



## Approach Paper

# Suriname 2011-2015

Country Program Evaluation



Inter-American Development Bank  
December 2015



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## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

CCB	Caribbean Country Department
CPE	Country Program Evaluation
CS	Country Strategy
GDP	Gross domestic product
GOS	Government of Suriname
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
LMS	Loan Management System
MIF	Multilateral Investment Fund
OPUS	Operations Update System
OPMAS	Operation Management System
OVE	Office of Evaluation and Oversight
PBL	Policy-based loan
PPP	Public-private partnership
SG	Sovereign-guaranteed
TC	Technical cooperation
UN	United Nations

## I. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 As part of its 2015 annual work plan, the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) is preparing the evaluation of the Bank's country program with Suriname for the period January 2011–December 2015. This paper sets out the proposed approach and methodology for the planned Country Program Evaluation (CPE), OVE's third for Suriname. Past evaluations covered the periods 1980-2004 (RE-318), and 2007-2010 (RE-381).
- 1.2 As indicated in the Bank's Protocol for CPEs (RE-348-3), the main function of a CPE is *"to provide information on Bank performance at the country level that is credible and useful, and that enables the incorporation of lessons and recommendations that can be used to improve the development effectiveness of the Bank's overall strategy and program of country assistance."* Like other CPEs, this evaluation will seek to examine the Bank's relationship with the country from an independent perspective. It aims both to strengthen accountability and facilitate learning to serve as an input to the new country strategy that is under preparation for 2016–2020.

## II. CONTEXT OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAM

### A. Overview

- 2.1 **Suriname is an upper-middle income,<sup>1</sup> small coastal state of 541,638 inhabitants<sup>2</sup> with a high human development index<sup>3</sup> and abundant natural resources that nonetheless faces significant development challenges** (Table 2.1). As a small, coastal developing state,<sup>4</sup> it shares several features of small states (size-related macroeconomic vulnerabilities, lack of economies of scale, and capacity constraints) as well as some specific characteristics of the Caribbean<sup>5</sup> (being highly prone to coastal floods). The

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<sup>1</sup> Estimated GDP per capita has increased to US\$9,426 in 2014 from US\$8,224 in 2010 (World Economic Outlook, Oct.2015).

<sup>2</sup> Suriname General Bureau of Statistics, 2013.


<sup>3</sup> Suriname ranked 100 out of 187 countries in 2013. Between 2005 and 2013, Suriname's Human Development Index value rose from 0.672 to 0.705, an increase of 4.9% or an average annual increase of about 0.6% (UNDP Human Development Report 2014).

<sup>4</sup> Small island developing states (SIDS) are widely acknowledged to be among the most economically vulnerable in the world. As small open economies, SIDSs are especially exposed to external shocks. The environmental, economic, and social difficulties stemming from climate change, rising sea levels, and natural disasters in the Caribbean exacerbate the significant risks to the sustainable development of SIDS. (D. King 2014)

<sup>5</sup> Caribbean small states are a diverse set of countries that can be grouped as commodity exporters, service-based economies, mainly tourism and financial services. Many countries share similar economic characteristics (small economies, open to international trade, highly exposed to natural disasters and economic shocks). The Caribbean is one of the most disaster-prone regions in the world. Many Caribbean economies face high and rising debt-to-GDP ratios that jeopardize prospects for medium-term debt sustainability and growth. Suriname's overall gross public sector debt, however, has been much lower than the Caribbean average (18.6% of GDP vs. 79% of regional GDP, respectively, in 2012). The main challenges for many Caribbean small states include low growth, high debt and reducing vulnerabilities from natural disasters as well as financial sector weakness.

country is highly vulnerable to external shocks (both economic and environmental), with limited resilience to protect against and recover from those shocks. Economic performance during the past decade has been strong compared with Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, with a real average GDP growth rate of 4.6% during 2000–2010 (Figure 2.1)<sup>6</sup> and public debt among the lowest in the region. Given the country's dependence on gold, oil, and bauxite (production accounting for more than 35% of GDP)<sup>7</sup>, its economic performance is highly vulnerable to developments in the commodity sector, which has witnessed tremendous change in the past ten years.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the services sector, which accounts for an additional 50% of GDP, is led by trade and transport activities that are closely linked to the commodities industry. High commodity prices have benefited the country's growth, employment, and government revenues for many years, however recent commodity price fluctuations have led to increases in the fiscal deficit and debt levels (Figures 2.2 and 2.3).<sup>9</sup> The country's lack of institutional arrangements to build fiscal buffers and countercyclical policies during crises, its lack of economic diversification, and its vulnerability to natural disasters, mainly flooding, pose risks to the sustainability of its development. The overall governance framework is outdated, as are many sectoral policies, and the public sector is large (employing 60% of the active workforce). Growth has generally not been driven by increases in productivity.

