



Independent Country Program Review

# Jamaica 2016-2022

**Copyright © 2022 Inter-American Development Bank. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license**

(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode>) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.

Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.

Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.



**Inter-American Development Bank, 2022**

Office of Evaluation and Oversight  
1350 New York Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20577  
[www.iadb.org/evaluation](http://www.iadb.org/evaluation)

**RE-573**  
**October 2022**

**Independent Country Program Review**

# **Jamaica 2016-2022**

**Office of Evaluation and Oversight**





# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>vi</b>
<b>Acronyms and Abbreviations</b> .....	<b>vi</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>viii</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>01</b>
<b>Country Context</b> .....	<b>02</b>
A. Macroeconomic and fiscal situation .....	03
B. Productive development .....	04
C. Social development.....	05
D. Public sector and governance .....	07
<b>IDB Group Country Strategy</b> .....	<b>08</b>
<b>Program Alignment</b> .....	<b>14</b>
A. Country program.....	15
B. Program alignment with the strategic objectives .....	20
<b>Program Implementation</b> .....	<b>24</b>
A. Portfolio execution .....	25
B. Contribution to the strategic objectives.....	29
<b>Conclusions</b> .....	<b>40</b>
<b>References</b> .....	<b>44</b>

## [Annex](#)

### [Response by IDB and IDB Invest Management](#)

# Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by Odette Maciel and Jonathan Rose (co-team leaders), Anais Anderson, Luis Fernando Corrales, Henry Dyer, Andreia Barcellos and Ingrid Garay under the supervision of Ivory Yong (OVE Director) and Monika Huppi (Principal Advisor).

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>BoJ</b>	Bank of Jamaica
<b>CCB</b>	Country Department Caribbean Group
<b>CCF</b>	Contingent Credit Facility
<b>CCLIP</b>	Conditional Credit Line for Investment Projects
<b>CPE</b>	Country Program Evaluation
<b>CS</b>	Country strategy
<b>CSJP</b>	Citizen Security and Justice Program
<b>DBJ</b>	Development Bank of Jamaica
<b>EFF</b>	Extended Fund Facility
<b>FAMP</b>	Fiscal Administration Modernization Program
<b>FISPEG</b>	Fiscal Structural Program for Economic Growth
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GoJ</b>	Government of Jamaica
<b>ICPR</b>	Independent Country Program Review
<b>IDB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INV</b>	Investment loan
<b>ING</b>	Investment grant
<b>LAC</b>	Latin America and the Caribbean

<b>MSMEs</b>	Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises
<b>NCDs</b>	Non-communicable diseases
<b>NFIS</b>	National Financial Inclusion Strategy
<b>NIDS</b>	National Identification System
<b>NIRA</b>	National Identification and Registration Authority
<b>NSG</b>	Non-sovereign guaranteed (operation)
<b>NWC</b>	National Water Commission
<b>NYS</b>	National Youth Service
<b>OVE</b>	Office of Evaluation and Oversight
<b>PATH</b>	Programme of Advancement through Health and Education
<b>PEFA</b>	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
<b>PIOJ</b>	Planning Institute of Jamaica
<b>PBs</b>	Public bodies
<b>PBL</b>	Policy-based loan
<b>PBP</b>	Programmatic policy-based loan
<b>PCR</b>	Project completion report
<b>PEU</b>	Project executing unit
<b>PMR</b>	Progress monitoring report
<b>PPP</b>	Public-private partnership
<b>SBA</b>	Stand-By Arrangement

# Executive Summary

**Purpose.** This Independent Country Program Review (ICPR) analyzes the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Group's country strategy (CS) and country program with Jamaica during the 2016–2022 period. ICPRs assess the relevance of a CS, provide aggregate information on the alignment and execution of the corresponding country program and, data permitting, its contribution to strategic objectives (SOs) set in the CS. ICPRs are primarily addressed to the IDB Group's Boards of Executive Directors. They seek to provide the Boards with relevant information, otherwise not readily available to them, to inform their consideration of the upcoming CSs.

**Context.** Jamaica is an upper-middle income economy struggling with a high debt burden, low economic growth (an average growth rate of 0.6% between 2010 and 2019 and declining 10% in 2020 due to the pandemic), and significant exposure to external and nature-related shocks. In 2016, Jamaica signed a successor International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-By Arrangement, which finished in 2019 and resulted in significant decreases in the debt-to-GDP ratio (from 144% in 2012 to a historical low of 94% in 2019). While the country's economy is still vulnerable (in fact, due to its tourism-dependent structure, the economy has not fully recovered from the Covid-19 shock), the country is today in a much stronger position to accommodate shocks. Challenges do remain in the productive and social sectors, including limited access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), high prevalence of non-communicable disease (NCD), low quality of and inequitable access to secondary education, high energy costs, and crime, among others.

**Strategic objectives.** The 2016–2021 CS established 13 SOs in three overarching strategic areas: (i) improve public sector management, (ii) increase private sector productivity and growth, and (iii) reinforce human capital protection and development. In addition, three cross-cutting themes were identified: (1) crime; (2) resilience to climate shocks; and (3) gender equality. The SOs were relevant given the development challenges and government priorities, but some expected results of the CS's results matrix were too broadly defined or too ambitious, and some indicators had evaluability weaknesses. Overall, the SOs were overly widespread given a history of implementation challenges and the tight fiscal space. As to the recommendations made in the 2009–2014 Country Program Evaluation, there was substantial progress on two of them (focus policy-based lending on deepening



public finance reforms, and ensure the continuity of the CS and better justify overall Bank's lending -supported by debt sustainability analysis-), but there were challenges regarding appropriate sizing of new investment loans (given the limited fiscal space) and in terms of strengthening monitoring and evaluation of the CS outcomes. Finally, the CS anticipated macroeconomic, natural disasters, and execution risks (which materialized during the CS period); mitigation was to take place primarily through the Bank's operations.

**Program alignment.** During the 2016–2022 period, the Bank approved US\$898 million of sovereign-guaranteed (SG) operations; almost the same as in the previous period (2013–2015). The program was concentrated on policy-based lending. The share of budget support approvals remained almost the same in comparison with the previous period (around 65%). Policy-based loans (PBLs/PBPs) were to support policy measures to strengthen fiscal sustainability, public financial management, and financial and health sector performance. The number of approved non-sovereign guaranteed (NSG) operations remained the same as in the previous period, but their total approval amount decreased. The program was strongly aligned with nine of the 13 SOs, and weakly aligned with the four remaining objectives (diversification of the energy matrix, agriculture productivity, learning outcomes, and human capital accumulation). Most operations that neither aligned with the SOs nor the expected results of the CS were technical cooperations (TCs); several of them related to the cross-cutting themes of citizen security and resilience to climate shocks. After 2020, the IDB Group's support specific to Covid 19 was mainly provided through two PBLs focused on supporting the short-term response to the crisis while maintaining an emphasis on fiscal management. No new SG investment loans (INVs) were approved after 2020, given the limited availability of fiscal space for investment lending (tighter amid the pandemic) and the country's proactive debt-management stance. Finally, regarding the three cross-cutting themes, the program mainstreamed gender issues in 70% of the SG loans and grants, and resilience to climate change in a third of those operations. Challenges related to crime were covered by only 18% of the SG loans and investment grants.

**Program implementation and results.** Disbursements for SG operations totaled US\$901 million for the CS period, below the US\$912 estimated in the CS and an 18% decrease from the previous period. The difference in disbursements compared with the previous period comes from a reduction in the share of fast-disbursing instruments (PBLs/PBPs) in total disbursements (from 68% to 62%). In contrast, the share of investment operations increased from 28% of total disbursements to 34%, with the legacy portfolio playing an important role. NSG disbursements totaled US\$328.6 million, or an annual average of US\$49.9 million. This annual average was 22.6 times greater compared with the previous period. Among the drivers

of these disbursements were the use of the TFFP and legacy SLOs. One of these SLO supported the expansion of the Kingston Container Terminal, the largest infrastructure project supported by the IDB Group in Jamaica without a sovereign guarantee. Preparation times for INVs in Jamaica remained stable, but longer than those in the CCB region and the Bank's average. In turn, preparation and execution expenses increased for this instrument in the country. The main challenges for implementing investment projects in the CS period were the tight fiscal space, limited institutional capacity of project executing units, complex procurement processes, and low coordination among key stakeholders, which, in some cases, intensified in the wake of the 2020 crisis. In contrast, preparation times for PBLs/PBPs significantly decreased compared with the previous period.

The IDB Group's contributions to the SOs varied but were mostly limited. They were stronger for the SOs related to improving public sector management than for the SOs related to private sector productivity and human capital protection. In the strategic area of improving public sector management, there were substantial contributions to the fiscal sustainability objective that led to improvements in the debt-to-GDP ratio, central government deficit, and public bodies' balances. Also, substantial progress was achieved in outcomes connected to strengthening public financial management systems and reducing the central government wage bill. However, the IDB program made a limited contribution to increasing public sector efficiency, strengthening the quality of administrative records, and reducing government expenditure on electricity. In the area of private sector productivity and growth, the IDB and IDB Invest programs made a limited contribution to the SOs of improving the regulatory framework for doing business, facilitating access to finance for SMEs, and increasing agriculture productivity. During the CS period, there was no contribution to the expected result of the SO of diversification of the energy matrix, however, an NSG operation focused on expanding solar energy capacity was approved at the end of the period. Finally, in the strategic area of reinforcing human capital protection and development, the IDB program made a limited contribution to the three SOs. The program supported consumption and human capital accumulation through Jamaica's main cash transfer program (PATH), and contributed to reducing extreme poverty, but had limited contribution to increasing access of PATH beneficiaries to labor market opportunities, and there is no evidence of contribution to improving targeting and reducing leakages. The IDB program included some actions geared toward improving the public health systems with a focus on NCD, but their implementation is still in early stages. Similarly, there was limited contribution to improving skills and access to job opportunities for youth, and there is no evidence of improvements in learning outcomes. There was no contribution to improving secondary completion and enrollment rates for boys.





# 01

## Introduction

- 1.1 This Independent Country Program Review (ICPR) analyzes the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Group’s 2016–2021 country strategy (CS) with Jamaica and the associated country program.<sup>1</sup> ICPRs assess the relevance of the IDB Group’s CS and provide aggregate information on the program’s alignment and execution. If the available information allows it, ICPRs also report on progress toward achieving the objectives that the IDB Group established in the CS. This review by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) is intended to provide the Boards of Executive Directors of the IDB and IDB Invest with information useful for their consideration of the upcoming CS with Jamaica. As with Country Program Evaluations (CPEs), ICPRs are based on existing documentation on operations and supported by interviews with key members of the IDB Group. However, unlike CPEs, ICPRs do not involve any in-person missions and only a limited number of key country stakeholders are interviewed. The period covered by this ICPR is January 1, 2016, to July 31, 2022.
- 1.2 This ICPR includes six sections and annexes with supporting information. Following this introduction, Section II describes the country context and development challenges. Section III reviews the strategic objectives (SOs) of the 2016–2021 CS and its results matrix, as well as the findings of the implementation of previous CPE recommendations. Section IV assesses the CS relevance and the program’s alignment with CS SOs and expected results. Section V reviews the program’s implementation, the outcomes achieved, and their contribution to the SOs. Section VI presents conclusions.

---

<sup>1</sup> The CS was valid until November 2021 with a transition period until November 2022.



