


ENCUENTROS



Cultural Capital and its Impact on Development

Lecture by

Camilo Herrera

Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values

From an article by

Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker

Culture Industries and the Development Crisis in Latin America

Lecture by

Néstor García Canclini

IDB CULTURAL CENTER

General Coordination and Visual Arts: Félix Angel

General Coordination Assistance: Soledad Guerra

Concerts and Lectures: Anne Vena

Cultural Development in the Field: Elba Agusti

IDB Art Collection: Gabriela Moragas and Susannah Rodee



The IDB Cultural Center was created in 1992 by Enrique V. Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Center has two primary objectives: 1) to contribute to social development by administering a grants program that sponsors and co-finances small-scale cultural projects that will have a positive social impact in the region, and 2) to promote a better image of the IDB member countries, with emphasis on Latin America and the Caribbean, through culture and increased understanding between the region and the rest of the world, particularly the United States.

Cultural programs at headquarters feature new as well as established talent from the region. Recognition granted by Washington, D.C. audiences and press often helps propel the careers of new artists. The Center also sponsors lectures on Latin American and Caribbean history and culture, and supports cultural undertakings in the Washington, D.C. area for the local Latin American and Caribbean communities, such as Spanish-language theater, film festivals, and other events.

The IDB Cultural Center *Exhibitions* and the *Concerts and Lectures Series* stimulate dialogue and a greater knowledge of the culture of the Americas. The *Cultural Development in the Field* funds projects in the fields of youth cultural development, institutional support, restoration and conservation of cultural patrimony, and the preservation of cultural traditions. The *IDB Art Collection*, gathered over several decades, is managed by the Cultural Center and reflects the relevance and importance the Bank has achieved after four decades as the leading financial institution concerned with the development of Latin America and the Caribbean.

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CULTURAL CAPITAL AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

Camilo Herrera

The Cultural Center of the Inter-American Development Bank, under the direction of Félix Angel, has organized this series of presentations on “Culture and Development” in order to expand the discussion on the importance of cultural processes in the economic development of nations. This initiative, it is worth emphasizing, is an example of the importance that the Cultural Center has acquired within the IDB itself, which confirms that cultural issues transcend strictly artistic activities. In the same way, the collaboration between the IDB’s Department of Sustainable Development and the Social, Educational and Cultural Development Unit of the Organization of American States (OAS) underscores the importance and relevance of multilateral cooperation in academic spheres. I extend my thanks to all of you, and especially to Anne Vena, for the creation of this space in which to explore and debate the question of culture and development.

One of the most vexing questions for economists all over the world is why countries have different patterns of development. In fact, the book that established

the foundations of this social science discipline is entitled *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. When Adam Smith wrote his book at the end of the 18th century, no one imagined that his concern would be shared by innumerable social thinkers.

Today, the economic phenomena of nations can be compared, thanks to the great quantity of indicators that economists have developed, but these are laid out for us in ways that are at times so complex as to be incomprehensible. Daily we hear in the media that the gross domestic product of a nation has risen in stable proportion to its population growth; then we hear that the Dow Jones Industrial Average took a fall that may be attributed to a rise in the NASDAQ, or that there is concern at the United Nations because the Index of Human Development varies greatly from one country to another.

All of this information, which is presented to us in technical language, derives from the many attempts to find a means to measure the wealth of a nation.

In the last few years, measurements of another type have garnered force in the

Cultural Capital and its Impact on Development was presented at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, D.C. on October 11, 2001 as the Inaugural Lecture of a series on “Culture & Development” of the IDB Cultural Center Lectures Program, and in collaboration with the OAS.

academic world. These measurements are attempts to quantify the conditions in which people live, as well as intangible human abilities and capacities. Economics has progressed from expressing itself in monetary units—dollars, euros or pesos—to speaking in terms of knowledge, confidence, and the ability to work collaboratively. The concept of “intangible capital” entered sociological discourse in order to explicate the complex world of economic development.

Today, economists drawn to theories on human capital and social capital are moving away from monetary units and entering the field of qualitative measurement. Now we hear it said that low confidence reduces the capacity to work collaboratively, and that that triggers a deceleration in economic growth.

What has led economists to focus on the intangible? Perhaps it is that the great social questions of today cannot be explained in terms of numbers. The classic authors emphasized the importance of the intangible: Weber talked of religions; Smith of the “invisible hand”; and Malthus about scarcity—induced infertility. In our day we hear Ingelhart talk about values, Fukuyama discourse on confidence, and North emphasize institutions. Economics has, without a doubt, crossed the line to the intangible.

Social capital—understood as the capacity for interaction toward common objectives, and human capital—understood as the level of acquired productive training, have begun to clarify, with great dynamism, the differences between different societies. But both theories lead to the same questions: *Why do people not collaborate?* and, *Why do people fail to acquire productive training?* Both questions aim to

illuminate why the inhabitants of different countries act so dissimilarly. And the answer is that this is due to cultural variances.

Culture is the array of collective expressions particular to a society, expressions that range from the political to the folkloric, that encompass the complexity of what it means to be human. Culture is everything the inhabitants of a place hold in common; and that which is shared by one people is not necessarily shared by others.

Now another question arises: why are cultures so different? In order to respond, we must refer to two distinct phenomena that exercise an effect on nations.

First, there is the country’s “geo-reference.” Every nation belongs to a hemisphere and a continent, and this confers specific traits that influence its productivity. Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the economic income of a population and its place of residence. Although it may seem strange, this study demonstrates that the inhabitants of countries not located in tropical latitudes have an income four times higher than the inhabitants of tropical countries. The vertical axis represents the latitudes where these countries are found, zero (0) being the equator; the horizontal axis represents the per-person income level. This function, which derives from a research study, shows that the change in seasons favors economic development. In regions where the seasons change every three months, personal needs and the demand for consumer items vary on a trimester basis, which obliges the industrial sector to changes its lines of production in order to adjust to consumer needs.

This particular trimester cycle is ob-

served in zones far away from the tropics. In the torrid zones, the cycles appear to be annual, and so the population's needs are not continually changing.

The aforesaid demonstrates that a country's "geo-reference" plays a fundamental role in its development, not so much because of its location *per se*, but rather because location determines people's needs. In addition to these changes, the inhabitants of regions where the seasons vary are accustomed to saving their resources and to enacting preventive measures with an anticipatory eye toward the future. This is exactly the opposite of what is observed among the inhabitants of the tropics. The geographic location of a society influences the activities and needs of its inhabitants.

Another pertinent indicator is the stability of the social and legal authorities, since every contract implies a balance of rights and obligations.

The most common form of a social contract is the Constitution of a country, whose continuity and stability depend on the conditions of the marketplace. Figure 2 clearly illustrates the connection between the social contract and economic development. The vertical axis shows national per capita income; the horizontal axis indicates the year in which the country's Constitution was established. It is amply evident that there is a direct relation between the age of a country's Constitution and per capita income, which confirms that a stable, sustained institutional environment offers better possibilities for achieving higher development.

The relation described above also derives from the people's needs, since Constitutions represent the contract the State

has with the population to supply common needs; and if the Constitution is old, it demonstrates that the contract has enjoyed general acceptance and inspires citizens' confidence in the system which allows them to make decisions for the middle- and long-term.

In conclusion, personal needs determine the process of economic development. If a person is cold or hot, he will endeavor to satisfy the needs those conditions impose; and if he has other needs, he can seek protection in the existing constitution, which protects his rights in exchange for fulfilling certain obligations. When a person has a need, he is obliged to fulfill it.

What a person expresses is the response to his individual needs; what a society expresses is the response to its collective needs. If there is in fact a connection between a need and its expression, as indeed seems to be the case, then culture is the result of a population's common needs.

Without deliberately intending to do so, we economists have excluded the cultural sector from our studies. I am speaking for myself, but I know that many economists would agree that we came late to appreciate that an artist or a literary text could help us understand the social nucleus we were studying. Today, however, we recognize that culture and artists play a major role in the phenomena of economic transformation and development. We now know that the cave drawings at Altamira allow us to understand the social and economic dimension of a prehistoric society, and that the canvases of Guayasamín, Kahlo and Botero help all of us—non-specialists and specialists alike—to appreciate the complexities of

Latin America.

The artist expresses himself in his work, in the form or medium of his choosing. The artistic goes beyond that which is purely visual, reflecting needs that are common to a whole society. Because culture is an active and essential part of economic development, it is important to measure it. But how does one measure culture? The problem is inherent in its very nature, which is completely different from anything else we have measured thus far. Unlike pieces of sculpture, needs are intangible and their essence is not entirely physical.

Culture is comprised of two major aspects that interact—the tangible and the intangible—and they cannot be separated, for the tangible would not be possible without its opposite; one is the causal agent of the other.

Let us suppose for a moment that a person has a need and wishes to express it through a short story. Normally, the person writes the story, and if the text represents needs common to the society, it will then be reproduced and offered in the marketplace as a book. Its commercial acceptance will be determined by the common concerns expressed in the text. Finally, the sale of the story will bring the author economic capital with which he may satisfy some of his needs. The acquisition of this economic capital was made possible because he had the power of cultural capital.

Cultural capital is the repository of values and expressions common to a society. Its intangible aspect is found in communal values like confidence, happiness, and national pride; its tangible aspect is found in the culture industry, cultural tourism, and cultural services.

Communal values have been amply studied in the context of institutional economics, where the theory of social capital explains many of these interactions. Confidence levels have a close connection to development. Figure 3 allows us to appreciate that a higher level of confidence is associated with a higher level of income. That correlation is derived from the *World Values Survey* of the University of Michigan (United States), and expresses with perfect clarity the relationship between income and confidence: if average income is high, there will be confidence in the market. Nevertheless, this causal relationship makes little sense. It appears rather that economic development occurs when there is a high level of confidence, and that it is confidence that energizes the system thanks to the social contract we mentioned earlier.