**Table 2.1. Per capita GDP in the Caribbean**     **Figure 2.1. Suriname's Real GDP growth**



Source: WEO, Oct. 2015


<sup>6</sup> WEO, Oct 2015.

<sup>7</sup> Central Bank of Suriname (2015).


<sup>8</sup> According to the 2012–16 National Development Plan, these three extractive sectors account for over 90% of the export value of goods.

<sup>9</sup> Economic activity slowed during 2012–14 (average real annual growth of 2.6%). The external accounts deteriorated because of weaker gold and oil prices and stagnating bauxite and alumina output. The fiscal balance has also slipped into deficit, mostly because of higher spending on public sector wages and diminished foreign exchange earnings from the mining sector (-54.8% in 2014). According to the Central Bank of Suriname, the central government deficit was 5.6% of GDP in 2014. The outlook for 2016 is for growth to continue to slow due to fiscal constraints and weaker investment in the extractive industries (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, 2015).

**Figure 2.2. Government deficit (% of GDP)**



**Figure 2.3. Public gross debt (% of GDP)<sup>10</sup>**



Source: Central Bank of Suriname

**2.2 Significant urban-rural and coastal-interior disparities exist<sup>11</sup>, though there is no official measure for poverty given the lack of reliable data.<sup>12</sup>** Poverty estimates based on 2006 surveys are between 26 and 31%, with those living in the rural, interior region of the country facing significantly higher levels of deprivation, including in access to services.<sup>13</sup> Suriname has a multiethnic and multi-religion population, of which approximately 80-90% lives in the three main coastal, urban districts (Paramaribo, Wanica, and Nickerie).<sup>14</sup> Given the overall low population density and the difficult-to-access interior land and geographically scattered settlements, service provision in nonurban districts is uneven and challenging. Other coastal-interior disparities are seen in different average life expectancies (nine years lower in the interior) and average school attainment: a child in the interior generally receives four fewer years of education than a child in Paramaribo. Moreover, as a small country geographically isolated on the north coast of South America, Suriname is further challenged by especially low integration with Brazil, by language (Dutch and 16 other languages) and institutions that reflect the Dutch structure, and by a small human resource pool and significant “brain drain” migration to the Netherlands.<sup>15</sup> The Surinamese diaspora population in the Netherlands is estimated at about 350,000.<sup>16</sup>

**2.3 In August 2010, the Government set among its top three priorities the transition from reliance on external grants to a modern, transparent, and**

<sup>10</sup> Data from Central Bank is similar to that from Ministry of Finance.

<sup>11</sup> World Bank Country Partnership Strategy for Suriname for the period FY 15-19, April 2015.

<sup>12</sup> Attempts to collect household income and expenditure data through surveys and censuses have been affected by very low response rates and frequent underreporting of income as well as sampling issues. For progress on Millennium Development Goals see *MDG Progress Report 2014* or link: [http://interwp.cepal.org/perfil\\_ODM/perfil\\_pais.asp?pais=SUR&id\\_idioma=2](http://interwp.cepal.org/perfil_ODM/perfil_pais.asp?pais=SUR&id_idioma=2)

<sup>13</sup> UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Suriname, 2006.


<sup>14</sup> Suriname's diversity is reflected in its multiparty political system, which is characterized by coalition governments. Governments are formed through multiparty parliamentary allegiances, and while political parties tend to follow ethnic and religious lines, there is no single dominant group (Annex II). Coalition-based governance has created fragmentation in the political system, making consensus harder to achieve (i.e., slower decision making and implementation of programs).

<sup>15</sup> The Netherlands offers more specialized higher education options than does Suriname.

