




# HOW DO **MIGRANTS** FARE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN?



Mapping socio-economic  
integration



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of the Republic of Korea



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
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# HOW DO **MIGRANTS** FARE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN?



Mapping socio-economic  
integration





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# Foreword

**Over the last decade, the migration landscape in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has changed significantly.** By 2022, the region had over 43 million Latin Americans and Caribbeans living outside their countries of origin, with almost a quarter of them residing in another LAC country. Additionally, the region faces the largest-ever displacement crisis in the Americas. Of the more than seven million Venezuelans who have left their country since 2015, 85% have settled in another country within the region.

**In this context, the socio-economic integration of immigrants is an increasingly high priority on the regional development and policy agenda.** For this reason, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have collaborated on this joint exercise that builds on OECD's previous experience in measuring migrant inclusion (OECD and EU, 2015, 2018, and 2023) as well as IDB's expertise in building data around the state of migration in Latin America and the Caribbean, and UNDP's presence on the ground and experience working with national and local governments in the region to advance their development priorities.

This report *"How do migrants fare in Latin America and the Caribbean? Mapping socio-economic integration"* provides a general overview of the state of socio-economic integration of migrants in 12 LAC countries by 2021. It presents a series of quantitative

indicators related with, for instance, labor market informality, self-employment, youth employment, school attendance, reading literacy and living conditions. This exercise also relies on selected policy indicators that shed light on the regulatory framework within which migrants' integration takes place.

This joint report focuses on the differences between the outcomes for the migrant and native-born populations within each country for which data are available. When migrants' outcomes are less favorable than those of the native-born population, it may reflect a failure to take advantage of the opportunities that migration may bring. It might also mean that social cohesion is at stake.

**The objective is to provide decisionmakers and policymakers in host countries with useful indicators to better understand where the gaps are in terms of migrants' integration and to help them identify the areas where they should focus their efforts and scarce resources.**

The report provides the evidence-base for socio-economic integration. Such integration is a key condition for migrants to improve their living conditions, but also represents a way to enhance their contribution to the economies and societies of their host countries. The report also provides for a benchmarking of outcomes and a mapping of policies, which are prerequisites for identifying areas of cooperation on integration across the region.

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# Executive Summary

**Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been experiencing significant changes in its migration patterns, coupled with a large increase in migration flows.** These changes started in the years 2010, mainly as result of the humanitarian crises in Venezuela and Haiti, but are also due to broader regional integration, notably within the Mercosur and Andean Community. Since mid-2010, the massive displacement of Venezuelans has led to an unprecedented increase in the immigrant population in many LAC countries. Between 2010 and 2020, the foreign-born share of the population increased in practically all LAC countries, except Paraguay – almost doubling in total. The twelve LAC countries analyzed in this report (plus Brazil) host close to 12 million foreign-born residents – around 2.2% of their total population. By comparison, in 2020, immigrants accounted for about 14% of the OECD population.

In the last ten years, the countries that experienced the largest increases of immigrant population include those hosting the largest number of Venezuelans— Colombia, Peru, and Chile. This has prompted countries to implement special permits and visas for the regularization of immigrants affected by these humanitarian crises. The recent regularization schemes have been implemented in Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru.

The needs of immigrants and their integration in the host country have increasingly become a high priority on the policy agenda of the region. However, little is currently known about immigrant characteristics and their socio-economic integration outcomes. This publication aims at filling this gap by presenting integration indicators of immigrants living in twelve LAC countries for which information is available – Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. Brazil is included in the education and policy indicators. This report presents the composition

of the immigrant population and compares the outcomes of the foreign- and the native-born populations in their education and skills, labour market participation, gender differences, and living conditions based on data available in household and labor force surveys. This report also discusses selected policy indicators to shed light on the regulatory framework within which integration is taking place.

The first and most salient finding is the vast difference in situations across the LAC region. It is often difficult to discern general trends that hold for all countries in the region. In contrast to what is observed for example in OECD-Europe, there is notably no overall picture of strong immigrant disadvantage across indicators and countries. That said, several general trends can be discerned.

**Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to be in employment in most LAC countries, but struggle to find formal and high-quality jobs**

**In most LAC countries, immigrants, particularly those aged 15–34, are more likely to be in employment and to participate in the labor market than their native-born peers.** What is more, immigrants are less likely to be unemployed than the native-born in half of LAC countries, while the reverse is observed in almost all OECD countries. Further, in most countries, the foreign-born experience less long-term unemployment than the native-born. And, unlike OECD countries, highly skilled occupations are more widespread among the foreign- than the native-born on average. In addition, only in four out of nine countries with available data (Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador), immigrants are overrepresented in low-skilled jobs, while this is true in virtually all OECD countries.

Despite this rather favorable picture, on average in LAC countries, immigrants are more likely to have an informal job than the native-born (52% and 45%, respectively). In Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic and Ecuador, the gap between groups is of at least 12 percentage points. In addition, immigrants not only face important barriers to finding formal jobs but also high-quality jobs. In most LAC countries, immigrants are more likely than the native-born to have temporary contracts, and to work long hours (50 or more hours per week). In addition, in LAC countries, a higher share of highly educated immigrants in employment holds jobs for which they are overqualified for compared to the native-born (27% vs. 19%, respectively). This difference is particularly high in Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.

### **Differences in living conditions between immigrants and the native-born tend to be small in LAC countries**

**While the prevalence of (relative) poverty is more widespread among the foreign- than the native-born in most OECD countries, the reverse is the case in six out of ten LAC countries.** Lower incidence of poverty among immigrants is especially observed in Chile, Panama, and Peru. In the Dominican Republic and in Trinidad and Tobago, however, poverty rates are higher among the foreign- than the native-born. Similarly, differences in housing conditions between immigrants and native-born are much smaller in the LAC region than in the OECD. Nevertheless, in around half of LAC countries, foreign-born are more likely than their native-born counterparts to live in overcrowded housing and substandard housing with lack of basic services (especially in Colombia and the Dominican Republic).

While there is a lack of comparable data on health outcomes, in all LAC countries, immigrants have access to public health services, although some migrants may only receive emergency care.

### **Immigrant children struggle to thrive at school, while immigrant adults have higher educational attainment than the native-born in most countries**

**In almost all LAC countries analyzed here (except Trinidad and Tobago), by law, children and adolescents have the right to compulsory public education and public early childhood care, regardless of their migration status.** Schools, however, face numerous challenges to host and integrate immigrant children, particularly in cases of mass influx. In half of LAC countries analyzed, foreign-born children are less likely to participate in school than their native-born peers, especially in Colombia and the Dominican Republic. This holds regardless of age group. At the same time, as in most OECD countries, foreign-born are more likely than native-born youth to lack basic reading skills at the age of 15, particularly in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico (difference between the groups is above 10 percentage points). They also tend to drop out of school earlier; and, after the end of their studies, they are more likely to be neither in education, employment, or training (NEET) than native-born youth, with marked differences (as high as 12 percentage points) observed in Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic.

While foreign-born children currently have poorer education outcomes than native-born kids, immigrants who arrived in LAC countries as adults usually have higher levels of educational attainment than their native-born counterparts. In eight out of twelve LAC countries, the share of working-age immigrants (aged 15 to 64) with tertiary education is higher than that of native-born (28% and 23%, respectively). This is especially true in Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Similarly, the share of low-educated people is much lower among immigrants than among the native-born population (33% versus 41%, respectively). This is a major difference with OECD countries where, on average, immigrants are overrepresented at both ends of the education spectrum.





# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 The changing outlook on migration in the Americas

The migration landscape in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has changed drastically over the past decade. Regional integration and the large-scale displacement from Venezuela—the largest ever displacement in the Americas and among the largest in the world—have led to a massive increase in the immigrant population in many countries in South America. There have also been significant changes in the regional migration landscape in Central America and ongoing displacement of Haitians across LAC. In this context, immigrant integration is an increasingly high priority on the policy agenda, but relatively little is currently known about immigrant characteristics and integration outcomes, especially on a comparative basis.

This publication sets out to fill this gap. Building on the OECD's experience with *Settling In* (a series of comparative reports, produced jointly with the European Commission, on immigrant characteristics integration outcomes in EU and OECD countries), this publication was developed jointly by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) using integration and inclusion indicators on migrants in LAC. In addition to core standard indicators (employment/unemployment rate, education level, etc.), it includes variables that are pertinent to LAC (labor market informality, marginalized self-employment, employment among young people, school attendance, reading literacy, living conditions, etc.) with a view to providing a broad benchmark of the current state of migrant integration in the region. These quantitative measures are complemented by select policy indicators collected by UNDP to shed light on the regulatory framework within which this integration takes place.

## 1.2 The value of international comparisons

Countries often face similar challenges in relation to the reception and integration of migrants, as immigrant populations differ from the native-born population in terms of sociodemographic and economic characteristics. In the short term, incorporating immigrants into the social and economic fabric of the host country often entails significant challenges. As a result, data on characteristics and outcomes that are comparable across countries enable policymakers and researchers to analyze differences in integration levels under different circumstances, to identify common challenges, and to provide benchmarks for national performance.

What is more, without measures of integration that are comparable across countries, it is difficult to identify effective policies and practices in order to share lessons to accelerate progress and avoid the repetition of errors.

## 1.3 How to measure integration

**Measuring the integration of migrants requires a clear understanding of what constitutes integration.** There are different ways that this can be approached and many dimensions along which migrants may integrate into receiving countries.

An initial approach to integration may consist of looking at the degree to which immigrants participate in different areas of the economy and society of their host country and their outcomes — employment and labor force participation rates, education, and living conditions, for example — and how they compare with the respective outcomes of the native-born population.

This report focuses on the differences between the outcomes for the migrant and native-born populations within each country for which data is available.<sup>1</sup> When migrants' outcomes are less favorable than those of the native-born population, it reflects a waste of potential for the host country. What is more, the acceptance of new migration by the host-country population greatly hinges on the outcomes of those already in the country.

## 1.4 Data

**The indicators in this report are predominantly based on data from household surveys, including labor force surveys and household income and expenditure surveys.** These surveys have large nationally representative samples; and, although they are not as comprehensive in terms of coverage as censuses and administrative data, they have several advantages. First, they gather detailed information on the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants that other sources do not, such as labor market participation rates, unemployment, household income, qualifications, and others. If they do not necessarily include immigrant-specific variables (such as detailed country of birth, duration of residence, migration categories), they allow migrants' situation to be compared with that of their native-born peers. Some household surveys include special modules on migration covering specific topics of relevance.

Second, household surveys are conducted on a regular basis. Labor force surveys, for instance are conducted on a monthly or quarterly basis ([Table 1.1](#)). Therefore, most indicators can be updated at least annually. By contrast, household income and expenditure surveys (e.g., CASEN in Chile) are conducted less frequently (every two or three years). In some countries, household survey data is made publicly available in a reasonably timely fashion. These data limitations restricted the countries that could be included in this study to a group of 12: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. In the other LAC countries, recent surveys either are not published or do not identify immigrants or include samples of immigrants that are not statistically representative.

The indicators in this report were constructed using the most recent data available. For most countries, the year of reference is 2021. However, for some non-OECD countries, the most recent year for which data was available was 2020 or before. In 2020, particularly during the second and third quarters of the year, survey response rates were affected by the pandemic, which reduced sample sizes ([Table 1.1](#)). Data from 2020 should thus be interpreted with caution, as it is likely to be affected by the nonresponse rate and possible biases that may result from these circumstances.

It is important to keep in mind that labor force surveys are not designed to produce statistics on immigrants. Consequently, they contain only a limited number of questions to identify and understand specific characteristics of immigrants (e.g., citizenship, duration of stay, whether they are returning migrants, etc.). They may also underrepresent the immigrant population as they only cover households living in ordinary dwellings.<sup>2</sup> In particular, they underrepresent immigrants living in an irregular situation or those in transit to other countries, which are non-negligible groups in many LAC countries. Furthermore, the sampling frameworks for labor force and household surveys are derived from censuses, and significant migration flows between censuses, as was the case recently in many countries in the region, can result in samples that are not fully representative of the current migrant population. Such challenges notwithstanding, these surveys are the most regular sources of sociodemographic data that allow comparisons to be drawn between the immigrant and native-born populations, thus providing insights into outcomes and the integration process.

When constructing indicators to make cross-country comparisons, one of the main challenges is harmonizing definitions to ensure comparability. Although the household surveys used in this study generally asked similar questions to gather the information for the indicators of interest, when countries use different questions that do not fit with the indicator definition, these countries are excluded from the respective analysis.

<sup>1</sup> This is but one of many ways that immigrants' integration can be measured. Other aspects, such as surveys of immigrants' perceptions of their experience or of the native-born population's perceptions of immigrants in general, are relevant for overall integration, but are not considered in this report.

<sup>2</sup> Ordinary housing is a place of residence that is not a hostel, group home, retirement home, military barrack, encampment, hospital, or prison.

**TABLE 1.1. Availability of Surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean**

	Country (survey name)	Last survey published*	Coverage of migrants	Statistically sufficient sample	Used in this report
Andean countries	 Bolivia (ECH)	2021/A	Yes	No	No
	 Colombia (GEIH)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Ecuador (ENEMDU)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Peru (ENAHO)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Venezuela (ENCOVI)	2021/A	Yes	No	No
Caribbean countries	 Bahamas (LFS)	2019/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Barbados (LFS)	2021/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Belize (LFS)	2021/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Guyana (GLFS)	2021/A	Yes	No	No
	 Haiti (DHS)	2017/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Jamaica (LFS)	2021/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Suriname (SLC)	2017/A	Yes	No	No
	 Trinidad & Tobago (CSSP)	2020/NA**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Southern Cone	 Argentina (EPH)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Brazil (PNADC)	2021/A	No	NI	No
	 Chile (CASEN)	2020/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Paraguay (EPHC)	2021/A**	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Uruguay (ECH)	2019/A**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mesoamerica and Mexico	 Costa Rica (ENAHO)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 El Salvador (EHPM)	2020/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Guatemala (ENEI)	2021/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Honduras (EHPM)	2021/A	Yes	No	No
	 Mexico (ENOE)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Nicaragua (ECH)	2021/NA	NI	NI	No
	 Panama (EPM)	2019/A**	Yes	Yes	Yes
	 Dom. Rep. (ENCFT)	2021/A	Yes	Yes	Yes

**Source:** based on data from each country's household surveys and IDB, 2022.

**Notes:** The initials in parentheses correspond to the name of the surveys (Spanish acronyms). LFS stands for *Labor Force Survey*, while the translations of the other names can be approximated for what it would be *National Household Survey* or *National Employment Survey*. Notes in page 21 contain the English names of the surveys used.

\* This column indicates that the whole year data were published, with a cut-off in September 2022. For this reason 2022 data were not used in this report. Also, the column contains the letters A (available) and NA (not available), which explain if the respective year data were available to be examined for this document.

\*\* For Trinidad and Tobago, Paraguay, and Panama, data from previous years were used in this report (2015, 2020, and 2019, respectively) since the most recent data were not available when research began, or the samples were reduced to a point they were not useful for this document. In Uruguay, data for 2019 was used since the questionnaire for the 2020 and 2021 surveys was reduced due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the migration-related questions were eliminated.

NI at the third, fourth and fifth columns means that there was No Information to determine whether migrants were covered or the sample of migrants was sufficient in the respective countries and years.

This is the case, for instance, with the share of people with an informal job, which is a key aspect of the labor market in LAC. This report uses the IDB definition of informality, thus taking into account the same set of questions across LAC countries, according to which informal workers are people who do not contribute to the old-age pension system. This measure is highly correlated with health insurance, unemployment, and other social security contributions and can be applied to both salaried employees and self-employed workers. Contributing to the pension system is the preferred measure for assessing informality because it is a stricter measure (a necessary and sufficient condition) of informality compared with contributing to financing the health system (more common but not a sufficient condition). For instance, in countries like Colombia, workers who contribute to the pension system must necessarily also contribute to the health social security system. By contrast, workers who contribute to the health system do not necessarily have to be affiliated with the pension system. In this sense, contributions to the pension system are a stricter measure of informality.

[Table 1.1](#) shows the data availability for the 26 IDB countries organized by subregions. It indicates whether on the cut-off date of this document the countries' microdata were available to be used to calculate the indicators and the year of the data. Additionally, an analysis was carried out regarding the effect of COVID-19 on this information, considering that many of the datasets used were captured in 2020. One possible consequence of the pandemic is that sample sizes were reduced as part of the survey could not be conducted in-person. This resulted in a fewer number of observations and questions, as well as the implementation of alternative sample frames and interview channels. In Uruguay and Panama in particular, the surveys in 2020 and 2021 did not correspond to their original formats and the questions that allowed the identification of migrants were eliminated. In other cases, the effect occurred in a reduction of the sample because some surveys were stopped during some quarters, in delays in the data collection where surveys were not conducted at all,

or in differences in the population coverage and response rates, if the survey was conducted by telephone only, for instance.

The main limitation of using household surveys to analyze migration is the reliability of the sample for this purpose. Household surveys do not oversample areas where migrants tend to concentrate because analyzing migrants is not their main objective. In addition, they only sample ordinary households, thus excluding some collective households, for instance. As a result, their statistical representativeness of migrants, especially irregular ones, may be less accurate.


As IDB (2022a) notes, considering that population censuses are usually carried out every 10 years, household surveys are carried out on a more regular basis. This is due to the constant need for up-to-date data to enable monitoring and decision-making on issues that change in the short and medium term, such as labor market participation rate, unemployment, and household income and expenditure. However, the sample, which must be statistically representative of the entire population, also needs to be representative for the migrant population itself, to fully grasp the differences in outcomes between the foreign- and the native-born.

To substantiate this, IDB (2022a) compares different sources of information to review the data from these surveys in the region and assess their reliability.<sup>3</sup> First, the study conducted a comparison between census data and household surveys and found that statistics derived from household surveys aligned with equivalent figures based on census data, at least in the years in which the latter were conducted. Among the countries used in this analysis, only in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Panama do the differences between survey estimates of the share of migrants in the population and current census estimates range between 0.5 and 1 percentage point (p.p.). This difference is smaller in other countries, such that household surveys can be said to accurately reflect the migrant population.

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<sup>3</sup> See also IDB (2020) for earlier work comparing outcomes for foreign- and native-born populations based on similar data sources.

**FIGURE 1.1. Differences in Migrants' population shares according to household surveys and censuses<sup>4</sup>**




**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the difference in the estimates of the foreign-born population.

These findings were subsequently compared with data from national censuses (figure 1.1). An average difference of -0.2% was found, which means that the household surveys tend to underestimate the share of migrants in the total population in comparison with censuses. Leaving aside the four countries for which no data was available, it was found that the difference between surveys and censuses exceeded 0.3 percentage points of population in four countries, across the Andean and Caribbean regions. By contrast, in five countries the difference between the two sources is less than 0.2 percentage points. Figure 1.1 shows the scale of the differences mentioned above.

The questions used in surveys to identify the target population of this report - “immigrants” - vary across countries (table 1.2). Wherever possible, identification through country of birth has been used—this was the case in the majority of countries. A few countries ask a slightly different question: mother’s place of residence at the time of the respondent’s birth (Chile, Costa Rica, and previously Uruguay). Only two countries ask for the respondent’s country of citizenship (Panama and Paraguay).

<sup>4</sup> The years of the household surveys (in the first term) and the years of the population censuses (in the second term) used were: Argentina (2010; 2010), Brazil (2010; 2010), Chile (2017; 2017), Colombia (2018; 2018), Costa Rica (2011; 2011), Dominican Republic (2010; 2010), Ecuador (2012; 2010), Honduras (2013; 2013), Mexico (2020; 2020), Nicaragua (2005; 2005), Panama (2011; 2010), Paraguay (2017; 2017), and Uruguay (2011; 2011).

**TABLE 1.2. Different Ways of Identifying “Migrants” by Country**

	Country (survey name)	Place of birth	Nationality/ country of origin	Mother’s place of residence at the time of birth
Andean countries	 Bolivia (ECH 2020)	Yes	No	No
	 Colombia (GEIH 2021)	Yes	No	No
	 Ecuador (ENEMDU 2021)	Yes	No	No
	 Peru (ENAHO 2020)	Yes	No	No
	 Venezuela (ENCOVI 2019)	Yes	No	No
Caribbean countries	 Bahamas (LFS 2014)	Yes	No	No
	 Barbados (LFS 2016)	No	Yes	No
	 Belize (LFS)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	 Guyana (GLFS 2021)	No	No	Yes
	 Haiti (DHS 2012)	No	No	Yes
	 Jamaica (LFS)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	 Suriname (SLC 2017)	Yes	No	No
	 Trinidad and Tobago (CSSP 2015)	Yes	No	No
Southern Cone	 Argentina (EPH 2021)	Yes	No	No
	 Brazil (PNADC 2015)	Yes	No	No
	 Chile (CASEN 2020)	No	Yes	Yes
	 Paraguay (EPHC 2020)	No	Yes	No
	 Uruguay (ECH 2019)	No	No	Yes
Mesoamerica and Mexico	 Costa Rica (ENAHO 2021)	No	No	Yes
	 El Salvador (EHPM)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	 Guatemala (ENEI 2014)	Yes	No	No
	 Honduras (EHPM 2019)	Yes	No	No
	 Mexico (ENOE 2021)	No	Yes	No
	 Nicaragua (ECH 2014)	No	No	Yes
	 Panama (EHPM 2019)	No	Yes	No
	 Dom. Rep. (ENCFT 2020)	Yes	No	No

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from each country’s household surveys.

In addition, indicators constructed using data from 2020 are affected by the negative impact of the pandemic on the employment and living conditions of both the native- and foreign-born populations. As elsewhere, the situation showed marked improvements in 2021. Overall, indicators remained below their 2019 levels, and the differential impact on immigrants over time varied across countries. It is important to consider such factors when analyzing the data.


[Figure 1.2](#) illustrates the effect of the pandemic on employment rates in the four LAC OECD countries. In all countries, employment rates decreased between 2019 and 2020 for both the foreign- and native-born populations. In 2021, however, they increased for both groups, returning to levels close to those observed in 2019, except in Costa Rica, where employment rates remained at 2020 levels. The gap between the foreign- and native-born remained practically unchanged during this period. In Chile and Colombia, however, this gap was somewhat wider in 2021, when employment rates

were higher among the foreign-born than their native-born peers.

### IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON RECENT FIGURES

**The report uses the most recent data available. For LAC OECD and G20 countries, the year of reference was 2021.** However, for some non-OECD countries, the most recent year available was 2020 or before. In 2020, particularly during the second and third quarters of the year, survey response rates were affected by the pandemic. As a result, data from 2020 should be read with caution as it is likely to be affected by the nonresponse rate and the corresponding biases. In addition, indicators constructed using data from 2020 are affected by the negative impact of the pandemic on the living conditions of both the native-born and foreign-born populations. The situation improved somewhat in 2021. All the same, it should be noted that some indicators remain lower than where they were in 2019. It is important to take these factors into account when analyzing the data.

**FIGURE 1.2. Employment Rates, 2019–2021**



**Sources:** Chile: ENE 2019–2021; Colombia: GEIH 2019–2021; Costa Rica: ECE 2019–2021; Mexico: ENOE 2019–2021.  
**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the degree to which the employment rate is higher for the foreign-born population.



## 1.5 Collection of policy indicators

To provide a normative and institutional background for the quantitative data collected, this report also provides a series of policy indicators. The construction of these indicators aims to provide context on the relationship between the policy decisions made regarding the integration of the migrant population in each of the 12 countries covered in the report and their outcomes in terms of actual integration, as measured by the quantitative indicators. The objective is also to better understand how integration data might evolve in the event of possible changes in the institutional and policy environment.

**The construction of the policy indicators began with the creation of a questionnaire focusing on seven key sectors:** (i) migration status and regularization; (ii) labor market; (iii) entrepreneurship and financial inclusion; (iv) education; (v) health and social protection; (vi) living conditions; (vii) social cohesion. The data collection was mostly completed through a desk review for the 12 countries included in the report.

The content of the initial desk review was validated by UNDP Country Office officials in each country, in close coordination with the respective national government teams in charge of migration issues. Finally, the migration focal points of the OECD countries included in the study validated and complemented the respective information.

## 1.6 Overview of this report

This report on indicators of immigrant integration in LAC contains six chapters, presenting 54 contextual and outcome indicators, along with 44 different migration policy indicators. The detailed list of context and outcome indicators is included in the annex to this document. Selected policy indicators are also discussed in the relevant chapters, such as policies on antidiscrimination, access to the labor market and social security, and access to education and the recognition of foreign credentials or qualifications, in the relevant chapters. For each indicator, the OECD averages for both the foreign- and native-born populations are also provided as a benchmark. As mentioned above, the OECD average is drawn from the *Settling In 2018* report (OECD, 2018).<sup>5</sup>

[Chapter 2](#) presents the size of the immigrant population, their duration of stay in the host countries, and their main countries of birth. It describes the sociodemographic context, covering the differences between the immigrant and native-born populations in terms of age, gender, marital status, household composition and family structure, and geographical concentration.

[Chapter 3](#) looks at the integration of foreign-born children and youth. This chapter covers the main indicators for children, including school attendance, educational outcomes, and the presence of children in the workforce. It also looks at educational attainment, an indicator that substantially impacts immigrants' life chances and that exerts a strong influence on the kind of job they can find. The chapter finishes by examining the labor market outcomes of immigrant youth aged 15 to 34 as compared to the native-born.

Immigrants' skills and labor market integration are presented in [chapter 4](#). The employment rate is often considered the single most important indicator of integration. Jobs are immigrants' main source of income and determines the social position in the eyes of their families and the host-country population. The extent to which immigrants participate in the labor market or face unemployment are key indicators that affect the risk of labor market exclusion. However, employment per se is not the only labor market indicator that needs to be considered: job quality is also important. Job quality indicators include type and formality of contracts, job skills, overqualification, occupational status, and wages.

[Chapter 5](#) covers gender-related aspects of immigrant integration. It starts by looking the composition of populations by sex, then focuses on foreign- and native-born women gaps and gender differences (men minus women) among both foreign- and native-born groups in different integration indicators. Migrants' past experience, which is often gendered, may play out differently in host communities and impact integration outcomes, particularly labor market outcomes, job skills, inactivity, and part-time work. How far inactivity and part-time work are voluntary is also gender specific. However, gender gaps also exist among the native-born. Disparities between immigrant men and women thus do not necessarily suggest


<sup>5</sup> *Settling In 2018* includes the 35 countries that were OECD member countries in 2018: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since its publication, Colombia and Costa Rica have joined the OECD, and will be included in future versions of *Settling In*, including the version published in 2023.





more or less successful integration but may also reflect, at least in part, structural gender disparities in the host-country labor market and society itself, as well as different choices by women and men.


Immigrants' abilities to generate sufficient income and meet essential needs such as decent housing and healthcare are crucial if they are to take their place in the host society. These living conditions are described in [chapter 6](#). Income is a decisive factor in many socioeconomic outcomes. Poverty adversely affects the well-being of immigrants in the host society in a number of ways. Housing is also a key factor in well-being. Immigrants' financial situation, their limited knowledge of the rental market, and discrimination in the housing market more broadly may restrict their choice of accommodation, pushing them to accept overcrowded or substandard housing.


## Data Sources and Issues by country


 **Argentina:** The Permanent Household Survey (EPH) only collects data in 31 urban areas across the country (that is, it excludes rural areas). It thus only represents Argentina's urban population, or around 63% of the total population. Given that immigrants tend to settle in urban localities in search of jobs, the EPH is likely to gather information of the great majority of immigrants (INDEC, 2021).


 **Bahamas:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Barbados:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Brazil:** The National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) has not gathered information on country of birth or nationality since 2016. The National Statistical Office (IBGE) confirmed that the census is the only source that collects such data. However, the last available census was conducted in 2011, meaning that it is out of date. It was thus not possible to include Brazil in this report. [See box 3.1](#) for some basic data from the Observatory of International Migration of Brazil that sheds light on the socioeconomic characteristics and demographics of regular immigrants.


 **Belize:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Bolivia:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Chile:** The household survey used in this report is the 2020 National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN). This survey uses two questions to identify immigrants: 1) mother's place of residence at the participant's time of birth and 2) country of birth. The National Employment Survey (ENE) collects information on a more frequent basis—the latest year available was 2021 and was used for labor market indicators for which no data was available in the CASEN. However, CASEN was used for the other indicators because ENE identifies immigrants by asking for respondents' nationality, which is not the preferred way of identifying them (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2020) and (INE, 2021a).


 **Colombia:** The Major Integrated Household Survey (GEIH) is a thorough survey that gathers detailed frequent data on the topics of interest in this report. However, the harmonization of the overqualification variable was not possible. The GEIH collects information on occupations. However, it uses a national classification system to group different occupations. It was thus not possible to match the national classification with the ISCO that is used in this report, so this indicator was not constructed for Colombia (DANE, 2021).


 **Costa Rica:** The Continuous Employment Survey (ECE) is one of the tools run by the National Institute of Surveys and Censuses of Costa Rica (INEC) to obtain constant information regarding the employed and unemployed population in the country. The information is compiled by quarter, at the national level. The issues that are examined include demographic, education-, and insurance-related characteristics, the economic characteristics of employment and unemployment, and the income that people receive from their work. It is possible to analyze the effects of economic policies and events on the labor market using this data (INEC, 2021).


