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Abstract

This paper examines the impacts of a migrant regularization program implemented in Peru in 2021. We find that the regularization process positively impacted migrant integration through labor outcomes (access to a written contract and increased income), social outcomes, and access to health services. The results of this study provide evidence of the importance of regularization programs for migrant populations and their impacts on well-being and productive integration in a context of high employment informality and limited public service coverage. The lessons learned are essential not only for developing countries where unexpected migratory flows have made regularization processes common but also for similar south-south movements, where the presence of migrants can pose unique challenges for host societies.

Keywords: Immigration, regularization, integration.
JEL Classification: F22, K37, O15

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1 Introduction

In recent years, Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced an unprecedented surge in migration, mainly due to the Venezuelan exodus, which saw over 7 million people displaced by the end of 2022. Over 85 percent of these migrants remained within the region[1]. Since 2017, countries traditionally known for sending migrants, such as Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, have become net receivers of migrants. In response to this significant influx, governments in the region have implemented extraordinary regularization processes, creating ad hoc documents through such programs to provide migrants with temporary residency permits (Acosta and Harris, 2020; ILO, 2021). Although termed "extraordinary," these regularization programs are quite common. This trend has been observed in Europe since the 1980s.In Latin America and the Caribbean, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) identified over 92 extraordinary migrant regularization programs between 2000 and 2020. Colombia has conducted 12 such processes in recent years, primarily targeting Venezuelan migrants. Countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru have each carried out nine or more different processes in the past two decades. Overall, 18 of the 26 countries analyzed in the IDB study have implemented extraordinary regularization processes in the last twenty years, averaging more than five per year (Acosta and Harris, 2020).

Regularization and documentation are crucial for integrating migrants into host communities. However, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank revealed that, out of the 3.9 million Venezuelans who had left by the end of 2019, an estimated 31 to 45

[1]https://www.r4v.info

percent lacked regular status in their host countries (Harris et al., 2021).

Our study contributes to the literature by examining the impact of the Temporary Permanent Permit Card (CPP by its Spanish name), a regularization document issued in Peru for Venezuelan migrants who entered the country at a specific time frame. While regularization programs are increasingly common in developing countries, the existing literature predominantly concentrates on North American and European contexts. Most studies assess the effects of migration and regularization on labor market outcomes for natives in countries characterized by high levels of formality (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007; Bratsberg et al., 2002; Kaushal, 2006; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Baker, 2015; Monras et al., 2018). However, the relevance of these findings may differ considerably in contexts marked by high levels of informality, such as Peru.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, where most employment is informal, and some countries have hiring quotas for the formal employment of foreigners, research exploring differentiated impacts of regularization programs is extremely important (Acosta and Harris, 2020). For instance, Bahar et al. (2021) show that although regular Venezuelan migrants in Colombia were eligible for formal employment, the regularization program had negligible effects on the fraction of migrants who switched to formal jobs. Nevertheless, although obtaining regular status increased the likelihood of working in the formal sector by a negligible amount, regularized migrants reported having higher job satisfaction, higher consumption, higher access to safety nets, and feeling more integrated into the host country's society. The paper also finds that the effects were negative for Colombian workers, especially for the highly educated and female workers.

The current literature also lacks a deep understanding of how host community characteristics affect regularization policies and implementation. For the migrant population, the potential benefits of the regularization are not always obvious. The impacts will depend on the program's characteristics and the perceived economic and social incentives to become regularized. These are largely determined by the characteristics of the receiving country, such as whether there are any chances of securing a job in the formal sector (Ibánez et al., 2021), whether taxation obligations will be too demanding (Acosta and Harris, 2020), or whether attitudes towards migrants favor the social integration of targeted individuals (Luzes and Rodróguez Guillen, 2023). In many Latin American countries, informal economies, weak social protection measures, and limited health services can significantly lessen the potential impact of regularization programs.

Finally, focusing solely on the impact of regularization processes on labor market outcomes is insufficient (Devillanova et al., 2018). Only a few studies take a more comprehensive approach to integration by examining the effects of regularization programs on access to health and education services, well-being, and other integration measures (Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2017; Hainmueller et al., 2017, 2015). For instance, Ibánez et al. (2021) analyzed the effect of the PEP amnesty program in Colombia on labor outcomes and access to services, as well as its impact on migrant well-being and several other integration measures.[2] On the other hand, Monras et al. (2021) studied the

[2]In 2018, the Colombian government opened the Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos (RAMV). The program was not intended to regularize migrants, and registrants were not guaranteed anything in return for participating. Following the census completion, the government of Colombia announced a program called *Permiso Especial de Permanencia *(PEP), which offered amnesty, including legal migratory status, a work permit, and access to government services. The program ran from August to December 2018, and approximately 60 percent of those who qualified under the RAMV census signed up for the PEP.

effect of the legalization of 600,000 non-EU immigrants in 2004 in Spain and its impacts on labor market outcomes, national tax revenue, and the probability that the regularization mechanism served as a magnet factor to additional migrants. Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2017) study how work authorizations to eligible immigrants, along with a temporary reprieve from deportation, influenced the probability of school enrollment of eligible, higher-educated individuals.

This document examines a regularization process implemented in Peru in 2021. Our study complements Ibánez et al. (2021), who examined the short-term effects of the PEP regularization program in Colombia and helps address a critical gap in the literature by investigating the impacts of regularization programs in a high-informality context, providing insights into its effects on labor market dynamics and outcomes in Latin America.