<sup>16</sup> World Bank (2012) Suriname Interim Strategy Note. Some estimates place diaspora at closer to 500,000.

**efficient governance structure.**<sup>17</sup> Substantial budget support from official development assistance (Figure 2.4) and the Dutch Development Fund was fully committed in 2010 and is almost depleted.<sup>18</sup> While reforms introduced early in the administration, particularly the macroeconomic stabilization program, have improved economic management, development has been hampered by the fact that the economy overall remains vulnerable to external shocks and suffers from lack of fiscal buffers and countercyclical policies, lack of diversification, and weak governance and institutional capacity. Challenges related to policy-making by consensus also slowed reforms.

**Figure 2.4. Aid and official development assistance (US\$ million)**



Source: World Bank

### III. COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND THE IDB PROGRAM

#### A. The country's strategic planning instruments

- 3.1 Suriname's National Development Plan (NDP) for 2012–2016, approved by parliament in December 2011, includes the following main goals: (i) good governance, institutional strengthening, and regulatory frameworks; (ii) economic growth and diversification, employment, improvements in the business climate and public-private partnerships (PPPs), reforms in the tax and banking systems, and food security; (iii) strengthening the Ministry of Education, professionalization of teachers, improvements in education quality; (iv) social development –poverty, access to public services, health care, and social security; (v) security and international policy; and (vi) urban planning and natural resources and the environment. The Plan includes specific tasks for each priority area as well as for infrastructure, energy, mining, agriculture, and tourism.

#### B. The Bank's Country Strategy, 2011–2015

- 3.2 In the context of Suriname's historic transition from dependence on the Netherlands to full independence, the IDB significantly expanded its engagement

<sup>17</sup> Other priorities were to continue supporting macroeconomic stability and to increase private-sector-led growth. The Government also stressed the need to make growth more equitable, mitigate the downside risks of falling commodity prices by diversifying the economy, and ensure an effective social safety net.

<sup>18</sup> Following Suriname's independence in 1975, the Netherlands agreed to provide 3.5 billion Dutch guilders (approximately US\$1.6 billion) in development aid for a period of 10 years; however, these funds have been intermittent and almost depleted, though the Netherlands has also provided other aid resources.



in Suriname during the evaluation period and became the lead development partner.<sup>19</sup> The Country Strategy (CS) proposed a threefold increase in the level of lending. The CS focused on supporting the transition to modern public governance structures, diversifying the economy, and expanding social benefits. The seven priority areas included were agriculture, energy, education, financial sector development, public investment management, social protection, and transport. Areas for continued dialogue were water and sanitation, disaster risk management, tax administration, health, private sector development, and natural resources and environmental management. Cross-cutting themes were natural disaster and climate change management and institutional and absorption capacity. Areas of strategic dialogue were water and sanitation, disaster risk management, health, private sector development, tax administration, and natural resources and environmental management.

### **C. The Bank's operational portfolio, 2011-2015**

- 3.3 Suriname's fiscal deficit during 2011–2014 averaged 4.1%<sup>20</sup> of GDP annually. The IDB's CS anticipated an envelope of total of sovereign-guaranteed approvals in the amount of US\$300 million during 2011-2015, equivalent to 6.8% of the country's GDP in 2011. The Bank did not lend to Suriname between 1990 and 1999, except for one policy-based loan (PBL) in 1998 (see Figure 2.5). Between 2000 and 2010, lending increased slightly, averaging US\$16.9 million per year, with a large transport loan being approved in 2008. In 2011, coinciding with the depletion of the Dutch Development Fund, the IDB became Suriname's principal external financing source, driven largely by PBL lending.
- 3.4 Between January 2011 and October 2015, the Bank approved a total of approximately US\$397 million<sup>21</sup> through 15 new loan operations. Annual average approvals were US\$78 million in loans (including investment grants, investment loans, MIF and PBLs) and US\$7.4 million in technical cooperation operations (TCs) (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6). These accounted for about 50% of Suriname's total government external debt, and SG loans made up 96% of the total amount. About 66% of this lending (equivalent to US\$255 million)<sup>22</sup> was in the form of budget support (PBLs) (Figure 2.6), designed in six programmatic policy-based loan series and approved in the following areas<sup>23</sup>: public capital expenditure management in 2011 (three operations planned, two approved to date); financial sector strengthening in 2011 (three operations planned, two approved to date); energy in 2012 (three operations planned, two approved to date); revenue policy

<sup>19</sup> This expansion coincided with the depletion of the Dutch aid treaty.