 **Dominican Republic:** The main purpose of the National Continuous Labor Force Survey (ENCFT) is to obtain information on the labor market through households. The results provide information on the level of economic activity in the country and other sociodemographic data, such as population, household, and housing characteristics. In this case, all the data gathered through the survey in 2021 was used. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (ONE, 2021).


 **Ecuador:** The National Employment, Unemployment, and Underemployment Survey (ENEMDU) is a statistical operation that is part of the Integrated Household Survey System. Its methodological design makes it one of the major statistical instruments for studying the employment situation in the country and profiling the labor market, the economic activity of Ecuadorians, and the population's sources of income. At the same time, it feeds into the System of National Accounts, administered by the Central Bank of Ecuador. In this case, all the data gathered through the survey in 2021 was used. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (INEC, 2021).

 **El Salvador:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Guatemala:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Guyana:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Haiti:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Honduras:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be


identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.

 **Jamaica:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Mexico:** The National Employment and Occupation Survey (ENOE) does not collect information on income or housing conditions. The alternative survey—the National Household Survey on Income and Expenditure (ENIGH)—does collect such data. However, at the time the indicators were constructed, the data from the most recent version of the survey (2020) had not been published yet (INEGI, 2021).


 **Nicaragua:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.


 **Panama:** The National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC) carries out the Multiple Purpose Survey to measure the labor market. Revised information on this topic is presented in this newsletter. The preparation of the sample and the final population estimates are based on the 2010 Population and Housing Census. The universe of the survey is the population aged 15 and over who usually reside in private homes. The reference week for the data obtained is the week before the interviews are carried out. In this case, all the data gathered through the survey in 2019 was used, since this is the only and thus the most recent database available for these calculations. It is also important to mention that the form of the survey was changed in 2020 and 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the questions that allowed immigrants to be identified were withdrawn. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (INEC, 2019).

 **Paraguay:** The main purpose of the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (PEHC) is to generate indicators on employment, unemployment, income, and other social and economic characteristics, which allow knowing the evolution of the well-being of the Paraguayan population. In this case, data was used only from the fourth quarter of the year 2020, since it this was the only and thus the most recent microdata base that allows


migrants to be identified through a sample that is statistically significant enough to be considered trustworthy. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (INE, 2021).


 **Peru:** Since 1995, the National Household Survey (ENAH) has allowed the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) to monitor indicators on living conditions. It is carried out at the national level in urban and rural areas in the 24 departments of the country and the Constitutional Province of Callao. Its objectives are as follows: i) generate indicators that provide insight into how poverty, welfare, and the living conditions of households in Peru are evolving; ii) carry out diagnoses on the living conditions and poverty of the population; iii) measure how far food- and nonfood-based social programs improve the living conditions of the population; and iv) serve as a source of information for public and private institutions, as well as researchers. In this case, all the data gathered through the survey in 2021 was used. In this case, all the applications that were made in the survey in 2021 are used. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (INEI, 2021).

 **Surinam:** The indicators for this country are not calculated, since there is no microdata available since 2015 that allows immigrants to be identified with a statistically sufficient sample to make reliable measurements.

 **Trinidad and Tobago:** The Continuous Sample Survey of Population (CSSP) is a multipurpose household survey whose primary objective

is to provide up-to-date data on the labor force characteristics of the population of Trinidad and Tobago on a continuing basis. It is also a vehicle for collecting data on other subjects of interest to both government and private agencies for the purposes of planning and formulating policies. In this case, all the data gathered through the survey in 2015 was used, as this is the only and thus the most recent database available for these calculations. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (CSO, 2015).

 **Uruguay:** The Continuous Household Survey provides official indicators on the labor market (activity, employment and unemployment) and income of households and individuals on a monthly, quarterly, six-monthly and annual basis. It is also used to estimate the proportion of households and people below the poverty and extreme poverty line on an annual basis. It constitutes the basis for studies on various topics, including health, education, and housing conditions. This survey has been carried out continuously by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) since 1968. In this case, all the data gathered through the survey in 2019 was used, since the form of the survey was changed in 2020 and 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the questions that allowed immigrants to be identified were withdrawn. The way that immigrants are identified is through the respondent's country of birth or the country in which their mother lived when the respondent was born (INE, 2019).

 **Venezuela:** The indicators were not calculated for this country as no microdata going back to 2015 is available that allows immigrants to be identified using a sample that is statistically sufficient for making reliable measurements.



## 2. COMPOSITION OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS

**Unlike in previous decades, LAC countries have recently become recipients of large successive waves of immigration over the 2010-2020 period.**

The sociodemographic factors that affect immigrant integration outcomes include age, gender, family structure, living conditions, and geographic concentration. In addition to these factors, which also apply to the native-born, there are certain determinants that are specific to immigrants, such as entry category, length of stay, and region of origin. Understanding how these aspects differ from country to country and how immigrants compare with the native-born population is a prerequisite for understanding integration outcomes.

A large percentage of immigrants move because they have been offered a job, while others simply seek better economic circumstances for themselves and their families. Migrants' country of origin is also an important factor, since the functioning and quality of education systems affect their capacity to integrate in the host country. Another significant variable in this regard is the duration of stay in the host country, since integration

varies over time, generally tending to improve. With increasing duration of stay, migrants acquire country-specific social and human capital such as language, customs, social networks, and a better understanding of how the education system and labor market work. This chapter seeks to explain these variables and show the sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants and their households in LAC.

This chapter looks at the sizes of immigrant populations ([indicator 2.1](#)), their duration of stay and countries of birth ([indicator 2.2](#)), and their geographical concentration ([indicator 2.3](#)). It also considers their age-related composition ([indicator 2.4](#)) and analyzes their partnership/marital status ([indicator 2.5](#)) and household composition ([indicator 2.6](#)). Finally, it considers migration status, with an estimation of migrants in an irregular status ([Indicator 2.7](#)), the migrant regularization processes ([Indicator 2.8](#)), the visa schemes provided by countries ([Indicator 2.9](#)), and social cohesion indicators ([Indicator 2.10](#)).



## 2.1 Size of the immigrant population



**Definition:** The immigrant population refers to all people born outside the country in which they are resident. It notably includes refugees and asylum seekers, although these cannot be identified separately in the data. The immigrant population is also referred to as “the foreign-born.”

**Coverage:** Total population, foreign- and native-born, all ages.

The twelve LAC countries analyzed in this report host close to 11 million foreign-born residents—around 3.3% of their total population. Brazil is home to an additional 1 million foreign-born individuals, such that immigrants account for a total of 12 million people living in these thirteen LAC countries, or 2.2% of their population. The rest of the IDB borrowing member countries<sup>6</sup> are home to around 3 million foreign-born individuals. This report thus portrays the situation of around 80% of migrants in the IDB LAC area. In the OECD area, by contrast, the foreign-born share of the population is three times that of LAC countries. In 2020, immigrants accounted for 14.1% on average of the OECD population or 136 million individuals. In 2020, the only LAC OECD countries were Chile and Mexico, and their shares of migrants were smaller. Excluding these two countries from the OECD average does not significantly affect the overall share of migrants in the total population, which remains at 11.7%.

Between 2010 and 2020, the share of the foreign-born population doubled in the thirteen LAC countries examined in this indicator (going from 1.1% to 2.2% or in absolute terms from 5.5 million to 11.9 million people). An increase was observed in practically all LAC countries except Paraguay, where there was a small decrease (-0.2 p.p.). The countries where the number and share of immigrants increased the most include those hosting the largest number of Venezuelans—that is, Colombia, Peru, and Chile. In these countries, the share of foreign-born individuals increased by


more than 3 p.p. In Colombia, the country that has received the largest share of Venezuelan migrants, the share of immigrants increased around tenfold over the past decade (going from 0.3% to 3.7%). However, as Colombia has a population of over 50 million, Venezuelans and other migrants still represent only a relatively small share of the total.

In 2020, the country in the region hosting the largest number of immigrants was Argentina (2.3 million immigrants), where the foreign-born represented 5% of the total population. Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil also host large numbers of immigrants, with more than one million each ([figure 2.1](#)). In relative terms, the two countries with the highest proportion of immigrants are Costa Rica and Chile, with 10.2% and 8.6%, respectively ([figure 2.2](#)). By contrast, the countries with the lowest proportions are Brazil and Mexico, where less than 1% of the population is foreign-born. These low percentages are explained by the size of the two countries’ total populations—210 million and 130 million, respectively.

Costa Rica’s high share of immigrants (10.2%) reflects the large numbers of foreign-born individuals from neighboring Nicaragua (71.0%), as well as smaller shares from Colombia (5.2%) and El Salvador (3.4%) ([table 2.1](#)). Chile’s share (8.6%) is explained by historical flows of migrants from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru and by recent arrivals of large numbers of Haitians and Venezuelans. The latter represent now 30% of all the foreign-born in the country.


<sup>6</sup> The IDB LAC area includes 26 countries: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

**FIGURE 2.1. Size of the Immigrant Population by Country**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the size of the foreign-born population.

**FIGURE 2.2. Foreign-Born Share of Population, 2010 and 2020**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the percentage of the foreign-born population.





## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Around 12 million foreign-born individuals live in the 13 LAC countries analyzed in this indicator—about 2.2% of these countries' populations. This is well below the average in the OECD, where the foreign-born account for 14% of the total population on average.
- ➔ Almost one-fifth of all immigrants in LAC live in Argentina (2.3 million immigrants). Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil have the next-largest immigrant populations, hosting more than one million each.
- ➔ Between 2010 and 2020, the foreign-born share of the population increased in practically all the LAC countries analyzed except Paraguay. The countries that experienced the largest increases include those hosting the largest number of Venezuelans—Colombia, Peru, and Chile.
- ➔ The two countries with the highest proportions of immigrants are Costa Rica and Chile, with 10.2% and 8.6%, respectively. The countries with the lowest proportions are Brazil and Mexico, where less than 1% of the population is foreign-born.

## 2.2 Duration of stay and countries of origin



**Definition:** *Duration of stay* refers to the length of time that has elapsed since an immigrant's year of arrival. This indicator considers foreign-born individuals with five or more years (which is the typical question asked in household surveys and censuses) of residence to be settled immigrants and those with under five years of residence to be recent arrivals.

*Country of origin* presents immigrants' three top countries of birth.

**Coverage:** Total population, foreign- and native-born, all ages.

The duration of stay in the destination country shows marked differences across countries. On the one hand, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay host the largest shares of settled migrants: more than two-thirds of the foreign-born have lived in the country for five or more years. Indeed, in Argentina, a country that has been receiving migrants for many years, almost 90% of the foreign-born are long-term migrants. Conversely, the countries that have recently received large numbers of Venezuelan migrants have the smallest shares of long-term immigrants. These countries include Colombia, Peru, and Chile, where long-term migrants account for 25%, 33%, and 44% of the totals, respectively.

In most countries, the top country of birth for immigrants is a neighboring country. For example, the top country of birth for migrants living in the Dominican Republic is Haiti; in Paraguay, it is Brazil; in Costa Rica, it is Nicaragua; in Ecuador, it is Colombia; and in Argentina, it is Paraguay ([table 2.1](#)). The exceptions are Chile and Peru, where Venezuela is the top country of birth. As a result, Venezuelans represent the largest share of the foreign-born in four countries: Colombia (92%), Peru (84%), Chile (31%), and Brazil (18%). They also represent the second- and third-largest shares of immigrants in Panama (20%), Trinidad and Tobago (13%), and Mexico (4%).

For the 13 countries analyzed here taken together, Venezuela is the top country of birth for all immigrants. Moreover, Venezuelans represent around 30% of all foreign-born individuals in these countries (table 2.1). Estimates from the Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V) suggest a higher share. According to its calculations, in 2020, around 6 million of the foreign-born people living in all LAC countries were born in Venezuela; that is, approximately 40% of all immigrants in LAC area.<sup>7</sup>


The second-most-important country of birth for all migrants in the LAC countries presented here is the United States. US-born individuals account for 8% of all migrants residing in these 13 countries. They represent the largest share of the foreign-born in Mexico (66%) and the second-largest share in Colombia (2%), the Dominican Republic (3%), and Ecuador (7%). However, these figures need to be interpreted with caution. As explained in box 2.1, most US-born migrants living in Mexico are the children of returning migrants. This is likely to be the case for many or most of the

US-born living in other LAC countries as well. The characteristics of US-born individuals differ from the rest of the foreign-born population, but they may still struggle to integrate into the country if they have spent a long time abroad.

A further 8% of all migrants living in these countries were born in Haiti, making it the third-most-important country of birth for migrants in LAC. Haitians represent the largest share of the foreign-born in the Dominican Republic (87%), the second-largest share in Brazil (15%), and the third-largest share in Chile (13%). Large flows of Haitians began to arrive in LAC countries after the devastating 2010 earthquake.

A smaller but nonetheless significant share of migrants in the region were born in Colombia (5%). Colombians moving abroad reside in several neighboring countries. They represent the largest share of the foreign-born population in Ecuador and Panama (50% and 26%, respectively) and the second-largest share of migrants in Peru and Costa Rica (4% and 5%, respectively).

**FIGURE 2.3. Migrants' Duration of Residence, 2021 or most recent year**

















**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the percentage of the foreign-born population who have lived in the host country for five or more years.

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants>.



**TABLE 2.1. Top Three Countries of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population in LAC, 2020**

Host country	Country of birth 1		Country of birth 2		Country of birth 3		Sum top 3
 Colombia	Venezuela	92%	United States	2%	Ecuador	1%	95%
 Dominican Republic	Haiti	87%	United States	3%	Spain	1%	91%
 Peru	Venezuela	84%	Colombia	4%	Spain	1%	89%
 Paraguay	Brazil	47%	Argentina	36%	Uruguay	2%	85%
 Costa Rica	Nicaragua	71%	Colombia	5%	El Salvador	3%	80%
 Mexico	United States	66%	Guatemala	5%	Venezuela	4%	75%
 Uruguay	Argentina	35%	Spain	21%	Brazil	16%	71%
 Ecuador	Colombia	50%	United States	7%	Peru	4%	61%
 Argentina	Paraguay	31%	Bolivia	19%	Chile	10%	60%
 Chile	Venezuela	31%	Peru	16%	Haiti	13%	60%
 Panama	Colombia	26%	Venezuela	20%	Nicaragua	9%	55%
 Trinidad and Tobago	Guyana	18%	Grenada	15%	Venezuela	13%	45%
 Brazil	Venezuela	18%	Haiti	15%	Bolivia	6%	39%
 LAC (13)	<b>Venezuela</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>Haiti</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>45%</b>



## MAIN FINDINGS

- The share of long-term immigrants (those who have lived in the country for five or more years) varies widely across countries. The largest shares were observed in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay (where long-term residents account for more than two-thirds of the total) and the smallest shares were in Colombia and Peru (where they represent one-third or less).
- In most countries, the top country of origin for migrants is a neighboring country, except in Chile and Peru, where Venezuelans represent the largest share of migrants.
- Venezuelans represent the largest group of foreign-born individuals (i.e., Venezuela is the top country of birth) in Colombia (92% of all immigrants), Peru (84%), Chile (31%), and Brazil (18%). They also represent the second- and third-largest group of immigrants in Panama (20%), Trinidad and Tobago (13%), and Mexico (4%).
- Around 30% of the foreign-born in all the LAC countries examined here were born in Venezuela. An additional 8% were born in Haiti and the United States.

## Box 2.1. Mexico's Foreign-Born Population

**In 2021, around 1% of the population living in Mexico were foreign-born—that is, around 1.2 million people.** Two-thirds of this population was born in the United States (67%), and the rest was born in neighboring Guatemala (6%), Honduras (2%), and Venezuela (1%). A large proportion of the immigrants that were born in the United States are the children of returning migrants. That is, they are the children of people born in Mexico who migrated to the United States, had children while living there, and went back to their country of origin. Our estimates show that around 85% of US-born children (under the age of 15) reside in households where all the responsible individuals are native-born. Therefore, Mexico has the highest young-age dependency ratio across all LAC and OECD countries. Conversely, only 4% of US-born children reside in households where all the responsible individuals are foreign-born.

The indicators in this report show that foreign-born individuals residing in Mexico have different profiles than the foreign-born residing in other LAC countries. This box examines the characteristics of the foreign-born population in Mexico by country of birth, specifically comparing US-born immigrants with immigrants born elsewhere.


Overall, US-born immigrants differ significantly from the rest of the foreign-born population in Mexico. The main difference is in the age structure of this group: the US-born are younger than the rest ([figure 2.1.1](#)). While around half of US-born immigrants are under 15, only 11% of immigrants born in other countries are in this age group. In addition, the share of youth (15-24) is much larger among US-born immigrants than among other immigrants (31% and 11%, respectively). Consequently, the share of the working-age population (15-64) is much smaller among US-born immigrants than among other foreign-born individuals (47% versus 77%, respectively). This has an impact

on employment indicators, which focus on the working-age population. Regarding place of residence, US-born immigrants are less likely to live in urban areas (45%) than other foreign-born individuals (65%). As explained below, most US-born immigrants are returning migrants. This type of immigrants may not be as attracted to urban locations as other immigrants as they are likely to go back to the rural areas where they lived before migrating to the United States. Their labor market outcomes may therefore also be impacted by differences in employment opportunities between rural and urban areas.

In terms of education and employment outcomes, marked differences emerged among the foreign-born according to the country of birth ([figure 2.1.2](#)). US-born immigrants are less likely to have high levels of educational attainment than the rest of the foreign-born population (22% and 41%, respectively), but they are somewhat more likely to be highly educated than the native-born population (18%). On the other hand, the US-born have a smaller share of low-educated individuals (29%) compared with other foreign-born groups (38%) and the native-born (55%).


In terms of employment, because the US-born are younger on average, they have lower employment rates than the rest of the foreign-born population (41% versus 65%, respectively). Their employment rates are also markedly lower than those of the native-born (61%). The US-born also have a higher share of informality (76%) than the rest of the foreign-born population (56%) and the native-born population (55%). US-born immigrants also differ from those born in other countries in terms of overqualification: they are more likely to hold jobs for which they are overqualified than immigrants born in other countries (40% and 33%), but they have similar overqualification rates to their native-born counterparts (42%).

**FIGURE 2.1.1. Age Structure and Place of Residence of the Foreign-Born Population in Mexico, by Country of Birth**



Source: ENOE (2021).

**FIGURE 2.1.2. Employment and Educational Outcomes of the Foreign-Born in Mexico, by Country of Birth**




Source: ENOE (2021).

To better understand the patterns observed in figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, we disaggregate the US-born population into two groups according to whether both responsible adults (the heads of household) were native-born (i.e., possible returning migrants) or foreign-born. Figure 2.1.3 confirms that the US-born population living in households where both heads are native-born is driving the differences observed among the foreign-born residing in Mexico. Households falling into this group have the youngest population among the foreign-born in Mexico, the lowest share of highly educated people, the highest share of low-educated individuals, the lowest employment rates, and the lowest overqualification rates. This group accounts for almost half of all the foreign-born in Mexico and more than one-third of the working-age foreign-born, such that it has a significant influence on the mean value of the indicators presented in this report.

The differences between the US-born population living in households where all the responsible individuals are native-born and the rest of the foreign-born is driven by the outcomes of young people aged between 15 and 24. For instance, in terms of education, while 74% of the US-born

living in households with native-born heads attend school, only 35% of the rest of the foreign-born population and 51% of the native-born population attend school. Among the US-born group, very few 15- to 24-year-olds participate in the labor market compared with the rest of the foreign-born population (28% and 46%, respectively) and their native-born peers (45%). By contrast, among 25- to 64-year-olds, the outcomes for US-born individuals with native-born heads of household are closer to those of the rest of the foreign-born population. The proportions of those who have completed tertiary education are 37% among the US-born living in households with native-born heads, 42% among the other foreign-born population, and 20% among the native-born. In addition, the employment rate of the US-born group is close to those of their foreign- and native-born peers (71% versus 67% and 68%, respectively). Consequently, outcomes for the foreign-born in Mexico are driven by the outcomes of US-born youth aged 15 to 24 as a result of the large share of US-born individuals among the foreign-born and the large share of young people aged 15 to 24 among the foreign-born working-age population.

**FIGURE 2.1.3. Employment and Educational Outcomes of Foreign-Born, by Country of Birth of Immigrants and Head of Household**



Source: ENOE (2021).

The Mexican Labor Force Survey (ENOE) may underestimate the size of the immigrant population but does so at a similar level to that of other household surveys, including the census. Estimates of the share of the foreign-born population drawn from the 2020 ENOE are similar to those drawn from the 2020 Mexican census (0.9% of the total population in both sources). In addition, both provide similar estimates on the share of US-born immigrants: (67% according to the 2020 ENOE and 66% according to the 2020 census). The only

difference between sources is the proportion of immigrants born in Venezuelans. These are underrepresented in the 2020 ENOE compared with the 2020 census estimates (1.3% and 4.4%, respectively).

Despite potential limitations, data from the ENOE provides a good picture of the socioeconomic conditions of the foreign- and native-born populations.

## 2.3 Distribution in urban areas and capital cities



**Definition:** *Urban areas* are classified according to each country's definition—see the notes at the end of the chapter for these definitions.

**Coverage:** Working-age population, 15 to 64 years old.


In the ten LAC countries for which data for this indicator was available, the foreign-born population is more often found in urban areas than the native-born population (81% and 70%, respectively), except in the Dominican Republic and Paraguay. In these countries, the share of each group living in urban settings is similar. Higher concentrations of immigrants in urban areas are also observed in the OECD countries.

In seven out of the ten countries presented here, there is a difference of at least 8 p.p. between the share of immigrants living in urban areas and that of the native-born population. The gap is widest in Peru, Panama, and Ecuador, where it is close to 20 p.p. In these countries, more than 90% of immigrants live in urban areas. The foreign-born are also highly concentrated in urban settings in Uruguay and Chile (more than 90%), but as this is also the case for the native-born, the gap between the two groups is narrower.

The largest shares of immigrants in urban areas are observed in Peru and Chile, where practically all immigrants live in cities (around 97%). By contrast, in Mexico, Paraguay, and Colombia, the concentration of the migrant population in urban areas is lower: less than two-thirds of the foreign-born reside in these areas (56%, 63%, and 65%, respectively), and the same is true of the native-born (47%, 63%, and 53%, respectively).

The difference in the share of immigrants and the native-born is even more marked when only the capital city is considered, especially in Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Panama. In these countries, more than two-thirds of immigrants reside in the capital city, and there is a gap of more than 25 p.p. between the concentration of the native- and foreign-born populations. By contrast, there are smaller shares of both the immigrant and native-born populations living in the capital city in countries with many more large cities, such as Mexico (13% and 16%, respectively) and Colombia (24% and 17%, respectively). Moreover, in Mexico and Paraguay, a smaller share of immigrants live in the capital city compared with the native-born.

**FIGURE 2.4. Share of Population Living in Urban Areas and Capital City**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the percentage of the foreign-born population living in urban areas or in the capital city. There is no data for Argentina as the EPH only collects data from urban areas. There is no data available on the share living in the capital city for the OECD average.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- In the ten LAC countries presented here, the foreign-born population is more often found in urban areas than the native-born population (81% and 70%, respectively). In the OECD area, the foreign-born are also more concentrated in urban areas than the native-born (56% and 38%, respectively). However, in LAC countries, both immigrants and the native-born are more present in urban areas than their counterparts in the OECD.
- In most countries, there is a difference of at least 8 p.p. between the share of immigrants and the share of the native-born living in urban areas. This gap is largest in Peru, Panama, and Ecuador, where it is close to 20 p.p.
- By contrast, in Mexico, Paraguay, and Colombia, the share of the population living in urban areas is relatively small (less than two-thirds) for both immigrants and the native-born.
- The difference in the distribution of immigrants and the native-born is more marked in capital cities. This is especially true in Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Panama, where there is a large concentration of immigrants in the capital city and a gap of more than 25 p.p. between the two groups.
- By contrast, in countries with many more large cities, the shares of immigrants and the native-born population living in the capital city are smaller—for example, Mexico (13% and 16%, respectively) and Colombia (24% and 17%, respectively).

## 2.4 Age composition



**Definition:** This indicator looks at the composition of the immigrant population by age. The overall dependency ratio is the number of non-working-aged individuals (under 15 and over 65 years old) divided by the number of working-aged individuals (15 to 64 years old). The young-age dependency ratio only considers children under 15 in the numerator, while the old-age dependency ratio only considers people aged 65 years and older.

**Coverage:** Total populations, all ages.

In the LAC countries analyzed here, the share of working-age immigrants (15- to 64-year-olds) is greater than that of the native-born population (72% and 65% on average, respectively). The same pattern is also observed in OECD countries (76% and 64%, respectively). There are, however, two main differences in the age composition of immigrants in LAC compared with the OECD area. First, there is a higher share of children (under 15) among the foreign-born in LAC countries than among those living in the OECD on average (18% and 8%, respectively). Second, the percentage of older people (65 and over) is lower among immigrants in LAC than among their counterparts in the OECD (11% and 18%, respectively). These differences in age composition are mainly explained

by the fact that most migration flows in LAC countries are recent and are made up of young immigrants who move and settle with their families.

The difference in the age composition of the foreign- and native-born populations is largest in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica, and Chile, where there is a gap of at least 15 p.p. between the two. In these countries, working-age immigrants account for more than 80% of the total. Further, the immigrant population is highly concentrated in the prime working years (25 to 54 years old): around 60% of the total are in this age group, compared with less than 40% among the native-born. In contrast, in Colombia and Paraguay, the shares of individuals in the



working-age group are similar for both the foreign- and native-born. In Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, the share of the native-born in the working-age group is larger than that of the foreign-born.

As some of children of immigrants are born in the host country, therefore falling into the native-born category, there are more native-born than foreign-born among children under 15. This is especially true in Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, where the proportion of young people is 18 p.p. lower among the foreign-born. The share of immigrant children is lowest in Argentina, where only 5% of immigrants are under 15, compared to about 23% of the native-born. The latter seems to be related to duration of stay ([see indicator 2.2](#)): around 90% of the foreign-born in Argentina are long-term migrants, hence most children with foreign-born parents are likely to be native-born and not foreign-born, which also explains why more than 24% of Argentinian immigrants are older adults (over 65 years).

However, migrant children are not underrepresented in all LAC countries. Exceptions include Mexico and Colombia, where around one-third of immigrants are under the age of 15. In Colombia, recent arrivals (Venezuelans and Haitians) include relatively large shares of children. In Mexico, on the other hand, the immigrant population under 15 is mostly made up of the US-born children of returning migrants ([see indicator 2.2](#) and [box 2.1](#)).

The pattern for the older population (over 65) varies across countries. While larger shares of immigrants are over 65 in Argentina, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago (around 20%), smaller shares are observed in Colombia, Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic (less than 3%). These differences seem to be associated with migrants' duration of stay ([see indicator 2.1](#)). Whereas immigrants in the first group of countries belong to earlier waves of migration, those in the latter group belong to more recent waves, which tend to include younger people in their prime working years.

The overall dependency ratio of the foreign-born is lower than that of the native-born in most countries ([see figure 2.5](#)). That is, there are fewer younger and older immigrants who depend on workers that is the case among the native-born.

These differences are especially marked in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, and Costa Rica, where immigrant overall dependency ratios are less than half those of the native-born. This pattern owes to large inflows of labor migrants, which results in large shares of immigrants in the working-age group. The lower overall dependency ratio among the foreign-born may also be explained by the fact that immigrants' children may have been born in the host country and hence are classified as native-born. For example, around 18% of children in foreign-born households in Colombia are classified as native-born in this analysis because they were born in the country.<sup>8</sup> The overall dependency ratio of the foreign-born is thus likely to be higher in Colombia than is shown below. Argentina's dependency ratio is explained by older adults (24%) and not by youth under 15 years old (5%).

In Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, foreign-born populations have significantly higher overall dependency ratios than their native-born peers. Mexico has a high young-age dependency ratio, while Trinidad and Tobago has a higher old-age dependency ratio. In Mexico, the overall dependency ratio of the foreign-born is likely to be biased by the share of foreign-born children: 85% of foreign-born children live in households where both responsible adults are native-born.<sup>9</sup> It is likely that the majority of these children are the offspring of returning migrants ([see box 2.1](#)).

[Figure 2.6](#) shows the distribution of the working-age population divided into four age groups: people aged 15 to 24 (those entering the labor force), people aged 25 to 39 (those in the first stage of the prime working years); people aged 40 to 54 (those in the second stage of the prime working years); and people aged 55 to 64 (those approaching retirement). On average, the foreign-born are concentrated in the prime working-age groups (25 to 54 years old): the largest shares are those aged 25 to 39 (above 40% of the working-age population) and those aged 40 to 54 (around 28%). In Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Peru, close to 50% of immigrants are in the first stage of their prime working years (25 to 39).