# 02

## Country Context

## A. Macroeconomic and fiscal situation

- 2.1 Jamaica is an upper-middle-income country that has experienced weak but stable economic growth over most of the CS period; economic activities remain concentrated in a few sectors, which are heavily reliant on external demand. In 2021,<sup>2</sup> its gross domestic product (GDP) was US\$13.6 billion, the second largest of the IDB Group's Country Department Caribbean Group (CCB) member countries, behind Trinidad and Tobago. Nevertheless, its real per capita income based on purchasing power parity was the lowest among the CCB countries (US\$10,026 in 2021). Jamaica's economic growth has been low over the past decade (2010–2019), averaging 0.6%<sup>3</sup> and declining 10% in 2020 due to the pandemic. In 2021, the economy grew 4.6%, not enough to recover from the previous year. Similarly, its exports declined sharply in 2020 (30%) but have rebounded partially since then (19%). The economy relies primarily on the services sector, which amounts to approximately 64% of GDP. In particular, Jamaica is heavily dependent on tourism (Mooney and Zegarra 2020), which accounted for 48.3% of export revenues in 2021 but remains below pre-pandemic levels. Additionally, Jamaica's traditional goods segment (aluminum, textiles, sugar, and bananas) suffered an important decline over the past decades.<sup>4</sup> Its dependence on tourism and traditional goods made Jamaica vulnerable to external economic shocks. Nevertheless, despite the deficit in the external balance of goods and services (18.8% of GDP in 2021), the positive inflows of remittances and foreign direct investment allowed the Bank of Jamaica (BoJ) to have sufficient reserves to cover 7.7 months of imports in 2021. As a result of external imbalances and a floating exchange rate regime, the currency experienced a devaluation of around 30% between 2015 and 2021, which hindered dollar-financed investments. Given the strong level of reserves, the BoJ has intervened in the foreign exchange market to contain further currency devaluations, but uncertainty about the future exchange rate trend remains. (Annex I)
- 2.2 Debt reduction and fiscal sustainability remained a centerpiece of Jamaica's economic policy framework; the country achieved important reductions in its debt-to-GDP ratio and is today in a much stronger position to absorb shocks. During the evaluation period, the country continued with significant efforts to reduce its debt burden and enhance its fiscal sustainability by implementing structural reforms based on the agreements initiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Box 1.1). In 2016, the government

---

2 The data in this section corresponds to 2021 or, otherwise, to the most recent year available.

3 This is compared with the 2.4% necessary to converge to its potential GDP (Scarlett 2021).

4 IDB (2021a). Alumina and bauxite export prices have declined sharply (IMF 2022b).

fulfilled its commitments under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) (World Bank 2017). In 2016, Jamaica signed a successor Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) that finished in 2019 and resulted in significant decreases in the debt-to-GDP and unemployment ratios. After the 2008 global recession, the country's debt-to-GDP ratio, at 144%, was one of the highest in the world. Jamaica has since consistently reduced this ratio and reached a historic low of 94.3% in 2019.<sup>5</sup> It has also increased its net international reserves while maintaining a primary surplus for over two decades. As a result of these efforts, the country has built buffers and is in a much stronger position to accommodate shocks. In addition, during the CS period, Jamaica had access to contingent financing as a means of financial protection to accommodate climate and natural hazard shocks. Finally, aiming to strengthen fiscal oversight, in 2021, the Parliament approved the creation of an independent fiscal council (IMF 2022a; Mooney, et al. 2018). Additionally, the BoJ has been working on the implementation of an inflation-targeting regime (IMF 2022).<sup>6</sup>

### *Box 2.1. IMF program in Jamaica promoting fiscal sustainability*

In 2019, Jamaica concluded its precautionary IMF SBA, having reduced its ratio of debt to GDP below 100%. Jamaica entered the CS evaluation period on track with the commitments for responsible fiscal management in the SBA (signed in 2016). This precautionary three-year SBA emphasized the need for acceleration of economic growth and of maintaining fiscal prudence. By the end 2019, the IMF's final review of the SBA stated that Jamaica had attained the institutionalization of fiscal discipline and completed the program. The IMF agreements put the emphasis on debt control and responsible fiscal management, although they also set structural benchmarks for instituting tax reform, modernizing the public sector, strengthening the financial sector, and fostering greater competitiveness.

During the period under review, the country continued making significant efforts to reduce its debt burden and enhance its fiscal sustainability by implementing structural reforms based on the agreements initiated with the IMF. Nevertheless, new fiscal challenges have arisen due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

*Source:* OVE (IMF 2019; IDB 2021b; IMF 2022a).

## **B. Productive development**

2.3 The country has faced productivity declines for decades and the overall business climate has remained unfavorable. Total factor productivity, labor productivity, and return on investment have been declining steadily (IDB, 2021a; IMF, 2022a). At the same time, structural factors, including low levels of human capital

5 The debt-to-GDP ratio was 144% in 2012. Since 2013, it passed from 138.75% to 108.1% in 2020. Jamaica's credit rating has improved after starting the program with the IMF in 2013 (Fitch Ratings 2022).

6 As a result, they announced an explicit target range of 4%–6% for inflation in 2017.



(particularly workers with skills in high-value-added sectors), weak infrastructure, burdensome business regulations<sup>7</sup> and trade procedures, low access to finance, high energy costs, weak competition regulation in the domestic market, and high competition from other countries with free trade agreements<sup>8</sup> have held back investment, productivity, and exports. Improving the business climate is critical to boosting investment (IMF 2022a; IFC 2022a).

- 2.4 The private sector exhibits a dual structure with a few large firms contributing the most to the GDP but accounting for less than a third of jobs and many micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) with limited access to finance. The few large firms are focused on tourism, finance, and agro-processing; the many MSMEs are mostly active in food services and agriculture. Most firms in Jamaica are young and highly dependent on imports (reflecting high production costs and limited innovation), and they have limited export activity (WB, 2010).<sup>9</sup> Only about a quarter of MSMEs have a bank loan or line of credit, and the great majority have limited access to digital financial services.
- 2.5 Longstanding underinvestment in capital projects has led to infrastructure shortfalls (specially in energy and logistics), which, in turn, have constrained growth. Access to electricity in Jamaica is above the regional average. Nevertheless, the sector presents important weaknesses such as high costs for energy due to reliance on outdated generators, high energy system losses (in part due to theft), and recurrent electricity outages (Mooney 2019: 16). Furthermore, underinvestment in capital projects related, in part, to fiscal constraints led, for example, to deficient road maintenance and, subsequently, to a worsening of road conditions (Mooney 2019: 16; Bollers et al. 2019). Jamaica's infrastructure ranked weaker than the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) average in the 2018 WB's Logistics Performance Index (WB, 2022a).<sup>10</sup>

## C. Social development

- 2.6 Unemployment and poverty continued their downward trend over most of the CS period but were negatively affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. After the 2008 global recession, unemployment in

7 While the Ease of Doing Business Index showed improvements between 2016 and 2020 (67.27 to 69.7, where 100 is the maximum), Jamaica's relative position decreased (WB; 2016, 2020).

8 Such as the Dominican Republic and Central America free trade agreements and the United States-Mexico-Canada agreement.

9 Only 16% of formal firms were involved in exports (IFC, 2022a).

10 Weak infrastructure is a binding constraint to export development (IMF, 2022c) and sustainable growth (IDB, 2020).

Jamaica increased from 11% in 2009 to 15.3% in 2013. After that, unemployment steadily improved, resulting in a historic low rate of 7.7% in 2019. With the pandemic shock, unemployment quickly rose to 12.6% in the second quarter of 2020, hitting the hospitality and tourism sector particularly hard. Indicators are already showing signs of a rebound: unemployment receded to 9.2% by the end of 2021 (WB 2022b; IMF 2022a). Similarly, the poverty rate (based on the national poverty line) decreased from 24.6% in 2013 to 19.4% by 2016 and 11% by 2019, the lowest level in over a decade (although still above the poverty level of 8.8% in 2008). But the pandemic reversed this trend by 2020.<sup>11</sup> Finally, an increase in inflation rates has particularly affected lower-income households.<sup>12</sup>

2.7 High non-communicable disease (NCD) prevalence remains an important public health problem in Jamaica, and in education, challenges in the quality and equitable access to the secondary level persisted. Jamaica is undergoing demographic changes, with a decline in the 0-14 age group and an important increase in the older age groups (50 years and over). While the infant mortality rate has declined,<sup>13</sup> the country faces rising rates of NCDs, which are the leading cause of death and morbidity in the country, responsible for 70% of deaths in 2017, with diabetes, cancer and cardiovascular diseases the most prevalent causes (WHO 2018; PAHO 2016). Additionally, around 2016, insect vector diseases (e.g., chikungunya, Zika, dengue) surged in Jamaica (as in other countries). Finally, the pandemic has imposed additional challenges on the country's health system with the disruption of some regular health-care services and one of the highest vaccine hesitancy levels in the LAC region.<sup>14</sup> In education, Jamaica has practically achieved universal student enrollment from early childhood through the primary levels (up to grade 9) (UNICEF 2022).<sup>15</sup> However, challenges remain in terms of quality (teaching and learning) at all educational levels, and in enrollment and equitable access at the higher levels of secondary and tertiary education (WB and UNICEF 2021).

2.8 Violence and crime remain a serious problem for Jamaica. Although the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants decreased in Jamaica during the CS period (from 46.6 in 2016 to 44.9 in 2020), the homicide rate in Jamaica is the highest of the LAC

---

11 According to the WB (2022b), the poverty rate increased to 23% in 2020 and was down to 18% in 2021.

12 WB (2022b). Inflation exceeded its 4%-6% target by the end of 2021 (IMF 2022a).

13 The mortality rate for children under 5 declined from 30.4 in 1990 to 13.3 in 2020. (WB 2022a).

14 By July 2022, around 24% of Jamaica's population had received two vaccination doses (WHO 2022).

15 While, on average, children complete 11.7 years of schooling, those are equivalent to only 7.2 years of learning when benchmarking against top-performing systems.

region, one of the highest in the world, and at least three times the Caribbean average. Young males are the main victims of murders, and, at the same time, the country has one of the highest femicide rates globally. Violence imposes severe costs on society, as it hinders business development and growth; in Jamaica, it has led to annual reductions to GDP of between 3% and 4%, according to different estimates (UNODC 2022; Jaitman and Torres 2017).

- 2.9 As an island country, Jamaica is highly vulnerable to natural disasters caused by sea level rise, hurricanes, floods, and droughts, which are becoming more common as a result of climate change. During the past decade, the country suffered hurricanes and floods that caused deaths and severe damages in goods and services. Given that 82% of Jamaica's population lives within 5 km of the coast and that 70% of industries are situated in the coastal zone, effective coastal zone boundary management is of high importance. Nevertheless, the country presents low adaptive capacity to face the challenges of climate change (WB 2022c).

## D. Public sector and governance

- 2.10 Public sector management remains a challenge, but the government is undertaking reforms to tackle some inefficiencies. The perception of government effectiveness in Jamaica showed improvements since 2013, but its latest value (0.41 points in 2020) shows a deceleration (Annex I).<sup>16</sup> In addition, Jamaica's public sector wage bill is among the highest in LAC.<sup>17</sup> An ongoing public sector compensation review aims at rationalizing public sector salary scales and streamlining existing allowances. At the same time, this reform seeks to attract talent to the public sector by reducing wage gaps with the private sector.<sup>18</sup> In addition, since 2010, the government has cut the number of public bodies (PBs) from 190 to 160.<sup>19</sup> Finally, in 2020, Jamaica was added to the Financial Action Task Force grey list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (IDB and OECD 2019; CFAFT 2021).<sup>20</sup>

16 Kaufmann and Kraay (2022) and WB-Worldwide Governance Indicators.

17 It accounted for 11.4% of GDP in FY 2019/20 (IMF, 2022a) and decreased to 9.6% in 2021/22.

18 IMF (2022b), JIS (2019) and interviews.

19 Alfonso et al. (2013). This has generated savings of around JM\$1 billion (JIS 2019).

20 The 2021 CFATF report identified progress in some areas such as politically exposed people and combating terrorism financing.



# 03

## IDB Group Country Strategy

3.1 The 2016–2021 CS established 13 SOs in three strategic areas. The CS aimed at supporting the government’s development agenda by addressing constraints to economic growth and contributing to poverty reduction with a focus on three overarching strategic areas: (i) improve public sector management; (ii) increase private sector productivity and growth; and (iii) reinforce human capital protection and development. The 13 SOs and their 22 expected results are listed in Table 3.1. The CS also included three cross-cutting themes: crime reduction, resilience to climate shocks, and gender equality. Although the CS period ended in November 2021, it remains valid during a transition period of 12 months until November 2022, when a new CS is expected to be approved by the Board of Executive Directors.

**Table 3.1. Strategic objectives (SOs) and expected results of the 2016–2021 CS**

Strategic objectives	Expected results <sup>(a)</sup>
<b>Strategic area 1: Improve public sector management</b>	
1.1 Attain fiscal sustainability in the medium term	Reduced central government deficit
	Positive public entities balance
	Reduced public and publicly guaranteed debt in relation to GDP
1.2 Strengthen public financial management system	Increased predictability of budget
1.3 Reduce central government wage bill as a percentage of GDP	Reduced wage bill as a percentage of GDP
1.4 Increase efficiency of public sector	Increased public sector effectiveness
1.5 Strengthen the quality of administrative records	Increased the % of population covered under the national identification system
1.6 Reduce government expenditure on electricity utility bills	Reduced electricity consumption (GWh) in public facilities (particularly hospitals & schools)
<b>Strategic area 2: Increase private sector productivity and growth</b>	
2.1 Improve the regulatory framework for doing business	Shortened distance to the frontier (DTF) – Doing Business
2.2 Facilitate access to finance for SMEs	Increased access to credit for SMEs
2.3 Increase the security of supply and diversification of the energy matrix	Increased share of renewable energy and natural gas in the energy matrix
2.4. Increase agriculture productivity	Increased labor force productivity in agriculture and accelerated agriculture sector growth rate
<b>Strategic area 3: Reinforce human capital protection and development</b>	
3.1 Improve the public health system	Increased usage of primary care facilities
	Reduced disability-adjusted life years lost due to NCDs
	Reduced prevalence of adult risk factors
3.3 Support consumption, protect and promote the human capital accumulation of the poor and vulnerable	Improved Grade 4 proficiency in numeracy
	Improved Grade 4 proficiency in literacy
	Increased lower secondary completion rates and upper secondary enrollment rates for boys
	Lower percentage of youth (14–24 years old) that does not work or study

Strategic objectives	Expected results <sup>(a)</sup>
3.3 Support consumption, protect and promote the human capital accumulation of the poor and vulnerable	Increased efficiency and effectiveness of PATH through improved targeting (target poor) and reduction of leakages (nonpoor receiving benefits).
	Increased access to PATH labor market programs
	Reduction in the extreme poverty rate of PATH beneficiaries

Source: 2016–2021 CS (document [RE-2868](#)).

