Crime and Violence in Jamaica

IDB Series on Crime and Violence in the Caribbean

Anthony D. Harriott
Marilyn Jones
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Abstract

This report is part of an IDB technical note series on crime and violence in the Caribbean. The overall aim is to establish a baseline of the crime prevention arena against which progress can be assessed. The report compiles the available data from multiple sources in order to provide a diagnosis of the size, characteristics, and changing nature of the crime problem in Jamaica over the last 10 years. In addition, the report provides a survey of the various crime prevention and suppression policies, programmes, and projects adopted by government, private organizations, and non-governmental organizations in recent years. In performing the above-mentioned tasks, the report offers an assessment of the data collection, analysis, and crime response capabilities in Jamaica, and makes suggestions regarding the most effective way forward.

JEL Codes: I39, Y80, J12, O54

Key words: violence, crime, Jamaica, prevention
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<td>BGA</td>
<td>Bureau of Gender Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CBSI</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Security Initiative</td>
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<td>CCPA</td>
<td>Child Care and Protection Act</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Child Development Agency</td>
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<td>CHDR</td>
<td>Citizen Security Survey</td>
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<td>CISOCA</td>
<td>Centre for the Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse</td>
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<td>COMET</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Transformation Project</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
<td>Community Renewal Programme</td>
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<td>CSBI</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Security Initiative</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Community Security Initiative</td>
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<td>CSJP</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Programme</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
<td>Department of Correctional Services</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecution</td>
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<td>ESSJ</td>
<td>Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica</td>
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<td>ICBSPP</td>
<td>Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INDECOM</td>
<td>Independent Commission of Investigation</td>
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<td>JCF</td>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
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<td>Jamaica Social Investment Fund</td>
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<td>JNCVS</td>
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<td>JVPPSDP</td>
<td>Jamaica Violence Prevention, Peace, and Sustainable Development Programme</td>
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<td>LAPOP</td>
<td>Latin American Public Opinion Poll</td>
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<td>MLSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Security</td>
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<td>MNS</td>
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<td>Medium-Term Socio-Economic Framework</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIAL</td>
<td>National Integrity Action Limited</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Plan of Action for Child Justice</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>NPGE</td>
<td>National Policy for Gender Equality</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Security Policy</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>OCR</td>
<td>Office of the Children's Registry</td>
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<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<td>OPD</td>
<td>Office of the Public Defender</td>
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<td>PAHO</td>
<td>Pan American Health Organization</td>
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<td>PICA</td>
<td>Passport, Immigration and Citizenship Agency</td>
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<td>PIOJ</td>
<td>Planning Institute of Jamaica</td>
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<td>PMI</td>
<td>Peace Management Initiative</td>
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<td>PSOJ</td>
<td>Private Sector Organization of Jamaica</td>
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<td>RHS</td>
<td>Jamaica Reproductive Health Survey</td>
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<td>RISE</td>
<td>Rise Life Management</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Sports Development Foundation</td>
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<td>STATIN</td>
<td>Statistical Institute of Jamaica</td>
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<td>TNAD</td>
<td>Transnational Crime and Narcotics Division</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>VPA</td>
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<td>VSU</td>
<td>Victim Support Unit</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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<td>WROC</td>
<td>Women's Research and Outreach Centre</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Crime is now the main public safety issue for Jamaicans and a significant threat to the country's human and economic development. Data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), public health data, and survey information show high levels of criminality and corruption on the island. Jamaica has homicide rates that are notably higher than both the regional and global averages, although since 2010 there has been a significant decline in violent crimes and indeed serious crimes in general.

In 2010, there was a 7.5 per cent decline in major crimes over 2009 (from 437 to 409 per 100,000 inhabitants) and a 15 per cent decline in murder (from 62 to 53 per 100,000 inhabitants). The trend evident in JCF statistics is also reflected in survey results showing that while security (crime) is considered the most important problem among citizens, reported crime and perception of crime are decreasing across time.

The declining but still very high rate of violent crime is now fuelled by organized crime, gang activities, and access to guns, among other factors. JCF data show that in 2013, 79 per cent of homicides were motivated by gang activities. International efforts to control the illegal movement of firearms have not significantly reduced their availability. Jamaica has acquired firearm marking machines, but the structure of trade in illegal arms has not been studied and is not well understood.

Administrative data show that the main victims and perpetrators of violent crimes are young males between the ages of 16 and 24. Women and girls are the main victims of sexual crimes. Data from both the JCF and the Office of the Children’s Registry show high rates of sexual victimization. Reported rapes and sexual intercourse with children and adolescents are particularly problematic. According to the 2010 Caribbean Community Youth Report, Jamaica has high rates of early sexual initiation, with consequences such as childhood pregnancy (UNFPA 2013), higher rates of HIV/AIDS, and interruption in education (CARICOM 2010a, 110).

Where crimes were previously concentrated in the Kingston metropolitan area, JCF crime data by division show they are now more dispersed geographically, especially in sub-urban areas. In short, the Jamaican crime situation remains fluid, and this development presents new challenges for crime prevention and control.

Research, Data, and Evaluation

Since the implementation of sector plans associated with Vision 2030, Jamaica's long-term development plan, there have been a range of collaborative programmes and projects aimed at achieving a safe, secure, and just society. Most initiatives have focused on urban violence. In principle, the three-year Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Frameworks represent an evidence-based and, by extension, rigorous research agenda. Nonetheless, the environment for these initiatives is uneven, and capacity for research and evaluation outside of agencies
such as the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and the Ministry of National Security (MNS) is unknown.

Sustainable programme funding can significantly affect the ability to achieve intended goals, and this increases the importance of public-private partnerships as well as citizen buy-ins. Areas of focus for programmes include gender-based violence and organized crime and associated activities. However, greater emphasis is needed on crime prevention. While the MNS has recognized the importance of crime prevention, there does not seem to be the requisite financial outlays for these programmes.

**Legislation and Policy**

Since 2009, the government of Jamaica has pursued an active legislative agenda that has collectively updated and strengthened the framework for addressing sexual violence against women and girls, strengthened criminal penalties, improved accountability of the police, established new law enforcement units, and clarified or updated definitions. Gender-based legislation has increased punishment for perpetrators, and several laws have been amended to conform to treaty obligations, increase penal sanctions, and strengthen the response to international and transnational crimes.

Domestically, most legislation has sought to address specific offences, and three laws have been passed in response to high-profile events that attracted intensive media coverage. Four of the five legislative priorities established by the MNS for 2013-2014 were achieved through passage of the Law Reform (Fraudulent Transactions) (Special Provisions) Act in 2013; the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) (Amendment) Act in 2013; the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act in 2013; and the Criminal Justice (Suppression of Organized Criminal Groups) Act in 2014. Several laws increased the powers of law enforcement personnel and restricted the rights of citizens. This was counterbalanced to some extent by laws establishing agencies such as the Police Oversight Authority and the Independent Commission of Investigation (INDECOM). While significant challenges remain, INDECOM reports directly to Parliament, and press releases show that there have been changes, such as a steady decline in security force fatalities.1 Despite the active legislative agenda, however, the island is still without a sexual harassment law.

Vision 2030 establishes the policy framework for Jamaica to achieve status as a developed nation by 2030, and the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS) provides the framework for implementation of crime prevention and community safety initiatives. The NCPCSS and associated frameworks such as the Community Renewal Programme and the Unite for Change Initiative represent the framework for the government’s 10-year process to reduce crime and violence. In the past, Jamaica’s response to crime and violence focused predominantly on law enforcement, but the new framework integrates an epidemiological framework for violence intervention.

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A range of interventions have been implemented and the five core programmes – the Citizen Security and Justice Programme\(^2\), Community Empowerment and Transformation Project, Jamaica Violence Prevention, Peace and Sustainable Development Programme, and Inner City Basic Services for the Poor – have been evaluated. However, not all of the programmes used data and evaluation from start-up through design and implementation. It is important to build capacity for monitoring and evaluation so that programme outcomes can be appropriately identified and recorded.

Despite inadequate levels of evaluation, several projects and programmes have been identified as promising. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s South-South Best Practices for Crime Prevention (UNODC 2005) identified the Women Crisis Centre, Women’s Media Watch, Grace & Staff Development Foundation, Change from Within, and August Town Crime Prevention Programme as best practices. Similarly, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 2013) identified the Adolescent Mother Programme of the Women’s Centre Foundation of Jamaica as a good practice programme and as a model for other countries dealing with teen pregnancy.

Analysis of violence prevention reveals that despite being pervasive, violence is predictable and preventable. The World Health Organization’s 2002 World Report on Violence and Health emphasizes the need for global responses, stating that “the factors that contribute to violent responses – whether they are of attitude and behaviour or related to larger social, economic, political and cultural conditions – can be changed. Violence can be prevented. This is not an article of faith, but a statement based on evidence” (Krug et al. 2002, 3).

Jamaican government policy documents such as the National Security Policy for Jamaica and Vision 2030 acknowledge that security is a public good that citizens expect the State to provide. Central to providing security is reducing violent crimes, preventing increases in crime, strengthening the justice system, and promoting the rule of law. However, these are predicated on reducing poverty and increasing opportunity and meaningful involvement in the labour force.

In Jamaica, crime locations are predictable and violent crimes are concentrated in known areas. These locations vary in population, core functions, and activities, but in most instances they are “hot spots” that are vulnerable to criminogenic risk factors such as drugs, guns, gangs, and high rates of youth unemployment.

This situation informs the rationale for dismantling garrison and informal squatter communities – environments that account for a disproportionate percentage of Jamaica’s violent crimes. Locations are predictable, but no single strategy is sufficient to prevent or reduce crimes. Crime reduction is primarily a policing mandate, hence the policing plan outlines priority actions. However, crime prevention initiatives are typically geared toward non-State institutions, particularly within the institutional frameworks identified by the International Centre for the

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\(^2\) This programme has been implemented since 2001 by the Ministry of National Security with funding support from the Inter-American Development Bank. The programme is currently in its third phase of implementation.