The largest difference between the foreign- and native-born populations is observed in the share of individuals aged 25 to 39. On average, 42% of

<sup>8</sup> This classification is for statistical purposes in this analysis due to the definitions in the data sources. It does not imply that Colombia grants citizenship to children of migrants.

<sup>9</sup> This proportion includes all foreign-born children. For US-born children, the share of those residing in households where both responsible individuals are native-born is 85%.




working-age immigrants are in this age group, compared with 32% of the native-born population—that is, there is a gap of 10 p.p. between the two groups. However, there are marked cross-country differences in the distribution of immigrants across the four age groups.

In Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, more than 30% of the working-age foreign-born population are in the youngest age group, those aged 15 to 24 (33%, 43%, and 31%, respectively). Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru host a large share of immigrants aged between 25


and 39 (above 40% of the working-age population). In half of the countries included in this study, the foreign-born labor force is predominantly young—around two-thirds are under the age of 40. This is the case in Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Argentina, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago are home to older working-age immigrants (between 55 and 64). Compared with the native-born, the foreign-born in this working-age group are overrepresented in these countries (16%, 18%, and 22%, respectively).

**FIGURE 2.5. Dependency Ratio**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the dependency ratio of the foreign-born population.

















**FIGURE 2.6. Age Composition of Working-Age Population**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the percentage of 25- to 39-year-olds in the foreign-born population.

**TABLE 2.2. Age Composition**

Age groups as a percentage of the total populations, 2021 or most recent year

Foreign-born					
	0-14	15-64	65+	Young-age dependency ratio	Elderly-dependency ratio
 Argentina	5.1	70.7	24.2	7.2	34.2
 Chile	14.3	82.2	3.6	17.4	4.4
 Colombia	33.0	65.7	1.2	50.2	1.8
 Costa Rica	9.0	80.4	10.6	11.2	13.2
 Dominican Republic	8.6	87.9	3.5	9.8	4.0
 Ecuador	23.2	71.3	5.4	32.5	7.6
 Mexico	36.3	56.6	7.1	64.1	12.5
 Panama	9.9	83.0	7.1	11.9	8.6
 Paraguay	27.9	63.6	8.6	43.9	13.5
 Peru	24.2	73.0	2.8	33.2	3.8
 Trinidad & Tobago	13.2	63.2	23.6	20.9	37.3
 Uruguay	12.3	66.9	20.8	18.4	31.1
 LAC (12)	<b>18.1</b>	<b>72.0</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>13.8</b>
 OECD (2018)	<b>7.5</b>	<b>76.1</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>21.4</b>
Native-born					
	0-14	15-64	65+	Young-age dependency ratio	Elderly-dependency ratio
 Argentina	23.1	65.5	11.4	35.3	17.4
 Chile	19.6	66.2	14.3	29.6	21.6
 Colombia	24.3	66.0	9.8	36.8	14.8
 Costa Rica	22.7	65.0	12.3	34.9	18.9
 Dominican Republic	26.6	63.1	10.3	42.2	16.3
 Ecuador	29.1	62.0	8.9	46.9	14.4
 Mexico	23.2	67.2	9.5	34.5	14.1
 Panama	28.0	61.4	10.5	45.6	17.1
 Paraguay	28.7	64.5	6.7	44.5	10.4
 Peru	25.0	64.1	11.0	39.0	17.2
 Trinidad & Tobago	19.4	69.1	11.5	28.1	16.6
 Uruguay	20.1	65.7	14.2	30.6	21.6
 LAC (12)	<b>24.2</b>	<b>65.0</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>16.8</b>
 OECD (2018)	<b>17.8</b>	<b>64.4</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>27.7</b>



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ On average, in the LAC countries analyzed here, the share of working-age individuals (aged 15-64) is higher among immigrants than among the native-born (72% and 65%, respectively).
- ➔ The share of young immigrants (aged 0-14) in LAC countries is smaller than that of the native-born population (18% and 24%, respectively). The share of older adults (over 65) is about the same for the immigrant and native-born populations (10% and 11%, respectively).
- ➔ While larger shares of immigrants are young people in Mexico and Colombia (where they account for around one-third of the total), larger shares of immigrants are older adults in Argentina, Uruguay, and Trinidad (around 20%).
- ➔ On average, the foreign-born are concentrated in the prime working-age group (25 to 54 years old): the largest shares are those aged 25 to 39 (above 30%), followed by those aged 40 to 54 (around 20%). In Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, more than 60% of immigrants are in their prime working years.
- ➔ The overall dependency ratio of immigrants is lower than that of the native-born. This difference is especially marked in Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, where immigrant overall dependency ratios are less than half those of the native-born.

## 2.5 Partnership status



**Definition:** This indicator presents the partnership status of individuals using three categories: people currently in a partnership, that is, people who are married or living with a partner as a cohabiting couple; people not currently in a partnership, that is, people who are separated, divorced, or widowed; and people who have never been in a partnership, that is, people who are single (never married).

**Coverage:** Working-age population, 15 to 64 years old.


In virtually all countries, a larger share of the immigrant population is either married or living with a partner as a cohabiting couple than the native-born. On average, across 11 LAC countries, 58% of the foreign-born are either married or living with a partner, while this percentage is 48% among the native-born. The exception is Mexico, where the opposite is observed (45% and 55%, respectively). The largest differences between foreign- and native-born partnership rates are observed in Costa Rica and Chile, where a much higher share of immigrants are married or living with a partner compared to their native-born peers: a gap of more than 17 p.p.

Overall, among immigrants who are not living with a partner, two-thirds have never been in a partnership (single), and one-third are not currently in a partnership (separated, divorced, or widowed). These shares are similar among the native-born. However, there are differences across and within countries. In Mexico, while 50% of immigrants are single, only 36% of the native-born have never been in a partnership. In the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the proportion of those who are not currently in a relationship because of separation, divorce, or widowhood is higher than in other countries, at around 20%. However, this higher share is observed for both the foreign- and the native-born.

Differences in partnership status among the foreign-born are mainly explained by differences in age composition ([indicator 2.4](#)). The lower partnership rates among the foreign-born in Mexico are due to the overrepresentation of young individuals in this group (24% are aged 15 to 24). By contrast, the higher share of married or cohabiting immigrants in Costa Rica and Chile is partly explained by there being a larger proportion of foreign-born individuals in the 25-54 age group, when individuals are more likely to be living with a partner (60% and 65%, respectively).

It is difficult to capture partnership status in the data sources used here. Although the data is broadly comparable, the exact definitions used in each country may differ. Further, the data presented here likely overrepresents the proportion of the population currently in a partnership, especially among the foreign-born. People may report their legal marital status (*de jure* status) and not their current living arrangements (*de facto* status). They may also have left their spouse behind in their country of origin and hence, although married, they are not living together with their partner in the destination country.

**FIGURE 2.7. Partnership Status**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the percentage of the foreign-born population married or cohabiting.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- In virtually all countries, immigrants tend to be married or living with a partner at a higher rate than the native-born (59% compared with 48%, respectively). The largest differences between groups are observed in Costa Rica and Chile, where a much higher share of immigrants are married or living with a partner than their native-born peers.
- Around two-thirds of immigrants who are not living with a partner have never been in a partnership (single), and the rest are not currently in a partnership (separated, divorced, or widowed). These rates are similar among the native-born, although there are differences across and within countries.
- Differences in the partnership status of the foreign-born are mainly explained by differences in the age composition of this population.

## 2.6 Household composition



**Definition:** This indicator identifies four types of households depending on whether children under the age of 18 are present and whether one or more adults live in the household. Households may thus be divided into four categories: single-person households—one adult, no children; adults without children—living as a couple or not; single-parent households with at least one child—referred to as *single-parent families*; and two or more adults with at least one child—referred to as *families*. *Foreign-born households* refer to households where all the responsible individuals are foreign-born; and *native-born households* are those where all the responsible individuals are native-born.

**Coverage:** Households with at least one responsible individual, or head of household, over the age of 15.

Families—that is, households with two or more adults and at least one child—are the most common form of household among the foreign-born population in LAC countries. On average, they account for 40% of foreign-born households. A further 30% of immigrant households are made up of adults without children, 23% are single-person households, and only 7% are single-parent families. Families are also the most common living arrangement among the native-born, and the share is even higher than among foreign-born households, at 44%. In the OECD, by contrast, families are less prevalent in both groups. They are more common among immigrant households than among native-born ones (28% and 25%, respectively), partly because of the aging of the native-born population.

Overall, children are present in close to half of all foreign-born households (either single-parent or multiple-adult families) in LAC countries (47%). This share is slightly higher among the native-born, at 51%. In 5 out of the 12 countries—Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru—more than 50% of immigrant households have children. This share is highest in Colombia, at 70%. Furthermore, in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, the proportion of households with children is higher among the foreign-born than among the native-born (a difference of 12 p.p. or more). The countries hosting the largest shares of households with children are also the countries that have received the largest migration flows in the region in recent years.


Conversely, foreign-born households without children are most prevalent in Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. They account for over 60% of immigrant households in these countries. This level is highest in Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay, where more than 70% of immigrant households have no children. The gap between foreign- and native-born households is, however, largest in Paraguay and Mexico, where households without children are less common among the native-born.

In 9 out of 12 countries, the foreign-born are less likely than the native-born to live in multiple-adult households without children (29.5% and 33.4%, on average). By contrast, in Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, the opposite is true. In these countries, this living arrangement is more widespread among the foreign-born (by a difference of up to 13 p.p.), and it is also the most common form of household among immigrants (at least 36% of immigrant households). In Uruguay, multiple-adult households without children are also the most common living arrangement, but

this is true for both the foreign- and native-born populations, accounting for around 40% of households in both groups.















In most LAC countries, single-person households without children are more widespread among foreign-born households than native-born ones (23% and 16% on average). The exceptions are Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, where this living arrangement is less common among the foreign-born. In the OECD, by contrast, single-person households account for a much larger share of the total than in LAC countries, both among the foreign- and the native-born (38% and 32%, respectively).

The proportion of single-person households without children is highest in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, where they account for over 30% of immigrant households. Further, in Argentina, Paraguay, and Peru, the foreign-born are also more likely to live alone, while this is true for around just 20% of immigrant households.





**TABLE 2.3. Household Composition. Percentages (left panel) and differences in percentage points (right panel), 2021 or most recent year**

	Total=100				Difference in % points			
	Immigrant households				Difference (+/-) with native-born households*			
	No child in the household		Children in the household		No child in the household		Children in the household	
	Single person	More than one adult	Single parent	More than one adult	Single person	More than one adult	Single person	More than one adult
 Argentina	27.2	27.1	7.8	37.9	8.2	-5.9	1.3	-3.5
 Chile	14.7	28.5	9.3	47.4	-2.3	-11.3	1.2	12.3
 Colombia	13.4	16.9	8.4	61.4	-3.8	-13.5	-0.1	17.6
 Costa Rica	12.7	23.3	8.8	55.2	-3.1	-17.3	2.0	18.4
 Dominican Republic	34.4	18.7	5.7	41.2	14.8	-11.1	-4.3	0.6
 Ecuador	15.5	25.5	7.8	51.3	3.6	-1.8	1.2	-3.0
 Mexico	34.7	32.6	6.8	25.9	23.9	-1.9	2.7	-24.7
 Panama	17.5	42.0	5.3	35.2	2.5	9.3	0.1	-12.0
 Paraguay	25.5	36.4	8.3	29.8	15.5	12.8	1.6	-29.8
 Peru	20.6	22.6	2.2	54.5	7.3	-8.3	-4.6	5.7
 Trinidad & Tobago	31.9	41.5	3.5	23.1	9.1	3.5	-1.0	-11.6
 Uruguay	32.3	38.8	7.0	21.9	13.5	-1.5	2.0	-13.9
 LAC (12)	<b>23.4</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>40.4</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>-3.9</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>-3.7</b>
 OECD (2016)	<b>37.9</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>-9.7</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>2.4</b>

\*+: higher than native-born households -: lower than native-born households.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- Families with more than one adult are the most common arrangement in LAC countries. However, they are more common among native-born households than foreign-born ones (40% and 44%, respectively). In the OECD, by contrast, families are more common among immigrant households (28% and 25%, respectively).
- In Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru, households with children account for more than half of all immigrant households. At the opposite end of the spectrum, foreign-born households without children are most prevalent in Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, where they account for over 60% of immigrant households.
- The foreign-born are less likely than native-born to live in multiple-adult households without children in 9 out of 12 countries. The exceptions are Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, where at least 36% of immigrant households have multiple adults and no children.
- In most countries, single-person households are more common among immigrant households than native-born ones. This proportion is highest in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, where over 30% of foreign-born households are made up of only one adult.

## 2.7 Migration status


















**Definition:** *Regular migrants* include those who have been granted residence permits. It also includes refugees and asylum seekers. A *refugee* is an individual who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. An *asylum seeker* is someone seeking international protection but whose claim has yet to be decided on. *Irregular migrants* are individuals who do not fulfill the requirements established by the destination country to enter and stay there.

**Coverage:** Total populations, all ages.

Measuring the share of migrants whose migration status is regular versus those whose is not is very difficult. By definition, migrants without a regular migration status are not included in administrative records. Their numbers can only be estimated through surveys, using methodologies that are not always consistent across countries or even necessarily fully representative in and of themselves. Where such estimates exist, they are frequently not published, as doing so may cause political difficulties. As such, no definitive cross-country statistics are available even for most OECD countries, much less for non-OECD LAC countries.

However, limited estimates can be made. UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) organize the Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), whose activities include compiling data on the numbers of Venezuelan migrants in each country and the numbers of applications for refugee status and other residence permits granted. By combining the estimates of the totals with the number of formal permits issued, very rough estimates of the number of Venezuelan migrants in an irregular situation can be obtained ([table 2.4](#)).

**TABLE 2.4. Estimates of Venezuelan Migrants in an irregular situation  
December 2021**

	Venezuelan migrants	Pending asylum requests	Residence permits granted	Estimated migrants in an irregular situ.
 Colombia	1,840,000	28,800	730,000	1,081,200
 Peru	1,290,000	531,800	362,800	395,400
 Ecuador	508,900	4,300	202,500	302,100
 Chile	448,000	4,700	160,700	282,600
 Brazil	261,400	85,700	294,900	-
 Argentina	173,200	5,600	345,500	-
 Panama	121,600	2,500	98,300	20,800
 Dominican Rep.	115,300	278	20,500	94,522
 Mexico	83,000	9,300	43,000	30,700
 Costa Rica	29,900	7,300	8,900	13,700
 Trinidad and Tobago	28,500	18,300	14,000	-
 Guyana	24,500	0	19,600	4,900
 Uruguay	15,700	2,100	20,100	-
 Bolivia	11,700	25	8,100	3,575
 Paraguay	5,640	440	4,000	1,200

**Note:** Estimates based on data from R4V.

The number of permits granted is likely to overestimate the number of individuals whose status is regular, as migrants may also request asylum and obtain other types of permits. In addition, where temporary permits are granted and periodically renewed, it is not always possible to distinguish between new permits and renewals or conversions to permanent status. As a result, the number of permits issued may exceed the number of individuals whose status is regular. Furthermore, estimates of the total population of Venezuelan migrants in each country are likely to have significant margins of error, but there is no reason to expect that error to be systematically positive or negative. Larger numbers of migrants may have entered each country than estimated. At the same time, it is also possible that significant numbers of migrants have left the country for other destinations.

As of December 2021, over 2.2 million Venezuelan migrants in LAC countries were estimated to be in an irregular situation. There were over 1 million Venezuelan migrants in an irregular situation in Colombia and a further 400,000 in Peru and around 300,000 each in Ecuador and Chile. In Brazil, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay the number of asylum requests and permits granted exceed the estimated numbers of migrants, demonstrating that permit numbers can double-count individuals granted regular status.

While Venezuelans are the largest group of migrants in LAC, they are not the only group. There are only limited indicators for other populations, and these are primarily based on specific border crossings. The flow of migrants who entered irregularly through the Darien Gap, on the border between Colombia and Panama, has grown rapidly:

nearly 100,000 Haitians were registered to have crossed in 2019, and over 100,000 Venezuelans in 2022 (up from less than 24,000 in 2019). In Mexico, the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance received nearly 130,000 asylum requests in 2021, largely from Haitians, Hondurans, and Cubans, and the 2022 numbers were at similar levels.

Although the precise figures are difficult to obtain and many countries are implementing large-scale regularization programs, it is clear that there are still significant numbers of migrants in irregular situations in many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Over the last decade, the 11 LAC countries for which information is available have implemented special permits or amnesties to regularize immigrants. The most recent such schemes have been in Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru, which have implemented special permits to regularize Venezuelan immigrants.

In Colombia, between 2017 and 2020, to promote the socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan immigrants, the government implemented temporary work and residence permits called *Permisos Especiales de Permanencia* (Special Stay Permits, PEPs) in six different stages (PEP1-PEP4).



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ It is estimated that 61% of Venezuelan migrants have residence permits or a pending asylum request in the 15 LAC countries for which estimates are available. The Dominican Republic, Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia have the lowest share of migrants in a regular situation (less than 50%).
- ➔ In Brazil, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay the number of asylum requests and permits granted exceed the estimated numbers of migrants.

## 2.8 Migrant regularization in LAC Countries

Migration regularization is one of the main tools used to facilitate the integration of migrants into host societies, promote their human rights, and generate peaceful, fair, and inclusive societies. Immigrants in an irregular situation are more vulnerable, which can affect their access to the formal labor market, basic services, and protection. Immigrants in an irregular situation cannot hold a formal job or access social security, formal education, health systems, and subsidies. They do not have access to financial services such as a bank account and usually cannot rent a house through legal channels.

In the last ten years, in response to several large and sudden migration flows, LAC countries have implemented special permits or amnesty processes for the regularization of immigrants, principally targeting those who entered countries irregularly. The current wave of migration from Venezuela has prompted countries like Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru to implement special permits to regularize a huge number of Venezuelans in an irregular situation.

There was no cost to acquire a PEP, which provided Venezuelan immigrants with a regular legal status, thus enabling them to access formal jobs, health services, education, financial services, and other basic services. In March 2021, the government established the *Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos* (Temporary Statute for the Protection of Venezuelan Migrants, ETPV) through Decree 216 of 2021 to regularize the status of nearly 1.8 million immigrants for 10 years. In April 2021, Resolution 0971 implemented the ETPV under the Temporary Protection Regime as a legal mechanism for Venezuelan immigrants, in compliance with the conditions established in Decree 216. The ETPV created the *Permiso por Protección Temporal* (Temporary Protection Permit, PPT), replacing previous special permits, including the PEP. The ETPV is a temporary legal protection mechanism for refugees and immigrants from Venezuela in Colombia that is complementary to the international refugee protection regime. The ETPV includes the implementation of the Registro Único de Migrantes Venezolanos (Single Registry of Venezuelan Migrants, RUMV), which Venezuelan immigrants must register with, and the PPT, which allows them to access government services and employment opportunities for ten years, while they acquire a residency visa (a type-R visa).

**TABLE 2.5. Regularization Schemes in LAC**

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Mexico	Panama	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay
Special permits or amnesties implemented in the last ten years to regularize migrants affected by humanitarian crises	No info.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Humanitarian visas for populations affected by persecution/humanitarian crises	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Only <sup>10</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Foot note <sup>11</sup>	Yes
Humanitarian visas are free	Yes	Yes	No	N/A	No	-	Yes <sup>12</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-
Amnesties or special permits are free	-	Yes <sup>13</sup>	No	Yes	No	No	No	-	No	No	Yes	-
Migrants with humanitarian visas or special permits/amnesties can apply for a residence visa	-	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	-

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

In the Dominican Republic, the *Plan Nacional de Regularización de Extranjeros en Situación Migratoria Irregular* (National Regularization Plan for Foreigners Whose Migration Status is Irregular, PNRE) was established in 2013. It was the first regularization program carried out in the country. Regardless of their nationality, irregular migrants who entered the country before October 19, 2011, were eligible to apply. In 2015, the Dominican

government established a special permit for the regularization of Haitian students through Resolution DGM-03-2015. Finally, the General Migration Authority implemented a “normalization” process in January 2021 through Resolution 119-21 to regularize the status of Venezuelan immigrants in an irregular situation living in the Dominican Republic within the nonresident category. Through this resolution, Venezuelan immigrants who entered

<sup>10</sup> Only for those with refugee status.

<sup>11</sup> In Trinidad and Tobago, in the absence of refugee legislation, the UNHCR adjudicates on claims for asylum and oversees refugees and asylum seekers as part of its mandate in collaboration with the Living Water Community.

<sup>12</sup> Only for visa renewals.

<sup>13</sup> The process for the recognition of refugee status is entirely free. Refugees whose status has been recognized may also be exempted from paying fees to obtain certain documents, when applicable, if he/she proves to be hyposufficient or belong to vulnerable groups.)

Dominican territory using a tourist card or visa issued by the Dominican authorities between January 2014 and March 2020 were eligible to extend their stay by applying for a nonresident permit, as were their children. The cost of applying for this special process is about US\$35 (DOP2,000) for children under 18 and about US\$113 (DOP6,500) for adults.

In Ecuador,<sup>14</sup> the government implemented the *Visado de Excepción por Razones Humanitarias* (Exceptional Visa for Humanitarian Reasons, VERHU) in 2019 for Venezuelan immigrants who entered the country through immigration control points before July 26, 2019. The cost of the VERHU is US\$50. At the same time, the government established a migration amnesty for Venezuelan migrants in an irregular situation. This exonerated them from a fine and enabled them to apply to regularize their migration status. However, in February 2021, the National Assembly passed some reforms to the Organic Law on Human Mobility, affecting the migration status of many Venezuelan immigrants. While the legislation contemplates certain options for regularizing migration status through temporary or permanent residency visas, the high cost of these has limited access for people who entered Ecuador regularly but are in an irregular situation because their temporary visa or identity document has expired (especially people whose passport has expired but cannot obtain a new one). On September 1, 2022, the government of Ecuador launched a plan to regularize thousands of Venezuelan migrants in its territory through the campaign *Estoy Aquí* [I Am Here]. Through this regularization process, it is hoped that Venezuelan migrants and refugees will be able to access legal protection and stability in Ecuador.

In Peru, Supreme Decree No. 010-2020-IN of 2020 approved special, exceptional, and temporary measures to regularize immigrants' migration status by granting them a one-year *Carné de*

*Permiso Temporal de Permanencia* (Temporary Stay Permit Card, CPP) following the approval of the administrative procedure for regularizing migration (article 5). This measure applied to immigrants in an irregular situation in Peru as of October 22, 2020, including those immigrants whose temporary stay or residency permit had expired and those who entered the territory irregularly. The CPP allows immigrants in an irregular situation to regularize this and obtain a *Permiso Temporal de Permanencia* (Temporary Stay Permit, PTP) for one year. The PTP cannot be renewed: before it expires, the beneficiary must be granted one of the migration statuses established in the Migration Act. In 2018 and 2017, the government implemented similar measures for Venezuelan migrants through Supreme Decree No. 001-2018-IN and Decree No. 002-2017-I. The cost of the CPP is about US\$13 (PEN47.30) for children under 18 and about US\$13 (PEN47.40) for adults.

## 2.9 Visa schemes in LAC Countries

The 12 LAC countries analyzed in this report established access to humanitarian visas in their migration laws or other decrees. In some cases, these special visas are aimed at people of a specific nationality, while in other cases there are no such nationality restrictions. In almost all countries, to access a humanitarian visa, immigrants have to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances such as being victims of natural or environmental disasters, victims of human trafficking, or other circumstances that are determined by the human mobility authority.<sup>15</sup> In countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay, a humanitarian visa does not entail any monetary cost. In other countries, the cost varies from US\$1 to US\$50.<sup>16</sup> Humanitarian visas are valid for a specific period of between one to six years. For example, in Panama, humanitarian visas are granted for six years (Migration Act, Chapter VI, Temporary Permit for Humanitarian Reasons, article 171).

<sup>14</sup> On September 1, 2022, the government of Ecuador launched a plan to regularize thousands of Venezuelan migrants in its territory, through the campaign *Estoy Aquí* [I am Here]. Through the regularization process, it is hoped that Venezuelan migrants and refugees can access legal protection and stability in Ecuador.

<sup>15</sup> See IDB and OECD (2021) for statistics on residence permits issued in ALC countries.

<sup>16</sup> **Chile:** US\$30. **Costa Rica:** Stateless person: CRC25; asylum seeker: CRC25; humanitarian grounds: CRC125; Special Temporary Category of Complementary Protection for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans Whose Application for Refugee Status Has Been Denied: CRC125. **Ecuador:** VERHU, US\$50.

Additionally, some countries have signed agreements to facilitate human mobility between them. These agreements include the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement and the Andean Migration Statute. The signatories to the former include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. The mechanism allows citizens of these countries the right to obtain legal residence in the territory of another signatory country. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are part of the Andean Migration Statute, which applies to the Andean Community. This enables Andean Community citizens who want to reside in a member

country other than that of their nationality to obtain an Andean Temporary Residency Visa for up to two years. After this, they are eligible for the Andean Permanent Residency Visa, which must be processed within 90 days of the expiry of the Andean Temporary Residency Visa.

Another significant factor affecting the integration of immigrants into host societies is the cost of visas, which may be a barrier to completing the regularization process. For example, in Brazil, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, visa costs exceed 25% of the national minimum wage.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> No information for Colombia.



**TABLE 2.6. Visa Schemes and acquisitions of citizenship in LAC**

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Mexico	Panama	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay
Special visas under the framework of a regional mobility cooperation agreement (Caricom, MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CAN) <sup>18</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
The cost of immigrant visas exceeds 25% of the minimum wage in the host country	No	No	Yes <sup>19</sup>	Not in gen. <sup>20</sup>	No	Yes <sup>21</sup>	Yes	Yes	No <sup>22</sup>	No	Yes	Yes
Immigrants must renounce their citizenship of their country of origin when they acquire host-country citizenship	No	No	No	No	Yes <sup>23</sup>	-	No	Yes <sup>24</sup>	Yes <sup>25</sup>	No	No	No
Migrant workers and their dependents gain citizenship within five years of residency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>26</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes but <sup>27</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>28</sup>	Yes

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

<sup>18</sup> MERCOSUR: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. CAN: Colombia and Peru. Ecuador: Ecuador-Venezuela migration status. CARICOM: Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>19</sup> Only for some nationalities (higher costs).

<sup>20</sup> Not in general. Some types of immigrant visas are for free.

<sup>21</sup> This depends on whether we take the minimum wage at large companies, small and medium companies, or micro companies.

<sup>22</sup> Although the visa itself comes at no cost, it can only be obtained through a lawyer, which implies higher costs.

<sup>23</sup> If the country does not have an agreement of double nationality.

<sup>24</sup> Within Mexican territory, they can only enjoy the rights that the Mexican citizenship entitles them to (not those of their country of origin).




<sup>25</sup> If the country does not have a double nationality agreement.

<sup>26</sup> With a specific residency permit.

<sup>27</sup> Yes, but with restrictions. This depends on a case-by-case basis but it is possible. Anyone who proves that they have temporary or permanent residence status for five years can access a certificate of naturalization.

<sup>28</sup> Five years for Commonwealth citizens and eight years for citizens of other countries.

**TABLE 2.7. Visa Costs and Monthly Minimum Wage 2022**

	 Brazil	 Costa Rica	 Dominican Republic
Monthly minimum wage 2022	US\$228	US\$465	US\$352 (large companies) US\$325 (medium-sized companies) US\$218 (small businesses) US\$202 (micro-enterprises)
Visa costs 2022	US\$20–US\$40 <sup>26</sup>	US\$32–US\$52	US\$80–US\$90

## 2.10 Social cohesion






To ensure the socioeconomic integration of immigrants in host societies, it is important to eradicate discrimination and xenophobia. Building social relationships, peaceful coexistence, and the appreciation and recognition of diversity and promoting the social inclusion and employment of immigrants are challenges facing LAC countries,

especially those that have received large inflows of migrants. Since the start of the current wave of migration, a wave of intolerance, discrimination, and xenophobia against the Venezuelan and Haitian population has arisen in the region.<sup>30</sup> Prejudices around immigrants must be confronted to achieve social cohesion and their socioeconomic integration.

<sup>29</sup> Except for immigrants from the United States of America and the United Kingdom, who must pay a higher cost.

<sup>30</sup> For a detailed analysis of xenophobia-related issues, see the IDB's Citizen Perception Laboratory on Migration. <https://laboratoriomigracion.iadb.org/#/en/>.

**TABLE 2.8. Social Cohesion Policy Indicators**

	 Argentina	 Brazil	 Chile	 Colombia	 Costa Rica	 Dominican Republic	 Ecuador	 Mexico	 Panama	 Peru	 Trinidad and Tobago	 Uruguay
<b>Government programs or policies on discrimination and xenophobia</b>	Not specific to migrant pop. <sup>31</sup>	Not specific to migrant pop. <sup>32</sup>	No	Yes <sup>33</sup>	Not specific to migrant pop. <sup>34</sup>	No	Yes <sup>35</sup>	Yes <sup>36</sup>	No	Not specific to migrant pop. <sup>37</sup>	No	Yes
<b>National or local campaigns to prevent xenophobia</b>	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Right to vote in local elections after having acquired long-term residency</b>	Yes <sup>38</sup>	No <sup>39</sup>	Yes (after residing in Chile for 5 years)	Yes (only for municipal and district elections)	No (only people who acquire Costa Rican nationality)	No (only people who acquire Dominican nationality)	Yes (minimum 5 years of residency)	No (only people who acquire Mexican nationality)	No (only people who acquire Panamanian nationality)	Yes (municipal elections)	Yes (minimum 5 years of residency, only for district elections)	Yes (15 years of residency)
<b>Migrants have the right to join associations</b>	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

<sup>31</sup> National Plan Against Discrimination.

