

ENCUENTROS



*Illicit:
How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats
Are Hijacking the Global Economy*

Lecture by
Moisés Naím

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The IDB Cultural Center was created in 1992 and has two primary objectives: 1) to contribute to social development by administering a grants program that sponsors and cofinances small-scale cultural projects that will have a positive social impact in the region, and 2) to promote a better image of the IDB member countries, with emphasis on Latin America and the Caribbean, through culture and increased understanding between the region and the rest of the world, particularly the United States.

Cultural programs at headquarters feature new as well as established talent from the region. Recognition granted by Washington, D.C. audiences and press often helps propel the careers of new artists. The Center also sponsors lectures on Latin American and Caribbean history and culture, and supports cultural undertakings in the Washington, D.C. area for the local Latin American and Caribbean communities, such as Spanish-language theater, film festivals, and other events.

The IDB Cultural Center *Exhibitions* and the *Concerts and Lectures Series* stimulate dialogue and a greater knowledge of the culture of the Americas. *The Cultural Development Program* funds projects in the fields of youth cultural development, institutional support, restoration and conservation of cultural patrimony, and the preservation of cultural traditions. The *IDB Art Collection*, gathered over several decades, is managed by the Cultural Center and reflects the relevance and importance the Bank has achieved after four decades as the leading financial institution concerned with the development of Latin America and the Caribbean.

ILLCIT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Moisés Naím

Thank you all for making time in your busy schedules to come to this event and for providing me with this opportunity to discuss the book.

The central theme of the book is that illicit trade is changing the world. This is a bold statement to make because illicit trade has existed since time immemorial. The first time that any authority attempted to put an obstacle in the way of humans moving goods or themselves across territory by imposing restrictions, borders, and customs, illicit trade was born. To state that such movements now have acquired a new dimension, that they have different consequences, and that indeed they are transforming global politics, global economics, and the way we live is quite an assertion to make. But I am deeply convinced and I am here to try to persuade you that this is the case. If I don't do a good job here, you should go buy the book.

In the 1990s conditions developed that you are all very familiar with: national borders became less relevant, creating an environment that made the international movement of money, people, goods, ideas, and communications far easier and cheaper. I am talking about the Internet, the fact that airplane tickets became very inexpensive, and other ways the world has changed. For example, the ubiquitous prepaid telephone calling card in most countries has become as transformational and powerful a tool of globalization as the Internet. Most of you probably have in your wallets or purses the ATM card, which allows you to withdraw money anyplace in the world, allows you to send it anywhere in the world, and allows a free exchange of money. As you know, it is a very convenient tool for all of us. But it is also paradise for people involved in illicit trade.

This is just a small sample of the kinds

This lecture about the book, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy*, was delivered at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, D.C., on December 6, 2005, as part of the IDB Cultural Center Lectures Program.

of things that have facilitated trade in general, and illicit trade in particular. Illicit trade is, first, trade and then it is illicit. It is driven by the same forces and the same global conditions as conventional trade.

The changes seen in the 1990s were not only a result of the new technologies that emerged. There were also political changes that opened countries that had been inaccessible, that allowed widespread adoption of deregulation, elimination of controls on foreign exchange transactions, and the opening of financial sectors. It is important to note, also, that financial budgets were tightened in many countries, often with the result that there were fewer resources available to law enforcement and to the judicial system. The protections historically used by governments to ensure that they could monitor or even control the goods, people, and money that move across borders stopped working very well.

Illicit trade boomed in the 1990s and achieved impressive levels in terms of volume as well as in terms of their transformation of politics, entire industries, and lifestyles. One cannot really understand what is going on in China today without understanding illicit trade. One cannot understand how decisions are made in Russia without considering the workings of their illegal trade networks. The case is the same in the Balkans, Africa, and parts of Latin America. In a column I wrote recently I point out that at the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas, as the presidents of the region were having a furious debate about free trade agreements and where free trade was going or not going, illicit traders were

integrating the hemisphere very effectively.

The IDB has pioneered research showing that most of the money that goes to Latin America these days comes from poor Latin Americans, or Latin Americans in general, who have emigrated. Remittances are far more important as a source of capital in Latin America than foreign direct investment. An important part of those remittances are earned by people who are illegal workers, and very often the channels that they use to transfer those funds are also illegal and outside of traditional banking and financial circles.