To conduct this analysis, we collected data over five months and interviewed 2,750 migrants in Lima and Trujillo. The study is part of a series of studies conducted by the IDB that aims to understand the impact of regularization programs in Latin America and the Caribbean.[3]

The characteristics of the CPP Card present challenges in identifying the impact of the regularization process through a regression discontinuity design, which is typically used for programs with eligibility criteria based on entry time limits. To address this, we collected detailed information on migrants' history, employment, and wealth conditions

[3]This study follows the design and implementation of the paper published by Ibánez et al. (2021). Our survey methodology is based on the one employed in Colombia and has been adapted to the Peruvian context.

in Venezuela to evaluate the program's impact. We estimate the effect of holding an ID card on integration outcomes using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Since individuals who obtain the ID card may differ systematically from those who do not, we included control variables to account for factors that could influence both integration outcomes and the likelihood of obtaining an ID card. This approach helps mitigate potential biases due to confounding variables, allowing us to better isolate the effect of holding an ID card on integration outcomes.

Our estimations measure the effect of this process on various integration outcomes. Specifically, we analyze the program's impact on labor market indicators such as employment status, hours worked, and income; access to social services like health and education; integration indicators; mental health outcomes; and experiences of discrimination.

Our results suggest a positive association between having an ID card and migrant labor market outcomes in Peru. Specifically, having an ID card is positively associated with having a written contract and having a higher income. We also document positive, albeit small, effects on integration indicators and access to public health services. We do not find any effects on secondary outcomes - mental health indicators and experiences with discrimination. Our results show that regularization programs can impact different dimensions of migrants' lives in host countries. Moreover, our results show that regularization programs alone may not be sufficient to insert migrants into formal employment in a context with high informality.

We build on the work of Ibánez et al. (2021) to further explore the impact of regular-

ization programs in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Both studies are set in countries with limited access to formal economic opportunities and a constrained, often overburdened, public service system. However, this study's context differs significantly from Colombia's regularization efforts.

First, Peru has a high concentration of migrants in Lima, with over 80 percent of the Venezuelan population residing in the capital. This unique demographic allows for a focused examination of labor outcomes (INEI, 2022). Second, the demographic profiles of native and migrant populations in Peru differ from those in Colombia, which may help explain some variations in labor market outcomes. Notably, the migrant population in Peru tends to be more highly educated than that in Colombia (IDB et al., 2023). Finally, the regularization program in Peru differs from Colombia's, particularly in how the campaign to inform the population was designed and disseminated and certain differences in the implementation of the regularization program. For example, Peru lacked a prior registry to identify the migrant population, which limited the program's reach.

Regularization mechanisms are becoming an increasingly common tool, distinct from other legal residency options like short-term work permits. Our study highlights the need for more research to fully understand how regularization affects access to employment and public services, as well as how the limitations of these programs influence their outcomes. Recognizing the economic potential of migration is crucial for both migrants and host countries. Facilitating access to the labor market, public services, and social integration can significantly enhance the benefits of migration, and regularization policies play a key role in this process. Our study contributes valuable evidence on the impact

of regularization programs in developing countries. It provides insights that can assist regional governments in designing effective policies that benefit both migrant and local populations.

2 Context

2.1 The Venezuelan migration to Peru

In Peru, migratory flows have grown exponentially since 2017, largely due to the influx of Venezuelan migrants. Between 2010 and 2020, the percentage of migrants in Peru's total population increased from 0.4% to 3.7% (UNDESA, 2020). The size, dynamics, and characteristics of migrants in Peru have changed significantly. The increase in the Venezuelan population has notably altered the demographic composition of Peru's migrant population, especially regarding age and education levels. By 2022, Peru hosted approximately 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants (representing 80% of the total migrant population in the country), making it the second-largest recipient of Venezuelan migrants after Colombia.[4]

In 2022, the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics conducted a survey called ENPOVE (Encuesta Nacional de la Población Venezolana en el Perú) to gather data on the Venezuelan population living in Peru. This was the second round of the survey, with the first conducted in 2018. According to ENPOVE, the Venezuelan population in Peru in 2022 was relatively young, with approximately 40% between the ages of 20 and 30 (INEI, 2022). Additionally, there was an increase in the population aged 0-19, growing from

[4]https://www.r4v.info/, https://datamig.iadb.org/es/migrant

23% in 2018 to 35% in 2022. This trend suggests that more migrants are either settling in Peru and starting families or migrating as family units. Regarding migratory status, 64.7% of Venezuelans in Peru have some form of regular status, while 35.5% do not. In terms of education, 21% have completed a university degree, and 12% have started but not finished a university education.

Regarding activity and labor indicators, 82% of Peru's Venezuelan population is economically active, and 98% of this population is employed (formal and informal work). Furthermore, 19% of the employed Economically Active Population (EAP) has some employment contract (formal work). This represents an increase of 7.7 percentage points compared to the results from 2018.

The emergence of novel migration patterns and changing migrant characteristics presents numerous hurdles for host nations and communities. Within Peru, significant obstacles persist for migratory policy, including guaranteeing that the migrant population has access to public services, the inclusion of the migrant population in the formal market, and promoting social processes that facilitate integration and social cohesion.

According to Gallup's Migrant Acceptance Index, which measures acceptance towards migrants in over 145 countries, Peru has experienced the most significant decline in acceptance of migrants between 2016 and 2019, dropping from 6.33 to 3.61. Opinions about migration in Peru have become increasingly negative in recent years. Many people express concerns that the influx of migrants leads to higher crime rates, public insecurity, and increased labor competition (Latinobarómetro, 2023).[5] Social exclusion

[5]https://laboratoriomigracion.iadb.org

and prejudices remain significant barriers to migrant inclusion.

