprograms, including areas designed to foster citizen participation and better governmental service to citizens, increase administrative decentralization, increase evaluation and measurement of public management, and encourage professionalization and ethical behavior of public employees.

This last subprogram recommended the introduction of a career civil service in the Mexican public administration. Although PROMAP drew up several general guidelines for establishing a career civil service, the responsibility for adopting these measures or for developing rules for hiring, training, promotion, and development of personnel was left it up to each public agency. Any agencies choosing to adopt career civil service programs would be monitored by the SCHP.

To develop a career civil service, PROMAP recommended establishing the following measures: an open recruitment system, a general entrance exam, a psychological profile, and an exam specific to the job. The general entrance exam and psychological

profile would be the same across all public agencies. The job-specific test would be developed within each public agency.

Other proposals included a new classification system for nonunionized employees, a limitation on the number of political appointments to high-level positions. Salaries would include base salary, incentives, and rights, all regulated by the SHCP. Promotions were to be given to groups, or for increases in salary or professional responsibilities. A new evaluation system was to be put in place, based on performance, customer service, and expertise. Employment could be terminated voluntarily, or for misconduct, poor performance, lack of promotion over several years, or economic constraints and public sector downsizing.

As for unionized workers, the SHCP had three recommendations: change the status of union membership so that base employees could be integrated into the new civil service system, keep the separation between base and patronage employment but allow union members to resign their membership to join the civil service, and design two civil service systems, one for patronage employees and the other for base employees. As stated, the SHCP reserved a significant amount of influence over the criteria used for hiring, firing, promotions, training, and salaries.

4. General Institutional and Economic Context

The lack of a federal career civil service in Mexico is best understood within this country's political, economic, and legal/constitutional context. Mexico has long been known for its hegemonic party system, controlled by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) throughout most of the 20th century. Though the PRI certainly relied on electoral engineering, fraud, coercion, and other forms of intimidation to maintain political power, its management of the public sector also facilitated control.

In addition to describing the PRI's rise to power, this section discusses the political uses of the Mexican public sector. Throughout the 20th century, the PRI relied on state resources and public employment to cultivate support, reward party members, and balance internal party factionalism. PRI control over the public sector has had three principal consequences: high turnover in personnel, a large unionized segment of public sector employees, and the lack of a career civil service. Each of these reduced the ability for the public to oversee and monitor bureaucratic activities and policy outcomes.

4.1 Constitutional Context and Legal Framework

The Mexican Constitution (1917) refers to public sector employees in several ways, sometimes calling them state functionaries or state employees (*funcionarios and empleados*), as in Articles 110 and 111, and public servants and patronage employees (*servidores públicos and cargos de confianza*), as in Article 123.

As mentioned, the *Estatuto de los Trabajadores al Servicio de los Poderes de la Unión* (1938) was the first law drafted that distinguished between two basic types of public sector employees: *empleados de base y empleados de confianza* (base employment and patronage employment). The 1963 *Ley Federal de los Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado* reified these basic categories, both of which are still in use today.

4.1.1 Patronage Appointments (*Empleados de Confianza*)

Empleados de Confianza, or patronage employees, are appointed public officials charged with the administration of government and the public sector more generally. These positions include high-level public officials, such as ministers, secretaries, and subsecretaries responsible for policy decisions and policy-making, as well as various departmental coordinators, directors, subdirectors, and division chiefs that administer government departments, agencies, and offices. *Empleados de confianza* also include various professionals responsible for technical, legal, and administrative aspects of government. These latter employees often have no political attachment to their bosses and are hired for their professional skills or technical capacity.

Empleados de Confianza only hold office in so far as they maintain the support or confidence (hence, the name empleado de confianza) of their superiors, whether the president of Mexico or another functionary. When a minister, secretary, or subsecretary is replaced, usually for political reasons, all empleados de confianza under them leave as well. Lower level staff members, required to relinquish their jobs along with their superiors, are often left without new positions, even when their bosses move to other areas of the public administration. As a result, job security among empleados de confianza is very low, while turnover in the same position is high.

Empleados de confianza are not unionized. Indeed, the very nature of patronage employment prevents unionization among such employees. Moreover, because they are hired to perform a specific job or task, and only keep their job until presidential or political turnover, empleados de confianza are unable to develop careers in government. Many people, however, work in government for numerous years, finding new positions after each political turnover. See Guerrero Amparán (1998) and Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault (2000).

In 1997, there were 21 secretaries, 62 subsecretaries, 16 high officials (oficiales mayores), 37 unit chiefs (jefes de unidad), 152 general coordinators (coordinadores generales), 343 general directors, 563 area directors, 5,473 subdirectors, and 10,152 department chiefs. This means a total of 16,806 empleados de confianza occupy a series of jobs ranging from high-level secretaries of state to lower level department chiefs. The 1997 Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación lists a total of 19,986 empleados de confianza, which are thought to represent about one tenth of total empleados de confianza in the centralized public sector employment. This means that there are about 200,000 non-unionized empleados de confianza in the central government alone, not counting the decentralized public administration. These employees represent about 35 percent of central governmental employment. See Guerrero Amparán (1998).

4.1.2 Tenured Employees (Empleados de Base)

Empleados de base are low-level workers in the public sector and include people such as drivers, secretaries, archivists, and other janitorial and grounds personnel. None of these workers has higher education or university degrees.

These employees enjoy a much higher level of job security than do empleados de confianza, since their tenure does not depend on political turnover or will. Even so, they have little hope for career advancement or salary increases (Guerrero Amparán 1998; Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000).

Most base employees belong to the public sector labor union, the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (FSTSE). This union was established in 1938, the same year that the Estatuto de los Trabajadores al Servicio de

los Poderes de la Unión, distinguishing between base and patronage employees, was passed. Those that belong to the FSTSE are guaranteed job security, though their possibilities for advancement to higher positions or increased salaries are still limited. Those not belonging to the union are not guaranteed job security, though they tend to receive higher salaries than their unionized counterparts (Pardo 1999). Several scholars associate the lack of job security of non-unionized base employees with increased levels of governmental inefficiency and corruption (Pardo 1999). Once an employee has joined the union he may not renounce his membership (Guerrero Amparán 1998).

4.2 Political Context

4.2.1 The Partido Revolucionario Institucional

Following the end of the Mexican revolution and the ratification of the Mexican Constitution in 1917, numerous political groups, political clubs, and personalistic party machines began to contest local and national elections. At the national level, politicians won office by organizing complex webs of local, regional, and national political leaders and parties. Mexican politics was multiparty and highly unstable until the late 1930s.

The shift toward single-party rule began in 1929 with the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), the precursor to the PRI. Created by former leaders of the Mexican revolution, this party incorporated many of the country's local political groups into a larger political network. Politicians restructured the PNR several times during the 1930s in order to strengthen control over local political groups. In 1933, all independent local party organizations included in the PNR were dissolved and their members incorporated directly into the organization.

In 1938, President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40), considered the father of the modern PRI, renamed this party the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), and reorganized it along socio-economic lines. In 1938, the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC) and the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM) were created within the party organization to represent peasants and workers, respectively. The Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (FSTSE), discussed above, figures within the CTM, enabling PRM (and later PRI) presidents to control state workers. In 1943, the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP) was formed to represent the professional and middle classes, merchants, and the military. The party obtained its current name, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), in 1946.

Even though the PRI has controlled Mexican politics since the 1930s, several other parties regularly contested elections during the 20th century. The PRI occasionally encouraged the formation of opposition parties in order to legitimize its dominant political position. These parties, however, were rarely allowed to win offices, and were always forced to remain subservient to PRI interests. In fact, many of these groups

regularly supported PRI presidential candidates at election time, though they ran their own candidates in legislative elections. The Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), founded in 1948, the Partido Autentico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM), created in 1951, and the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), founded in 1973 are examples of such parties. The PPS and the PST were soft socialist parties, somewhat left of the PRI, while the PARM has generally been characterized as more conservative.

In contrast to the parties just mentioned, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), created in 1939, formed in opposition to PRI interventionist economic policies and has always been more vocal in its opposition to PRI rule. The PAN is thus longest surviving opponent of the PRI. As will be shown below, however, frequent electoral engineering and the regular distribution of benefits and policies enabled the PRI to dominate such competitors, protecting its privileged position in Mexican politics and government.

4.2.2 Political Institutional Arrangements and Single-Party Rule

According to the 1917 Constitution, Mexican government is organized into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Presidents hold six-year terms and cannot be reelected. Since Mexico is constitutionally federal, the national legislature is composed of two chambers, a senate and a chamber of deputies. 31 states and the federal district each elect four representatives to the senate. Senators hold six-year terms and ½ of this chamber is elected every three years. Until 1977, there were 200 seats in the chamber of deputies with, beginning in 1964, additional seats allocated to minority parties. Between 1964 and 1976, the total size of the chamber of deputies varied from election to election. In 1977, the number of seats was fixed at 400. In 1986, the lower house was given another 100 seats, expanding its total membership to 500. National deputies hold three-year terms, with this chamber completely renewed at election time. Senators and deputies cannot be reelected. Presidential and legislative elections are concurrent, though there are mid-term elections. Each state has its own constitution, elected governor, and elected unicameral legislature. Municipalities elect their own councils and mayors. Prior to reforms in the 1980s, presidents appointed the governor of the federal district.

Frequent electoral engineering has kept Mexican party politics artificially stable throughout most of the 20th century. In particular, between 1946 and 1977 the federal government, that is, the PRI electoral machine, regularly adjusted political institutional arrangements to increase control over political opposition and thus to reinforce its dominant position in Mexican politics. In 1946, the federal government, under the control of the growing PRI organization, began to implement measures to undermine the power of local bosses, reduce the level of multipartism, and centralize the political system. Measures included restrictive party registration procedures and increased federal control over the electoral process. These changes, combined with plurality election of the president, concurrent presidential-legislative elections, the use of single-member districts in all legislative elections, and presidential power to remove elected

governors and state legislators, reduced the ability of opposition parties to challenge PRI political control. See Méndez de Hoyos (2000) for a discussion of how institutional engineering, electoral laws, and other political institutional arrangements facilitated PRI political domination.