Regardless of the level and type of intervention, violence prevention strategies require the following (WHO 2005, 1):

- Developing safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and caregivers
- Developing life skills in children and adolescents
- Reducing access to guns, knives, and poisons
- Promoting gender equality to prevent violence against women
- Changing cultural and social norms that support violence
- Implementing victim identification, care, and support programmes.

Crime prevention is a long-term goal, whereas crime reduction is an immediate need. Some crime prevention responses work, others do not. Some are promising and others have not been adequately tested. Some programmes fail to prevent or reduce risk factors for crime. The success of many programmes designated as crime prevention is often hard to measure. Consequently, what works is based on a preponderance of evidence showing that a programme is effective in preventing crime or reducing risk factors for crime in the specific social context in which it was evaluated. Therefore, rigorous testing can help to provide guidance about what works. Evaluation is also important for effectively allocating resources.
I. INTRODUCTION

This introductory section:

- Summarizes key findings on trends for major violent and property crimes in Jamaica, including violence against women and children
- States the purpose and limits of the baseline mapping exercise
- Explains briefly how the exercise was conducted
- Introduces the main public, private, and non-profit stakeholders working to reduce and prevent crime and violence
- Summarizes the main findings on the adequacy of data collection, analysis, and evaluation of programmes
- Briefly mentions any programmes that have implemented evaluations with positive results
- Summarizes key recommendations.

Crime Trends

Jamaica’s post-independence environment has been characterized by high (and until recently increasing) rates of violent crimes and relatively low and declining rates of property crimes. In 2009, Jamaica’s homicide rates peaked at 62.2 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants. From 2000-2010, Jamaica was one of few places in the world where homicides neither declined nor stabilized (Malby 2010, 22) and despite a decline starting in 2009, Jamaica’s homicide rate was still ranked sixth highest in the world, according to the Global Homicide Report (UNODC 2013b).

Indeed, for more than three decades crime and violence have been primary issues on the Jamaican governmental agenda. Two central issues have been Jamaica’s ranking among jurisdictions with high rates of homicides and the impact of such a high-crime environment on the nation’s development.

Since 2009, however, the main development in Jamaica’s situation has been the significant decline in all categories of violent and other serious crimes. Both violent crimes and the most troubling types of property crimes declined during this period. More specifically, between 2009 and 2013, homicides declined by 30.2 per cent, shootings by 25.8 per cent, and robberies by 12.5 per cent.

The serious crimes (in the sense that the police have defined the term) that were exceptions to this trend include rape, which increased by 20.5 per cent. At the time of this writing, official data on burglary for the entire period under review were still not available, although data for break-ins – that is, the daylight equivalent of burglary – were available. Burglary is classified as “serious,” while break-ins are not. The difference turns on the time of occurrence, which is reasonably presumed to make one more dangerous than the other. Break-ins typically occur when contact with victims is unlikely, thereby reducing the likelihood of a break-in becoming a robbery or occasioning other violent crimes. From 2011 to 2013, Jamaica’s burglary rate remained stable at 21.7 and 21.5 per 100,000 inhabitants for the respective years.
Victimization surveys conducted during this period suggest that the decline in the rates of reported violent and other serious crimes may indicate a similar change in the true crime rate. The Latin American Public Opinion Poll (LAPOP) surveys (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014)\(^3\) as well as the National Crime Victimization Surveys (NCVS) (2006 and 2012-2013) indicate an incremental decline in the aggregate victimization rate. This rate would not be very sensitive to changes in the most serious violent crimes such as homicides, as changes in frequency as a percentage of the number of all crimes would be quite small. The sample sizes are too small for these surveys to be used to validate changes in specific crimes. The surveys simply suggest that the changes in reported crimes are likely to reflect similar changes in the true rates for these crimes, and that the overall security situation has become more positive.

This report has to be somewhat tentative on issues related to sexual violence against adults and minors, domestic violence, gender-based violence, and, more generally, crimes against vulnerable populations. Measuring these types of violence is best done by large sample victimization surveys and specialized surveys. This measurement gap ought to be narrowed.

Nevertheless, data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) for 2009 to 2013 show an increase in sexual violence over this five-year period.\(^4\) Some other forms of violence against women such as homicides declined in absolute terms by some 15 per cent, but as a percentage of all homicides they remained stable at approximately 10 per cent. There are no available estimates of injuries due to domestic violence.

Victims of gender-based violence receive some support from State institutions such as the Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA), which is a unit of the JCF, as well as from NGOs such as the Women’s Resource Outreach Centre, which provides shelter services.

Despite a general decline in major crime since 2009, the sources of data on child victimization show an increase, although not for all crimes and abuses. These data show that childhood is dangerous for Jamaican children, who increasingly come in contact with criminal justice and health institutions as both victims and perpetrators of crime and violence. They face violence such as corporal punishment at home and in school, as well as in institutions supposedly designed for their care and protection. The situation for girls is further complicated because of the consequences of sexual victimization in terms of adolescent pregnancy and HIV/AIDS.

**The Response**

Jamaica’s long-term development plan, Vision 2030, aims to put the country in a position to attain developed-country status by 2030.\(^5\) The plan acknowledges that public safety cannot be achieved while Jamaicans operate under a cloud of fear and insecurity. It emphasizes

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\(^3\) These surveys may be distinguished from the reports of their results. The latter are cited by the names of their authors and are included in the bibliography. At the time of writing this report, the 2014 survey had already been conducted but the report had not yet been published.

\(^4\) These data are presented in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.21 in Section II of this report. Reports of carnal abuse declined (Figure 2.20).

the importance of reducing crime and violence and seeks to strengthen governance to overcome the various challenges that cut across Jamaica’s development spheres.

Other Jamaican government policy documents – such as the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS), the National Security Policy for Jamaica, and the Unite for Change Initiative – also recognize that reducing violent crimes, strengthening the justice system, and promoting the rule of law are central to security as a public good that citizens expect the State to provide.

Jamaica’s ability to consolidate the recent decline in serious crimes is related to the performance imperatives, integrity imperatives, and rights-respecting imperatives of criminal justice agencies. It also depends on the ability to design and implement more comprehensive crime prevention programmes.

Purpose of the Report

The objective of this report is to review existing data on crime and violence in Jamaica and on the reduction and prevention policies, programmes, and projects the country has adopted since 2009, when the island’s homicide rate peaked at 63 per 100,000 inhabitants. To illustrate the chronic nature of the problem, crime trend data will be provided for the period from 2000 to 2013.

Section II of the report outlines crime trends, and Section III describes the institutional framework to reduce and control crime. Section IV describes and examines the evidential foundations for policies, programmes, and projects that have been implemented within the last five years by the government of Jamaica to prevent and control crime and violence. The analysis stays with a Jamaica-specific context. The section starts by reviewing the state of basic knowledge with regard to national-level determinants and community- and individual-level risk factors. It draws on the development context to describe the Jamaican crime environment. In Section V, the baseline mapping exercise also reviews and assesses Jamaica’s data generation and analysis capabilities as well as the state of knowledge and the evidential foundation for crime and violence prevention policies, programmes, and projects. The review focuses on surveying the state of knowledge, with special reference to government policies, programmes, and projects that directly address crime. It emphasizes the current landscape and therefore is contextualized with reference to national-level determinants and community- and individual-level risk factors since 2009. Chapter VI presents recommendations to strengthen crime and violence prevention and control going forward.

Limits of the Study

This baseline study is a survey of the state of knowledge, evidential foundation, and extent of evaluation research for policies, programmes, and projects implemented in Jamaica to directly address crime and violence. The baseline for crime trends is anchored in 2009 because during that year (1) Jamaica’s murder rate peaked, (2) Jamaica launched its national development plan (Vision 2030) to reach developed-nation status, and (3) benchmarking was conducted of national security and safety outcomes in the Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF). The MTF was the initial prioritized action plan for
the first three years of Vision 2030 Jamaica. As the frame of reference for implementing the plan and designing ways to more effectively align programmes and activities with the national budget, the MTF presents national outcomes and details the strategies and actions needed to advance what it describes as a “safe, secure and prosperous nation.” This, then, establishes ideal national-level benchmarks and allows for the incorporation of the NCPCSS.

The literature review is restricted to analyses of programmes and projects specifically intended to have an impact on crime in Jamaica. Initiatives not primarily designed for this purpose, such as the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), are in the main excluded.\(^6\) The literature review also excludes any information not yet published, not made available by the end of September 2014, or not formally released to the authors of this report.

**Methodology and Data Sources**

This report relies primarily on secondary sources that are in the public domain or that were made available during the course of the study with the understanding that they would be referenced. The report relies mainly on official government sources of data and information on the State institutions that are discussed. Very limited primary research was conducted, and where this was done, it was in an effort to fill some of the gaps in the secondary sources. Any methodological notes required are listed in the respective sections of this report.

The bibliography was generated from systematic searches of academic journal databases, government of Jamaica documents, and personal knowledge of the authors. The search produced 68 academic journal articles, 26 books, book chapters, or monographs, and 65 research reports. These results represent an underestimation of the output on crime in Jamaica, as much of this output is not available online. Each source was assessed for its methodological rigor, theoretical foundation, and contribution to the body of literature in its field. There is a plethora of media reports of crime and violence in Jamaica, so the articles chosen speak to specific issues or details not found elsewhere.

Crime and violence prevention and reduction are central to Jamaica’s security landscape. Therefore, the overall aim of this report is to establish a baseline of the crime prevention arena against which progress can then be assessed.