2.2 Peruvian pathways to regularization

In recent years, Peru has introduced several programs to regularize the status of migrants living in the country. These initiatives aim to grant legal status and basic rights to individuals who have entered Peru without proper documentation or overstayed their visas. These efforts reflect Peru's commitment to upholding migrants' rights and providing access to essential services and legal protections. However, challenges remain in ensuring the effective implementation of these programs and in making sure all migrants in Peru can access their rights.

Since 2017, Peru has launched four extraordinary regularization processes specifically for Venezuelan migrants residing in the country. These programs generally offer medium-term legal status, ranging from one to two years, after which eligible individuals must update their migratory category. This differs from more recent regularization processes in Colombia, where ID cards issued to migrants are valid for 10 years, resulting in different implications for the migrant population (Cruces et al., 2023).

In 2020, Peru introduced a new temporary regularization measure called the Temporary Permanence Permit Card (CPP) to regularize the immigration status of migrants who had arrived in Peru before October 22, 2020, and lacked regular status.[6] The application process for the CPP ID card was open from July 2021 to November 2023. The CPP granted regular status for two years and allows beneficiaries to transition to one

[6]Supreme Decree No. 010-2020-IN

of the temporary migratory categories after that period. This program was available to migrants who had overstayed their visas or entered the country irregularly.

The population that applied for the CPP was self-selected, and registration to the program was voluntary. Although the regularization program was designed to cover all undocumented migrants, the communication of the program was not very effective and has left some people out of the regularization effort. By mid-2023, around 350 thousand people had requested their CPP ID Card.[7] To be eligible for the CPP process, a foreign citizen must have entered Peru before October 22, 2020, and be in an irregular migratory situation or have an active asylum request (having not yet received the refugee status). This included individuals with expired documentation or those who entered the country through irregular entry immigration control. The CPP registration process was initiated in July 2021 and closed on November 10, 2023.

Having regular migratory status in Peru gives migrants access to various basic services and rights. This status allows migrants to work legally and be protected by labor laws, particularly if employed in the formal sector. It also grants access to social security benefits, such as health insurance and pensions, for those with formal employment (Acosta and Harris, 2020). However, it is important to note that Peru imposes a limit on the number of foreign workers a company can hire. Specifically, national or foreign companies are allowed to employ foreign personnel for up to 20% of their total workforce, with some exceptions. Additionally, the compensation for foreign workers cannot exceed 30% of the company's payroll and salaries.[8]

[7] Information given by the Superintendency of Migration of Peru to the IDB

[8] Legislative Decree No. 689, Law for the hiring of foreign workers (November 4, 1991) Article 4.

Regarding public services, regardless of migratory status, migrants can access public healthcare services and public education. However, with a migratory status, migrants can potentially access some public healthcare insurance options (either through formal work or by enrolling in social assistance programs and accessing the Sistema Integral de Salud, SIS). Migrants with a regular migratory status have the right to rent or own property and are protected by housing laws. They can also access bank accounts and financial services, including loans and credit. Overall, having a regular migratory status in Peru can give migrants a sense of security and stability and access to essential services and protections.

Despite the guarantees provided by the migratory regularization process, migrants often face practical challenges in the day-to-day application or recognition of their legal migratory document. For instance, Venezuelan migrants have encountered difficulties enrolling their children in public schools due to a lack of information about the requirements, informal barriers, or limited availability of school places (WB, 2019). Similarly, despite universal access, some migrants do not seek health services due to a lack of information on access or fear of being treated differently because of their nationality. According to the same study, of those who suffer from a health problem, only a small proportion sought care at medical centers (WB, 2019).

3 Data

For our estimations, we collected data from Venezuelan migrants in Lima and Trujillo between November 2022 and March 2023. The data collected covers variables such as

employment, access to services, migration history, demographics, etc. Our total sample size used for the analysis is $n = 2,570$ where 76 percent are migrants residing in Lima, and 24 percent are migrants residing in Trujillo.[9]. This distribution was based on the percentage of migrants residing in the capital versus those residing in other cities outside the capital and following the ENPOVE 2022 distribution (INEI, 2022). We also gathered similar data about the household members of each respondent.[10]

The data collection was limited to individuals who arrived in Peru between January 2019 and June 2022. This restriction was based on the understanding that the characteristics of the Venezuelan population have changed over time. Therefore, individuals who arrived before 2019 might differ significantly from those arriving in 2022. Our goal was to ensure that the demographic characteristics of the study sample were as comparable as possible, thereby minimizing the influence of these variables on our findings.

Due to the lack of access to a confidential data registry of migrants in the regularization program or prior contact information data of Venezuelan migrants in Lima and Trujillo (either regular or irregular), we conducted primary data collection in Peru. Data collection lasted five months, and a fieldwork strategy was implemented in Lima and Trujillo to identify Venezuelan migrants.

Our main recruitment strategy focused on identifying migrant hot spots. These hot spots were places where there was a higher chance of an encounter with the Venezuelan population. This could be due to high levels of economic activity in these spaces (street

[9]During fieldwork, we collected $n = 3,593$ surveys, but only use a subset of this data since we do not include individuals with other forms of regular documents besides the CPP ID card or an irregular status

[10]The average household size consists of 2.5 members. For the purpose of the current analysis, we will be looking only at the data from the household head.

markets, selling stands, etc) or due to a high presence of the Venezuelan population in a specific district.[11]. Furthermore, we also used a referral strategy in which participants were asked to refer three contacts of other Venezuelan nationals.

The strategy used a snowball mechanism to find participants and referrals. The strategy consisted of the following steps:

- Contact civil society organizations that are key actors in the Venezuelan migration panorama in Peru and have close contact with this population (focus on Lima and Trujillo). These will help identify hot spots and main neighborhoods where migrants live and work.

- Using the recently implemented ENPOVE survey, identify different segments of the population that live in different neighborhoods in Lima and Trujillo (for example, to gather more information on where different segments of the population tend to live).