<sup>20</sup> Average central government balance for 2011-2014, Central Bank van Suriname.

<sup>21</sup> Total current approvals amounted to US\$397 million which includes US\$50 million in co-financing through the China Co-Financing Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean for the project SU-L1034 "Financial Sector Strengthening Program II". A US \$15 million Social Protection Program (SU-L1013) was cancelled after approval.


<sup>22</sup> Policy-based lending to Suriname from IDB OC to date is US\$205 million, plus an additional US\$50 million from the China Fund co-financing, for a total of US\$255 million. In 2015, the private sector development loan (SU-L1043) was comprised of a PBL of US\$15 million and a reimbursable TC of US\$5 million.

<sup>23</sup> PBLs in: (1) expenditure management and (2) business climate and innovation were not originally planned. These were dialogue areas that were expected to be carried out over two CS periods according the CS.


and administration in 2013 (three operations planned, one approved to date); agriculture in 2013 (three programs planned, one approved to date); and business climate and innovation in 2014 (two operations planned; one approved to date). The Bank's non-sovereign-guaranteed operations are all in MIF.<sup>24</sup>

- 3.5 Since 1990, more than 70% of the total *number* of operations approved has been TCs. However, during the 2011-2014 period, while the lending figures skyrocketed compared with previous years, the number of TCs approved annually actually declined compared with the annual average for 2000-2010 (Figure 2.6).

**Figure 2.5. Amounts approved 1990-2014 (US\$ million)**



**Figure 2.6. Number of operations approved, by instrument, 1990-2015**



Source: OVE using IDB data warehouse

- 3.6 In addition to the loans approved between 2011 and 2015, the portfolio under evaluation also includes seven inherited loan operations that were approved before 2011 and were completed or nearly completed at some point during the evaluation period. As of January 2011 this group of loans had an undisbursed balance of US\$1.63 million (Annex I).

## IV. EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

- 4.1 The CPE will assess whether the program implemented by the Bank during Q1 2011 to Q4 2015 was consistent with Suriname's development needs as well as with the objectives defined in the CS.

### A. Relevance

- 4.2 *Relevance* refers to "the degree to which the design and objectives of the Bank strategy and program of assistance were consistent with the needs of the country

<sup>24</sup>

The Bank had no IIC, SCF, or OMJ operations in the period. For MIF, there were three active and five closed operations in the evaluation period.

*and with the government's development plans and priorities"* (RE-348-3). Under this heading the CPE will address the following questions:

- i. How consistent were the program's strategic objectives, as defined in the country strategy, with Suriname's development challenges, and with the development priorities of the Government of Suriname (GOS)?
- ii. To what extent was the implemented program aligned with these strategic objectives?
- iii. Was the instrument mix appropriate to achieve the stated objectives?
- iv. To what extent did Bank instruments allow the Bank to respond to development challenges in Suriname during the period?

## **B. Implementation and results**

- 4.3 In assessing the implementation of the Bank's program, **effectiveness** refers to *"the extent to which the assistance instruments achieved the intentions and objectives set [in the Country Strategy and Program]"* (RE-348-3).

### **1. Implementation**

- a. Which factors explain the success or constraints faced during program implementation? What did the Bank do to address bottlenecks identified in project preparation and implementation, including those identified in the previous CPEs?
- b. How did the efficiency of investment loans change over the period?
- c. Did the Bank promote the use of country systems (fiduciary and environmental management), especially in the areas of external auditing and procurement? What did the Bank do to improve data generation/dissemination/use, and with what results?
- d. Was the Bank's strategy to reduce and focus the TC resources successful?