Perhaps one of the most direct relations with respect to intangible cultural capital is that between income and happiness, and here the causal factor would appear to be income (Figure 4). Happiness levels in countries are closely connected to income levels, such that if the latter is high, then people have better probabilities of satisfying their needs.

One of the surprising and unexpected findings of this study is that there is an inverse relation between income and national pride (Figure 5). When this relationship was proposed, it was based on the hypothesis that a direct relation between income and national pride would explain the capacity of a country to satisfy its needs. But the results showed an inverse tendency due, perhaps, to the fact that in many cases national pride is subject to conditions of authority and not to

those of a free market. The relation between income and satisfaction with the government (Figure 6) was then studied, and that relation too was shown to defy expectations. Despite this finding, the conclusion reached is that low levels of satisfaction with the government, even when income is high, may derive from humankind's natural state of dissatisfaction, since societies that do not have strong national pride and are not in accordance with their government are those whose needs are satisfied thanks to high levels of income. It follows that a people's attitude toward the State is not dependent on the satisfaction of its needs.

This brief examination of some of the intangible aspects of cultural capital leads us to reflect on the reservoir of values of each country and its close relation to economic development. If a person is confident, happy, and correctly expresses his needs, he will be apt to realize a good income, helping his country along a path of development.

Consequently, intangible phenomena constitute a fundamental part of that which defines a society, and their interactions are increasingly relevant to our discussion. For example, there is a direct relation between confidence and happiness, and this has an impact on the environment in which people interact.

Little is known about tangible cultural capital in the context of cultural industries because debate on the subject has been so profound that it has not advanced very far. UNESCO holds that cultural industries are those that confer royalties on the creators of items of consumption, while the World Bank defends the thesis of a "creativity industry." These

differences have impeded the efforts of some organizations, including the Convenio Andrés Bello and CERLALC, to develop a program of satellite accounts for the cultural sector based on estimates of national production.

In spite of the aforementioned problem, the Convenio Andrés Bello has managed to estimate the contributions of the cultural sector in certain countries (Figure 7). It is clear that the cultural sector is as large as the electricity sector, that it is a strong provider of jobs, and that it promotes regional commercial integration, particularly in industries targeted at Spanish-speaking populations. There is a close relation between economic development and cultural industries (Figure 8) like publishing, music, film, video, television, radio, theatre, visual arts, publicity, press, magazines, and crafts—all sectors that require artists who have identified common needs.

It is an irrefutable fact that there exists a close relation between cultural capital and economic development, whether from the perspective of tangible or intangible capital. Now, how does one generate cultural capital?

The intangible forms of cultural capital arise from a society's reservoir of values. Therefore it follows that there can be no single strategy for the formation of intangible cultural capital, although in every specific case it appears that the process begins with the nation's creation. As we said earlier, culture refers to that which is held in common, that which is shared, and here, precisely, is the root from which a nation is formed. Human beings have a natural desire to form associations in order to satisfy common needs through group effort: herein is born the concept

of the nation. It is essential to identify the conditions, experiences, and values common to the people in each country, in order to develop a strategy for encouraging the creation of intangibles.

The intangible inevitably imposes itself. In many cases, even though political life may be oriented around forging national identity or the formation of certain values, a people's needs always exercise a decisive influence.

The culture industry—in its goods as well as services—is one of the most promising paths to reducing the poverty of developing nations. In Latin America, the fact of a common language helps, perhaps, to mitigate identity differences; in any case, it is the most important means of commercial integration. If a Latin American artist writes a text, the market potentially includes all of South and Central America; the same is true for music, television, film, and periodicals. This competitive advantage derives from two basic conditions: a shared language and common needs throughout the whole region.

On the other hand, one must also acknowledge that consumer tastes are subject to unpredictable factors, and so the “strange” and the “unfamiliar” often find wide acceptance. This is why, all over the world, souvenirs are so popular.

In order to create a culture industry, one must think like an impresario and not in terms of a protectionist State. Cultural goods attract so many consumers, that in a free market this improves the quality of the offerings. In such a case, phenomena that characterize international markets—which have affected many nations—are eliminated, owing to the homogeneity of the products.

The artist must insert himself into the

dynamics of the market so as to generate solid structures that will provide new advantages and better options. A case in point is the cartoonists' guild in Argentina, which succeeded in imposing the rule that half of the cartoons published daily in the country's newspapers must be by Argentine artists. Initially, this law was considered protectionist; nevertheless, today many Argentine cartoonists are famous all over the world.

If the question is, *How does one create cultural capital?* then the answer must point to consolidating a national identity on the basis of commonalities, and to establishing an organized culture industry as an essential axis of the country's foreign trade policies. One must leave behind the aristocratic notions of the Offices of Tourism, which employ the visual arts and other works that feature typical local scenes as part of their international public relations strategy.

A clear example of the importance of cultural capital is seen when an aesthetic phenomenon foments development, as in the cases of Curitiba and Bogotá. The residents were inculcated with an image of their cities as friendly, beautiful, spacious, and humane; this triggered a change in the inhabitants' orientation, which in turn triggered an increase in productivity. When one succeeds in changing intangible attitudes toward and perceptions of commonalities, and when that satisfies shared needs, the benefit exceeds expectations.

Another aspect of the culture industry that is essential for raising the levels of intangible cultural capital is the presence of museums. They contain the nation's living memory, and should be considered dynamic and modern cultural

services, rather than sterile buildings full of objects representative of a history with which the visitor has only a passing familiarity. Museums must be foundational elements in the building of a nation, not only as custodians of the past, but also as sources of education in the present.

In such a dynamic market, the creation of cultural capital requires firm and audacious decisions. It is not enough to teach school children who Bolívar was, unless we also teach them why and for what he fought. Young people must be made to understand that showing faith in their country goes beyond singing the national anthem; it means working day by day in order to meet their individual needs, which are certainly the same as for many of their compatriots. It is equally essential to transform negative ways of thinking about our problems by demonstrating that these represent potential opportunities for development. It is also necessary to distribute local crafts to tourists staying in hotels and to put works by the country's artists in hotel rooms; to promote the creation of artists' organizations to develop strategies for market expansion; to show authors that registering and copyrighting their works brings important economic benefits. In other words, it is imperative to understand that culture must be an active element of the market, and need not lose its distinctive characteristics in order to do so.



The creation of cultural capital, and its integration with and penetration in the markets, is a difficult process and one that takes a certain amount of time. But the first step consists in demonstrating to artists and young people that they can make a living from their art and from their dreams if they identify themselves with



the interests of their whole society and with the needs of others.



In summary, many factors influence economic development, but its base is the cultural composition of societies. Studies show a close parallel between cultural capital, human capital, and social capital. Without culture, there is no development. If we fail to recognize that which we have in common, we will never be able to communicate; and today more than ever we must learn from artists, when the world is on the verge of a conflict between societies with radically different cultures. A month ago today, there occurred a terrorist attack that changed the world; tomorrow we will commemorate Spain's arrival in the New World 509 years ago; and, exactly eleven days ago, a former cultural minister was murdered in Colombia. These three phenomena have brought horror to societies and transformed their cultures, but let us learn from artists, who day by day, through their writings, brush strokes, and eloquent words, give us lessons in tolerance.



Thank you very much.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Andrés Bello', written in a cursive style.









Camilo Herrera was born in Colombia in 1975. He is an economist and Professor of Philosophy at the Universidad Javeriana in Bogota, and pursued studies in specialized negotiations at Harvard University in Boston, Massachusetts. From 1993 to 1995, he was a researcher at the Banco de la República de Colombia, at the National Planning Department of Colombia, and at the United Nations Development Program. During this same period, he was Assistant Professor of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics at the Universidad Javeriana. From 1996 to 1997, he directed economic research at the Fórmulas Corporation, and in 1998 he was a researcher at UNESCO's Observatory of Culture and Economics. In 2000, he became founding director of the Center for Cultural Studies for Political, Economic and Social Development in Bogota.

His books include *Economía cultural, una aproximación teórica al desarrollo mundial* (Alfaomega, 2001); *Social Value Added* (Alfaomega, 2000); and *Consumo Cultural en Bogotá* (Instituto Distrital de Cultura y Turismo, 1998).

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MODERNIZATION, CULTURAL CHANGE, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES

From an article by Ronald Inglehart and Wayne. E. Baker

Well into the twentieth century, modernization was widely viewed as a uniquely Western process that non-Western societies could follow only insofar as they abandoned their traditional cultures and assimilated technologically and morally “superior” Western ways. But during the second half of the century, non-Western societies unexpectedly surpassed their Western role models in key aspects of modernization. East Asia, for example, attained the world’s highest rate economic growth. Using official exchange rates, Japan had the highest per capita income of any major nation in the world, led the world in automobile manufacturing and consumer electronics, and had the world’s highest life expectancy. Today, few observers would attribute moral superiority to the West, and Western economies are no longer assumed to be the model for the world.

A core concept of modernization theory seems valid today: Industrialization produces pervasive social and cultural consequences, from rising educational levels to changing gender roles. Industrialization is seen as the central element of a modernization process that affects most other elements of society.