- Furthermore, ethnographic explorations were carried out (visits to the neighborhoods to understand the dynamics of the target population) to identify key points where the population could be found. Likewise, these ethnographic explorations allowed the research team to understand the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants who lived in each hot spot

- Carry out survey collection. At the end of the survey, ask participants for 3-4 referrals that match the target population's characteristics.

[11]This information was collected from the ENPOVE 2022 survey, which details the concentration of the Venezuelan population in the different Lima districts.

- Contact the recruited referrals, conduct the survey, and ask for a new set of 3-4 referrals. Repeat this process until the networks are exhausted.

Initially, the data was collected in person using a Computer Assisted Interviewing (CATI) tool. The data collection team applied the survey to participants and recorded information with the support of an electronic device (tablet and/or cell phone) and through an electronic form programmed by the research team using the SurveyCTO tool. Some surveyors were of Venezuelan nationality, especially in Trujillo. In cases where it was impossible to hire Venezuelan nationals, surveyors were Peruvian nationals trained to understand the Venezuelan migration in the country.

Given the increase in protests and security fears in Lima during data collection, fieldwork had to stop for a few days during December, January, and February. The research team decided to start implementing phone surveys to the referrals database. The phone surveys represent less than 10% of the sample and were used until the end of fieldwork to support the team of surveyors on the field.

Table 1 summarizes our sample's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 2,570 individuals. About 57% of the sample is female, approximately 31 years old, 33% are married or live with a partner, and 64% have children. The mean household size is 2.5 members, with a standard deviation of 1.5, indicating that most households consist of 2-3 members. In terms of education attainment, around 30% of the sample has technical education or more. Most individuals in our sample worked in Venezuela (87%), mostly as employees (78%), and around half had a written contract. Regarding the migration process, 48% of the sample arrived before October 22, 2020, mostly by

ground transportation (82%), and most of them had relatives or friends in Peru before arriving (79%). On average, respondents had lived in Peru for over two years at the moment of the survey.

4 Empirical approach

Since individuals who participate in the regularization process and receive the ID card are systematically different from those who do not, we can not compare their outcomes directly to estimate the effect of the regularization program. Therefore, to investigate the effect of the regularization program on socioeconomic integration, we control by socio-demographic characteristics and detailed employment history in their home country.

To estimate the effects of having a CPP ID card, we employed an OLS estimation as specified in Equation 1:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{ID Card}_i + Z_{ij} + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

In this model, Y_i represents one of the outcomes described in Section 4.1. The variable *ID Card* is a binary indicator that equals one if the respondent i holds an ID card at the time of the survey. The control variables, Z_{ij}, include sociodemographic, migratory, and labor history variables. Our parameter of interest, α_1, aims to estimate the effect of possessing an ID card on socio-economic integration outcomes. The error term, ϵ_i, captures all other unobserved factors affecting Y_i.

The identification strategy assumes that the control variables included in the regres-

sion account for factors that could be correlated with both the integration outcomes and the likelihood of obtaining an ID card. These variables are detailed in Table 1. We believe that the characteristics selected as controls contribute to explaining the outcomes variation and therefore control for the potential differences between migrants who are regularized and migrants who are not [12]. By including these controls, we aim to mitigate potential biases due to confounding variables and better isolate the effect of holding an ID card on integration outcomes. [13]

4.1 Main Outcomes

We estimate the effect of the regularization program on three main outcomes:

- **Outcome 1: Labor Market Indicators** This outcome will measure the self-reported labor market indicators for the migrant population. It will include indicators of employment status (dummy indicating if employed or unemployed), employment scheme (dummy indicating whether there is affiliation with social security and if it has a written contract), hours worked (standardized variable),

[12] We included (i) socio-demographic controls: gender, province, age at arrival in Peru, and education level; (ii) Migration controls: number of months in the country, mode of arrival in Peru (walking, by plane, or ground with ground as the base category), and whether they had relatives in Peru before arriving; and (iii) Labor history controls: whether they worked in Venezuela, age at their first job, occupation in Venezuela (employer, self-employed, employee with employee as the base category), and type of contract (verbal, written, or none with none as the base category)

[13] As an alternative methodology, we tried to employ the eligibility for the regularization program - according to arrival date to Peru- as an instrumental variable to explain having the ID card and use that prediction to estimate the program effects. We could not use this approach for two reasons: First, the instrument is not exogenous. Although the law was announced unexpectedly, migrants who arrived before and after the cutoff date differ in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. As the economic crisis in Venezuela intensified, migrants with lower levels of education, fewer professional skills, and fewer financial resources migrated later (IMF,2022). Furthermore, the duration of residency in the host country is a strong predictor of migrants' economic integration. Thus, on average, migrants who arrived in Peru in 2019 will be systematically better off. Finally, the arrival date does not accurately predict the probability of having an ID card, as some respondents who arrived after the cut-off date could get the ID card (See Figure 2).

income received (log variable of labor wage, for those who are employed, or labor earnings through independent work, for those self-employed), and overqualification (dummy indicating if the individual is overqualified for the job they work at).

- **Outcome 2: Access to Social Services** This outcome will measure access to public services in Peru. Public services in this context will be defined as access to health insurance (dummy indicating whether the person has health insurance or has employer-sponsored health insurance) and access to medical attention (dummy indicating whether the person received medical attention when needed).

- **Outcome 3 : Integration Indicators** This outcome will measure integration levels. For this purpose, we will use a multidimensional index of migrant integration, the IPL Integration Index, developed by the Immigration Policy Lab at Stanford. The measure applied in this paper is the short version of the Index, the IPL-12. The index captures six dimensions of integration: psychological, economic, political, social, linguistic, and navigational. Respondents are asked about their level of agreement on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 to 5. There is a maximum score of 60 across all six dimensions for the IPL-12. The Index was constructed following the Immigration Policy Lab recommendations and adaptation to the Latin American context.