### **2. Effectiveness**

- a. To what extent were the Bank's strategic objectives, as stated in the CS, achieved through the Bank-supported operations?
- b. To what extent did investment loans achieve their objectives?
- c. Given that the majority of the PBLs included in the reform package are incomplete, what are the results to date and likelihood of effectiveness? How important were the related TCs for supporting the quality of the policy reforms?
- d. What were the results of the TC portfolio?
- e. To what extent has the Bank identified and mitigated risks?
- f. The effectiveness of the last CS was apparently compromised by the Bank's limited country knowledge and weak dialogue with the authorities. What efforts were made during the current CS to enhance this, and is there evidence of an improvement?

## C. Sustainability and going forward

- 4.4 **Sustainability** refers to “the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the program period” (RE-348-3). The evaluation will address the following question:
- What is the likelihood that the results of Bank's interventions will be sustainable?
- 4.5 To address the evaluation questions, the evaluation will use various sources of information: interviews with key stakeholders and informed observers, including current and former Surinamese officials, IDB managers and staff (notably team leaders of Bank projects and Bank sector specialists), relevant representatives of other international agencies (particularly the IMF, World Bank, and CDB), IDB project beneficiaries, and representatives of Surinamese civil society who are familiar with Suriname's development challenges or the Bank's program. Data and information from IDB and other government sources will be used to document and interpret the extent to which the targeted outcomes of CS and IDB operations have or have not materialized, and the possible causal relationship with Bank-supported reforms.
- 4.6 OVE will also analyze current and prior CSs, Country Programming Documents, loan and grant proposals, monitoring and completion reports, project evaluations, and other relevant material produced by the Bank and executing agencies. OVE will complement the interviews and document review with a statistical analysis of the Bank's administrative databases, where needed. Databases used in the past include the following: administrative budget (BUDGET), project preparation (OPUS), contractual conditions (OPMAS), procurement (PRISM), use of staff time (TRS), and financial transactions (LMS).

## V. TEAM AND TIMELINE

- 5.1 The evaluation team includes Leslie Stone (team leader), Michelle Fryer, Pablo Alonso, Jose Claudio Pires, Lynn Scholl, Hector Valdes Conroy, Maria Jose Hernandez Medina Mora, Adriana Molina, Odette Maciel, Maria Jose Vargas, and Patricia Sadeghi.
- 5.2 The expected timeline for the evaluation is as follows:

Activity	Date
Evaluation missions	May and October 2015
Draft for Government and Management review	February 2016
Delivery of CPE to the Board of Executive Directors	April 2016


### Annex I. Portfolio

	Approved before 2011			Approved 2011-2015			
	Projects with ≥20% undisbursed		Available balance (US\$ million)	Loan approvals		Approved amount (US\$ million)	
Investment loan	1	3.3%	-3.73	6	15.8%	121.7	30.7%
PBLs	---	---	---	9	23.7%	260.0	65.5%
TCs	---	---	---	18	47.4%	7.4	1.9%
Investment grant	---	---	---	1	2.6%	4.4	1.1%
MIF grant	---	---	---	4	10.5%	3.3	0.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>8.27</b>	<b>38</b>		<b>396.8</b>	


	Approved before 2011		
	Projects with ≤20% undisbursed		Available balance (US\$ million)
Investment loan	7	23.3%	1.63
PBLs	---	---	---
TCs	18	60.0%	0.0
Investment grant	---	---	---
MIF grant	4	13.3%	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>		<b>1.63</b>

## Annex II. Additional graphs and tables

**Figure II.1 Number of operations approved by sector, 2010-2015**




**Figure II.2 Amount approved by sector, 2010-2015 (US\$ million)**



Source: OVE/OVEDA and OPS. Current approved amounts.

**Figure II.3 Population by ethnicity**



Source: General Bureau of Statistics of Suriname

**Table II.1 Selected social indicators**

	HDI value	HDI rank	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (PPP US\$)
Suriname	0.705	100	71.0	12.0	7.7	15,113
Guyana	0.638	121	66.3	10.7	8.5	6,341
Belize	0.732	84	73.9	13.7	9.3	9,364
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.740	—	74.9	13.7	7.9	13,767
High HDI	0.735	—	74.5	13.4	8.1	13,231