In 2004, Latin America exported \$75 billion in agricultural products, but it is estimated that it exported something like \$400 billion in drugs. So, while free trade and free trade agreements may not be booming in Latin America, illicit traders certainly are integrating the continent at a very fast pace in a way that is transforming both the south and north of the hemisphere.

One cannot talk about certain regions without addressing the impact that illicit trade networks are having; nor can one think about nation building without thinking of illicit trade and smuggling. Ali Al-lawi, the former Minister of Finance of Iraq, told me that the smuggling and criminal networks that have become engrained in Iraq were as great, if not a greater challenge than the insurrection. He maintained that even if the insurrection and the war stopped, criminal activities and smuggling would continue and become an even more powerful and long-term trial for the country.

When we talk about financial sector

reform, about institution building, about what governments can do and the options in terms of using government as tools, using markets as tools, the topic of illicit trade becomes a critical part of this discussion. Until now it has been a blind spot in our conversations.

Let me tell you how I started thinking about the global impacts of illicit trade. I do not come to this with a background of law enforcement; I am not a lawyer; I am not a criminologist. I work at a magazine that has a sustained interest in the ways the world has been changing and how the world has been brought together by this transformation of forces: these are technology, politics, economics, and social conditions. In my work with the magazine I have traced some of the surprises of globalization, some of the very unexpected links among countries, peoples, industries, societies, and so on. These issues were on my mind when I visited Milan in the mid-1990s. On one of my walks I came upon a street vendor selling bags—very expensive Prada bags—that he was selling for a few liras. I started talking to him and very quickly discovered that he was as illicit as the bags that he was selling. He had been transported from West Africa and was indebted to the network of people who transported him. They first took him to North Africa and from there, in a rickety boat, to Italy. They provided him with some training and put him to work for long, long hours under horrible conditions. He earned very little money and most of the money was going to pay the debt to the traffickers. And the bag was, of course, the same bag being sold by Prada, except

that it was going to cost hundreds of times more in the real Prada shop, just two blocks away from the street vendor. On my way back from Milan I stopped in New York. As I was walking the streets of Manhattan I found a street vendor who was selling the exact same bag. He was also from West Africa, but from Senegal. He told me exactly the same story as the vendor in Milan. Then I spoke to the producers and owners of the original merchandise and discovered something of their world.

Now, think of what it takes to generate what I have just related to you. First, someone has to steal the design from Prada in Europe, or from Louis Vuitton, or Coach or any number of high-end companies. These companies are well aware that their designs are being stolen, so they are very careful about industrial espionage and protecting their intellectual property. Often these counterfeits hit the market before the original owners launch them. This is true also for software: hackers release new Microsoft operating systems before Microsoft does. Bono, the singer, once said that his most recent release was launched by thieves and available on the Internet before his label distributed it.

So, first you have to steal it from the original owners. In the case of the counterfeit Prada bag, you typically take the design to China, but it can be to many other places in the world. In China you procure all the necessary raw materials—the leather, zippers, buckles—everything that goes into these bags. These materials are nearly identical and very often are the same materials used in the authentic Prada bags. After that

you have to assemble it in the thousands, very often in the hundreds of thousands. Then you have to put it in shipping containers and distribute it all over the world. You count on having a distribution system that can launch these bags at the same time in Milan, Madrid, Paris, New York, and London, and who knows where else.

You must have a system to collect payments, since such an operation requires major financial backing. If you ask any international corporate manager about the financial and managerial challenges associated with an operation like this, they will tell you that they are huge. It requires highly sophisticated procedures: accounts receivable, just-in-time inventory management, accounts payable, human resource management, international trade, etc. Once all of the shipping containers are filled with bags, you have to link up with the networks that traffic in the people who then become your global retail chain.

Imagine what a challenge it is to carry out all of these transactions. Then imagine that each one of these transactions is a crime, which in fact is the case. This gives you a sense of the scale and significance of such an operation. It also gives a very clear sense that this is impossible to pull off without the help of governments: unless you have accomplices in several governments along this chain it will be impossible to create and supply this market.