4.2 Secondary Outcomes

We will estimate the effect of the regularization program on three secondary outcomes:

- **Secondary Outcome 1 : Mental Health**. This secondary outcome will measure

the prevalence of mental health disposition in the migrant population. Mental Health outcomes are self-reported and measure anxiety and depression disorders. These outcomes are measured using two indexes: General Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7) and Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9).

The GAD-7 score is calculated with a 4-point Likert scale by assigning 0, 1, 2, and 3 to the response categories of 'not at all' 'several days', 'more than half the days', and 'nearly every day', respectively,. The index is calculated by adding together the scores for the seven questions. Scores of 5, 10, and 15 are taken as the cut-off points for mild, moderate, and severe anxiety, respectively. Here, we generated a dummy if the score is equal or greater than 10 for moderate and severe anxiety. When used as a screening tool, further evaluation is recommended when the score is ten or greater.

The PHQ-9 follows the same scoring criteria. Total scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 represent cutoff points for mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe depression, respectively. Here, we generated a dummy if the score is equal or greater than 10 for moderate and severe anxiety. When used as a screening tool, further evaluation is recommended when the score is ten or greater.

- **Secondary Outcome 2 : Experiences with discrimination** This outcome corresponds to the self-reported experiences of participants with discrimination in their daily lives in Peru. The outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers that they have experienced discrimination in Peru and equal

to zero if they have not.

5 Results

The following set of tables presents our main results. Each cell shows the estimated effects of a particular outcome from separate regressions. Each row corresponds to a separate outcome in each table, while the columns include an expanding set of controls. Specifically, the first column shows the estimated effect without any controls. The second column shows estimations after including socio-demographic controls. The third column includes socio-demographic and migration history controls. The fourth column, our preferred specification, includes all the previous controls plus information on respondents' labor history in Venezuela. Importantly, in addition to the estimated coefficient, each panel also reports the R-squared of the regression to display how much of the variance in the outcome is explained by the inclusion of the controls.

Table 2 illustrates the impact of possessing an ID card on various labor market indicators. According to the table, having a CPP ID card does not significantly affect the likelihood of being employed. This finding is not unexpected, as most of the respondents (86%) were already employed. However, we observe positive effects of the ID card on workers' income, associated with a 12.1% increase in income.

To better understand whether the change in labor income is driven by shifts in bargaining power between employers and migrant workers, we examine changes in working conditions in the following four panels. Panel C provides evidence that possessing a CPP ID card is linked to a 1.7 percentage point increase in the probability of having a

written contract, which is about 56,7% of the outcome mean. Moreover, panel D shows that having a CPP ID card is also associated with an increase in the likelihood of having employer-provided health insurance. Despite this, the effect on labor formality, measured by the likelihood of having an employer who makes social security contributions, is not significant when migration and labor history controls are added.

The discrepancy between the effects on written contracts, health insurance, and social security contributions suggests that the CPP ID card may facilitate more binding agreements without necessarily leading to formal contracts. However, due to the widespread lack of awareness about retirement benefits in Peru, employees under formal contracts might be unaware that their employers contribute to the national pension system.

In panels F and G, we investigate the impact of possessing an ID card on working hours and the likelihood of being overqualified. Overall, we do not find significant associations between having an ID card and either the number of hours worked or the likelihood of being overqualified. The absence of an effect on working hours may be due to counterpoising income and substitution effects, which push workers in opposite directions. The likelihood of being overqualified suggests that, like other countries in the region, possessing a work permit alone is insufficient for securing employment matching workers' educational qualifications.

To better understand how the CPP contributes to migrants' integration, we examine the relationship between holding a CPP ID card and access to health services, mental health, and self-reported integration.

In table 3, we investigate the effect on access to health insurance in panel A, the

likelihood of seeking medical attention in panel B, and mental health indicators in panels C and D. The results show that having an ID card is associated with an increase in the likelihood of having health insurance by 1.4 percentage points. We also found a significant and positive effect of the CPP on the probability of respondents accessing medical care when needing medical attention. The estimated effect corresponds to an increase in the likelihood of seeking medical care of 5.7 percentage points. Regarding mental health, there are no significant associations between having a CPP ID card and anxiety or depression. Although we find some significant effects in anxiety scores when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, these effects are no longer statistically significant when controlling for control variables associated with labor market history in Venezuela.

It is worth noting that the coefficients do not change when relevant observable characteristics are included, suggesting that biases due to unobserved characteristics are not particularly large. We will look at this in more detail in future paper versions. There is also an R_2 increase as we add controls, suggesting that the added controls are relevant to explain the variance of the outcome.

Table 4 investigates the relationship between having a CPP ID Card and the level of perceived integration as measured by the Immigrant Integration Index built by the Immigration Policy Lab (IPL). The results show that CPP holders score higher on the aggregate IPL Integration Index, 1.57 percentual points.[14] Interestingly, when we desegregate the effect into the five dimensions of the index, we find significant associations

[14]see Section 4 for more details of the IPL-12 Index calculation.

between holding the CPP ID Card and all dimensions of integration except the political dimension.[15] These results suggest that migrants with a CPP ID card are better integrated in almost every dimension that migrants who do not have the ID Card.

In future versions of this paper, we intend to follow Oster (2019) and include robustness checks that show whether the coefficients are stable to the inclusion of additional controls and thus help us shed light on how unobservable selection may impart the estimated effects.