*Source: UNDP HDI, 2014*

**Annex III. PBL Programmatic Series Anticipated and Approved (July 2015)**

Sector	Operation number	Operation name	Approval year	Status	Amount
Agriculture	SU-L1033	Modernization of Agricultural Public Services - I	2013	completed	15,000,000
	SU-L1032	Modernization of Agricultural Public Services II	2016A	pipeline	
	SU-L1031	Modernization of Agricultural Public Services III	2017A	pipeline	
Energy	SU-L1022	Support to the Institutional and Operational Strengthening of the Energy Sector	2012	completed	15,000,000
	SU-L1035	Support to the Institutional Strengthening of the Energy Sector II	2013	completed	10,000,000
	SU-L1036	Support to institutional & operational strengthening of the energy sector III	2015A	pipeline	30,000,000
Public sector modernization	SU-L1026	Public Capital Expenditure Management Program	2011	completed	20,000,000
	SU-L1028	Strengthening of Public Expenditure Management II	2012	completed	20,000,000
	SU-L1029	Public Expenditure Management III	2015B	pipeline	
	SU-L1037	Revenue Policy and Administration Reform I	2013	completed	20,000,000
	SU-L1040	Revenue policy and administration II	2015A	pipeline	20,000,000
	SU-L1041	Revenue policy and administration III	2016A	pipeline	
Financial	SU-L1023	Financial Sector Strengthening I	2011	completed	40,000,000
	SU-L1034	Financial Sector Strengthening II	2013	completed	100,000,000
	SU-L1030	Financial Sector Strengthening Program III	2016A	pipeline	
Private sector	SU-L1043	Business Climate and Innovation Program I (SUBCIP-I)	2014	Active	20,000,000
	SU-L1045	Business Climate and Innovation II	2016A	pipeline	



### Annex IV. Portfolio by Operation Name, Amount, and Type

Number	Operation Name	Approval year	Current approved amount (US\$)	Disbursed amount (US\$)	Operation type
<b>Operations approved 2011-2015</b>					
SU-T1081	Implementation of the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative in Paramaribo	2015	1,100,000	0	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1076	Institutional Strengthening for the Implementation of the Business Climate (to support reforms for SU-L1043)	2015	280,000	0	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1079	Action Plan for C and D Countries	2015	195,085	17,587	Technical Cooperation
<b>SU-L1039</b>	<b>Support for the Implementation of the EBS Investment Plan</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>33,000,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>INVESTMENT_LOAN</b>
<b>SU-L1043</b>	<b>Business Climate and Innovation Program I (SUBCIP-I)</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>20,000,000</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS/RTC</b>
SU-T1069	Revenue and Expenditure Administration Support	2014	450,000	11,080	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1070	Assessment of Aquifer Potential and Groundwater level	2014	500,000	0	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1072	Support for Active Malaria Case Detection Program	2014	400,541	225,825	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1075	Action Plan for C and D Countries	2014	198,076	174,982	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1077	Support for the Power Sector Reform	2014	410,000	0	Technical Cooperation
<b>SU-L1009</b>	<b>Support to Improve Sustainability of the Electricity Service</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>30,000,000</b>	<b>13,544,652</b>	<b>INVESTMENT_LOAN</b>
<b>SU-L1033</b>	<b>Modernization of Agricultural Public Services - I</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS</b>
<b>SU-L1034</b>	<b>Financial Sector Strengthening II</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>100,000,000</b>	<b>100,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS</b>
<b>SU-L1035</b>	<b>Support to the Institutional Strengthening of the Energy Sector II</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>10,000,000</b>	<b>10,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS</b>
<b>SU-L1037</b>	<b>Revenue Policy and Administration Reform I</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>20,000,000</b>	<b>20,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS</b>
SU-G1001	Development of Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Electrification	2013	4,400,000	264,017	INVESTMENT_GRANT
SU-M1015	Youth Job Skills Training in Suriname	2013	898,034	530,865	MIF_GRANT
SU-T1066	Air Transport Modernization Program	2013	450,000	3,000	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1067	Support for the design of Early Childhood Development Program	2013	550,000	247,259	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1068	Action Plan for C and D Countries	2013	195,688	195,688	Technical Cooperation
<b>SU-L1019</b>	<b>Second Basic Education Improvement Program (2nd BEIP)</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>13,700,000</b>	<b>12,830,341</b>	<b>INVESTMENT_LOAN</b>
<b>SU-L1021</b>	<b>Meerzorg - Albina Integration Corridor Rehabilitation Project - Sup. Financing</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>40,000,000</b>	<b>32,970,690</b>	<b>INVESTMENT_LOAN</b>
<b>SU-L1022</b>	<b>Support to the Institutional and Operational Strengthening of the Energy Sector</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS</b>
<b>SU-L1028</b>	<b>Strengthening of Public Expenditure Management II</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>20,000,000</b>	<b>20,000,000</b>	<b>PBLS</b>
SU-M1017	Food Safety and Income Security in Surinamese Small scale farming	2012	52,514	52,514	MIF_GRANT
SU-M1018	Sustainable Microenterprises in rural communities through Microfinance	2012	736,200	113,174	MIF_GRANT
SU-M1019	Introduction of Sustainable Business Models in Suriname Rural Electrification	2012	1,563,466	149,600	MIF_GRANT
SU-T1055	Support for the Preparation of the Sustainable Energy Framework	2012	700,000	508,518	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1062	Support for Prevention and Control of NCDs	2012	500,000	265,943	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1063	Action Plan for C and D Countries	2012	206,688	206,688	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1064	Support of Modernization of Public Agricultural Services Program	2012	700,000	332,064	Technical Cooperation