<sup>32</sup> Policy Against Racial Discrimination.

<sup>33</sup> Law 2136 of 2021.

<sup>34</sup> National Policy for a Society Free of Racism, Racial Discrimination, and Xenophobia 2014-2025 and the associated Action Plan.

<sup>35</sup> National Plan for Human Mobility, which addresses discrimination and xenophobia.

<sup>36</sup> Federal Law on Discrimination, Federal Migration Act, and the National Program for Equality and Nondiscrimination 2021-2024.

<sup>37</sup> Law Against Acts of Discrimination of 2000 (Law no. 27270).

<sup>38</sup> For local elections, migrants with permanent residency.

<sup>39</sup> Only Brazilian citizens (native-born or naturalized) have the right to vote, with the exception of Portuguese citizens with permanent resident status.

Only 5 out of 12 LAC countries analyzed in this report have a specific policy to reduce discrimination against migrants. Argentina has a national plan against discrimination that addresses different types of discrimination, including discrimination against migrants. Costa Rica has a national policy (2014–2025) for a society free of racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia and the action plan for this. This policy addresses discrimination against migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers. Ecuador has a national plan for human mobility in which discrimination and xenophobia are addressed, through the promotion of awareness campaigns on discrimination against migrants and xenophobia. In Uruguay, Law No. 17,817 contains provisions to fight racism, xenophobia, and discrimination against immigrants. There are also specific laws on discrimination against migrant women, such as Law 19.643 and Decree 184 of 2007. Colombia has its Law 2136 de 2021 “Comprehensive Migratory Policy” which considers addressing discrimination against migrants as one of its guiding principles. Two other LAC countries (Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) do not have a specific policy or action plan regarding discrimination against migrants, but they have policies and norms on discrimination in which they address discrimination against migrants. Brazil has a policy to address

racial discriminations (Política e Legislação Contra a Discriminação Racial). In Peru, there is a law against discriminatory acts, Law No. 27270.

Furthermore, almost all LAC countries conduct xenophobia prevention campaigns to create awareness around immigrant discrimination and the importance of integrating them into society (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay). These kinds of campaigns are even more important due to the high migration flow from Venezuela.


Finally, turning to the right to vote as a factor of social integration for migrants in host societies, this varies by country.<sup>40</sup> Some countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago allow regular immigrants to vote, but only in local/regional or municipal elections. Other countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic only give access to the vote to migrants who have acquired local nationality. In Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay, immigrants can vote in all elections only after having lived in the country for more than 5 years (Chile and Ecuador) or more than 15 (Uruguay). In Mexico and Panama, only migrants who have acquired local nationality have the right to vote.


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<sup>40</sup> See IDB (2022b) for details on multiple aspects of the migration policy regimes in LAC countries.


## Notes and sources for chapter 2


### Definition of urban localities in indicator 2.3:


 **Argentina:** the EPH survey only collects data from the 31 urban centers of the country, so data for [indicator 2.3](#) is not available.


 **Chile:** urban areas are defined as cities with 40,000 inhabitants or more, and urban centers as areas with less than 40,000 inhabitants.


 **Colombia:** urban areas include the 23 main cities of the country; the rest is considered rural.


 **Costa Rica:** urban areas are defined according to physical and functional criteria, taking into account factors such as clearly defined quadrants, streets, sidewalks, urban services (garbage collection, public lighting), and economic activities such as industry, large businesses, and various services.


 **Mexico:** urban areas are defined as those with 100,000 inhabitants or more.


 **Ecuador:** urban areas include the urban nucleus of the provincial capitals, cantonal capitals, and parish capitals, which have a population of 2,000 or more.


 **Dominican Republic:** urban areas are those with 250,000 or more inhabitants.

 **Panama:** urban areas are those with 1,500 or more inhabitants and that have electricity service, public water supply, a sewage system, and paved streets. However, neighborhoods or urbanized areas with most of the characteristics listed above are also considered to be urban areas even if they have less than 1,500 inhabitants.

 **Paraguay:** urban areas are municipal territories that are divided into city blocks, have a road network, are no less than six hectares, and have a minimum occupancy density of four or more built plots in each block, or a constructed area greater than 500m<sup>2</sup> in each hectare.

 **Peru:** an urban area or urban populated center is one that has at least 100 dwellings grouped contiguously (an average of 500 inhabitants). All district capitals are also included, even when they do not meet these criteria.

 **Trinidad and Tobago:** urban areas are defined using an urban/rural dichotomy, primarily based on population density, agricultural density, and elements of remoteness from urban hubs.

 **Uruguay:** urban areas are those with 2,000 inhabitants or more. In some cases, public services are used to distinguish between rural and urban areas.

**TABLE 2.9. Sources for Chapter 2 by Indicator**

Indicator	Size of immigrant population	Foreign-born share of population	Top 3 countries of birth	Duration of residence	Population in urban areas and capital city	Dependency ratio	Age composition of working-age population	Age composition	Partnership status	Household composition	Venezuelan migrants with irregular status
Table			2.1					2.2		2.3	2.4
Figure	2.1	2.2		2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6		2.7		
<b>OECD countries</b>											
Chile	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	INE (2020)	CASEN (2020)	CASEN (2020)	CASEN (2020)	CASEN (2020)	CASEN (2020)	CASEN (2020)	CASEN (2020)	R4V (2021)
Colombia	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	R4V (2021)
Costa Rica	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data		ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	R4V (2021)
Mexico	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	INEGI (2020)		ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	R4V (2021)
<b>LAC IDB countries</b>											
Argentina	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	R4V (2021)
Brazil	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	OBMigra (2020)								R4V (2021)
Dominican Republic	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data	ENCFT 2022	ENCFT 2022	ENCFT 2022	ENCFT 2022	ENCFT 2022	ENCFT 2022	ENCFT 2022	R4V (2021)
Ecuador	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data	ENEMDU 2022	ENEMDU 2022	ENEMDU 2022	ENEMDU 2022	ENEMDU 2022	ENEMDU 2022	ENEMDU 2022	R4V (2021)
Panama	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	OIM (2021)	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019		EHPM 2019	R4V (2021)
Paraguay	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	R4V (2021)
Peru	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	INEI (2019)	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	R4V (2021)
Trinidad and Tobago	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data			CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	R4V (2021)
Uruguay	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Migration Data Portal (UNDESA)	Datos macro (2019), based on UN data	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	R4V (2021)



### 3. EDUCATION AND YOUTH INTEGRATION

In various parts of the world, young people face great challenges in achieving good results for socioeconomic indicators that reveal the general well-being of society. How well foreign-born children manage to integrate into their receiving communities is thus a major component in the successful integration of migrants overall. Having been at least partly educated in their parents' host country, the children of immigrants—both native-born and very young arrivals—should not, in theory, encounter the same difficulties as those arrived as adults. Ultimately, their outcomes should be closer to those of youth without native-born parents. However, this is not the case in many host countries, as can be seen below. These indicators differentiate between children who were born abroad and those who were born in the host country, irrespective of their parents' country of birth. Most foreign-born children have parents who are also foreign-born. Children who are native-born but whose parents are foreign-born may also struggle to integrate, but distinguishing

this group is not possible. Such difficulties may also be an issue in countries with a high percentage of long-term migrants (Argentina, Uruguay), but less so in countries with a higher share of recent arrivals (Colombia).

The chapter considers the reading literacy proficiency of children at age 15, as measured through the Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) ([indicator 3.1](#)). It also focuses on the proportion of pupils who lack basic reading skills at 15 ([indicator 3.2](#)), the proportion of children (aged 6–16 and 15–18) attending school ([indicator 3.3](#)), the proportion of children (aged 15–18) in employment ([indicator 3.4](#)), the proportion of young people (aged 15–24) who are not in employment, education, or training NEETs ([indicator 3.5](#)), the early school-leaving rate ([indicator 3.6](#)), and the level of educational attainment ([indicator 3.7](#)). The chapter concludes by examining education policies for migrants ([indicator 3.8](#)).





### 3.1 Reading literacy at the age of 15



**Definition:** Reading literacy results are drawn from the OECD PISA tests. This indicator measures the capacity to understand, use, and reflect on written texts to achieve goals, develop knowledge and potential, and participate in society. A 40-point gap is equivalent to roughly one year of schooling. Foreign-born students are defined here as those who were born abroad, irrespective of the country of birth of their parents.

**Coverage:** Students at the age of 15 at the time of the survey (with a three-month margin).


The level of reading literacy is higher among native-born 15-year-olds than among their foreign-born peers in half of the 14 LAC countries examined here. The average test score for foreign-born is 394, as compared to 458 in the OECD area, corresponding roughly to 1.5 year of schooling. The gap between the foreign- and native-born is widest in Brazil, where the reading score of pupils born abroad falls short of that of their native-born counterparts by 78 points—the equivalent of nearly two years of schooling. The school performance of immigrant students in Brazil might be hampered by language problems, given the large share of immigrants from non-Portuguese speaking countries (see [indicator 2.2](#)), while in other LAC countries, the host country language rarely constitutes a barrier to integration. Immigrants also perform worse in Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, and Paraguay. The disparities are especially wide in Mexico and Guatemala, exceeding 30 points, such as in the OECD on average. By contrast, foreign-born students outperform their native-born peers in Ecuador and Panama (by more than 36 points) and in Peru and Honduras, albeit to a lesser extent (by around 10 points). Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay report no significant differences between both groups. In countries that have received a significant inflow of immigrants from Venezuela—such as Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama (see [indicator 2.2](#) and [2.7](#))—immigrant students have similar or higher PISA reading scores than their native-born peers. This suggests that immigrant students from Venezuela possess reading skills that are on par with or even surpass those of their native-born counterparts.

Native-born students with foreign-born parents lag behind those with native-born parents in all countries except for Argentina. The widest differences occur in Mexico and Brazil, amounting to over two years of schooling. What is more, native-born students with immigrant parents score lower on average than foreign-born students in almost two-thirds of countries, most notably in Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. Native-born students born to immigrant parents are thus less well-integrated into the school system than their foreign-born peers.

The financial, social, cultural, and human resources available to students shape their school performance and are reflected in the PISA index of economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS). Average ESCS values are higher among foreign-born students than native-born ones in four out of five LAC countries. This might be partly due to the comparatively higher educational attainment of the immigrant population in the region. After controlling for these differences,<sup>41</sup> the native-born outperform immigrants in three out of four countries, and the average gap across LAC countries between both groups increases from 7 to 14 p.p. This suggests that other factors influence reading scores over and above ESCS. The other issues that young people face in the course of integrating into a new country may include cultural and social barriers not captured by the ESCS score, unfamiliarity with the school system, discrimination (both by other students and/or teachers), and schools with limited resources. Furthermore, young women in LAC countries (and OECD countries) generally achieve higher reading scores than their male counterparts (407 versus 391 points in the LAC countries on average), but this gender gap is much smaller among the foreign-born than the native-born.

<sup>41</sup> A Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is applied to produce scores adjusted for the ESCS structure. See OECD (2012) for more detail.

**FIGURE 3.1. Reading Literacy, 2018**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of PISA reading score points of the foreign-born population.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ The average reading literacy scores of native-born 15-year-olds surpass those of their foreign-born peers in the OECD and in half of the 14 LAC countries examined here. However, after controlling for the economic, social, and cultural status of students—usually higher among immigrants in LAC, the native-born outperform immigrants in three out of four LAC countries.
- ➔ In Brazil, where immigrants are more likely to face language difficulties, the gap amounts to an equivalent of almost two years of schooling (78 score points). By contrast, the level of reading literacy among immigrants is similar or higher than among their native-born peers in virtually all countries with a high share of Venezuelan immigrants (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama) as well as in Argentina, Honduras, and Uruguay.
- ➔ Young women generally achieve higher reading scores than their male counterparts (407 versus 391 points on average), but this is less the case among the foreign-born.

### 3.2 Proportion of pupils who lack basic reading skills at the age of 15



**Definition:** Students who lack basic reading skills at the age of 15 (i.e., low school performers) are those who score no higher than level 1 (or 407 points) on the PISA assessments of reading proficiency. According to PISA, students with this level of proficiency have serious difficulties in using reading as a tool to advance and extend their knowledge and skills in other areas. Foreign-born students are defined here as those who were born abroad, irrespective of the country of birth of their parents.


**Coverage:** Students at the age of 15 at the time of the survey (with a three-month margin).

Across the 14 LAC countries analyzed here, more than half of all students lack basic reading skills, independently of whether they were born abroad or not (56% and 54%, respectively). In the OECD on average, one in three foreign-born students and one in five native-born students have difficulty with basic aspects of reading. In LAC countries, low reading proficiency is more widespread among the foreign- than the native-born in Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico; and, to a lesser extent, Chile and Paraguay. Gaps are widest in Brazil, where four in five foreign-born pupils perform poorly in school vis-à-vis only one in two native-born. Compared to immigrant students in other Latin American countries, language might pose a major barrier to immigrant students in Brazil, as most come from Spanish-speaking countries ([see indicator 2.2](#)) and thus Portuguese is not their native language.

By contrast, immigrants are less likely to lack basic reading skills than their native-born peers in the Andean Community countries (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) as well as in Panama and Honduras. The immigrant population in Colombia and Peru had already been shaped by the large-scale displacement from Venezuela by the time of testing, and the small shares of low school performers might thus suggest that young Venezuelan immigrants have a lower propensity to struggle at school. In Argentina and Uruguay, the proportion of pupils lacking basic reading skills is similar among both foreign- and native-born youth.

Native-born young women in LAC countries are less likely to perform poorly in school than their male peers in all LAC countries, with a gender gap amounting to 8 p.p. on average. The gender gap in favor of girls is much smaller among the foreign-born (2 p.p. on average), except in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Paraguay. In Brazil, Guatemala, and Panama, foreign-born young women are even more likely to lack basic reading skills than their male counterparts.

**FIGURE 3.2. Proportion of Students Without Basic Reading Skills, 2018**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born students without basic reading skills.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ On average, more than half of all foreign- and native-born 15-year-olds lack basic reading skills in LAC countries (56% and 54%, respectively).
- ➔ Low reading proficiency is more widespread among the foreign-born than the native-born in around half of all countries, particularly in Brazil (81% and 49%, respectively). The opposite holds true in the Andean Community countries (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), which are home to a large share of Venezuelan immigrants.
- ➔ Young men are generally more likely to perform poorly at school than their female counterparts, but the difference is less pronounced among the foreign-born. The opposite is even true in Brazil, Guatemala, and Panama, where young foreign-born men outperform their female peers.

### 3.3 School Attendance (6- to 16-year-olds and 15- to 18-year-olds)



**Definition:** This indicator presents the proportion of children and adolescents attending school. It presents the total share of 6- to 16-year-olds and 15- to 18-year-olds in education.

**Coverage:** Children aged 6 to 16 and adolescents aged 15 to 18.

Across the nine LAC countries for which data was available, 86% of foreign-born children aged 6 to 16 attend school. Among native-born children, this proportion is 93%. In five out of the nine countries, school participation rates are lower among immigrant children than among the native-born. The 6–16 age range is a crucial stage for school attendance as it is the age when education is compulsory in most countries. Not attending compulsory education may be negatively associated with future socioeconomic outcomes.

In countries with high school attendance rates among native-born children, participation rates are also high among foreign-born pupils (above 94%). In addition, there is practically no gap in attendance rates between immigrant and native-born pupils in these countries—differences vary by less than 1 percentage point. This pattern is observed in Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. By contrast, in countries like Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Peru, where attendance rates among foreign-born pupils are the lowest (below 75%), the gaps between the two groups are much wider—at least 11 p.p. Colombia, where attendance rates are high among native-born children (95%), has the widest school attendance gap between groups—almost 20 p.p.


School participation rates among 15- to 18-year-olds are lower than those of younger children. In 11 LAC countries, 73% of foreign-born youth and 79% of native-born youth are in school. Like younger children, in half of the countries, foreign-born youth are less likely to attend school than their native-born peers. The gap between groups is largest in Colombia and Dominican Republic (where there is a difference between groups of over 24 p.p.), followed by Ecuador (13 p.p.). By contrast, the gap is narrow in countries where education participation rates are high (above 80%).

This pattern is observed in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. In Mexico and Uruguay, school attendance rates among young immigrants are higher than those of the native-born. The difference is particularly marked in Mexico, where foreign-born children are 8 p.p. more likely to participate in education than their native-born peers (81% and 73%, respectively).

Gaps in school participation between the foreign- and the native-born owe partly to migrants' duration of stay. On one hand, the gaps are smallest in countries like Uruguay and Argentina: the vast majority of migrants to these destinations (more than two-thirds) have been living there for five or more years ([see indicator 2.2](#)). On the other hand, the gaps in school attendance rates are widest in Peru and Colombia, where large numbers of migrants have arrived in recent years. In these countries, most immigrants are considered recent arrivals, having lived in the country for less than five years (66% and 75%, respectively). However, in the Dominican Republic, duration of stay does not explain the low school attendance rates among foreign-born children. In this country, almost two-third of migrants (64%) have been living in the country for five or more years.


In general, most children aged 15 to 18 who are in education do not participate in the labor market ([see figure 3.6](#)). This is especially true in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, where less than 5% of young people attend school and work. However, there are some exceptions. These include Peru, Ecuador, and Paraguay, where the share of youth both in school and at work may be as high as 21%. Furthermore, in these countries, the native-born are more likely to participate in both activities than foreign-born youth—there is a gap of at least 10 p.p. between the two.

**FIGURE 3.3. School Attendance of Children Aged 6-16**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born children attending school.

**FIGURE 3.4. School Attendance of Children Aged 15-18**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born children attending school.





## MAIN FINDINGS

- Across the nine LAC countries examined here, 86% of foreign-born children aged 6 to 16 attend school, compared with 93% of native-born children. In half of these countries, school participation rates among immigrant children are lower than among their native-born peers.
- School attendance rates among 6- to 16-year-olds are similar for foreign- and native-born pupils in countries where school attendance is high among the native-born. This is observed in Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. By contrast, the gaps between groups are largest in Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Peru—at least 11 p.p.
- In 11 LAC countries, 73% of foreign-born youth aged 15 to 18 attend school, as do 79% of native-born youth. In half of these countries, foreign-born youth are less likely to attend school than their native-born peers.
- The gap in school attendance rates among 15- to 18-year-olds is largest in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, with a difference of over 24 percentage between groups. By contrast, in Mexico and Uruguay, school attendance rates among young immigrants are higher than those of the native-born.
- Gaps in school participation between foreign- and native-born children are partly due to the duration of stay of migrants.
- In general, the share of youth who are in both education and employment is relatively low. Exceptions include Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay, where it is as high as 21%.

### 3.4 Participation of children in employment (15- to 18-year-olds)



**Definition:** This indicator presents the proportion of children aged 15 to 18 in employment, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition. It also presents the proportion of children who are only in employment (that is, children who were in employment but were not attending school); children in education and employment (that is, children who were participating in both education and employment); and children who are not in employment, education, or training (NEET).

**Coverage:** Young people aged 15 to 18.

Around 15% of both foreign- and native-born young immigrants aged 15 to 18 have a job in the LAC countries examined here. Employment rates of 15- to 18-year-olds, however, vary widely across countries and between the foreign- and the native-born. Among the foreign-born, the rates are highest in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico (between 21% and 28%) and lowest in Argentina, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay (below 10%). Conversely, among native-born youth, employment rates are highest in Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru, where they exceed 25%. At 6% or less, these rates are lowest in Argentina and Chile.

In two-thirds of the 12 LAC countries analyzed, young immigrants are less likely than their native-born peers to have a job. This is especially true in Paraguay and Peru, where the share of foreign-born in employment is less than half that of the native-born (14% and 34%, respectively, for both countries). By contrast, foreign-born youth are more likely to hold a job than their native-born peers in Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. The differences between groups are largest in Colombia, where young immigrants are almost twice as likely as their native-born counterparts to having a job (28% and 15%, respectively).


Figure 3.6 presents the proportion of 15- to 18-year-olds in employment and/or education. In 7 out of 12 countries, young immigrants are more likely to devote their time exclusively to working than to both working and studying. This is especially true in Colombia (24% and 4%, respectively), the Dominican Republic (13% and 4%, respectively), and Ecuador (16% and 6%, respectively).

There are wide gaps between the shares of foreign- and native-born youth of participation exclusively in employment. In Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador, foreign-born youth are more likely than the native-born to spend their time only working, with a difference of more than 6 p.p. In Colombia, whereas 24% of young immigrants

spend their time exclusively in employment, only 9% of the native-born do so. Conversely, in Paraguay and Peru, native-born youth are more likely than their foreign-born counterparts to participate only in employment, with a difference of around 8 p.p. between the two groups.


Figure 3.6 also shows the proportions of 15- to 18-year-olds not in employment, education, or training (NEET). These rates are close to 14% among the native-born and 19% among the foreign-born. However, they vary widely across countries, especially among foreign-born youth. The shares for the latter range from about 9% in Uruguay, Mexico, and Panama to 30% in Peru, 36% in Dominican Republic, and 38% in Colombia.

**FIGURE 3.5. Participation of Children Aged 15-18 in Employment**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born children in employment.

**FIGURE 3.6. Youth Participation in Education and or Employment**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born children attending school only.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- Employment rates for 15- to 18-year-olds are around 15% for both foreign- and native-born youth in the 12 LAC countries examined here. However, they vary widely across countries and across foreign- and native-born groups. Among foreign-born youth, they are highest in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico (between 21% and 28%) and lowest in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay (below 10%).
- In 7 out of the 12 countries, young immigrants are more likely to devote their time exclusively to working than to both working and studying. The largest proportions of immigrant youth only in employment are observed in Colombia (24%), Dominican Republic (13%), and Ecuador (16%). Likewise, foreign-born youth in these countries are more likely to spend their time only working than the native-born.
- In two-thirds of countries, young immigrants are less likely than native-born youth to hold a job. This is especially true in Peru and Paraguay, where the employment rate for foreign-born youth is less than half that of native-born youth (14% and 34%, respectively, in both countries).
- Foreign-born youth are more likely to hold a job than native-born youth in Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. The differences are largest in Colombia, where young immigrants are almost twice as likely as their native-born counterparts to be employed (28% and 15%, respectively).
- The proportion of 15- to 18-year-olds who are not in employment, education, or training is close to 14% and 19% among the native- and foreign-born, respectively. However, among the foreign-born youth, these rates vary widely across countries.

### 3.5 Not in employment, education, or training (15- to 24-year-olds)



**Definition:** The proportion of young people aged 15 to 24 who are not in employment, education, or training (NEET).

**Coverage:** Young people aged 15 to 24.

In the 11 LAC countries with information for this indicator, the proportion of foreign-born individuals aged 15–24 who are NEET is 24%, against 19% in the OECD. For native-born youth, this rate is close to 20% and 12%, respectively. NEET rates among the foreign-born population, however, vary widely across countries. These proportions range from 13% in Argentina and Panama to 32% in Costa Rica and Peru, and 38% in Colombia and Dominican Republic. By contrast, the range of NEET rates among the native-born is much narrower, from 16% in Argentina to 26% in Colombia.

In almost three-quarters of the countries in question, foreign-born youth are more likely to be NEET than their native-born peers. This difference is especially marked in Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, where the foreign-born are more than 12 p.p. more likely than the native-born to be NEET. At the opposite end of the spectrum, foreign-born young people are less likely than the native-born to be NEET in Argentina, Mexico, and Panama, with the gap between groups being narrower, at around 3 p.p.


In all the LAC countries examined here, women aged 15–24, both native- and foreign-born, are more likely to be NEET than young men. This pattern is also observed in OECD countries among immigrants, although NEET rates are similar for both genders among the native-born. The highest NEET rates among young women are observed in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Peru, where around 30% of foreign-born young women and over 50% of native-born young women are classified as NEET. In these countries, NEET rates among foreign-born men are also among the highest, at around 20%. Among native-born men, however, the highest rates (also 20%) were observed in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Chile. Conversely, the proportions of 15- to 24-year-olds who are NEET are lowest for both foreign- and native-born women and men in Argentina and Uruguay.

In two-thirds of 11 LAC countries, the NEET gender gap is narrower among the foreign-born than among the native-born. The exceptions are Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, where the gender gap is similar between groups; and Mexico and Paraguay, where

foreign-born young women are more likely to be NEET than men compared with their native-born peers.


Comparing the outcomes for foreign- and native-born populations by sex, estimates show that in 4 out of the 11 countries, foreign-born women and foreign-born men have lower NEET rates than their native-born peers. That is, foreign-born youth are more likely to be economically active than their native-born counterparts. This is true in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. The differences between foreign- and native-born men are rather small (1 to 4 p.p.). However, they are larger between foreign- and native-born women, with gaps of more than 20 p.p. favoring foreign-born women in Colombia and Costa Rica, as well as in the Dominican Republic and Peru. By contrast, foreign-born youth are more likely to be NEET than their native-born counterparts in 3 out of 11 countries. These include Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay for young women, and the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Peru for young men.

**FIGURE 3.7. NEET Rates Among Young People**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the NEET rates among foreign-born youth.

**FIGURE 3.8. NEET Rates Among Young People, By Sex**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the NEET rates among foreign-born young women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In the 11 LAC countries examined here, 24% of foreign-born young people aged 15–24 are NEET, against 19% in the OECD. This compares with 20% and 12% among the native-born youth, respectively. While there are marked cross-country differences in NEET rates for the foreign-born population, these are narrower for the native-born.
- ➔ In almost three-quarters of the countries, young people born abroad are more likely than the native-born to be NEET. These differences are especially marked in Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, where the gap exceeds 12 p.p. By contrast, young foreign-born individuals are less likely than the native-born to be NEET in Argentina, Mexico, and Panama.
- ➔ Young women—both the native- and the foreign-born—are more likely than young men to be NEET. The largest gender gaps among foreign-born youth are observed in countries where gender gaps among the native-born are also large. This includes countries like Ecuador, Mexico, and Panama.
- ➔ The gaps between the foreign- and native-born populations show that foreign-born women and men do better than their native-born counterparts in 4 out of the 11 countries. The differences are rather small between foreign- and native-born men (between 1 and 4 p.p.) but are larger between foreign- and native-born women (over 20 p.p.).

### 3.6 Early school-leaving



**Definition:** The proportion of young people who are neither in education nor training and have gone no further than lower secondary school. The term “lower secondary” is used for programs classified as International Standard Classification of Educational Degrees (ISCED) level 2. This level is also referred to as the first stage of secondary school, junior secondary school, middle school, or junior high school.

**Coverage:** Young people aged 15 to 24.

Across the 11 LAC countries for which data is available, 26% of foreign-born young people leave school early, while the share of early dropouts among the native-born is around 20%. Both figures are much higher than in the OECD on average, where less than 10% of young people aged 15 to 24 leave school early, irrespective of their country of birth. There are cross-country differences among LAC countries, especially among the foreign-born population, although levels are higher than in the OECD in all LAC countries. The proportion of early school-leavers among foreign-born youth ranges from 13% in Panama to 50% in Costa Rica, whereas among the native-born youth it


varies from 16% in Colombia and Argentina to 25% in Mexico and Peru and 27% in Chile.

In two-thirds of countries, the foreign-born are more likely to drop out of school early than their native-born peers. This is particularly true in Costa Rica, where drop-out rates among the foreign-born are more than twice those of native-born youth (50% and 21%, respectively). However, there are also marked differences in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, where the rate of early school-leavers among the foreign-born is over 30%, and there is gap with their native-born peers of at least 13 p.p.

In Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, drop-out rates are similar in both groups, with a difference of less than 2 p.p. between them. However, the rates are lower in Argentina and Uruguay than in Chile. While only around 16% of students living in Argentina and 18% in Uruguay leave the school system early, around 27% of students living in Chile do so.

The native-born are more likely than their foreign-born peers to drop out of school early in two countries: Mexico and Panama. In Mexico, however, the gap between the two groups is larger than in Panama (6 and 3 p.p., respectively). Further, early school-leaving is more widespread in Mexico than in Panama. Whereas the drop-out rates in Mexico are 25% among native-born pupils and 19% among foreign-born, in Panama they are 17% and 13%, respectively.

**FIGURE 3.9. Early School-Leavers**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born early school-leavers. Data for the OECD average refers to foreign-born arrived before the age of 15, rather than all foreign-born.





## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Foreign-born children are more likely than their native-born peers to drop out of school early in two-thirds of LAC countries. This is particularly true in Costa Rica, where drop-out rates among immigrants are more than twice as high as those of native-born youth (50% and 21%, respectively). These differences are also marked in Colombia and Dominican Republic.
- ➔ By contrast, in Mexico and Panama, early school-leaving is more widespread among native-born students than among foreign-born ones (25% versus 19% in Mexico; and 17% versus 13% in Panama).
- ➔ The proportions of early school-leavers are similar among native-born youth and their foreign-born peers in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay.