5.1 Heterogeneous effects

To better understand the disparities between the regularization program and migrants' socioeconomic integration, we estimate separate regressions for men, women, individuals with lower levels of education (defined as lower than tertiary education), high levels of education (defined as having tertiary education or higher), young adults (aged 18-30), and adults (aged 31-65).

Table 5 presents the results on labor market outcomes. Interestingly, we find suggestive evidence of a small but significant negative relationship on employment for female workers. In future versions of the paper, we will further investigate as it may be related to the optimal allocation of household resources when more than one member obtains a work permit. We then turn to the positive association between the CPP ID Card and income and find that the positive association is driven by women, individuals with lower levels of education, and young adults. The effects on working conditions, examined in

[15] We exclude the language dimension from the analysis as Venezuelan migrants speak Spanish

panels C through G, suggest that working conditions are improving in more meaningful ways among men and those with higher levels of education as we find evidence of positive associations with having employer-paid health insurance and fewer working hours among these groups. There is no evidence of positive effects on the likelihood of being overqualified among any group.

Table 6 presents the results concerning health insurance coverage, health service utilization, and mental health indicators. The data indicates a positive association between possessing a CPP ID card and having health insurance, particularly among highly educated individuals and those aged 31 and above. Similarly, there is a positive correlation between holding a CPP ID card and obtaining medical attention for adults over 31, a demographic likely to experience more serious health issues. Turning to mental health, the findings suggest a reduction in depression levels for highly educated; however, no significant associations were observed in other groups.

Table 7 presents evidence of integration. Overall, possessing a CPP ID card is significantly associated with higher levels of integration across all groups, except for those with higher levels of education. For this latter group, although there is evidence of a positive correlation, the smaller sample size and larger standard errors limit the robustness of this finding. In terms of specific dimensions, there is a notably higher degree of correlation among all integration indices for young adults and individuals with lower levels of education.

6 Discussion

We examine the socio-economic impacts of a large-scale regularization program in Peru. The CPP program grants holders the right to work and access public services such as education and health. The paper, however, goes beyond these integration measures and explores the impact of the CPP on other outcomes, such as social integration, mental health outcomes, and discrimination. This paper contributes to a gap in the literature on the impact of large-scale regularization programs in a developing country with a predominant informal economy and weak social protection mechanisms. Furthermore, our paper contributes to a small strand of literature that measures the impact of a regularization program beyond its effects on labor market outcomes. These contributions are important, especially for the Latin American and the Caribbean region, which has seen an increase in migration flows, and migration management is new for most countries.

We find significant, albeit limited, impacts of the CPP on labor market outcomes, specifically on having a written contract and income. There are several potential explanations for the limited effect of the CPP on labor outcomes. Quota regulations on the formal labor market in Peru can explain why firms would hire a limited quantity of foreign nationals. This may also generate hesitance from firms to hire migrants. On the other hand, accessibility to the informal market may be easier for migrants in the short term, given the differential taxing percentages that migrants face compared to native-born.

Our study finds impacts of the regularization program on access to health services and integration indicators. These results may suggest that even though the CPP has

small impacts on labor outcomes, it does improve perceived social integration outcomes for migrants and their households. It is important to mention that our analysis was conducted 16 months after the implementation of the CPP. Therefore, our results show the short-term impact of the regularization program. Further research is necessary to understand the impact of the regularization program over time and how outcomes evolve in the long term. Regularization mechanisms are beneficial not only for migrants themselves but also hold great potential impacts for host countries (Alvarez et al., 2022). We hope this study sheds light on the importance of regularization programs in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Arrival date distribution



Figure 2: Probability of receiving CPP according to arrival date



Note: The individuals located at the right side of the graph entered Peru after October 22 of 2020, while the ones located at the left side entered Peru before the threshold date. Discontinuity at the threshold = -0.19 pp. FDR q-value = 0.02.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD	N
Sociodemographics			
Female	0.57	0.50	2,570
Age	30.94	9.83	2,570
Married/Partner	0.33	0.47	2,570
Has children	0.64	0.48	2,570
Household members	2.50	1.49	2,570
Education attainment in Venezuela			
Primary or less	0.05	0.21	2,570
Secondary	0.65	0.48	2,570
Technical	0.07	0.26	2,570
Some college	0.11	0.32	2,570
University	0.11	0.32	2,570
Labor characteristics in Venezuela			
Worked in Venezuela	0.87	0.33	2,570
Age of first job	16.26	3.46	2,246
Employer	0.05	0.21	2,246
Self-employment	0.16	0.37	2,246
Worker/Employer	0.78	0.42	2,246
Verbal contract	0.10	0.29	2,246
Written contract	0.47	0.50	2,246
Migration characteristics			
Months in Peru	26.87	13.69	2,570
Age at arrival	28.62	9.72	2,570
Arrival: Walking	0.17	0.38	2,570
Arrival: Ground	0.82	0.38	2,570
Arrival: Plane	0.00	0.07	2,570
Relatives in Perú before migration	0.79	0.41	2,570
Arrived before Oct 22, 2020	0.48	0.50	2,570