4.3 Economic Context

4.3.1 State-Led Economic Development

As in most of Latin America, the Great Depression was the principal catalyst for the turn toward state-led economic development. Between 1926 and 1932, the value of Mexican exports decreased 71 percent, while the value of imports dropped 69 percent, pushing the Mexican economy into crisis (Teichman 1995, 29). President Cárdenas (1934-40) reacted by undertaking policies to promote state-led economic development. Public development banks were created to provide funds for infrastructure investment, including the construction of roads, irrigation systems, and energy production. Numerous public enterprises were created to provide the growing economy with subsidized utilities and other materials necessary for industrialization. Thanks to the passage of the Ley de Expropiación in 1936, the state was able to take control of various foreign owned firms, giving it control over petroleum production, railways, and electricity. Cárdenas also undertook various populist policy measures, including social spending programs, some land reform, and efforts to increase workers' rights and wages. The national bureaucracy and public sector employment also grew in response to the needs of state intervention.

Cárdenas' economic policy agenda had a political component as well. During his tenure in office the PRI was reorganized along sectoral lines in order to help mobilize the support of groups not then formally or systematically incorporated into the political system. Increased state intervention in the economy enabled presidents, particularly Cárdenas, to determine the nature of economic relationships and thus to implement policies favorable to specific interest groups. Presidents appointed governmental ministers and bureaucrats in the expanding central government, as well as named directors of newly created public enterprises. The shift to state-led economic development enabled Cárdenas to deliver benefits directly to the newly created PRI associations, creating a firm basis of electoral support. As a result, at the time when the PRI was reorganizing its internal structure to streamline the process of building support, it was best able to deliver benefits to newly mobilized members. As a result, the PRI quickly outpaced other political groups.

In the post-Cárdenas era, economic policy-making moved more firmly to an Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) development strategy. Tariffs, tax breaks, subsidies, and an overvalued exchange rate were used to protect infant industries from foreign competition, facilitate financing, as well as provide cheap domestically produced or imported inputs. State-owned financial institutions guaranteed cheap, subsidized credit

to nearly every sector of the Mexican economy. Public enterprises guaranteed cheap electricity and petroleum, steel, fertilizer, equipment and tools, and even transportation equipment such as trucks and railcars. The increasing role of the state in the economy is demonstrated by the dramatic growth in public investment and public expenditure over the years. Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 7.7 percent in 1940 to over 58 percent in 1982. Public investment grew from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1940 to 10.8 percent in 1982. Public investment outpaced yearly growth in GDP. See Teichman (1995, 32).

4.4 Political Institutions, the Public Sector, and PRI Hegemony

State-led economic development facilitated the delivery benefits and preferential policies to PRI supporters. Public enterprises, protected industries in the private sector, and the growing governmental bureaucracy provided jobs and high wages to the popular sectors, middle classes, and industrial elites.

Public Sector employment was used to build support, reward party activists, and keep factions loyal to the PRI political machine. Between 1970 and 1980, public sector employment increased, on average, 7.9 percent each year. The population increased at an average rate of 3.1 percent each year (Teichman 1995, 39). By 1983, 20.3 percent of the country's economically active population was employed in the public sector. The number of public enterprises increased dramatically over the years, going from 39 in the late 1930s to over 1,000 in the 1970s (Teichman 1995, 29). Public enterprises provided cheap goods and services to the public, as well as jobs for party members.

Protective tariffs, cheap credit, tax breaks and subsidies protected private industries and firms, ensuring the allegiance of many industrial elites. When such businesses threatened to fail, the state intervened on their behalf. Most urban workers were employed in either the public sector, or in industries heavily protected and subsidized by the state. Businessmen opposed to such interventionist tactics were often given appointments to large, state-owned enterprises, thus tying their economic welfare to the government's economic policy agenda and ensuring their support.

PRI presidents also undertook extensive social programs, as well as provided health insurance and social security benefits to citizens. The Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS) provided health and social security to urban salaried workers. The Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE) was established to provide social security benefits to public employees. The Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO) delivered basic foodstuffs to marginalized groups such as peasants and rural workers.

As long as the PRI was able to take credit for such benefits and policy measures, as well as preserve economic growth, it maintained the support of its members and

citizens, thus reinforcing and legitimizing its hegemonic political position. In fact, in addition to using the public sector to secure general public support, the PRI used the state and its resources to quell internal party dissent, thus enabling the party to maintain a unified public front and thus hegemonic rule. Public sector jobs, in particular, were useful for building internal cohesion. Jobs were distributed among different factions within the PRI. As factional dynamics changes, so too did those persons occupying positions. The importance of public sector patronage employment to settling internal party disputes explains the lack of career civil service legislation in Mexico. PRI politicians found it in their interests to discourage such reforms that stood to limit their ability to satisfy potentially destabilizing factional leaders and supporters with public sector jobs. It has only been in recent years, with the rise of other political contenders, that the PRI has begun to consider the benefits of such reforms.

The unionized sector of the Mexican public sector also facilitated PRI rule. Unions were affiliated with the PRI, enabling the party to manage union support. As long as union members, particularly unionized state employees, maintained jobs and wages, so too did the PRI maintain political support.

Restrictive political institutional arrangements and state-led economic development thus worked together to produce an artificially stable party system in Mexico. PRI politicians dominated state and municipal governments as well. In the end, restrictive political institutional arrangements enabled the PRI to manage opposition party participation and build support, allowing it to reinforce and legitimize its dominant position in the political system.

4.5 The PRI and Public Employment

Thanks to single party rule throughout most of the 20th century, the electoral process did not define political representation or distribution of power among competing groups. Without political competition, the control of the president over Mexican politics and government, including all branches of government and the public sector, was complete.

To facilitate the relationship between the party, the state, and society, groups representing peasants, public and private sector workers, middle classes, public teachers, and state bureaucrats were incorporated into the central structure of the PRI. As long as jobs, private benefits and policy favors were forthcoming, these groups remained loyal to PRI rule. As long as the PRI controlled politics, government, and the state bureaucracy, the president was able to reward constituents and party activists with jobs, private benefits, and policies.

State resources and patronage jobs were also instrumental for mediating internal party disputes and social conflicts, and the state bureaucracy was instrumental to this process. Presidential succession struggles, for example, occurred within the state bureaucracy. Various secretaries of state were usually the main contenders and they

used their control over the resources of their agencies to build internal party support for their rise to power. The allocation of resources among social groups was also negotiated within the public administration, that is, not within congress or in the general political arena as in other countries (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000).

The Mexican bureaucracy and administrative process have thus been, for all intents and purposes, indistinguishable from Mexican politics and political processes (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). Indeed, the frequent rotation of PRI politicians and party members through elected and public sector positions meant that the distinction between building a political career or an administrative one was practically nonexistent (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). As political fortunes changed, so too did the assignation of public sector jobs and services. This explains why major proportion of public sector employment consists of patronage appointees, or *empleados de confianza*. These employees hold their jobs as long as their patron is on staff. At the very least, they are replaced every six years, with the end of presidential terms. At the most, they become unemployed as internal party dynamics demands a redistribution of jobs within the public sector. If a minister, secretary, or department chief leaves office for political or personal reasons, all patronage appointments attached to him must leave as well. This applies to those holding positions for political reasons, as well as those contracted for their expertise. As all are patronage appointees, they are entitled to their positions only as long as are their patrons.

Though some patronage employees find themselves reemployed in other public sector jobs, the high turnover associated with specific positions leads to administrative instability and inefficiency. In addition, the lack of political competition has meant that politics, government, and the public sector have been unaccountable to the general public for their political and administrative decisions.

The Mexican bureaucracy is highly centralized, hierarchical, rigid, and overly regulated. This is not surprising given the dependent nature of patronage employment on national political fortunes, as well as the relationship between the PRI and the state apparatus.

The concentration of power in the president alongside the centralized bureaucracy has made oversight nearly impossible. The congress and judiciary were limited in capacity and interest to oversee public functions and the use of state resources, since most congressmen and justices owed their positions to PRI political will. That most bureaucrats were political appointees of a single party also reduced accountability to political opposition or the public at large. The lack of public or political oversight has left the inner workings of the public sector opaque and unpredictable. This lack of accountability has led to inefficiencies and corruption.

The historic relationship between the PRI and the public sector explains the lack of professionalizing or civil service reforms during the 20th century. Placing patronage appointments under civil service laws would require politicians to relinquish an important

tool for ensuring political support. Only recently has the PRI lost political control over local and national government, and thus the public sector. As neither of the largest parties in Mexico can expect to dominate Mexican politics in the future, there have been a series of measures and programs undertaken to encourage the development of a civil service and to professionalize public sector employment. Most likely, the three largest parties (the PRI, PAN, and PRD) see such measures as a way to protect their political fortunes. If no party is able to use the public sector for purely political purposes, then that party controlling the national executive can benefit at the expense of others.

5. Quantitative Analysis of Mexican Public Sector Employment

This section presents data on the size of public sector employment and type of personnel in Mexico.

5.1 Number of Employees

The total number of public sector employees in Mexico has increased since 1990. In particular, as shown in Table 5.1.1 and Table 5.1.2, total public sector employment has gone from 4,683,129 in 1990 to 4,810,586 in 1999. Local and state governmental employment accounts for most of this increase. The central government and state enterprises have cut their payrolls in half, while local governments have increased employment by more than 100 percent. See also Table 5.1.3 and Table 5.1.4. Much of this increase occurred with decentralizing reforms undertaken in 1992.