**Stakeholders**

The crime and violence prevention and control infrastructure involves a range of stakeholders that, in the main, fall into three categories: (1) public institutions comprised of government ministries, departments, and agencies; (2) private sector organizations; and (3) non-profit groups comprised of civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, academia, and individuals. These national, regional, and international stakeholders are involved in short-, medium-, and long-term public-private partnerships and have varying degrees of commitment, involvement, and investment in the government’s crime prevention, control, and reduction initiatives. The

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\(^6\) The JSIF was established in 1996 as a component of the government’s poverty alleviation strategy to channel resources into small-scale, community-based projects. While crime prevention can be a result of such initiatives, the design was for poverty reduction.
government continues to benefit from loans, grants, and technical assistance from international development partners, particularly multilateral financial institutions and the private sector. These stakeholders collaborate on projects and programmes that utilize sector-specific or cross-sectoral approaches that for the most part focus on urban violence in volatile communities. Strong private-public partnerships with non-State actors can reach communities in ways that governments cannot.

Data

While there are a growing number of actors in the field of crime reduction, there is still a deficit in the evaluations of the projects and programmes with which they are involved. Good evaluations rely on good-quality data. Data on crime and violence fall into three categories: (1) official (administrative) crime statistics based on all categories of crime that are reported to the police, (2) health reports on violence-related injuries, and (3) surveys. These data sources are supplemented by data collected from agencies that provide services to victims such as children and women. Some governmental agencies, such as the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), as well as the University of the West Indies, are repositories for data.

Despite advances in data collection, an examination of the current institutional framework for collecting and analysing data on crime and violence in Jamaica reveals that, while much data are generated and collected, they are not readily accessible to the general public. Nor are they always amenable to assessment by the responsible institutions or to programme evaluations. Indeed, there is a need for more standardized, robust, comprehensive, accessible, and transparent data collection and analysis to inform the design, intervention, and implementation of programmes to combat crime and violence. Moreover, many projects and programmes were not designed to be evaluated.

Summary of Key Recommendations

- Ensure greater trustworthiness of data that are generated by both State and non-State institutions and actors, including data on reported crimes, and data in victimization surveys and other crime-related surveys. This outcome could be achieved by various means, including an independent crime observatory.
- Support specialized surveys that include measuring crime and violence against vulnerable groups as a tool for more equal distribution of the protective resources of the State.
- Better estimate and analyse crimes that constrain economic development – particularly those that are still largely or totally absent from reported statistics, such as extortion and protection rackets. A regularized business victimization survey would help considerably in providing evidence-based responses to the victimization of businesses. Such an initiative could be jointly funded by the State and the private sector.
- Strengthen crime control and prevention design and evaluation capabilities within and outside of the State.
Better structure institutional learning via systematic self-assessments, external evaluations, and the dissemination of the knowledge and experiences generated. This would help to ensure the iterative advance of the more successful projects and programmes.

An important aspect of the baseline mapping study is an estimation of the problem, which is summarized in the next section of this report.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA

The main features of the domestic crime and security situation in Jamaica are:

- A significant decline in violent crimes and other serious crimes from 2009-2013, with rape as the only exception to this trend. However, the decline in serious crimes has not altered the ratio of violent to property crimes.
- Declining but still very high rates of homicide, with gang violence accounting for most homicides and serving as the main engine of the homicide rate.
- High rates of gun use in serious crimes.
- Low and declining rates of property crime.
- A low aggregate crime victimization rate relative to other Caribbean countries.
- Criminal impunity, as evidenced by the low conviction rates for serious crimes.
- A high level of insecurity among the population.

This section describes the main and most basic crime trends in Jamaica. It first provides an overview of patterns of the Jamaican crime problem and trends in violent and selected property crimes. It then describes the homicide problem analytically before turning to a discussion of violence in the home and sexual and gender-based violence. This is followed by a brief description of violence in schools and the country’s gang and organized crime problem. The period reviewed is from 2000 to 2013, with a particular focus after 2009, as this period was clearly a moment of opportunity and perhaps a turning point that will mark a sustained decline in violent crime.

The data sources used are:

- Administrative data (police, social services, public health, NGOs, and other relevant sources);
- Findings from the relevant literature on the subject.

For some four decades, the main feature of the crime and security situation in Jamaica has been the high rate of violent crime. The salience of this feature can be expressed in terms of the ratio of violent to property crimes. Since 1977, and contrary to the typical Caribbean pattern, the number of violent crimes in Jamaica has been greater than the number of property crimes (Harriott 1996). By 1999, the ratio was approximately 2:1, and some 40 per cent of all crimes were violent (Robotham 2003, 200).

Since 2009, however, an important feature of the security situation in Jamaica has been a significant decline in reports of the most violent crimes and other serious crimes. Indeed, there has been a 12.4 per cent decline in the aggregated frequency of reported violent

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7 See Appendix 2.1 for further discussion of data sources.
crimes (murder, shootings, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault). This decline altered the ratio of violent to property crimes from approximately 1.8:1 in 2009 to 1.7:1 in 2013 (Figure 2.1). The change in the ratio is incremental. Thus, despite the decline in reports of violent crimes, this type of crime continues to be dominant and remains a distinguishing feature of the Jamaican situation.

There are, however, some difficulties with the continuity and thus comparability of the categories. For example, in 2013 the JCF removed robbery from the violent crimes category and re-categorized it as a property crime.\(^8\) This report, however, continues to list robbery as a violent crime because (1) it is distinguished from other property crimes by the use of a weapon (including but not limited to firearms) in the commission of the crime and is therefore marked by violence; and (2) this continuity of categorization permits comparability with earlier work. Similarly, aggravated assault is not consistently used in the police reports. It is a merger of the crimes of felonious wounding and wounding with intent. For comparability, this report therefore makes an effort to use aggravated assault for all of the years under review. Thus, where the term does not appear in the data sources – as in the Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ) and JCF crime reports – we try to constitute this category as the sum of these two crimes, although we cannot claim great success in doing so. Until this series of data is properly constituted, there is a risk that data on aggregated assaults will distort the true picture regarding the extent of the decline in violent crimes. Assaults account for a large number of violent crimes, but we have little idea of the reporting patterns and thus the reliability over time of these data. The number of annual observations recorded by the hospital surveillance system (which uses the standard International Classification of Diseases Revision 10 coding system but with modifications for suicide) suggests that there is gross under-reporting of these crimes.\(^9\) In 2013, only 599 aggravated assaults were reported to the police. If the reported assaults are added to the violent crimes category for 2013 but are only partly included or completely excluded for the other years, then the effect of this crime on the behaviour of violent crimes may be misrepresented.

With regard to property crimes, the reporting and available official data are not consistent. For example, data on motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicles are not always made available. Similarly, for some years (including 2013), data on burglaries have not been made public. Following the JCF, we stipulatively define, rather narrowly, serious property crimes as break-ins, larceny, and car theft. As data on theft of vehicles were not available for the entire 2009-2013 period, this crime category was excluded from the computations for Figure 2.1. The property crimes category is thus underestimated (but the comparisons in Figure 2.1 are consistent). Later in the text, we extend the discussion of property crimes to include some of the less serious property crimes.

\(^{8}\) See the 2013 Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.

\(^{9}\) The hospital surveillance system is guided by a training manual that contains the measurement instruments and operational definitions. See Appendix 2.2.
We now turn to a more detailed description of these two categories of violent and property crimes. Figure 2.2 highlights the rates of violent crimes in 2013. The rates for murder, shooting, robbery, and aggravated assaults were 44, 46, 98, and 22 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. For the first three crimes (murder, shooting, and robbery), these rates represented declines of 30.1 per cent, 25.8 per cent, and 12.5 per cent, respectively, from 2009 to 2013. In the absence of adequate data on aggravated assaults for the entire period, we are unable to estimate the change in the rate for that category. Contrary to the general trend, there were 30 incidents of rape per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013, up from 24.9 per 100,000 in 2009.
Gun use in the commission of violent crimes is prevalent. In 2013, some 73.4 per cent of homicides, 16 per cent of rapes, and 71 per cent of robberies involved gun use. These percentages approximate the means for the period of decline (and were 72 per cent, 12 per cent, and 69 per cent, respectively, over 2010-2013). And even though the rates of these crimes have sharply declined during the period under review, the proportions of these crimes that were committed with the aid of a gun have remained fairly stable. Figure 2.3 shows the close tracking of (a) total number of robberies, by (b) number of robberies by gun.

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.
Note: Aggravated assault is a merger of the crimes of felonious wounding and wounding with intent.

10 The source of these data is the Statistics Unit of the JCF.
As was the case with violent crimes, there was also a decline in reported property crimes. Based on the rather limited definition of property crimes used in Figure 2.1, these crimes declined by 6.5 per cent from 2009 to 2013.

Given the problems that are associated with statistics on reported crimes (under-reporting, under-recording, and the general trustworthiness of these data), it is always useful to check the trends in police data against victimization surveys and other sources of data. The LAPOP surveys provide high-quality data on crime victimization for the period from 2006 to 2014. These data, presented in Figure 2.4, hint that perhaps there has indeed been a decline in the true crime rate.