The illustration involving the Prada bags has several implications. It shows how the traffickers in one market are linked to those in another. It shows how the traffickers and counterfeits and knockoffs are

connected and have strategic business alliances with those trafficking in people, for example. They, in turn, are connected to traffickers in drugs and in money. These are huge and complex operations. A lot of money is being made, and the money needs to be laundered.

When examining these other markets, I of course looked at the narcotics trade. The war on drugs and attempts to stop the drug trade were launched in the late 1960s by Richard Nixon in this country. Today the United States spends some \$40 billion trying to contain the importation and distribution of narcotics. Yet government statistics indicate that narcotics consumption continues to increase. The quality, purity, and price show no significant effect of the government's efforts to contain the trade, and it has grown immensely. Perhaps you remember the movie "The French Connection" with Gene Hackman. That was 1971, and the big drug deal involved 100 kilos of heroin in Marseilles. Last year the production of heroin just in Afghanistan increased by 2,000%; it was something like 70 tons. The international narcotics trade was estimated to be \$61 billion in 1991 and now is about a trillion dollars.

There have been many transformations in that market: there are new players, new products, and new entrants. Looking at this trade not from the criminal perspective but as a business, you will discover that it is booming. It is very effective at exploiting new technologies, including biotechnology. There are new strains of marijuana, for example, that are resistant to attempts at eradication. We usually think of mari-

juana being harvested in the tropics, but a new, very potent and sought-after variety is called “B.C. bud.” It is called this because it is grown in British Columbia, Canada, a very cold climate. Biotechnology applications allow this product to be harvested year-round in greenhouses. It is transported from that rugged terrain in kayaks, and the smugglers use BlackBerry devices to coordinate deliveries. Five to seven years ago, B.C. bud did not exist; today, the government estimates that the market is \$7 billion a year.

High-school students surveyed in the United States report that it is much harder for them to get a packet of cigarettes than a joint of marijuana. This is not an American phenomenon only, but it occurs globally. For example, Brazil used to serve primarily as a trans-shipment point for drugs produced in the region and shipped to Europe. It is now the second largest consumer of hard drugs in the hemisphere, after the United States. Narcotics are evolving from being harvested to being cooked. The future of drug production and consumption is no longer in agriculture, but in chemical labs, and very often in chemical labs that can be set up in basements. Lists of ingredients are available on the Internet, can be purchased over-the-counter at your friendly pharmacy, and then processed and sold.

I studied five major markets: drugs, weapons, people, counterfeit products, and money. I also examined some smaller markets that are growing very fast. For example, the international trade in human organs (kidneys, eye corneas, livers) did not exist a decade ago. It has appeared as a result

of innovations in medical technology that have lowered the risks in transplantation and increased the possibility of maintaining an inventory of organs that are usable for longer periods of time. The market in human organs is estimated to be \$3 billion annually.

Industrial waste is another market I examined. As countries develop more stringent environmental laws and constraints, companies that produce a lot of waste contract companies that are very efficient, conventional, and legal, and get paid to dispose of the industrial waste. However there is a secondary market for industrial waste, so the legitimate company may profit by selling the waste, which is then exported to countries that either have more lax environmental laws or more corrupt officials. International smuggling and dumping of industrial waste amount to some \$12 billion a year.

The weapons trade, and I am not talking about destroyers and jet fighters but small arms, has grown tenfold in the last decade. Data from the United Nations show that a thousand people are killed with small arms each day; 80% of the victims are women and children. Of the estimated 550 million small arms that are in circulation today, only 3% are in the hands of government, military, or police forces; 97% are in the hands of civilians and very often in the hands of insurgents.

There are treaties and other attempts to control the small arms trade, but there is no evidence that they are working. When was the last time that anyone in this room heard of an insurrection or armed guerilla move-

ment that went out of business because it could not get the weapons it needed? When have you heard of a guerilla movement, a group of committed individuals with money that could not get the weapons and ammunition to sustain a long-term campaign? Never. If you have the money, you'll get the weapons. In spite of embargos, blockades, international treaties, and criminal tribunals, the international trade in small arms is soaring.