Our thesis is that economic development has systematic and, to some extent, predictable cultural and political consequences. These consequences are not iron laws of history; they are probabilistic trends. Nevertheless, the probability is high that certain changes will occur, once a society has embarked on industrialization. We explore this thesis using data from the World Values Surveys. These surveys include 65 societies and more than 75 percent of the world’s population. They provide time-series data from the earliest wave in 1981 to the

Dr. Ronald Inglehart delivered the lecture, *Latin American Societies Have Distinctive Cultural Values: What Are Their Implications?* on February 21, 2002 at the IDB Cultural Center in Washington, D.C., as part of a series on “Culture and Development,” of the IDB Cultural Center Lectures Program, and in collaboration with the OAS. This essay is the basis for the lecture and comprises extracts from an article entitled, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values* by Dr. Inglehart and Dr. Baker, that was originally published in its entirety in the *American Sociological Review*, 2000, Vol. 65 (February: 19-51), and is reprinted with permission.

most recent wave completed in 1998, offering new and rich insights into the relationships between economic development and social and political change.

Modernization or the Persistence of Traditional Values?

In recent years, research and theory on socioeconomic development have given rise to two contending schools of thought. One school emphasizes the *convergence* of values as a result of “modernization”—the overwhelming economic and political forces that drive cultural change. This school predicts the decline of traditional values and their replacement with “modern” values. The other school of thought emphasizes the *persistence* of traditional values despite economic and political changes. This school assumes that values are relatively independent of economic conditions (DiMaggio 1994). Consequently, it predicts that convergence around some set of “modern” values will continue to exert an independent influence on the cultural changes caused by economic development.

In the postwar United States, a version of modernization theory emerged that viewed underdevelopment as a direct consequence of a country’s internal characteristics: traditional economies, traditional psychological and cultural traits, and traditional institutions (Lerner 1958; Weiner 1966). From this perspective, traditional values were not only mutable but could—and should—be replaced by modern values, enabling these societies to follow the (virtually inevitable) path of capitalist development. The causal agents in this developmental process were seen as the rich, developed nations that stimulate

the modernization of “backward” nations through economic, cultural, and military assistance.

These arguments were criticized as blaming the victim, because modernization theorists assumed that underdeveloped societies needed to adopt “modern” values and institutions to become developed societies (Bradshaw and Wallace 1996). Modernization theory was not only criticized, it was pronounced dead (Wallerstein 1976). The postwar version of modernization theory tended to neglect external factors, such as colonialism, imperialism, and newer forms of economic and political domination. The emerging neo-Marxist and world-systems theorists emphasized the extent to which rich countries exploited poor countries, locking them in positions of powerlessness and structural dependence (Chase-Dunn 1989; Chirot 1977, 1994; Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974). Underdevelopment, as Frank put it, is *developed*. This new school of thought conveyed the message to poor countries that poverty has nothing to do with internal problems—it is the fault of global capitalism.

The central claim of modernization theory is that economic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political life. Evidence from around the world indicates that economic development tends to propel societies in a roughly predictable direction: Industrialization leads to occupational specialization, rising educational levels, rising income levels, and eventually brings unforeseen changes—changes in gender roles, attitudes toward authority and sexual norms; declining fertility rates; broader political participation; and less easily led

publics. Determined elites in control of the state and the military can resist these changes, but in the long run, it becomes increasingly costly to do so and the probability of change rises.¹

The shift from preindustrial to industrial society wrought profound changes in people's daily experiences and prevailing worldviews (Bell 1973; Inglehart 1997; Spier 1996). Preindustrial life, Bell (1976) argues, was a "game against nature" in which "one's sense of the world is conditioned by the vicissitudes of the elements—the seasons, the storms, the fertility of the soil, the amount of water, the depth of the mine seams, the droughts and the floods" (p. 147). Industrialization brought less dependence on nature, which had been seen as inscrutable, capricious, uncontrollable forces or anthropomorphic spirits. Life now became a "game against fabricated nature" (Bell 1973:147), a technical, mechanical, rationalized, bureaucratic world directed toward the external problem of creating and dominating the environment. As human control of the environment increased, the role ascribed to religion and God dwindled. Materialistic ideologies arose with secular interpretations of history, and secular utopias were to be attained by human engineering operating through rationally organized bureaucratic organizations.

The emergence of postindustrial society seems to be stimulating further evolution of prevailing worldviews, but it is moving in a different direction. Life in postindustrial societies centers on services, and hence life becomes a "game between persons" in which people "live more and more outside nature, and less and less with machinery and things; they

live with, and encounter only, one another" (Bell 1973:148-49). Less effort is focused on producing material objects, and more effort is focused on communicating and processing information. Most people spend their productive hours dealing with other people and symbols. Increasingly, one's formal education and job experience help develop the potential for autonomous decision-making (Bell 1973, 1976). Thus, the rise of postindustrial society leads to a growing emphasis on self-expression (Inglehart 1997). The hierarchical organizations of the industrial age required (and allowed) little autonomous judgment, whereas service and knowledge workers deal with people and concepts, operating in a world in which innovation and the freedom to exercise individual judgment are essential. Self-expression becomes central. Furthermore, the historically unprecedented wealth of advanced industrial societies, coupled with the rise of the welfare state, mean that an increasing share of the population grows up taking survival for granted. Their value priorities shift from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and quality-of-life (Inglehart 1977, 1997). Thus, cultural change is not linear; with the coming of postindustrial society, it moves in a new direction.

Different societies follow different trajectories even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic development, in part because situation-specific factors, such as cultural heritage, also shape how a particular society develops. Weber ([1904] 1958) argued that traditional religious values have an enduring

influence on the institutions of a society. Following this tradition, Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that the world is divided into eight major civilizations or “cultural zones” based on cultural differences that have persisted for centuries. These zones were shaped by religious traditions that are still powerful today, despite the forces of modernization. The zones are Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones.

The Evidence

Our main data source is the World Values Surveys, the largest investigation ever conducted of attitudes, values, and beliefs around the world. This study carried out three waves of representative national surveys: in 1981-1982, 1990-1991, and 1995-1998. It covers 65 countries on all six inhabited continents, and contains more than 75 percent of the world’s population. These societies have per capita annual gross national products ranging from \$300 to more than \$30,000, and their political systems range from long-established stable democracies to authoritarian states.

The number of respondents interviewed in these surveys averages about 1,400 per country. These data are available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) survey data archive at the University of Michigan.²

Our thesis implies that economic development is linked with a broad syndrome of distinctive value orientations. The two most important dimensions that emerged tapped scores of variables and

demonstrated that the worldviews of the peoples of rich societies differ systematically from those of low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms and beliefs. These two dimensions reflect cross-national polarization between *traditional* versus *secular-rational* orientations toward authority; and *survival* versus *self-expression* values. Each society can be located on a global map of cross-cultural variation based on these two dimensions (Inglehart 1997:81-98).

All of the preindustrial societies for which we have data show relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, and the importance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; most of them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics. It would be a gross oversimplification to assume that all known preindustrial societies had similar characteristics, but one can meaningfully contrast the cultural characteristics of industrial societies with those of this mainstream version of preindustrial society.

Table 1 shows (a selection of 15 out of 24) variables in the World Values Survey. This dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not, but deference to the authority of God, Fatherland and Family are all closely linked.³ The importance of the family is a major theme: In traditional societies a main goal in life is to make one’s parents proud—one must always love and respect one’s parents, regardless of how they be-

have. Conversely parents must do their best for their children even if their own well-being suffers. People in traditional societies idealize large families, and they actually have them (high scores on this dimension are strongly correlated with high fertility rates). Yet although the people of traditional societies have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority, take protectionist attitudes toward foreign trade, and feel that environmental problems can be solved without international agreements, they accept national authority passively: they

seldom or never discuss politics. In preindustrial societies the family is crucial to survival. Accordingly, societies at the traditional pole of this dimension reject divorce and take a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They emphasize social conformity rather than individualistic striving, favor consensus rather than open political conflict, support deference to authority, and have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.

Table 1. Correlation of Additional Items with the Traditional/Secular-Rational values Dimension

Item	Correlation
TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING	
Religion is very important in respondent's life.	.89
One of respondent's main goals in life has been to make his/her parents proud.	.81
Respondent attends church regularly.	.75
Euthanasia is never justifiable.	.66
There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here.	.63
Parent's duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being.	.60
Respondent seldom or never discusses politics.	.57
Divorce is never justifiable.	.57
There are absolutely clear guidelines about good and evil.	.56
Expressing one's own preferences clearly is more important than understanding others' preferences.	.56
My country's environmental problems can be solved without any international agreements to handle them.	.56
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.	.53
Family is very important in respondent's life.	.45
Respondent is relatively favorable to having the army rule the country	.43
Respondent favors having a relatively large number of children.	.41
(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)	
<i>Source:</i> Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 1995-1998 World Values Surveys.	

Table 2. Correlation of Additional Items with the Survival/Self-Expression Values Dimension

Item	Correlation
SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:	
Men make better political leaders than women	.86
A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled	.83
Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals, and people with AIDS as neighbors	.81
Respondent has not recycled things to protect the environment	.78
When seeking a job, a good income and safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like	.74
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women	.69
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	.68
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl	.67
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child	.65
Imagination is <i>not</i> one of the most important things to teach a child	.62
Leisure is not very important in life	.60
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased	.55
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government	.45
(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)	
<i>Source:</i> Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 1995-1998 World Values Surveys.	

Table 2 conveys the wide range of values that are linked with the survival versus self-expression dimension. Societies that emphasize survival values show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, report relatively poor health, are low on interpersonal trust, relatively intolerant of outgroups, are low on support for gender equality, emphasize materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental activism, and relatively favorable to authoritarian government. Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on these topics.

When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't "enough to go around," foreigners

are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable—indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may be positively valued because it is interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisine; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening.