Consistent with these results (and with the police statistics), there has been a decline in the feeling of neighbourhood insecurity among the population. Feelings of neighbourhood insecurity have been consistently lower than feelings related to national insecurity or security outside of the boundaries of one’s neighbourhood. We cite data on neighbourhood insecurity rather than those on national insecurity because the former are more experientially based. People tend to feel safer in familiar surroundings and where there is social support (UNDP 2010a; UNODC 2007). This indicator is therefore a good measure of insecurity. However, the sharp decline in serious crimes is only associated with an incremental decline in feelings of neighbourhood insecurity (Figure 2.5). Perhaps this outcome is to be expected, as neighbourhood security/insecurity may not be very sensitive to short-term changes in the rates of violent and other crimes nationally.
Figure 2.4. Criminal Victimization, 2006-2014 (per cent)

Source: AmericasBarometer; LAPOP Surveys, 2006-2014.
Note: The years in the figure are the years of publication. The data represent the previous years. Thus, 2010 actually represents the finding for 2009 – the peak year in reported violent victimization. The question posed to respondents was as follows: VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No

Figure 2.5. Feelings of Neighbourhood Insecurity in Jamaica, 2006-2014 (per cent)

Source: AmericasBarometer; LAPOP Surveys, 2006-2014.
Note: The question posed to respondents was as follows: AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe

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An analysis of the reasons for the decline in violent and serious property crime is beyond the scope of this report. This is an important task that needs to be undertaken, because properly assessing and drawing the appropriate lessons from these experiences are key to better informing the development of strategies and programmes. Nevertheless, with regard to the decline in violent crimes, the extradition of Christopher Coke and the subsequent assault on organized crime and street gangs nationally appeared to mark a turning point in Jamaica.\footnote{“PM Commends Security Forces on Crime Reduction,” \textit{Jamaica Observer}, January 11, 2011. \url{http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/PNP-commends-security-forces-on-crime-reduction}.}{11}

**The Homicide Problem**

Perhaps the most closely observed indicator of violent crime is the homicide rate. The term is used in this report interchangeably with suspected murder. The official reports list this crime as murder, but the murders are really suspected murders based on the initial assessments of the police investigators, not the pronouncements of a court of law. This category therefore included cases that may later be declared manslaughter or justifiable homicide by further police investigation or the ruling of a court. Indeed, only some 5-8 per cent of these cases result in a conviction for murder.

In 2009, when the homicide rate peaked at 63 per 100,000 inhabitants (Figure 2.6), Jamaica had the third highest homicide rate in the world (UNODC 2011, 22-24), and in 2013, when the homicide rate had declined to 44/100,000, Jamaica was ranked sixth (UNODC 2013a, 2013b). Figure 2.6 depicts the sharp decline of 30.2 per cent in the homicide rate for the period 2009 to 2013.

![Figure 2.6. Homicide Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants, 2000-2013](image)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.
When Jamaica’s homicide trend is compared with other Caribbean countries, Jamaica stands out for its extraordinarily high rates over a fairly long period (Figure 2.7). During the period under review, it is only after 2010 that Jamaica began to approximate the rates of the other countries in the region that also have persistently high rates and problems of chronic violence, such as The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago.

**Figure 2.7. Comparison of Homicide Rates per 100,000 population in Jamaica and Other Caribbean Countries, 2000-2013**

![Graph showing homicide rates per 100,000 population in Jamaica and other Caribbean countries, 2000-2013.](image)

Sources: Numbers of reported homicide cases were provided by the Royal Bahamas Police Force, Strategic Policy and Planning Unit; the Jamaica Constabulary Force; the Crime and Problem Analysis Branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service; the Suriname Police Corps; and the Royal Barbados Police Force. Note: Homicide rates were calculated using population estimates (Medium Fertility) by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (UNDESA 2013).

**Profile of Homicide Victims**

The profile of homicide victims identifies who is most at risk and when, where, and why. The JCF collects very limited data on victims, perhaps because the immediate interest is in data that are helpful for solving cases. There is less interest in data that may be useful for understanding the patterns of victimization and inform problem-solving.

Most victims of homicide are male, young, uneducated, and poor. In 2013, 90 per cent of all victims were male (Figure 2.8), a figure that approximates the mean proportion of male
victims for the period 2009-2013 (Figure 2.9). Given that most killings are gang-related and confrontational, the gender profile of the killers is expected to be symmetrical. With the decline in the homicide rate, it may be reasonably expected that the proportion of female victims would have declined, but rather it has remained stable during the period of decline (Figure 2.9). This suggests that females and males have both benefitted proportionately from the decline.

![Figure 2.8. Murder Victims by Gender, 2013 (per cent)](image)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.

![Figure 2.9. Murder Victims by Gender, 2009-2013 (per cent)](image)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.

Being male and young multiplies a person’s risk of being a victim of homicide. Figure 2.10 depicts the age distribution of victims for 2013. Some 51 per cent were 35 years old or less. Of those victims, 27 per cent were ages 26-35, 20 per cent were 18-25, and 4 per cent were younger than 18. Persons ages 36-45 accounted for 21 per cent of the victims, and persons
over the age of 45 accounted for 21 per cent. Murder is thus distributed across all age groups but is primarily a problem that affects youth.

However, although the problem disproportionally affects youth, not every age set is disproportionally affected. The 15-24 age group represents 19.5 per cent of the population and accounts for 20.4 per cent of all homicide victims. And while persons under 35 years of age represent 59.4 per cent of the population, as noted above, they account for 51 per cent of homicide victims. These data suggest a near symmetry for those age groups. However, while the 26-35 age group accounts for 15.8 per cent of the population, it accounts for 27 per cent of murder victims. The disproportionality is evident in this latter age group. People are expected to age into and out of the high risk pools or age-sets of potential victims.

As may be expected, there is concern with the victimization of the very young and the very old. Violence against children is discussed below. Here the discussion is therefore limited to noting that during the peak murder year of 2009, there were 23 child murders (victims age 0-14), which accounted for 1.4 per cent of all murders in that year. In 2013, there were 17 such murders, which also accounted for 1.4 per cent of the murders in that year. In other words, the decline in the homicide rate has not altered the proportion of child murders. Some of these children were innocent victims of retaliatory gang violence that holds entire families liable (Harriott 2008), some are the victims of indiscriminate shootings, and a few reflect the troubling reality of child involvement in gang life.

**Figure 2.10. Homicide Victims by Age, 2013 (per cent)**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of homicide victims by age group in 2013.]

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.

At the opposite end of the age spectrum is the problem of murders of the elderly. This problem has been highlighted in the work of Mahoney (2004), who explores the effects of elderly homicide on surviving family members as secondary victims and how they cope or fail to cope with these tragedies. She argues for more programme support for these victims.
What is even more compelling is the need for programme support for dependent elders who have lost needed material support due to the murder of supportive family members.

As is the case of children, the elderly are vulnerable people who for the most part are innocent victims. Childhood and old age are expected to protect people from criminal victimization, most of all from murder. The monitoring of changes in victimization among these age groups is thus a good indicator of potential changes in attitude regarding the use of discriminate violence, and of the efficacy of boundaries and security established socially to protect these groups.

In the context of a declining homicide rate, it may be expected that this decline would disproportionately favour more vulnerable groups, and that the homicide rates for these groups would decline to an even greater degree than the general homicide rate. We particularly expect this to be true of homicides of the elderly (young children may be at greater risk simply by being more in the presence of their adult parents).

The data presented in Figures 2.11 and 2.12 permit some comment on changes in the age structure of the victims during the period of declining violence (2009-2013). Figure 2.11 does not distinguish young children and the aged, but looking at the specified age groupings in the figure one can note some change in the age-related patterns of victimization. These changes are less sharp in the distribution of the proportions of victims, but striking in the shift in the rank order of groups by level of risk. Thus:

- The 26-35 year old group is the group most victimized both during the period of increasing homicides (2000-2009) and the period of decline (after 2009). It is the most at-risk group, perhaps the most conflict-prone group, and the group most likely to use violence to resolve conflicts.
- The 18-25 year old group experienced a relative change in its risk ranking during the period of decline in the homicide rate, moving from the group second most at risk in 2009 to become the fourth most at risk in 2013.
- The reverse is true for the over 45 group. This group was the least (fourth) at risk in 2009, but became the second highest at-risk group in 2013.

These developments urge further analysis beyond the scope of this report.
Figure 2.11. Homicide Victims by Age, 2009-2013 (frequency counts)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.

Figure 2.12 is more finely age-grouped and thus allows for a closer examination of the older age groups. According to these data, in 2013:

- Homicides of the elderly (age 65 and older) accounted for 3.5 per cent of all homicides, a decline compared with the period prior to 2010. In the mid-1990s, the comparable statistic was 5.1 per cent (Mahoney 2004, 39). However, for ages 55 and over, the change goes in the opposite direction. While in 2009 this age group accounted for 8.2 per cent of all homicide victims, in 2013 it accounted for 9.3 per cent.
- Sex as a protective factor matters less in the 65 and older age group. Within this group, male victimization is less than three times higher than that of female victimization. In contrast, in the 25-29 age group – the most at-risk group – male victimization is 16 times higher than female victimization.
- The proportion is highest in the 25-29 age group at 15.3 per cent, then declines to 1.8 per cent in the 60-64 age group, but then rises again in the over 65 group. The reasons for the increased proportion of victimization in this latter age group relative to the younger (60-64) group, as well as its close approximation to the victimization proportion in the 55-59 group, may be worthy of further examination. More information is needed on the profile of the oldest group. They are not expected to be as wealthy as the middle-aged group and they generally tend to be more socially vulnerable.
Profile of Homicide Perpetrators

As is the case with homicide victims, the vast majority of homicide suspects are male and young. In 2013, some 97.3 per cent of all persons arrested for murder were males, and 84.8 per cent of these suspects were age 35 or younger (Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13. Age and Gender of Persons Arrested for Murder, 2013 (frequency counts)
Homicide Motives

The motives of murder suspects are an important concern of homicide investigators. The JCF classifies motives as gang-related; criminal (not gang-related), which includes robbery; mob killings; domestic; and not yet established (which has replaced “undetermined”) (Figure 2.14). The classifications are constantly changing in the direction of revealing less. During the period under review (2009-2013), for example, some of the categories that capture conflict-related murders were removed. The current focus of the JCF is on gangs, which seems to be the reference point for categorizing the motivations of homicides (gang and non-gang are thus the main groupings). We will return to the problems with the definition of “gang-related” later in this section.

