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Fiscal Indicators in Latin-American Countries

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Introduction

It is quite a difficult task to undertake a comparative analysis of public expenditures, income, overall balances and debt stocks in Latin-American countries. The IMF data, published annually in "*Government Finance Statistics*", is generally insufficient and old. For instance, in 2004 report data is available on public expenditure for 14 of the 21 countries assembled in "*western hemisphere*" category at the central government level, and for 6 countries at the general government level, with information of 1998 in some cases. Of course, this lack of information is not the responsibility of reporters, that can only compile what does exist.

To face this situation, ECLAC, trough the Area of Budgeting and Public management of ILPES, began to build a fiscal data base in 2002, in order to publish a " Public Finances Panorama"[1], which is the basic input of periodical reports of ECLAC: the Economic Study of Latin America and the Caribbean (August) and the Preliminary Balance (December). Graphs 1 to 4 and appendix tables show the result of these efforts. Graph 1 compares the evolution of 19 countries of public expenditure with other geographical zones. At the central government level, the diagnosis is clear: the upward trend of the nineties reflects a tenuous recuperation after the huge contraction of the eighties (almost 10 point between 1985 and 1991). The average level of public expenditure was 19.8 GDP points en 2003, when compared with the United States and the Southeast of Asia, but far from European Union levels (35 points of GDP), at the Central Government level. The remaining graphs show details for countries, public incomes ant the overall balance, and public debt.

The task becomes more complicated when we are looking for a general government coverage, a very important issue since three of the biggest economies of the region are federal countries. Table 1 shows the evolution of the State between 1990 and 2002, for traditional institutional coverage. A nivel de gobierno general, sólo se publican cifras para 10 países, y a nivel de sector público no financiero la información está disponible para 14 países.

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[1] The Panorama de la Gestión Pública, ILPES (2004) contains a description of fiscal variables for period 1990-2003. The database, maintained by researchers María Victoria Espada and Varinia Tromben, is updated twice a year, and is available at www.ilpes.org.

The purpose of this document is to explore some of the problems that arise in country comparisons and in regional harmonization of fiscal targets, an important issue when considering common goals of overall balances and public debt. In addition, it is interesting to point out the decisions that have taken some countries to build more sophisticated fiscal indicators. There are currently interesting initiatives, in applying accrual accounting and registering all variations of public net worth, or including economic cycle and relative prices fluctuations in the estimation of overall balances and public debt, or seeking to protect investment in strategic areas, or establishing priority areas in social expenditures. We analyze these experiences in what follows.

Graph 1

Public spending comparison (General Government)



Fuente: OCDE, Economic Outlook N. 75 para países de la OCDE; FMI y CEPAL para América Latina. Se muestra el promedio simple para Unión Europea y América Latina. Para América Latina la cobertura es gobierno central.

Graph 2

Evolution of Central Government



Graph 3

Incomes and spending of Central Governments (19 countries)



Fuente: OXLAD para serie 1950-1989, CEPAL para serie 1990-2003

Graph 4
Public debt



Table 1

PUBLIC SPENDING, 1990-2003

	Public spending, 2003			Change from 1990 (points of GDP)		
	Central government	General Government	Non-financial public sector	Central government	General Government	Non-financial public sector
Argentina	15.9	24.2	26.3	5.1	1.0	3.8
Bolivia	28.3	...	32.8	10.8	...	-2.3
Brazil	20.7	38.6	...	2.0	-1.0	...
Chile	21.7	23.9	35.1	1.1	1.8	0.2
Colombia	20.2	...	38.9	10.9	...	18.3
Costa Rica	16.8	25.0	26.1	1.9	3.5	3.2
Cuba	...	58.0	...	...	-13.4	...
Ecuador	18.7	...	24.5	4.3	...	-1.8
El Salvador	15.5	17.7	17.6	1.1	1.6	0.7
Guatemala	13.4	15.1	...	3.2	3.8	...
Haití	12.1	...	...	0.5	...	...
Honduras	25.5	...	38.2	2.8	...	4.8
México	19.9	...	24.3	-0.7	...	-3.2
Nicaragua	24.4	27.0	27.8	5.5	5.3	2.1
Panamá	18.3	...	25.1	0.3		0.3
Paraguay	16.7	19.7	24.9	7.2	0.5	8.1
Perú	16.8	19.4	...	-0.9	0.2	...
Dominican Republic	18.4	...	...	5.9	...	...
Uruguay	26.0	…	32.7	10.0	…	3.0
Venezuela	27.1	...	31.4	2.2	...	-3.2
Latin America	**19.8**	**23.4***	**29.0**	**3.9**	**1.9***	**2.4**

Fuente: CEPAL.

*: average, without Cuba

1. The coverage of fiscal operations: a recurrent debate

In the public sector area, the observance of procedures contained in the recently published manuals by the IMF and the OECD is part of the integration of emerging countries that have access to international capital markets. Even if countries made notorious progress in the application of standards and codes in public accounting, some recent practices are rather controversial and even misleading.

Government finance statistics should refer in priority to the general government, as ministries and agencies are essentially providing public goods, financed primarily by taxation. In spite of its straightforwardness, this kind of rule could lead to small or big revolutions in fiscal institutions. On one hand, several countries in Latin America have extra-budgetary mechanisms, for example special funds or stabilization funds. On the other hand, countries organized politically as federal states cannot establish fiscal rules for all the *Estados* or *Provincias*. For example, the fiscal responsibility law of 1999 in Argentina only encompassed the federal government.

Nevertheless, IMF-supported programs have tended to widen institutional coverage of overall fiscal balance and public debt stock targets, including in most cases public enterprises and central bank. IMF staff reports in the framework of Article IV consultations for developed countries use the general government coverage. For Latin American countries, the coverage is eighty five percent nonfinancial public sector, including non-financial enterprises and in some cases the central bank. Moreover, compared to other geographical areas, Latin America is clearly in disadvantage (see figure 5).