Table 5.1.1 Public Sector Employment by Level of Government, 1990 – 1999 (Annual Average Number of Paid Employees)

Level of Government	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Federal Government	1,991,478	2,054,653	2,065,859	1,028,105	1,055,348	1,046,473	1,033,613	960,567	966,778	952,905
Federal District	138,907	143,669	146,493	149,318	151,468	153,444	156,741	159,960	175,388	176,940
Decentralized Organizations	234,838	226,729	222,549	222,554	224,473	229,047	229,080	236,473	240,204	239,350
<i>Total Central Government</i>	<i>2,359,223</i>	<i>2,425,051</i>	<i>2,434,901</i>	<i>1,399,977</i>	<i>1,431,289</i>	<i>1,428,964</i>	<i>1,419,434</i>	<i>1,357,000</i>	<i>1,382,370</i>	<i>1,369,195</i>
State Governments	760,365	791,815	817,718	1,873,278	1,925,291	1,963,958	2,005,605	2,161,170	2,218,794	2,240,872
Municipal Governments	217,539	224,550	231,817	237,291	243,325	246,288	250,968	258,505	262,140	267,261
<i>Total Local Governments</i>	<i>977,904</i>	<i>1,016,365</i>	<i>1,049,535</i>	<i>2,110,569</i>	<i>2,168,616</i>	<i>2,210,246</i>	<i>2,256,573</i>	<i>2,419,675</i>	<i>2,480,934</i>	<i>2,508,133</i>
<i>Social Security</i>	<i>396,414</i>	<i>420,345</i>	<i>422,655</i>	<i>426,782</i>	<i>430,808</i>	<i>437,493</i>	<i>433,098</i>	<i>440,922</i>	<i>443,761</i>	<i>454,013</i>
Public Enterprises: Direct Control	438,867	401,934	343,429	291,309	279,693	280,195	283,098	270,424	256,983	238,124
Public Enterprises: Indirect Control	510,721	448,158	282,890	248,428	247,026	238,320	234,332	239,757	240,925	241,121
Non financial	304,550	266,731	226,087	210,725	211,177	203,607	202,251	210,969	212,457	215,068
Financial	206,171	181,427	56,803	37,703	35,849	34,713	32,081	28,788	28,468	26,053
<i>Total Public Enterprises</i>	<i>949,588</i>	<i>850,092</i>	<i>626,319</i>	<i>539,737</i>	<i>526,719</i>	<i>518,515</i>	<i>517,430</i>	<i>510,181</i>	<i>497,908</i>	<i>479,245</i>
<i>Total Public Sector Employment</i>	<i>4,683,129</i>	<i>4,711,853</i>	<i>4,533,410</i>	<i>4,477,065</i>	<i>4,557,432</i>	<i>4,595,218</i>	<i>4,626,535</i>	<i>4,727,178</i>	<i>4,804,973</i>	<i>4,810,586</i>

Source: INEGI (2001). Note: Los datos de este cuadro no representan, en estricto sentido, el número de personas ocupadas en cada actividad, sino el número promedio de puestos remunerados que se estima fueron requeridos para la producción. En consecuencia, una misma persona puede ocupar dos o más puestos dentro de una o varias actividades económicas, tal es el caso del personal del magisterio. Asimismo, los incrementos en el número promedio de ocupaciones no representan necesariamente un aumento neto en plazas, sino la regularización del personal contratado por honorarios.

Table 5.1.2 Public Sector Employment by Level of Government, 1990 – 1999 (Annual Average Number of Paid Employees)

Level of Government	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Central Government	2,359,223	2,425,051	2,434,901	1,399,977	1,431,289	1,428,964	1,419,434	1,357,000	1,382,370	1,369,195
State and Municipal Governments	977,904	1,016,365	1,049,535	2,110,569	2,168,616	2,210,246	2,256,573	2,419,675	2,480,934	2,508,133
Social Security	396,414	420,345	422,655	426,782	430,808	437,493	433,098	440,922	443,761	454,013
Public Enterprises	949,588	850,092	626,319	539,737	526,719	518,515	517,430	510,181	497,908	479,245
Total Public Sector Employment	4,683,129	4,711,853	4,533,410	4,477,065	4,557,432	4,595,218	4,626,535	4,727,178	4,799,350	4,810,586

Source: INEGI (2001).

Table 5.1.3 Distribution of Public Sector Employment by Level of Government, 1990 – 1999 (Percent)

Level of Government	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Central Government	50.4	51.5	53.7	31.3	31.4	31.1	30.7	28.7	28.7	28.7
State and Municipal Governments	20.9	21.6	23.2	47.1	47.6	48.1	48.8	51.2	51.2	51.2
Social Security	8.5	8.9	9.3	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.3
Public Enterprises	20.3	18.0	13.8	12.1	11.6	11.3	11.2	10.8	10.8	10.8

Source: INEGI (2001).

Table 5.1.4 Employment in the Central Government by Ministry and Agency, 1990-1999 (Total Number of Permanent Employees)


	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>Poderes, Órganos Electorales y Tribunales</i>										
Cámara de Diputados	3,899	3,899	3,800	3,942	3,922	3,956	3,956	5,505	5,509	5,760
Cámara de Senadores	613	613	613	613	851	851	851	1,054	1,054	1,054
Suprema Corte de Justicia	11,356	12,033	12,915	14,058	14,955	15,626	16,876	19,557	19,483	21,475
Órganos Electorales		89,752	18,281	31,378	45,287	11,122	15,794	31,644	16,902	18,118
Tribunales Agrarios			794	1,057	1,196	1,347	1,336	1,348	1,520	1,527
Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación						859	878	964	1,151	1,406
<i>SUBTOTAL</i>	15,868	106,297	36,403	51,048	66,211	33,761	39,691	60,072	45,619	49,340
<i>Administración Central</i>										
Presidencia de la República	2,669	2,668	2,608	2,542	2,359	2,565	2,123	2,247	2,224	2,172
Gobernación	12,039	10,384	12,352	13,961	15,267	15,812	18,161	18,244	18,107	18,479
Relaciones Exteriores	3,704	3,944	3,750	3,713	3,703	3,716	3,625	3,747	3,912	4,068
Programación y Presupuesto	9,627	9,130								
Hacienda y Crédito Público	38,819	38,135	39,235	34,376	33,550	45,267	47,446	10,423	10,818	10,167
Defensa Nacional	151,178	155,218	157,142	162,169	169,689	172,072	163,638	177,018	183,788	181,708
Agricultura, Ganadería y Desarrollo Rural	78,022	73,188	69,596	59,449	60,509	35,001	31,770	31,762	29,525	26,901
Comunicaciones y Transportes	46,600	44,639	44,222	44,138	44,115	42,350	75,335	45,847	34,018	30,035
Comercio y Fomento Industrial	6,924	6,503	7,397	8,558	6,042	6,204	5,535	5,407	5,308	5,121
Educación Pública	873,315	908,460	928,311	235,069	243,975	241,566	250,234	251,847	255,444	156,032
Salud	134,504	144,671	145,564	154,538	160,488	163,915	138,006	20,752	11,812	13,615
Marina	41,816	43,737	46,687	48,072	48,170	53,128	53,128	54,247	53,566	54,972
Trabajo y Previsión Social	5,781	5,682	6,569	6,980	6,107	6,033	5,358	5,882	7,057	6,079
Reforma Agraria	15,285	14,380	13,773	11,053	11,245	11,436	9,921	10,158	3,189	2,662
Medio Ambiente, Recursos	4,920	4,895	4,344	4,325	4,436	34,150	32,421	36,606	36,469	40,221

Table 5.1.4 Employment in the Central Government by Ministry and Agency, 1990-1999 (Total Number of Permanent Employees)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Naturales y Pesca										
Procuraduría General de la República	7,841	8,947	9,835	11,244	14,201	15,839	15,132	15,573	15,806	15,753
Energía	2,177	1,973	1,926	2,146	2,245	1,669	1,447	1,092	1,140	1,029
Desarrollo Social	12,867	12,751	13,923	13,672	13,601	9,404	8,608	8,345	8,336	7,239
Turismo	2,658	2,672	2,640	2,312	2,373	2,410	2,271	2,321	2,338	2,249
Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo	1,658	1,616	1,658	1,618	1,750	1,756	2,064	2,080	2,675	2,491
<i>SUBTOTAL</i>	<i>1,452,404</i>	<i>1,493,593</i>	<i>1,511,532</i>	<i>819,935</i>	<i>843,825</i>	<i>864,293</i>	<i>866,223</i>	<i>703,598</i>	<i>685,532</i>	<i>580,993</i>
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>1,468,272</i>	<i>1,599,890</i>	<i>1,547,935</i>	<i>870,983</i>	<i>910,036</i>	<i>898,054</i>	<i>905,914</i>	<i>763,670</i>	<i>731,151</i>	<i>630,333</i>

Source: Poder Ejecutivo Federal (2000). Note: Incluye al personal directivo, técnico o profesionista, administrativo y operativo. Los datos se refieren al número de plazas permanentes y eventuales ocupadas al 31 de diciembre de cada año.

Figure 5.1.1 The Distribution of Public Sector Employment by Level of Government, 1990 – 1999



Source: Table 5.1.1.3.

5.2 Salaries and Overall Cost

As shown in Table 5.2.1, in the late 1990s public sector employment accounted for about 15 percent of total employment in Mexico. This represents a drop in about 3 percent between 1990s and 1999. In terms of total population, as shown in Table 5.2.2, the percent employed in the public sector declined from 5.6 percent in 1990 to 4.9 percent in 1999. These figure show that, despite an aggregate increase in governmental employment throughout Mexico, the size of the public sector relative to total employment or total population has declined. Table 5.2.3 shows that, within the central government, there has been an increase in the percent employed in public agencies not related to the central administration.

Table 5.2.1 Public Sector Employment as a Percent Total Employment, 1990 – 1999

Sector	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Public Sector	18.0	17.6	16.7	16.3	16.2	16.8	16.4	16.1	15.7	15.3
Private Sector	82.0	82.4	83.3	83.7	83.8	83.2	83.6	83.9	84.3	84.7

Source: INEGI (2001).

Table 5.2.2 Public Sector Employment as a Percent Total Population and Total Employment, 1990-1999

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>Percent Total Population</i>	5.6	5.6	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9
Central Government	2.8	2.9	2.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4
State and Municipal Governments	1.2	1.2	1.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6
Social Security	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Public Enterprises	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
<i>Percent Total Employed Persons</i>	18.0	17.6	16.7	16.3	16.2	16.8	16.4	16.1	15.7	15.3
Central Government	9.1	9.1	9.0	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.5	4.4
State and Municipal Governments	3.8	3.8	3.9	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.0	8.2	8.1	8.0
Social Security	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
Public Enterprises	3.7	3.2	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5

Source: INEGI (2001).