### 3.7 Level of educational attainment



**Definition:** This indicator measures educational attainment against the ISCED. It considers two levels: i) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5–8); and ii) low, not higher than lower secondary education (ISCED Levels 0–2).

**Coverage:** People not in education aged 15 to 64.


In terms of educational attainment levels, the foreign-born are more likely to be highly educated than the native-born in eight out of twelve LAC countries. The gap is largest in Uruguay, where the share of highly educated people is twice as large among the foreign-born compared with the native-born (47% and 23%). Similarly, in Mexico and Peru, where around 30% of immigrants are highly educated, the foreign-born outperform the native-born by 15 p.p. There is also a 15-percentage-point difference in Chile.

In contrast, in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, immigrants are half as likely to be highly educated than their native-born peers. In these countries, while more than 22% of the native-born are highly educated, less than 12% of immigrants complete tertiary education. Only in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic is the share of low-educated individuals higher among the immigrant population than the native-born population, which partially reflects the low shares of highly educated people among the immigrant population in those countries. In Argentina and Colombia, the foreign-born population has smaller shares of both high- and low-educated individuals. This means that the immigrant population has a larger share of medium-educated people.

When comparing levels of educational attainment in LAC with the average for OECD countries, both the native- and foreign-born in the OECD area are more likely to be highly educated than in LAC. However, in both groups of countries, immigrants outperform the native-born on this standard. There is a 5-percentage-point difference between the shares of the foreign- and native-born in LAC countries (28% and 23%, respectively), while this difference is close to 3 p.p. in OECD countries (35% and 32%, respectively).

By contrast, the share of low-educated people in the OECD area is much lower than the share in LAC countries. Once again, this is true for both the foreign- and native-born. While in OECD countries 25% of the foreign-born and 22% of the native-born are low educated, these shares are equal to 33% and 41% in the LAC region. In addition, while the foreign-born in OECD countries are more likely to be low educated than the native-born, the opposite holds in LAC countries. This means that immigrants are overrepresented at both sides of the education spectrum in OECD countries, while they are only overrepresented among the highly educated in LAC countries.

**FIGURE 3.10. Share of High- and Low-Educated Working-Age Population**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of high- and low-educated foreign-born.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- The foreign-born are more likely to be highly educated than the native-born in 8 out of the 12 LAC countries. The largest gaps between the foreign- and native-born are observed in Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.
- In the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, immigrants are half as likely to be highly educated as their native-born peers.
- Both the foreign-born and the native-born are more educated in OECD countries (35% and 32%, respectively) than in LAC (28% versus 23%, respectively). Similarly, for both the foreign- and native-born, the share of low-educated people in the OECD area (25% and 22%, respectively) is much lower than the share in LAC countries (33% versus 41%, respectively).
- Immigrants are overrepresented at both ends of the education spectrum in OECD countries, while they are only overrepresented among the highly educated in LAC countries.

### Box 3.1 Brazil's Migration Data

Brazil has received large flows of migrants from Venezuela, Haiti, and other LAC countries in recent years. In this report, it was not possible to present estimates for Brazil for most indicators because recent socioeconomic data is not available by country of origin (either country of birth or nationality). Most indicators in this report were constructed using data from household surveys and labor force or household income and expenditure surveys. These surveys gather detailed socioeconomic information and include a question to identify people born abroad. Brazil's Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua (Continuous National Household Sample Survey, PNA-DC) has not included questions on this issue since 2016, when the existing question was removed. Today, the census is the only national-level source that allows immigrants to be identified and their situation compared with that of the native-born. The latest available census took place in 2011. It is thus not possible to produce up-to-date estimates that compare the situation of the foreign- and native-born populations in Brazil today and assess their integration outcomes.

National institutions like the Observatório das Migrações Internacionais (Observatory of International Migration, OBMigra) and the Sistema de Registro Nacional Migratório (National Migration Registry System, SISMIGRA) collect and regularly publish data on immigrants. The SISMIGRA platform is run by the Federal Police and the Brazilian Migration Authority. It collects data from all migrants who enter the country irregularly, including temporary and permanent immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and cross-border migrants. OBMigra also collects data on registered immigrant workers and students. These sources could not be used in this report as they do not gather data on the socioeconomic profiles of native-born individuals or people with the Brazilian citizenship. Data on employment is only available for people working in the formal sector,<sup>42</sup> which covers around 60% of Brazil's labor market (Shamsuddin et al., 2021). Despite these limitations, we drew information from these sources to provide a broad picture of the immigrant population in Brazil.

<sup>42</sup> Labor market data for immigrants is drawn from the 2020 RAIS-CTPS-CAGED harmonized dataset, managed by the Ministry of the Economy.

In the past decade, the number of migrants living in Brazil has more than doubled. The 2011 Census estimated their numbers at 592,570. By 2020, according to UN Migration Data, this number had increased to 1.1 million. Administrative records of residence permit requests from the Federal Government estimate that by the end of 2020, there were 1.3 million immigrants in the country (SIS-MIGRA, 2020), a figure close to the UN estimate. At the same time, the main nationalities of immigrants changed markedly between 2010 and 2020. While at the start of this decade, the immigrants residing in Brazil were mainly born in Portugal and Japan, followed by other non-LAC countries, by the end of it, they were mainly from Venezuela, Haiti,<sup>43</sup> Bolivia, and Colombia (see indicator 2.1).

Another significant change in migrants' profile is their level of education (see figure 3.1.1). While in 2011 more than half of immigrants with a formal job were highly educated (52%), in 2020 this was true of only one-fifth (21%). Conversely, the share of immigrants with very low levels of education increased during this period, going from 13% in 2011 to 24% in 2020. These changes are associated with changes in migrants' country of birth and their occupations. Whereas in the early 2010s migrants were mainly from European countries, and thus possibly had higher levels of education, in the late 2010s, they were mainly from LAC countries, many with lower levels of education.

However, despite the decrease in the share of highly educated workers among the foreign-born, the proportion with a tertiary education was twice as high as that of the native-born population in 2020 (21% and 11%, respectively; figure 3.1.2). At the same time, the share of workers with very low levels of education (a complete primary level education or less) was higher among the foreign-born than among the native-born (24% and 15%, respectively). In two-thirds of the LAC countries examined in this report, it was also observed that the share of highly educated foreign-born is larger than that of native-born.<sup>44</sup> By contrast, it is less common for the proportion of those with very low education levels to be higher among immigrants

than the native-born. This pattern is observed only in one-quarter of the 12 countries reported here.<sup>45</sup>

Similarly, the level of job skills of foreign-born workers in Brazil underwent marked changes during the past decade. While around 60% of immigrants worked in highly skilled occupations in 2011, only 22% did so in 2020. Conversely, the share of immigrants in low-skilled occupations increased in this ten-year period, rising from 17% to 46%. Immigrants, especially Haitians and Venezuelans, are able to access the labor market working in these occupations (Cavalcanti et al., 2021b). Figure 3.1.2 shows that the proportion of formal workers in occupations considered to be low-skilled, such as occupations in agriculture and industry, were much larger among foreign- than native-born workers in 2020 (45% versus 24%, respectively). The larger proportion of low-skilled jobs among the foreign-born compared with the native-born is observed in around half of the LAC countries for which information for this indicator was available.<sup>46</sup> Given the share of low-skilled jobs among immigrants, it is possible that overqualification in Brazil is higher among immigrants than among the native-born, as is the case in two-thirds of the other LAC countries examined here.

As in other countries, the share of women in the total migrant population has been increasing over time. In Brazil, large flows of migrant women arrived from the second half of the 2010s on, particularly from Venezuela and Haiti (Cavalcanti et al., 2021a). Despite this increase in female arrivals, women continue to be underrepresented among the foreign-born population, accounting for one-third of immigrants in Brazil (36%) (Cavalcanti et al., 2021). Furthermore, the share of female immigrants with formal jobs has remained practically unchanged during the past decade, at around 30% (figure 3.1.2). This is markedly lower than the share of native-born women employed in the formal sector in 2020. Although this share is not fully comparable with the estimates in indicator 5.3, it is also much lower than the employment rates of immigrant women in other LAC countries (54%).


<sup>43</sup> While the large-scale flows of Haitians into Brazil (and other LAC countries) began after the devastating 2010 earthquake, the massive arrival of Venezuelans started in the mid-2010s, when the political and economic crisis in their country intensified.

<sup>44</sup> These countries include Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

<sup>45</sup> These countries include Argentina, Costa Rica, and Dominican Republic.


<sup>46</sup> These countries include Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador.

**FIGURE 3.1.1. Changes in Regular Immigrants' Characteristics Over Time**




**Note:** Data drawn from Cavalcanti et al. (2021b). Occupations were originally classified using the Brazilian Occupations Classification (CBO, 2002). We classified occupations into low-skilled occupations (elementary occupations, production of industrial services and goods, and agriculture, forestry and fisheries) and high-skilled occupations (managers, professionals, and midlevel technicians).

**FIGURE 3.1.2. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Foreign- and Native-Born Formal Workers**



**Note:** Data for immigrants is drawn from Cavalcanti et al. (2021b) and for the native-born population from Shamsuddin et al. (2021).

**FIGURE 3.1.3. Number of Immigrant Children Enrolled in Schools by Educational Level, 2010 and 2020**



Source: Cavalcanti et al. (2021a).

The arrival of migrants and their families has led to a larger number of children requiring access to schools across all educational levels. Data from the annual school census shows that the number of immigrant children enrolled in Brazilian schools almost tripled between 2010 and 2020, going from around 42,000 to almost 123,000 (figure 3.1.3).

#### References for Box 3.1:

Cavalcanti, L; Oliveira, T.; Silva, B. G. (2021a). Imigração e refúgio no Brasil: Retratos da década de 2010. Observatório das Migrações Internacionais; Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública/ Conselho Nacional de Imigração e Coordenação Geral de Imigração Laboral. Brasília, DF: OBMigra, Available at: <https://portaldeimigracao.mj.gov.br/pt/dados/relatorios-a>.

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Shamsuddin, M., P. Acosta, R. Battaglin Schwengber, J. Fix, N. Pirani (2021). Integration of Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in Brazil (English). Policy Research working paper, no. WPS 9605 Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/498351617118028819/Integration-of-Venezuelan-Refugees-and-Migrants-in-Brazil>.

Uebel, R. R. G. (2018). Política externa migratória brasileira: das migrações de perspectiva à hiperdinamização das migrações durante os governos Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff (dissertation). LUME Repositório Digital. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Retrieved December 16, 2022, from <http://hdl.handle.net/10183/188410>.

### 3.8 Education policies for immigrants in LAC countries

As highlighted in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, education is a fundamental tool for the protection of human dignity. Education for all, without discrimination, is guaranteed by international human rights law. The principle of nondiscrimination applies to all, including noncitizens, regardless of their legal status. Consequently, immigrants in an irregular situation can invoke the right to education. In practice, this right may be impeded by the incompatibility between different laws, and the documentation required by host countries. However, even in countries where access to education is available, language barriers and high costs of education can discourage families from enrolling their children into the

available programs. For example, in Colombia, young Venezuelans can enter the public education system. But if they do not have a valid identity document by the time they graduate from high school, they cannot obtain their high school diploma. The educational inclusion of immigrants, including refugees, into schools on equal terms with the native-born population is an important starting point for social cohesion. However, in some cases, how education is delivered, language barriers, and discrimination can drive these groups away from school. Access to quality education is fundamental for children and young people to develop the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values that contribute to a healthy, happy, productive life, in addition to contributing economically to their host nations.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> See also IDB (2022c) for further analysis of education issues for migrants in the region.

**TABLE 3.1. Education Policy Indicators**

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Mexico	Panama	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay
Migrants and their family members have access to public primary and secondary education, regardless of their migration status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (with restrictions) <sup>48</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (only residents)	Yes
Migrants must comply with more requirements than the native-bon population to get their foreign high school degrees officially recognized	No	Yes <sup>49</sup>	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Migrants have access to the same public education support services as citizens, regardless of their migration status	Yes	Yes (basic education) / No (higher education)	-	Yes (with restrictions) <sup>48</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (only residents)	Yes

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

<sup>48</sup> Valid identification is required to receive a high school diploma.

<sup>49</sup> According to MEC Normative Ordinance No. 22 of December 13, 2016, which establishes general rules and procedures for processing requests for the validation of foreign undergraduate and postgraduate diplomas (master's and doctorate), issued by foreign institutions of higher education; and the CNE/CNS Resolution No. 03, of June 22, 2016, which establishes rules regarding the revalidation of diplomas from undergraduate courses and the recognition of stricto sensu postgraduate diplomas (master's and doctorate), issued by foreign higher education establishments.



**TABLE 3.1. Education Policy Indicators (Cont.)**

	Argentina 	Brazil 	Chile 	Colombia 	Costa Rica 	Dominican Republic 	Ecuador 	Mexico 	Panama 	Peru 	Trinidad and Tobago 	Uruguay 
<b>Migrants' children have access to public early childhood care and the education system, regardless of their migration status</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (only residents)	Yes
<b>Migrants have access to free or public language courses</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	No language courses for migrants	-	Yes	-	-	No specific language courses for migrants	Yes
<b>Tuition costs at higher education institutions are higher for foreign students than for nationals</b>	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No (Except for international transfer fee for foreigners)	Yes	No

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

Almost all countries in LAC guarantee the right to education and allow migrant to enroll in their education systems regardless of their migration status. However, schools face administrative, financial, and teaching-related challenges that pose barriers to the full integration of immigrant children.

In 11 of the 12 LAC countries analyzed in this report, by law, children and adolescents have the right to compulsory public education and public early childhood care, regardless of their migration status (i.e., whether they are residents, refugees, asylum seekers, or irregular migrants).<sup>50</sup> In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, immigrants' must submit a special request for their children to be able to access public education according to the National Immigration Act, which can only be granted if no local student will be displaced, among other conditions.<sup>51</sup>

In Costa Rica, a government resolution (Government Decree No. DJUR-0019-01-2021-JM, General Migration Authority) established a process for the temporary regularization of students in an irregular situation so that they could be enrolled in the public education system. Applications had to be submitted before April 30, 2021, and the process was free, but the documentation of their new legal status cost US\$60. Applicants have to be under the age of 18 at the time of application and can maintain their status until they are 20 years old and renew it every two years for a fee of US\$38. Requirements include proof of school enrollment.

In Peru, through Resolution N.665-2018-Minedu, the Ministry of Education seeks to standardize requirements and simplify the process for Venezuelan children to enroll in basic education programs in the country. As a result of this resolution, parents no longer need to present their ID cards to enroll their children in basic education—instead, an affidavit is all that is required.

However, all LAC countries are facing practical challenges in enrolling immigrants in their education systems. They must deal with the fact that migrants often lack the documents that schools usually require and address placing children in the right grades when they lack school records, among

other factors. Another challenge immigrants must face is getting their foreign high school diploma recognized. In almost all LAC countries, to validate their high school diploma, immigrants can present their passport or an ID card obtained from the Migration Department. However, the process can become complicated as all documents (such as diplomas or school records) must be legalized through an apostille. In Chile, this process is only possible for migrants from countries that have signed an agreement with Chile. In the absence of such an agreement, only the children of Chileans who attended educational establishments abroad can access the recognition process. In Colombia, only immigrants with a foreigner identity card, residence permit, special permit, or humanitarian visa can get their high school diploma recognized. In Peru, foreigners are required to present an identity document recognized by competent immigration authorities.

Higher costs<sup>52</sup> of education for the foreign-born than for the native-born can also limit access to education. Argentina, Costa Rica, and Peru, costs are the same for both foreigners and nationals. In Brazil, public higher education is free of cost (this is also the case in Ecuador and Uruguay), and private higher education costs the same for Brazilians and foreigners (but regular documents are required). In Chile, the costs are the same for foreigners and nationals. However, to access a free education (Article 103), a person must be Chilean, a foreigner with permanent residence, or a foreigner with residence who has completed high school in Chile. Tertiary institutions in the Dominican Republic apply different tuition costs depending on nationality. This is also true in Panama, although in 2019, the University of Panama made tuition costs for Central American students the same as for nationals. The Administrative Council of the Technological University of Panama established a payment of an immigration fee of PAB200 (US\$200) per academic period for foreign undergraduate students (this does not include tuition). Immigrants with a Panamanian ID card (cédula E), foreigners from countries with which Panama has signed cultural agreements (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela), permanent residents, and refugees do not have to pay this fee.

<sup>50</sup> Argentina (Migration Act—Article 7), Brazil (Migration Act—Article 10 and Resolution N° 1, November 13, 2020), Chile (Migration Act—Article 17), Colombia (Political Constitution—Articles 44 and 67), Costa Rica (Political Constitution—Article 78 and Decrees N° 40529-MEP REGLAMENTOS Article 5°), Dominican Republic (Law 66-97 General Education Law, Political Constitution—Article 63), Ecuador (Political Constitution—Article 28), Mexico (Education Law—Articles 5 and 8), Panama (Political Constitution—Article 91 and Organic Education Law), Peru (Migration Act—Article 8), Uruguay (Migration Act—Article 11).

<sup>51</sup> [https://rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt/laws2/alphabetical\\_list/lawspdfs/18.01.pdf](https://rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt/laws2/alphabetical_list/lawspdfs/18.01.pdf).

<sup>52</sup> No information was available for Colombia and Mexico.

In 10 out of the 12 LAC countries<sup>53</sup> analyzed in this report, by law or through specific programs, immigrants have access to public education support services (tutoring, training, food support, or psychosocial support), regardless of their migration status (residents, refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in an irregular situation). In Argentina, as defined by the Migration Act, children have access to education support services. In Costa Rica there are no restrictions on access to public education support programs such as the *Familias fuertes con útiles escolares* program. In Panama, immigrants have access to the *Estudiar sin hambre* [Study without hunger] program. In Peru, the Migration Act (229.2) clearly specifies that immigrants have access to public services with an emphasis on health, education, and work. In Uruguay, immigrants have access to youth centers and centers belonging to the *Progama Nuestros Niños* [Our Children Program]. Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago give access to these services only to regular immigrants or residents.

Education is a fundamental human right and is indispensable for the achievement of sustainable development and addressing inequalities.<sup>54</sup> It is fundamental not only for the development of people's skills and capabilities but also for the construction of peaceful, prosperous societies. Education is a pathway to improving social cohesion by facilitating migrants' socioeconomic inclusion. These benefits can be more easily obtained when host countries ensure early childhood education for all, the first step in the development of children's emotional and cognitive abilities. This is even more important for the integration of children who do not speak the host-country language or face unstable living conditions. Almost all countries face some legal, socioeconomic, and financial barriers that impede access to education.

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<sup>53</sup> No information is available for Chile and Colombia.

<sup>54</sup> <https://migration4development.org/en/news/migration-and-education-leveraging-potential-migration-better-tomorrow>.

## Notes and sources for chapter 3

**TABLE 3.2. Notes and sources for chapter 3**

Indicator	Reading literacy	Proportion of students without basic reading skills	School attendance children aged 6-16	School attendance children aged 15-18	Employment participation of children aged 15-18	Youth participation in education and or employment	NEET rates among young people	NEET rates among young people, by sex	Early school leavers	Share of high- and low-educated
Figure	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.10
<b>OECD countries</b>										
Chile	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	.	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020
Colombia	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021
Costa Rica	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	.	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021
Mexico	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021
<b>LAC IDB countries</b>										
Argentina	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021
Brazil	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Dominican Republic	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021
Ecuador	PISA-D 2017	PISA-D 2017	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021
Guatemala	PISA-D 2015	PISA-D 2015	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Honduras	PISA-D 2016	PISA-D 2016	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Panama	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019
Paraguay	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020
Peru	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021	ENAHO 2021
Trinidad and Tobago	.	.	.	.	CSSP 2015	.	.	.	.	CSSP 2015
Uruguay	PISA 2018	PISA 2018	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019



## 4. IMMIGRANT LABOR MARKET INTEGRATION

**One of the main ways to successfully integrate immigrants into the economy of a country and thus take advantage of the contributions they have to offer is through inclusion in the labor market.** This inclusion should not be through any kind of employment but rather in occupations that match their qualifications and in sectors that offer opportunities for upward labor mobility. However, migrants often face obstacles in accessing decent employment based on their qualifications and aspirations, which restricts their integration and reduces their economic contributions. In addition, integration can take years and the failure to enter the labor market quickly and obtain a job can have negative effects for the rest of the newly arrived immigrants' lives.

For this reason, this chapter seeks to measure indicators that provide an understanding of how far the qualifications that migrants bring to their destination countries are being used. To achieve this, we first need to know their rates of participation in the labor market and the numbers of people of working age and thus analyze the proportion of people who are employed and unemployed. It is also important to examine the percentage of people who are excluded from the labor market, in terms of long-term unemployment and involuntary inactivity. Finally, we also need to understand the characteristics of these jobs, in terms of

formality, hours worked, and the types of contracts offered. Analyzing these aspects will enable us to achieve the objective mentioned above regarding migrants' skills and the capacity of host economies to make the most of these and the knowledge of those who arrive in host countries.

The chapter begins by considering immigrants' skills. It first analyzes immigrants' labor market outcomes, looking at their employment, participation, and unemployment rates ([indicators 4.1](#) and [4.2](#)) and indicators on labor market exclusion—long-term unemployment and involuntary inactivity ([indicator 4.3](#)). The chapter goes on to look at the characteristics of the jobs and types of contracts that immigrants hold ([indicator 4.4](#)), their informality conditions ([indicator 4.5](#)), working hours ([indicator 4.6](#)) and the skill levels of jobs that migrants hold ([indicator 4.7](#)). It then considers the match between workers' educational attainment and the requirements of their occupations to capture overqualification ([indicator 4.8](#)), a key measure of whether immigrants are able to fully apply their knowledge and skills in the destination economy. The chapter next looks at the incidence of self-employment ([indicator 4.9](#)) and analyzes the difference between foreign- and native-born wages ([indicator 4.10](#)). The chapter concludes with an analysis of labor market policies for migrants ([indicator 4.11](#)).



## 4.1 Employment and labor market participation



**Definition:** The *employment rate* denotes people in employment as a percentage of the working-age population (those aged 15 to 64). The ILO defines an employed person as someone who worked at least one hour during the reference week or who had a job but was absent from work.

The *participation rate* (or activity rate) denotes the economically active population (employed and unemployed) as a share of the working-age population.

**Coverage:** Working-age population (15- to 64-year-olds).

The foreign-born account for an average of 5% of the employed population in the Latin American countries examined. In OECD countries, the foreign-born represent 12% of the employed population, or more than twice the share in Latin American countries. The region's employment average is very similar to that of the OECD, where native- and foreign-born employment rates are very similar on average—around two-thirds in both groups. The difference between these two groups of countries is that in LAC, immigrants are more likely to be employed than the native-born population, while in OECD countries, they are slightly less likely on average.


Across LAC countries, most immigrants are in employment ([figure 4.1](#)). In general, employment rates among the foreign-born are higher (69% on average) than among the native-born (66%). The exceptions include Mexico, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, where the native-born are more likely to be employed. In Mexico, when disaggregating the foreign-born by country of birth, employment rates of the foreign-born are only lower than those of the native-born among those born in the US, but not among those born in other countries (41% for the US-born, 65% for the other foreign-born, and 61% for the native-born).

Foreign-born employment rates approach 70% in Panama, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Chile. These are the countries with the lowest dependency ratios (see the definition in [indicator 2.4](#)), which enables maximum participation in the labor force among a population, especially in cases where most migrants move in search of better jobs. In all these countries, the foreign-born are clearly more likely to be in employment than the native-born, as the employment rates of the native-born are below 70%.

Almost three-quarters of the foreign-born (73%) participate in the labor market in LAC countries on average, compared with just over two-thirds of the native-born (69%) ([figure 4.1](#), right panel.) The immigrant labor market participation rate exceeds 80% in Uruguay and Panama. In these countries, the participation rates of native-born residents are among the highest in the region but are still markedly below those of the foreign-born. As with employment rates, LAC and OECD countries have similar average labor force participation rates for migrants and the native-born. However, in the OECD countries, both immigrants and natives tend to participate more in the labor market on average (74% and 74.2%, respectively) than their counterparts in LAC (73% and 69%, respectively), where the rate of participation in the labor market is also higher among immigrants than among the native-born.


Immigrant participation rates are somewhat higher than that of the native-born among the youngest age group, 15- to 34-year-olds, with an average difference between groups of 6 percentage points (66% and 60%, respectively). By contrast, among 35- to 64-year-olds, there is no considerable difference in participation rates between foreign- and native-born populations (73% and 72%, respectively). The largest gaps among the youngest age group are seen in Panama, Chile, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic. However, in most LAC countries, the gap narrows among older workers and remains only in the Dominican Republic and Chile. In the other countries, no significant difference is observed. The only country where the native-born tend to participate in the labor market more than migrants in both age groups is Argentina.

**FIGURE 4.1. Employment and Labor Market Participation**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born who are in employment or participating in the labor force.

**FIGURE 4.2. Labor Market Participation by Age Group**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born who are participating in the labor force.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In most countries, the foreign-born are more likely to be in employment and to participate in the labor market than their native-born peers.
- ➔ In general, employment rates among the foreign-born are higher (69% on average) than among the native-born (66%).
- ➔ Almost three-quarters of the foreign-born (73%) participate in the labor market in LAC countries on average, compared with just over two-thirds of the native-born (69%).
- ➔ Labor market participation of foreign-born compared to native-born tends to be higher for the age group 15-34, where there is a 6-percentage-point difference between the foreign- and native-born, while for people aged 35-64, there is a 1-percentage-point difference.



## 4.2 Unemployment



**Definition:** The ILO defines the unemployed as people without work but who are available to work and have been seeking work in the reference week.\* The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed people in the labor force (the latter being the sum of employed and unemployed individuals, including those in education).

**Coverage:** The economically active working-age population (15- to 64-year-olds).

\*Some national statistical offices use definitions that differ from the ILO, and therefore the unemployment rates reported here will differ from the official statistics in some cases. Using the ILO definition allows for correct comparison across countries.


There are mixed results for the LAC unemployment indicator. In four of the twelve countries (Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Chile), unemployment is higher among the native-born population. Among this group, the largest gaps are found in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, where native-born unemployment is around 4 p.p. higher than that of immigrants. In Chile, the difference is almost 3 p.p. In Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, although the graph and data show a higher proportion of the native-born in unemployment, differences between groups are not significant. By contrast, in the remaining six countries (Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica), the percentage of people actively looking for work is slightly higher among those born abroad than among the native-born. Among these, the largest gaps are observed in Argentina and Uruguay, where the differences are of around 2 percentage points. In the other four countries, although the data suggests a higher concentration of unemployment among immigrants than among the native-born, differences are not big enough to have a clear conclusion.

Interestingly, this indicator does not seem to be related to immigrants' duration of stay in these countries. In Argentina and Uruguay, two of the countries with the highest concentration of foreign-born people who have lived in the country for more than five years, unemployment rates among this group are higher in general and greater than for the native-born. In comparison with Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador, which are countries with a greater presence of new immigrants, mostly from Venezuela, there is no clear trend in unemployment rates differences between the foreign- and native-born.


Unemployment rates by age group show that while for young people, those aged 15 to 34, unemployment is higher among native-born (9.4% against 7.3% among foreign-born), for people aged 35 to 64, it is higher among the foreign-born (6% against 4.5% among native-born). The largest differences between young native- and foreign-born groups occur in Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Paraguay, with a gap of more than 3 percentage points. The only country where young immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than the native-born is Argentina (16.6% and 13.7%, respectively). In Uruguay, Mexico, and Ecuador there are no statistically significant differences. On the other hand, among people aged 35 to 64, differences between the foreign- and native-born are most pronounced in Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, with a gap of more than 3 percentage points. This gap is followed by the one observed in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico of 2 percentage points. The only countries where there is greater unemployment among native- than foreign-born aged 35 to 64 are Dominican Republic (3 percentage points), followed by Chile, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Panama, where the differences are small, to draw conclusions.

In the more global comparison, average unemployment (among both immigrants and the native-born) is slightly higher in the OECD (7.9%) than in LAC (7.4%). In the first group of countries (OECD), there is a larger gap, with a higher proportion of immigrants in unemployment (9.4%) than their native-born peers (6.5%). In the LAC averages, in contrast, the results for the two populations are very similar: 7.3% unemployment among those born abroad and 7.4% among the native-born.

**FIGURE 4.3. Unemployment Rate**



**FIGURE 4.4. Unemployment Between Age Groups**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born unemployed.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ On average in the 12 LAC countries for which data are available, migrants and the native-born have similar unemployment rates.
- ➔ In four of the twelve countries (Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Chile), unemployment is higher among the native-born population.
- ➔ In contrast, in six countries (Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica), the percentage of people actively looking for work is slightly higher among those born abroad than among the native-born.
- ➔ The widest gaps are in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Panama, and Chile, where the native-born are unemployed at higher rates than immigrants. There also is a small but significant gap between Argentina and Uruguay, where migrants tend more to be unemployed.