According to the JCF, in 2013, gang-related motives accounted for 79 per cent of all murders, non-gang criminal motives (including robbery-related deaths) accounted for 14 per cent, and domestic conflicts accounted for 6 per cent (Figure 2.14). The non-gang criminal category may become problematic, as it conceals many details. Interestingly, robbery and extortion-related killings are not given independent classifications and so are now invisible to research.

![Figure 2.14. Homicides by Motive, 2013 (per cent)](image)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.

When examined over time, some categories are found to be fairly stable despite the sharp decline in the homicide rate, while other categories are highly volatile (Figure 2.15). Domestic violence and mob killing have been stable. Gang-related, non-gang criminal, and the not yet determined categories are volatile. Unlike domestic violence and mob killings, these categories are very responsive to police activity. The decline in the homicide rate may be associated with the intensive gang control campaign of the police. And the changes in the not yet determined category, which are also related to changes in the gang-related category, may be explained by decision-making in the JCF’s Statistical Unit. Many of the killings that are initially classified as “undetermined” fit the modus operandi of gangs (Harriott 2003, 89-
They may, therefore, reasonably be grouped with gang-related murders. The difficulty here is that the official reports do not describe the processes by which the results are generated, so it is difficult to judge the degree of confidence that one should have in these statistics.

**Figure 2.15. Homicides by Motive, 2009-2013 (frequency counts)**

![Homicides by Motive Chart](image)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.

**Where Homicides Occur**

Jamaica’s homicide problem is nationwide, but it nevertheless displays a pattern of urban and regional concentration mentioned earlier. Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show the ranking of parishes by their homicide counts and rates, respectively. St. Catherine, St. Andrew, and St. James display the highest numbers of homicide, in that order. St. James, Westmoreland, and St. Andrew have the highest homicide rates, in that order.

The parishes correspond to the police districts (with the exceptions of Kingston, St. Andrew, and St. Catherine, each of which have more than one police division). The parishes therefore correspond to the accountable police administrative unit, and these administrative units are accountable to the JCF high command. Each police division has or ought to have a homicide reduction plan and targets that are based on the identification of homicide hotspots within the respective division.
Figure 2.16. Number of Murders by Parish, 2013

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.

Figure 2.17 reports the murder rate by parish. These data suggest that:

- While there are still wide variations in rates across the different parishes, violent crime largely remains an urban phenomenon.
- The south-coast conurbation that includes Kingston, St. Andrew, (urban) St. Catherine, and (urban) Clarendon is the area with the highest concentration of violent crimes. Manchester, which is contiguous with Clarendon, is also becoming problematic (especially with regard to non-lethal serious crimes).
- A similar zone has been formed in the western end of the island that includes the contiguous parishes of St. James, Westmoreland, and Hanover. While the proportion of homicides committed in the south-coast area declined from 67 per cent of all homicides in 2009 to 59 per cent in 2013, the percentage of homicides in the western zone increased from 20.2 per cent in 2009 to 23.4 per cent in 2013 (ESSJ 2009, 2013). This latter zone needs to be more closely studied in order to better account for the changes in its crime patterns during the period, as there may be some displacement or contagion effects occurring.
Weapons Used in Homicides

As shown in Figure 2.18, 73.4 per cent of all murders were committed with the aid of a firearm in 2013. Between 2009 and 2013, the proportion of murders that were the outcome of firearm use ranged from 70 per cent (2012) to 76.9 per cent (2009), according to the ESSJ (Figure 2.18). The reduction in gun use was not as sharp as the reduction in the homicide rate. As noted in the Citizen Security Survey (CHDR), the rate of firearm offences in Jamaica is among the highest in the Caribbean (UNDP 2012, 22).

Violent offenders, and in particular gang members, appear to have fairly easy access to illegally imported firearms. A report commissioned by the Caribbean Community on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons identified Jamaica as having an established, high-level pattern of armed crime (CARICOM 2002, 26). The report claims that a wide variety of handguns and assault weapons are available. The structure of the trade in illegal arms and the domestic market in these arms, however, has not been studied and is not well understood.

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica.

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International efforts to control the illegal movement of firearms have not significantly reduced their availability. However, the Organization of American States (OAS) has helped Jamaica acquire firearm marking machines, and Jamaica’s Firearm Licensing Authority has started marking all firearms with specific tracing codes. There are several sources for the illegal firearms found in Jamaica, but most have been traced to three U.S. counties in Florida with large Jamaican populations (UNODC 2007, 131).  

**Assault and Injuries**

Equally important as examining homicides is to look at assaults that end in injury instead of death, since often the intent was the same. In some cases, it may be the availability of a gun, or the quality and proximity of the nearest hospital, that determines if an assault becomes a murder. Assaults have already been discussed in this report under the category of aggravated assaults. Here we further disaggregate assaults into their legal subcategories: assault occasioning bodily harm (technically referred to as “assault O.G.B. harm”), felonious wounding, and wounding with intent. Table 2.1 shows that between 2012 and 2013, all of these categories of crime increased.

### Table 2.1 Aggravated Assaults Reported in 2012 and 2013 (frequency counts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault occasioning bodily harm</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felonious wounding</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounding with intent</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>810</strong></td>
<td><strong>933</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Unit of the JCF.

---

13 Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Canada, and the United States manufacture weapons.
It would have been useful to compare reported assaults with hospital-presented violence-related injuries, but the data for the latter have not been systematically collected for the comparable period. In addition to the problem of the limited series of data, there is also incomplete data for the years included in the period under review. Because of a breakdown in the surveillance system, the data for these years are only for the period from January to September each year, so these data are not annualized. Nevertheless, these data do provide some indication of the degree of under-reporting to the police. Sexual assaults that are presented at hospitals, for example, are significantly higher than those recorded by the police. And more importantly, the hospital data suggest an increase in all categories of recorded violence from 2011 to 2013 (Table 2.2). These observations are troubling because while trends in police statistics are not inconsistent with trends from victimization surveys, they are inconsistent with hospital data. This suggests the importance of multiple data sources and the need to have a properly functioning hospital surveillance system.

### Table 2.2. Number of Patients Seen for Intentional Injuries, 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attempted suicides</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional laceration</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stab wound</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>1,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunshot wounds</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blunt injury</td>
<td>6,662</td>
<td>6,107</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assault</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: For all years, the data presented are for the period from January-September. na = no data available.

* 2013 data were provisional.

**Violence in the Home and Sexual and Gender-based Violence**

There have been few reliable measurements of the levels and types of violence against women in the home.14 Two studies are LeFranc et al. (2008)15 and the CHDR (UNDP 2012).16 The latter is perhaps the most comprehensive and current, so we will rely here

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14 While the police provide statistics on murders in the home, the cases of sub-lethal domestic violence and assaults are not recorded by this category and were not available for use in this study.

15 LeFranc et al. (2008) studied two types of interpersonal violence using the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS2) and other behavioral instruments. The study assessed the level and characteristics of intimate partner violence in a sample of 3,401 respondents between 15 and 30 years old at different levels of socioeconomic development across three countries. The objective was to examine intimate partner violence among adolescents and young adults as both victims and perpetrators of violence. The sample was selected using a three-level cluster sampling regime based on standard methodology used by the respective country’s national statistical office to generate census enumeration districts. The study used districts with probability proportional to size, and households were then randomly selected. Participants were selected using random selection tables and were further stratified by sex and age to ensure adequate representation.

16 The UNDP’s Citizen Security Survey (CHDR) was conducted in Jamaica from November 2010 to February 2011. The sample for the survey (2,000 questionnaires were completed) was designed to reflect key demographic characteristics of the adult population based on the composition of the most recent population census. The survey used a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample designed to achieve the highest level of representativeness and dispersion of selected sampling units. Sampling units selected matched their
primarily on that study. The CHDR estimated the victimization prevalence of domestic violence in Jamaica for 2010 at 5.9 per cent of the population (UNDP 2012, 29). The study defined domestic violence as violence among household members with at least one member age 16 or older. Victims of domestic violence by intimate partner were estimated to be 2.3 per cent of the population. Of the seven Caribbean countries that were surveyed, Jamaica had the lowest prevalence of domestic violence (UNDP 2012, 28-30).

These are, however, measures of sub-lethal violence. Estimates of lethal violence against women in the home rely on official statistics from the JCF. Figure 2.19 charts the proportion of murders that the police categorize as “domestic” for the period 2009 to 2013. There is no definition of domestic violence in the country’s Domestic Violence Act and none in the Violence against Person Act. The police now define a “domestic” homicide as “any homicide or shooting incident [emphasis by the author] that occurs between related persons or living in the same household.” It is not clear if this definition, which is itself problematic, informs the actual coding that is done.17 Here, we take it that this category approximates household violence typically but not exclusively involving intimate partners (with the “household” understood in the Jamaican context, that is, cohabitation is not a necessary condition). These crimes steadily increased during the 2009-2013 period from 3.8 to 9.4 per cent. Most of the murder victims were women.

**Figure 2.19. Murders Resulting from Domestic Violence, 2009-2013 (as a percentage of all murders)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.

The main victims of violence in the home are women and children. Risk factors for child and youth victimization fall into four categories: family, community, schools, and individuals. Physical violence includes corporal punishment directed toward children. All four categories proportion from the population census for rural and urban neighbourhoods. In addition, care was taken to ensure that characteristics such as gender, age, and other relevant variables were proportionately represented in the final sample of respondents.