Note: <sup>(a)</sup>In other ICPRs this is referred to as “expected outcomes.”

3.2 The SOs were aligned with the country’s development challenges as well as with the government’s priorities, but they were overly widespread given a history of implementation challenges and tight fiscal space for investment lending. To formulate the CS, the IDB Group prepared a Country Development Challenges document based on a growth diagnostic, which concluded that the most binding constraint on Jamaica’s economic growth was the macroeconomic instability derived from fiscal imbalances. As such, the document highlighted the importance of promoting macroeconomic stability, fiscal consolidation, and debt reduction. The analysis also identified challenges related to poor public sector service delivery, low access to finance for MSMEs, expensive energy, and low productivity in the agricultural sector. In addition, while the document highlighted steady progress in key aspects of social development, it also emphasized remaining challenges in terms of poverty, equitable access to quality health care (focused on NCD), and education. Finally, it mentioned three cross-cutting themes that needed to be tackled: high crime and violence rates, vulnerability to climate shocks, and gender inequality issues. Other development partners working in the country concurred with this diagnostic (Annex II, Box I.2.1).<sup>21</sup> The government’s priorities were reflected in two medium-term policy frameworks (2015–2018 and 2018–2021) under the framework of a long-term plan, “Vision 2030”. Those strategies also addressed challenges related to macroeconomic stability (including fiscal consolidation and debt management), among others. There was continuity, with respect to the CS 2013–2014, in the three strategic areas and in most of the SOs.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, the IDB Group proposed working on health, agriculture productivity, and energy, thus broadening the scope.<sup>23</sup> The SOs selected in the CS generally met Jamaica’s key development needs and were aligned with both the government’s

21 IMF and the WB, particularly concurred on safeguarding macroeconomic stability and on fiscal management. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) highlighted social protection, crime, etc.

22 In the 2013–2014 CS, “safety and security” was a specific SO.

23 Energy and agriculture were areas of dialogue in the 2013–2014 CS.

priorities and the objectives of the Bank’s Institutional Strategy.<sup>24</sup> Notwithstanding, the CS scope was rather broad, given the persistent implementation challenges and the tight fiscal space (identified, since the previous CPE, as hindering factors for the scope of investment lending).

- 3.3 In general, the vertical logic of the CS was adequate, although some expected results were too broad or too ambitious and, in some cases, their associated indicators had evaluability weaknesses. (Annex II, Table I.2.2). The SOs, expected results, and actions proposed by the CS show an adequate chain of causality. In some cases, the objective and expected result defined were too broad (objective 1.4 to “increase public sector effectiveness”)<sup>25</sup> or too ambitious to be achieved during the strategy period (“accelerate the agriculture sector growth rate”, related to objective 2.4). The results matrix of the CS included 30 indicators, but the progress on only 22 of them was later successfully tracked as planned.<sup>26</sup> In addition, OVE used proxy indicators and complementary indicators that made it possible to assess changes during the period in some areas, but in other cases (seven), there was no comparable (or readily available)<sup>27</sup> data to enable conclusions to be made on progress in the corresponding expected result (Annex II, Table I.2.2).
- 3.4 As to the recommendations made in the 2009–2014 CPE, OVE identified substantial progress on two of the four recommendations endorsed by the Board of Executive Directors. Between 2016 and 2022, substantial progress was made on two recommendations: focusing policy-based loans (PBLs) and programmatic policy-based loans (PBPs) on deepening public finance reforms, including aspects of fiscal responsibility, tax policy, and efficiency of public spending; and ensuring the continuity of the CS and better justifying overall Bank’s lending (supported by debt sustainability analysis). Regarding the third recommendation—ensuring appropriate sizing of new investment loans (INVs)—limited fiscal space continued to be a challenge for the execution of the IDB portfolio during the CS period. Finally,

24 The Institutional Strategy of the IDB Group was adopted in 2010. It has been updated twice (in 2015 and in 2019). (*Second Update to the Institutional Strategy*, document [AB-3190-2](#)).

25 In addition, objective 1.4 aimed to “increase efficiency of public sector,” but its expected result was defined in terms of effectiveness. While these concepts can be related, they are different. While the breadth allows alignment with a larger number of operations, the lack of specificity limits the orientation of operations and outcomes.

26 Within these 22, two indicators were rightfully adjusted after 2016 to match the definition in Jamaica’s 2017 MSME policy, and another indicator (discontinued in 2021 by the WB) was complemented by Management with another that provided more updated information on the sector.

27 OVE identified restrictions in the availability of data, inconsistencies between baseline indicators and endline indicators, and outdated values. In one case (“number of PATH beneficiaries that join a school-to-work program”), the indicator refers to progress on outputs rather than outcomes.



with respect to strengthening monitoring and evaluation of the CS outcomes, OVE identified evaluability weaknesses in the CS results matrix (paragraph 3.3) and, at the project level, there were challenges in terms of evaluability, tracking, and reporting outcomes. Nevertheless, OVE identified specific efforts around evaluation and generation of evidence at the sector level (e.g., in education, social protection, and citizen security) (Annex III).

3.5 The CS anticipated macroeconomic, natural disasters, and execution risks (which materialized during the CS period); mitigation was to take place primarily through the Bank's operations. With respect to macroeconomics, the expected risk was that the country would be affected by unforeseen economic shocks derived from its vulnerabilities as a small, open island economy (with exports concentration and remittances dependent on labor market conditions in other countries) that would trigger debt increases. To mitigate this risk, the CS proposed monitoring the country's macroeconomic performance and supporting corrective measures when needed, as well as supporting key areas for macroeconomic stability. Objectives and expected results in the CS strategic area 1 focused on strengthening Jamaica's ability to face shocks. In terms of *natural disaster* risks that could have significant fiscal impacts,<sup>28</sup> the CS proposed including them as a cross-cutting theme as a mitigation measure. *Execution* risks focused on staff turnover and the impact of resulting institutional weakness on the SOs. To mitigate this risk, the CS proposed strengthening the capacity of project executing units (PEUs), conducting assessments of loans that were not meeting milestones with an aim of reformulating or canceling operations that no longer met the original development objectives, and strengthening the collaborative oversight of the portfolio jointly with the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). The Bank carried out institutional capacity assessments of some PEUs (showing medium to satisfactory ratings for executing IDB-funded projects) (Annex VIII, Table I.8.6), as well as periodic portfolio analyses. The Bank also provided trainings to PEUs in results-based management, procurement, and fiduciary topics, among others, but the limited capacity of PEUs continued to negatively impact project implementation (paragraph 5.6). No loans were canceled but some were reformulated during the CS period.<sup>29</sup>

---

28 In 2016 and 2021, the Meteorological Service of Jamaica issued temporary tropical storm warnings for the island due to Hurricanes Matthew and Elsa, respectively.

29 The most recent IDB loan cancellation with Jamaica was at the end of 2015. The IDB also supported, to varying extents, institutional strengthening activities at the sector level (Annex VIII, Table I.8.6).







# 04

## Program Alignment

4.1 The Bank's support for Jamaica's fiscal sustainability reform was well coordinated with that of the IMF; IDB collaboration in the country also extended to bilateral partners in various sectors. The Bank's support for Jamaica's fiscal sustainability reform was well coordinated with that of the IMF under the EFF and the successor SBA, which finished in 2019; and for which the Bank was recognized as a trusted partner by the GoJ. Other sources of finance in the country were the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the CDB; but collaboration with them has been more limited. In turn, IDB collaboration in Jamaica extended to bilateral partners, including co-financing projects in various sectors (e.g., fiscal sustainability and debt management, health, energy, and citizen security) with the European Union; Japan International Cooperation Agency; the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development of Canada; the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom; and China (Annex IV).

## A. Country program

4.2 The country program consisted of 103 sovereign-guaranteed (SG) operations and six non-sovereign-guaranteed (NSG) operations. The program comprises all operations approved between January 1, 2016, and July 31, 2022<sup>30</sup> (75 SG and 3 NSG) and legacy operations (28 SG and 3 NSG) from previous periods (i.e., inherited operations approved before 2016 but which still had undisbursed balances as of January 1, 2016). Additionally, the NSG portfolio includes those operations that had to have an expanded supervision report (XSR) during the 2016–2022 period. Annex V lists the operations.

4.3 SG approvals between January 2016 and July 2022 were US\$898.2 million, with average annual approvals decreasing compared with those of the previous period (2013–2015).<sup>31</sup> Between January 2016, and July 2022, the Bank approved US\$878.1 million in seven PBLs/PBPs and 11 investment operations (Figure 4.1).<sup>32</sup> In addition, 55 technical cooperation operations (TCs) were approved, with a total value of US\$20.1 million.<sup>33</sup> The average annual amount of

---

<sup>30</sup> The CS was valid until November 2021 with a transition period until November 2022.

<sup>31</sup> OVE's previous CPE covered mid-2009 to 2014; there was no specific evaluation of the 2013–2014 CS, which was extended until mid-2016. In this ICPR, OVE is considering the period of January 2013 to December 2015 (36 months: 3 years), as the comparison period and January 2016 to July 2022 (79 months: 6.58 years) as the analyzed period.


<sup>32</sup> Investment operations included eight INVs and three investment grants (IGRs). The US\$878.1 million is composed of: seven PBLs/PBPs (US\$585 million) and 11 investment operations (US\$293.1 million).

<sup>33</sup> Although the yearly average number of SG approved operations of the 2016–2022 period increased by 11% compared with the 2013–2015 period (on average, 11 SG operations vs. 10 SG operations), the annual approvals (i.e., average amount) of the 2016–2022 period decreased by 11% compared with the 2013–2015 period (Annex V, Table I.5.2).

approvals between 2016 and 2022 (US\$136.5 million) decreased by 11% compared with average between 2013 and 2015, and was below the estimated lending framework for the 2016–2021 CS (\$159 million per year).<sup>34</sup> During the period, the Bank also approved one Contingent Credit Facility (CCF) for Natural Disaster Emergencies, which so far has not been needed,<sup>35</sup> and one Conditional Credit Line for Investment Projects (CCLIP).<sup>36</sup> While the Bank’s program comprised a variety of instruments spanning several sectors, the focus of the IDB Group’s program remained primarily on public sector management, especially fiscal policy, which was appropriate given the priorities of the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) and development challenges (Table 4.1; Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1**  
2013–2022 SG approvals by instrument type

Source: OVE with data from IDB (2022).



Note: TCs are not included.

4.4 Although the IDB Group had envisioned more support for the private sector, the number of approved NSG operations in the CS period remained the same as in the previous period, but their amounts decreased. The CS did not estimate a financing framework for NSG operations, but the strategy expected NSG approvals to increase as a result of the improved macroeconomic stability and economic recovery after the 2008 crisis. As during the prior period, IDB Invest’s operations mostly consisted of senior loans (SLOs) for local financial intermediaries or corporate financing. Since 2016, IDB Invest has approved two SLOs<sup>37</sup> and had operations under its Trade Finance Facilitation Program

34 The indicative lending framework estimated total approvals for SG operations of US\$954 million for the 2016–2021 period (i.e., the estimate from January 2016) (Annex IV of the CS).

35 The CCF is a parametric instrument that is triggered in accordance with the criteria outlined when the facility was approved.

36 JA-O0010 is the first CCLIP approved in the Caribbean region.

37 One was in the financial markets sector and the other in the energy sector.

(TFFP). Average annual NSG approvals decreased by 40% when compared with the previous period (from US\$61 million to US\$36.5 million)<sup>38</sup> (Annex V, Table I.5.3).

- 4.5 In addition to new approvals, the program also included SG and NSG legacy operations with an undisbursed balance of US\$451.32 million at the beginning of the period. Regarding SG legacy operations, the program included 13 investment operations, US\$237.2 million of which were pending disbursement, and 15 TCs.<sup>39</sup> Regarding the NSG legacy portfolio, the program included two SLOs<sup>40</sup> (approved in 2015) that had undisbursed balance at the beginning of the CS period. An SLO for US\$3.5 million that prepared an XSR during the CS period was also considered in this review.
- 4.6 The Bank continued to use a variety of instruments to adapt to the country's needs for the period, with SG lending skewed toward PBLs/PBPs and with a focus on public sector management, especially fiscal policy (Table 4.1; Annex V.B). The share of budget support approvals remained almost the same as in the previous period (around 65%) in line with the CS's aim of continuing to support structural reforms in the country, the limited availability of fiscal space for investment lending, and the country's proactive debt-management stance.<sup>41</sup> The seven PBL/PBP operations comprised: a two-tranche PBL (completed) focused on public sector transformation (strategic area 1); and four programmatic PBLs (PBPs) that were part of three programmatic series: (i) a fiscal structural program (completed) (strategic area 1), (ii) a financial system reform support program (series not completed yet) (strategic area 2), and (iii) a health systems strengthening program (completed) (strategic area 3). Most of them, in turn, were complemented by INVs that are mostly still in execution, TCs, and investment grants (IGRs). In fact, the PBL JA-L1078 (public sector) and PBP JA-L1080 (health) were designed as hybrid operations, each paired with an INV aimed at financing the implementation and consolidation of policy measures. The health program was complemented by an IGR focused on upgrading primary health care facilities. Most of the policy conditions of the PBLs/PBPs approved in strategic area 1 were either of high

38 In addition, four regional NSG operations (13079-01, 13186-01, 11911-01 and 13659-01) are analyzed given that they are Jamaica-specific operations approved under a regional umbrella and are related to SME growth and Covid-19 liquidity facilities (Annex VI-Box I.6.1; Annex V.C). Interviews suggest that the currency devaluation affected credit demand (Section II; Annex I).