### 4.3 Risks of labor market exclusion



**Definition of *long-term unemployment*:** the share of job-seekers who have been without a job for at least 12 months among all the unemployed.

**Coverage:** Unemployed people aged 15 to 64.

**Definition of *involuntary inactivity*:** the share of the economically active who are not seeking work but are willing to take up work. This includes, among others, discouraged workers, who are not seeking work because they believe no suitable jobs are available.

**Coverage:** Economically inactive people aged 15 to 64.

In general terms, in LAC, the native-born tend to experience more long-term unemployment (for at least 12 months) than the foreign-born (17% and 12%, respectively). This is the case in 9 of the 11 countries for which data is available, while in only two countries are the native-born as likely to be in long-term unemployment as immigrants (Peru and Costa Rica). As mentioned above, this may be related to the fact that foreign-born are more willing to accept any kind of job due to their urgent needs. The largest gaps (over 11 p.p.) are found in the Dominican Republic and Argentina, while the gaps in Colombia, Panama, and Chile are over 7 points.

For this indicator, the difference between the group of OECD countries and LAC is observed in both groups of the population: among the foreign-born, the difference exceeds 22 p.p., while among the native-born, it is 20 p.p. In both cases, the native-born tend to experience longer periods of unemployment. However, the 5-percentage point gap between the native- and foreign-born is larger in LAC countries than the 3-percentage point gap in OECD countries.


When compared with the unemployment indicator ([Indicator 4.2](#)), interesting differences are observed: unemployment in Costa Rica seems to be low in most cases, because although in the previous indicator this was the country with the highest unemployment rates, these values are considerably reduced when compared to the percentages of people who remain unemployed for more than 12 months. In countries such as Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic (especially among the native-born), unemployment

seems to last longer, since the values seen in the previous indicator remain the same or are higher in this indicator.

There is a higher rate of involuntary inactivity among the foreign-born, although differences with the native-born are relatively small. The gap between groups is of less than 3 percentage points, but it varies widely across countries. It is most pronounced in Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Peru, where the gap is of at least 8 percentage points. Except for Costa Rica, the latter are countries where involuntary inactivity among the foreign-born is highest, with rates of at least 27%. In Uruguay, a large gap in involuntary inactivity between foreign- and native-born is also observed (of 12 percentage points), but inactivity is more pronounced among native- than foreign-born. The average for the OECD countries is more similar to the latter countries, with the foreign-born experiencing involuntary inactivity at a rate about 5 p.p. higher than the native-born (25% vs. 19%).

Involuntary inactivity also tends to be higher in OECD countries than in LAC countries for both foreign- and native-born. However, differences are smaller than in the case of long-term unemployment. Involuntary inactivity among the foreign-born is almost 7 percentage points higher in the OECD than in LAC (24.5% and 17.9%, respectively), while among the native-born there is a 4-percentage-point difference (19.4% and 15.2%, respectively). Further, the gap between foreign- and native-born in OECD countries is greater than the gap in LAC countries (5 and 3 percentage points, respectively).

**FIGURE 4.5. Labor Market Exclusion**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born in long-term unemployed and involuntary inactivity.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In general, native-born in LAC countries are more likely to be in long-term unemployment than immigrants (17.2% and 12.3%, respectively). The difference between the simple averages for these groups is of 5 percentage points.
- ➔ The largest gaps between foreign- and native-born are observed in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, where unemployment is much higher among the native-born than among migrants.
- ➔ Involuntary inactivity is more widespread among migrants than native-born (17.9% and 15.2%, respectively). The largest gaps between groups occur in Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Peru, and Paraguay.
- ➔ In Uruguay, natives are more involuntarily inactive than migrants—a gap of 12 p.p. Also, native-born unemployment tends to be greater among migrants.

### 4.4 Types of contracts



**Definition:** *Temporary work* denotes any kind of wage-earning employment governed by a fixed-term contract, including apprenticeships, temporary employment agency work, and remunerated training courses.

**Coverage:** People aged 15 to 64 who are in employment but are not self-employed or in education.

In 5 of the 10 LAC countries for which data is available, workers with temporary contracts represent a higher percentage of the foreign-born group than among the native-born, with an average difference of 4 p.p. The largest gaps are found in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, where the shares of the population on temporary contracts are approximately 20 p.p. higher among immigrants than for the native-born. This is followed by Peru, where the difference is of 10 percentage points. In Paraguay and Argentina, the shares are at least 4 p.p. higher among migrants than among the native-born. Although in Mexico and Colombia the graph shows a higher percentage of foreign-born in temporary jobs, the difference presented is not statistically significant.

However, there are three countries with a higher percentage of native-born workers in temporary contracts than is the case among immigrants. These are Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru. In these countries, there are gaps of 4 p.p. or more, with the greatest difference occurring in Peru, where there are 10 p.p. more native-born workers than

immigrants in these jobs. In Costa Rica, the difference is almost 6 p.p.; and it is over 4 p.p. in Chile.


As in the case of Colombia and Mexico, although the graph shows a higher percentage of native-born workers with temporary contracts in Panama, the difference established in this indicator is not statistically significant enough to draw conclusions, which suggests that the situation among the native-born and immigrants in this country are quite similar.

A temporary contract is often the first step into the labor market. Recent arrivals are thus more likely to work in temporary jobs, the likelihood of working in such jobs reduces as duration of stay lengthens. This is the reason why the countries with the greatest presence of new migrants (Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador) are usually the ones with the highest shares of foreign-born workers with temporary contracts vis-à-vis the native-born. Finally, in comparison with the OECD countries, the average share of temporary contracts for both foreign- and native-born

workers in the LAC region (28% and 24%, respectively) is much higher than in the OECD area (16% and 12%). In both groups of countries, individuals with temporary contracts represent a higher

percentage among the foreign-born than among the native-born, with similar gaps between these two groups (around 4 p.p.).

**FIGURE 4.6. Temporary Contracts**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born workers with temporary contracts.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Migrants are more likely to hold temporary or short-term contracts than the native-born, although the gap between the two groups is only 4 p.p. on average.
- ➔ There are four countries in which there is a higher percentage of native-born in temporary contracts than immigrants: Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, and Peru.
- ➔ The average of both groups in LAC countries is almost 10 p.p. higher than the OECD average, where foreign-born are also more likely to have temporary contracts by a difference of 4 p.p.

### 4.5 Informality



**Definition:** Employees are considered to have informal jobs if their employment relationship is, in law or practice, not subject to national labor legislation, income taxation, social protection, or, entitlement to certain employment benefits (advance notice of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual or sick leave, etc.). In this report, informality is calculated according to the people who make contributions to the social security system of their country.

**Coverage:** People aged 15 to 64 years old who are in employment.

After a period in which the greatest concern in LAC was economic growth and the reduction of unemployment, today the interest in the region in labor matters has turned toward working conditions and, in particular, the high informality that characterizes these markets. Informality is a situation with multiple causes, of great magnitude and, at the same time, highly heterogeneous, characterized by an acute deficit of decent work. This problem is manifested in various ways in the region: people selling goods and services on the streets and at traffic lights; jobs in favorable conditions for companies that impose labor times, hours, and tasks without the prior signing of a contract; people who own small businesses, where they can be the only employee and where they have to work longer hours than any other job; the nonpayment of social security to workers; among others, constitute the forms in which this problem is presented in these countries. This problem is further aggravated when the workers are those born abroad.

This can be seen in [figure 4.7](#), where most countries tend to show informality rates above 40% in both groups. Only in Uruguay and Chile this problem occurs in a percentage of less than 30% of workers, and with similar proportions between foreign-born and native-born. In Argentina the

percentage is less than 30% for natives, but for immigrants it exceeds 40%; so, the gap between these two groups is greater than 10 p.p. Similarly, but with higher proportions, in Costa Rica, 42% of native-born workers are in the informal sector, while more than 54% of immigrant workers are in this condition. Again, the gap is greater than 10 p.p.


In the other six countries for which data is available and in the regional average, these values exceed the 40% mentioned above. In Paraguay and Peru there is no considerable difference between foreign- and native-born in terms of informality, both approaching 60% shares. In Panama, Mexico, and Ecuador immigrants' workers are mostly in informal conditions. In these three cases, informal workers represent almost 60% of all immigrant workers, while in the case of natives, informal workers represent a value close to 50%. Lastly, in the Dominican Republic, native-born informal workers represent more than half of the total native-born workers, while the informal immigrant workers represent more than 70% of the total number of immigrant workers. In the LAC countries on average, informality is higher among the foreign-born with a gap of approximately 8 p.p.



Another related indicator that could be calculated for describing informality is the percentage of people with a signed written contract ([figure 4.8](#)). On average, more than 50% of native-born workers have a labor relationship through a written contract in the region, while this is the case for 43% of foreign-born workers. This average is driven by countries such as Uruguay, Mexico, and Chile, where workers with a signed contract represent more than 50% of the total of both groups of workers. These also correspond to countries with lowest rates of informality in the region according to the indicator analyzed above, except


for Mexico, which is the country with the second highest rates of informality, after the Dominican Republic. In addition, in Paraguay, there is no statistically significant difference between immigrants and native-born. The largest gaps between groups are found in Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Panama, since the share of native-born workers with a contract is more than twice that of foreign-born. The gap between groups in these countries is at least 24 percentage points. It is important to mention the difference with immigrant workers in Colombia is due to the low share of immigrants with a contract, only 13%.

**FIGURE 4.7. Share of population with an informal job**



See the [definition box](#) for a detailed definition of an informal job. Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of the foreign-born with an informal job and with written contract respectively.

**FIGURE 4.8. Share of population with written contract**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of the foreign-born with an informal job and with written contract respectively.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Migrants are much more likely to be in informal work than their native-born peers (52.2% and 44.5%, respectively), which is a key measure of the precariousness of employment. The exceptions are Paraguay and Uruguay, where there is no statistically significant difference between groups. In Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru, the informality rate among foreign-born is above 50% and above the LAC average.
- ➔ On average, migrants are 8 percentage points more likely to have an informal job than their native-born counterparts.
- ➔ On average, more than 50% of native-born workers have a labor relationship through a written contract in the region, while this is the case for 43% of foreign-born workers.

## 4.6 Working hours



**Definition:** This indicator includes the proportion of employed persons who report working long hours (50 or more hours per week) and it also includes the share of part-time workers (those with a working week of fewer than 30 hours) among all the employed.

**Coverage:** People in employment aged 15 to 64 but who are not self-employed or in education.

This section examines the number of hours worked, which is related to informality and high employment rates. Although, in most countries in the region, full-time employment is considered to be 40 hours per week, data from labor force surveys shows that, in the twelve LAC countries examined here, people tend to work much longer hours. [Figure 4.9](#) shows the share of people who work 50 hours or more per week (as a measure of long-working hours) and those who work less than 30 hours per week (i.e., considered a threshold for part-time work). The percentage of people working 50 hours or more per week is higher among the foreign- than the native-born in practically all countries (27% and 20%, respectively). That is, there is a difference of more than 7 percentage points between the two groups. Exceptions include Uruguay and Mexico.

Long-working hours are widespread among foreign- and native-born in Panama (62% and 49%, respectively), followed by Peru (55% and 32%, respectively), and Colombia (41% and 24%). The gap between foreign- and native-born workers is largest in Peru, (with 23 percentage points), followed by Colombia (with 18 percentage points).

Conversely, the smallest shares of workers in jobs of 50 hours or more per week are observed in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago, with shares of less than 15% among both groups. In these countries, the differences between immigrant and native-born workers are not particularly large. In Mexico, there seems to be no difference between groups (25% and 27%, respectively). However, the picture changes if US-born migrants are excluded from the foreign-born sample. In this case, the share of foreign-born people working 50 hours, or more is above the LAC average and is higher than that of the native-born (30% versus 25%). Thus, in Mexico, foreign-born workers are also more likely to hold lower quality jobs than their native-born counterparts.


On the other hand, the proportion of people working less than 30 hours per week (mostly in part-time jobs), is more common among native- than foreign-born workers (23% and 19%, respectively). Only in Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica is the share of people working less than 30 hours per week larger among the foreign- than the native-born. Argentina is the country with the highest percentage of people working part-time (less than 30 hours a week), with a similar share of part-time workers among migrants and natives. By contrast, the share is smallest in Trinidad and Tobago, where less than 6% of the population has working weeks of 30 hours or less. In the case of Mexico, once again, the difference between foreign- and native-born is less pronounced if the US-born are excluded from the foreign-born (see [Box 2.1](#) for more details). In Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Panama, a smaller proportion of immigrant workers work less than 30 hours, with gaps of 4 to 13 p.p. between the two groups. For their part, in Mexico and Costa Rica, a larger share of the foreign-born tend to work 30 hours or less, with a difference of more than 4 p.p. between them and the native-born. Lastly, in Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago, differences are small to draw conclusions from.

In the OECD countries, the share of foreign-born people working 50 hours or more is less than half that of LAC countries (12% against 27%). Similarly, the share of native-born workers in long-hours jobs in the OECD is smaller than that of their counterparts in the LAC area, albeit to a lesser degree (12% and 20%, respectively). The only country with a lower proportion of people working more than 50 hours than in the OECD is Trinidad and Tobago, where, on average, just 3.6% of people do so. On the other hand, the percentage of people (both foreign- and native-born) who work less than 30 hours per week in the OECD area (17% for foreign- and native-born) is somewhat larger

than the share working long hours (12% for both groups). The opposite is true in LAC countries, where the share of foreign-born people working 50 hours or more per week (27%) is larger than that of people working part-time (19%). The share of people who work less than 30 hours was

almost 4 p.p. higher in LAC than in the OECD, on average. This data suggests that a larger share of workers in the group of OECD countries (around two-thirds) tend to work around 40 hours per week (between 30 and 50 hours per week), which is different from the situation in LAC.

**FIGURE 4.9. Working Hours**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born who work more than 50 and less than 30 hours per week, respectively.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Migrants are more likely than native-born to work long hours in most LAC countries examined here (on average 27% and 20%, respectively). Foreign-born are also less likely to work in part-time jobs than their native-born peers (19% and 23%, respectively).
- ➔ The greatest gaps in long working hours between foreign- and native-born are observed in Colombia and Peru, with at least 18 percentage points difference.
- ➔ The share of people working less than 30 hours per week is more common among native- than foreign-born workers (23% and 19%, respectively). This is especially true in Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, where more native-born workers hold part-time jobs than foreign-born – about 11 percentage points difference.
- ➔ In Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica, a working week of less than 30 hours is more common among foreign- than native-born workers.
- ➔ Around two-thirds of workers in OECD countries work between 30 and 50 hours per week. This stands in contrast with the working hours in LAC.

### 4.7 Job skills



**Definition:** *Job skills* are measured by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). This indicator compares the share of workers in low-skilled jobs (i.e., elementary occupations that entail simple, routine tasks and, often, physical effort [ISCO 9]) with the share of workers in highly skilled jobs (e.g., senior managers, professionals, technicians, and associate professionals [ISCO 1-3]).

**Coverage:** People in employment aged 15 to 64 (not including military occupations [ISCO 0]).

The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) is one of the main international classifications which the ILO is responsible for. It belongs to the international family of economic and social classifications. ISCO is a tool for organizing jobs into a clearly defined set of groups according to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job. Its main aims are to provide (i) a basis for the international reporting, comparison, and exchange of statistical and administrative data on occupations; (ii) a model for the development of national and regional classifications of occupations; and (iii) a system that can be used directly in countries that have not developed their own national classifications.

According to the data collected, in half of countries, immigrants are overrepresented at both ends of the job skills spectrum. In five of the nine countries reported here (Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, Panama, and Peru), immigrants tend to participate in highly skilled jobs more often than their native counterparts, with differences between 4 and 14 percentage points. The largest gaps are found in Paraguay and Mexico, where immigrants are 14 p.p. more likely to work in highly skilled jobs than their native-born counterparts. With the exception of Peru, this tends to occur in countries where the majority of migrants have been living in the host country for more than five years ([indicator 2.2](#)), such as Paraguay, Uruguay and Panama.

By contrast, in Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, the native-born are more likely than the foreign-born to hold highly skilled jobs, with a difference between groups of at least 7 p.p. The largest difference is found in Costa Rica, where 26% of native-born workers work in highly skilled jobs compared with only 8% of the foreign-born. In Ecuador, no differences are observed between these two groups.

Similarly, in four out of nine countries – Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador –, the share of foreign-born workers in low-skilled jobs is larger than that of native-born. The difference between groups is as high as 20 percentage points in Costa Rica and Dominican Republic. By contrast, in Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay,

native-born workers represent a higher proportion of those in low-skilled jobs.

In OECD countries, a larger share of foreign- and native-born workers hold highly skilled jobs (35% and 42%, respectively) than in LAC countries (23% and 21%). In OECD countries, there is a 7-p.p. gap between the share of native-born workers holding these jobs and that of migrants. Finally, in OECD countries, a lower percentage of foreign- and native-born workers hold low-skilled jobs compared with their counterparts in LAC countries (27% and 21%, respectively). In both areas, the foreign-born represent a higher percentage of people working in low-skilled jobs, with differences between groups of 6 p.p. in LAC and 8 p.p. in OECD countries.

**FIGURE 4.10. Job Skills Groups**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born workers in highly skilled and low-skilled jobs.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- In five of the nine countries – Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, Panama, and Peru –, immigrants are more likely than native-born to work in high-skilled jobs, with differences between 4 and 14 percentage points. By contrast, in Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, the native-born are more likely than the foreign-born to hold highly skilled jobs, with a difference between groups of at least 7 p.p.
- In OECD countries, a larger share of foreign- and native-born workers hold highly skilled jobs. The difference between the OECD average and the LAC country with the highest share reaches 10 p.p. for the native-born and 2 p.p. among the foreign-born.

### 4.8 Overqualification



**Definition:** The share of highly educated immigrants (i.e., educated to ISCED levels 5–8—see [indicator 3.1](#)) who work in low- or medium-skilled jobs (i.e., ISCO-classified at levels 4–9—See [indicator 4.7](#)).<sup>55</sup>

**Coverage:** People aged 15 to 64 who are not in education, are highly educated, and are in employment (not including military occupations [ISCO 0]).

A considerable difference is found between the foreign- and the native-born, indicating that immigrants are more likely to accept any type of employment, at least when they have recently arrived in the host country. The difference between the regional averages for these two groups is greater than 8 p.p. In Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica, the highly educated foreign-born tend to participate to a greater extent in low- or medium-skilled jobs than their native-born peers. In these cases, the largest differences are observed in Costa Rica (23 p.p.), Chile (25 p.p.), and Uruguay and Peru (16 p.p.). In Ecuador, this difference is around 8 p.p., and in Panama, it approximates 4 p.p.

On the other hand, in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, the reverse is true, with gaps of 9 p.p. and 7 p.p., respectively. Finally, in Paraguay, there is no statistically significant difference.

Interestingly, the countries with the highest overqualification rates coincide with the countries that have the highest unemployment rates (seen in [indicator 4.2](#)). This is the case in Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, which could be related to the

fact that in such contexts, people tend to accept any available job, regardless of their education levels. These countries also have the highest levels of long-term unemployment. Also, Chile and Uruguay are the countries with the lowest rates of informality, which would indicate that although the jobs offered do not match with migrant's educational levels, at least there are formal jobs that workers are willing to take in a short time. In the other countries (Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama) the informality rate is quite high, above 50%, which can indicate the same as above.

Finally, some of these countries with a higher proportion of foreign-born overqualified are those where immigrants have generally been there less than five years. This is the case of Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Panama. This suggests that in those countries the foreign-born are accepting the first jobs offered to them.


In terms of education levels, [indicator 3.7](#) (level of educational attainment) shows that the foreign-born are more likely to be highly educated than the native-born in 8 out of 12 LAC countries. The gap is largest in Uruguay, where the share of

<sup>55</sup> In some literature overqualification is referred to as “skill downgrading”.

the highly educated is twice as large among the foreign-born compared with the native-born (47% and 23%). Similarly, in Mexico and Peru, where around 30% of immigrants are highly educated, the foreign-born outperform the native-born by 15 p.p. There is also a 15-p.p. difference in Chile.

In comparison with the OECD, similar gaps in overqualification rates between the foreign- and the native-born are observed in both areas, but with a higher proportion in the OECD countries, which shows that this is a wider-spread problem in these more developed countries.

**FIGURE 4.11. Overqualification**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of the highly educated foreign-born in low- or medium-skilled jobs.





## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In the nine LAC countries for which it was possible to calculate this indicator, on average migrants are more likely to be highly educated and to work in low or medium-skilled jobs than their native-born counterparts (27% and 19%, respectively).
- ➔ In Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama, migrants are more likely to be working in jobs at skill levels below their educational attainment. In Mexico, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic, the opposite is true: native-born workers tend to be more overqualified.
- ➔ There are similar gaps between the overqualification rates for the foreign- and the native-born in both LAC and the OECD, but higher levels of overqualification rates occur in OECD countries.

### 4.9 Self-employment



**Definition:** The *self-employed* are people who work in their own companies or create their own businesses, sometimes hiring employees. Self-employment includes entrepreneurs, liberal professions, artisans, traders, and many other freelance activities.

**Coverage:** Population aged between 15 and 64 who are in employment, excluding the agricultural sector.

It is common for people to work in their own businesses in LAC, sometimes due to the high levels of informality in some countries. In the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Paraguay, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina, the foreign-born tend more to be self-employed more than the native-born. The largest gaps are found in the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago, where migrants outnumber the native-born by more than 14 p.p. and 10 p.p., respectively. In the other four countries, the differences are less marked. Conversely, the native-born tend more to be self-employed in Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Mexico, (as with other indicators, the difference in Mexico disappears if the US-born are excluded). The biggest differences are found in Ecuador and Peru, where there are differences of 12 p.p. and 10 p.p., respectively. In the other countries, the gaps are close to 4 p.p.


Some of the countries with the highest rates of self-employment are also those where people tend to hold temporary jobs, namely the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Colombia, and Paraguay, although in Ecuador temporary jobs are more common among native-born workers. In Peru

these two indicators have very similar results in terms of the differences between foreign- and native-born.

It is important to keep in mind that this indicator does not necessarily refer to large companies, but also includes people who sell goods and services, including in the informal sector (usually one-person businesses). However, a significant difference emerges when LAC is compared to the group of OECD countries: the self-employment rates of foreign- and native-born in the latter are approximately a third of the rate observed in LAC. There is no difference between the foreign-born and the native-born in the OECD averages, as in the case for LAC countries.

Countries with high levels of self-employment – such as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Paraguay – also have the highest rates of informality among both foreign- and native-born workers. Also, in these countries, less than 40% of foreign-born workers have a written contract. Finally, in these countries more than 50% of their foreign-born population have lived there for more than 5 years.

**FIGURE 4.12. Self-employment rate**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of the foreign-born who are self-employed.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In six countries (the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Paraguay, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina), the foreign-born tend more to be self-employed than the native-born.
- ➔ In the other six countries (Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Mexico), the native-born tend more to work in their own businesses.
- ➔ A large difference is seen when LAC is compared to the group of OECD countries, in which the self-employment rate is only a third the rate observed in the LAC region.

## 4.10 Wages



**Definition:** Nominal monthly wages are generally derived from wages and salaries at purchasing power parity (PPP).

**Coverage:** Population aged between 15 and 64 who are in employment (excluding the self-employed).

In half of the countries, the foreign-born earn higher salaries than the native-born, with an average difference of almost US\$200 per month. This is the case in the following: Paraguay (where the difference is US\$227), Mexico (US\$403), Panama (US\$282), Uruguay (US\$45), Ecuador (US\$101), and Peru (US\$23). The largest gaps in this group of countries are found in the first three countries mentioned above, where immigrants earn wages that are more than US\$200 higher than the native-born, on average. In these six countries, the foreign-born earn average salaries of more than US\$780, although in Uruguay, Panama, Mexico, and Paraguay, this increases to US\$950. This results in overall average wages of US\$995 per month among the foreign-born.

In the other six countries with data available, the native-born tend to have higher salaries than immigrants. This is the case in Argentina (where

there is a difference of US\$73), Chile (US\$125), Costa Rica (US\$500—the largest gap), Colombia (US\$140), the Dominican Republic (US\$230—the second-largest gap), and Trinidad and Tobago (just US\$20). In these six countries, the native-born earn average wages of US\$1,100 per month, although it is worth clarifying that this average is depressed by Trinidad and Tobago. Meanwhile, immigrants have lower average salaries of around US\$920. The highest incomes are in Argentina and Chile, where average wages are close to US\$1,400.

For the regional average, these two groups cancel out the differences in wage levels, such that there are not statistically significant differences. Considering the numbers of hours worked ([indicator 4.9](#)), these results may be explained by the length of time worked by the foreign-born, which tends to be longer than for the native-born.

**FIGURE 4.13. Wages**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of average wages among the foreign-born.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Wages are determined by skill levels and hours worked. In many countries, migrants are more highly skilled and/or work longer hours, which is reflected in their tendency to be paid higher wages.
- ➔ In half of the countries (Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru), the foreign-born earn higher average salaries than the native-born, with an average difference of almost US\$200.
- ➔ In the other six countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic), the native-born tend to have higher salaries than the foreign-born.

## 4.11 Labor market, self-employment, and immigrant skills policies

A major share of immigrants in the region work in the informal labor market, without an employment contract or access to social protection or social security. Many migrant workers face major barriers to finding employment (such as obtaining a work permit, getting their skills and diplomas recertified, and discrimination), principally in the formal labor market. In many cases, migrant workers do not enjoy decent work. As shown in this chapter, immigrants are more likely to be unemployed, find short contracts or temporary employment, work in the informal sector, work longer hours than the native-born and, in many cases, be overqualified. In some cases, they are denied the right to freedom of association and other labor rights, and in many others suffer from discrimination and xenophobia.

In the 12 LAC countries included in this study, all regular immigrants can work in the formal labor market if they obtain work permits, including refugees. With respect to the large-scale migration from Venezuela, some countries have adopted special permits to allow these migrants to work even if they have transitory or irregular migration statuses. For instance, Colombia implemented special permits for Venezuelan immigrants through the *Permiso Especial de Permanencia* (Special Residence Permit, PEP) and the *Permiso Especial de Permanencia para el Fomento de la Formalización* (Special Permanence Permit for the Promotion of Formalization, PEPFF). The PEP authorizes Venezuelan immigrants to remain in the country temporarily and grants them regular migration status, allowing them to exercise any legal

activity or occupation in the country. The PEPFF was a mechanism through which irregular Venezuelan migrants could regularize their migration status through labor formalization. Costa Rica is another country in the region that implemented specific permits for immigrants working in the agricultural, agro-export, or agro-industrial sectors.<sup>56</sup> This regime applied to immigrants who entered the territory between January 15, 2016, and January 15, 2020. In addition, immigrants whose migration status was irregular or who had applied to have regularize their status between the dates in question could opt for this special category.

Almost all the countries<sup>57</sup> analyzed applied some restrictions on immigrants working in some occupations, except Argentina and the Dominican Republic. Panama is the country in the region to have implemented the most restrictions: a total of 52 occupations<sup>58</sup> are protected and can only be practiced by Panamanians. In Colombia, some occupations are regulated by professional councils, as is the case in Brazil and Mexico. Additionally, in Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay, police and national security jobs, healthcare occupations, and occupations within the host government are not open to foreigners. In almost all LAC countries,<sup>59</sup> companies can hire only a specific percentage of foreigners, except for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. In 7 out of the 12 countries, only 10% to 20% of the total staff a company hires can be migrants (in Ecuador, this is only the case for transportation companies). However, this rule is generally not applied to immigrants with a family reunification permit (in most cases, this applies to immigrants who are married to nationals).


<sup>56</sup> Decree No. 42406-MAG-MGP.

<sup>57</sup> No information is available for Peru.

<sup>58</sup> Nursing, dentistry, architecture, medicine, psychology, accounting, economics, law, engineering, and social work.

<sup>59</sup> No information is available for Ecuador.













**TABLE 4.1. Labor Market Policy Indicators**

	 Argentina	 Brazil	 Chile	 Colombia	 Costa Rica	 Dominican Republic	 Ecuador	 Mexico	 Panama	 Peru	 Trinidad and Tobago	 Uruguay
All categories of migrants in a regular situation have access to the formal labor market	Yes	Yes	Yes	No <sup>60</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migrants face restrictions to employment in some occupations, including public occupations	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	No	Yes
Quotas on the number of migrant workers that can be hired by companies	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Migrants have access to the public system for the certification of skills, regardless of their migration status	-	Yes	-	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	Yes	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	Yes	No (only regular migrants)

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

<sup>60</sup> There are inconsistent interpretations as to whether holders of SC2 permits (asylum applicants) have access to the formal labor market.