17 This definition, by including “shooting incidents,” would suggest that the police now include non-fatal shootings in their “domestic homicides” numbers. But this does not appear to be the case, so in fact the police have simply added confusion to an old problem.
intersect (Samms-Vaughan et al. 2005; Smith, Springer, and Barrett 2011; Smith and Mosby 2003). The 2008 Jamaica Reproductive Health Survey (RHS)\(^\text{18}\) found high levels of a history of family violence such as children witnessing or experiencing parental violence. Prior to age 15, nearly 1 in 5 (18 per cent) Jamaican women witnessed physical abuse between their parents and two-thirds (61 per cent) were physically abused by their parents. (Notably, however, 55.8 per cent of women also believed that physical punishment is necessary to raise children.) Among young men, 14 per cent had witnessed parental violence and 58 per cent were physically abused by their parents. Methods of discipline used include hitting the child with an object (36.2 per cent), hitting the child with a hand or fist (34.3 per cent), cuffing or spanking (23.4 per cent), and locking the child away (9.6 per cent). Female respondents (12 per cent) reported being physically forced to have sexual intercourse by their husband/partner (36 per cent), an acquaintance (20 per cent), or a boyfriend (18 per cent). Half of the women reported forced intercourse prior to age 20, and two-thirds before age 25. Intimate partner violence inflicted by a current or ex-spouse was the most common form of violence against Jamaican women, regardless of age, education, or socio-economic background: 35 per cent reported lifetime experiences while 17 per cent reported experiencing at least one of three types of intimate partner violence. Interestingly, the levels of women’s reports of intimate partner violence experienced were similar to young men’s reports of intimate partner violence inflicted. Specifically, 9 per cent of females reported experiencing and 9 per cent of males reported inflicting physical intimate partner violence. The three strongest risk predictors were childhood experience of violence, controlling behaviour of a husband/partner, and alcohol use. These factors also increased vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.

Among 2010 CHDR respondents, 6 per cent reported being victims of domestic violence. However, this was most likely to be psychological, i.e., insulted (14.9 per cent), and least likely to be a physical injury (5.4 per cent). Some 7.9 per cent reported threats of violence and 7.3 per cent reported that violence was used. Only 15.4 per cent of those who were victims of violence reported the incident to the police. While lower socio-economic status slightly elevated the risk of violence, experiences generally transcended age, sex, education and socio-economic status.

Additionally, children may be directly and indirectly involved in violence. Jamaican children who are directly involved in violence are those who are exposed to a wide range of situations such as physical, sexual, emotional, and verbal abuse. Indirect involvement often means witnessing violent occurrences (2008 RHS). The UNICEF (2006a) Situational Analysis on Excluded Children in Jamaica indicates that approximately 37 per cent of children under age 18 can be considered as excluded, that is, these children do not benefit from an environment that protects them from violence, abuse, and/or exploitation, or may be excluded by a range of institutions such as family and government. In addition, some Jamaican community contexts put children at risk by providing the circumstances that predispose them to being victims or victimizers (UNICEF 2006a; Bailey 2009; Ustanny 2006). Ustanny (2006)

\(^{18}\) The 2008 RHS was a household survey of a nationally representative sample of 8,259 women aged 15-49 (96.7 per cent response rate) and 2,775 men aged 15-24 (94.4 per cent response rate). Female and male samples were selected independently, allowing for independent estimates by urban and rural residence and health regions. The survey employed a three-stage stratified cluster sample design based on the 628 census sectors and stratified by the 14 parishes. The RHS violence module design was based on internationally accepted standards for gathering information on violence against women in population-based surveys.
highlights the impact of community context (inner-city) and poverty on the risk of sexual violence in Jamaica. Children at risk of sexual violence include those who work on the streets\textsuperscript{19} or who suffer child-shifting, which is defined as living arrangements that involve moving from one relative to another or living in foster care (Bailey 2009).

Factors influencing the potential for violent behaviour in youths include biological, psychological, and behavioural factors, as well as family and peer influences. Psychological and behavioural characteristics predicting youth violence include hyperactivity, impulsiveness, and poor behavioural control and attention problems.\textsuperscript{20} Parental behaviour, the degree of home-based monitoring and supervision by adults (Krug et al. 2002, 33), the use of physical punishment,\textsuperscript{21} low socio-economic status, and types of peer group ties influence the risk of young people developing violent tendencies. The negative consequences of peer relationships also emerge from association with or exposure to delinquency. Parenting style also affects children’s psychosocial outcomes and contributes to transmission of violence (Brown and Johnson 2008; Smith and Mosby 2003; Baker-Henningham et al. 2009). However, Brown and Johnson (2008) found widespread support for use of corporal punishment across socio-economic groups and family structures.

\textbf{Violence against Children and Child “Discipline”}

The overall data show that childhood is a dangerous period for Jamaican children, who increasingly come in contact with criminal justice and health institutions as both victims and perpetrators of violence. Information from all agencies collating crime and violence statistics indicates high levels of sexual, verbal, emotional, physical, and psychological abuse of Jamaican children in all institutions.

Despite a general decline in major crimes between 2009 and 2013, child victimization data from the Office of the Children’s Registry (OCR) show an overall 26 per cent increase in all categories of child victimization (up to age 18)\textsuperscript{22} reported to that office in 2013 compared to 2012. Some 57 per cent of these reported cases involved female victims, 41 per cent males, and 2 per cent unknown. The percentage increase for specific abuses ranges from 20 to 53 per cent. The three highest categories were child neglect (48 per cent), children in need of care and protection (39 per cent), and sexual abuse (31 per cent). Of sexual abuse reports, 56 per cent were carnal abuse. The data indicate that the OCR received reports of child abuse for 11 out of every 1,000 children living in Jamaica in 2013 (OCR 2014, 9). Table 2.3 shows preliminary data from the OCR for 2013.

\textsuperscript{19} National Survey of Street and Working Children, Ministry of Health (2002); Cassandra Brenton, “Street Children to be Tackled,” \textit{Jamaica Observer}, December 26, 2010.
\textsuperscript{20} Krug et al. (2002, 32) citing Kandel and Mednick (1991)
\textsuperscript{22} The Office of the Children’s Registry was established in 2007 as a provision of the Child Care and Protection Act 2004 (CCPA). The CCPA was enacted in compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. While the statistics were not disaggregated by age, it is safe to say these are children under 18.
Table 2.3. Total Number of Reports of Physical Abuse Received by the Office of the Children’s Registry, by Gender, 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>4,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>4,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>2,342</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>8,618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the Children’s Registry.
Note: Preliminary data for 2013.

JCF data for 2000 to 2013 show the upward trend in reports of violent crimes against children until 2009, after which there was a sharp drop in reports of these crimes. However, this precipitous decline was followed by a sharp increase in 2013, so there was a reversal of the gains. Rape and carnal abuse of children and adolescents are particularly problematic. Reporting of carnal abuse are shown in Figure 2.22. According to these JCF data:

- Reported rapes of children and adolescents dropped from 421 incidents in 2009 to 132 in 2012; and
- Reported carnal abuse cases dropped from 503 incidents in 2009 to 137 in 2010. At the time of this writing, there were no available data on carnal abuse for 2013, but an upward trend occurred in 2012.

Figure 2.20. Child and Adolescent Victims of Carnal Abuse, 2009-2012 (frequency counts)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.
Note: Post-2011 carnal abuse data are not perfectly comparable with prior years. This category was changed on June 30, 2012 to sexual intercourse with someone (male/female) under 16 years of age. The main difference between the two categories is that the new category is gender-neutral. As reported male carnal abuse numbers are expected to be few, we opt for continuity and comparability within the series.

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23 Carnal abuse, which refers to sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 with or without her consent, was by definition, an offence against female children. Effective July 1, 2011, pursuant to the Sexual Offences Act (2009) this was replaced with a new, gender-neutral offence, sexual intercourse with a person under 16.

24 The behaviour of these series’ is very erratic and should be taken with caution.
Jamaican children and youths are disproportionately affected by crime and violence (World Bank 2003; UNICEF 2007a; CARICOM 2010a; Arscott-Mills 2001; RHS 2008; OAS 2005; Samms-Vaughan 2008). They experience, and are witnesses to, a range of violence in all the major institutions such as families (RHS 2008), communities (Bailey 2009), schools (UNICEF 2006b), work situations, and the media. Children in institutional care, in children’s homes or places of safety, and in correctional institutions are vulnerable to institutional violence.

Smith and Mosby (2003) examined the plausibility of speculation regarding harsh childrearing practices and the psychosocial adjustment of Jamaican children and adolescents. Their review of this body of literature on childrearing practices in Jamaica highlights the authoritarian nature of Jamaican parenting practices. It finds that a high percentage of Jamaican children are subjected to at least one form of psychological or physical punishment ranging from aggression to severe means of discipline and punishment. Citing empirical examination of the extent and prevalence of such harsh disciplinary measures, Smith and Mosby (2003, 371) reported that as many as 84 per cent of mothers in one study admitted to beating their children. This occurs in a context where cultural norms sanction the use of corporal punishment as the primary form of child intervention and discipline, and as a mechanism to solve problems at home and in school (UNICEF 2005a, 2008a; Smith and Mosby 2003).

Jamaican parents rationalize and defend authoritarian childrearing practices, including the use of corporal punishment, as necessary to improve conduct and life chances. This expected outcome is not always realized. The excessively harsh and/or frequent use of physical punishments at times leads to child victims running away from home and joining the ranks of street children. Some children, however, share the belief that physical punishment is valid and necessary (Brown and Johnson 2008). This observation should not be surprising, as if this were not so, then the use of corporal punishment by parents would more greatly undermine their authority in the home and their control of their children.

According to Ricketts and Anderson (2008) and Samms-Vaughan (2008), poverty and stress affect parental use of harsh corporal punishment. However, Brown and Johnson (2008) found widespread support for use of corporal punishment across socio-economic groups and family structures. These practices are implicated in the transmission of violence (Brown and Johnson 2008; Smith and Mosby 2003; Baker-Henningham et al. 2009). This logic perhaps also applies to the transmission of sexual violence.