Of course the big threat is not just the small arms that kill thousands. The trade in weapons of mass destruction or the elements to produce such weapons has become a very important issue. As we were transfixed watching the invasion of Iraq to preempt its use of such weapons, there was another gentleman, not Saddam Hussein, but A.Q. Khan, known as the father of Pakistan's atomic program, who quite anonymously conducted his own weapons business. A few years back he decided to go private and go global and created an international network smuggling the weapons, the technology, and the machinery to produce nuclear bombs. He was caught as he was trying to deliver a shipment of centrifuges to Libya and apparently has sold this technology to others. Khan had machining operations in Malaysia, partners in South Africa, banks in Oman and other Gulf states, operations in Pakistan, and was assisted by banks in Switzerland. A very senior intelligence officer told me that when all the information is revealed about A.Q. Khan's operations, he will go down as one of the biggest destabilizers of world security in the last fifty years. And essentially

what he was doing was illicit trade. He argues that he was promoting the creation of an Islamic atomic bomb, but the fact is that his operations were very lucrative and his sale of technology to North Korea had absolutely nothing to do with the notion of advancing an "Islamic atomic bomb."

In the process of doing this research I had a fascinating conversation with the Russian General Mikhail Kalashnikov, the inventor of the famous AK-47 assault rifle. He and his lawyer are in the process of suing the U.S. Government because of its purchase of thousands of counterfeit AK-47s to supply the new Iraqi National Army. Needless to say, he was very concerned that his weapon has been copied. The fact of the matter is that there is proliferation in the production of all kinds of counterfeit small arms, and not limited to the "usual suspects," everywhere in the world.

This brings me back to the counterfeit market I discussed earlier. It has grown to an estimated \$630 billion per year. It includes not only the fancy bags, running shoes, and Rolex watches, but aircraft parts. It also includes medicines that instead of curing, kill. It is transforming business models in entire industry sectors. There is no doubt that someone in the music business is thinking very hard about how to organize sales distribution in the future and what modalities to use to make sure the investment can be recovered. The same occurs with software, of course, and the movies.

I already mentioned the link between counterfeit products and the people trade. To give some context to what has occurred in the trafficking of humans, it took 400

years to traffic twelve million people from Africa to the New World. It took twelve years to traffic thirty million people in South East Asia alone. There are two components to this trade. First are the people who want to be trafficked, such as the Guatemalan woman, desperate to put food on the table for her children, who pays a “coyote” or the head of a trafficking network in Mexico or Guatemala to smuggle her into the United States.

The second component is forced transport of people, and it shows the most horrible aspects of this trade. The victims are most often children and women. Many of the women are from Central Europe, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, and from Turkey and the Balkans. They are enticed by being told that they will be taken to London to work at a pizzeria, or to Rome to work as a housekeeper. In fact, once the traffickers have them in their control, they are beaten, isolated, raped, and then forced into prostitution. There is a major network involving Brazilian and Colombian women who are trafficked to Japan, a major destination for Latin American women. There is also a very sophisticated operation involving Middle Eastern men who travel via Brazil and Mexico and are put to work in the United States.

Again, the point is that all of these operations are connected and initially the connection is through money. This trade generates huge revenues that have to be circulated and incorporated into the international financial system. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then the Managing Director of the IMF, said he thought that 2–3% of

global GDP was laundered. The estimates vary depending on whom you ask; no one really knows. But there is no doubt that it is growing.

After September 11 there were strong attempts to stop terrorists by cutting off their supply of money. There were all sorts of initiatives to try to stop money laundering. Banks were asked to write very systematically what their procedures are regarding reporting suspicious activity. “Know Your Customers” is a new rule requiring that all banks know who their clients are. In England alone, these new regulations cost some 11 billion pounds per year.

Early in 2005, Ted Truman and Peter Reuter, economists at the Institute of International Economics here in Washington, published a book presenting results of their four years of research about the impact of anti-money laundering efforts. What they report is very much in line with what I learned in Zurich one day when interviewing a banker. He specializes in managing the money of “high net worth” individuals, very wealthy clients, and provides them with services. I asked him whether all of the efforts to stop money laundering had made it more difficult for him to serve a client who brings in \$50 million and asks for his management services. And by “managing,” I meant moving it around the world, hiding it from governments, tax authorities, and the like. He smiled and said, “The only difference is that now I charge more.”

The research of Reuter and Truman involved sophisticated econometric and statistical analysis and a large number of interviews. They concluded that the prob-

ability of a money launderer being caught is highest in the United States at 5%. The probability of a money launderer being caught elsewhere in the world falls very quickly to zero.