Table 5.2.3 Employment in the Central Government by Ministry and Agency, 1990-1999 (Percent Total Permanent Employees)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Poderes, Órganos Electorales y Tribunales	1.1	6.6	2.4	5.9	7.3	3.8	4.4	7.9	6.2	7.8

Table 5.2.3 Employment in the Central Government by Ministry and Agency, 1990-1999 (Percent Total Permanent Employees)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Administración Central	98.9	93.4	97.6	94.1	92.7	96.2	95.6	92.1	93.8	92.2

Source: Poder Ejecutivo Federal (2000). Note: Incluye al personal directivo, técnico o profesionista, administrativo y operativo. Los datos se refieren al número de plazas permanentes y eventuales ocupadas al 31 de diciembre de cada año.

5.3 The Structure of Public Sector Employment: Base and Patronage Employment

Current studies estimate that in 1997 there are about 200,000 *empleados de confianza* in the central government. This figure does not take into account the government of the federal district, decentralized agencies, state or municipal governments, the social security agency, or state enterprises. Using data from in Table 5.1.1, the percent patronage appointees represents about 20 percent of employment in the federal administration (1997). Using data from Table 5.1.3, the percent patronage employment is estimated at 35 percent (1997). Despite the scanty data available, using these percents we can estimate that the level of patronage employment in the federal administration lies somewhere between 20 and 35 percent.

Most other employees are either base employees or have been recently contracted under new civil service programs. Assuming that patronage employment accounts for about 35 percent of total central governmental employment and that around 15 percent of central governmental employees can be considered civil servants of a sort (see discussion in part 5.1.4 below), base employees account for about 50 percent of total central governmental employment. Base employment is thus the largest sector of the Mexican public administration, with patronage and civil service employment running second and third.

5.4 The Structure of Public Sector Employment: Civil Service Employment

Using the limited data reported in Table 5.1.3 and Table 5.4.1 it is possible to estimate the percent employees in the central government covered by professionalization or civil service measures. About 10 percent of total employment in the central administration is covered by professionalization or civil service measures, excluding teachers and armed forces personnel. Teachers were excluded from the calculations because their jobs were placed under state, rather than federal, jurisdiction in 1992 as a result of decentralizing reforms. To arrive at this number, the number of public sector employees reported in Table 5.4.1, excluding teachers and members of the armed forces, was divided by the total number of central administration employees reported in Table 5.1.3, excluding the armed forces (*Defensa Nacional*). Including the armed forces raises the figure to 26 percent.

Given that most civil service reforms date only to the late 1990s and affect few public agencies, it is unlikely that missing data would lead to a significant increase in the percent employees affected by civil service measures. Most likely, the amount would increase by only 5 or 10 percent, leaving it somewhere between 15 and 20 percent state employees covered by some type of civil service program.

Table 5.4.1 Number of Public Employees Affected by Professionalization or Civil Service Measures*

Public Agency	Number of Employees
The Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE)	1,352
The Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA)	3,014
The Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, y Informática (INEGI)	35,000
The Secretaría de Educación Pública	450,000 **
The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)	2,336 ***
The Sistema de Administración Tributaria (SAT)	n/a
The Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)	n/a
The Procuraduría General de la República (PGR)	n/a
The Procuraduría Agraria	1,446
The Secretaría de Gobernación (SG)	n/a
The Nacional Judicial Branch	3,400
The National Armed Forces	120,000
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>616,548</i>
<i>TOTAL Excluding Teachers and the National Armed Forces</i>	<i>46,548</i>

Source: Barragán and Roemer (2001), Espinoza Garibay (2001), Valdez Mejía (2001), Méndez Martínez (2001), Cárdenas Barajas (2001). Note: N/A means not available.


*The data presented here refer to the highest reported number of employees in each public agency. **The Secretaría de Educación Pública reports 580,908 positions affected by civil service legislation. Since teachers can hold more than one position, this number does not coincide with the number of people working as teachers covered by civil service laws, which accounts for approximately 450,000 persons (Valdez Mejía 2001). ***This is the number of positions filled in 2000, as reported by Méndez Martínez (2001).

5.5 The Structure of Public Sector Employment: Base, Patronage, and Civil Service

Figure 5.5.1 presents a graphical representation of public sector employment in Mexico, taking into account base, patronage, and newly created civil servants. As shown, base employment accounts for the largest portion of the Mexican public sector, with patronage and civil servants falling second and third. Recall that base employees are unionized, with the public sector union overseeing all hiring and firing practices. Patronage employees have high turnover, as their fates depend on political fortunes. Employees

that fall under civil servant status are only recent members of the public sector. Many of these jobs were categorized as patronage positions in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Figure 5.5.1
Comparison of Type of Public Sector Employment, Late 1990s



5.6 Public Sector Employment: Salaries and Costs

Governmental data indicate that Mexican public servants are well paid, on average, compared their counterparts in the private sector. Table 5.6.1, Table 5.6.2, and Table 5.6.3 compare average annual remuneration of public sector employees in the various governmental agencies and levels. The tables also report average private sector wages. Though average wages have increased in all public agencies, as well as in the private sector, public sector wages have risen at a much faster rate.

Table 5.6.4 shows that the cost of public sector employment, that is, the percent total governmental expenditures devoted to wages, has remained largely stable over the years. Table 5.6.5 shows that, though the percent expenditures devoted to wages has remained largely stable, actual funds spent have varied dramatically from year to year and have not followed governmental spending patterns.

Table 5.6.1 Average Annual Remuneration of Public Sector Employees Compared to Average Annual Private Sector Remuneration, 1990-1999 (Current Pesos per Paid Employee)

Level of Government	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Federal Government	10,671	14,272	19,153	28,008	33,034	37,841	49,001	63,656	81,004	100,537
Federal District	13,059	16,957	20,521	24,670	29,213	34,002	45,640	60,702	74,934	92,083
Decentralized Organizations	14,358	20,158	25,633	30,267	36,053	44,552	57,388	72,023	89,088	107,631
<i>Average Central Government</i>	<i>11,172</i>	<i>14,983</i>	<i>19,828</i>	<i>28,011</i>	<i>33,103</i>	<i>38,504</i>	<i>49,984</i>	<i>64,766</i>	<i>81,635</i>	<i>100,685</i>
State Governments	11,893	15,985	20,600	23,635	27,852	31,777	39,627	49,749	62,621	78,154
Municipal Governments	11,828	15,648	19,235	23,603	27,538	32,751	38,916	47,657	58,138	71,284
<i>Average Local Governments</i>	<i>11,879</i>	<i>15,910</i>	<i>20,295</i>	<i>23,631</i>	<i>27,817</i>	<i>31,885</i>	<i>39,548</i>	<i>49,526</i>	<i>62,147</i>	<i>77,422</i>
<i>Social Security</i>	<i>19,468</i>	<i>28,042</i>	<i>34,728</i>	<i>41,945</i>	<i>47,736</i>	<i>54,498</i>	<i>64,797</i>	<i>79,744</i>	<i>96,941</i>	<i>119,806</i>
Public Enterprises: Direct Control	24,898	31,948	42,826	51,964	59,900	73,426	94,376	121,361	175,386	196,646
Public Enterprises: Indirect Control	25,422	30,711	32,561	36,579	41,592	48,381	59,189	72,164	88,230	102,988
Non financial	20,458	20,743	23,887	27,476	31,351	36,764	45,468	54,987	67,426	80,776
Financial	32,754	45,366	67,088	87,457	101,918	116,522	145,687	198,038	243,483	286,353
<i>Average All Public Enterprises</i>	<i>25,180</i>	<i>31,296</i>	<i>38,190</i>	<i>44,883</i>	<i>51,314</i>	<i>61,915</i>	<i>78,440</i>	<i>98,241</i>	<i>133,213</i>	<i>149,524</i>
<i>Average Public Sector</i>	<i>14,862</i>	<i>19,291</i>	<i>23,863</i>	<i>29,308</i>	<i>34,047</i>	<i>39,485</i>	<i>49,463</i>	<i>61,973</i>	<i>78,332</i>	<i>95,226</i>
<i>Average Private Sector</i>	<i>6,985</i>	<i>9,184</i>	<i>11,572</i>	<i>13,278</i>	<i>14,687</i>	<i>17,119</i>	<i>21,150</i>	<i>26,301</i>	<i>30,993</i>	<i>36,704</i>

Source: INEGI (2001).

Table 5.6.2 Average Annual Remuneration of Public Sector Employees Compared to the General Minimum Wage and Wages in Other Economic Sectors, 1990-1999 (Current Pesos)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Average Central Government	11,172	14,983	19,828	28,011	33,103	38,504	49,984	64,766	81,639	100,685
Average Local Governments	11,879	15,910	20,299	23,631	27,817	31,885	39,548	49,526	62,147	77,422
Average Social Security	19,468	28,042	34,728	41,945	47,736	54,498	64,797	79,744	96,941	119,806
Average Public Enterprises	25,180	31,296	38,190	44,883	51,314	61,915	78,440	98,241	133,213	149,524
General Minimum Wage	12,084	12,084	13,060	13,970	18,430	24,300	24,300	31,910	31,910	35,120
Average Contracted Wage	21,260	23,811	26,124	27,508	30,891	37,378	44,667	52,573	61,248	69,088
Average Wage in the Formal Construction Industry	28,539	31,148	39,821	42,567	50,771	55,149	64,171	75,793	88,991	90,072
Average Wage in Maquiladoras	28,232	44,892	49,187	54,961	69,550	88,780	108,780	129,963	154,613	170,201
Average Wage Per Employed Person	64,270	80,580	91,810	102,370	120,360	146,815	175,870	209,603	247,001	263,946

Source: INEGI (2001) and Ortiz Dietz (1999).