39 Out of which US\$220.2 million corresponded to INV, and US\$17 million to IGR. The three main sectors of the SG portfolio with undisbursed balances are social investment (US\$97 million out of US\$136.1 million approved), water and sanitation (US\$72.9 million out of US\$134.6 million), and reform and modernization of the State (US\$68.6 million out of US\$98.6 million).

40 One was in the sustainable tourism sector and the other in the transport sector.

41 In interviews, GoJ representatives indicated their preference to use PBLs/PBPs.

or medium structural depth. Most of the policy conditions of the health and the financial system reform PBP were of low structural depth (the second PBP of the financial system series has not been approved, which limited the contribution of the program) (Annex X). Finally, two IDB prototype PBLs to address the pandemic (Covid-19 prototypes), with a strong focus on fiscal management, were approved in 2021 and 2022 (Annex VI-Box I.6.1). Since the pandemic's onset in 2020, no new SG INV has been approved, and there were no SG operations with objectives or components formally adjusted in response to the pandemic.

- 4.7 Annual TC approvals increased compared with the previous period and were mostly for client support, but a growing number of TCs were for operational support. On average, during the CS period, 8 TCs were approved per year with an annual value of US\$3.1 million, compared with 6 and US\$13.6 million in the previous period. While there was an increase in the number of TCs, the average approved amount decreased. This larger amount in the previous period, however, is explained by a single TC.<sup>42</sup> During the entire CS period, 55 TCs were approved (US\$20.1 million), 40 (73%) of which were for client support. While in the previous period there were no operational support TCs, during the CS period, there were 13 of this type. Most of them (5) aimed at supporting operations in the strategic area of reinforcing human capital, and 4 aimed at improving public sector management (Annex V, Table I.5.12). Additionally, only 2 research and dissemination TCs were approved during the CS period. Finally, there were no specific TCs to advance the use of country systems and, overall, there was only moderate progress in this matter during the CS period (Annex II, Table I.2.3).<sup>43</sup>

---

42 One legacy client support TC (JA-X1008, US\$35.1 million) related to a legacy INV focused on citizen security, accounted for 86% of all TC approvals in the 2013–2015 period. Crime was a specific objective in the CS of that period.

43 Two TCs financed capacity building at the Auditor General's Department (JA-T1078) and assisted in the implementation of an e-procurement system (JA-T1063). Furthermore, two loans included some interventions to strengthen the central treasury (JA-L1039) and capacity of external and internal auditors and procurement (JA-L1046).

Table 4.1. SG and NSG country program by alignment with strategic objectives

Strategic objective <sup>(a)</sup> <sup>(b)</sup>	Concept	Legacy (balance to be disbursed)			Approvals			Total
		2016-2022						
		SG	NSG	TC	SG	NSG	TC	
<b>Strategic area 1. Improve public sector management (US\$666.1 million)</b>								
1.1 Attain fiscal sustainability in the medium term (S)	Operations #	1	0	1	4	0	1	7
	Amount (US\$M)	38.8	0	0.2	225	0	0.1	264.1
1.2 Strengthen public financial management system (S)	Operations #	2	0	0	3	0	1	6
	Amount (US\$M)	29.5	0	0	100	0	0.1	129.6
1.3 Reduce central government wage bill as a % of GDP (S)	Operations #	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
	Amount (US\$M)	29.5	0	0	50	0	0	79.5
1.4 Increase efficiency of public sector (S)	Operations #	3	0	3	2	0	10	18
	Amount (US\$M)	102	0	0.5	160	0	3.6	266.1
1.5 Strengthen the quality of administrative records (S)	Operations #	0	0	1	2	0	2	5
	Amount (US\$M)	0	0	0.2	178	0	0.9	179.1
1.6 Reduce government expenditure on electricity utility bills (S)	Operations #	1	0	0	2	0	3	6
	Amount (US\$M)	72.5	0	0	25	0	0.8	98.3
<b>Strategic area 2. Increase private sector productivity and growth (US\$522 million)</b>								
2.1 Improve the regulatory framework for doing business (S)	Operations #	0	0	0	2	0	7	9
	Amount (US\$M)	0	0	0	115	0	2	117
2.2 Facilitate access to finance for SMEs (S)	Operations #	2	0	0	5	2	4	13
	Amount (US\$M)	17.8	0	0	153.7	227.1	1.4	400
2.3 Increase the security of supply and diversification of the energy matrix (W)	Operations #	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
	Amount (US\$M)	0	0	0	0	13.3	0.5	13.8
2.4 Increase agriculture productivity (W)	Operations #	1	0	0	0	0	5	6
	Amount (US\$M)	5.4	0	0	0	0	1.1	6.5
<b>Strategic area 3. Reinforce human capital protection and development (US\$286.7 million)</b>								
3.1 Improve the public health system (S)	Operations #	0	0	2	4	0	6	12
	Amount (US\$M)	0	0	0.4	211.4		2.1	213.9
3.2 Improve learning outcomes (W)	Operations #	2	0	2	1	0	5	10
	Amount (US\$M)	1.2	0	1.1	15	0	1.4	18.7
3.3 Support consumption, protect and promote human capital accumulation of the poor and vulnerable (W)	Operations #	2	0	1	0	0	0	3
	Amount (US\$M)	54	0	0.1	0	0	0	54.1
<b>Nonaligned to strategic objectives (US\$257.2 million)</b>								
Nonaligned	Operations #	2	3(c)	5	1	0	14	25
	Amount (US\$M)	17.9	182.5	29.1	20	0	6.9	256.4

Source: OVE, with data from IDB Group-Datwarehouse (retrieved in 2022).

Notes: <sup>(a)</sup> Some operations were aligned with more than one SO, in which case such operations and their corresponding amounts are counted for each of those objectives. However, in the grand total, those are only counted once. CCLIP and CCF operations are counted in the number of operations in the respective SO to which they are aligned (objective 2.2 for the CCLIP and objectives 1.1 and 1.2 for the CCF), but their approved amount is not included in the table.

<sup>(b)</sup> (S) indicates strong alignment, (W) indicates weak alignment.

<sup>(c)</sup> This shows NSG operations that were included for having prepared an XSR during the period but had already finished disbursing in 2016 and, therefore, their amount is zero.

## **B. Program alignment with the strategic objectives**

- 4.8 The program was strongly aligned with nine of the 13 SOs but weakly aligned with the remaining four.<sup>44</sup> The program alignment was strong with all the objectives (and their expected results) of the strategic area of improving public sector management, but there were alignment gaps with some objectives (and their expected results) in the areas of reinforcing human capital and development and private sector productivity and growth. Table 4.1 groups the program's operations based on the SOs with which they were aligned.
- 4.9 The program was strongly aligned with the SOs and their expected results in the strategic area of improving public sector management. The program covered all six CS objectives of this strategic area through a mix of instruments (representing, approximately, 48% of the SG portfolio active in the country during the CS) (Table 4.1). Overall, the policy conditions supported in four PBLs as well as the components and expected results of the INV focused on supporting the government's efforts to achieve a sustainable fiscal path and on strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector and public financial management. The legacy portfolio (JA-L1039 and JA-L1046) focused on strengthening the GoJ's institutional capacity to improve fiscal sustainability and public financial management. JA-L1055 (third tranche PBP approved in 2016), focused on continuing previous efforts<sup>45</sup> to enhance the control of budgetary expenditures. In addition, the hybrid program (JA-L1078 and JA-L1073) focused on improving efficiency in the delivery of public services, and JA-L1072 was approved to strengthen the quality of administrative records (in particular, the National Identification System -NIDS-). In addition, two PBLs (JA-L1087 and JA-L1088) approved in response to the Covid-19 pandemic aimed at supporting the GoJ's response to the health and economic crisis caused by the pandemic (Covid-19 response prototypes) (Annex VI, Box I.6.1); at the same time, both operations maintained a strong focus on fiscal responsibility and fiscal recovery in the post-pandemic period. Finally, JA-L1056/JA-G1003 focused on promoting energy efficiency in government facilities (Annex VI).
- 4.10 In the strategic area of private sector productivity and growth, the program was strongly aligned with two of the four SOs and their expected results: facilitating access to finance for SMEs

---

44 In this ICPR, alignment is classified as "strong" when the program deployed relevant operations to contribute to all the expected results under the SO (coverage) and when it is plausible that these operations, if implemented correctly, will contribute to achieving the SO through progress on their expected results (feasibility). See details in Annex VI.

45 The two other PBPs in the series that were approved before the CS period.



and improving the regulatory framework for doing business. The objective and expected result of increasing access to credit for SMEs were covered with a mix of SG and NSG operations. The PBP JA-L1058 included policy conditions oriented toward enhancing SMEs access to finance, while JA-O0010, JA-L1085 and JA-G1006 (CCLIP, INV and IGR, respectively) focused on fostering productivity among start-ups and SMEs through access to finance and funding for innovation. IDB Invest maintained its presence with an SLO to finance a commercial bank to support its small and medium-sized portfolio, and a TFFP program focused on supporting foreign trade operations of a commercial bank.<sup>46</sup> For the objective of improving the regulatory framework for doing business (and its expected result of shortening the distance to the frontier), the program consisted of the PBP JA-L1058, which included policy conditions aimed at improving the regulatory framework of the financial system and an INV JA-L1079 which included activities to optimize the institutional and regulatory framework of the global services sector to adapt to digital services. Finally, various TCs were aligned with both objectives (Annex VI).

- 4.11 The program was weakly aligned with two objectives: diversification of the energy matrix and agriculture productivity. The program weakly covered the objective of increasing the security of supply and diversification of the energy matrix with one NSG SLO (13385-01), one NSG regional operation (13079-01) and one TC. While the SLO was designed to substantially increase installed solar capacity, it was only approved in 2021 and could thus not be expected to contribute to the expected result during the CS period. No SG loans were approved to increase alternative energy production. The SO of increasing agriculture productivity and its associated expected results were also weakly covered with a legacy loan (JA-L1012). The CS's support for agriculture was explicitly framed in terms of modernization of the regulatory framework, investment in critical infrastructure such as roads and irrigation services, research, and incorporation of innovation and technology in nontraditional value chains. The loan's design was modified after approval with a focus on agro-parks, in the context of the country's fiscal adjustment program with the IMF; this shift in emphasis rendered it less relevant to the related CS objective. No SG loans directly linked to this objective were approved during the CS period (Annex VI).<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> In addition, two regional NSG operations (13079-01 and 13186-01) related to SME growth in Jamaica were aligned with this objective (Annex V- Box I.5.1).

<sup>47</sup> In addition, in 2021, IDB Invest approved two regional Covid-19 liquidity facilities focused on Jamaica, aimed at mitigating financial constraints, and supporting the liquidity of SMEs and tourism firms (some of the sectors hit hardest by the shock) (Annex VI-Box I.6.1).

4.12 In the strategic area of reinforcing human capital and development, the program was strongly aligned with one of the three objectives and its expected results: improving the public health system. Two PBPs, one INV and an IGR were approved during the CS period with a focus on improving the public health system. The portfolio was complemented with TCs oriented to support strategic planning to manage chronic diseases in primary and secondary care settings, among others. In addition, the IDB program had two INVs (JA-L1053 and JA-L1037) that, while aligned with the overall SO of supporting consumption and protecting and promoting human capital accumulation of the poor and vulnerable (by financing conditional cash transfers), weakly covered its expected result of improving targeting and reducing leakages of the Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH). Finally, the objective of improving learning outcomes was partially covered through a legacy supplemental loan in the education sector (JA-L1021) that provided additional financing to finalize the civil works (new buildings, replacements, or expansions) aimed at addressing issues of overcrowding in primary schools to facilitate teaching and learning.<sup>48</sup> Various TCs supported important efforts to improve learning outcomes. While these operations were aligned to the SO, their scope was insufficient to achieve the expected results of improving proficiency in numeracy and literacy during the CS period. Additionally, there are no operations with specific components covering the expected result of increasing lower secondary completion rates and upper secondary enrollment rates for boys. Finally, within this objective of improving learning, there was the expected result of lowering the percentage of youth that does not work or study, which was covered with an INV (JA-L1079) and a legacy loan (JA-L1005) focused on creating better-skilled workers and facilitating the transition of youth to work (Annex VI).