This trend is not arising only from the IMF. In the case of regional agreements, common goals refer to overall fiscal balance and public debt stock of the non-financial public sector (this is the case for the Andean Community and the Common Central American Market), or to the new concept of change in net public debt stock (MERCOSUR). In this last example, international reserves are included in the common goal, contributing to give to that norm another pro-cyclical characteristic. A broad coverage seems to be necessary when it is clear that countries have important quasi-fiscal activities (fiscal activities that are off-budget). But these practices should not represent the norm for medium-term macro-fiscal rules[2], as it leads to magnifying fiscal deficits.

The inclusion of nonfinancial enterprises in a consolidated basis with the general government may induce to artificial adjustments; it will always be easier to reduce investments from public enterprises than reducing programs from the general government, or than increasing tax rates. When the target is non-financial public sector balance, any public enterprise investment will aggravate deficit. With this institutional coverage, analysts and financial agencies would see a worsening of the fiscal stance, rising country risk and punishing infrastructure investments with high interest rates.

[2] For a detailed discussion see Dirección de Presupuestos, Chile (2002).

Figure 5
FISCAL STATISTICS INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE IN IMF STAFF REPORTS
(as % in each group of countries)



Source: International Monetary Fund (2004a)

If public enterprises do not have quasi-fiscal activities and if transfers from and to central government are well recorded in the budget, to include their operations in fiscal goals (overall fiscal balance and public debt stock) is nonsense. It has been argued that, as guarantees for public enterprises are contingent liabilities for the Treasury, coverage for fiscal statistics should be nonfinancial public sector. Nevertheless, contingent liabilities do not represent certain obligations and should have then a different treatment.

It is important to exclude from fiscal indicators public enterprises that are commercially run (IMF, 2004), in order to remove investment restrictions. How to define a commercially run public enterprise is more controversial. The IMF recommend that public enterprises must perform nine criteria falling into four broad categories: managerial independence (prices and employment policies), relations with government (subsidies and transfers, and regulatory and tax regime), financial conditions (profitability and creditworthiness) and governance structure (stock listing, outside audits and shareholders' rights). As these criteria are too restrictive, the IMF focus on managerial independence and relations with government.

Within this framework, a set of public enterprises has been identified in Turkey that have compulsory goals for the program 2002-2004, while others only have indicative goals. Nevertheless, 47 public enterprises are still included in the principal fiscal indicator. In Brazil, with the 2002-2005 arrangement, Petrobras was classified as a commercially run enterprise considering all the criteria discussed above, excluding therefore Petrobras' investments from the fiscal primary surplus calculation. In Colombia, this framework was applied to 14 public enterprises, but only one met the established criteria.

This approach should be a first step, considering that, in several cases, the proposal does not achieve to reduce the coverage of fiscal indicators. Moreover, this "case by case" approach may

allow to confusion when countries need harmonized and fair criteria in their relations with international financial organizations.

2. The new Government Finance Statistics Manual

In 2001, the IMF published the new Government Finance Statistics Manual (*GFSM 2001*), establishing new standards in the structure, coverage and accounting rules for fiscal statistics. The *1986 GFSM* was concentrated in governments' cash problems, considering that liquidity or finance restrictions of the government was the way to evaluate a country's fiscal policy. The *GFSM 2001* introduces accrual basis accounting rule and balances with the complete coverage of economic and financial activities of the government. As consigned by the *GFSM 2001*, there are many similitudes between those rules and the ones applied by private enterprises in their financial statements. Then, this new accounting structure should allow evaluating general government financial strength according to the same criteria applied to the other economic agents.

As it is well known (see table 1 of the appendix), in most Latin American countries accounting rules for recording flows are defined in a cash basis (flows are recorded when cash is received or disbursed) and not in an accrual basis (flows are recorded when economic events occur irrespective of whether cash was received or paid). The combination of cash basis accounting and explicit fiscal rules may lead to an intensive use of creative accounting. A budget can appear to be balanced in the short-term, but at the same time it can generate unsustainable obligations for the future or it can be financed by net worth reduction (through sales of non-financial assets or through the reduction of public investment) that would imply a progressive decrease for future financing. A fundamental difference is that accrual basis accounting distinguishes between depreciation expenses and acquisition of non-financial assets (are recorded separately).

Almost all LA countries follow the 1986 manual, with some differences. Brazil and Mexico have excellent public finance information, but do not follow the manual of 1986. An exception is Chile, who adopted officially GFSM 2001 in year 2004. Two countries are officially moving to GFSM 20001. Honduras has done some methodological changes, following IMF Report of Observance of Standard and Codes (ROSC). For example, now interest payments now are registered in accrual basis, and they include interests payments of the guaranteed debt of other non-financial public sector agencies. Also, debt amortization is registered below the financing line and grants are included above the line (except in the cases of debt relief). The new time series begin in 1998. The Secretaría de Estado de Finanzas of Dominican Republic, with Central Bank, has made some methodological changes according to GFSM 2001: interest payments are now registered in accrual basis.

The *GFSM 2001* analytical framework is constructed over the principle that "all changes in stocks can be fully explained by the flows" and it is also based on the same accounting rules than the 1993 System of National Accounts. Double-entry accounting is used for recording flows (every economic event should have a credit-entry and a debit-entry[3]), which implies a simple definition of what are government revenues and expenditures. Revenue is an increase in net worth resulting from a transaction, whereas expense is a decrease in net worth resulting also from a transaction. In the *GFSM 2001*, public investment is recorded as an increase in

[3] A debit is an increase in an asset, a decrease in a liability, or a decrease in net worth. A credit is a decrease in an asset, an increase in a liability or an increase in net worth. .

nonfinancial assets and its counterpart is a decrease in financial assets (double-entry accounting). Therefore, net worth is not affected and public investment is not considered as an expense.