Table 5.6.3 Comparison of Average Annual Remuneration of Public and Private Sector Employees, 1990-1999
(Public Sector Pay as a Multiple of Private Sector Pay)

Level of Government	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Federal Government	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.7
Federal District	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5
Decentralized Organizations	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.9
<i>Average Central Government</i>	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7
State Governments	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1
Municipal Governments	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9
<i>Average Local Governments</i>	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1
<i>Social Security</i>	2.8	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.3
Public Enterprises: Direct Control	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.6	5.7	5.4
Public Enterprises: Indirect Control	3.6	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8
Non financial	2.9	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2
Financial	4.7	4.9	5.8	6.6	6.9	6.8	6.9	7.5	7.9	7.8
<i>Average All Public Enterprises</i>	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7	4.3	4.1
<i>Average Public Sector</i>	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6
<i>Average Private Sector</i>	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Source: Table 5.1.6.1.

Table 5.6.4 The Cost of Public Sector Employment, 1994-1999 (Millions of Constant Pesos)

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total Governmental Expenditures	300,842.2	283,452.2	299,277.4	324,975.4	309,891.9	334,853.5
Expenditure on Personnel	54,217.4	45,971.6	46,534.7	52,321.8	52,690.5	59,724.7
Personnel Expenditures as a Percent Total Expenditures	18.0 %	16.2 %	15.5 %	16.1 %	17.0 %	17.8 %

Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. Note: Personnel expenditures include remuneration of permanent and temporary employees, additional special remunerations, payments into the social security and other social systems.

Table 5.6.5 The Rate of Change in Total Governmental and Personnel Expenditures, 1995-1999 (Percent Change)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total Governmental Expenditures	-5.8	5.6	8.6	-4.6	8.1
Expenditure on Personnel	-15.2	1.2	12.4	0.7	13.4

Source: Table 5.1.6.3.

5.7 Social, Professional, and Educational Profiles of Central Governmental Employees (Patronage Appointees) in the 1980s

This section presents data on the social, professional, and educational profiles of central governmental employees in Mexico. The data all point to the fact that most employees are affiliated with the PRI, tend to come from well-connected families, and tend to work in public sector jobs for many years. This data supports the conclusion that patronage appointees in Mexico tend to rotate from job to job (Table 5.7.3), as well as tend to be appointed based on political ties (Table 5.7.4, 5.7.5, and 5.7.6) rather than merit, even if they are qualified for the job at hand (Table 5.7.2, 5.7.5, and 5.7.6). See Tables 5.7.1 through 5.7.5 below.

Table 5.7.1 The Social Origin of Political Elite in the Central Government (Percent)

	1983	1986	1989
Place of Birth			
Federal District	52.2	55.2	55.8
Other Urban	14.1	14.0	12.2
Rural	34.1	30.9	31.9
Father's Occupation			
Professional	38.2	39.4	40.9
Business	34.8	34.2	31.5
Government	14.2	13.5	13.7
Peasant/Labor	6.7	6.3	6.3
Other	6.0	6.6	7.6

Source: Centeno (1999).

Table 5.7.2 Educational Profile of Political Elite in the Central Government (Percent)

	1983	1986	1989
Level of Education			
B.A. or Less	41.7	37.0	35.4
Some Graduate School	24.9	26.2	25.2
Master's Degree	20.2	22.0	22.8
Ph.D.	13.1	14.9	16.5
Place of Education			

Table 5.7.2 Educational Profile of Political Elite in the Central Government (Percent)

	1983	1986	1989
UNAM B.A.	57.9	62.3	62.8
Private School in Mexico B.A.	13.6	14.0	15.6
U.S.A.	22.1	23.8	25.5
Subject			
Law	25.0	24.6	26.5
Engineer/Science	30.0	25.7	26.2
Economics/Administration	42.0	45.6	45.7

Source: Centeno (1999).

Table 5.7.3 Previous Career Experience of the Political Elite in the Central Government (Percent)

	1983	1986	1989
Worked in Private Sector	24.8	24.8	22.6
Worked in Public Sector	75.2	75.2	77.4

Source: Centeno (1999).

Table 5.7.4 Political Activity of the Political Elite in the Central Government (Percent)

	1983	1986	1989
No PRI membership	25.9	25.0	23.7
PRI member but not active	33.2	34.3	32.8
Active in party	40.9	40.7	43.5

Source: Centeno (1999).

Table 5.7.5 Personal Profiles of the Political Elite in the Central Government by Bureaucratic Sector in 1983 (Percent)

	Banking	Planning	Manage	Control	Military	Diplomat
Percent Total	14.8	13.5	38.8	19.7	4.3	8.8
Born After 1939	50.3	72.1	45.3	49.4	3.6	33.9
Birthplace						
Mexico City	55.3	59.3	52.0	40.0	25.0	67.3

Table 5.7.5 Personal Profiles of the Political Elite in the Central Government by Bureaucratic Sector in 1983 (Percent)

	Banking	Planning	Manage	Control	Military	Diplomat
Other Urban	13.7	12.8	15.0	16.0	14.3	13.3
Rural	31.1	27.9	34.0	43.0	60.7	19.5
Graduate Degree	31.7	44.8	32.8	32.7	10.9	32.1
Studied in Mexican Private School or in the USA	48.7	51.7	34.6	21.9	23.6	35.7
Subject Studied						
Law	25.9	20.3	17.6	49.8	5.5	66.1
Science/Engineering	13.2	25.0	50.2	16.7	14.5	13.4
Economics/Administration	70.9	59.9	39.3	31.9	1.8	19.6
Political Activity						
Not a Member of the PRI	27.0	14.0	27.3	12.4	76.4	42.0
Nonactive Member	38.6	33.7	37.0	27.5	18.2	25.9
Active Member	34.4	52.3	35.6	60.2	5.5	32.1
Worked in Two or More Public Sectors in the Past	48.7	65.7	57.9	76.1	16.4	50.9

Source: Centeno (1999).

Table 5.7.6 Personal Profiles of the Political Elite in the Central Government by Position in 1983 (Percent)

	Cabinet	Sub-Cabinet	Major Officials and Coordinators	Director General
Born after 1939	18.5	41.7	42.2	55.0
Birthplace				
Mexico City	54.2	53.5	52.7	52.0
Other Urban	8.3	13.4	14.3	14.0
Rural	37.5	33.1	33.0	34.0
Graduate Degree	37.0	35.4	29.4	35.4

Table 5.7.6 Personal Profiles of the Political Elite in the Central Government by Position in 1983 (Percent)

	Cabinet	Sub-Cabinet	Major Officials and Coordinators	Director General
Studied in Mexican Private or US University	29.6	42.5	37.6	35.8
Subject Studied				
Law/Liberal Arts	51.9	35.4	22.9	26.7
Science/Engineering	14.8	22.0	32.1	34.2
Economics/Administration	44.4	44.4	43.3	49.5
Active in the PRI	66.7	54.3	42.2	41.4
Specialization				
Banking	37.0	13.4	20.0	12.8
Planning	14.8	11.0	15.5	13.5
Management	18.5	32.3	32.7	31.5
Control	14.8	26.0	12.7	16.9
Other	14.9	17.3	19.1	25.3

Source: Centeno (1999).

6. Qualitative Analysis of the Mexican Public Sector and Civil Service Reforms

The historic relationship between the PRI and the public sector explains the lack of professionalizing or civil service measures during most of the 20th century. This section discusses recent efforts to introduce a civil service, linking such efforts measures to political liberalization and economic crisis. Most public sector reforms during the 1980s and 1990s were aimed at increasing efficiency but did little to change the fundamentally political nature of public sector employment. More recently, reforms have centered on increasing governmental transparency and reducing corruption. Though civil service measures are seen as instrumental to meeting these goals, few agencies have introduced them. This section discusses how and why recent civil service measures continue to be largely superficial or have failed altogether. This section also evaluates current civil service practices in those agencies adopting such reforms.

6.1 Institutional Reforms and Political Liberalization

Institutional reforms undertaken in 1977 and 1986 not only began the long-awaited process of political liberalization but also might be linked to recent efforts to establish a civil service. There are several factors that appear to have contributed to the PRI's decision to introduce political reforms. Increasing economic troubles associated with years of heavy state spending undermined the economic basis of PRI political support, de-legitimizing its place in Mexican politics and government (Gómez Tagle 1993). The rise of urban and rural guerrilla movements, leftist political groups, and other marginalized sectors of civil society who refused to participate in what they considered fraudulent elections also undermined the political legitimacy of PRI rule, both domestically and internationally (Cornelius 1988). Internal party struggles between liberal and conservative groups within the PRI have also been used to explain move toward liberalization (Cornelius 1988; Middlebrook 1988).

The most important reforms, including the addition of seats to the chamber of deputies, changes to the procedures for registering parties, and reconstitution of the governmental agencies charged with overseeing and running elections, were introduced in 1977 in a new electoral law called the Ley Federal de Organizaciones Políticas y Procesos Electorales (LFOPPE). Additional liberalizing measures were introduced in 1986 and 1990. See Craig and Cornelius (1995) and Méndez de Hoyos (2000) for a discussion of institutional and electoral reforms that liberalized Mexican politics.

The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), discussed above, was created in 1990 to replace the old Comisión Federal Electoral. The IFE is organized around a Consejo General, a Junta General Ejecutiva, and a Dirección General (Craig and Cornelius 1995). The Consejo General includes four PRI representatives, the Minister of the Interior, one deputy and one senator from the PRI, six representatives from opposition parties, one deputy and one senator from the opposition as a whole, and six other members

nominated by the president. These last six members had to be approved by a 2/3 vote in the chamber of deputies (Craig and Cornelius 1995). All parties are empowered to participate in naming polling station supervisors and workers. A new voter registration procedure was introduced, with every voter given a voter registration card with photo identification. And all parties were given access to the process of counting votes. Even though the director of the IFE was nominated by the Minister of the Interior, and was likely to be a PRI sympathizer, each of these changes increased the ability for opposition party groups to supervise the electoral process and thus made it difficult for the PRI to rig elections without detection.