I would like to summarize what these different types of illicit trade have in common. Four aspects are particularly interesting. The first is that in all cases illicit trade pits governments against market forces, and each case is about arbitrage—buying cheap here and selling dear there. The difference between “here” and “there” is usually a national border. In all of these cases there is the attempt to buy something that fetches a far higher multiple in pricing elsewhere. In all cases the governments are trying to contain this activity. In all instances it is a chronicle of politics against profits, of governments against markets.

The second shared element is that due to the changes that took place in the 1990s, illicit trade is no longer about geography, it is now global. What we are talking about, really, is smuggling. Smuggling used to be very regional, between two, three countries at most. Now it is global. Now you find Nigerian drug traffickers operating in northern Thailand; you find Ukrainian weapons traffickers in cahoots with the Colombian drug traffickers, who, in turn, are allied with the Russian mafia that launders money through the New York stock exchange; you find Chinese producers of counterfeit designer bags allied with human traffickers in West Africa.

Consider again the complexity, logistics, and management challenges associated with some of these transactions. In fact,

they are far easier to coordinate thanks to new technology. It is for this same reason that during the 1990s multinational corporations, NGOs, churches, orchestras, sports clubs, and all of us were able to become so much more international. Our reach grew, as did that of the terrorists. Of course, the same thing happened to these illicit traders who were subject to the same forces and the same impulses.

The third shared element is that in the 1990s national borders provided huge opportunities for the traffickers and a big headache for governments because the protections that I mentioned before dissolved. First, the border is what creates the arbitrage opportunity. It is thanks to the border that profits exist. Borders also create wonderful shields; the issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction implicit in the existence of borders protect criminals. If someone commits a crime in jurisdiction A and then quickly moves to jurisdiction B, the government can begin extradition proceedings. But such a procedure is very slow and clumsy and it involves multiple government bureaucracies working in very complex ways.

The natural habitat of governments is national, which is an important result of the changes that took place in the 1990s. Governments do well inside their own borders. Governments are not very well equipped to work elsewhere, in another jurisdiction or nation. Governments are creatures of domesticity; they are domestic. It is as artificial and difficult for a government to operate in another country as it is for any of us to work under water. To

work under water we need artificial lungs and all manner of support systems. Governments need as much artificial support to work in another country: they need treaties and agreements, multiple bureaucracies, embassies and ambassadors and consulates. Meanwhile, the habitat of illicit traders is across and in between. They thrive in between jurisdictions. It is the difference in jurisdictions that makes them potent. So while governments are hampered and contained by national borders and sovereignty, criminals thrive in their ability to move quickly across borders, which, of course, accelerated in the 1990s.

Again, what these different types of illicit trade have in common is: first, governments are pitted against the markets; second, the trade is not bounded by geography; and third, borders help traffickers and hinder governments. The fourth element shared, and this will not surprise you, is that in all cases governments are losing.

I could not find one single instance in which a government was winning the war or the battles. There have been occasional successes. Pick up a newspaper on any day and you will find news that a trafficking ring was busted; that someone was caught and sent to jail. But while it is difficult to find agreement on the numbers, no one would argue that the number of illegal transactions is lower now. Everyone who follows these trends would agree that in all cases governments' attempts to contain, to stop, and to shrink these markets have failed.

Again, consider the examples of the Swiss banker and money laundering; children in the United States being able to pro-

cure drugs more easily than cigarettes; the frustration of industries whose profits are being eroded by counterfeits; and illegal immigrants. During the 1990s, the number of illegal immigrants who entered the United States was about 500,000 per year. After September 11 massive efforts were made to try to stop people from illegally crossing the borders of the United States; there was a drive to fortify the borders and all sort of laws were passed making it very hard to get visas. A recent study shows that following the enactment of all of these laws, the number of illegal immigrants entering the United States since 2001 is 500,000 per year, exactly the same number who entered in the 1990s. This shows how difficult it has been to contain these markets.