**TABLE 4.1. Labor Market Policy Indicators (Cont.)**

	Argentina 	Brazil 	Chile 	Colombia 	Costa Rica 	Dominican Republic 	Ecuador 	Mexico 	Panama 	Peru 	Trinidad and Tobago 	Uruguay 
<b>Migrants have to meet additional requirements to have their degrees recognized</b>	No	No	No	Yes	Yes (must be paid for)	Yes (must be paid for)	No	No	Yes (must be paid for and additional documents must be presented)	Yes (must be paid for)	No	No
<b>Migrants have access to the public vocational training system, regardless of their migration status</b>	Yes	No (only regular migrants)	-	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	Yes	-	Yes <sup>61</sup>	No	-	No (only regular migrants)	Yes
<b>Migrants have access to public employment services, regardless of their migration status</b>	Yes	No (only regular migrants)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (only regular migrants)	-	No (only regular migrants)	No	Yes	No (only regular migrants)	Yes
<b>Migrants can use labor inspection services, regardless of their migration status</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (only regular migrants)	Yes
<b>National policy for the labor inclusion of migrant workers without restrictions</b>	-	Only a policy on the protection of migrant workers	No	Yes	Comprehensive Migration Policy	-	-	No	No	Yes (job promotion for migrants)	No	No

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

<sup>61</sup> Mainly online training systems.













**TABLE 4.2. Entrepreneurship and Financial Inclusion**

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Mexico	Panama	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay
Migrants in a regular situation can establish a formal business	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (for refugees and economic migrants)	Yes <sup>62</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migrants have to present additional requirements or face higher costs to open business than the native-born	None identified	No	No	No	No	No	No	No (only regular migrants with work permits)	None identified	No	No	No
Migrants can benefit from public support to develop business, such as support for the development of business plans, capitalization, entrepreneurial training, and technical assistance	Yes	Yes (only regular migrants)	Yes (only regular migrants)	Yes (only regular migrants)	Yes	Yes	None identified	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes

<sup>62</sup> Migrants with temporary or permanent residency or refugees.



**TABLE 4.2. Entrepreneurship and Financial Inclusion (Cont.)**

	Argentina 	Brazil 	Chile 	Colombia 	Costa Rica 	Dominican Republic 	Ecuador 	Mexico 	Panama 	Peru 	Trinidad and Tobago 	Uruguay 
<b>Migrants have the right to open a bank account or gain access to credit, regardless of their migration status</b>	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)	No (only regular migrants)
<b>National financial inclusion policy for migrants, regardless of their migration status</b>	Yes (financial inclusion policy)	No	No	Yes (only for regular migrants)	No	No	No	Yes (financial inclusion policy with a mention of migrants)	No	No	No	No
<b>National policy for entrepreneurship promotion among migrants, regardless of their migration status</b>	None identified	No	No (only a program for startups)	Yes (only for regular migrants)	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Self-employment or entrepreneurship is another option for immigrants to achieve economic integration into their host societies. In the 12 LAC countries analyzed, only regular immigrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, can establish formal businesses. In the LAC countries for which information is available,<sup>63</sup> the right to open a business applies under the same conditions as for the native-born and is established in labor codes or migration acts.

In some cases, immigrants face barriers to participation in specific economic activities due to the need to get their foreign qualifications recognized, which can be a long and expensive process. A lack of documentation may also prevent them from doing so. In the 12 LAC countries analyzed, only regular immigrants (including refugees and asylum seekers) have access to the certification process.<sup>64</sup> Immigrants in Costa Rica,<sup>65</sup> Dominican Republic,<sup>66</sup> Panama<sup>67</sup> and Peru<sup>68</sup> face higher costs than the native-born to get their foreign qualifications recognized. In Panama, immigrants have to present additional documents such as a thesis, research work, and a certificate of equivalence for foreigners issued by the University of Panama. In some host countries, these processes imply higher costs that constitute large amounts of money and can discourage immigrants from getting their qualifications recognized, which limits their opportunities for finding a job that allows them to use their training and be paid a salary that is commensurate with their skills and qualifications. The main barriers to the certification of foreign degrees are the high costs, lack of information about procedures, and lack of the required documentation.

Finally, access to public employment services, labor inspection services, and public vocational training play an important role in the inclusion of migrants in the formal labor market. These constitute a source of information on the local labor market, a way to acquire new skills that fit local demand, and protection from unsafe working conditions, discrimination, or labor exploitation. In Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and

Uruguay, all immigrants can use public employment services regardless of their migration status. However, in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, public employment services require an identification card or migration card in order to be registered in their database. In the 12 LAC countries analyzed, immigrants have access to labor inspection services regardless of their migration status. In these countries, this right is recognized by labor codes/legislations and/or migration acts. Among the 12 LAC countries analyzed, only Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago give access to vocational training to immigrants regardless of their migration status. By contrast, in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay, only regular immigrants have access to public vocational training. Panama has the most restrictions in this regard: only Panamanian have access to vocational trainings. However, alliances between the Panamanian government and the UNHCR have been implemented allowing refugees to participate in the courses offered by the National Institute of Vocational Training and Training for Human Development (INADEH).

The inclusion of immigrants in the formal labor market is essential to their integration in host societies. Access to the labor market benefits not just immigrants and their families but also host societies. Integrating immigrants into the local labor market increases countries' economic productivity, as immigrants represent an additional source of labor and could also represent business investment. Properly managed migration represents a development opportunity for all countries. Integrating immigrants into the labor market is vital to achieving social cohesion and economic growth in host countries and is a key condition for migrants to become self-reliant, productive citizens. Employment in the formal labor market includes the private sector, self-employment or entrepreneurship, and the public sector, even if in almost all countries access to the latter is much more restricted for immigrants.

<sup>63</sup> This information was obtained for Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

<sup>64</sup> Analysis of migration acts, education legislations, and norms that regulate the process for recognizing foreign qualifications.

<sup>65</sup> For nationals and immigrants with permanent residence cards and immigrants with refugee status, the cost is approximately US\$184. For foreigners with a different migration status, the cost is approximately US\$367.

<sup>66</sup> For Dominicans, the cost is US\$6 for each document to be recognized and US\$265 for the recertification of foreign qualifications. For foreigners, it costs US\$250 to get each record validated and an additional US\$10 if they come from a U.S. territory, and it costs US\$1,650 to get degrees or qualifications officially recognized.

<sup>67</sup> The cost is US\$125 for nationals and US\$500 for foreigners.

<sup>68</sup> The process is free for Peruvians but costs PEN33 for foreigners.

## Notes and sources for chapter 4

**TABLE 4.3. Sources for Chapter 4 by Indicator**

Indicator	Employment and labor market participation	Unemployment	Risks of labor market exclusion	Temporary Contracts	Informality	Population with written contract	Working hours	Job skills	Overqualification	Self-employment	Wages
Figure	4.1 and 4.2	4.3 and 4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.10	4.11	4.12	4.13
<b>OECD countries</b>											
Chile	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020
Colombia	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	.	.	GEIH 2021	.	.	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021
Costa Rica	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021
Mexico	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021
<b>LAC IDB countries</b>											
Argentina	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	.	.	EPH 2021	EPH 2021
Brazil	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Dominican Republic	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021
Ecuador	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021
Panama	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019
Paraguay	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020
Peru	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021
Trinidad and Tobago	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	.	.	.	.	CSSP 2015	.	.	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015
Uruguay	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	.	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019




## 5. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

To carry out a comparative analysis of the gender results between foreign- and native-born, this review focuses on the gaps between sexes, both gaps within foreign- and native-born populations, and for women between the native- and foreign-born, can provide information on the challenges of integrating immigrant women. This analysis examines population sizes, education, and participation in labor markets.

However, there are also gender gaps among natives, which on some dimensions are particularly large in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Therefore, the disparities between immigrant men and women do not necessarily reflect differences in levels of, integration but may also speak of a persistent gender bias in the labor market of the host country and in society itself, as well as the different women's and men's options and choices. For this reason, this analysis will be mainly based on the differences between migrant women and their peers born in the country under analysis.

This chapter examines key integration indicators to gauge whether and how outcomes differ between migrant and native-born women, as well as differences in the gender gaps between the foreign- and native-born. It begins showing the share of women among native- and foreign-born populations ([indicator 5.1](#)). Then it continues with an overview of the educational attainment ([indicator 5.2](#)). It then turns to differences in labor market outcomes: employment, participation, and unemployment rates ([Indicators 5.3](#) and [5.4](#)), followed by levels of involuntary inactivity ([indicator 5.5](#)). The next section looks at the kind of work that immigrants do. It first addresses working hours with a particular focus on people who work more than 50 hours a week, which could be considered as a gender-specific issue in many of these region's countries ([indicator 5.6](#)), and then the skills levels of jobs held by foreign- and native-born women ([indicator 5.7](#)).



## 5.1 Female population



**Definition:** This indicator presents the composition of immigrant populations by sex. The female or male population refers to the biological aspects of an individual assigned at birth. The sex category may not match with the gender perception that individuals identify with. The sex ratio is defined as the number of males per 100 females in the population.

**Coverage:** Total populations, all ages.


In LAC countries, 51% of foreign-born of all ages are women. That is, for every 100 immigrant women, there are 96 immigrant men, on average. With a small difference, the share of women among the native-born is somewhat higher than that of men (51% of native-born women). In OECD countries, as the percentage of native-born women is higher (51%), immigrant women also tend to outnumber men (53%). Historically, migration patterns were driven by men seeking work and sending remittances to their family at home. More recent patterns consist more of family reunification as women join their partners abroad or entire families move as conditions in their countries of origin make it less practical to leave family members behind.

There are, however, cross-country differences, particularly among the foreign-born population. While the average proportion of women among the native-born is around 50% across all countries (except Chile, where it is 54%), the share of women among the foreign-born population varies from one country to another.

In 3 out of the 12 countries, the proportion of women is close to 50% for both the foreign- and native-born. These equal shares are observed in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. By contrast, in Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica women represent a larger share of the foreign-born population compared with that of the native-born. In Trinidad and Tobago, for example, the percentage of women in the immigrant population is higher than the other countries considered here, at just 58%, compared with 50% of women among the native-born. Similarly, in Panama, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, there are more foreign-born women (55%, 54%, 54%, 53%, and 52%, respectively). In these countries, there are less than 82 immigrant men for every 100 women.


Distinctly, in Mexico, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic, the opposite is true. In these countries, foreign-born women are relatively underrepresented (48%, 46%, and 42%, respectively). This sex imbalance is especially true in the Dominican Republic, where there are 138 immigrant men, approximately, for every 100 women. In the other countries, the imbalance is smaller, yet at most there are 106 immigrant men for every 100 women.

**FIGURE 5.1. Female Share of Population**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born women.

**FIGURE 5.2. Sex Ratio**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the sex ratio.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ On average, in the LAC countries analyzed, women represent 51% of the foreign- and native-born population. This contrasts with OECD countries, where foreign-born women largely outnumber foreign-born men (53%) while native-born women have a similar share as men (around 51%).
- ➔ In the LAC region, there are cross-country differences. In the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Mexico, women represent a smaller share of the immigrant population (43%, 46%, and 49%, respectively), compared with the share of women among the native-born.
- ➔ By contrast, in Trinidad and Tobago and Panama, the proportion of women among the foreign-born is higher than that of the native-born.

## 5.2 Gender differences in educational attainment



**Definition:** This indicator measures educational attainment according to the ISCED classification. It considers two levels: i) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5–8); and ii) low, not higher than lower secondary education (ISCED Levels 0–2).

**Coverage:** People not in education aged 15 to 64.

In LAC countries, foreign-born women tend to be more educated than their native-born peers. [Figure 5.3](#) gives the percentages of women according to two levels of education for the two population groups analyzed. In the graph on the left, there are higher percentages of highly educated foreign-born women on average than among native-born women in the region. This is observed in 8 of the 12 countries (Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago), although in the last two countries the differences are not large. The largest gaps are found in Uruguay, Chile, and Paraguay, (20 p.p., 15 p.p., and 10 p.p., respectively), while in Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, the gaps are below 8 p.p. On the other hand, in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, native-born women are more highly educated than immigrant women. The largest gaps in this group are in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, where there are differences of 16 p.p. and 14 p.p., respectively. In Argentina, the gap is below 10 p.p., while in Colombia the difference is only 6 p.p.

The graph on the right shows a similar situation. Native-born women are more likely to be low educated than immigrant women in the regional average. This is also the case in 8 of the 12 countries: Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. There are seven countries with consistent results, that is, seven countries where the foreign-born are more likely to be highly educated and where the native-born are more likely to be low educated. These countries are Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. This means that Colombia is the only country in which there is a higher proportion of native-born women at both education levels. Unlike most LAC countries, in the OECD on average and in Trinidad and Tobago, foreign-born women tend to be slightly over-represented among both the low- and highly educated. Lastly, in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina, a similar


situation to the graph on the left is observed, indicating that just as native-born women are more highly educated, foreign-born women are less educated (11 p.p., 6 p.p., and 4 p.p., respectively).

The gaps between sexes at the two educational levels and both populations were analyzed ([figures 5.4](#) and [5.5](#)). In general terms, it can be seen that both foreign- and native-born women tend to be more highly educated than the men in these two groups. (Negative values indicate that the percentage of women is higher). In the case of the highly educated foreign-born, the only case in which men present a higher percentage is in Mexico, with a gap between the foreign-born of 6 p.p. and a small difference of 0.1 p.p. among the native-born. Panama and Peru also present higher but still small differences for highly educated foreign-born men. In the other cases, although there are also some small differences, a trend is observed indicating that women tend to be more highly educated than men—again, this is true for both the native- and foreign-born groups. OECD countries present a similar average compared with LAC, indicating that in this set of countries women, in general, are more educated.

Finally, although similar results are seen in the gender comparison between the low-educated in that men from both groups tend to be less educated. Trinidad and Tobago stand out among the foreign-born and Peru among the native-born as these two countries have more low-educated women than men. In Costa Rica, Colombia, and Paraguay there are significant differences among the foreign-born (men tend to be lower educated than women); and in Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and Uruguay the same is true among the native-born. Although in this case OECD countries do not show big differences, it can be seen that men also tend to be less educated than women in both foreign- and native-born populations.




**FIGURE 5.3. Level of Education Among Women**




**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born level of education.

**FIGURE 5.4. Gender Gaps in Education Level Among the Foreign-Born**



**FIGURE 5.5. Gender Gaps in Education Level Among the Native-Born**



**Note:** In graphs 5.4 and 5.5 countries are sorted in descending order of the difference in both levels of education. A positive difference means that men are more likely to be in the level of education mentioned than women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In LAC countries, foreign-born women tend to be more educated than their native-born peers.
- ➔ In Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Panama, there are higher percentages of highly educated foreign-born women than native-born women. On the other hand, in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, native-born women are more highly educated than immigrant women.
- ➔ Both foreign- and native-born women tend to be more educated than men among both LAC and OECD countries.

### 5.3 Gender differences in employment rates and labor market participation



**Definition:** The *employment rate* denotes people in employment as a percentage of the working-age population (those aged 15 to 64). The ILO defines an employed person as someone who worked at least one hour during the reference week or who had a job but was absent from work.

The *participation rate* (or activity rate) denotes the economically active population (employed and unemployed) as a share of the working-age population.

**Coverage:** Working-age population (15- to 64-year-olds).


By a small margin, migrant women tend to work and participate in the labor market more than native-born women ([figure 5.6](#)). In the case of the employment indicator (left side graph), this occurs mainly in Panama and Chile, where there are differences of more than 16 p.p., and in Uruguay, where the difference exceeds 6 p.p. However, the overall regional difference is less than 2 p.p. This is because in countries like Peru, Mexico, and Paraguay, working native-born women outnumber their immigrant peers by more than 5 p.p. In a similar case, in OECD countries, native-born women tend to work more than their foreign-born peers. In the other LAC countries, no significant differences were found.

Also, [figure 5.7](#) shows that men are much more likely to have a job than women in all countries. In the case of foreign-born, the difference between the regional averages for men and women exceeds 27 p.p. Even so, there are four countries that exceed this average: Costa Rica and Colombia (with differences of over 30 p.p.), and Paraguay and the Dominican Republic (with differences of over 40 p.p.). The situation is similar among the native-born. In most countries, the gender gaps are over 25 p.p., and Mexico particularly stands out, as native-born men outnumber the native-born women with jobs by 30 p.p. This also happens in both OECD averages, to a lesser extent. While the average gap in LAC countries is 27 points (foreign-born) and 22 points (native-born), in the OECD it barely exceeds 15 and 10 points respectively.

Turning to the percentage of people who participate in the labor market ([figure 5.8](#)), the situation is similar to that described above. There are some small gaps from which it is not possible to draw accurate conclusions. However, by a small difference, the foreign-born tend to participate to a greater extent in the labor market than the native-born. This is the case in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay, Panama, and Chile, with the largest gaps being in the latter (16 p.p. and 17 p.p., respectively). In the other three countries, the difference is less than 10 p.p. In contrast, in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, the native-born tend to participate more in the labor market, with differences greater than 5 p.p. OECD average also shows a greater percentage of native-born participating in the labor force than the foreign-born.


In this case, a gender comparison reveals that men participate to a much greater extent than women in the labor market in the countries analyzed. All countries have differences of above 10 p.p. Thus, in the case of the foreign-born, there is a 26 p.p. from the regional averages, while among the native-born, this difference is 22 p.p. Among the foreign-born, the largest gaps are found in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Colombia (above 35 p.p.). Among the native-born, the largest gaps are found in Mexico and Colombia above (25 p.p.). As for the employment rate, gaps are also important in the OECD on average, but are smaller (16 p.p. for the foreign-born and 11 points respectively).

**FIGURE 5.6. Women's Employment Rates and Participation in the Labor Market**




**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born with a job and participating in labor market respectively.

**FIGURE 5.7. Gender Gaps in Employment Rates**



**FIGURE 5.8. Gender Gaps in Labor Market Participation**



**Note:** In figures 5.7 and 5.8, countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born in employment and participating in labor force, respectively. A positive difference means that men are more likely to participate in the labor market than women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ By a small margin, migrant women tend to work and participate in the labor market more than native-born women.
- ➔ This is particularly the case in Panama and Chile, where there is a difference of more than 16 p.p., and in Uruguay, where there is a difference of over 6 p.p.
- ➔ In all countries, men are much more likely to have a job than women. Among the foreign-born, the regional average difference exceeds 27 p.p. The situation is similar among the native-born, but in this group, there are seven countries where the difference exceeds the difference in regional averages. In OECD the average gap is 10 p.p.
- ➔ Men participate to a much greater extent than women in the labor market in all LAC and OECD countries, with differences of above 20 and 11 p.p respectively.

### 5.4 Gender differences in unemployment



**Definition:** The ILO defines the *unemployed* as people without work but who are available to work and have been seeking work in the reference week.\* The *unemployment rate* is the percentage of unemployed people in the labor force (the latter being the sum of employed and unemployed individuals, including those in education).

**Coverage:** The economically active working-age population (15- to 64-year-olds).

\*Some national statistical offices use definitions that differ from the ILO, and therefore the unemployment rates reported here will differ from the official statistics in some cases. Using the ILO definition allows for correct comparison across countries.

On average in LAC, there is no meaningful difference between foreign- and native-born women's unemployment rates. In Costa Rica, Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador, foreign-born women tend to be more unemployed than native-born women, with differences of over 3 p.p. The greatest difference is found in Costa Rica (more than 5 p.p.), which is also the country with the highest overall unemployment rates. On the other hand, in Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, although there are higher unemployment rates among foreign-born women, the differences are small.

In Chile, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Paraguay, native-born women show higher unemployment rates than their immigrant peers. In Trinidad and Tobago, the percentages are the same. OECD countries represent a significant difference with immigrant women tending to be more unemployed than their native-born peers.

These results coincide almost completely with the unemployment indicator in [chapter 4](#). Costa Rica,

Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are in the same positions, above the regional averages and with similar gaps. The results change slightly in the countries that are below the regional average. In the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, unemployment among women is almost double the rate for the entire country. Peru and Colombia are next, with similar results, although the rate is slightly higher for women. In the other cases, the resulting average levels, and the gaps between the native-born and the foreign-born, are almost the same.

Regarding the gender differences in unemployment rates, it can be seen that unemployment tends to be much higher among women than among men. Initially, in the foreign-born group, small differences were found in 6 of the 12 countries: Colombia, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, Panama, and Uruguay, although these gaps generally show higher unemployment among women. Similarly, albeit with more significant gaps, the other six countries in the region also show a




negative bias, indicating that women are unemployed more than men. Of these countries, in Paraguay, Chile, and Argentina, the differences exceed 4 p.p. In Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, the differences range from 5 p.p. to 7 p.p. Finally, in Costa Rica, this gap exceeds 15 p.p.

In the case of the native-born, Colombia is the only country in which unemployment seems to be higher among men than among women, although


the difference is insignificant. In the other countries, unemployment tends to be higher among women. However, in this population group, the gap is greater than 4 p.p. in just three countries: Paraguay (-5.5 p.p.), Dominican Republic (-7.3 p.p.), and Costa Rica (-8.7 p.p.). In the other 8 countries, the difference are less than 3 percentage points. Among both native- and foreign-born women unemployment seems to be slightly higher in OECD countries on average.

**FIGURE 5.9. Unemployment Rates Among Women**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born unemployed.

**FIGURE 5.10. Gender Gaps in Unemployment Between Foreign- and Native-Born Populations**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign-born unemployed. A positive difference means that men are more likely to be unemployed than women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ On average, there is no meaningful difference between foreign- and native-born women's unemployment rates in LAC.
- ➔ In Costa Rica, Argentina, and Ecuador, unemployment rates tend to be higher among foreign-born women than native-born women, with differences greater than 4 p.p.
- ➔ Conversely, in the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, native-born women are more likely to be unemployed.
- ➔ OECD countries represent a significant difference with immigrant women tending to be more unemployed than their native-born peers.
- ➔ Unemployment tends to be much higher among women than among men. Six countries in the region also show a negative bias among the foreign-born, indicating that women are more unemployed than men. In the case of the native-born, in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica, unemployment tends to be higher among women. Among both native- and foreign-born, women unemployment seems to be slightly higher in OECD countries on average.

### 5.5 Gender differences in involuntary inactivity



**Definition:** *Involuntarily inactive* people are those who are not seeking work but are willing to take up work. They include, among others, discouraged workers, who are not seeking work because they believe no suitable jobs are available.

**Coverage:** Economically inactive working age population (15- to 64-year-olds).

The relative similarity in the LAC averages for female involuntary inactivity obscures wide variation among individual countries. The rate of involuntary inactivity is marginally higher on average among native-born women than among foreign-born, but this is true in only 4 of the 11 countries for which the indicator can be calculated. Specifically, in Mexico and Ecuador, involuntary inactivity is higher among foreign-born than native-born with gaps above 4 p.p., while in Panama and Uruguay these gaps reach up to 20 p.p., pulling the regional average in that direction.

In Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Paraguay, in contrast, the involuntary inactivity rate for the foreign-born women exceeds that of native-born by between 6 and 12 p.p. This can also be seen in OECD countries on average, where there is a difference of 5 p.p., which indicates that in this region there is a clearer trend

than what can be seen in LAC countries on average. Lastly, in Chile and Argentina there are not meaningful differences.


In the comparison between men and women of both foreign- and native-born groups, a trend can be observed indicating that women, in general, tend to be more involuntarily inactive in the region than men. In the case of foreign-born, in 7 of the 11 countries, women present a higher rate of inactive involuntary than men. Within these, the differences in Peru stand out, reaching 14 p.p.; Dominican Republic, which exceeds 8 p.p.; and Paraguay, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, with differences between 5 and 7 p.p. In Mexico, the gap barely reaches 4 p.p. and in Uruguay it the gap exceeds two percentage points. However, in 2 of the other 4 countries the gap turns to the right of the graph, indicating that in Chile and Panama men tend to be mostly inactive involuntary, with 14 and 8 p.p.

higher, respectively. In the OECD on average, men tend to be slightly more involuntarily inactive than women.

Regarding involuntary inactivity rates among the native-born, higher percentages are also observed in women than in men. This occurs in 6 of the 11 countries (Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador) with differences considered significant for this analysis, while in


Mexico and Costa Rica there is also a higher percentage of women in involuntarily inactive, but in these two cases by very small margins. In the three remaining countries there is a higher rate for men, but only Chile has a meaningful difference with a value close to 13 p.p. This results in a significant average regional difference with women more likely to involuntarily inactive (by 4 p.p.) Among the native-born, the OECD average indicates that men tend to be slightly more involuntarily inactive.

**FIGURE 5.11. Women involuntarily inactive (available past week, not looking for job)**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the proportion of foreign-born women involuntarily inactive.

**FIGURE 5.12. Gender gaps in involuntary inactivity among the foreign- and native-born populations**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of foreign- inactive involuntarily. A positive difference means that men are more likely to be involuntarily inactive than women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- The rate of involuntary inactivity is marginally higher on LAC average among native-born women than among the foreign-born, while it is much higher among foreign-born in the OECD on average.
- In Colombia and Panama, the rate for the native-born exceeds that of foreign-born inactivity by 20 and 17 p.p. Ecuador, and Mexico also display higher rates of involuntary inactivity among native-born women.
- In Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica, in contrast, involuntary inactivity is much higher among foreign-born women than the native-born.
- In the region women tend to be more involuntarily inactive than men, while this is the other way around in OECD countries on average.

### 5.6 Gender differences in working hours



**Definition:** This indicator includes the proportion of employed persons who report working long hours (50 or more hours per week). It also includes the share of part-time workers (those with a working week of fewer than 30 hours) among all the employed.

**Coverage:** People in employment aged 15 to 64 but who are not self-employed or in education.

In none of the countries in the region do native-born women work long hours at a higher rate than foreign-born women. On average, migrant women work more than 50 hours per week at a rate nearly 9 p.p. higher than that of native-born women, with 25% of migrant women working long hours compared to 16% of native-born women. These rates are highest in Panama, Peru, Colombia, and Paraguay, exceeding 23% in the latter and reaching 60%. Even where it is less common to work long hours, foreign-born women do so at the same rate or at a higher rate than native-born women (See figure 5.13). The OECD average is below the LAC average, exceeding only Trinidad and Tobago. In this last group of countries, the native-born average is slightly above that of foreign-born women. Less than 10% of women of both groups work more than 50 hours a week in OECD countries.

At the other end of the spectrum, migrant women work part-time (less than 30 hours per week) at a lower rate than do native-born women on average, albeit with more variation. While long hours are more common among migrant women, part-time work is less so (Panama, Peru, and

Ecuador) or as common (Paraguay) compared to the native-born.

This is also the case in Uruguay (by 7 p.p.) and Ecuador (16 p.p.). In Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago, no meaningful gaps were found for this analysis. Finally, in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, foreign-born women were found to work less than 30 hours a week more often than their native-born peers by almost 12 p.p. In the OECD on average, both native- and foreign-born women have similar outcomes: near 30% of them work less than 30 hours a week.

In contrast, the gender gap analysis shows that men tend to work long hours more than women regardless of whether they were born in the country or abroad. Figure 5.14 shows the foreign-born who work more than 50 hours a week on the left and the native-born who work the same number of hours on the right. Both graphs show that in 10 of the 11 countries, there is a gap of more than 4 p.p., indicating that there is a greater proportion of men who work more hours than women. Among the foreign-born in Ecuador, Colombia,

Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, and Costa Rica, there are gaps of more than 10 p.p., greater than the regional average. In OECD countries, the situation is similar. The average is similar to that of these LAC countries (in both groups) and indicates that men tend to work long hours more than women as well.

Similarly, [figure 5.15](#) shows that women are more likely to work less than 30 hours a week than men, regardless of whether they were born in the country of analysis or abroad. In 9 of the 11 countries


in which this is the case, there are considerable differences among the foreign-born. Only in Peru are men more likely to work less than 30 hours per week, but the value is not significantly different from women. Among the native-born population, this is true in ten countries. Only Trinidad and Tobago does not show large gaps in either of the two population groups. OECD average also shows that there are more women working part time than men, to a larger extent.

**FIGURE 5.13. Women’s Working Hours**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born working hours.

**FIGURE 5.14. Gender Gaps Among People Who Work More Than 50 Hours Per Week**





**FIGURE 5.15. Gender Gaps Among People Who Work Less Than 30 Hours**



**Note:** In figures 5.14 and 5.15, countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born who work more than 50 and less than 30 hours per week, respectively. A positive difference means that men are more likely to work the number of hours mentioned than women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- In none of the countries in the region do native-born women work long hours at a higher rate than foreign-born women.
- Migrant women work part-time (less than 30 hours per week) at a lower rate than native-born women do, on average, albeit with more variation. In the OECD, however, shares are similar for both groups.
- As migrants generally tend to work longer hours than the native-born (unlike in OECD countries on average), the results for men are not surprising. The differences in the case of women in the four countries where this is not the case may reflect barriers to greater labor force participation in those instances.
- Men tend to work long hours outside the home more than women regardless of whether they were born in the country or abroad.

### 5.7 Gender differences in job skills



**Definition:** *Job skills* are measured by the ISCO. This indicator compares the share of workers in low-skilled jobs (i.e., elementary occupations that entail simple, routine tasks and, often, physical effort [ISCO 9]) with the share of workers in highly skilled jobs (e.g., senior managers, professionals, technicians, and associate professionals [ISCO 1-3]).