Number	Operation Name	Approval year	Current approved amount (US\$)	Disbursed amount (US\$)	Operation type
SU-L1013	Social Protection Support Program	2011	25	25	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-L1023	Financial Sector Strengthening I	2011	40,000,000	40,000,000	PBLS
SU-L1026	Public Capital Expenditure Management Program	2011	20,000,000	20,000,000	PBLS
SU-L1027	Nat. Pop. & Housing Census & Household Budget Survey: Incr. use of Basic Stats.	2011	5,000,000	3,572,420	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-T1057	Support Program for Social Policy in Suriname	2011	710,000	710,000	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1058	Institutional Strengthening of the Central Bank of Suriname	2011	649,784	649,784	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1059	Action Plan for C and D Countries	2011	88,171	88,171	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1060	Public Procurement Strengthening in Suriname	2011	250,000	181,256	Technical Cooperation
<b>Operations approved before 2011</b>					
SU-L1018	Water Supply Infrastructure Rehabilitation	2010	12,000,000	3,731,886	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-M1014	Quality Improvement of the Wood Processing Industry of Suriname	2010	147,050	147,050	MIF_GRANT
SU-T1046	Management for Results -PRODEV	2010	1,493,658	1,493,658	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1053	Technical Support for the Preparation of the Project SU-L1017	2010	101,986	101,986	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1054	Support for Improving Disaster Risk Mgmt. for Climate-Resilient Development	2010	293,048	293,048	Technical Cooperation
SU-L1015	Second Low Income Shelter Program	2009	15,000,000	13,366,751	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-M1012	Improving Skills Standards in Accounting and Financial Management in Suriname	2009	121,438	121,438	MIF_GRANT
SU-T1042	Support to the Energy Sector: Renewable and Bioenergy	2009	399,805	399,805	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1050	Paranam Industrial and Commercial Park	2009	580,366	580,366	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1052	Air Transport Support Program	2009	338,278	338,278	Technical Cooperation
SU-X1001	Governance Update	2009	180,000	180,000	Technical Cooperation
SU-L1006	Meerzorg - Albina Corridor Rehabilitation Project	2008	62,491,081	62,491,081	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-L1011	Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening II	2008	12,796,772	12,796,772	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-T1031	Competitiveness Enhancement Program	2008	246,144	246,144	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1045	Water Supply Master Plan for Suriname	2008	494,200	494,200	Technical Cooperation
SU-M1001	Strengthening of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority	2007	467,727	467,727	MIF_GRANT
SU-M1009	Entrepreneurial Skills Enhancement & Improvement Production Processes	2007	79,754	79,754	MIF_GRANT
SU-T1026	Support for the Sustainable Development of the Interior	2007	630,485	630,485	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1030	Studies for the Road Rehabilitation Meerzorg-Albina	2007	1,484,975	1,484,975	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1034	Socioeconomic Conditions in the Meerzorg-Albina & Paramaribo-Afobaka Corridors	2007	360,000	360,000	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1038	Sustainable Livelihood Program for Saramaka (Maroon) Women	2007	79,263	79,263	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1027	Modernization of Labour Market Institutions in Suriname	2006	149,032	149,032	Technical Cooperation
SU-L1002	Trade Sector Support Program	2005	3,269,168	3,269,168	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU-T1001	Support for the Public Sector Investment System	2005	148,837	148,837	Technical Cooperation
SU-T1007	Support the National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS	2005	747,814	747,814	Technical Cooperation
SU0027	Strengthening of Public Sector Management	2004	1,248,979	1,248,979	INVESTMENT_LOAN
SU0028	Health Sector Facility	2004	4,939,054	4,939,054	INVESTMENT_LOAN
TC9811078	Road Map for Public Sector Reform	2004	490,213	490,213	Technical Cooperation
SU0023	Basic Education Improvement Project	2003	12,440,300	12,440,300	INVESTMENT_LOAN
TC9705081	Action Plan C and D Countries	1997	1,090,303	1,090,303	Technical Cooperation