4.13 The program mainstreamed gender issues in 70% of the SG operations and resilience to climate change in a third of those operations. The gender focus was included in 70% of the SG loans and IGRs addressing gender challenges across the three strategic areas either in their diagnostics, objectives, activities, results indicators, or a combination of these. A set of operations included actions to foster more equal conditions for women at work. For example, in the strategic area of public sector management, operations incorporated financing to identify wage differentials by gender, as well as policy conditions to increase the female participation in PBs boards. IDB Invest approved two operations that included a gender approach. Both incorporated the assessment of the Women Empowerment Principles tool.<sup>49</sup> In turn, a third of the SG lending and

---

48 As recommended by OVE (document [RE-486-1](#)), the third PBP in the education sector was approved in 2015 (right before the approval of the current CS).

49 The tool was developed by IDB Invest in partnership with UN Women.

investment operations (particularly in the strategic areas of public sector management and private sector productivity)<sup>50</sup> included, to varying extents, measures to improve resilience to climate shocks. The largest SG operation (US\$285 million) out of the ten with this characteristic was the CCF for Natural Disaster Emergencies (not disbursed yet), which sought to strengthen Jamaica's response to a natural disaster by increasing the availability of contingent financing resources.<sup>51</sup> In addition, it is worth highlighting JA-L1048, the first and only INV from the IDB's Climate Change Division (CSD/CCS) in the Caribbean and the second in the LAC region.<sup>52</sup> It focuses on increasing Jamaica's resilience to climate change through enhancing adaptive capacity (generation of evidence and institutional strengthening) across priority sectors.<sup>53</sup> Finally, IDB Invest's SLO (13385-01) aimed at developing a business portfolio of solar photovoltaic generation assets (Annex VII).

- 4.14 Among cross-cutting issues, development challenges related to crime were mainstreamed the least in the IDB program. Only 18% of the SG loans and IGRs included actions to address crime challenges in areas such as citizen security, financial transparency, customs control, and vulnerable youth. The Citizen Security and Justice Program (CSJP) III (JA-L1043) focused on supporting violence prevention services for vulnerable communities. JA-L1005 aimed at facilitating the transition of unattached youth (not employed or in school) to work. The Security Strengthening project (JA-L1074) sought to improve crime prevention strategies. In addition, two operations included components that addressed the need for enhanced financial transparency (including anti-money laundering) (Annex VII).
- 4.15 Most operations that were not aligned with the SOs nor the expected results of the CS were TCs; various of them related to the cross-cutting themes of citizen security and resilience to climate shocks. Of all the operations in the portfolio, 25 were not aligned with the SOs. These consisted of two SG INVs, three NSG SLOs, and 20 TCs and IGRs. The SG loans focused on citizen security. The NSG SLOs, all of them legacy, supported sustainable tourism, logistics infrastructure, and financing related to fuel distribution. The TCs covered a variety of issues, including citizen security, ecosystem services, disaster risk management, and sustainable tourism. Eight of the TCs are generic to the 'Action Plan for C and D Countries' (Annex VI, Table I.6.2).

---

50 In the sectors of energy, financial markets, modernization of the state, water and sanitation, etc.

51 This CCF is available for disbursement for five years (between 2018 and 2023) and, under current terms, the disbursement period is eligible for up to five additional years (JA-00004).

52 The first loan operation of the CSD/CCS was in Mexico in 2017 but was canceled in 2019.

53 The INV has an 87% disbursed amount, and it is in its seventh year of implementation (it had a three-year extension). IGR JA-G1002 complements this INV.



# 05

## Program Implementation

## A. Portfolio execution

- 5.1 Disbursements for SG operations were slightly below CS estimates and previous period disbursements. The CS estimated SG disbursements of US\$912 million for the whole period (or US\$182 million per year).<sup>54</sup> Since 2016, annual disbursements of SG loans and IGRs have been below the CS estimates and averaged US\$136.9 million (a total of US\$901.4 million during the CS period).<sup>55</sup> This represented an 18% decrease compared with the previous period, for which average annual disbursements totaled US\$166.67 million. While the proportion of approvals of fast-disbursing PBLs/PBPs (65%) remained similar to that in the previous period (see above), their relative share of disbursements in the total active portfolio decreased from 68% during the 2013–2015 period to 62% during the current CS period. In contrast, the share of investment operations increased from 28% of total disbursements to 34%, with the legacy portfolio playing an important role in those disbursements. The relative share of TC disbursements remained the same in both periods (4%). Among the 13 legacy operations, 11 finished disbursements, while the remaining two<sup>56</sup> reached an average of 86% disbursed until July 2022, and both started to disburse at the beginning of the CS (Figure 5.1). Investment operations faced various implementation challenges during the CS period that affected the speed of disbursements (paragraph 5.5).
- 5.2 Annual average disbursements for NSG operations were significantly higher than during the previous period, driven by the use of a TFFP line and disbursements of legacy operations. Compared with the previous period, IDB Invest experienced a notable increase in disbursements (despite the decrease in the annual average approved amount), driven in part by the use of the TFFP and disbursements of two legacy operations (JA-L1054 and JA3388A-03) that were approved at the end of 2015. Between 2016 and 2022, disbursements—including TFFP transactions, which accounted for an important share of total disbursements—totaled US\$328.6 million, or an annual average of US\$49.9 million. This annual average was 22.6 times greater than that of the previous period (Figure 5.2).

---


54 The estimates are included in Annex IV of the CS.

55 Out of the total US\$901.4 million that has been disbursed during the period, US\$585 million corresponds to PBLs, US\$301.74 to INVs, and US\$14.61 million to IGRs.

56 These two legacy operations are the related JA-L1048 and JA-G1002, “Adaptation Program and Financing Mechanism for the PPCR Jamaica,” approved in 2014.

**Figure 5.1**  
**Disbursements of SG loans and IGRs by instrument type**


Source: OVE, with data from IDB (2022).



Note: Investment operations refer to INVs and IGRs.

**Figure 5.2**  
**Disbursements of NSGs by instrument type**

Source: OVE, with data from IDB invest (2022a, 2022b).



5.3 Compared with the previous period, preparation times of INVs remained stable, but longer than those of the CCB region; in turn, preparation and execution expenses increased for this instrument in Jamaica (Annex VIII.A).<sup>57</sup> Compared with the previous period, Jamaica’s preparation times, as well as the time between Board approval and first disbursement for INVs,<sup>58</sup> remained stable (going from 20.7 to 20.2 months, and remaining at 10 months, respectively). However, preparation times remained longer

57 Preparation times were calculated as the average of the time elapsed between the registration in pipeline of an operation and its Board approval. Additionally, OVE calculated the average of the time elapsed between Board approval and first disbursement. For later stages, it is not yet possible to compare execution, given that the INVs approved during the period have, on average, been 42% disbursed.

58 Although throughout this document INVs and IGRs have been analyzed jointly as investment operations, in this analysis only INVs are considered. However, average preparation and execution expenses of INVs and their associated IGRs (analyzed jointly) also increased during the CS period.

compared with those of the CCB region (which decreased from 18.6 to 16 months) and to the average of the Bank (from 18.7 to 13.5 months). In turn, INV preparation expenses increased 10% from US\$9,215 to US\$10,142 per million approved (pma). Still, these were lower than the average of the CCB region (US\$12,836 pma) but higher than the IDB average (US\$7,375 pma). Similarly, the execution costs of INV (US\$25,780 per million disbursed -pmd-) slightly increased (2%) in comparison with the previous period (US\$25,512 pmd). During the CS period, average INV size also increased.

- 5.4 In contrast, preparation times and preparation and execution expenses for PBL/PBPs significantly decreased. On the PBL/PBP side, preparation times decreased by a factor of almost four compared with the previous period (from 48.7 to 12.7 months). The most significant decrease within this group occurred in the early phases of project preparation, specifically the time elapsed between registration and Proposal for Operations Development (POD) approval (from 46.7 to 10.8 months). In addition, preparation and execution expenses of individual PBLs also decreased compared with the previous period by 9% for preparation (from US\$2,233 to US\$2,028 pma) and by 25% for execution (from US\$1,528 to US\$1,143 pmd). These expenses were lower than the CCB region average (US\$2,417 pma for preparation and US\$2,074 pmd for execution) but higher than the IDB average for preparation (US\$1,475 pma) and about the same for execution (US\$1,175 pmd).
- 5.5 The fiscal context and the pandemic intensified implementation challenges (tight fiscal space) in half of the INVs. In Jamaica's central administration, the Fiscal Responsibility Act/Law which imposed public spending limits and prioritization (i.e., tight fiscal space), has impacted the availability of funds in the national budget for some investment projects during the CS period. In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak further reduced fiscal space to accommodate other spending (e.g., public health matters, recovery, and fiscal consolidation). The Bank reported that this situation negatively affected the execution of nine out of the 18 INVs active during the period of analysis, in the sectors of financial markets, environment and natural disasters, citizen security, social protection/labor markets, education, agriculture, water and sanitation, and modernization of the state, some of which had previously already shown slow execution rates. It is worth mentioning that three of the four INVs in strategic area 1, associated with fiscal administration and public transformation, did not report challenges related to fiscal constraints. The pandemic also brought additional execution challenges to some INVs and NSG operations, including delays and/or adjustments in traditional in-person trainings (modernization of the state



and labor markets), additional delays in physical works and supervision in program intervention areas due to lockdown regulations restricting social gathering (health), delays in data collection (social protection), disruption of supply chains (energy and natural disasters), and changing priorities in the allocation of human resources, for example, to maintain the public order (citizen security).

- 5.6 Interviews and project progress documents indicated that limited capacity of project executing units (PEUs) negatively impacted project implementation throughout the IDB portfolio (eight of 18 investment loans in the three strategic areas). In most sectors (energy, modernization of the state, citizen security, health, education, agriculture, water and sanitation, and environment and natural disasters), the limited operational or technical capacity impacted project implementation.<sup>59</sup> One example was the health project (JA-L1049), in which the Ministry of Health and the PEU were committed to supporting the project but lacked trained personnel and had limited recent experience building health infrastructure. To ease these challenges, the Bank is currently providing support through the Social Infrastructure Unit and the JA-T1177.
- 5.7 Almost half of the investment loans faced delays due to complex procurement processes, while some PEUs lacked expertise in IDB procurement and fiduciary policies. Seven projects reported execution challenges related to complex or lengthy procurement processes in the country and/or duplication of those between the IDB and GoJ. <sup>60</sup>This was the case for projects in the three strategic areas in the sectors of energy, modernization of the state, water and sanitation, health, education, and environment and natural disasters. In five cases, PEUs also had limited technical knowledge of Bank policies, particularly procurement and fiduciary policies, and of the IDB's programming and reporting tools. The Bank provided training to various PEUs on those topics, and has promoted dialogue with the GoJ aimed at reducing duplication in the use of procurement procedures.
- 5.8 Other factors, such as the lack of support in the legislative arena and low coordination among key stakeholders, affected SG and NSG project execution. Low coordination among the PEUs and other ministries, departments, or agencies in charge of specific activities within an operation was a factor causing implementation challenges in five loans related to modernization of the state (strategic area 1), agriculture (strategic area 2), education (strategic area 3), and citizen security (a cross-cutting theme).

---

59 The turnover of key personnel, both in execution units and the government, was also indicated in some cases as a factor in implementation delays.

60 Only some projects can get GoJ waivers for applying national procedures when the IDB procurement rules are followed.



In addition, one NSG operation suffered from coordination challenges in aligning the procedures and requirements of the different financial institutions involved in the transaction. In two cases (JA-L1072 and JA-L1005), SG projects faced legislative-related challenges. In one of these cases, the NIDS was affected in 2019 after the decision by the Supreme Court to strike down the National Identification and Registration (NIR) Act, but the legislative issues were overcome, and the NIDS was launched in 2021. Finally, in two cases (JA-L1035 and JA-1048), projects related to water and sanitation and environment and risk management were affected by external shocks from climate change and severe weather conditions (a drought in 2018–2019 and hurricanes and flooding).

## B. Contribution to the strategic objectives

5.9 This subsection summarizes IDB Group country program results and their contribution to the SOs of the CS. During the CS period, 16 SG loans (nine INVs and seven PBLs) and two IGRs, as well as one NSG operation, were concluded.<sup>61</sup> In addition, one NSG operation prepared an XSR during the CS period. Except for the seven fast-disbursing SG loans approved between 2016 and 2022, the other nine SG loans and two IGRs that concluded were legacy projects (Annex VIII). Various loans are still executing, and results are not yet available. Of the 11 investment operations approved during the period, disbursements were below 5% for three operations, and averaged 42% for the remaining eight. Of the 13 SOs of the CS, the IDB Group program substantially contributed to the expected results of three SOs (fiscal sustainability, public financial management, and central government wage bill). It made a limited contribution to nine SOs (public sector effectiveness, quality of administrative records, agriculture productivity, government expenditure on electricity utility bills, doing business, access to finance for SMEs, health, learning outcomes, and human capital accumulation), and no contribution to one SO (increasing supply and diversification of the energy matrix). Below is a summary of the program's contributions to every objective (see also Annex VI).