Figure 2. Economic Zones for 65 Societies Superimposed on Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation

Economic development seems to have a powerful impact on cultural values: The value systems of rich countries differ systematically from those of poor countries. Figure 1 shows a gradient from low-income countries in the lower left quadrant, to rich societies in the upper right quadrant. Figure 2 redraws Figure 1, showing the economic zones into which these 65 societies fall. All 19 societies with an annual per capita gross national product over \$15,000 rank relatively high on both dimensions and fall into a zone at the upper right-hand corner. This economic zone cuts across the boundaries on the

Protestant, ex-Communist, Confucian, Catholic, and English-speaking cultural zones. All societies with per capita GNPs below \$2,000 fall into a cluster at the lower left of Figure 2, in an economic zone that cuts across the African, South Asian, ex-Communist, and Orthodox cultural zones. The remaining societies fall into two intermediate cultural-economic zones. Economic development seems to move societies in a common direction, regardless of their cultural heritage. Nevertheless, distinctive cultural zones persist two centuries after the industrial revolution began.

GNP per capita is only one indicator of a society's level of economic development. As Marx argued, the rise of the industrial working class was a key event in modern history. Furthermore, the changing nature of the labor force defines three distinct stages of economic development: agrarian society, industrial society, and postindustrial society (Bell 1973, 1976). Thus, another set of boundaries could be superimposed on the societies in Figure 1: Societies with a high percentage of the labor force in agriculture would fall near the bottom of the map, societies with a high percentage of industrial workers would fall near the top, and societies with a high percentage in the service sector would be located near the right-hand side of the map.

Religious traditions appear to have had an enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of 65 societies, as Weber, Huntington, and others have argued. But a society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage. A central historical event of the twentieth century was the rise and fall of a Communist empire that once ruled one-third of the world's population. Communism left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. East Germany remains culturally close to West Germany despite four decades of Communist rule, but its value system has been drawn toward the Communist zone. And although China is a member of the Confucian zone, it also falls within a broad Communist-influence zone. Similarly Azerbaijan, though part of the Islamic cluster, also falls within the Communist superzone that dominated it for decades.

The influence of colonial ties is apparent in the existence of a Latin American

cultural zone. Former colonial ties also help account for the existence of an English-speaking zone. All seven of the English-speaking societies included in this study show relatively similar cultural characteristics. Geographically, they are half-way around the world from each other, but culturally Australia and New Zealand are next-door neighbors of Great Britain and Canada. The impact of colonization seems especially strong when reinforced by massive immigration from the colonial society—thus, Spain, Italy, Uruguay, and Argentina are all near each other on the border between Catholic Europe and Latin America: The populations of Uruguay and Argentina are largely descended from immigrants from Spain and Italy. Similarly, Rice and Feldman (1997) find strong correlations between the civic values of various ethnic groups in the United States, and the values prevailing in their countries of origin—two or three generations after their families migrated to the United States.

Figure 1 indicates that the United States is not a prototype of cultural modernization for other societies to follow, as some modernization writers of the post-war era naively assumed. In fact, the United States is a deviant case, having a much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial society. On the traditional/secular-rational dimension, the United States ranks far below other rich societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable to those found in developing societies. The phenomenon of American exceptionalism has been discussed by Lipset (1990, 1996), Baker (1999), and others; our results support their argument. The United States does rank among the most ad-

vanced societies along the survival/self-expression dimension, but even here, it does not lead the world, as the Swedes and the Dutch seem closer to the cutting edge of cultural change than do the Americans.

While the placement of each society in Figure 1 is objective, determined by a factor analysis of survey data from each country, the boundaries drawn around these societies are subjective, using Huntington's (1993, 1996) division of the world into several cultural zones. How "real" are these zones?

Reality is complex: Britain is both Protestant and English-speaking, and its empirical position reflects both aspects of reality. Similarly, we have drawn a boundary around the Latin American societies that Huntington postulated to be a distinct cultural zone. All 10 of these societies show similar values in global perspective, but with only minor changes we could have defined an Hispanic cultural zone that included Spain and Portugal, which empirically also resemble the Latin American societies. Or we could have drawn a boundary that included Latin America, Catholic Europe, the Philippines, and Ireland in a broad Roman Catholic cultural zone. All these zones are conceptually and empirically justifiable.

When we combine the clusters shown in Figure 1 into broader cultural zones with large sample sizes, we generate variables having even greater explanatory power. Figure 3 indicates that the Catholic societies of Eastern Europe constitute a distinct sub-cluster of the Catholic world—midway between the West European Catholic societies and the Orthodox societies (Figure 1 merges these Eastern and Western clusters into one Catholic

Europe zone). The Latin American cluster is adjacent to the two Catholic groups, so we can combine all three of these groups to form a broad Roman Catholic "super-zone." Two other historically Catholic societies, the Philippines and Ireland, are also nearby and thus can be merged into the Catholic zone. Similarly, Protestant Europe and most of the English-speaking zone can be merged into a broad historically Protestant zone. Each of these two new zones covers a vast geographic, historical, and economic range, but each reflects the impact of a common religious-historical influence, and each is relatively coherent in global perspective.

To illustrate the coherence of these clusters, we examine one of the key variables in the literature on cross-cultural differences—interpersonal trust (one component of the survival/self-expression dimension). Coleman (1990), Almond and Verba (1963), Putnam (1993), and Fukuyama (1995) argue that interpersonal trust is essential for building the social structures on which democracy depends and for creating the complex social organizations on which large-scale economic enterprises are based. Figure 4 demonstrates that most historically Protestant societies rank higher on interpersonal trust than do most historically Catholic societies. This holds true even after controlling for levels of economic development: Interpersonal trust is significantly correlated with a society's level of GDP per capita ($r = .60$), but even rich Catholic societies rank lower than equally prosperous historically Protestant societies. A heritage of Communist rule also has an impact on interpersonal trust, with virtually all ex-Communist societies ranking relatively low (in *italic type* in Figure




Figure 3. Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, and Historically Communist Cultural Zones in Relation to Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation

4); thus, the historically Protestant societies that had experienced Communist rule (e.g., East Germany and Latvia) show relatively low levels of interpersonal trust. Of the 19 societies in which more than 35 percent of the public believe that most people can be trusted, 14 are historically Protestant, three are Confucian-influenced, one (India) is predominantly Hindu, and only one (Ireland) is historically Catholic. Of the 10 societies ranking lowest on trust in Figure 4, 8 are his-

torically Catholic and none is historically Protestant.

These findings suggest that, once established, the cross-cultural differences linked with religion have become part of a national culture that is transmitted by the educational institutions and mass media of given societies to the people of that nation. Despite globalization, the nation remains a key unit of shared experience, and its educational and cultural institutions shape the values of almost




Figure 4. Locations of 65 Societies on Dimensions of Interpersonal Trust and Economic Development, by Cultural/Religious Tradition

everyone in that society.

The persistence of distinctive value systems suggests that culture is path-dependent. Protestant religious institutions gave rise to the Protestant Ethic, relatively high interpersonal trust, and a relatively high degree of social pluralism—all of which may have contributed to earlier economic development in Protestant countries than in the rest of the world. Subsequently, the fact that Protestant societies were (and still are) relatively prosperous has probably shaped them in distinctive ways. Although they have experienced rapid social and cultural change,

historically Protestant and Catholic (and Confucian, Islamic, Orthodox, and other) societies remain distinct to a remarkable degree.

Changes in Values Over Time

We have shown that cross-national cultural variation is closely associated with a society's level of economic development and its cultural heritage. Are these merely cross-sectional patterns? Only time-series data can answer this question conclusively. The World Values Surveys provide time-series data covering the relatively




Figure 5. Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural Variation for 38 Societies.

brief span from 1981 to 1998.

Figure 5 shows, for each of the 38 societies for which we have data from at least two time points, how values have changed during the years covered by our surveys. For example, the arrow for West Germany, near the upper right-hand corner of Figure 5, shows the changes in values among the West German public from 1981 to 1997. Data from East Germany are available only from the 1990 and 1997 surveys, and a somewhat shorter arrow shows the trajectory of change in values for what was once East Germany and is now part of the Federal Republic of Germany. Both

regions of Germany experienced substantial changes in values and both moved upward and to the right, toward increasingly secular-rational values and an increasing emphasis on self-expression values. Many countries in Figure 5 show similar shifts in values from 1981 to 1997.

Some societies (e.g., Russia and Belarus) show retrograde movements, moving downward and to the left. With the collapse of the economic, social, and political systems of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991, the peoples of all the Soviet successor states placed increasing emphasis on survival values, and some placed increasing

emphasis on traditional values as well.

The pattern underlying these shifts was not random. Our thesis holds that economic development promotes secular and self-expression values, while economic collapse will push in the opposite direction. Thus, most of the societies that show a retrograde movement are ex-Communist societies, reacting to the collapse of their economic, social, and political systems. Two contrasting trends are found in advanced industrial societies: Established religious institutions are losing the allegiance of their followers, but there is a growing interest in spiritual concerns at the individual level.

The ex-Communist societies fall into two groups: those that experienced economic and social collapse, and those that made a successful transition to market economies. All of the Soviet successor states fall into the former group.

The trend toward modern values is not irreversible. While this seems to be the prevailing trend among industrialized societies, the combination of economic, political, and social collapse that afflicted the former Soviet Union during the 1980s and 1990s clearly reversed this trend, bringing growing misery, distrust, rejection of outgroups, xenophobia, and authoritarian nationalism.⁵

The eight developing and low-income societies for which we have time-series data show two contrasting patterns: There is little evidence of secularization—only two of the eight societies shifted toward the secular-rational pole (Chile and Mexico); Argentina, Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey do not shift. Yet most of these societies do show some movement from survival values toward self-expression val-

ues—only Nigeria and South Africa do not.