In the *GFSM 2001*, there are three financial statements: the statement of government operations, the statement of other economic flows and the balance sheet. The balance sheet records the stocks of assets, liabilities and net worth of the government at the end of each accounting period, which is also the beginning of the next accounting period. By breaking down the total of assets and liabilities into their constituents and establishing the sources of their changes from one period to another in terms of transactions and other economic flows, the framework provides statistical explanation of the factors that cause the changes in net worth. (See an illustration in figure 9):

$$W = pK + FA - FL$$

Net worth (W) is equal to the sum of all assets (pK corresponds to public capital stock or, in other words, to nonfinancial assets and FA corresponds to financial assets) minus liabilities (FL corresponds to financial liabilities). This framework would allow evaluating, for example, if fiscal adjustments in the last period have been accompanied by a decrease in net worth. If fiscal adjustments have been done basically with a decrease in assets (for example public investment), the reduction of financial liabilities would not be necessary accompanied by an increase in the government net worth. Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2004) made such exercise for European Union countries, seeking to determine if the decrease in public debt was "genuine", leading to an increase in net worth or a decrease in non-financial assets through privatizations and reduction of public investment. In this study, the authors divided into two adjustment periods: in the first period (1992-1997) they found a positive correlation between changes in assets and liabilities with a reduction in net worth; in the second period (1998-2002), the reduction observed in liabilities was accompanied by a substantive increase in net worth. Despite the importance of that kind of diagnosis, lack of information in Latin American countries makes this type of evaluation almost impossible. Parece crucial por tanto impulsar la aplicación del nuevo Manual en los países de América Latina, si se quiere tener una apreciación más apropiada de la sostenibilidad fiscal, midiendo todas las variaciones de activos, pasivos y patrimonio neto.

Graph 6

GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS MANUAL 2001



Source: International Monetary Fund (2001)

3. Examples of "creative" fiscal indicators

As traditional fiscal indicators have many shortcomes, some countries –especially those that do not have IMF-supported programs—developed fiscal norms that are more appropriate to their own policy goals. These innovations are not necessarily "creative accounting" in traditional terms[4], but rather reveal a proper treatment of some fiscal operations. Among these innovations, we can highlight the use of cyclically adjusted indicators of the overall balance, the strategic treatment of particular public investments, and the effects of exchange rate fluctuations and GDP on GDP stock. We analyze three examples in what follows.

Ideally, public spending should be a-cyclical, rather neutral in the business cycle, or counter-cyclical, with explicit policies aimed at reducing public debt during good periods and hence confronting in better conditions cyclical downturns. In OECD countries, it has been widely accepted to let automatic fiscal stabilizers operate. This principle has been supported by ECLAC (1998) in Latin American countries, recommending the use of structural fiscal indicators instead of the traditional fiscal balance. A recent IMF report (2004) is also stressing the importance of managing boom periods (constraining public expense and debt during those periods) with cyclically adjusted indicators. Putting into practice this kind of policy represents a huge step toward macroeconomic stability.

[4] "Creative accounting" refers to operations that tend to differ or reduce expenditures or to inflate revenues, in order to achieve ex-ante fiscal targets artificially.

Unfortunately, if interest rates climb up or if revenues decrease, authorities are compelled to reduce primary expenditures' growth. There is ample empirical evidence of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies in Latin-American countries[5]. For this reason, applying counter-cyclical fiscal rules is very important to ensure a stable path of public spending. Many countries have made improvements; the fiscal responsibility Laws launched in the beginning of the decade succeeded to stop ever-growing debt dynamics. Nonetheless, there are few experiences where the explicit goal of fiscal rules is counter-cyclical.[6].

- Chile: structural balance and new accounting framework

The Chilean experience is valuable in that sense: since 2001, a fiscal policy rule (a structural fiscal surplus fixed to 1% of GDP) has been implemented to set ceiling in central government expenses (see box 1). The rule implied fixing the public expenditure growth in terms of trend GDP, regardless effective GDP fluctuations. This in theory ensures a neutral and stable multi-annual path to public expenditure, reducing the probability of severe adjustments and bringing in practice some certainty to the execution of public projects and programmes.

This rule was first applied in a period of negative output gap (the cyclical component of the budget was negative until 2003 with a maximum level of 1,7% of GDP in 2002. See table 2). In 2004, the rule showed its strength, being applied in the upper size of the business cycle when pressures to spend are bigger. A basic requirement is then fulfilled: fiscal policy's neutrality throughout the complete business cycle. The authorities anticipate that the sum of fiscal surpluses for the period 2004-2005 will be greater than fiscal deficits for the period 2000-2003, which confirms that the rule is operating symmetrically within the cycle. Resources will be placed in deposits in the Copper Compensation Fund (CCF), and used in part to reduce external public debt. At the end of 2005, the CCF should recover his before Asian crisis level, being able to finance budget in case of a reversion of the present phase of high prices of copper.

[5] See for example Martner, Tromben (2003) for a recent analysis.

[6] The tax stabilization funds (Argentina, Peru), or commodities stabilization funds (Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, México) are in fact anti-cyclical policies. In Peru, the resources of the Fondo de Estabilización Fiscal (the fiscal surplus of public sector at the end of the year) will be used to pay external debt when their amount is superior to 2% of GDP; in Ecuador, 70% of the resources of the Oil stabilization Fund will be used to pre-pay debt and cancel liabilities with the Institute of Social Security; in Chile, non expected incomes from Copper sales are accumulated in the Fondo de Compensación, that can either increase international reserves or be used to pre-pay external debt (see Ilpes, 2004, for more details). But the existence of these funds is not enough to ensure neutral or anti-cyclical policies. As a matter of fact, legislative limitations of public expenditure growth (3.5% per year in real terms in Ecuador and Peru, for example) tend to impose a descendent path to public expenditure in terms of GDP, if trend growth is higher, and hence these kind of policies are not neutral.