Let me conclude by making a quick reference to a chapter in my book entitled "What To Do?"—a question that I am sure has crossed your minds. The first thing is to recognize the hypocrisy of the conversation about illicit trade. In most instances, when people talk about this trade, the notion is that it is a moral problem, that this has to do with bad values, that these are crimes committed by people who have no values. So, it is a moral problem and therefore the problem is best dealt with by courts, churches, and in classrooms. The courts put the criminals in jail, the churches teach values, and the classrooms provide the education that stops children and students from becoming criminals. Very seldom do you hear the notion that this type of trade is not driven by low morals but by high profits. The very strong economic forces at work here are touching very basic human

instincts. Asking governments to intervene where there are millions of customers eager to buy a Prada bag for a tenth or more of its store price is a difficult request.

There are things that can be done. The first is to use new technology to help contain illicit trade. It is not enough, however, to have a tool; technology in incompetent hands can be dangerous. It is very important to equip the organization that is going to use the tool, and by that I mean governments.

To equip governments to deal with this trade, two things need to take place. First is to defragment governments, and the second is to unburden them. By defragment I mean to take again the case of the United States: in the United States the public agency in charge of controlling money laundering is the Department of Treasury; the agency in charge of controlling counterfeiting is the Department of Commerce and Revenue; the agency responsible for narcotics is the Drug Enforcement Agency; control of weapons is in the Pentagon and Department of State; human trafficking is in Customs and Immigration. Of course these agencies talk to each other but it is very hard for government agencies to achieve good coordination.

Meanwhile, the traffickers are not specialized, but they are experts in transportation. One day they can transport DVDs, the next day they will be transporting people, and the third day they will be transporting drugs. What they are very good at is logistics. Of course there are traffickers specialized in certain markets, but the point is that illicit trade is not market- or prod-

uct-specific, it is function-specific. Governments must have a more integrated view that parallels in some way the criminals they are supposed to be fighting. But you cannot do that because now everything is criminalized.

The next thing is to unburden governments. By that I mean to take governments out of pursuing crimes that are very hard to deal with. I would rather have governments make sure that children and women are not traded internationally, than have scarce government resources spent on ensuring that Bono's latest DVD or the latest Microsoft software are not copied. Let Bono and the music and software industries find technologies that will make copying harder, and get the government to focus on the trade of weapons of mass destruction, of children, and of hard drugs—trade that is a much more serious threat to our security and individual well-being.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Moisés Naím', written in a cursive style.

Moisés Naím is Editor-in-Chief of *Foreign Policy*, one of the world's leading publications on international politics and economics, and winner of the 2003 National Magazine Award for general excellence. *Foreign Policy* circulates in 161 countries and is simultaneously published in eleven different languages.

Dr. Naím has written extensively on international political economy, economic development, international finance, world politics, and globalization's unintended consequences. His opinion columns have appeared in the *Financial Times*, *El País*, *Newsweek*, *Time*, *Corriere della Sera*, *Le Monde*, *Berliner Zeitung* and many other internationally recognized newspapers and magazines.

He is the author or editor of eight books including *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy*, a best-seller selected by the *Washington Post* as one of the best nonfiction books of 2005. *Illicit* has been published in over twelve languages and was the subject of a two-hour TV special produced by National Geographic Film and Television for worldwide broadcasting.

Dr. Naím is a member of the World Economic Forum's International Media Council which is composed of the 100 most influential media figures in the world. He is the Chairman of the Group of Fifty, a select network of CEOs of Latin America's largest corporations. He also serves as a board member of the National Endowment for Democracy and Population Action International.

Moisés Naím previously served as an executive director at the World Bank and directed policy studies on economic reforms at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served as Venezuela's Minister of Trade and Industry in the early 1990s. Prior to his ministerial position, he was professor and dean at IESA, a business school and research center in Caracas.