The Persistence of Religious and Spiritual Beliefs

As a society shifts from an agrarian to an industrial economy and survival comes to be taken for granted, traditional religious beliefs tend to decline. Nevertheless, as the twenty-first century opens, cleavages along religious lines remain strong. Why has religion been so slow to disappear?

There are several reasons. For example, although rising existential security does seem to make religious faith less central, the converse is also true, and history has taken an ironic turn. Communist-style industrialization was especially favorable to secularization, but the collapse of Communism has given rise to pervasive insecurity and a return to religious beliefs. In 1990, when a tottering but still dominant Communist party ruled Russia, 56 percent of Russians described themselves as religious. By 1995, when the Soviet political, economic and social systems had collapsed, 64 percent of Russians described themselves as religious—a figure that is not only well above the previous level for Russia, but above the average level for advanced industrial societies.

A decline in the prevalence of traditional religious values characterizes industrialization, but not necessarily the postindustrial phase. The need for security is not the only attraction of religion. People have always sought answers to such questions as: Where do we come from? Where are we going? Why are we here? The need for answers may be especially acute in the face of disaster, but it does not die out in postindustrial society. Spiritual concerns will

probably always be part of the human outlook. The established churches today may be on the wrong wavelength for most people in postindustrial societies, but new theologies, such as the "theology" of environmentalism, or New Age beliefs, are emerging to fill an expanding niche (Baker 1999). With the rise of postindustrial society, allegiance to the established religious institutions continues to decline, *but spiritual concerns do not*. Wuthnow (1998) argues, for example, that the decline of organized religion in America is accompanied by the rise of spiritual concerns, a shift from what he calls a "spirituality of dwelling" (emphasizing sacred places) to a "spirituality of seeking" (emphasizing a personal quest for new spiritual avenues). Wuthnow's thesis seems relevant beyond the American context. Postmaterialists are less attached to traditional forms of religion than are materialists, but they are *more* likely to spend time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. And in the three successive waves of the World Values Surveys, concern for the meaning and purpose of life became *stronger* in most advanced industrial societies.

Conclusion

Evidence from the World Values Surveys indicates that traditional values. Economic development is associated with pervasive, and to some extent predictable, cultural changes. Industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values, while the rise of postindustrial society brings a shift toward more trust, tolerance, well-being, and postmaterialist values. Economic collapse tends to propel societies

in the opposite direction. If economic development continues, we expect a continued decline of institutionalized religion. The influence of traditional value systems is unlikely to disappear, however, as belief systems exhibit remarkable durability and resilience. Empirical evidence from 65 societies indicates that values can and do change, but also that they continue to reflect a society's cultural heritage.

Modernization theorists are partly right. The rise of industrial society is linked with coherent cultural shifts away from traditional value systems, and the rise of postindustrial society is linked with a shift away from absolute norms and values toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, postindustrial values. But values seem to be path dependent: A history of Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development. Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages. We doubt that the forces of modernization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future.

Economic development is associated with major changes in prevailing values and beliefs: The worldviews of rich societies differ markedly from those of poor societies. This does not necessarily imply cultural convergence, but it does predict the general direction of cultural change and (in so far as the process is based on intergenerational population replacement) even gives some idea of the rate at which such change is likely to occur.

NOTES

1. Paradoxically, modernization can actually strengthen traditional values. Elites in underdeveloped nations who attempt to mobilize a population for social change often use traditional cultural appeals, as in Japan's Meiji Restoration. More recently, radical reformist groups in Algeria used Islam to gain peasant support, but as an unintended result strengthened fundamentalist religious values (Stokes and Marshall 1981). Thus, cultural identity can be used to promote the interests of a group (Bernstein 1997) and in the process may strengthen cultural diversity. Generally, "[a]s global integration intensifies, the currents of multiculturalism swirl faster. Under these conditions which include the juxtaposition of ethnically distinct labor forces and communities, the politics of identity tends to substitute for the civic (universalist) politics of nation-building" (McMichael 1996:42).
2. For further information about these surveys, see the World Values Survey web site. <http://wvs.isr.umich.edu>
3. These 65 societies show a tremendous amount of variation. In Pakistan, 90 percent of the population say that God is extremely important in their lives, selecting "10" on a 10-point scale; in both Brazil and Nigeria, 87 percent select this extreme position on the scale; in East Germany and Japan, on the other hand, only 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively, take this position.
4. This cultural map is consistent with an earlier one by Inglehart (1997:334-37) based on the 1990-1991 World Values Surveys. Although our Figure 1 is based on a factor analysis that uses less than half as many variables as Inglehart used (1997), and adds 22 societies that were not included in the earlier map, the overall pattern is strikingly similar to the cultural maps in Inglehart (1997, chaps. 3 and 11). These similarities demonstrate the robustness of the two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation. The same broad cultural zones appear in essentially the same locations, but some zones now contain many more societies.
5. The contrasting paths that different types of societies have taken in recent years indicates that these cultural changes do not result primarily from the emergence of a global communications network. Most ex-Communist societies have been exposed to Western motion pictures, television, the Internet, and a global pop culture of jeans, Coca-Cola, and rock music. Nevertheless, their underlying basic values have been shifting in the *opposite* direction from other industrial societies. While the rise of a global communications network is important, an even more crucial influence on cultural change is whether people experience secure socioeconomic environments in their daily lives. Security has been notably absent from the former U.S.S.R. during the last decade.

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Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Science and Program Director at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He helped found the Euro-Barometer surveys and is Chair of the executive committee of the World Values Surveys. His research deals with changing belief systems and their impact on social and political change. His most recent books are *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton University Press, 1997) and *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook* (with Miguel Basanez and Alejandro Moreno, University of Michigan Press, 1998). Author of more than 125 publications, he has been a visiting professor or visiting scholar in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Nigeria and has served as a consultant to the U.S. State Department and the European Union.

Wayne E. Baker is Professor of Organizational Behavior and Director of the Center for Society and Economy at the University of Michigan Business School, and Faculty Associate at the Institute for Social Research. His research interests include economic sociology, networks, organization theory, and culture.

CULTURE INDUSTRIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA

Néstor García Canclini

This talk will examine the opportunities for socio-economic development offered by the culture industries in the midst of the present crisis in Latin America. On the one hand, the production of music and television, film and information technology, have acquired a decisive importance in the exchanges between societies; they generate vast levels of investment, and create a growing number of skilled jobs. Meanwhile, Latin American countries—even those that already have a productive trajectory in these fields—have stagnated in their development and have little capacity for expansion via the culture industries. In this context, I will explore several issues that are of special interest in the current agendas of States and some international organizations.

Industrialized Culture and the Worsening of Inequality

The industrial production of cultural goods and messages has changed the traditional role of culture. When culture was perceived in terms of books, paintings, and classical music, these things were

considered as luxuries of social life, recreational occupations that meant little in the economy of nations. Today, however, developments in the music industry alone force us to think differently about these matters.

In the decade of the 1990s, musical production generated \$US 4 billion each year, 90% of which was concentrated in four large multi-national corporations; today, mega-infusions from entertainment and information technology companies like American On Line and Time Warner have made music a truly gigantic economic force. In the United States, the audiovisual industry places second in terms of export income. Owing principally to the creation and exportation of audiovisual products, the cultural sector represents 6% of the United States gross domestic product (GDP), and provides jobs for 1.3 million people. In France, the cultural sector accounts for 2.5% of the GDP, with communications media employing a half million individuals (Warnier, 1999).

It is not only in the most developed countries that culture industries have

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begun to play a key role in economic expansion. In 1998, Brazil, which places sixth in the world market for recordings, realized \$US 8 billion through the sale of music products, records and videos. In Colombia, it is estimated that all the culture industries together contribute 4.03% of the GDP, which is higher than the contributions of other important sectors, like restaurants and hotels, and the aggregate value of the country's principle agricultural product, coffee, which accounts for 2.75%. According to a major study, the cultural sector "traditionally seen as a net demander of resources," now shows "high levels of profitability and the highest levels of growth in terms of demand" in television, cinema, and music (Convenio Andrés Bello, Colombian Ministry of Culture, 1999).

Cultural goods, in addition to occupying a notable place in economic statistics, extend beyond theatres, bookstores, and concert halls. Supermarkets and large grocery stores sell books and recordings; theatrical works and classical and popular music find audiences on television. Today many more writers and musicians can live from their work. At the same time, audiences not previously exposed to aesthetic pleasures have access to cultural works from their own countries and many other nations besides.

La cultura da trabajo [Culture provides work] is the title of a book published in Uruguay that explores the economic functions of cultural goods (Stolovich and Mourelle). Said goods favor the development of other industrial areas—transport, tourism, investment—and contribute to the overall vibrancy of cities and regions. For these reasons, and because they have become principal agents of

communication within and between countries, radio, television, film, recordings, and the Internet are important for social and political cohesion.

This growing inter-relation between the economy and culture could yield major benefits for the region of Latin America and greatly aid its insertion in the world economy. But first, there must be changes in the unequal distribution of benefits between central and peripheral nations. Of the worldwide earnings produced by cultural goods and communications, 55% stays in the United States; 25% accrues to the European Union; 15% goes to Japan and Asia; and only 5% goes to Latin America. The correlation between the economic distribution of communications profits and their geo-linguistic distribution indicates that Spanish is the third-largest language in the world, with approximately four billion speakers, including 35 million in the United States.

The asymmetry in the globalization of culture industries not only generates inequality in the distribution of economic benefits; it also aggravates the inequalities that have always existed in communications, access to information and sources of entertainment, and in participation in the domestic and international public sphere. While the lack of employment is the principal causal factor in immigrations, another important motivation is decadence in educational and cultural development.