Table 2

CHILE: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TRADITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL BALANCES

(as % of GDP)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004/e	2005/b
Traditional balance	2.0	0.4	-2.1	-0.7	-0.6	-1.3	-0.4	1.9	1.2
Total cyclical component	1.2	-0.2	-1.3	-0.8	-1.4	-1.7	-1.2	1.0	0.3
Of which:									
Tax revenues	1.0	0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4	-0.7	-0.8	-0.6	-0.5
Cupper	0.2	-0.7	-0.9	-0.4	-1.0	-1.0	-0.4	1.6	0.7
Structural balance	0.8	0.6	-0.8	0.1	0.9	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.0

Source: DIPRES (2004): "Informe de finanzas públicas. Proyecto de Ley de Presupuesto del sector público para el año 2005", Santiago de Chile. **Notes**: e: estimated; b: budgeted

Box 1

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL BALANCE RULE IN CHILE

With the 2001 budget law, the Chilean government made official the decision of driving a fiscal policy rule based on the fulfillment of a structural budget surplus equivalent to 1% of GDP. The basic idea of a structural budget balance is to exclude cyclical components of the budget in order to give to the fiscal policy its stabilization function. To achieve the implementation of the rule the government needs:

- The estimation of the potential output. This is done through a Cobb-Douglass production function. Since 2002, a committee of 14 external experts has been created and each member of this committee gives every year an estimation of the inputs for the production function (gross fixed capital formation, labour force and total productivity factor). An average of the experts' estimations is made excluding the extreme values. In order to enhance transparency to the process, the Budget Direction publishes in its web site the meetings minutes.

- The estimation of the long-term copper price. This estimation is also made through a committee formed by 10 external experts. An average of each expert's estimation is made excluding the extreme values in order to obtain a representative indicator.

- The estimation of the cyclical components of the budget. The calculation of the cyclically adjusted tax revenues and social security contributions is realized adjusting effective revenues proportionally to the output gap. This proportion is derived from output elasticity (ε) estimated to 1,05. The copper cyclical component ($IC_{s,t}$), is estimated considering physical sales from CODELCO (the copper state enterprise) and the price cyclical variations.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that there is no cyclical component of the budget for expenditures. The calculation of the structural budget balance ($B_{s,t}$) is obtained starting from the convencional balance, making to it accounting adjustments to obtain the adjusted balance (BA_t) and deducting the cyclical components of tax revenues and copper revenues:

$$B_{s,t} = BA_t - T_t + (T_t * (\frac{Y_t^*}{Y_t})^{\varepsilon}) - IC_t + IC_{s,t}$$

The elaboration of the budget respecting the fiscal policy rule requires every year the determination of the maximum growth of cyclically adjusted expenditure compatible to the structural budget surplus of 1 % of GDP. To do that it is necessary to have structural revenue projections. Based on these projections it is therefore possible to elaborate the budget.

Source: Dirección de Presupuesto (several documents).

As it can be seen in table 3, Chile has implemented the GFSM 2001 framework for its fiscal statistics. Although the gross operating balance will probably be soon a familiar indicator for analysts and public opinion, it is doubtful that it will be an explicit fiscal goal. The change from cash accounting to accruals, which required a different treatment of the Copper Compensation Fund. In addition, rules covers General Government operations, as public enterprises accounting are presented separately. The NFPS coverage is not published as such, but all the information is available to proceed to consolidation.

Table 9

CHILE: STATEMENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS: 1987-2003

(As % of GDP)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Transactions affecting net worth																	
Revenues	26.2	25.8	26.0	23.0	22.4	22.4	21.9	21.3	21.7	21.8	21.6	21.1	20.4	21.6	21.8	21.1	21.3
Tax revenues	17.9	15.2	14.7	14.0	15.9	16.3	16.9	16.2	15.6	16.7	16.3	16.4	15.7	16.5	16.6	16.7	16.3
Gross revenues from Copper	2.5	5.8	6.8	4.7	2.3	1.9	0.8	1.4	2.4	1.3	1.3	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.9
Social security contributions	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5
Grants	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2
Property income	1.6	1.3	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6
Sales of goods and services	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Other revenues	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.1
Expense	23.6	21.0	19.4	18.5	18.4	17.6	17.6	16.8	15.8	16.4	16.4	17.3	18.9	19.1	19.0	18.9	18.4
Compensation of employees	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.8	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3
Use of goods and services	3.2	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.7
Interest	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.2	2.9	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Subsidies and grants	5.8	4.6	4.6	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.8	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.9	5.7
Social benefits	6.8	6.2	5.8	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.5	4.8	4.7	5.0	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.4
Other expense	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Gross operating balance	2.6	4.8	6.6	4.5	4.0	4.7	4.3	4.5	5.9	5.4	5.2	3.8	1.5	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.9
Transactions in non-financial assets																	
Net acquisition of non-financial assets	2.4	2.8	2.5	2.0	2.2	2.6	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3
Sales of fixed assets	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Investment	2.2	2.4	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.0
Capital transfers	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
Total Revenues	**26.5**	**26.1**	**26.2**	**23.1**	**22.5**	**22.5**	**22.0**	**21.4**	**21.8**	**21.8**	**21.7**	**21.1**	**20.4**	**21.7**	**21.8**	**21.1**	**21.3**
Total Expense	**26.3**	**24.1**	**22.1**	**20.7**	**20.8**	**20.3**	**20.5**	**19.9**	**18.7**	**19.6**	**19.6**	**20.7**	**22.5**	**22.3**	**22.3**	**22.3**	**21.7**
Net lending / Borrowing	**0.2**	**2.0**	**4.1**	**2.4**	**1.8**	**2.1**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**3.1**	**2.2**	**2.1**	**0.4**	**-2.1**	**-0.6**	**-0.5**	**-1.2**	**-0.4**

Source: Dirección de Presupuesto (2004): "Estadísticas de las finanzas públicas. 1987-2003", Santiago de Chile

-México: Traditional Balance and public-private partnerships

In the case of Mexico, the institutional coverage used for the presentation of the traditional fiscal balance is the central nonfinancial public sector. It includes the federal government and nonfinancial entities that produce goods and services for the market and/or nonprofit enterprises (*parastate*). Several ordinances and particular budget practices can explain the fact that the traditional fiscal balance does not reveal the real borrowing requirements of the central nonfinancial public sector. As of the first semester of 2001, the *Secretaría de Hacienda y Credito público* began to present two fiscal indicators showing in a more integrated way the borrowing requirements of the central nonfinancial public sector. The first one is the "public sector borrowing requirements" (PSBR) and the second the "historical balance of borrowing requirements" (HBBR)[7]. PSBR measure the financing needs of public entities and of private and social entities that act on behalf of the government. The PSBR indicators include, among others, the traditional fiscal balance; IPAB's (Instituto de Protección al Ahorro Bancario) borrowing requirements net of federal's government's transfers; private financing of public investment projects (PIDIREGAS) and the borrowing requirements of the toll road rescue program (FARAC), among others. Calculations of these indicators are presented in table 4.