### 1. Strategic area 1: Improve public sector management

#### **Strategic objective 1.1: Attain fiscal sustainability in the medium term**

5.10 The IDB program substantially contributed to this SO. The IDB program, in conjunction with the IMF and WB programs, contributed to the expected result of reducing the central

<sup>61</sup> Of these 14 SG operations, five have a project completion report (PCR) validated by OVE. The NSG operations closed in the portfolio have an XSR validated by OVE (Annex IX).

government deficit, which improved during the CS period (Annex I-Table I.2.2). The PBL JA-L1055 (the third loan of the Fiscal Structural Program for Economic Growth -FISPEG- PBP series), approved in 2016, and the legacy portfolio (JA-L1039, Fiscal Administration Modernization Program -FAMP-) continued the Bank's support for Jamaica's fiscal reform, jointly with the IMF and the WB. Based on the validated PCR, both, the FISPEG and FAMP contributed to increases in tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.<sup>62</sup> Specifically, at the end of the program, tax revenue/nominal GDP increased from 23.9% to 25.6% and central government deficit as a percentage of nominal GDP decreased from -4.1% to -0.7% (achieving 92% of its target). As recognized in OVE's evaluation (Schijman *et al.* 2017, document [RE-509-1](#)), the complementarity of the FISPEG and the FAMP was instrumental in achieving the tax and customs administration reforms sponsored by the program. The IDB program also contributed to the expected result of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. A counterfactual analysis of the reforms supported by the FAMP and the FISPEG estimated that the reforms resulted in a 24% improvement in the ratio of public debt to GDP by 2018. Although the pandemic led to an increase, it began to fall again in 2021 and is estimated by the IMF to be on track to decline to 60% by 2028 (IMF 2022a). The program also contributed to improvements in the control of PBs, in particular, to the increase in the percentage of self-financed PBs reporting on time (from 44% to 66%) and to improvements to the overall balance of selected PBs as a percentage of the GDP (Annex II). Finally, the PBP series JA-L1087 and JA-L1088 included policy actions to provide countercyclical support to individuals and businesses during the pandemic while promoting economic and fiscal recovery in the post-pandemic period. However, it is too early to measure the results of the PBP series.

### **Strategic objective 1.2: Strengthen public financial management system**

5.11 The IDB program substantially contributed to this SO. The program (JA-L1055) supported policy measures that enhanced the fiscal rules to decrease the time required (from 12 months to one) to take corrective measures to address deviations from budget.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, JA-L1046 (which is co-financed by IGR JA-X1007) supported the GoJ's efforts to eventually have 100% of public sector employees managed through a centralized human capital management system integrated with a payroll platform (called MyHR+). At the end of the project, 56% of employees were

---

62 The area of strengthening tax policy and administration was the most successful one in the series, with the highest share of indicators meeting or exceeding the targets (OVE's PCR validation).

63 The enhanced fiscal rules provided for a national account into which cumulative deviations are recorded.

managed by MyHR+. Its first phase of implementation started in 2017 and it is now operating in various ministries, departments, and agencies (30 of 59). While the expansion of MyHR+ is still ongoing (supported by JA-L1073), prior to this effort, the government lacked centralized management tools to control the payroll, avoid duplication and red tape, and enhance expenditure predictability. Through these operations, the IDB supported the GoJ to improve its Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicator for the effectiveness of payroll control (PEFA PI-18).<sup>64</sup> As a result, the GoJ has more certainty in knowing what its budget expenditures will be for public employees. Overall, it is feasible that these efforts contributed to the improvement in the predictability of the budget (in particular, the absolute deviation of total expenditure from budgeted total expenditure decrease from 3.3% to 0.6% during the CS period) (Annex II). Additionally, having access to CCF JA-00004 strengthened the GoJ's disaster risk financial management.

**Strategic objective 1.3: Reduce central government wage bill as a percentage of GDP**

- 5.12 The IDB program substantially contributed to this SO. As noted above, some of the reforms supported by the FISPEG series (including a policy condition to manage central government salary increases) helped rationalize expenditures and were shown to reduce the wage bill as a percentage of GDP, although less than expected (the achievement ratio was 0.62 as the percentage at the end of the program was 10.2% compared with the target of 9.7%). However, latest data has shown further improvement (9.6% in 2021) (Annex II). JA-L1046/JA-X1007 and JA-L1073 also contributed to this SO by strengthening government capacity in human resource management (MyHR+) and helping implement other measures oriented to improve the efficiency of personnel expenditures. The GoJ's PEFA indicator for the effectiveness of payroll control improved. As a result of these contributions, the GoJ has more complete information and, therefore, better capacity to manage its wage bill. Finally, a compensation review and the signing of agreements to deliver upskilling training for public officers are still ongoing under the JA-L1073.

**Strategic objective 1.4: Increase efficiency of public sector**

- 5.13 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The SO focused on "increasing efficiency of the public sector," but its related expected outcome was defined in the CS in terms of effectiveness. Moreover, there was no available data to assess progress toward the proposed CS indicator. Despite these

---

<sup>64</sup> OVE concluded in the PCR validation that it was plausible to assume that the project's interventions contributed to the outcomes that were achieved.

limitations, the implemented IDB program supported some activities (with varying degrees of progress) aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness of public sector. JA-L1046/JA-X1007 (fully disbursed) contributed to achieving some improvements in three areas: (i) strengthening government capacity in human resource management; (ii) strengthening government capacity in information and communication technologies management, for which the project supported activities to streamline and digitize administrative procedures for online business registration that contributed to a reduction in the number of days to register a business and an increase in the online service index (activities also supported with JA-T1156); and (iii) strengthening government capacity in control systems and accountability mechanisms, for which it contributed to improvements in the PEFA indicators related to legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law and the number of information systems audit reports produced, but not to the PEFA indicators related to the effectiveness of internal audit, value for money, and controls in procurement. In turn, the two-tranche PBL JA-L1078 included some policy conditions to improve efficiency in the public sector, such as the creation of the Public Sector Transformation Implementation Unit, and an Oversight Committee. The related INV JA-L1073 (65% disbursed), supported the compensation review and MyHR+; although these activities are being implemented.

**Strategic objective 1.5: Strengthen the quality of administrative records**

5.14 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The PBL JA-L1078 supported the tabling of the NIR Act that was approved in Parliament in 2017, which established the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) for the creation and regulation of the NIDS and national identification numbers. However, the NIR Act was declared unconstitutional (due to privacy rights) in 2019. Legislation was reviewed to ensure the protection of personal data; and the NIRA was approved as a statutory body, but it is still not operational. The related loan, JA-L1072, which complements these efforts, has disbursed 36% of its funds with progress in some outputs, such as the operation of mobile workstations for birth registration (90 out of 160), setting up an ID production facility, and the implementation of a communications plan for the NIDS. While the NIDS was launched in 2021, there is limited progress on the expected result of national identification numbers for the population as the enrolment has not started.

### **Strategic objective 1.6: Reduce government expenditure on electricity utility bills**

5.15 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The IDB program (JA-L1035) supported the National Water Commission (NWC) in the rehabilitation and replacement of water production facilities as well as with the operating and maintenance measures needed to improve energy management. As a result, the project reported a reduction in energy consumption of NWC's facilities from 2.15 to 0.73 kilowatt-hour/m<sup>3</sup> by 2021.<sup>65</sup> JA-L1056 and JA-G1003, aimed at promoting energy efficiency in government facilities, have disbursed 25.6% and 4.1%, respectively<sup>66</sup> (the interventions in public buildings have gone through several rounds of design and market testing) and have yet to show a contribution toward the expected result of reducing electricity consumed in public facilities.

## **2. Strategic area 2: Increase private sector productivity and growth**

### **Strategic objective 2.1: Improve the regulatory framework for doing business**

5.16 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The Ease of Doing Business Index showed improvement between 2016 and 2020, as did the Global Innovation Index (GII), which also measures the regulatory environment. Nevertheless, the GII decreased in 2020 to levels below those of 2016 (Annex II, Table I.2.2).<sup>67</sup> The PBP JA-L1058 supported limited initial steps toward improving the financial legal and regulatory framework for doing business (e.g., the drafting of the amendment to the public-private partnership -PPP- policy, reviewed by the Development Bank of Jamaica -DBJ- and the Ministry of Finance and Public Service and currently under review by the Attorney General's Office) and while supervisory regulatory guidelines related to problem assets (consistent with the Secured Interest in Personal Property Act) were published on the BoJ website in 2019, amendments in terms of public awareness are still pending. In turn, proposals for alternative financing mechanisms to enhance long-term financing for business development via venture capital, angel financing, and an innovation grant financing (IGNITE) are currently operating. Overall, the policy measures supported under JA-L1058 are of low depth (Annex X) and by themselves cannot be expected to yield results that significantly contribute

65 The loan component covered more than 10% of NWC's facilities in the Kingston metropolitan area.

66 The last three PMRs (2019–2021) for JA-L1056 indicated disbursement challenges in its Bank performance indicators (Annex VIII-Table I.8.4).

67 The regulatory environment of the GII increased from 66.1 in 2016 to 66.5 in 2020. In 2021, it decreased to 65.7—below 2016 levels. (Annex II, Table I.2.2).

to the CS's expected outcome. Moreover, the second loan under the PBP series (JA-L1076) that was expected to delve into the approval, implementation, and evaluation of some of these policy conditions was not approved.

### **Strategic objective 2.2: Facilitate access to finance for SMEs**

- 5.17 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The results matrix indicator of the percentage of small establishments with a line of credit decreased from 38.9% to 33.8% between 2013 and 2021, while the percentage of medium-sized establishments with a line of credit increased from 35.1% to 42.9% over the same period (Annex II, Table I.2.2). Despite these mixed results, SG operations made some, albeit limited, contributions to the objective of facilitating access to finance for SMEs. The PBP JA-L1058 supported some measures toward increasing access to credit for SMEs such as drafting the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS), which was approved by the cabinet in 2016 and formally launched in 2017;<sup>68</sup> a proposal for incentivizing lending to MSMEs with a special focus on rural and agricultural sectors; and a proposal for improving the Credit Enhancement Fund managed by the DBJ. But these measures by themselves cannot be expected to increase access to finance without a follow-up. Related to the PBP series, the IDB provided technical support (JA-T1143) for the implementation of the Financial Resolution Regime, the NFIS, as well as for a report on the impact of Covid-19 on SMEs. Also, the program supported the sector with JA-L1048 and JA-G1002 (still disbursing) that established a climate change special line of credit for SMEs to cover the additional cost of addressing the impacts of climate change, which has disbursed a total of US\$2.5 million in almost 300 loans to SMEs (100% of the planned amount). Similarly, JA-L1075, focused on replenishing the capital of an existing DBJ trust fund, has disbursed 65% and reports progress granting 322 guaranteed SME loans (out of 640 projected). Other operations (JA-O0010, JA-L1085 and JA-G1006) that provide grants and seed capital to firms are starting execution (Annex VI).
- 5.18 The IDB Invest program made a limited contribution to this SO. Two NSG operations contributed, to a certain extent, to facilitating access to finance for SMEs.<sup>69</sup> An SLO, still active, provided financing to a private bank to support its SME portfolio with a special focus on women-led SMEs. Moreover, IDB Invest

---

68 The number of (financial) access points per 1,000 km<sup>2</sup> almost doubled between 2017 and 2020 (NFIS 2020 report). The Microcredit Act was enacted in 2021 to regulate microcredit companies, and additional sources of finance for SMEs have been established since 2017 (CAPRI, 2022).

69 During the CS period, NSG operations had a bigger focus on access to finance for SMEs.



helped mobilize funds for the private bank and financed foreign trade operations, mostly from the manufacture, agri-product, and oil and gas sectors.

**Strategic objective 2.3: Increase the security of supply and diversification of the energy matrix**

5.19 The IDB Group program did not contribute to this SO. The IDB program financed a TC, JA-T1172 (77% disbursed), which supported the GoJ in its efforts to progressively adopt electric vehicles (EVs) and promote renewable energy investments in the public transport sector through financing the drafting of the strategic framework and regulatory Guidelines of EVs which was approved by the cabinet in 2022. In addition, an NSG SLO operation that seeks to support an innovative mechanism in Jamaica to finance the construction, operation, and maintenance of solar photovoltaic installations and energy storage solutions (a one-stop financing shop) and to enhance the future diversification of the energy matrix<sup>70</sup> was just recently approved.

**Strategic objective 2.4: Increase agriculture productivity**

5.20 The implemented IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. While there is improvement in the CS indicator of labor force productivity in agriculture (from JM\$240,805 to JM\$288,811 per worker between 2015 and 2021), the sector growth rate has not accelerated.<sup>71</sup> The SO was supported by a legacy loan (JA-L1012), which made only moderate progress on its output indicators and outcomes. An aspect to highlight of this loan is that the IDB helped establish contracts between small and medium size farmers in agro-park clusters and agro-processors, exporters, and an importer/distributor (2,800 farmers benefitted, roughly 30% of whom were women). While there was an increase (albeit less than expected) in the proportion of targeted farmers selling to national and international dynamic markets as well as an increase in the average income of farmers, there was not enough information to attribute these outcomes to the program or to determine whether the IDB support translated into increases in productivity. Also, the program supported the sector with TCs that financed knowledge-exchange visits of GoJ representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to Argentina and the Dominican Republic that helped them gather information

<sup>70</sup> As of 2021, the solar electricity capacity expected to be installed through the project (25 megawatts -MW-) would represent 6.4% of the total installed electricity capacity of the country (1447.3 MW), and a 27% increase in the current installed solar electricity capacity (IRENA 2022).