Table 2: Effect of CPP Program on labor market outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Employed				
ID Card	-0.00566	-0.00517	-0.00722	-0.00679
	(0.0147)	(0.0144)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86
R2	0.0001	0.1114	0.1176	0.1208
Panel B: Income (Ln)				
ID Card	0.119***	0.119***	0.120***	0.121***
	(0.0427)	(0.0422)	(0.0460)	(0.0462)
Observations	1786	1786	1786	1786
Outcome mean	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
R2	0.0044	0.1189	0.1190	0.1212
Panel C: Written contract				
ID Card	0.0243***	0.0207**	0.0183**	0.0175**
	(0.00828)	(0.00842)	(0.00838)	(0.00835)
Observations	1923	1923	1923	1923
Outcome mean	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
R2	0.0044	0.0695	0.0759	0.0784
Panel D: Work health insurance				
ID Card	0.0157**	0.0148**	0.0121*	0.0118*
	(0.00611)	(0.00624)	(0.00653)	(0.00652)
Observations	1923	1923	1923	1923
Outcome mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
R2	0.0034	0.0700	0.0744	0.0757
Panel E: Social Security				
ID Card	0.00802**	0.00659**	0.00483	0.00471
	(0.00353)	(0.00322)	(0.00329)	(0.00320)
Observations	1923	1923	1923	1923
Outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
R2	0.0026	0.1539	0.1550	0.1557
Panel F: Working hours				
ID Card	-0.786	-1.017	-1.522	-1.620
	(1.060)	(1.052)	(1.093)	(1.098)
Observations	1923	1923	1923	1923
Outcome mean	59.19	59.19	59.19	59.19
R2	0.0003	0.1123	0.1158	0.1194
Panel G: Overqualified				
ID Card	0.135***	-0.00346	-0.00433	-0.00464
	(0.0210)	(0.00397)	(0.00467)	(0.00477)
Observations	2015	2015	2015	2015
Outcome mean	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
R2	0.0200	0.9664	0.9664	0.9665
Controls				
Sociodemographic	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor history	No	No	No	Yes

Note: Each column reports the OLS estimates of the CPP Program. The outcome variable is indicated by the panel title. Robust standard errors are used. Statistical significance is denoted at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 3: Effect of CPP Program on health outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Health insurance				
ID Card	0.0168***	0.0169***	0.0148**	0.0141**
	(0.00594)	(0.00583)	(0.00584)	(0.00581)
Observations	2234	2234	2234	2234
Outcome mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
R2	0.0035	0.0497	0.0516	0.0540
Panel B: Medical attention				
ID Card	0.0989***	0.0867***	0.0614**	0.0571*
	(0.0267)	(0.0279)	(0.0296)	(0.0296)
Observations	1190	1190	1190	1190
Outcome mean	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
R2	0.0116	0.0619	0.0718	0.0772
Panel C: Anxious (GAD-7)				
ID Card	-0.0271	-0.0338*	-0.0279	-0.0271
	(0.0170)	(0.0173)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
Observations	2235	2235	2235	2235
Outcome mean	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
R2	0.0011	0.0639	0.0689	0.0737
Panel C: Depressed (PHQ-9)				
ID Card	-0.0153	-0.0171	-0.00293	-0.00199
	(0.0157)	(0.0164)	(0.0174)	(0.0174)
Observations	2235	2235	2235	2235
Outcome mean	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
R2	0.0004	0.0577	0.0678	0.0700
Controls				
Sociodemographic	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor history	No	No	No	Yes

Note: Each column reports the OLS estimates of the CPP Program. The outcome variable is indicated by the panel title. Robust standard errors are used. Statistical significance is denoted at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 4: Effect of CPP Program on integration outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: IPL				
ID Card	0.0335***	0.0286***	0.0157***	0.0157***
	(0.00476)	(0.00465)	(0.00493)	(0.00493)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
R2	0.0217	0.1482	0.1823	0.1889
Panel B: IPL Psicological				
ID Card	0.0983***	0.0910***	0.0590**	0.0563**
	(0.0227)	(0.0235)	(0.0248)	(0.0248)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
R2	0.0083	0.0497	0.0595	0.0624
Panel C: IPL Navigational				
ID Card	0.0559**	0.0630**	0.0574*	0.0621**
	(0.0285)	(0.0290)	(0.0307)	(0.0307)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19
R2	0.0017	0.0438	0.0516	0.0566
Panel D: IPL Social				
ID Card	0.147***	0.139***	0.0611*	0.0620*
	(0.0333)	(0.0331)	(0.0346)	(0.0346)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.13
R2	0.0087	0.1024	0.1295	0.1352
Panel E: IPL Political				
ID Card	0.186***	0.107***	0.0117	0.0108
	(0.0391)	(0.0395)	(0.0411)	(0.0411)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
R2	0.0101	0.1051	0.1319	0.1394
Panel F: IPL Economical				
ID Card	0.0954***	0.0877***	0.0658**	0.0658**
	(0.0272)	(0.0267)	(0.0282)	(0.0283)
Observations	2236	2236	2236	2236
Outcome mean	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
R2	0.0055	0.1205	0.1386	0.1413
Panel G: Felt discriminated				
ID Card	0.0261	0.0204	0.00744	0.00778
	(0.0212)	(0.0218)	(0.0229)	(0.0229)
Observations	2229	2229	2229	2229
Outcome mean	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52
R2	0.0007	0.0463	0.0611	0.0708
Controls				
Sociodemographic	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration	No	No	Yes	Yes
Labor history	No	No	No	Yes

Note: Each column reports the OLS estimates of the CPP Program. The outcome variable is indicated by the panel title. Robust standard errors are used. Statistical significance is denoted at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 5: Heterogeneus effects of CPP Program on labor market outcomes