The RFSP and SHRP indicators represent only indicative fiscal figures. Therefore, Mexican authorities will continue using the traditional public balance as the relevant fiscal indicator to budgetary commitments. Moreover, internal and external net indebtedness ceiling authorized by the congress are consistent with the traditional measure of fiscal balance.

Table 4

MEXICO: PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING REQUIREMENTS, 2003

(% of GDP)

1. Traditional fiscal balance	-0.62
2. Borrowing requirements from PIDIREGAS	-1.08
3. Borrowing requirements from IPAB	-0.30
4. Adjustments to budgetary entries	-0.09
5. Borrowing requirements from FARAC	-0.04
6. Debtor support programs	0.01
7. Borrowing requirements from development banks and public funds	-0.40
8. PSBR (1+2+3+4+5+6+7)	-2.52
9. Non-recurrent revenues	0.69
10. PSBR not including non-recurrent revenues (8-9)	-3.21

Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2004): "Balance fiscal en México: definición y metodología"

The interest for public and private partnerships (PPP) has been growing in Latin American countries[8]. Nevertheless, the concept of PPP is not easy to define. Most of the time, confusion exists between PPP and privatizations or concessions that can lead to contingent liabilities. In a recent report published by the IMF, PPPs are defined as "arrangements where the private sector

[7] See *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (2004): "Balance fiscal en México: definición y metodología"

[8] Brazil is making legislative modification to enhance this kind of investment and Mexico is seeking to generalize this partnership association.

supplies infrastructure assets and services that have been traditionally provided by the public sector." These operations include the construction and management of hospitals, schools, prisons, highways, tunnels, bridges, railways, air traffic control systems, etc.

In Mexico, the concept of PPP is used for those projects involving the public and private sectors participation. Most common used types of public-private associations in Mexico are: concessions (roads, water treatment, etc.), outsourcing and PIDIREGAS. Borrowing requirements for long-term infrastructure projects (PIDIREGAS, for *PEMEX* and *CFE*, state-owned enterprise of petrol and electricity).) are derived from projects that can be financed by themselves and have an economic impact once they are realized. Their budgetary registration is deferred across time according to legal arrangements from the Budget Law (article 18 of the General Law of Public Debt and article 30 from the Budget Law). The private sector executes these projects on behalf of the public sector and frequently obtains financial resources covering the costs during the project execution period. Infrastructure projects realized under this modality correspond to prioritary and strategic activities and should have a demonstrated income-yield capacity in order that revenues generated from sales of goods and services should be sufficient to cover financial obligations.

In contrast to the traditional balance, PSBR record the project's financing requirements when it is carried out by the private sector, when a commitment is generated by the public sector and the public policy has a direct impact on the aggregate demand. PBBR do not record the project's financing when it is concluded and the federal government begins to amortize it, as it is stated in budgetary rules. Borrowing requirements are estimated for direct investment projects realized by the private sector during the accounting year. The PIDIREGAS's scheme is based on a simple formula, making agreements with the private sector or the external sector which have to restitute ownership to the public entity once the works have ended. Once the ownership's transfer is realized the government assumes as a direct liability payments realized in advance, and the rest is assumed as a contingent liability.

The extent of this practice is illustrated in graph 7 for period 1998-2003, representing in this last year the same amount than traditional public investment. For this reason, the downward trend of budgeted public investment is misleading. Nevertheless, fiscal authorities consider that *Pidiregas* does not represent an advantage anymore, since amortization is similar to new investment. In the future, the budgetary channel sould be used to keep in line traditional balance.

Graph 7

PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN MEXICO

(As % of GDP)



Source: Ibarra (2003).

A particular case of PPPs is constituted by those long-term projects related to rendering of services (PPS). Mexican authorities have launched this kind of PPPs in the education and health sectors. The objective is to establish long-term contracts to private suppliers who are in charge of building infrastructures. Based on the experience of the United Kingdom (PFI), PPSs' basic characteristics are: i) the government assigns a contract to the private investor who have to provide services for a period superior to 15 years; ii) assets' ownership could be from private investor or from a public entity; iii) once services have been supplied with satisfaction, government realizes corresponding payments. The investment potential amount is quite important: US$ 780 million in projects in Transport and Communications sector, US$ 300 million in Health sector; US$ 230 million in Education sector.

As it can be observed, with PPS that will be implemented in Mexico, accounting is similar to the private sector: annually part of the investment is recorded in fiscal accounts, including maintenance expenses. As this initiative concerns "pure" public goods investments, it represents a real and attracting alternative to reduce anti-public investment bias.

- The calculation of public debt in Brazil

Another example is the presentation od public debt in Brazil. The Federal government (defined as direct and indirect administration, public social security system, and non financial federal public funds) gross debt is composed by national government liabilities held by sub-national governments, public and private financial system, non financial private sector and the rest of the world. Obligations linked to the external sector are converted to reales with the exchange rate at the end of the period. Values of Federal government gross debt are recorded considering portfolio positions without taking into account operations of the Central bank. The items of the Federal government net debt (36% of GDP) in 2003 are:

- Securities issued by the National Treasury - Federal domestic public debt constituted by public bonds issued by the National Treasury recorded in the Electronic Settlement and Custody System (SELIC) and those under the custody of the Central Office for Private Securities (CETIP) placed and redeemed in Brazilian currency, including securities at the Central Bank's portfolio;

- Bank debt - Loans and financing granted by financial institutions to the non-financial public sector.