<sup>71</sup> The annual average growth rate over a five-year period of agricultural GDP decreased from 11.5% (2011–2015) to 10.4% (2016–2021) (Annex II, Table I.2.2).

about the challenges and opportunities in exporting agricultural products as well as about the functioning and procurement processes used by ministries of agriculture in those countries.

### **3. Strategic area 3: Reinforce human capital protection and development**

#### **Strategic objective 3.1: Improve the public health system**

5.21 The IDB program made limited contribution to this SO. During the CS period, no improvements were observed in the expected results of increasing the use of primary care facilities and decreasing the disability-adjusted life years lost due to NCDs, and only minor improvements were made and/or no updated information was available in terms of prevalence of adult risk factors (Annex II, Table I.2.2). Although the Bank supported some initial measures (JA-L1080 and JA-L1086) to address preventable causes of NCDs and reorient some health practices toward NCD prevention and control,<sup>72</sup> there is little evidence that they contributed to the CS expected results. Additionally, the associated INV (JA-L1049),<sup>73</sup> IGR (JA-G1005), and other TCs of this hybrid program, which would complement and support implementation of some policy conditions, are still in early stages (outputs include hospital infrastructure upgrades, medical equipment installation, Caribbean Chronic Care Model implementation at health centers, etc.).

#### **Strategic objective 3.2: Improve learning outcomes**

5.22 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The Bank deployed operations that, to a certain extent, contributed to improving learning environments, but there is no evidence of improvement in learning outcomes and there is no contribution to improving secondary completion and enrollment rates. A supplementary loan (JA-L1021) that provided additional financing to finalize the civil works component of the old Primary Education Support Project fully disbursed in 2016 with one new primary school built, two existing schools fully replaced, and two more expanded. In addition, four schools not originally in the plan also benefitted from expansions. The loan helped ease overcrowding in selected schools and also had spillover effects on three others in the vicinity. While there is no information on learning outcome indicators associated with this loan, it did help improve

---

72 For example, related to the expected result of reducing NCD risk factors, the PBP supported the approval of the National Screening Guidelines of the seven priority NCDs in primary health care, the initial implementation of two of these guidelines in one health network, and the institutionalization and initial implementation of the Jamaica Moves at School Programme in targeted schools to promote healthy eating habits and physical activity at an early age.

73 This loan is the first investment focused on strengthening the health infrastructure and on improving the supply capacity of the health care system in over a decade.



the learning environment as it increased school infrastructure (almost 90 new classrooms and more than 3,000 student spaces) at the primary education level, though, to a lesser degree than planned.<sup>74</sup> The average occupancy rate and class size were reduced in beneficiary schools.<sup>75</sup> This was accomplished over eight years, mostly outside the original timeframe. Additionally, the IDB provided technical support (JA-T1116) to strengthening teacher training institutions by introducing quality assurance standards with a focus on numeracy and science, as well as other activities to support early childhood education. Similarly, the TC JA-T1094 financed a parent mathematics training pilot (in primary education) that reported positive results in terms of an increased number of parents that are confident helping their children with mathematics, but more evidence is needed to determine the impact of those results on learning outcomes. There was no contribution of IDB operations to the expected result of increasing lower secondary completion rates and upper secondary enrollment rates for boys, as there were no specific activities or components on IDB operations focused on that expected result.

5.23 The Bank also financed activities oriented toward improving skills and access to job opportunities of youth, with positive but limited results. Through the operation JA-L1005, the number of Youth Information Centers (YICs) increased as well as the services provided, and new National Youth Service (NYS) offices were located closer to the YICs for a more integrated service and training approach. In addition, the loan and the TC JA-T1124 helped strengthen institutional capacity (i.e., management, monitoring, and evaluation) of the NYS, the YICs, the apprenticeship programs, and the Labour Market Information System (LMIS) for a better integration of data on skills, job vacancies, and training offers; two impact evaluations of youth programs were completed (IDB 2016). The PCR reports progress on some outcome indicators, in particular, an increase in the Career Advancement Program certification rate and improvement in National Vocational Qualification Examinations; but there is no information on the skills acquired or the absorption rate of youth from lower socioeconomic strata into the labor market, nor on the overall indicator of youth that do not work or study.<sup>76</sup> Finally, JA-L1079 (focused on the global services sector) has disbursed 42% and reports progress in some activities: the industry skills upgrade strategy, frameworks for career pathways and apprenticeships,

---

74 Infrastructure alone, generally, does not guarantee improved learning outcomes.

75 Of the nine schools, seven have an occupancy rate of less than 100%, and two of them, while improved, are still overcrowded due to an expansion in enrollment.

76 JA-T1124 (fully disbursed) focused on strengthening the LMIS and on developing inputs required to establish a National Apprenticeship Programme.

spaces available in programs (500 out of a target of 1,000) for training trainers, and apprenticeship places available (800 out of a target of 1,400), among others. However, it is still too early to observe the contributions of these actions to the results. The IDB also supported key studies and carried out outreach activities to achieve the revision of the National Youth Policy 2017–2030.

**Strategic objective 3.3: Support consumption, protect and promote human capital accumulation of the poor and vulnerable**

5.24 The IDB program made a limited contribution to this SO. The IDB program helped support vulnerable families' consumption, and contributed to reducing extreme poverty among PATH beneficiaries, but there is no evidence that it contributed to improving targeting or reducing leakages of the PATH program. Additionally, there was limited contribution to improving access to labor market programs. During the disbursement period of the projects (JA-L1037 and JA-L1053), the Bank financed approximately 41% of cash grants to support consumption among children and pregnant women (29% of total PATH grants).<sup>77</sup> In addition, JA-L1087 and JA-L1088 (Covid-19 response prototype operations) supported policy measures to temporarily protect the income (smooth consumption) of vulnerable households, such as Covid-19 PATH Grants that provided beneficiaries with a 50% increase in monetary benefits in 2020 and a temporary cash transfer (SET Cash) for some employees who lost their jobs in 2020 (Annex VI-Box I.6.1). However, there is no evidence of IDB contribution to the expected result of improving targeting and reducing leakages (i.e., nonpoor receiving benefits) of PATH,<sup>78</sup> as no concrete activities were identified on the part of the IDB in this regard. Though, the IDB program supported components aimed at improving the administrative efficiency of PATH, such as an assessment and proposal of various options for alternative payment methodologies (including the deepening of electronic payments).<sup>79</sup> Additionally, there was limited contribution to the expected result of improving access to labor market programs among PATH beneficiaries. For example, through the Steps to Work on-the-job training (OJT) pilot or through a referral system.<sup>80</sup> Finally, Jamaica experienced improvements in poverty and extreme poverty indicators before the pandemic. Poverty and

---

77 Since 2019, the GoJ has fully funded PATH (with a recurring expenditure line in the budget).

78 PATH, STATIN and MLSS are adjusting the proxy mean test to improve targeting (source: interviews).

79 At present, approximately 38% of PATH families collect payments electronically, an increase compared with the 14% in 2017 (PMR 2021; MLSS webpage). The pandemic accelerated this transition.

80 Under the JA-L1037, the PCR reported that more than 450 PATH beneficiaries were employed six months after completing the OJT trainings and that 40% of PATH beneficiaries participating with the electronic labor exchange referral were in verified employment within six months after the referral.

extreme poverty rates among PATH beneficiaries are reported to have decreased more than for the population as a whole (Annex II, Table I.2.2).

#### **4. Other operations: Citizen security and logistics**

5.25 The IDB program helped to achieve gang ceasefire agreements, but there is no evidence that reductions in homicide rates can be attributed to it. In terms of logistics, the IDB Group supported the expansion of Jamaica's main container terminal. Between 2016 and 2020, Jamaica's homicide rate decreased, but it remained the highest rate in the LAC region. The CSJP III (JA-L1043) built upon preexisting phases of the program<sup>81</sup> and focused on supporting violence prevention interventions to vulnerable communities. The program showed positive results at the individual level related to changes in attitudes and the reduction of risk factors in the beneficiary population. By 2020, the program exceeded its target outcome of achieving 60 gang ceasefire agreements that lasted for at least six months. In addition, restorative justice cases in target communities in which an agreement was reached increased from 50% to 95%. However, there was no evidence of attribution to reductions in the homicide rate. JA-L1074 is still in the early phases of implementation. Regarding transport and logistics, IDB Invest (JA-L1054) supported the first phase of expansion of the Kingston Container Terminal and a long-term PPP agreement. This was the largest infrastructure project supported by the IDB Group in Jamaica without a sovereign guarantee.<sup>82</sup>

---

81 The CSJP I (JA0105) was launched in 2002 and was the first citizen security loan funded by the IDB. CSJP II (JA-L1009) was approved in 2009, and CSJP III in 2014. The CSJP was implemented in 50 target communities selected based on three criteria: (i) low-income status, (ii) high crime and violence levels, and (iii) community resident ability to participate in program activities.

82 Suarez-Alemán; et. al. (2020).



# 06

## Conclusions

- 6.1 During the 2016–2022 period, the country continued to make significant efforts to reduce its debt burden and enhance its fiscal sustainability. Jamaica continued to implement structural reforms based on the agreements initiated with the IMF. In 2016, Jamaica signed an SBA, which finished in 2019 with significant decreases in debt relative to GDP. While the country’s economy is still vulnerable (in fact, it has not fully recovered from the Covid-19 shock), the country is today in a much stronger position to accommodate shocks. Additionally, challenges remained in the productive and social sectors: limited access to finance for SMEs, high NCD prevalence, low quality of and inequitable access to secondary education, and crime.
- 6.2 The 2016–2021 CS was relevant to address some of the country’s structural challenges, but the SOs were overly widespread given known implementation challenges and the tight fiscal space. The program was strongly aligned with nine SOs and weakly aligned with four objectives, which were insufficiently covered by the program given the associated expected results. The CS was based on a diagnosis of Jamaica’s development challenges, and its objectives were relevant to the country’s pressing needs (fiscal responsibility, expenditure efficiency, access to finance for SMEs, human capital accumulation). The program was strongly aligned with the objectives of the strategic area of improving public sector management (covered by a mix of instruments representing approximately 48% of the SG portfolio), but there were alignment gaps with two of the three objectives of the strategic area of reinforcing human capital (learning outcomes and human capital accumulation) and with two of the four objectives of the private sector productivity area (diversification of the energy matrix and agriculture productivity), for which the scope, focus, and coverage of their related operations were insufficient to be feasible to achieve some of the expected results during the CS period. The program mainstreamed gender issues in 70% of the SG loans and grants, and resilience to climate change in a third of those operations. In addition, OVE identified evaluability weaknesses in indicators of the results matrix and, at the project level, there were challenges in terms of tracking and reporting outcomes.
- 6.3 The Bank continued to use a variety of instruments to respond to the country’s structural challenges, with SG lending skewed toward PBLs/PBPs supporting relevant policy measures, particularly related to strengthening fiscal sustainability. In turn, SG investment loans faced diverse implementation challenges. The approved program used a wide variety of instruments but maintained the high share of fast-disbursing operations. PBLs/PBPs supported relevant policy measures, particularly related to strengthening fiscal sustainability. During the CS period, preparation and execution expenses for INVs increased, and disbursements were below

previous period disbursements. Average INV size also increased. The main challenges for implementing investment projects were the tight fiscal space, limited operational or technical capacity of PEUs, complex procurement processes, and low coordination among key stakeholders (which intensified in the wake of the 2020 crisis). IDB Invest's average annual approvals decreased compared with the previous period, but average annual disbursements experienced a notable increase. There was a stronger focus on supporting SMEs than in the previous period.

6.4 With the onset of Covid-19, the IDB Group program largely directed its support to address the challenges resulting from the pandemic while maintaining its focus on fiscal sustainability. The IDB Group's support specific to Covid-19 was mainly provided through two PBLs that financed the short-term response to the crisis (temporary income protection for vulnerable populations) while maintaining focus on fiscal sustainability in the medium term. No new SG INVs were approved after 2020 due to the limited availability of fiscal space for investment lending and the country's proactive debt-management stance. IDB Invest approved two regional Covid-19 liquidity facilities related to Jamaica.

6.5 The IDB Group's contributions to the SOs varied but were mostly limited.

- In the strategic area of improving public sector management, there were substantial contributions to the fiscal sustainability objective that led to improvements in the debt-to-GDP ratio, the central government deficit, and PBs' balance. Also, substantial progress was achieved in outcomes connected to the strengthening of public financial management systems and reduction in the central government wage bill. However, the IDB program made a limited contribution to increasing public sector efficiency, strengthening the quality of administrative records, and reducing government expenditure on electricity.
- In the strategic area of increasing private sector productivity and growth, the IDB and IDB Invest programs made a limited contribution to the SOs of improving the regulatory framework for doing business, facilitating access to finance for SMEs, and increasing agriculture productivity. During the CS period there was no contribution to the expected result of the SO of diversification of the energy matrix, however, an NSG operation focused on expanding solar energy capacity was approved at the end of the period.
- In the strategic area of reinforcing human capital protection and development, the IDB program made a limited contribution to the three SOs. The program supported consumption and

human capital accumulation through Jamaica's main cash transfer program (PATH) and contributed to reducing extreme poverty, but had limited contribution to increasing access of PATH beneficiaries to labor market opportunities, and there is no evidence of contribution to improving targeting and reducing leakages of PATH. The IDB program included some actions geared toward improving the public health systems, with a focus on NCD, but their implementation is still in early stages. Similarly, there was limited contribution to improving skills and access to job opportunities for youth, and there was no evidence of improvements in learning outcomes. There was no contribution to improving secondary completion and enrollment rates.