	(1) Female	(2) Male	(3) Low Education	(4) High Education	(5) Young Adults	(6) Adults
Panel A: Employed						
ID Card	-0.0387*	0.0178	0.00610	-0.0338	0.00549	-0.0167
	(0.0227)	(0.0196)	(0.0196)	(0.0251)	(0.0203)	(0.0235)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel B: Income (Ln)						
ID Card	0.147*	0.0750	0.124**	0.0362	0.170**	0.0468
	(0.0781)	(0.0549)	(0.0590)	(0.0729)	(0.0703)	(0.0618)
Observations	928	858	1192	594	916	870
Panel C: Written contract						
ID Card	0.0129	0.0164	0.0182*	0.0203	0.0219*	0.00961
	(0.00931)	(0.0142)	(0.0105)	(0.0142)	(0.0119)	(0.0120)
Observations	1005	918	1286	637	978	945
Panel D: Work health insurance						
ID Card	0.00331	0.0160*	0.00642	0.0232***	0.0111	0.0152
	(0.00777)	(0.00945)	(0.00885)	(0.00840)	(0.00813)	(0.0100)
Observations	1005	918	1286	637	978	945
Panel E: Social Security						
ID Card	0.00139	0.00429	0.00512	0.00399	0.00535	0.00530
	(0.00448)	(0.00299)	(0.00474)	(0.00313)	(0.00355)	(0.00549)
Observations	1005	918	1286	637	978	945
Panel F: Working hours						
ID Card	-0.0866	-3.579**	0.00564	-5.042***	-2.258	-0.902
	(1.545)	(1.608)	(1.351)	(1.946)	(1.471)	(1.700)
Observations	1005	918	1286	637	978	945
Panel G: Overqualified						
ID Card	-0.00601	-0.00237	0	-0.0143	-0.00401	-0.00540
	(0.00548)	(0.00860)	(.)	(0.0144)	(0.00769)	(0.00601)
Observations	1073	942	1286	729	1006	1009

Note: Each column reports the OLS estimates of the CPP Program for a different subsample: (1) Female, (2) Male, (3) Less than tertiary education, (4) Tertiary education or more, (5) Adults under 30, and (6) Adults over 30. All regressions include controls for demographic, migration, and labor history variables. The outcome variable is indicated by the panel title. Robust standard errors are used. Statistical significance is denoted at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 6: Heterogeneus effects of CPP Program on social services outcomes

	(1) Female	(2) Male	(3) Low Education	(4) High Education	(5) Young Adults	(6) Adults
Panel A: Health insurance						
ID Card	0.00680	0.0148	0.0110	0.0195*	0.0101	0.0170***
	(0.00764)	(0.00911)	(0.00729)	(0.0104)	(0.0101)	(0.00652)
Observations	1214	1020	1506	728	1111	1123
Panel B: Medical attention						
ID Card	0.0467	0.0568	0.0539	0.0777	0.0513	0.0688*
	(0.0387)	(0.0519)	(0.0373)	(0.0511)	(0.0441)	(0.0413)
Observations	736	454	765	425	575	615
Panel C: Anxious (GAD-7)						
ID Card	-0.0249	-0.0378	-0.0216	-0.0499	-0.0386	-0.0318
	(0.0274)	(0.0245)	(0.0220)	(0.0341)	(0.0261)	(0.0267)
Observations	1213	1022	1506	729	1112	1123
Panel C: Depressed (PHQ-9)						
ID Card	-0.0145	0.00869	0.0186	-0.0529*	0.0151	-0.0314
	(0.0258)	(0.0232)	(0.0217)	(0.0305)	(0.0251)	(0.0242)
Observations	1213	1022	1506	729	1112	1123

Note: Each column reports the OLS estimates of the CPP Program for a different subsample: (1) Female, (2) Male, (3) Less than tertiary education, (4) Tertiary education or more, (5) Adults under 30, and (6) Adults over 30. All regressions include controls for demographic, migration, and labor history variables. The outcome variable is indicated by the panel title. Robust standard errors are used. Statistical significance is denoted at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 7: Heterogeneus effecte of CPP Program on integration outcomes

	(1) Female	(2) Male	(3) Low Education	(4) High Education	(5) Young Adults	(6) Adults
Panel A: IPL						
ID Card	0.0134**	0.0184**	0.0216***	0.00208	0.0235***	0.00798
	(0.00661)	(0.00791)	(0.00597)	(0.00917)	(0.00695)	(0.00725)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel B: IPL Psicological						
ID Card	0.0325	0.0842**	0.0641**	0.0387	0.0633*	0.0431
	(0.0338)	(0.0381)	(0.0312)	(0.0429)	(0.0352)	(0.0359)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel C: IPL Navigational						
ID Card	0.0782*	0.0611	0.111***	-0.0433	0.125***	0.00137
	(0.0408)	(0.0487)	(0.0374)	(0.0583)	(0.0419)	(0.0465)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel D: IPL Social						
ID Card	0.0733	0.0727	0.0551	0.0836	0.125**	-0.000121
	(0.0462)	(0.0551)	(0.0424)	(0.0622)	(0.0498)	(0.0497)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel E: IPL Political						
ID Card	0.0328	-0.0264	0.0377	-0.0502	-0.0225	0.0434
	(0.0537)	(0.0663)	(0.0493)	(0.0784)	(0.0563)	(0.0610)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel F: IPL Economical						
ID Card	0.0214	0.0932**	0.0931***	-0.00846	0.0955**	0.0398
	(0.0396)	(0.0420)	(0.0354)	(0.0497)	(0.0401)	(0.0412)
Observations	1214	1022	1507	729	1112	1124
Panel G: Felt discriminated						
ID Card	0.0122	-0.0115	0.00735	-0.0111	0.00435	0.0156
	(0.0312)	(0.0348)	(0.0284)	(0.0412)	(0.0334)	(0.0325)
Observations	1213	1016	1501	728	1107	1122

Note: Each column reports the OLS estimates of the CPP Program for a different subsample: (1) Female, (2) Male, (3) Less than tertiary education, (4) Tertiary education or more, (5) Adults under 30, and (6) Adults over 30. All regressions include controls for demographic, migration, and labor history variables. The outcome variable is indicated by the panel title. Robust standard errors are used. Statistical significance is denoted at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.