## Annex V. Previous CPE recommendations

**Table V.1 Summary of recommendations from CPE Suriname 1980-2004 (RE-318):**

- The new CS should assist government to analyze and renew its development model in agreed strategic areas, through an active program of policy dialogue, ESW, and the targeting of TC resources.
- The new strategy should clearly define its strategic goal and development objective at the program level within a results framework, including baseline indicators, benchmarks, and targets.
- Vulnerability, both economic and social, should remain a focus for the Bank in Suriname.
- The Bank should continue to prioritize the imperative for efficiencies in public sector reform.
- The CS should continue to support Suriname's efforts to identify the potential for economic diversification and the expected role of the private sector.
- It is recommended that the Bank review its practice regarding the evaluability of TCs and the reporting of results.
- The slow implementation of Bank projects needs to be addressed.
- To improve coherence, the Bank should review the effectiveness of its current blend of financial and non-financial instruments.
- To enhance investment targeting, program efficiency, and donor coordination, the Bank should work with Suriname to establish a national investment system.
- The Bank should identify ways to optimize the participation of COF professional staff in leading policy dialogue, updating the country strategy, and providing continuity throughout the project cycle.
- The staffing complement of the COF should be reviewed to ensure that there is a good match between technical capacity and language skills.
- As the largest multilateral creditor to Suriname, and as part of its due diligence for the CS, the Bank should address the issue of debt management and the Bank's role in it.
- It is difficult to review past Bank experiences in Suriname due to a lack of official records.

**Table V.2 Recommendations from CPE Suriname 2007-2010 (RE-381):**

1. Reconsider its *modus operandi*.
  - a. Increase funding towards COF and change the skill mix of its staff in the country as it originally intended to do. It should push more forcefully its donor coordination agenda, with the country in lead role. The Bank should use the Paris Declaration's principles to guide not only coordination with other donors but also the Bank's own strategic *modus operandi*.
  - b. Place the gathering of primary data (administrative in key government agencies and surveys by the country's statistical entity) as a central theme, while facilitating the transparent dissemination of information of both the data and its analysis. This should be within a broad strategy of transparency in general, for an informed public debate about policy and the generalized use of evidence based decision making in the country and in the relation between the country and the Bank. The Bank could start by demonstrating the development effectiveness of its operations.
  - c. Define, deliver, measure and report on the strategic use of its large TC portfolio. It should create a local system, embedded in a government entity, which reports on progress (activities and outputs) and is easily accessible to third parties. The system should also include the Bank's analytical work (through TCs, operations and stand-alone studies).
2. Revise the Bank's strategic niche and the corresponding operations. The strategic challenges and niche remain essentially what the Bank identified, through its analytical work
  - a. Pervasive intervention of the public sector in the economy;
  - b. Lack of critical mass of private sector activities;
  - c. Poor social integration
3. The increasing possibility of an intensifying Dutch-disease-resource curse must be added. However, the implementation of the previous country strategy analyzed in this paper shows that the Bank should be careful in ensuring that the mapping of the proposed strategy onto proposed operations and technical assistance has a high country ownership. Elements in the Bank's proposed strategic intent and the corresponding set of operations not taken up by the country should be reported in the next country strategy.