Many of the reforms implemented since 1977 increased the ability for opposition parties to participate in the Mexican electoral process, win seats, and supervise elections. The inclusion of new parties in the system legitimized continued PRI hegemony. Yet, many opposition party members, particularly congressmen, criticized the reforms because they were designed to maintain PRI control. Rules, for allocating multimember district seats, for example, were engineered to help numerous smaller parties at the expense of larger opposition groups. This would prevent any single, large party organization from emerging to challenge PRI hegemony. Coalitions were difficult as well, further protecting PRI rule. Even with increase opposition party representation, allocations of fraud in local and national elections still occurred.

As long as opposition parties were prevented from winning control of congress or the country's electoral machinery, so they thought, they could not hope to challenge the PRI's hold on power. To the surprise of many political observers, however, two large party groups emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, which challenged PRI hegemony: Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and the PAN.

Recent PRI political losses also mean loss of control over the public sector. Indeed, as neither of the largest parties in Mexico can expect to dominate Mexican politics and thus the public sector in the future, they should have an incentive to implement civil service reform. Civil service reforms and the introduction of more merit based employment criteria could prevent politicians from opposing parties from using the public sector as a means of rewarding politicians and party activists. (See Geddes (1994) for an application of this argument to other countries.) Even so, recent political changes have not encouraged politicians and parties to the development of a civil service.

6.2 Economic Reform and Changes to the Public Sector

Though political institutional changes facilitated political liberalization, deteriorating economic conditions also undermined the ability for PRI politicians to use the public sector for political purposes. The necessity of balancing state budgets and increasing economic efficiency has spurred the Mexican government to professionalize public sector processes and employment, though such goals do not appear to have led to significant civil service reform.

Mexico's state-led industrial development program and years of heavy public spending enabled a long but temporary period of unusually high growth between 1955 and 1970 (Kaufman 1990, 71). By the 1970's, however, ISI development had led to increased external debt, growing fiscal and external account deficits, and high inflation (Kaufman 1990, 95). The rise of U.S. interest rates coupled with a sharp decline in the price of Mexican oil exports ushered in Mexico's "declaration of bankruptcy" in August 1982. The Mexican public sector deficit nearly doubled, going from 7.9 to 14.5 of GDP between 1981 and 1982. Mexico's external debt increased 20 percent in this same period as well, going from 32.5 percent of GNP to 52.5 percent (see Table 5.9). Inflation went from 27.9 percent in 1981 to over 100 percent in 1983. Formerly supporting an average growth rate of 4.0 percent, on average, during the 1970s, the Mexican economy shrank by over 4 percent in just two years (1982-83). Mexico's economic crisis signaled the beginning of the Latin American economic and debt crisis.

The election of Miguel de la Madrid (PRI) (1982-1988) in 1982 heralded a new era of economic policy-making. Rather than supporting the continuation of ISI and heavy state spending, de la Madrid undertook measures to restructure the economy. Subsequent president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (PRI) (1988-1994), continued reform measures. The adjustment measures followed by de la Madrid and Salinas dramatically reduced the level of state intervention in the economy, and thus the ability for PRI politicians to distribute benefits and build party support in customary ways. See Kaufman (1990) for a description of Mexico's economic reform project.

Political institutional reforms designed to increase electoral participation certainly increased the ability for opposition parties to compete in elections, thus reducing the number of votes going to PRI candidates. Hardship associated with economic crisis and economic reforms, however, also reduced the ability for the PRI electoral machine to distribute customary benefits to supporters, thus weakening traditional ties to constituents. After nearly two decades of losses associated with liberalization, both political and economic, in 2000 the PRI lost hold of the presidential electoral process when it was outcompeted by the PAN presidential candidate, Vicente Fox Quesada. The PAN won 42.5 percent of total national votes, with the PRI accounting for only 6.1 percent. In the span of 25 years, the PRI lost about 65 percent of total national votes and its control over the Mexican presidency.

It was only after the introduction of economic crisis and reform in the early 1980s that the PRI began to suffer sizeable electoral losses. Though institutional arrangements were designed to liberalize the political system, growing economic hardships associated with economic crisis and reform undermined PRI efforts to engineer majorities in the legislature. More important, the PRI was unable to rely on the state to build political support, leading to a decline in public sector employment. Economic crisis and subsequent reforms encouraged the PRI to implement administrative reforms to modernize and professionalize employment as a means of increasing efficiency.

Institutional reforms and the end of state-led economic development thus have worked together to undermine PRI hegemony, as well as administrative and bureaucratic change. Even so, few civil service reforms have seen the light of day.

6.3 Efforts at Public Administration Modernization in the 1980s and 1990s

The first discussions about the merits of a more professionalized civil service occurred during the 1980s. Economic reforms implemented since 1982 included, among other things, efforts to decrease corruption, and modernize the public administration through increased efficiency. Such measures were seen as a way to reduce public expenditures.

Despite agreement about the merits of a more professional, modernized, and efficient public administration, however, there was no civil service reform (Guerrero Amparán 1998; Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). Indeed, most public agencies were left on their own when choosing how to professionalize employment. Rather, public administration reform was managerialist in nature. That is, they sought to improve administrative procedures and overhaul the administrative structure without changing the fundamentally political nature of the public administration (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000).

Corruption by public employees was targeted, beginning with the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988). His government considered a moral restoration of society of utmost importance. New controls were implemented on the management of the national budget and expenditures, reducing the ability for public officials to deviate state resources for personal or political purposes (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). SECOGEF, discussed above, was created to oversee this goal. Also, the number of public employees was reduced, mainly through the privatization of public enterprises.

During the administration of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) further measures were introduced to streamline the public sector, principally through decentralization. The public sector union, who stood to lose members, and public sector employees who stood to lose resources opposed decentralization. Additional controls were placed on the use of public resources, mainly with new rules governing expenditures. The budget and all expenditures were centralized in the SHCP.

The PRI, though unable to use public sector employment as liberally as in the past, was reluctant to sever its political ties. For this reason, though initiating major changes in administrative processes throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the fundamental nature of public sector employment did not change and there was no civil service reform. Managerialist reforms aided the Mexican state in achieving its primary goal of economic stability. Managerialist reforms also enabled the government to maintain the

fundamentally political nature of public sector employment, even though hiring now tends now to be more merit-oriented in nature.

6.4 Efforts to Introduce a Career Civil Service: An Evaluation of PROMAP

The administration of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) was the first to begin serious discussions about how to reduce corruption and to increase transparency and accountability of governmental activities. PROMAP was the most important project undertaken to meet these objectives. Though many measures were recommended to increase governmental accountability and reduce corruption among governmental employees, the introduction of a civil service was seen as a means for meeting these ends. The subprogram for professionalization and ethical behavior of public employees in PROMAP recommended the introduction of a career civil service. For this reason, the SHCP created the Unidad de Servicio Civil (USC), which was given the task of designing civil service legislation to be endorsed by SECODAM and presented to the president.

6.6 Public Agencies that Have Implemented Programs to Increase the Level of Professionalism among Personnel or to Develop a Career Civil Service

Several areas in the federal public administration have undertaken measures to professionalize hiring and firing, promotions, professional development and career paths, and other aspects of their public functions and responsibilities. While the Servicio Exterior began such reforms as early as the 1920s, most public agencies only began adopting such measures in the 1990s.

Areas in the national public administration that have introduced at least some rules or regulations for professionalizing personnel and services, or developing a career civil service include:

1. The Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE)
2. The Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA)
3. The Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, y Informática (INEGI)
4. The Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)
5. The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)
6. The Sistema de Administración Tributaria (SAT)
7. The Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)
8. The Procuraduría General de la República (PGR)
9. The Procuraduría Agraria
10. The Secretaría de Gobernación (SG)
11. The National Judicial Branch
12. The National Armed Forces

The following sections give a brief summary of the measures undertaken by these public agencies.

6.6.1 The Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE)

In 1922 the federal government introduced a system of public competitions (concursos) to announce and fill positions in the Foreign Service. Although numerous reforms have been made to hiring and employment practices over the years to this area of the public administration, the most recent reforms were implemented in 1994 with the passage of the Ley del Servicio Exterior Mexicano (LSEM). The Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos was established in 1975 to help prepare and train employees.

In the LSEM (1994), three employment categories were established: career or permanent employment, temporary employment, and assimilated employment (asimilable). Career employees are divided into a diplomatic-consular branch and a technical-administrative branch. The diplomatic-consular corps includes the minister of SRE, all ambassadors and consuls, counselors, the first, second, and third secretaries, and all diplomatic attachés. The technical-administrative body includes administrative coordinators, and various administrative attachés and technicians. Technical-administrative employees are divided into two categories, with three levels each. Categories differentiate employees according to function. The duties of Administrative coordinators include representation and analysis. Other administrators dedicate themselves to administrative and operational tasks. See Martínez Cianca (2001).

Temporary employees are appointed with agreement of the President and are hired to carry out specific jobs or tasks, with employment ending with completion of the work. Assimilated employees are various officials or attachés appointed to diplomatic missions or consulates temporarily by some part of the federal government. As with temporary employees, their tenure lasts only so long as the task they were assigned to complete.

Since 1922, positions in the career foreign service have been filled and continue to be filled by public competitions. To enter in the diplomatic-consular corps and technical-administrative branch, candidates must be Mexican by birth, under 30 years of age (unless specific academic and professional skills are sought), be in good mental and physical condition, and not be a member of the clergy. Since the 1990s, the following criteria have also been used to choose between candidates:

Diplomatic-consular corps: exams and courses, test of knowledge of foreign cultures and international relations, Spanish language exam, foreign language exam, essay exam on current foreign policy, and interviews. Candidates must have at least a bachelor's degree. Courses take at the Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos also help, as does prior experience in the SRE. Technical-administrative

body: public exam determined by the department of entry. Candidates must have a high school diploma and mastery of a foreign language.

The director of the Matías Romero Institute of Diplomatic Studies serves as chair of the personnel committee responsible for evaluating exams. After the passage of a yearlong trial period, those admitted to the career foreign service are then evaluated to determine whether they will receive permanent status. After that, promotion of employees is determined by a combination of seniority, written and oral exam, and ultimately merit. Competitive exams are used to evaluate and compare performance of officials in the career civil service, and in the SRE more generally. A Personnel Commission, made up of a career ambassador, the head of the department concerned, and the general director of human resources, is responsible for recommending employees for entry, re-entry, promotion, transfer, commission membership, sanction, and retirement, etc...