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Roberto Sosa (1930-), Honduran poet, editor and journalist, Casa de las Americas Award (1971), National Rosa Literary Award (1972), National Itzamna Literary Award (1980).
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Douglas Cardinal (1934-), Canadian architect, projects include Canadian Museum of Civilizations, and original proposal for U.S. National Museum of the American Indian.
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Roberto Suro (1951-), North American reporter for *The Washington Post*, former Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* in Houston, Texas, and Director of Pew Hispanic Center.
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Felipe Cárdenas-Arroyo, Colombian archaeologist from the University of Los Andes in Bogotá, CASVA scholar, specialist in pre-Hispanic mummification and human bone.
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Cynthia McLeod (1936-), decorated Surinamese author of the best-selling *The High Price of Sugar* and *Farewell Merodia*, specialist in 18th century Suriname.
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Salvador Garmendia (1928-2001), Venezuelan novelist, National Literature Prize (1970), Juan Rulfo Short Story Award (1989), literary magazine founder and editor.
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Gloria Guardia (1940-), Panamanian writer, journalist and essayist, member of the Panamanian Academy of Language, National Short Story Prize (Bogotá, 1996).
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Fred D'Aguiar (1960-), UK/Guyanese novelist and poet, Guyana Prize for Poetry (1986), Malcolm X Poetry Prize (1986), Whitbread First Novel Award (1994).
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Sergio Ramírez (1942-), Nicaraguan author of 25 books, Dashiell Hammett Award (1988), Alfaguara Award (1998), and former Vice-President of his country.
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Tomás Eloy Martínez (1934-), Argentine writer and journalist, Rutgers University professor, author of *Santa Evita* (1995), Argentina's most translated book (37 languages).
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Leopoldo Castedo (1915-1999), Spanish-Chilean art historian, scholar, and filmmaker who drove the length of South America twice, co-author of 20-volume *Historia de Chile*.
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Miguel Huezo Mixco (1954-), Salvadoran poet and journalist, cultural editor of *Tendencias* magazine, Director of National Council for Culture and Art (CONCULTURA).
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Nélida Piñon (1937-), decorated Brazilian author of *The Republic of Dreams* (1984), Juan Rulfo Award (1995), member and former president of the Brazilian Academy of Letters.
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María Susana Azzi (1952-), Argentine cultural anthropologist, Board Member of the Astor Piazzolla Foundation and the National Academy of Tango in Buenos Aires.
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Patricia Glinton Meicholas, Bahamian writer, founding president of the Bahamas Association for Cultural Studies, Silver Jubilee of Independence Medal for Literature.
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Camilo Herrera (1975-), Colombian sociologist and economist, founding director of the Center for Cultural Studies for Political, Economic and Social Development in Bogotá.
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Ronald Inglehart (1934-), North American political scientist, Director of Institute for Social Research at University of Michigan; and Wayne E. Baker, Faculty Associate.
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Néstor García Canclini (1939-), distinguished Argentine philosopher and anthropologist, Casa de las Americas Prize (1981), and Director of Urban Culture Studies at UNAM.
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Julio Escoto (1944-), Honduran novelist, National Literary Prize (1974), Spain's Gabriel Miró Prize (1983), José Cecilio del Valle Prize in Honduras (1990).
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Maria Grazia Mattei (1950-), Italian expert in new communications technology, founder of MGM Digital Communication, with remarks by artist Fabrizio Plessi.
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Marcos Aguinis (1935-), Argentine physician, former Minister of Culture in Argentina, Planeta Prize (Spain), Grand Prize of Honor by the Argentine Society of Writers.
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Darío Ruiz Gómez (1935-), Colombian art and literary critic, former Professor of Architecture in Medellín, published four books of poetry and five books of short stories.
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William Ospina (1954-), Colombian essayist, journalist, poet, and translator; National Literature Award (1992), Casa de las Americas Award (2002).
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Moisés Naím (1952-), Venezuelan Editor-in-Chief of *Foreign Policy* magazine, National Magazine Award for General Excellence (2003, 2007), author or editor of eight books.
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- *Translating Cervantes*
Edith Grossman (1936-), preeminent North American translator of Spanish language works, including García Marquez, Vargas Llosa, and her new version of *Don Quixote*.
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- *Panel on Culture and Development- Inauguration of Enrique V. Iglesias Conference Center*
Enrique V. Iglesias (1930-), distinguished Uruguayan economist and statesman, third President of the IDB (1988-2005), founder of the IDB Cultural Center (1992); Néstor García Canclini (see Encuentros No. 43c); and Gilberto Gil (1942-), Minister of Culture of Brazil, acclaimed musical composer, performer, and pioneer of *Tropicalia*.
No. 53, February 2005.
- *Cervantes and the Art of Storytelling*
Antonio Muñoz Molina (1956-), Spanish journalist, essayist and novelist, National Prize for Criticism (1988), National Award for Literature (1988, 1991), Planeta Award (1991).
No. 54, May 2005.

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