# References

- Afonso, A., A. Romero-Barrutieta y E. Monsalve (2013). *Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence for Latin America*. DISEG Economics Working Paper No. 20/2013/DE/UECE. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2365007>.
- BoJ (Bank of Jamaica). (2021). *National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) 2020 Annual Report*. Available at: <https://boj.org.jm/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/NFIS-Annual-Report-2020-1.pdf>.
- (2022). *Financial Sector Statistics*. Available at: <https://boj.org.jm/statistics/financial-sector/>.
- Bollers, E., Z. Deyal, V. Gauto, L. Giles Álvarez, J. Khadan, H. Mooney, L. Smets, K. Waithe y A. Wright (2019). *Country Infrastructure Briefs: Caribbean Region*. Inter-American Development Bank Policy Brief No. IDB-PB-313. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001627>.
- CAPRI (Caribbean Policy Research Institute). (2022). *Cheque In: Increasing Access to the Formal Financial System*. R2201. Available at: [https://www.capricaribbean.org/sites/default/files/public/documents/report/cheque\\_in\\_increasing\\_access\\_to\\_the\\_formal\\_financial\\_system.pdf](https://www.capricaribbean.org/sites/default/files/public/documents/report/cheque_in_increasing_access_to_the_formal_financial_system.pdf).
- CFATF (Caribbean Financial Action Task Force). *Anti money laundering and counter terrorist financing measures Jamaica: 3rd Enhanced Follow Report & Technical Compliance Re Rating*. Available at: <https://www.cfatf-gafic.org/documents/4th-round-follow-up-reports/jamaica-2>.
- EPOC (Economic Programme Oversight Committee) (2022). *Update on the GOJ Economic Reform Program (ERP)*. July 2022, Communiqué 40. Available at: <http://epocjamaica.com/communiques/july-2022-update-on-the-goj-economic-reform-programme-erp/>.
- Fitch Ratings (2022). *Fitch Affirms Jamaica at 'B+'; Outlook Stable*. En *Rating Action Commentary*, March 9, 2022. Available at: <https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/fitch-affirms-jamaica-at-b-outlook-stable-09-03-2022>.
- JIS (Jamaica Information Service). (2019). *Approximately \$1 Billion Saved from Rationalisation of Public Bodies*. Available at: <https://jis.gov.jm/approximately-1-billion-saved-from-rationalisation-of-public-bodies/>.
- IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). (2016). *Development Effectiveness Overview 2015: What Worked (and Didn't), Lessons on Development 2012–2015*. Available at: <https://publications.iadb.org/en/development-effectiveness-overview-deo-2015>.
- 2014. *Country Program Evaluation: Jamaica 2009–2014*. Available at: <https://publications.iadb.org/en/country-program-evaluation-jamaica-2009-2014>
- 2015 *Country Development Challenges*. Internal Document.
- (2017). *Comparative Evaluation: Review of Bank Support to Tax Policy and Administration, 2007–2016*. Washington, DC: IDB OVE. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0000833>



- \_\_\_\_\_ (2020). *Case Studies in Public-Private Partnerships in Latin America and the Caribbean: Kingston Container Terminal (Jamaica)*. Available at: <https://publications.iadb.org/en/case-studies-in-public-private-partnerships-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-kingston-container-terminal-jamaica>
- (2021a). *Country Development Challenges Update*. Internal Document.
- (2021b). *Jamaica's Case Study in Transparency and Integrity: OVE's Evaluation*. Internal Document.
- (2022). *Enterprise Data Warehouse. Tables ODS.OPER\_ODS\_OPER, ODS.OPER\_ODS\_OPEVENT, EDW.SL\_FINBAL\_PROD\_RPT [Database]*.
- IDB Invest. (2022a). *Azure SQL Database: metrics. Operational Use of Funds RPT [Database]*.
- (2022b). *IDB-IIC Combined Historical Disbursements up to 2015 [base de datos]*. Data obtained by request for information from OVE to IDB Invest.
- IDB and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2019). *A Beneficial Ownership Implementation Toolkit*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001711>.
- IFC (International Finance Corporation). (2022a). *Creating Markets in Jamaica: Repositioning for Private Sector-led Sustainable Growth, Country Private Sector Diagnostic*. Available at: [https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/publications\\_ext\\_content/ifc\\_external\\_publication\\_site/publications\\_listing\\_page/cpsd-jamaica](https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/publications_ext_content/ifc_external_publication_site/publications_listing_page/cpsd-jamaica).
- (2022b). *IFC Project Information and Data Portal: Latin America and the Caribbean*. Available at: [https://disclosures.ifc.org/enterprise-search-results-home?f\\_region\\_description=LACREG](https://disclosures.ifc.org/enterprise-search-results-home?f_region_description=LACREG).
- IMF (International Monetary Fund). (2012). *Public Information Notice: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2011 Article IV Consultation with Jamaica*. Public Information Notice No. 12/56, June 7, 2012. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/pn1256>.
- (2013). *Press Release: IMF Executive Board Approves US\$932.3 Million Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Jamaica*. Press Release No. 13/50, May 1, 2013. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr13150>.
- (2016). *Jamaica: Thirteenth Review under the Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility—Press Release and Staff Report*. IMF Country Report No. 16/297, August 31, 2016. Available at: [https://www.imf.org/-/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/\\_cr16297.ashx](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/_cr16297.ashx).
- (2018). *Jamaica: 2018 Article IV Consultation, Third Review under the Stand-By Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria—Press Release and Staff Report*. IMF Country Report No. 18/103, April 16, 2018. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2018/cr18103-JamaicaBundle.ashx>.
- (2019). *IMF Executive Board Completes Sixth and Final Review under the Stand-By Arrangement for Jamaica*. Press Release No. 19/393, November 4, 2019. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/11/04/pr19393-jamaica-imf-executive-board-completes-sixth-and-final-review-under-the-stand-by-arrangement>.
- (2022a). *Jamaica: 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Statement by the Executive Director for Jamaica*. IMF Country Report No. 22/43, February 15, 2022. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2022/English/1JAMEA2022001.ashx>.
- (2022b). *Jamaica: Selected Issues*. IMF Country Report No. 22/44, January 25,

2022. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2022/English/1JAMEA2022002.ashx>.

——— (2022c). *World Economic Outlook Database: April 2022 Edition*. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April>.

IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2022. IRENASTAT Online Data Query Tool. Available at: <https://pxweb.irena.org/pxweb/en/IRENASTAT>.

Jaitman, L., and I. Torre. 2017. “A Systematic Approach to Measuring the Costs of Crime in 17 Latin American and Caribbean Countries.” In *The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean*, edited by L. Jaitman, 19–29. Washington, DC: IDB.

The Economist (2019). *Jamaica’s Tumultuous Relationship with the IMF Has a Happy Ending: How the Government Created a Consensus for Austerity*. November 9, 2019. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/11/09/jamaicas-tumultuous-relationship-with-the-imf-has-a-happy-ending>.

Kaufmann, D., and A. Kraay. 2022. Worldwide Governance Indicators Project Dataset. The World Bank. Available at: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.

MEGJC (Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation) Jamaica. 2018. Third National Communication of Jamaica to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/192422>.

Mooney, H. (2019). *Jamaica*. In *Bollers et al.* (2019), 16-19. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001627>.

Mooney, H., D. Rosenblatt, L. Giles Álvarez, A. McCaskie, V. Gauto, E. Bollers, J. Khaden, and N. Abdul-Haqq. 2020. “A Pandemic Surge and Evolving Policy Responses.” *Caribbean Quarterly Bulletin* 9 (3). Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002836>.

Mooney, H., A. Wright y K. Grenade (2018). *Fiscal Councils: Evidence, Common Features, and Lessons for the Caribbean*. Inter-American Development Bank Policy Brief No. IDB-PB-339. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001454>.

Mooney, H. y M. A. Zegarra (2020). COVID 19: shock sin precedentes sobre el turismo en América Latina y el Caribe. Inter-American Development Bank Policy Brief No. IDB-PB-300. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002470>.

OECD and IDB. 2017. “Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2017; Country Fact Sheet, Jamaica.” Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/lac-jamaica.pdf>.

PAHO (Pan American Health Organization). 2016. *Health Minister of Jamaica Outlines Priority Health Concerns*. Press Release, September 15, 2016. Available at: [https://www3.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=12492:health-minister-jamaica-outlines-priority-health](https://www3.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12492:health-minister-jamaica-outlines-priority-health).

GoJ (Government of Jamaica). 2009. *Vision 2030 Jamaica: National Development Plan*. Available at: <https://www.vision2030.gov.jm/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/04/vision-2030-jamaica-national-development-plan-1.pdf>.

——— (2015). *Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework: 2015 2018*. Available at: <https://www.vision2030.gov.jm/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/12/MTF-2015-2018-final.pdf>.

——— (2018). *Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework: 2018 2021*. Available at: <https://www.vision2030.gov.jm/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/12/MTF-2018-2021-March-2019-2-1.pdf>.

PIOJ (The Planning Institute of Jamaica) and STATIN (Statistical Institute of Jamaica).

- (2019). *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2019*. Government of Jamaica.
- Scarlett, H (2021). *Estimating Jamaica's Potential Output*. Working Paper WP/05/21. Bank of Jamaica. Available at: <https://boj.org.jm/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Estimating-Jamaicas-Potential-Output.pdf>.
- Schijman, A., A. Khadr, M. Huppi, R. Marto, P. Buitrago, P. Freeman, and A. Florimon. 2014. *Country Program Evaluation: Jamaica 2009–2014*. Office of Evaluation and Oversight, Inter-American Development Bank. <https://publications.iadb.org/en/country-program-evaluation-jamaica-2009-2014>
- Suarez-Alemán et al. (2020). *Case Studies in Public-Private Partnerships in Latin America and the Caribbean: Kingston Container Terminal (Jamaica)*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002485>
- UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund). 2022. "Jamaica: Education." Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/jamaica/education>.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). *Victims of Intentional Homicide—Regional Estimate. En International Homicide Statistics Database*. Available at: <https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-intentional-homicide-victims-est>.
- WHO (World Health Organization). 2018. *Jamaica: Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance*. Available at: [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136900/ccsbrief\\_jam\\_en.pdf](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136900/ccsbrief_jam_en.pdf).
- (2022). *WHO Health Emergency Dashboard: Jamaica*. Available at: <https://covid19.who.int/region/amro/country/jm>.
- World Bank. (2016). *Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency*, 13.<sup>a</sup> edición. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: <https://archive.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB16-Full-Report.pdf>.
- (2017). *Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Strategy for Jamaica for the Period FY14–17*. Report No. 112663-JM. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
- (2018). *Country Score Card: Jamaica 2018*. World Bank International Scorecard. Available at: <https://ipi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/line/2/C/JAM/2018>.
- (2020). *Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/688761571934946384/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies.pdf>.
- (2022a). *World Development Indicators Databank*. Available at: <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>.
- (2022b). *Jamaica*. In *Macro Poverty Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: Country-by-Country Analysis and Projections for the Developing World*, Spring Meetings 2022, 38–39. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e408a7e21ba62d843bdd90dc37e61b57-0500032021/related/mpo-lac.pdf>.
- (2022c). *Jamaica Country Summary*. In World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal. Available at: <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/jamaica>.
- World Bank and IFC (International Finance Corporation). *Enterprise Surveys: Jamaica Country Profile 2010*. Washington, D.C.: Banco Mundial. Available at: <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2010/jamaica>.

World Bank and UNICEF. (2021). *Public Expenditure Review of the Education Sector in Jamaica*. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/jamaica/reports/public-expenditure-review-education-sector-jamaica>.

Wright, A., K. Grenade y A. Scott Joseph (2017). *Fiscal Rules: Towards a New Paradigm for Fiscal Sustainability in Small States*. IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-780. Washington, DC: IDB. <https://hdl.handle.net/11319/8208>.



## Office of Evaluation and Oversight - OVE

Established in 1999 as an independent evaluation office, OVE evaluates the performance and development effectiveness of the activities of the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group). These evaluations seek to strengthen the IDB Group through learning, accountability and transparency.

OVE evaluations are disclosed to the public in accordance with IDB Group policies to share lessons learned with the region and the development community at large.



[iadb.org/evaluation](http://iadb.org/evaluation)



[linkedin.com/showcase/idb-ove](https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/idb-ove)



[@BID\\_evaluacion](https://twitter.com/BID_evaluacion)