Those aspiring to advancement within the career civil service also benefit from study at the Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos. This institute currently offers a master's degree program aimed at new members of the SRE. Cause for termination of employment usually results from lack of promotion after an extended period or sanctions for poor performance. See Barragán and Roemer (2001), Pardo (1999), Sánchez González (1999), Uvalle Berrones (2000) and Martínez Cianca (2001).

According to recent employment statistics, career personnel accounts for 1,186 employees ((Barragán and Roemer 2001) report 1,136 employees) that staff 136 overseas offices or consulates, that is, 70 embassies, 7 permanent diplomatic missions within international organizations, 32 general consulates, 25 career consulates (Martínez Cianca 2001).

6.6.2 The Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA)

The system of hydraulics specialists was instituted in 1989 as a first step toward professionalizing employment and implementing a career civil service in the CNA. The CNA was designed to replace the now extinct Subsecretaría de Infraestructura Hidráulica de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos, who had previously employed 37,540 persons. Of these, only 9 percent had formal academic or professional training, indicating a lack of qualified personnel (Espinoza Garibay 2001).

The rationale for creating the CNA and the system of hydraulics specialists was to develop a group of qualified hydraulics professionals, whose pay scales and expertise would reflect equivalent jobs in the private sector. Thanks to the plan de carrera implemented within the CNA, by the late 1990s a total of 2,986 hydraulics specialists were covered by the new civil service system. In 2001, the system had grown to include 3,014 hydraulics specialists (Espinoza Garibay 2001).

Qualification for entry into the system of hydraulics specialists is decided by evaluation of academic accomplishments, work experience, technical expertise, and other personal background information. The CNA's professional development program ensures that financial support is available to employees for completing certificate programs or postgraduate studies. Evaluation for promotion is conducted by self evaluation and evaluation by immediate supervisors. A point system is used to appraise employee progress and professional development, with points awarded for coursework, projects completed, job performance, technical capacity, and communication skills. See Pardo (1999) and Espinoza Garibay (2001).

Since 1994, the CNA's system of professional development has been guided by PROMAP. CNA employees are divided into three groups: hydraulics specialists, middle and upper level employees, and general salary employees. In the late 1990s, there were 2,986 hydraulics specialists (3,014 in 2001), 2,119 middle and upper level employees, and 20,368 general employees. General employees include administrative staff and other lower level jobs that tend to be tenured or unionized. Middle and upper level employees may be appointed or long-term career employees. Unlike most of the Mexican public sector, in the CNA it is possible to move from one type of employment to another.

Personnel management is divided into three areas: salaries management, administration modernization management, and a branch whose job it is to act as a liaison with the union. The salaries branch monitors and approves pay raises and promotions, as well as maintains salary and employment level information in the CNA database. The administrative modernization branch is in charge of implementing PROMAP recommendations. This section oversees recruitment, training, and the selection process for hydraulics specialists, as well as maintains employee performance information in the CNA personnel database. Recruitment is done through open or closed competitions. Closed competitions are open only to current CNA employees, while persons from the general public may apply for positions in open competitions. See Espinoza Garibay (2001).

The last branch, known as the work reconciliation branch, reconciles conflicts between union and CNA promotion paths. The personnel management administration is the only body empowered to authorize promotions or movements within the CNA civil service system. Usually, a particular department will propose someone for promotion or movement, with the administrative modernization branch responsible for evaluating the proposed candidate (using its database) and proposing other qualified candidates.

Although the CNA system is devoted to training all employees for promotion to higher levels, formal career development programs only include middle and upper level employees and hydraulics specialists. Even so, the core of the civil service system is still organized around developing hydraulics specialists, with numerous resources

available for coursework and training programs. This means that only about 20 percent of CNA employees benefit from formal professional career development programs. See Barragán and Roemer (2001), Pardo (1999), Sánchez González (1999), Uvalle Berrones (2000) and Espinoza Garibay (2001).

6.6.3 The Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, y Informática (INEGI)

As early as 1989, INEGI began working on ways to modernize procedures and professionalize employment and human resources management. What resulted was a comprehensive system of professionalization, called the Sistema Integral de Profesionalización (SIP), in 1994.

The SIP (1994) affects a range of positions, including technicians and other support personnel, secretarial staff, project leaders, department directors and assistant directors, area directors, regional directors, general directors and coordinators, and the president of INEGI. Each of these jobs falls into either tenured, appointed, or general personnel categories. General personnel refers to the highest positions in INEGI, appointed personnel to mid-level directors, and tenured employees to technicians, secretarial staff, or other specialists. In the late 1990s, there were about 35,000 employees affected by the SIP. Ventura Nevares (2001) reports 29,122 registered SIP members and 2,572 candidates. Lower level employees are not included in the system.

The principal objective of SIP is to cut down on employee rotation, and thus to streamline INEGI business. Measures were introduced to clarify job responsibilities and objectives, develop a system for evaluating worker performance and encouraging feedback, ensure that worker skills match job responsibilities, increase participation in training programs, and streamline processes for completing projects through better division of labor between employees and departments. To accomplish these goals, several development programs were introduced to monitor changes and improvements in human resources management, personnel recruitment, induction and orientation processes, performance evaluation, professional development, and remuneration and salaries. A general SIP commission oversees the new system, as well as acts as the principal decision-making body of INEGI. Members include the president and administrative coordinator of INEGI, as well as a series of regional and area directors. There are two subcommissions, one in charge of exams for prospective personnel and another in charge of salary issues.

Recruitment for positions in INEGI is accomplished through open or closed competitions. Closed competitions are open only to current INEGI employees, while persons from the general public may apply for positions in open competitions. A combination of academic accomplishments, work experience, exams, and interviews are used to select employees.

To receive a promotion or salary increase, a combination of work performance and technical capacity are evaluated. To help workers develop expertise training courses are made available. Workers can also take courses or pursue higher degrees at academic institutions. Employment can be terminated after failure to receive a satisfactory evaluation, pay increase, or job promotion for three years. The head of the department or area in question proposes all employment decisions, with ultimate approval granted by the general commission. See Barragán and Roemer (2001), Pardo (1999), Sánchez González (1999), Uvalle Berrones (2000), and Ventura Nevares (2001).

6.6.4 The Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)

The most important law in recent years affecting public school teachers was the Acuerdo Nacional para la Modernización de Educación Básica y Normal, introduced in 1992. This law established the rules and regulations covering the new system for teacher careers, called La Carrera Magistral, in 1993. The Acuerdo and Carrera Magistral affects all personnel involved in basic education, including teachers, school directors, and supervisors in elementary, secondary, and technical schools. The Acuerdo and Carrera Magistral system are aimed at improving educational quality in Mexico through reform of the system of promotions and career development of public school teachers and educators.

Since teachers are unionized in Mexico, a joint SEP-teachers' union (the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación) commission was organized to supervise the selection of personnel and new system of promotions. Promotions are based on seniority and an evaluation of educational background and performance.

Today (1991) there are approximately 450,000 teachers inscribed in the Carrera Magistral system (Valdez Mejía 2001). See Barragán and Roemer (2001), Pardo (1999), Sánchez González (1999) and Valdez Mejía (2001).

6.6.5 The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)

The IFE was created in 1990 as a part of political institutional reforms undertaken by the Mexican government. The most important of these political institutional reforms are discussed in section 4.2.3 below. In 1992, the Servicio Profesional Electoral was established to help augment and reinforce the level of professionalism among IFE employees. In 1999, the General Counsel of the IFE approved the Estatuto del Servicio Profesional Electoral y del Personal del Instituto Federal Electoral (ESPEPIFE).

The ESPEPIFE clarified the rules and regulations guiding the development of a career civil service in the IFE, with the ultimate goal of such measures to ensure political impartiality in the Mexican electoral process. ESPEPIFE guidelines cover the entrance,

promotion, salary scale, process of specialization and training, and tenure requirements for IFE employees.

IFE jobs are filled by open public competitions. 26,700 candidates competed in the first competition for 2,336 civil service jobs. Méndez Martínez (2001) reports that 5,000 people competed for jobs in this same year. Mechanisms have been established to make the selection process as transparent as possible, as well as to guarantee that candidates are chosen according to merit rather than other personal or political criteria.

Upon receiving a civil service position, employees are trained in different specialties to ensure their professional development. Because continuous professional development is an IFE priority, the institute established the Programa de Formación y Desarrollo, headed by the Dirección Ejecutiva del Servicio Profesional Electoral, with the support of the Centro de Formación y Desarrollo. To meet its goal of ensuring a high level of professional development and performance among IFE employees, the program includes three phases. First, an initial phase designed to help introduce entering employees to the IFE and learn basic skills required for their jobs. Second, a phase focused on helping IFE employees keep abreast of the principal activities of the IFE. Third, a set of courses designed to help employees develop more specialized knowledge about specific areas and activities of the institute (Méndez Martínez 2001).

Although the civil service system is designed to promote job stability, so that employees can develop longer time horizons and thus think in terms of developing professional careers, all employees must submit to performance evaluation each year to keep their positions. This serves to reduce the risk that poorly performing employees will retain their jobs for multiple years.

Promotions are based on an evaluation of work performance, technical capacity and expertise, and academic credentials. The evaluation system is divided into three parts. The first evaluates job performance and focuses on the quality of work reached on completed assignments or tasks. A second part focuses on performance and progress made within the Programa de Formación y Desarrollo, discussed above. The final part consists of a general evaluation, which combines the more specific evaluations just mentioned and an appraisal of objectives reached (or sanctions received) during the course of the year (Méndez Martínez 2001). Sanctions can result in loss of job. See Pardo (1999), Sánchez González (1999), and (Méndez Martínez 2001).