In all the countries of Latin America, the massive distribution of *some* books, recordings, and soap operas in large and mid-sized cities happens on a parallel track with the closing of bookstores and theatres, the dismantling of libraries, and

salary cuts across the public sector. The fervor sometimes generated in our capitals by open-air performances and concerts cannot make us forget the cultural and educational poverty produced in practically every institution by “financial adjustments” and the withdrawal of state and private investment in many Latin American nations. In Argentina, the economic recession that began in 1998 caused a drop-off in theatre attendance, and in book and record sales. With the collapse there at the end of 2001, many theatre and film projects were cancelled; publishers and bookstores went out of business. Caracas, Lima, and Montevideo, also suffered a loss of jobs and fall-off in communications and cultural production.

This relation between culture and education atrophies the development of public audiences. Deficiencies in the area of artistic and intellectual understanding—the cultivation of which requires decades—and the loss of conceptual abilities due to drop-out rates at school, cannot be resolved by installing computers in thousands of classrooms and preaching the magical effects of the Internet. The gusts of globalization cannot compensate for the policies that segregate economics and education.

Globalization or “Americanization”?

A frequent question of analytical debate turns on whether globalization is merely an “intensification of reciprocal dependencies” (Beck, 1998) among the countries and regions of the planet. Or rather, whether for reasons of geographical and historical affinity, or owing to different access to economic and technological

resources, what we call “globalization” many times simply concretizes an agreement among nations or regions that have always been connected: Asian countries with other Asian countries; Latin American countries with Europe or the United States; the United States with those groups in other countries that speak English and share its lifestyle. As I asserted in another text (García Canclini, 1999), cultural affinities and differences determine whether or not globalization includes the whole planet, whether it is circular or simply tangential.

It has also been observed that certain industrial and consumer goods are more apt than others for globalization. The publishing industry concentrates its energy and exchanges in defined linguistic areas; while film and television, music and information technology circulate their products more easily throughout the world. Major and mid-sized cities (Miami, Berlin, Barcelona) that are hotbeds of globalized activities and magnets for immigrants and tourists, are better linked to world networks; but even in these places there are dichotomies that marginalize extensive sectors of the population.

Bearing all this in mind, we must reconsider the so-called cultural “Americanization” of the entire planet. It is undeniable that a vast sector of the production, distribution, and exhibition of audio-visual goods either belongs to United States corporations or is dedicated to disseminating their products: Hollywood films and U.S. television programs are distributed by domestic companies to theatre chains and television channels financed mostly by North American capital, or to chains associated with Japanese or German companies that specialize in

English-language films. One must also pay attention to the energetic influence of the United States in the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and in multinational communications organizations, which yields benefits for U.S. companies. The lobbying of the U.S. government and private companies has paralyzed legal and economic initiatives (laws for the protection of film and other audio-visual media) designed to stimulate local cultural production. It is impossible to deny the predominance of New York in the visual arts, of Miami in music, and of Los Angeles in film, but it would be simplistic to maintain that the culture of the world is manufactured in the United States or that the country holds the power to direct and legitimize all activity on every continent.

On the other hand, the control of U.S. corporations over broad-band mass communications does not imply the automatic obedience of the public. Studies on music consumption reveal that in only a few Latin American countries does English-language or so-called "international" music (a mixture of Anglo-American and European) predominate. Only in Venezuela is international music favored by 63% of listeners. In Peru, *chicha* predominates; in Colombia, it is *vallenato*; in Puerto Rico, it is *salsa*; and in Brazil, 65% of the music listened to comes from a variety of domestic styles. However, in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, over half the population prefers a combination of domestic genres with styles from other Spanish-speaking countries. According to George Yúdice (1999), the system of commercialization and consumption "cannot be explained in terms of either homogeni-

zation or localization. The consolidation of the system depends upon the articulation of both of dynamics."

In light of this perspective, it is possible to re-examine the inequality between developed and peripheral countries, and even that between different modes of cultural development, for example between the Anglo and Latino. The appropriation, by private mega-companies, of the greater portion of public life has brought with it a whole process of unilateral privatization, trans-nationalization, and evasion of responsibility with respect to collective social interests. How can we develop cultural policies that connect culture industries with the public sphere in a way that is both creative and in line with the logic that reigns in this current phase of globalization and regional integration?

In the middle of the 20th century, the importance of radio as a social service led many to believe that this type of communication was the model for a public arena of citizens who would freely debate state power and the profits of corporations (Garnham, 1997). The air waves carried a proliferation of independent information, fostered a flowering of consciousness among the citizens, legitimized the demands of the "common people," and limited the power of hegemonic political and business groups (Keane, 1995).

Today, the privatizing forces of State companies and civilian enterprises are reducing the public sphere to the accumulation of profit to be held in private hands. Public deliberation is dissolved or masked on programs that simulate social participation, via open telephone lines or talk shows. It is difficult for businessmen caught up in the rude logic of the mar-

ketplace to assume public obligations for communication and cultural development. Their refusal of all responsibility for public tasks is further aggravated by State cultural policies that are oriented around refined or “classical” culture, and that do not advance new approaches to the industrialization and trans-nationalization of communications, or even to the quality of regulatory standards and practices.

Few States and multi-national organizations are interested in representing public interests in these fields. But such action is indispensable in order to situate commercial interactions within the context of other social interactions that affect quality of life and that cannot be reduced to the merely mercantile, like human rights, scientific and aesthetic innovation, and the preservation of natural and social environments. Only a few studies conceive of these matters in terms of “social capital,” and have begun to explore how State and international bodies (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Inter-American Development Bank, Convenio Andrés Bello) can intervene, given that the market is unable to guarantee social and political rights, and the political claims of both majorities and minorities (Kliksberg and Tomassini, 2000).

I wish now to elaborate on how we must put an end to the Manichean opposition between the State and private enterprise. Today we need to think of the State as the place where governments integrate initiatives from both the business sector and other parts of civil society. One of the tasks of regulation and arbitrage, whose exercise corresponds to the State, is to ensure that social life is not scorned in favor of business interests, and that

those interests are not reduced to those of investors and shareholders.

In order to design integrative cultural policies in the face of new forms of trans-national privatization, we must re-examine our notions of the State and of the market, and their respective and combined relations to cultural creativity. For a long time now, the efforts of certain States to control cultural creativity has met with rejection; in the same way, we must confront the erroneous notion that the free market favors the freedom of creators and extends access to majorities. The disjunction between the State and the market—unsustainable in the case of art and communication—also departs from the mode in which the socio-cultural creativity of consumers (or recipients) is conceived.

Cultural and artistic theory (Bourdieu, 1979; Eco, 1981) amply demonstrates that culture is also created through the circulation and reception of symbolic products. So it is essential to consider the importance of the period that follows the generation of goods and messages, that is to say, when the arts and media of mass communication are consumed and appropriated. The State can counteract the commercial segregation produced in the access to goods and messages between those who have, and those who lack, educational and economic resources. In a period when the production and distribution of symbolic goods are privatized, the cracks widen between consumption on the part of the elite and that of the masses, and advanced technologies are unable to facilitate trans-national circulation and popular consumption. In abandoning responsibility for public access to the consumption of cultural products,

especially technological and artistic innovations, the State has further aggravated the breach. The de-regulated re-structuring of the trans-national production and distribution of culture neutralizes the public meaning of cultural creativity, as well as exchanges among Latin American countries. The still-visible preference among certain audiences for Latin music, which in other times applied to the echo of European cinema in Latin America, barely finds an outlet on contemporary movie and television screens.

Latin American: What It Means Today

As a way of putting the brakes to trans-national control of communications by the English-speaking world, it is common to extol national or Latin American identities. The region's diversity has given rise in the social sciences to the notion of a very heterogeneous *cultural space*, rather than a common Latin American identity. In this space or network, the Romance languages are associated with publishing, academic, gastronomic, tourist, and media circuits, all of which generate important economic investments. The "Latin American" is seen through a host of optics, according to the historic weight and current influence of Europe, the United States, and their connection to domestic and ethnic projects. I want to pause a moment to explore the significance of this *Latina* inheritance in order to discuss basic themes in the relation between economics and culture, like the valuating of heritage and patrimony, and the definition of intellectual property.

These debates take on strategic importance as we attempt to locate, to situate

in the world, that which is "Latin American." The category of "Latin American" always had hybrid origins, found in the confluence of contributions from Mediterranean Europe, from local indigenous peoples, and from African migrations. These constitutional fusions are expanding today through contact with the English-speaking world; the voluminous presence of Latin immigrants and products in the United States, the use of Anglicisms in computer slang attest to this. "Latino" is also transformed in the dialogue with European, and even Asian cultures.

We must not only take into account the movement of that which is "Latin American" away from Latin American borders and toward the United States and European countries—which has great interest in terms of market expansion—but we must also consider the historically unequal conditions of development as compared with those of Euro-America's socio-cultural space.

The comparison between Latin America and the process of European integration serves to illuminate the different conditions in which Franco-Italian-Spanish films are co-produced, or in which the Franco-German ARTE television channel operates, in relation to the markets, number of viewers, and capacity for recouping on investments. In Latin America, there are but few recent experiments to confirm the value of this sort of international cooperation. However, a Media or Eurimages program supported by Claude Chabrol, Pedro Almodovar, or the European Plus networks, is not the same as one by an Uruguayan film director, a Mexican editor, and a Costa Rican television producer, who must battle their

nations' pre-Media Age customs laws, and contend with bureaucracies that don't consider films and books as deserving of special postal rates and arrangements. Agreements were signed in 1988 to liberalize the circulation of cultural goods and services (ALADI, Article XIII, of the Mercosur Protocol), yet this has not yet brought changes in the customs practices of Latin American nations. (Saravia, 1997). This brings us to two strategic challenges: *multimedia integration*, and *legislation for the protection of culture*.