- Bank debt of decentralized agencies - Loans and financing granted by financial institutions to entities of indirect administration (governmental agencies, universities, foundations, etc).

- Social Securities deposits and investments - Corresponds to the public securities investment portfolio of the Social Security.

- Certificates of privati zation (CP) - Securities issued by the National Treasury and usable in the purchase of shares of state-owned enterprises within the framework of the National Privatization Program.

- Debts of the Union and of state-owned enterprises, assumed and renegotiated by the federal government and securitized through the issuance of securities registered with the CETIP.

- Agricultural debt securities (TDA) on the market - Securities backed by the INCRA/MA issued by the National Treasury in land expropriation procedures for agrarian reform.

- FAT investments in public securities -Worker Protection Fund investments in National Treasury securities.

- Investments of various funds - Refers to investments of public funds other than financial intermediaries in federal securities.

- Law 8727/93 - Debt of states, municipalities, and public enterprises at 6/30/93, refinanced by the Union under Law 8727/93.

- External debt - Short-, medium- and long-term external public debt.

Federal government debt is disseminated as net and gross with a monthly periodicity, and the difference between them was 15 points of GDP in 2003 for Federal government. The net consolidated public sector debt (which is composed by General government, Central bank and public non financial enterprises) corresponds to net debt of National government (Federal government and Central bank) plus net debt of local and intermediate government with national government, public and private financial system, non financial private sector and the rest of the world. Social security public system and public funds are also included. The resulting stock is adjusted in order to obtain the concept of net fiscal debt: privatization adjustments, patrimonial

adjustments, external debt adjustments (for exchange rate fluctuations) and domestic debt adjustments (also for exchange rate fluctuations when domestic debt is indexed to the US dollar). Finally, the question surges: which is the appropriate data?

Sin duda, los ajustes realizados sobre la deuda externa y la deuda interna son relevantes, pues dan cuenta del tremendo impacto del tipo de cambio sobre las variables medidas en moneda doméstica como porcentaje del PIB. En tal sentido, se trata de una medición similar al saldo estructural aplicado a la deuda pública, pues muestra lo que sería su evolución si no hubiesen fluctuaciones cambiarias, consideradas en este caso como transitorias.

Table 6

Public Debt in Brazil

(en % de PIB)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Net debt National Government	25.0	29.8	30.6	32.8	35.3	36.2	32.4
Federal Government	25.6	29.6	29.8	33.4	35.7	36.6	32.9
Central Bank	-0.6	0.2	0.8	-0.6	-0.4	-0.4	-0.5
Gross Debt General Government	54.8	58.5	64.5	70.6	71.4	76.9	71.8
Net Debt General Government	39.8	45.7	45.9	51.7	54.2	56.1	51.4
Federal Government	25.6	29.6	29.8	33.4	35.7	36.6	32.9
States and counties	14.2	16.1	16.1	18.3	18.5	19.8	18.9
Net Debt Consolidated Public Sector (A)	41.7	48.7	48.8	52.6	55.5	57.2	51.6
General Government	39.8	45.7	45.9	51.7	54.2	56.1	51.4
Central Bank	-0.6	0.2	0.8	-0.6	-0.4	-0.4	-0.5
Non financial public enterprises	2.6	2.8	2.2	1.6	1.7	1.1	0.2
Privatization adjustment (B)	-3.2	-3.7	-5.1	-4.8	-4.0	-4.0	-3.5
Ajuste patrimonial (C)	3.3	4.2	4.6	6.2	5.8	5.8	5.4
Methodological adjustment on external debt (D)	0.6	3.3	3.8	4.4	8.0	6.4	5.2
Methodological adjustment on internal debt (E)	0.7	4.4	4.9	6.0	9.6	8.1	6.8
Net Fiscal Debt (A-B-C-D-E)	40.3	40.5	40.6	40.8	36.1	40.9	37.7

Source: Central Bank of brazil

These three examples show, on one hand, that accounting imagination is widespread in the region, and on the other hand that the manner of presenting information is not neutral, but closely associated to policy objectives. In that sense, the conduct of fiscal policy will be very different according to the fiscal indicator. The traditional concepts of cash balance and debt stock are highly pro-cyclical, leading to a public investment bias. In the present situation of economic recover, it is then urgent to develop alternative fiscal indicators that enhance the medium term perspective of fiscal policy.

4. Indicators of the "quality" of public expenditure

Whereas development objectives were typically cast in terms of economic growth and income distribution, in recent years the primary goal has been poverty reduction. International Financial Organizations have promoted "pro-poor budgeting" initiatives. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative represented a unique opportunity, re-directing interest savings from external debt reduction to social expenditure. As part of conditionality, donors required governments to identify and increase the share of "pro-poor" expenditure. A recent review confirmed that, for 26 countries, 65% of resources were allocated to social expenditure (health and education), and the rest to agriculture, social networks, infrastructure and governance, among others.

There is however growing concern in relying so heavily on social spending to achieve poverty reduction targets. Some studies find that a better balance between social and other sectors like infrastructure and rural development would be desirable, in order to ensure positive effects on growth, a necessary condition for sustained poverty reduction.. As stressed by a recent evaluation: "most PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Stategy Papers) fall short on providing a strategic

roadmap for policy making, focusing in the composition of public expenditures, especially social sector spending, with much less emphasis on other aspects of a broader strategy to encourage poverty-reducing growth"[9]. Even if experiences refer mostly to low income countries, these conclusions are reasonable to middle-income Latin-American countries. As it can be seen, it is not straightforward to relate public expenditure composition to poverty reduction, income distribution and economic growth.

The discussion becomes more complex when target is growth. For example, member States of the European Union, as part of the strategy defined in Lisbon in 2000, have agreed on the recommendation to "enhance the contribution of public sector to growth by redirecting, i.e. while respecting overall budgetary constraints, public expenditure towards growth-enhancing cos-effective investment in physical and human capital and knowledge". It is hence necessary to make assumptions as to which expenditure items are considered productive. The empirical research into the effects of specific expenditures categories has come to a degree of consensus in the European Union, showing that on average education, R&D and infrastructure investment are more productive than others. Of course, the outcomes not only depends on the amount of public expenditure, but in its cost-effectiveness or "value for money".