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25 Additional information on violence against children is available in UN Secretary General Study (UNICEF 2006b) and UNICEF (2000, 2002, 2005c).
27 Smith and Mosby (2003, 371), citing Smith (1989), state that 71 per cent of rural parents and 55 per cent of urban parents reported flogging as the most frequent response to perceived misbehavior in their children.
28 This is a qualitative study of childrearing practices in Jamaica that was conducted in 2006. Data were drawn from 14 nationally distributed focus groups.
Sexual Violence

Rape, as defined in Section 3 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act (2009), is gender-specific. The section states that “a man commits the offence of rape if he has sexual intercourse with a woman (a) without the woman’s consent; and (b) knowing that the woman does not consent to sexual intercourse or recklessly not caring whether the woman consents or not.”

The UNODC (2007, 12) notes that among 102 countries examined worldwide, three of the top 10 recorded rape rates occur in the Caribbean. Among Caribbean countries with available comparable data, each experienced a higher rate of rape than the weighted average of 102 countries. Across the Caribbean, sexual violence against women is rooted in gender inequality, often tolerated and condoned by law and socio-culturally sanctioned (Lazarus-Black 2008). Relative to other Caribbean countries, Jamaican women and girls experience high rates of forced sexual intercourse (UNDP 2012, 26; LeFranc et al. 2008). Most perpetrators of violence against women are partners, relatives, or acquaintances, rather than strangers. (UNDP 2012; RHS 2008; LeFranc et al. 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009).

Female children are especially vulnerable to early sexual initiation (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Geary 2013), domestic violence, being trafficked, being a victim of child labour, and commercial sexual exploitation (Dunn 2000). The 2008 RHS found that such abuses often lead to sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS infection, exposure in later life to intimate partner violence, intergenerational transmission of violence and poverty in later life, and early pregnancy.

However, since the creation of the OCR, there has been increased reporting of male victimization (Table 2.4). There are also media and NGO reports of sexual victimization of male children in institutional care, indicating a general failure of adults and institutions to protect all vulnerable children.29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>2,551</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>12,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>3,386</td>
<td>13,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the Children’s Registry.
Note: Preliminary data for 2013.

The Sexual Offences Act 2009 created a new gender neutral category – “sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen” to replace the category of “carnal abuse.” There were 814 recorded victims of rape in 2013, and 601 of them (74 per cent) were below the age of 25.

Girls between the ages of 10 and 19 comprised 56 per cent of victims. Victimization of girls in this age group is consistent with findings in the 2008 RHS in which almost half the women reported that their first incident of forced intercourse occurred prior to age 20.

Figure 2.21 shows the changes in reported rapes during the period 2009 to 2013. As noted earlier, in 2013, the rate of reported rapes was 30 per 100,000 inhabitants. In a context of declining rates of violent crime, the number of reported rapes increased by some 15 per cent. Child victims (age 0-14) accounted for 25.9 per cent of these victims (Figure 2.22).

**Figure 2.21. Total Rape Victims, 2009-2013**

![Chart showing total rape victims from 2009 to 2013](image)

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica for the respective years.

Figure 2.22 shows that four age categories from 10-29 are most vulnerable to rape, and that the most vulnerable single category is ages 15-19. Rape is largely considered to be the most under-reported violent crime, making the measurement of its prevalence extremely difficult. Thus, for example, in 2013, while 814 cases of rape were reported to the police (Figure 2.21), the injury surveillance system recorded some 1,225 cases of sexual assault at public hospitals. And these hospital-reported cases were recorded only for the period from January to September, that is, only for a part of the year. This knowledge deficit opens the door to speculation regarding changes in the rates – especially at moments when important changes in crime patterns may be occurring. In the context of a general decline in violent crimes and increasing confidence in law enforcement, it is possible that there may be increased reporting of rape. Alternatively, sexual crimes may have a specific dynamic and not be as responsive to a general law enforcement strategy that is aimed at reducing violent crime or gang-related violence. For example, in 2013, the proportion of rapes that were cleared up (suspect arrested and charged) was 47 per cent, and for the period 2009 to 2013, the range of the clear-up rate for rape was 30 per cent (in 2010) to 47 per cent (ESSJ 2009, 2013).
Incest

As defined in the Sexual Offences Act (2009) 7(1), incest is committed by a male person who willingly has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that other person is his grandmother, mother, sister, daughter, aunt, niece or granddaughter, or (2) incest is committed by a female person who willingly has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that the other person is her grandfather, father, brother, son, uncle, nephew or grandson. Incest is a lesser researched offence than many of the other types of sexual violence. Eldemire (1986) conducted a case study to alert medical and other interested practitioners to the problem of incest and the importance of health care management of such cases. The paucity of information on this behaviour suggests the need to pay closer attention to it.

Violence in Schools

Violence pervades all institutions within Jamaican society. Schools, a microcosm of the wider society, now exhibit increasing levels of violent behaviours such as extortion, gang-related activities, bullying, wounding, stabbing, and deaths perpetrated by both male and female students against other students or against teachers. A security survey conducted during the first four months of the Safe Schools Programme30 detected illegal firearms, offensive weapons (including knives, scissors, ice picks, half-machetes) and other activities linked to the emergence of gangs in schools.31

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30 The Safe Schools Programme was officially launched in November 2004 as a joint effort of the Ministries of National Security and Education, Youth and Culture. It was implemented at the start of the 2004-2005 academic year. Law enforcement officers were placed within 89 troubled institutions across the parishes of St. James, St. Ann, St. Elizabeth, Kingston, and St. Andrew.

31 See Office of the Children’s Advocate (2009, Table 3), drawing on information derived from the Ministry of National Security School Safety Secretariat.
The Ministry of Education reports that for the 2012-2013 school year, there were 1,288 violent incidents that included 915 fights, 160 robberies, and three murders. Of the 1,288 weapons seized, there were 431 knives and 486 scissors (no guns). During the same academic year there were 201 arrests, 2,361 cautions, and 1,109 monitoring cases. Perhaps the emergence of gangs in schools is the most significant phenomenon. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Safe School Assessment Report found that although not all school violence is gang-related, there is evidence of gangs in schools (USAID 2005). This finding is supported by the work of Grant, Gibson, and Mason (2010).

At the time of this writing, there were no assessments of teachers’ responses to the challenges of violence in schools. Nor were there data available on teacher discipline and corporal punishment in schools.

Property Crimes

As noted earlier, during the period under review there was a decline in reported property crimes. This observation is based on the rather limited definition of property crimes used earlier in this report (Figure 2.1). The category of property crimes is extended in this section to include crimes for which more limited time series data are available. The 2013 rates for reported property crimes that are considered to be the most “serious” (“seriousness” may be measured by the level of punishment for these crimes) are as follows (Figure 2.23).

- Burglary: 21.5 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants. Burglary is legally defined as a break-in at night, that is, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.
- Break-ins: 92 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants. This crime is defined as the unlawful entry of a home or other buildings during the hours that are not included in burglary.
- Larceny: 20 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants. In general, larceny is defined as the unlawful taking and carrying away of property of another with intent to appropriate it to a use that is inconsistent with the owner’s rights. Larceny from dwellings refers to persons who steal in any dwelling house, any chattel, money, or valuable security.
- Motor vehicle theft: 24 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants. This crime is named and defined as larceny of motor vehicle. It is distinguished from taking a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner. (This latter crime anticipates the behaviour of delinquent children.)

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33 Praedial larceny is not considered to be a serious crime, although it is claimed that it has a significant negative impact on agricultural production. According to the JCF, in 2013 there were 302 reported cases of praedial larceny.
34 This rate was taken from the JCF but it has not yet been made official and may be changed.
Unlike the trends in violent crimes, these rates represent more of a mixed picture of the changes in the rates of property crimes during the period under review (Figure 2.24). Thus, relative to 2009, break-ins declined by 34 per cent (the number, not the rate). However, as opposed to the general tendency for serious crimes to decline, the larceny count increased incrementally by 4 per cent. At the time of this writing, the available data on motor vehicle theft were limited to the period 2011 to 2013. During this period, the numbers of this crime did not exhibit a consistent pattern, but relative to 2011, the number increased by 11 per cent in 2013 (Figure 2.25). Its rate, however, declined incrementally (Figure 2.24). Most of these stolen motor vehicles are cars, but a significant number of buses and trucks are also stolen (Figure 2.26), which is particularly disruptive of economic activities because these vehicles are used to transport working people and goods. This was the only notable property crime that showed a significant increase (in frequency count) during the period 2009-2013. The JCF and the government of Jamaica do not classify this crime as “serious.” Nevertheless, this exception to the general decline in serious crimes may be a statement about changing illegal opportunities (especially for lower-level criminals) in the context of stagnation in the formal economy. Since the mid-1990s, when the importation of used cars was permitted, there has been a sharp increase in the number of motor vehicles in Jamaica. This phenomenon, coupled with the growth of opportunities in urban informal transportation, accounts for the increased opportunities for motor vehicle theft and the increased demand for inexpensive replacement parts and stolen vehicles. Moreover, given the high rates of violent crimes, these data may also reflect the priorities of policing and guardianship more generally. The increase in these categories of crime, even in a context of a general decline in the aggregate crime rate and the most serious crimes, should therefore not be surprising.
Consistent with this logic, property crimes are geographically distributed in keeping with the opportunity structure. Thus, most property crimes are concentrated in the more affluent parishes of St. Andrew, St. Catherine, and Manchester (Figure 2.27). Survey data provide support for this claim. The victims of property crimes are disproportionately from the middle strata and the more affluent households (UNDP 2012; LAPOP 2012, 2013).
The geographic distribution of property crimes contrasts rather interestingly with that of violent crimes, with the exception of robbery (which shares a common purpose with property crimes but differs in the means used). While violent crimes and robbery are highly concentrated in cities and the most urban parishes (Kingston, St. Andrew, St. James, and St. Catherine), property crimes are more evenly distributed across the parishes, although an urban skewness is still clearly discernible (Figure 2.27). The opportunity structures of these two sets of crimes differ in their respective spatial distributions, although generally the opportunities for crime tend to be greatest in urban areas. Moreover, the conditions for accessing these opportunities also differ. Thus, for example, gangs, which are the principal driver of violent crimes, find a less hospitable environment in rural areas. On the other hand, most property crimes are not group activities but rather individual efforts, and so many tend to be opportunistic rather than planned.