There is a fundamental difference between European film and that produced in Spanish (in Spain, as well as Latin America). In a number of European countries—France, Italy, Germany—the re-invigoration of the cinematographic industry has been approached as a multimedia movement in which television was granted a key role in generating resources and participating in film distribution. And so Spanish and Latin American television companies work behind the backs of film companies, and no one obliges them to pay proper fees and royalties for the right to show these movies in the countries in which they were made. Certain functionaries and producers are euphoric over the small increase in the number of films shot in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico over the last three years, and because movies have been winning international prizes (though almost all of secondary importance), and because there has been a relative increase in audience; yet these are fragile phenomena, due to the disconnection between the movie and television industries, which weakens both areas and discourages synergism.

In order to define the cinema and television we wish to have, we must define

how best to distribute works and develop audiences for them. These are essential tasks in the fostering of collective knowledge and reciprocal appreciation between societies. *In order to accomplish these ends, we need legislation reform, professionalization of cultural management, and the participation of creators and cultural consumers in these decisions.* This social participation, fostered and coordinated by artists' organizations and cultural consumers' groups, can be helpful in identifying cultural differences, so that even those populations least apt to intervene in the industrialization of culture, like peripheral countries, indigenous groups, and the urban poor, will be able to speak out in word and image. Perhaps in this way we will contribute to the formation of cultural and communications policies that are hospitable not only to works and products favored by the market, but also to those which express difference and dissension, innovation and risk. So we can develop more democratic, less monotonous, collective inter-cultural imageries.

Many artists doubt that creativity can be the focus of policy. They are correct, in that state or company actions can never substitute for authors. But we should not forget that creators are not, as idealist aesthetes used to insist, gods that emerge from the void; they emerge, rather, from film schools and humanities faculties, and they need publishing houses, museums, television channels, and movie theatres in order to exhibit their works. As we said earlier, socio-cultural creativity implies an audience. The assertion that readers and viewers have the last word in terms of what deserves to circulate and be supported is but a half-truth in the discourses of techno-marketing; it is a deceptive asser-

tion in societies where the State does less and less to enhance audience development, where libraries are considered as warehouses for books rather than reading clubs, where educational systems still don't emphasize that an appreciation of audio-visual media needs to be part of the basic curriculum (as recently happened in France).

The State does not create culture, but it is indispensable in generating the contextual conditions and policies for stimulation and regulation that encourage the production of cultural goods, as well as in making culture more easily and widely accessible.

Strategies for Endogenous Development in the Midst of Globalization

In this context of new dilemmas, one of the most urgent questions for States and international organizations is the need to make trans-national laws and agreements that protect the meaning of cultural production. An example that illustrates the importance of this issue is the polemic that is developing between Latin and Anglo-Saxon conceptions of intellectual property.

The dispute arises as a result of the attempt to globalize the system which in Anglophone countries gives companies the authorial rights to films and television programs. Television channels and film producers pay directors, screenwriters, and actors once, while retaining the option of repeating, copying, and modifying the work as many times as they like, without paying royalties or consulting with the creators. This is a conflict between an originally French system—which is used extensively in much of Eu-

rope and Latin America, and that recognizes the authorship of the intellectual creator—and United States legislation, which accords those rights to the producer, or simply to the investor.

This transfer of intellectual property to those who finance cultural goods, separating them from the creators and communities traditionally recognized as authors, has elicited this reflection from the French writer Jack Ralite: "Following on eras of no jobs, no documents, and no homes, we arrive now at the age of no authors." In opposing this commercial modification of criteria, which since the modern age had defined the creation of cultural works, Ralite declares: "Pope Julius II didn't paint the Sistine Chapel. Fox didn't build the *Titanic*. Bill Gates and the Municipal Water Authority are not authors." This French expert demands that national and international organizations acknowledge intellectual authorship and protect creativity and aesthetic innovation so that they will not fall victim to the arrogance of profit. (Ralite, 1998).

Over the last three years, the debate has been repeated periodically in the World Trade Organization (WTO). How can business property and intellectual rights be articulated in an economy that tends to de-regulate investment? Various member countries of the Organization want to impose sanctions on governments whose policies favor national production, although opposition from some European States and from Canada has postponed the decision. Latin American governments are following the controversy in silence. If this project is approved, it will make for substantive changes in cultural patrimony, which in Latin countries

is considered an expression of communities and persons. What will be lost, above all, is our ability to manage our intangible heritage (languages, music, knowledge), whose commercialization increases with international distribution through advanced technologies for easy reproduction (videos, Internet).

It must be acknowledged that it is no easy matter to protect or delimit authorship of traditional communitarian products (crafts and ethnic music converted into prosperous businesses). The situation is even more complex when it comes to incorporating goods created in the same communities where electronic products are manufactured; this is especially true with music, which is more profitable than monuments and tourist attractions. The income realized from entrance fees to archeological sites and historic places continues to rise in many countries, but not as fast as that connected to the commercialization of popular and classical music through mass communications media and the Internet. But there is still no adequate public regulation to meet the demands of this new epoch. Throughout the 1990s, in numerous Latin American and European nations, as well as in the halls of UNESCO (Throsby, 1998), there were debates on how the commercial expansion of tourism could make use of countries' historical heritage, but there are neither public policies, nor effective social mobilizations that serve to preserve and promote intangible patrimony in these new trans-national contexts, especially in Latin America.

It is unclear, for example, what should be done about the conflicts between music production companies and Internet servers caused by Napster's invention of

ways to transfer music from one computer to another without payment of fees or royalties. In provisional negotiations between recording companies and information technology businesses, Napster ceded a part of its earnings to record producers, in this way creating a model for other conflicts that could arise from the circulation of films and books on the Internet. Multimedia integration facilitated by new digital support systems makes legislation in these areas all the more urgent.

I do not in general oppose the liberalization of markets, nor the opening of domestic economies and cultures, because together with technological globalization, these apertures can further knowledge and understanding among cultures. It can also help a few Latin American, African, and Asian authors to distribute their television shows, music, and books throughout the world. But this expansion and these inter-connections must be situated within cultural policies that recognize the plurality of interests among artists, consumers, and each society. The task must be assumed in part by ministries of culture and international organizations. It also calls for the mobilization of artists associations, communicators, and consumers of culture. Some countries have begun to study the designation of a judicial figure or ombudsman for the culture industries, whose role would be to represent citizen consumers.

The inequalities between the urban centers where culture industries proliferate and the countries of Latin America are even greater with respect to advanced technologies, that is to say, they have intensified with the passage from analogic to digital registers, and with the coupling

of telecommunications with electronic media. It is a territory in dispute, with North Americans, Europeans, and the Japanese fighting for control of the entire world, with long-term consequences for the accumulation of strategic information and services affecting all areas of culture, from the documentation of historical patrimony and artistic experimentation, to the commercialization of more heterogeneous goods for the home, and the creation of scientific and entertainment networks. Except for the positioning of a few satellites and a very limited number of minor research efforts in several countries, Latin America is only a consumer, and not a producer, of these innovations.

The magnitude of actions needed to reformulate the role of the culture industries in trans-national public space, requires programs that will both foster diversity within each country, and be coordinated with international agencies (OAS, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Convenio Andrés Bello, etc.). A primary task is to ensure that culture industries are included in the public agenda for free trade, exchange, and integration agreements.

International organizations could help create and promote agile, rather than bureaucratic, institutional structures for co-productions and trans-national distribution; support regional studies; and coordinate programs for cooperation between countries, and between nations and businesses, both domestic and trans-national, as well as with associations that are part of civil society. A new cultural relationship between schools and the communications industries, and the formation of

professional as well as consumer associations (television viewers, moviegoers, media ombudsmen) are of primary importance in modifying the social function of these industries and helping them to transcend their purely mercantile character.

While a large percentage of teachers continue to consider mass media as an enemy of education, studies done by CEPAL, UNESCO, and many specialists show conclusively that a partnership must be formed between these sectors in order to ensure that young people acquire the skills needed in media and information-driven societies. How will the rising generations qualify for better-paying, more flexible jobs, or express collective demands and situate them in the context of globalized, or at least inter-cultural strategies, if they are leaving primary school in ever-growing numbers, and if, among the students who don't leave school, only a minority receive training that will enable them to compete in a "digitalized" world? According to Martin Hopenhayn (2002), the digital divide currently constitutes "the mother of all breaches; a breach in productivity and income, a breach in options for future occupational mobility, a breach in access to markets, a breach in the efficient use of time, a breach in access to information and to services of all types, a breach in the power of expression and the power of the vote, a breach in political participation, a breach in the power of personal management and agency, a breach in cultural and communicative exchange, a breach in currency of knowledge, a breach in levels of life. A person who is not connected will be excluded with increasing intensity and in ever-expanding ways."

As a consequence of better apprecia-

tion for regional diversity and the multiplicity of cultures, educational reform has focused on promoting bilingual teaching in some indigenous areas. The trans-nationalization of communications media, even with their mercantile bias, helps imbue citizens with an international vision, disposing them to integrate information from different cultures. Still, it is hardly reasonable to expect such commercialized media to foment selective discernment, ethics that value difference, and a critical view of power and human rights. It is schools and universities that can position children and young people for groundbreaking long-term projects for human solidarity, enable them to construct social meaning beyond "the discontinuities of a present that is every day more instantaneous, and the incessant, intoxicating flux of information and images" (Martín Barbero, 1996). Formal education requires television screens and computers in order to connect with the daily lives of students and prepare them for the future, but neither the remote control nor the "mouse" can organize cultural diversity or develop intelligent life choices.