In any case, these brief considerations show that it is very difficult to fix priorities in budgeting, even when targets of poverty reduction are set. Having a look to the functional classification of public expenditures (table 6), it can be appreciated that it is a hard task to establish a hierarchy of expenditures without taking into account specific situations of each country. Even if the importance of allocating resources to the diverse categories of social protection is out of discussion, it seems dangerous to proceed by causing detriment to other items, equally significant in social and economic development.

Table 6

Functional Classification of Public expenditures (COFOG)

Description	Social Protection
1. General public services	1. Sickness and disability
2. Defense	2. Old age
3. Public order and safety	3. Survivors
4. Economic Affairs	4. Family and children
5. Environment Protection	5. Unemployment
6. Housing and community amenities	6. Social housing
7. Health	7. Social exclusion
8. Recreation, culture and religion	8. Others
9. Education	
10. Social Protection	

Source: United Nations

[9] Ver IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2004): "Report on the Evaluation of poverty reduction strategy papers and the poverty reduction and growth facility".

When speaking about the "quality" of public expenditure, in macroeconomic terms, the components can be divided into four different categories, according to their presumed impact on economic efficiency, which a combination of the economic and functional categories. Efficient spending are the components defined as having positive effects on growth and employment. The empirical evidence tend to show that the effects of public spending vary according to its composition, are positive in moderate ranges and can become rapidly negative if limits are exceeded (see European Commission, 2002, for a detailed discussion of this taxonomy). This non linear relationship between public expenditure and growth is illustrated in figure 1, with the following four categories:

Figure 1

Quality and efficiency of public spending



- Category 1: interest payments, represented by the line AF in the graph; spending always negatively affect growth and employment as these resources could be used for productive resources.
- Category 2: collective consumption, wages of public employees, old-age and survivors expenditures, and is represented by line AE. Generally, empirical evidence show that these expenditures are efficient to a certain limit. Beyond that boundary, their growth can have negative effects on savings, investment and growth.
- Category 3: disability, social exclusion, housing, family and children allowances, unemployment transfers, and is represented by line CD. Low spending hinders efficiency, as it inhibit participation rates of women and excluded persons. A certain level of unemployment transfers can also be efficient as labor market becomes more flexible and

employment protection can be reduced. Once again, this relation is non-linear; at a certain point this kind of spending has a negative effect on macroeconomic efficiency.

- Category 4: education, active labour market policies, health, R&D, gross fixed capital formation, represented by line AB. This kind of expenditures is almost always positive to growth, with a much higher turning point than the other categories.

As any typology, this classification is somewhat arbitrary and has many limitations and caveats. It is nevertheless useful for three purposes. The first is to emphasize the non linear path of the macroeconomic effects of public sector spending. It is hence nonsense to ban based on efficiency reasons any expansion of public spending, nor betting that it is the unique engine of economic and social development. It appears clearly that for most Latin-American countries, la pendiente de las categories 2 and 3 are positive; the level of public expenditure is sub-optimal, even if there can be productivity gains.

The second is to propose a more illustrative differentiation than economic and functional classifications. The mere distinction between current and capital expenditures, albeit important, is not sufficient to accomplish social and economic policies[10]. Referring to functional classification, the tendency to protect social spending can be distorting, as discussed, when it is recognized that economic growth and job creation have a very important role to play in poverty reduction.

The third purpose of this classification is it can illustrate a medium term sequence to enhance the quality of public expenditures, first of all by reducing interest payments, which in some countries of the region can represent 50% of the approved budget. With those levels of interest payments, the priority must be to ensure a sustainable path of public debt, and only then using these remaining resources to invest in physical and human capital.

In the last five years social spending grew significantly (see the Social Panorama of CEPAL). Moreover, social spending has redirected to investment in capital human (health and education), which has more pronounced effects on income distribution and growth. It is urgent to stimulate as Cepal has emphasized[11] infrastructure and research and development expenses, aimed at compensate the alarming reductions of these categories in recent fiscal adjustment episodes.

To sum up, as in other regions, the improving of the quality of public spending in Latin American Countries means sustained investment in physical and human capital, as well as knowledge. Some progress has been made in the social front, but is it important to continue the efforts of diminishing interest payments, while accelerating spending in physical capital and knowledge. As the information referring to the functional classification of spending is not available, it is not possible at this stage to elaborate this synthetic indicator of the quality of expenditures.[12].

[10] The so called golden rule is very difficult to implement, as it can distort the changing balance between expenditures as priorities and targets do evolve.
[11] See CEPAL, 2004: "Productive development in open economies".
[12] CEPAL is trying to compile all available information, so may be in a short period it will be possible to include this kina of indicators in the analysis of public budget.

Conclusions and recommendationss

Countries should make progress in the following points:

1. Make progress in the General Government coverage, both in accounting and targeting. The lack of consolidation of transfers between central and sub-national governments impedes a general vision of public finances.
2. Implement the new manual of Government Finance Statistics, which is a long and expensive task, especially in terms of accrual accounting.
3. Include officially measures of cyclically adjusted balances, to reflect the effects of macroeconomic environment in public finance
4. Report the magnitudes and types of PPPs.
5. Improve information and budget projections concerning functional classification.

These tasks are expensive, as they require qualified human resources. May be a result of the network could be to stimulate initiatives to improve fiscal accounting transparency. As there are no specialized organisms in fiscal statistics in the region, may be CEPAL could have a technical role aimed at improve the understanding of public accounts of authorities, analysts an public opinion in general.