**Coverage:** People in employment aged 15 to 64 (not including military occupations [ISCO 0]).

In four of the nine countries for which data is available, immigrant women are more likely to hold high-skilled jobs than native-born women ([figure 5.16](#)). This is the case in Paraguay (by a difference of 17 p.p.), Mexico (10 p.p.), Peru (5 p.p.), and Uruguay (4 p.p.). However, the reverse is true in four other countries: Panama (with a gap of almost 7 p.p.), Chile (over 13 p.p.), Costa Rica (over 21 p.p.), and the Dominican Republic (15 p.p.). These contrasting outcomes result in a relatively small regional difference of 2 p.p., with native-born women outperforming their migrant peers. This is also the case in OECD countries, where native-born women have more highly skilled jobs than foreign-born by a significant difference of 10 p.p.

Similarly, when the percentages of women in low-skilled jobs are examined, larger shares of foreign-born women are found to be in jobs categorized as low-skilled. This is observed mainly in Costa Rica, where the difference is over 17 p.p., and in Dominican Republic, by almost 15 p.p. Similarly, in Panama and Chile there are differences of over 7 p.p. Conversely, in three countries do

native-born women hold low-skilled jobs more frequently than their foreign-born peers. This is the case in Ecuador (with a difference of 4 p.p.), Peru (9 p.p.), and Paraguay (6 p.p.). In Uruguay and Mexico there are no substantial differences. OECD average shows smaller proportions of women with low-skilled jobs, and here also foreign-born are more likely to hold one of this kind of jobs.


The results of the gender gap comparison are diverse ([figure 5.17](#)). On the one hand, in high-skilled jobs, no clear pattern is observed in the gender gaps of foreign-born populations. In five countries (Panama, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, and Peru), higher values are observed for men (although in Peru and Mexico the gaps are not statistically sufficient), while in the other four countries for which data is available (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Paraguay), higher values are observed for women. OECD also shows a not meaningful gap. In contrast, native-born women are much more likely to be in high-skilled jobs than men, on average. This is the case in eight countries: in four, this difference is over 6 p.p.

(Mexico, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Paraguay), while in the other four it is over 9 p.p. (Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Panama). Only in Peru is there is no difference. This results in an average gender gap of 8 p.p., with native-born women more likely to hold highly skilled jobs than men. Similarly in OECD countries, native-born women are more likely to have a highly-skilled job than men on average.

Finally, [figure 5.18](#) shows the gaps between men and women in low-skilled jobs. The graph on the left shows the gender gaps for the foreign-born: Mexico and the Dominican Republic are the countries with higher proportions of men born abroad


in low-skilled jobs, with differences greater than 5 p.p., while Peru, Chile, and Panama show higher proportions of women, also with differences of more than 5 p.p. This means that there is no a considerable regional gender difference. By contrast, OECD average does show a significant gender gap, indicating that foreign-born women are more likely to work in low-skilled jobs. For the native-born, in four countries men are the majority in low-skilled jobs (Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Panama), while in three countries women are the majority (Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador). Here LAC and OECD countries do not have big gender gaps.

**FIGURE 5.16. Women’s Job Skills**




**Note:** Countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born in highly skilled and low-skilled jobs.

**FIGURE 5.17. Gender Gaps in Highly Skilled Jobs**



**FIGURE 5.18. Gender Gaps in Low-Skilled Jobs**



**Note:** In figures 5.17 and 5.18, countries are sorted in descending order of the proportion of the foreign-born in highly skilled and low-skilled jobs. A positive difference means that men are more likely to be in the level of job skills mentioned than women.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In four of the nine countries for which data was available (Paraguay, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), immigrant women are more likely to hold high-skilled jobs than native-born women.
- ➔ However, the reverse is true in the same number of countries (Panama, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic) and in OECD countries on average.
- ➔ In four countries, higher values are observed for men (Panama, Uruguay, Chile, and Peru), while in the other four countries for which data is available, higher values are observed for women (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Paraguay).

## Notes and sources for chapter 5

**TABLE 5.1. Sources for Chapter 5 by Indicator**

Indicator	Female Population and Sex Ratio	Gender differences in level of educational attainment	Gender differences in employment rates and labor market participation	Gender differences in unemployment	Gender differences in involuntary inactivity	Gender differences in working hours	Gender differences in job skills
Figure	5.1 and 5.2	5.3, 5.4, and 5.5	5.6, 5.7, and 5.8	5.9 and 5.10	5.11 and 5.12	5.13, 5.14, and 5.15	5.16, 5.17, and 5.18
<b>OECD countries</b>							
Chile	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	.	CASEN 2020
Colombia	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	.
Costa Rica	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021	ECE 2021
Mexico	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021	ENOE 2021
<b>LAC IDB countries</b>							
Argentina	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	.
Brazil	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Dominican Republic	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021
Ecuador	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021
Panama	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019
Paraguay	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020
Peru	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021	ENAO 2021
Trinidad and Tobago	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	.	CSSP 2015	.
Uruguay	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019



## 6. IMMIGRANTS' LIVING CONDITIONS

**Formal work and educational are not the only channels for economic integration for immigrants. There are other economic and social aspects to the integration process.** Immigrants' capacity to generate sufficient income and meet their housing and health care needs is fundamental to their ability to fully participate in the host-country society. Employment status and job quality strongly influence living conditions in LAC, as higher incomes lead to better health and housing outcomes. Improved living conditions can then lead to greater welfare and, in turn, to even better employment opportunities.

This chapter focuses on three primary determinants of living conditions: household income, poverty, and housing quality. Income is a key factor driving many socioeconomic outcomes, and income inequality is also associated with social exclusion. Access to quality housing for migrants can be limited by discrimination and lack of local knowledge. Furthermore, housing quality affects health, which then affects employment capacity and income.

This chapter looks first at disposable household income ([indicator 6.1](#)) and relative poverty ([indicator 6.2](#)). It then considers two housing indicators: the incidence of overcrowding ([indicator 6.3](#)), and general housing conditions ([indicator 6.4](#)). The chapter concludes with an analysis of policy indicators with a bearing on living conditions.



## 6.1 Household income



**Definition:** A household's equivalized disposable income is its income per capita adjusted by the square root of household size. Income is expressed in monthly terms, in US dollars at constant prices based on PPP for 2020. It includes earnings from labor and capital. The median income divides households into two halves: one-half receives less and the other more than the median income. Income deciles: one-tenth of the population has an income lower than the first decile (D1) and one-tenth higher than the ninth decile (D9).

**Coverage:** All people aged 15 and over who live in ordinary housing. The household's annual equivalized income is attributed to each individual member.

In the OECD area, the foreign-born population has household incomes that are, on average, 17% lower than that of the native-born population. In the LAC countries for which information is available, the foreign-born-to-native-born income ratio suggests that, on average, the household income of the foreign-born is similar to that of the native-born. However, there are some important cross-country variations.

Immigrants have lower household disposable incomes than their native-born peers in only three out of ten LAC countries: Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago. In these countries, the foreign-born have household incomes that are between 14% and 20% lower than that of the native-born (the foreign-born-to-native-born income ratio ranges between 0.86 and 0.80). In Colombia, immigrants' income mainly refers to that of Venezuelans, who represent the largest share of immigrants in this country. The characteristics of Venezuelan migrants differ across countries. Those who have arrived in Colombia may be those with fewer resources, as those with more resources may have migrated to more distant destinations (US, Europe, the Southern Cone). The Venezuelans with more resources in Colombia tend to be those who migrated earlier, rather than as part of the most recent waves.


In contrast, in six out of the ten countries analyzed, foreign-born individuals have higher household incomes than their native-born counterparts. The difference is striking in Panama, where immigrants' income is 76% higher than that of the

native-born (US\$666 more each month). Other countries where immigrants have higher household incomes than the native-born include Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay (with foreign-born-to-native-born income ratios ranging between 1.09 and 1.24). The higher income of the foreign-born is mainly explained by the large shares of highly educated migrants, and partly by the smaller size of their families ([indicator 3.7](#)). In these countries, the proportion of migrants with high levels of education is the largest across the countries examined, as over one-third are highly educated.

Immigrants are overrepresented in the bottom income decile in four out of ten LAC countries, including Argentina, Dominican Republic, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago ([figure 6.3](#)). This overrepresentation is particularly marked in Trinidad and Tobago, where more than 30% of the foreign-born belong to the bottom income decile. At the other end of the income distribution, the foreign-born are underrepresented in the top income decile in five out of ten countries. These countries are almost exactly the same as those where immigrants were overrepresented in the lowest income decile; that is, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, and Ecuador, where less than 8% of the foreign-born classified in the top income decile. Immigrants, on the other hand, are overrepresented in the top income decile in two countries: Paraguay (17%) and Panama (25%). Panama is the only country where immigrants are overrepresented at both ends of the income distribution, suggesting high levels of inequality among immigrants.




**FIGURE 6.1. Median Income**




**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the median income of the foreign-born population.

**FIGURE 6.2. Income Ratio**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of income ratio of the foreign-born population.

**FIGURE 6.3. Share of Foreign-Born in Bottom and Top Income Deciles**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the bottom income decile.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ In half of the countries analyzed, foreign-born individuals have higher median household disposable incomes than their native-born counterparts. The difference is remarkable in Panama, where immigrants' income is 76% higher than that of their native-born peers.
- ➔ Other countries where immigrants have higher household incomes than native-born include Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay (with foreign-born-to-native-born income ratios that range between 1.09 and 1.24). This is mainly explained by their higher level of education, compared to that of the native-born.
- ➔ In three countries—Colombia, Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago—immigrants have household incomes that are up to 20% lower than the native-born.
- ➔ The median income of immigrants' households is very similar to that of native-born households in Argentina and Ecuador.
- ➔ Immigrants are overrepresented in the bottom income decile in four out of ten LAC countries: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. At the other end of the income distribution, the foreign-born are underrepresented in the top income decile in five out of ten countries: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago.

### 6.2 Relative poverty



**Definition:** The proportion of individuals living below the poverty threshold. The poverty threshold used here is 60% of the median equivalized disposable income in each country.

**Coverage:** All people aged 15 and over living in ordinary housing.


Across the ten LAC countries for which data was available, around 30% of both the foreign- and native-born live in relative poverty—30% and 28%, respectively. In OECD countries, poverty rates are somewhat smaller—25% for the foreign-born and 17% for the native-born—but the gap between groups is wider. This is due to the lower share of the native-born with incomes below the poverty threshold. However, across the LAC countries, there are major differences in both these levels and the gaps between groups.

In six out of ten countries, immigrants are less likely than the native-born to be classified as poor. This is particularly true in Chile, Peru, and Panama, where the gap in favor of the foreign-born is at least 8 p.p. However, it is also true in Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay, where the foreign-born are around 4 p.p. less likely to be poor than their

native-born peers. By contrast, in the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago, immigrants' poverty rates are at least 10 p.p. higher than those of the native-born (18 p.p. in Trinidad and Tobago). In two countries, Argentina and Colombia, poverty rates are similar for the foreign- and native-born, standing at around one-third in both countries.

Foreign-born poverty rates are highest in the countries where they are also highest among the native-born. This is observed in Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago, where the share of the foreign-born living in poverty is over 33%. Specifically, they are highest in Trinidad and Tobago (61%), followed by Argentina (37%). Conversely, poverty rates are lowest in Chile, Peru, and Paraguay, where less than 20% of immigrants live in poverty.

**FIGURE 6.4. Relative poverty rates**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of the relative poverty rates of the foreign-born population.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ Across ten LAC countries, around 30% of the foreign-born and 28% of the native-born live in relative poverty. In OECD countries, poverty rates are somewhat smaller: 25% for the foreign-born and 17% for the native-born, and the gap between groups is wider (2 p.p. and 8 p.p., respectively).
- ➔ In six out of the ten countries, immigrants are less likely than the native-born to live in relative poverty. This is particularly true in Chile, Peru, and Panama. The exceptions include Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic, where immigrants' poverty rates are at least 10 p.p. higher than those of the native-born.
- ➔ Foreign-born poverty rates are highest in Trinidad and Tobago (61%), followed by Argentina (37%), Colombia, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic (33% in the last three). They are lowest in Chile, Peru, and Paraguay, where less than 20% of immigrants are considered poor.

## 6.3 Overcrowded housing



**Definition:** A dwelling is considered to be overcrowded if the number of rooms is less than the sum of one living room for the household, plus one room for the single person or the couple responsible for the dwelling (or two rooms if they are not a couple), plus one room for every two additional adults, plus one room for every two children.

**Coverage:** People aged 15 and over living in ordinary housing.

The percentage of the foreign-born aged 15 and over and living in overcrowded housing is around 40% in the ten LAC countries reported here. This compares with a smaller percentage rate among the native-born (36%). In the OECD area, the respective share is much lower for both groups, but the gap between the foreign- and native-born is twice as large. While 17% of foreign-born live in overcrowded accommodation, only 9% of native-born live in such conditions.

There is wide variation in overcrowding rates across countries. Whereas more than half of the foreign-born live in overcrowding housing in the Dominican Republic (53%), Ecuador (54%), Peru (61%), and Colombia (69%), this is true for less than one-third of immigrants in Trinidad and Tobago (30%), Uruguay (26%), and Chile (11%). Cross-country variations are also observed among the native-born, but they are less marked. Newly arrived immigrants from Haiti and Venezuelans may explain the high shares of overcrowding in the above-mentioned countries. This large influx of migrants puts constraints on the housing market, thereby increasing the share of housing in poor condition, which particularly affects migrants.


In five out of ten LAC countries, the foreign-born are more likely to live in overcrowded housing than their native-born peers. The differences between groups are particularly marked in Colombia (33 p.p.), followed by the Dominican Republic (14 p.p.), and Peru (11 p.p.). The gap between groups

is partly due to the type of migrants' household arrangements, especially with regard to the presence of children. Migrants are more likely than their native-born counterparts to live in households with two or more adults and children. For instance, around 61% of the foreign-born in Colombia live in this type of household, compared to 44% of the native-born ([indicator 2.6](#)).

In contrast, the foreign-born are less likely than native-born to live in overcrowded conditions in three out of ten countries: Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago. The lower share of overcrowding among the foreign-born in these countries is also explained by household composition. The foreign-born are more likely than the native-born to live in households without children, especially households with multiple adults and no children. For example, in Paraguay, while 62% of individuals live in households without children, only 34% of the native-born live in this type of household.

Overcrowding rates are similar between the foreign- and native-born populations in two countries: Argentina and Uruguay. However, the percentage of overcrowded housing varies significantly between these (43% and 26%, respectively). These two countries are among those with the largest share of long-term immigrants in LAC ([indicator 2.2](#)), a group that tends to have more similar outcomes to the native-born, hence the similarity in housing conditions as measured by this indicator.

**FIGURE 6.5. Overcrowded Housing**



**Note:** Countries are sorted in ascending order of overcrowding rates among the foreign-born population.



## MAIN FINDINGS

- The foreign-born are more likely than their native-born counterparts to live in overcrowded housing in five out of ten LAC countries. The gap between the foreign-born and the native-born is particularly marked in Colombia (33 p.p.), followed by the Dominican Republic (14 p.p.) and Peru (11 p.p.).
- The foreign-born are less likely than the native-born to live in overcrowded conditions in Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago.
- Overcrowding rates are similar between the foreign-born and the native-born in two countries: Argentina (43% for both) and Uruguay (26% for both).

## 6.4 Housing conditions



**Definition:** Housing is considered *substandard* or *deprived* if it does not provide exclusive access to a bathroom, if the fuel used for cooking is other than gas or electricity, or if the water source for human consumption is not piped. This indicator presents the share of dwellings that lack one or more of the characteristics mentioned.

**Coverage:** People aged 15 and over living in ordinary housing.

The foreign-born are more likely than the native-born to live in substandard housing (as defined above, based on lack of access to basic services) in four out of ten countries. The gap is largest in the Dominican Republic, where the proportion of immigrants living in deprived conditions is three times that of their native-born peers (46% and 15%, respectively). Similarly, in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, the share of the foreign-born living in substandard housing exceeds that of the native-born (37% versus 32%, and 34% versus 31%, respectively). However, the gap between groups is narrow because a relatively high share of the native-born also reside in deprived conditions.

On the other hand, in six out of the ten countries analyzed, a smaller share of the foreign-born live in substandard housing than the native-born. This is particularly notable in Peru (33 p.p.), followed by Ecuador (15 p.p.) and Panama (10 p.p.). The favorable circumstances of the foreign-born in these countries may be explained by the high concentration of immigrants in urban areas<sup>69</sup> (above 90%) and the capital city ([indicator 2.3](#)). In addition, the foreign-born may have better access to quality housing due to their socioeconomic characteristics. In these countries, immigrants are more likely than native-born to be highly educated ([indicator 3.7](#)) and to work in high-skilled jobs in their host country ([indicator 4.7](#)). For instance,

while 32% of the foreign-born in Peru have high education levels and 19% work in high-skilled jobs, this is only true of 15% and 13% of the native-born, respectively.


In general, the share of immigrants living in substandard housing conditions is highest where the share of the native-born living in these conditions is also high. This is true in Colombia, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago. The exception is the Dominican Republic, where the share of the native-born in substandard housing is relatively low (15%). The gap between groups in the Dominican Republic is explained by the large number of Haitians who have migrated fleeing the poor conditions in their country of birth ([indicator 2.2](#)). These migrants mainly come from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds and work in low-skilled jobs in the host country ([indicator 3.8](#)). As a consequence, almost half of them (46%) live in deprived housing conditions, lacking access to basic services.

At the other end of the spectrum, the share of the foreign-born living in poor-quality housing is lowest in countries where this rate is also low among the native-born. This includes immigrants in Argentina, Chile, Panama, and Uruguay, where less than 10% live in substandard housing.

<sup>69</sup> Housing in urban areas is more likely to have connections to public water, sewer, and electricity, regardless of its relative quality. The concentration of migrants in urban areas implies that under this definition, higher shares natives overall will be in substandard conditions.



**FIGURE 6.6. Substandard Housing**



## MAIN FINDINGS

- ➔ The foreign-born are more likely than the native-born to live in substandard housing in four out of the ten countries analyzed. The gap is largest in the Dominican Republic, where the proportion of immigrants living in deprived housing conditions is three times that of their native-born peers (46% and 15%, respectively). Similarly, in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, the foreign-born are more likely to live in substandard housing than the native-born. The gap between groups is, however, narrower because a high share of the native-born (around one-third) live in deprived housing.
- ➔ By contrast, the foreign-born are less likely than the native-born to live in substandard housing conditions in Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. The difference is outstanding in Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, where the share of the native-born living in substandard housing is more than three times that of immigrants. The gap is smallest in Chile and Uruguay.
- ➔ In general, the share of immigrants living in substandard housing conditions is highest where also the share of the native-born in these conditions is also high. This is true in Colombia, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago. The exception is the Dominican Republic, where the share of the native-born in substandard housing is relatively low.

## 6.5 Policy indicators for living conditions













Access to quality living conditions is primordial for having a decent quality of life. As expressed by the special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, “under international law, to be adequately housed means having secure tenure—not having to worry about being evicted or having your home or lands taken away.” Adequate housing was recognized as part of the right to an adequate standard of living in article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 11.1 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. As shown in this chapter, the foreign-born are more likely than their native-born counterparts to live in overcrowded housing. Besides the right to be adequately housed, it is important for immigrants to have access to public social assistance, family support services, as well as public cash support on equal terms with the native-born. Indeed, these public programs are key to alleviating poverty.

The right to health is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (articles 10 and 11), which stresses that people have a right to access healthcare services regardless of their legal status. Governments should adopt policies that ensure and safeguard migrants’ right to access health services regardless of their migration status. Despite the lack of data in household

surveys on migrants’ access to health services and the challenges that measuring this entails, it is essential to assess this issue through policy analysis. In some countries, access to health services may be limited, especially for immigrants whose status is irregular. In almost all countries, the status of immigrants determines the type of access to health services that they have.

The large-scale migration flows in LAC have created challenges to host-country health systems, which must provide care to a growing population. These recent migration flows in LAC countries have increased the vulnerability of immigrants’ health conditions. They are more likely to live in precarious conditions, have unstable jobs, and are more exposed to food insecurity, lack of shelter, and the risk of human trafficking. In addition, their access to health services is limited, especially if they are undocumented. In almost all the LAC countries analyzed, the legal status of immigrants determines the type of access to health services that they have. When immigrants do not have a legal migration status or a temporary status through a work visa, they generally have fewer rights of access to health care than the native-born population. Another problem that has been sparked by the mass migration flows of recent years is access to housing, particularly adequate housing, which has only partly been addressed. Adequate housing is not just a human right: it has also been shown to be effective in generating economic benefits, increasing education levels, improving physical and mental health, and promoting social inclusion.













**TABLE 6.1. Policy Indicators for Living Conditions**

	 Argentina	 Brazil	 Chile	 Colombia	 Costa Rica	 Dominican Republic	 Ecuador	 Mexico	 Panama	 Peru	 Trinidad and Tobago	 Uruguay
<b>Migrants in a regular situation have access to public social assistance/family support services</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	None identified	No	Yes	No	No (only nationals with a DNI or NN)	Yes (residents)	Yes
<b>Migrants in a regular situation have access to the public cash support</b>	Yes (provided they have resided in the country for a certain time and hold a DNI)	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	None identified	Yes (if resident, access to the Bono Solidario during Covid)	No (only nationals with a DNI or NN)	-	Yes
<b>Migrants in a regular situation can sign leases or buy housing<sup>70</sup></b>	Yes	Yes	Yes (permanent residency for buying a house)	Yes (with restrictions)	Yes	Yes	Yes (but more complicated to buy a house)	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
<b>Migrants have access to defense mechanisms to protect their rights, regardless of their migration status</b>	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.


<sup>70</sup> In many countries there are significant restrictions on migrants in an irregular situation accessing housing.

**TABLE 6.2. Health and Social Protection Policy Indicators**

	Argentina 	Brazil 	Chile 	Colombia 	Costa Rica 	Dominican Republic 	Ecuador 	Mexico 	Panama 	Peru 	Trinidad and Tobago 	Uruguay 
Migrants have access to free emergency care, regardless of their migration status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migrants have access to all public health services (health promotion and disease prevention, diagnosis and treatment, rehabilitation)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (regular migrants)	No (regular migrant and refugees with health insurance)	No (regular migrants)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (non-nationals must pay for treatment)	Yes
Migrants' children have access to the public care pathway for malnutrition (monitoring and prevention of malnutrition)	None identified	Yes	-	-	Yes	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	Yes

"-" indicates that no information was obtained to make a determination.

**TABLE 6.2. Health and Social Protection Policy Indicators (Cont.)**

	Argentina 	Brazil 	Chile 	Colombia 	Costa Rica 	Dominican Republic 	Ecuador 	Mexico 	Panama 	Peru 	Trinidad and Tobago 	Uruguay 
<b>Migrants can join the country's pension system (including pensions for injuries, old-age and disability)</b>	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (migrants who are affiliated)	Yes (regular migrants with work permits)	Yes (regular migrants with work permits)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants with work permits)	Yes (regular migrants affiliated to Social Security Fund)	Yes (regular migrants with work contracts)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants affiliated)
<b>Migrants have access to the occupation hazard insurance</b>	Yes	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes	Yes (regular migrants with work contracts)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants with work permits)	Yes (regular migrants affiliated to Social Security Fund)	Yes (regular migrants with work contracts)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants affiliated)
<b>Migrants have access to unemployment insurance</b>	Yes (migrants with work permits and work contracts)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (regular migrants)	Yes (migrants who are affiliated)	No unemployment insurance in CR	No unemployment insurance in DR	Yes (regular migrants)	No unemployment insurance in Mexico	No unemployment insurance in Panama	At the moment there is no unemployment insurance. But there is a proposed legislation to be adopted	No unemployment insurance in TT	Yes (regular migrants)

Despite being a universal right, immigrants in an irregular situation generally do not have access to the formal housing market and face challenges around finding an adequate house, forcing them to live in overcrowded situations and/or bad-quality housing. In the 11 LAC countries for which we obtained information,<sup>71</sup> the right to access adequate housing is recognized for all people living in the territory. However, in almost all cases, an ID card is needed to rent a house. A comprehensive public policy on human mobility must address access to housing. On the one hand, in terms of renting or purchasing a home, migrants (even those with a regular status) continually face problems that are mainly reflected in excessive requirements, lack of access to credit, and even factors related to discrimination, resulting in cases of overcrowding, the formation of ghettos, and exploitation by landlords in terms of excessive rent.

Regardless of the lack of available data on migrants' access to healthcare services, conducting a policy analysis on the right to access healthcare services is essential. In 8 out of the 12 LAC countries analyzed, migrants have access to free

emergency care and public health services, regardless of their migration status (including irregular migrants). This right is highlighted in these countries' respective migration acts or their constitutions.<sup>72</sup> In Colombia, immigrants in an irregular situation only have access to emergency services and vaccination. To be affiliated and benefit from all public health services, documentation such as an ID card or residency permit is required (this applies to immigrants with a residency permit, refugees, asylum seekers). In Costa Rica, immigrants in an irregular situation only have access to emergency services and prenatal care. Like migrants in an irregular situation, refugees have no legal right to receive medical attention and need to have insurance through the social security fund (*Caja del Seguro Social*) to access public healthcare services. However, both migrants in an irregular situation and refugees can receive prenatal and emergency care. In the Dominican Republic, the Migration Council expressed that access to public hospitals will be limited to immigrants in an irregular situation and "only in case of emergency." In Trinidad and Tobago, migrants in an irregular situation only have access to emergency services.

<sup>71</sup> No information for Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>72</sup> Argentina (Migration Act—Article 8), Brazil (National Migration Policy -Política Nacional de Imigração e Proteção ao(a) Trabalhador(a) Migrante), Chile (Migration Act—Article 15), Ecuador (Migration Act—Article 52), Mexico (Migration Act—Title I and Article 8), Panama (National Constitution—Article 105), Peru (Migration Act—Article 7, paragraph 7.1 and Article 9, paragraph 9.1), Uruguay (Migration Act—Article 9).

## Notes and sources for chapter 6

**TABLE 6.3. Sources for Chapter 6 by Indicator**

Indicator	Household income	Relative poverty	Overcrowded housing	Housing conditions
Figure	6.1, 6.2, and 6.3	6.4	6.5	6.6
<b>OECD countries</b>				
Chile	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020	CASEN 2020
Colombia	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021	GEIH 2021
Costa Rica	.	.	.	.
Mexico	.	.	.	.
<b>LAC IDB countries</b>				
Argentina	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021	EPH 2021
Brazil	.	.	.	.
Dominican Republic	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021	ENCFT 2021
Ecuador	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021	ENEMDU 2021
Panama	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019	EHPM 2019
Paraguay	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020	EPHC 2020
Peru	ENAH0 2021	ENAH0 2021	ENAH0 2021	ENAH0 2021
Trinidad and Tobago	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015	CSSP 2015
Uruguay	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019	ECH 2019

## SUMMARY: Scoreboard of Outcomes of the Foreign-Born Population Compared with the Native-Born

	Education			
	PISA scores (2021)	Share of early school-leavers (2021)	Share of highly educated (2021)	Share of lowly educated (2021)
Argentina	○	○	-	○
Chile	-	-	+	+
Colombia	○	-	-	+
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	+	-	+	+
Mexico	-	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	-	-	+	○
Peru	+	-	+	+
Trinidad & Tobago	.	.	+	+
Uruguay	○	-	+	+













  

	Employment				
	Employment rate (2021)	Un-employment rate (2021)	Informality rate (2021)	NEET rate 15-24 (2021)	Overqualification rate (2021)
Argentina	+	-	-	+	.
Chile	+	+	+	-	-
Colombia	+	○	.	-	.
Costa Rica	+	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	+	+	-	-	+
Ecuador	+	-	-	-	-
Mexico	-	-	-	+	+
Panama	+	+	-	+	-
Paraguay	○	+	○	-	○
Peru	○	-	○	-	-
Trinidad & Tobago	-	○	.	.	.
Uruguay	+	-	+	-	-

**Notes:** Difference between the foreign- and the native-born  
+ More favorable to the foreign-born (to a 1% significance level)  
- Less favorable to the foreign-born (to a 1% significance level)  
○ No significant difference between foreign-born and natives (to a 1% significance)  
. Data not available



## SUMMARY: Scoreboard of Outcomes of the Foreign-Born Population Compared with the Native-Born (Cont.)

	Living Conditions		
	Household income	Poverty rate (2021)	Overcrowded housing (2021)
 Argentina	○	○	○
 Chile	+	+	-
 Colombia	-	○	-
 Costa Rica	.	.	.
 Dominican Republic	-	-	-
 Ecuador	○	+	-
 Mexico	.	.	.
 Panama	+	+	+
 Paraguay	+	+	+
 Peru	+	+	-
 Trinidad & Tobago	-	-	+
 Uruguay	+	+	○

**Notes:** Difference between the foreign- and the native-born  
 + More favorable to the foreign-born (to a 1% significance level)  
 - Less favorable to the foreign-born (to a 1% significance level)  
 ○ No significant difference between foreign-born and natives (to a 1% significance)  
 . Data not available



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