We must absolutely expand access to digital networks; this is a key step in overcoming the breaches that exist within and between nations. But we cannot forget that information-age connections will require many areas in Latin America to take a step backward: to install lights and telephones.

Regions with less socioeconomic development and little institutionalization of cultural activity need direction and support so they can eventually export a variety of cultural products into global markets. Legislation will need to be developed to protect the rights of producers, intermediaries, and consumers. Interna-

tional solidarity can strengthen audio-visual and informational resources, help to periodically update technological infrastructure and technical training of personnel, especially in countries with little tradition of production and exportation of cultural goods. Courses, training sessions, and the sharing of professional experience from regions that are more integrated and better able to industrialize cultural content would serve to expand domestic markets, and elasticize local habits and structures to facilitate integration with globalized artistic, cultural, and commercial systems.

Future actions must transcend the *preventive* level (i.e., efforts to protect intellectual property and stifle illegal traffic in films and videos) and encourage the *production and fluid distribution* of goods and messages between regions that presently lack good links. Experiences like that of Ibermedia, which coordinates the co-production and distribution of films among multiple Latin American countries along with Spain and Portugal, indicate that multi-national organizations can improve their efficacy if, in addition to working with State institutions, whose numbers are shrinking in trans-national markets, they establish links with independent producers and distributors, as well as with artists networks and media associations focused on the new challenges of globalization and regional integration.

Points of Departure for Economic and Cultural Reinvigoration

It is not possible to strengthen what is left of our societies and cultures, with their distinct historical profiles, without initi-

ating projects that bring prosperity and global integration to the whole region. This perspective means ceding central importance to persons and societies, rather than to the investments and other financial or macroeconomic indicators that articulate Latin America in such a diffuse way with the rest of the world. The key question is not what internal economic adjustments will better allow for payment on debt, but rather which local (and imported) symbolic and material products can improve the living conditions of Latin American populations and maximize their communication with those beyond their borders.

While "content production" is on the rise in the culture industries, we need to stress that increased resources for the control of hardware alone will be insufficient. Latin American culture is offering new repertoires and narrative styles (melodramas, soap operas, ethnic music, and urban cinema) and these help diversify internationalized cultural offerings. The ability of some Latin American and European countries to generate film and television, with the benefit of endogenous co-production programs and protective laws, makes clear that there is a place in global markets for cultures that do not produce in English and that do not produce mega-spectacles. The growing interest shown by Hollywood studios, MTV, Sony, and other companies for what is currently being produced in Latin America gives us an indication of what we could achieve with more autonomous management.

What is the most valuable property in the world in the information age? According to Jeremy Rifkin (2001), "Radio frequencies—the electromagnetic spectrum—are increasingly the medium for

human communication and commercial activity in the era of wireless communications. Our personal computers, electronic calendars, wireless Internet, mobile telephones, tracking and positioning devices, all depend on radio frequencies to send and receive messages, photographs, audio, and data."

The same author demonstrates that that spectrum, treated as "common property," (others call it "humanity's new patrimony") is no longer controlled by either nations or governments, but rather by commercial corporations that administer practically all the radio waves. Even the United States government, adds Rifkin, has ceded the power to regulate communications within its own territory. Sony, a company of Japanese origin, now controls Hollywood's major movie studios and Miami's music recording studios; Bertelsman, a German company, bought Random House, the largest U.S. publishing house.

Between the 1940s and 1970s, the creation of publishing houses in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Colombia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, produced a "substitution of imports," which was crucial for development in education, the formation of modern nations and democratic citizens. In the last three decades, the majority of publishers have gone out of business or sold their catalogues to Spanish houses, which were later bought by French, Italian, and German companies.

In Argentina, the trans-nationalization of communications, begun more than ten years ago, culminated in the surrender of most of the country's culture industries to foreign businesses. The advantages that came with those investments have no reciprocity in North American and European

markets. Rather than struggle to position their products in foreign markets, Argentines, like many Peruvians, Venezuelans, and Mexicans, prefer to become managers for Telefónica de España, ATT, or CNN.

A branch manager's responsibility is to provide good performance for his bosses, not to make decisions. During the decade of the 1990s, the selection of Latin American authors to be published outside the country passed from Buenos Aires and Mexico City to Madrid and Barcelona. Now Spain also decides which authors from other countries we can read. The cultural supplement of *Clarín* (March 16, 2002) is dedicated to "our foreign books": the most recent works by Arturo Carrera, Rodolfo Fogwill, César Aira, Clara Obligado, and Diana Bellessi would not be distributed in Argentina, these authors' country, because the Buenos Aires branches of their Spanish publishers cannot guarantee sales of more than 3,000 copies. Between the time these authors signed their contracts and their respective dates of publication, the Argentine economic collapse and the sharp drop in people's buying power, made these books unprofitable among the writers' compatriots. This interrupts the dialogue between some major novelists and poets with their immediate cultural context. At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the military dictatorship cut off the dialogue between exiles and their compatriots: *The Buenos Aires Affair* (censored, before the military assault, by the government of Juan Domingo Perón) and *The Kiss of the Spider Woman* (1976) could not be distributed in Argentina, along with hundreds of other books, until democracy returned in 1983. Now the authoritarianism of the market impedes

authors from being known in the very countries where they live. Cruel irony: the literary supplement of *Clarín* publishes reviews of books by Aira and Fogwill, assigned to Argentine critics living abroad, and lists the prices in euros.

The countries of Latin America must urgently adopt a policy to actively maintain and protect the cultural diversity of that which was produced prior to 2005. It is estimated that the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas will create a market of nearly eight billion persons and a gross domestic product (according to the Spanish, who are worried) of close to 2.2 billion pesetas. The *El País* estimate notwithstanding, the sum will be calculated in U.S. dollars; although in any case, as that newspaper states, it represents forty per cent of world commerce. It should not be impossible to get art organizations, some political and social movements, and even perhaps the ministries of culture to carve out a position in this negotiation that benefits the historical and current relationships among the countries of Latin America. If we begin this task now, with regional studies and economic and cultural forecasts, it may be possible to situate ourselves in productive positions. This will be the most intelligent way to defend cultural diversity.

At the same time, we must pass legislation before the Free Trade Area of the Americas hands down laws concerning culture industries and the management of cultural patrimony. Given the international magnitude of the agreements, if we adopt only domestic laws within each country, we will be unable to sustain ourselves. The work of international organizations like the IDB, ECLAC, and the Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Sci-

ence, and Culture(OEI) is indispensable. A first task of these institutions should be to ensure that different modes of industrializing local cultures in trans-national markets be part of the public agenda in accords for integration and commercial exchange. Efforts must be made so that in every area covered by these negotiations the economy is re-oriented toward an anti-monopoly system allowing the most diversified and equitable access to goods and information.

Let me briefly mention a few strategic initiatives for the distribution and regulation of culture and communications in this age of trans-nationalization between private companies. Numerous authors have concluded that in areas linked to information, like print media, radio, and television, countries should limit foreign investment to less than 50%, and, in the audiovisual industries (including film), set minimums for national and regional programming. In cinema, the classic 50% screen time can no longer be achieved, owing to reductions in domestic production, but a basic quota is essential to keep the increasing control of distribution and exhibition by U.S. companies from preventing local films from finding their audiences in the countries in which they were made. It is also important to establish audio-visual advertising rules that increase the society's access to events and information of public interest. In order to create equitable conditions for information and competition, it is essential to have a diversity of voices on each channel, including voices that disagree with the editorial line of the company, and to protect the right of reply.

All of this requires the creation of cultural indicators which, as UNESCO pro-

poses in its *World Culture Report* (1998 and 2000), would form the basis for criteria sufficiently flexible to be appropriate to any country—analogueous to educational and health indicators—for the evaluation of cultural development. Naturally, this does not mean establishing whether one culture is more developed than another. Rather the idea is to evaluate the historical diversity, styles and projects particular to each society, analyze the extent to which existing policies and structures contribute to integration, end discrimination, and foster the self-determination of diverse groups and their possibilities for finding equal opportunities for creativity and communication (UNESCO, 2000). In Latin America, the countries with the most robust levels of cultural production still lack reliable cultural statistics, and so are unable to make the regional comparisons that facilitate cooperation and exchange.

I haven't the time here to explore other aspects of the relationship between industrial cultures and development in Latin America. My intention was not to be exhaustive in my comments, but rather to encourage debate by highlighting perspectives and measures that can help liberate us from Manichean oppositions between the private and the public, between "globalizing ourselves" and affirming our identities. Latin American cultures are so complex, that the options go far beyond having to choose between a McDonalds and a Macondo.



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Néstor García Canclini has done assiduous research in the field of urban culture. His works seek to recover decision-making arenas that have been usurped by economists and business figures. He directs the Program of Studies on Urban Culture at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana de México, Plantel Iztapalapa (UNAM). He has taught at Stanford, the University of Texas at Austin, and at universities in Barcelona, Buenos Aires, and São Paulo. He has received a Guggenheim Fellowship and other distinctions, including the Casa de las Américas Prize (1981) for his book *Las culturas populares en el capitalismo*, and the Iberoamericano Prize (1992), given by the Latin American Studies Association for the Spanish edition of *Culturas híbridas: estrategias para entregar y salir de la modernidad* [*Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, 1995]. In *La globalización imaginada* (2000) he gives an acute analysis of the question of globalization in the perception of social metaphors; he is convinced that it is not only possible, but absolutely necessary, to speak of the process of globalization in cultural terms.

Others books include *Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico*, 1993, translated by Lidia Lozano, University of Texas Press, and *Consumers and Citizens: Global and Multicultural Conflicts*, 2001, translated by George Yúdice, University of Minnesota Press.

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