6.6.6 The Sistema de Administración Tributaria (SAT)

In 1997, the Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT) was created. This agency is a deconcentrated agency within the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público and is charged with collecting taxes, whether from citizens, internal and external commerce. The Ley del Servicio de Administración Tributaria, which established the SAT rules and regulations, also created the Servicio Fiscal de Carrera. The Servicio Fiscal de Carrera

has as its main objective to develop a corps of permanent, professional and specialized employees. The civil service professional career development program is intended only for nonunionized employees (Pardo 1999).

The Ley del Servicio de Administración Tributaria divides SAT employment into three types: career functionaries, freely appointed functionaries (patronage appointees or empleados de confianza), and base employees (empleados de base). Career employees include specialists and technicians who succeeded in meeting the new selection criteria. These may be former patronage appointees. The second, freely appointed functionaries, are patronage appointees working as specialists or technicians who can be appointed or removed at will. The final group includes unionized employees performing lower level tasks. Only the first group is considered career civil servants, though all categories are discussed in the Ley del Servicio de Administración Tributaria. Patronage appointees may become career civil servants (Vázquez Cano 2001).

To meet its objective of creating a professional and specialized body of employees, the SAT created the Secrteriado Técnico de la Comixión del Servicio Fiscal de Carrera, responsible for coordinating and designing the Servicio Fiscal de Carrera. To improve efficiency and professionalization among employees, the SAT promotes equality opportunities for entry into the system, promotion based on merit, specialization courses for all career positions, financial remuneration tied to productivity, obligatory professional development courses and seminars, and honesty and integrity among employees (Vázquez Cano 2001).

Incorporation into the Servicio Fiscal de Carrera is voluntary, with the objective of identifying public servants who have the knowledge, skills, and necessary characteristics for performing SAT jobs. Open contests are used to recruit possible candidates. A series of psychological and theoretical exams are used to evaluate each candidate's personalities and skills.

Upon entry, candidates are given individualized career development plans. These plans include, among other things, information about positions available on their career trajectories, and courses and accreditations required for professional advancement. Promotions are based on results obtained in competitive exams, evaluations of job performance, and completed coursework (Vázquez Cano 2001).

6.6.7 The Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)

In the 1990s, the Sistema de Evaluación de Efectividad Gerencial was created to manage the process of employee and agency professionalization. Within SEDESOL, the Dirección General de Estadística began using open competitions to fill positions. Also, competition for the post of Director General de Desarrollo Urbano was opened to

the public. Selection of candidates was made according to criteria established by SEDESOL's Comisión Interna de Administración y Programación (Uvalle Berrones 2000).

6.6.8 The Procuraduría General de la República (PGR)

The Instituto de Capacitación de la PGR began its activities in 1993. The Instituto was charged with designing a new process for selecting employees and determining job profiles. This led to the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (1996), which outlines all procedures for hiring, firing, promotions, and professional development (Mirón Reyes 2001; Pardo 1999). The Reglamento de Carrera del Ministerio Público Federal outlines all the rules and procedures governing the career civil service.

To supervise the development of the career civil service, the Ley Orgánica established the Consejo de Profesionalización del Ministerio Público de la Federación. The Dirección General de Organización y Control del Personal Ministerial, Policial y Pericial and its chief, who is also the Secretario Técnico del Consejo de Profesionalización del Ministerio Público de la Federación, oversee the day to day operation of the career civil service. Career civil service refers to agents in the Ministerio Público de la Federación and in the Policía Judicial Federal.

All job candidates are required to compete in open competitions. Once hired, employees must complete several courses, including course at the Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales. Regular evaluations determine promotion paths (Mirón Reyes 2001; Pardo 1999).

6.6.9 The Procuraduría Agraria

The professional agrarian service began in 1994, with the goal of developing a career civil service in this public agency. Career civil servants include those receiving grants or scholarships, employees still in an initial trial period, and other career employees. Promotion within the new system is based on completion of coursework and competitions (Pardo 1999; Sánchez González 1999).

6.6.10 The Secretaría de Gobernación

The Secretaría de Gobernación began the process of its internal professionalization with the creation of the Policía Federal Preventiva and within this body the establishment of the Sistema Integral del Servicio Civil de Carrera Policial.

The Sistema manages recruitment and selection of employees, tenure and promotions, and salary and other incentives. The Reglamento de la Policía Federal Preventiva states that this body has the following goals for professionalizing employment and

creating a career civil service: guarantee stable and secure employment, promote a sense of responsibility, efficiency, diligence, and honesty among employees, use a system of fair compensation and promotion to encourage long-term career employment, and encourage professional development to increase institutional loyalty (Uvalle Berrones 2000).

6.6.11 The National Judicial Branch

There has long been a system of education and professional development and promotion in this branch of government (Barragán and Roemer 2001).

6.6.12 The National Armed Forces

The Mexican armed forces have their own schools and system of education, as well as a system overseeing the professional development and promotion of its members (Barragán and Roemer 2001).

6.7 Evaluation of Civil Service Reform Attempts in Mexico

Although PROMAP and the USC drew up general guidelines for establishing a career civil service, disagreements with SECODAM over the basic organization of the civil service prevented the recommendations from being adopted more generally. As a result, no general civil service legislation was accepted by both agencies, and the public sector was not forced to adopt a civil service program. See Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault (2000) for a description of the points of disagreement between the two agencies. The decision to implement suggested civil service reforms was left to individual departments and public agencies. It is hardly surprising, however, that few chose to adopt such changes. The implementation of a civil service would reduce discretion over human and material resources that political leaders have traditionally enjoyed (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000).

Indeed, recent reports suggest that the majority of PROMAP's objectives were not achieved as well. The process for reaching consensus among public agencies and employees was slowed by inter-agency fighting and lack of bureaucratic interest in PROMAP's agenda. Proposed budgetary reforms, for example, required all public agencies to adopt new procedures. Few chose to implement suggested reform, leaving PROMAP's objectives largely unmet. It is hardly surprising that budgetary reform failed. Such large changes not only require major coordination efforts, they also require the support of employees. Few employees, however, had an interest in adhering new suggested practices, since they stood to reduce discretion over public expenditures. Measures meant to open state activities and spending to public view were ignored as well (Guerrero Amparán and Arellano Gault 2000). The implementation of any of these reforms would have meant jeopardizing an important political (and economic) tool.

Increasing the visibility of public agencies' procedures and policy performance would leave them open to public criticism.

Given the strong political motives behind lack of interest in implementing a career civil service, it is not surprising that all efforts to this end have been thwarted, either by public agencies, bureaucrats, or politicians. What is surprising, however, is that several public agencies have chosen to implement civil service reforms despite such obvious opposition. The newness of such reforms, however, means that it is still too soon to evaluate their merits or effectiveness. Even so, a few comments about such agencies are in order, though they should be taken as impressionistic rather than based on empirical observation.

First, the SRE has long been known for its effective civil service program, so its merits are not in doubt. Second, given their largely technical activities, the CNA, INEGI, IFE, and SAT have most likely implemented effective civil service programs, though they cover very few employees. The SEP's civil service program has not been effective. Since the powerful national teacher's union protects teachers and teachers' jobs, it has not been in its interest to allow civil service measures to truly take effect. The presence of unions thwarts the implementation of civil service measures among its members because the union retains control over hiring, promotion, and firing practices which should be monitored by civil service programs. Problems with corruption plague the police force in the PGR and SG, as well as the national armed forces, among so-called civil servants. The inherently political nature of SEDESOL's tasks, as well as those of the Procuraduría Agraria, make it unlikely that civil service reforms in these agencies have been or will be effective in the near term. It is possible that these agencies will overcome internal political agendas or endemic corruption and thus implement effective career civil services, but right now it is too soon to tell.

7. Construction of the Index

7.1. Efficiency

The resulting value is 4.38, with $(4.38 \times 20) / 9.23 = 9.49$ for the index.

7.2. Merit

The resulting value is 5.9, with $(5.9 \times 20) / 13 = 9.07$ for the index.

7.3. Structural Consistency

7.3.1 Strategic Coherence

The resulting value is 4.57, with $(4.57 \times 10) / 10 = 4.57$ for the subindex.

7.3.2 Management Consistency

The resulting value is 3.37, with $(3.37 \times 10) / 8.75 = 3.85$ for the subindex.

7.3.3 Consistency of Processes

The resulting value is 3.85, with $(3.85 \times 10) / 8.57 = 4.92$ for the subindex.

7.4. Functional Capacity

7.4.1 Competitiveness

The resulting value is 6.53, with $(6.53 \times 10) / 10.66 = 6.12$ for the subindex.

7.4.2 Effectiveness of Incentives

The resulting value is 4.71, with $(4.71 \times 10) / 9.64 = 4.88$ for the subindex.

7.4.3 Flexibility

The resulting value is 4.83, with $(4.83 \times 10) / 9.58 = 5.04$ for the subindex.

7.5. Integrative Capacity

The resulting value is 4.94, with $(4.94 \times 20) / 8.94 = 11.05$ for the index.

7.6 Analysis of Indices

Table 7.6.1 The Indices by Area

Area	Index
Efficiency	9.49
Merit	9.07
Structural Consistency	
Strategic Coherence	4.57
Management Consistency	3.85
Consistency of Processes	4.92
Functional Capacity	
Competitiveness	6.12
Effectiveness of Incentives	4.88
Flexibility	5.04
Integrative Capacity	11.05

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

It is difficult to make recommendations about the Mexican civil service as very few employees fall under such criteria. With this in mind, the most important recommendation is that a general civil service law must be enacted into law, which will force all public agencies to comply. To this end, support for a comprehensive civil service program must be built in Congress. Second, an independent body must be created to oversee the implementation of civil service norms. As it is, those bodies which have thus far been empowered to oversee such measures, that is, the SHCP and SECODAM, suffer from conflict of interests. As they themselves are struggling with civil service reforms, it is difficult to expect them to monitor other public agencies. Third, most patronage employees must be turned over to civil service programs. This should not be difficult as such employment makes job tenure insecure. As it is, the high turnover suffered with changes in political fortunes makes government in Mexico inefficient and costly. Finally, the vast public sector union must be made to conform to some sort of civil service practices, if only concerning promotions and firing. Though this is contrary to union incentives, as it is the union has little interest in eliminating redundant employees. To do so would mean losing members.

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