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Appendix. Table 1

PUBLIC FINANCES STAISTICS: INSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE

País	Gobierno central	Gobierno general	Sector público no financiero	Fuentes de información	Metodología
Argentina	X		X	Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto del Ministerio de Economía.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base caja y devengado.
Bolivia	X	X	X	Ministerio de Hacienda, UDAPE, Banco central.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base devengado excepto algunas transacciones que se registran en base caja.
Brasil	X	X	X	Secretaria do Tesoro Nacional y Banco central.	Metodología mixta entre clasificación económica y funcional. Registro: base caja para transacciones del Gobierno central (excepto pago de intereses que se registran en base devengado). Registro de las transacciones de los Estados y Municipios: en base devengado.
Chile	X	X	Empresas públicas	Dirección de Presupuesto del Ministerio de Hacienda.	MEFP 2001. Registro: base devengado.
Colombia	X		X	Ministerio de Hacienda (CONFIS) y Banco central.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base caja.
Costa Rica	X	X	X	Autoridad presupuestaria del Ministerio de Hacienda.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base caja.
Ecuador	X		X	Banco central.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base devengado (SPNF) y base caja (GC).
El Salvador	X	X	X	Banco central de Reserva.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base caja.
Guatemala	X			Ministerio de Finanzas	MEFP 1986. Registro: sistema mixto.
Haití	X		X		
Honduras	X		X		MEFP 1986. Registro: base devengado.
México	X		X	Secretaría de hacienda y crédito público.	MEFP 1986 con algunos aspectos particulares a México. Registro: base caja modificada.
Nicaragua	X	X	X	Banco central.	MEFP 1986.
Panamá	X		X	Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas.	MEFP 1986. Registro: sistema mixto (ingresos en base caja y gastos en base vencimiento de pago).
Paraguay	X		X	Ministerio de Hacienda.	MEFP 1986. Registro: sistema mixto para SPNF y base caja para Administración central.
Perú	X	X	X	Banco central de Reserva.	MEFP 1986. Registro: sistema mixto para gobierno central y gobierno general, base caja para operaciones de las empresas públicas no financieras.
R. Dominicana	X			Banco central y Secretaría de Finanzas.	MEFP 1986. Registro: sistema mixto.
Uruguay	X	X	X	Ministerio de Economía y Banco central.	MEFP1986. Registro: sistema mixto para gobierno general (MEF), base caja para gobierno central, El Banco central publica además estadísticas con criterio "por debajo de la línea" para todas las coberturas.
Venezuela	X		X	Oficina de Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas del Ministerio de Finanzas.	MEFP 1986. Registro: base caja.

Fuente: CEPAL, sobre la base de información oficial.

Table 2

AMERICA LATINA: COFOG

País	Administración central	Gobierno central	Gobierno general	Sector público
Argentina	CGF1980 (80-02)			CGF1980 (80-02)
Bolivia	CGF1980 (90-03)			GS (95-03)
Brasil			CFG (80-04)	
Chile		CGF2000 (87-03)		
Colombia				
Costa Rica				CFG1980 (87-02)
Ecuador		CSG (86-04)		
El Salvador				
Guatemala	CFG1980 (95-04)			
Haití				
Honduras				
México	CFG			
Nicaragua				
Panamá				
Paraguay	CGC			
Perú				
R. Dominicana	CFG1980 (95-04)			
Uruguay				
Venezuela	CFG1980 (99-02)			

Fuente: CEPAL, sobre la base de información oficial.

Notas explicativas: **GS**: gasto social; **CFG2000**: clasificación funcional del gasto según Naciones Unidas (2000); **CGF1980**: clasificación funcional del gasto según metodología Naciones Unidas (1980). **CFG**: clasificación funcional del gasto según otra metodología. **CSG**: Clasificación sectorial del gasto público.

Table 3
TAX INCOME INFORMATION

País	Datos anuales	Datos mensuales	Cobertura	Fuentes de información
Argentina	1990	1997	GC, GG	Subsecretaría de Ingresos Públicos
Bolivia	1990	Año en curso	GC, GG	UDAPE, Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales
Brasil	1985	1994	GC, GG	Secretaría de Receita
Chile	1987	Año en curso y anterior	GC	Dirección de Presupuestos
Colombia	1995	2001	GC	Ministerio de Hacienda, DIAN
Costa Rica	1987		GC	Ministerio de Hacienda
Ecuador	1990	Año en curso	GC	Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Servicio de Rentas Internas
El Salvador				
Guatemala	1995	1995	GC	Ministerio de Finanzas Públicas y Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria
Haití				
Honduras				
México	1990	1990	GC, GG	Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público
Nicaragua				
Panamá	1990	1995	GC, GG	Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Dirección General de Ingresos
Paraguay	1980		GC	Ministerio de Hacienda
Perú	1998	1998	GC	Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas y Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria
R. Dominicana	1992	Año en curso y dos anteriores	GC	Banco Central y Dirección General de Impuestos Internos
Uruguay	1982	Año en curso y anterior	GC	Dirección General de Impuestos
Venezuela	1996	Año en curso y anterior	GC	Ministerio de Finanzas y Servicio Nacional Integrado de Administración Tributaria y Aduanera

Fuente: CEPAL, sobre la base de información oficial.
Nota: GC: gobierno central; GG: gobierno general.

Table 4

BUDGETARY INFORMATION

País	Disponibilidad Proyecto Ley	Proyecciones macroeconómicas	Estimaciones de ingresos y gastos	Cobertura	Información años anteriores
Argentina	X	X	X	SPN	X
Bolivia	NO				
Brasil	X	X	X	GC, SP	X
Chile	X	X	X	GC	X
Colombia	X	X	X	GC	X
Costa Rica	X	X	X	GC	X
Ecuador	X	X	X	GC e INSS	X
El Salvador	X	X	X	GC	X
Guatemala	X	X	X	GC	X
Haití					
Honduras	X	X	Poco detalle	GC	X
México	X	X	X	SP	X
Nicaragua	X	X		GC	X
Panamá	X	X		GC, SPNF	
Paraguay					
Perú	X	X	X	GC, GG, SPNF	X
R. Dominicana					
Uruguay					
Venezuela	X	X	X	GC	X

Fuente: CEPAL, sobre la base de información oficial.
Nota: GC: gobierno central; GG: gobierno general; SP: sector público; SPNF: sector público no financiero; INSS: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social