As is the case with violent crimes, the extent of the decline in the rates of most property crimes is significant. However, historically the decline is less significant than the new turn in the trend lines of violent crimes. In the case of property crime, the decline from 2009 to 2013 is simply a continuation of a much longer period of decline in property crimes. Here there is long-term or historical continuity. In the case of violent crimes, there is a break with the long-term or historical pattern.
Gangs and Organized Crime

Gangs and organized crime are major engines of violence in Jamaica, particularly homicides (UNODC 2007; Harriott 2003, 2009; Morris and Graycar 2011). Organized crime is a prime source of corruption in the state and polity (Waller and Harriott 2008; UNODC 2010). This section discusses gangs and organized crime networks as significant insecurity-generating forces in Jamaica.

According to the JCF, there were 238 gangs operating in Jamaica in 2013 (Table 2.5). This number represents an increase of 27 over the 268 that were operating in 2010, at the beginning of the anti-gang campaign and the start of the decline in violent crimes. On the face of it, this fact should not be taken as an indicator of ineffectiveness of the anti-gang campaign. Rather, gang fragmentation is an expected outcome of any serious assault on powerful gangs. There is a particularly high concentration of these gangs in the western quadrant of Kingston, specifically in the police division of St. Andrew South in this quadrant.

Tables 2.5 and 2.6 classify the gangs and specify their geographic locations. The gang typology used by the JCF, which is based on the work of Manwaring (2007), categorizes gangs according to organizational characteristics, type of criminal activities, and levels of violence into first, second, and third generations. The least organizational sophistication, the most opportunistic (as opposed to planned) criminal income-earning activities, and the lowest levels of violence are associated with the first generation. In 2013, there were increases in the total number of first- and second-generation gangs, but first-generation gangs accounted for 90 per cent of the 238 gangs (Table 2.6).
Table 2.5. Number of Gangs by Parish, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Total Number of Gangs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Clarendon</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Hanover</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Kingston &amp; St. Andrew</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- Manchester</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- St. Catherine</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6- St. Ann</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7- St. Mary</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8- St. Thomas</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9- Trelawny</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10- St. Elizabeth</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11- Westmoreland</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12- St James</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13- Portland</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>238</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.6. Gang Type by Parish, 2013 (frequency counts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Division</th>
<th>Type of Gang</th>
<th>Total Number of Gangs by Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>Second Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1- Clarendon</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Hanover</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Kingston</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- St. Andrew</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- Manchester</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6- St. Catherine</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9- St. Ann</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10- St. Mary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11- St. Thomas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12- Trelawny</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13- St. Elizabeth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15- Westmoreland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18- St. James</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19- Portland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>215</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Definition of Gang-Related Murder**

As noted earlier in this report, gangs and organized crime networks accounted for some 79 per cent of all murders in Jamaica in 2013. The JCF (2013) defines gang-related murders in its murder context definitions as follows:
“Gang-related refers to any homicide or shooting incident:

A. That is committed by known gang members or by persons who are actively associated with such gang members through their habits, lifestyle or criminal activities or;
B. In which the victims or intended victims are associated with members of a gang or;
C. In which the victims are innocent by-standers during the course of an incident or;
D. That are attacks on gang-related premises by rival groups or by internal feud.”

It should be noted that in previous years the JCF used the category “gang-related murder” without having a clear and explicitly stated definition. There was therefore much inconsistency in the coding of these cases. Even after the JCF provided the definition above, some of the earlier problems persisted in terms of unreliability due to inconsistencies between the stated definition and its operationalization in the coding procedures.

**Identifying Membership**

Identifying the membership of gangs according to the classification by Manwaring (2007) has its challenges. The movement of members between gangs with different organizational characteristics is fluid in Jamaica. A member may be involved in the activity of more than one gang. There may be different degrees of attachment to the different groups, but there is clear evidence of overlapping memberships.

Police are only able to capture statistics on those gang members who are actively engaged in gang activity or charged for a criminal offense associated with gang membership. These data, although useful, do not represent a clear picture of the true membership of the gangs.

As shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, gangs are distributed nationally and may be found in every parish and police division. There is, however, considerable variation in gang density across the urban-rural divide. Most gangs are concentrated in the city of Kingston (52 per cent) and in the larger southern coastal con-urban area from Kingston to Clarendon (68 per cent). The north coast city of Montego Bay accounts for another 8 per cent. There is also considerable variation in gang density across rural parishes. The low-violence parishes of Portland, St. Mary, Hanover, and St. Ann all have low gang densities. Gangs tend to hold territory in informal settlements and communities of the urban poor. Where these settlements are few and do not take on an urban character, gang density is low.

Estimates of gang prevalence are also provided by surveys. Most respondents (74 per cent) in the 2010 Citizen Security Survey (UNDP 2012) did not perceive gang violence as a problem in their community. Indeed, 10.9 per cent considered it serious and 12.6 per cent reported the occurrence of gang violence in their neighbourhood in 2010. The 2012-2013 JNCVS reports a significant decline to 11 per cent in both criminal gangs and corner crews compared with 2006, when 23 per cent of respondents indicated the presence of criminal gang in their community (a 52 per cent decline). More than one in 10 respondents (11.9 per
cent) believed that criminal gangs were present in their neighbourhood. The 2012-2013 JNCSVs findings are comparable to the 10.8 per cent of respondents in the 2010 CHDR who reported a criminal gang in their neighbourhood. Some 12.6 per cent reported that gang violence occurred in their neighbourhood in 2010. Interestingly, among youth participants in the CHDR (n = 537), 29.5 per cent reported gang violence in their neighbourhood and 12.9 per cent considered gang violence a serious problem.

From issues related to prevalence we now turn to the characteristics of these gangs. The classification of gangs by “generation” is not consistently and rigorously done. Thus, some gangs, including those that have endured for decades, may or may not appear in the numbers for a particular year. Much depends on their level of violent activity during the year in question.

Most gangs are classified as first-generation (216). Second- and third-generation gangs (numbering 24) account for 10 per cent of all gangs. These are the gangs that are or approximate organized crime in their activities and structure. They are the most problematic groups.

**Growth of Organized Crime: Guns and Gangs**

Organized crime is the most criminally productive form of criminal organization. Although the relative contribution of ordinary street gangs versus organized crime to the homicide rate has not been disaggregated (the method of recording the data does not permit its disaggregation), there is sufficient evidence to reasonably suggest that the organized crime groups and networks are responsible for a large proportion of the gang-related murders that occur in Jamaica.35

The rise of organized crime in Jamaica reflects a maturation of criminal and street gangs from an earlier era.36 As shown in Table 2.6, 26 ordinary street gangs have mutated into sophisticated, organized criminal groups. Some of them are transnational, engaged in drug dealing in several countries, and able to corruptly exploit the resources of the Jamaican government. The rise of organized crime in the middle to late 1980s therefore signalled a new stage in the development of criminal activity (Harriott 1996). As a result, the decade from 1989 to 1998 saw a dramatic increase in offences classified as either drug- or gang-related, and an increase in gun-related crimes. Cases such as USA v. Samuel Knowles37 and United States v. Christopher “Dudus” Coke illustrate the transnational nature of organized crime and confirm the strong correlation between gangs, illicit drug trade, and illicit arms trade.

Factors accounting for or marking the development of organized crime include the consistent demand for illegal goods and services, including the demand for illegal drugs and the accessibility of major drug markets, facilitative political patronage, progressive privatization of protection, and a weakening of the criminal justice system (Harriott 2009, 16). Other

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35 See Harriott (2011) for a discussion of the difference between ordinary street gangs and organized crime.
studies have highlighted Jamaica’s narco-geography (Griffith 1996) and porous borders. While there has been some effort to explain the growth of street gangs, and in particular the risk factors associated with a gang joining forces with another gang elsewhere in the Caribbean (Katz and Fox 2010), crime prevention programmes in Jamaica have not had the benefit of this type of basic research.

Impact of High Rates of Violent Crime on Growth and Development

This final subsection comments on the impact of high rates of violent crime on economic development and security among the population, as well as on the state of knowledge regarding explanations for this phenomenon. There is a body of literature, including considerable empirical work, that discusses the causes of these crimes and their impact on the social, political, and economic development of Jamaica. Among the adverse effects cited are the negative impact on the investment climate (Francis et al. 2009), erosion of existing development, and prevention of the development of human and social capital (UNDP 2012).

Francis et al. (2009) examined the impact of crime on business in Jamaica and found high levels of victimization, with about 65 per cent of all firms reporting one or more forms of criminal victimization. The direct cost of crime in Jamaica, not including the impact on business, is at least 3.7 per cent of GDP (2001 data). Bennett et al. (2007) show a differential impact between crime types, especially between violent and property crimes.

The World Bank (2003) estimates that in 2001 crime cost Jamaica approximately JMD 12.4 billion, or 3.7 per cent of GDP. The health costs were JMD 1.3 billion (with expenditure in the public health system accounting for JMD 995.7 million and in the private health system for JMD 254.5 million). Lost production is estimated at JMD 500 million, and losses from mortality at JMD 194.1 million and from injuries at JMD 337.2 million. Public expenditures on security are estimated at JMD 10.5 billion, and the costs of injuries due to interpersonal and self-directed violence in 2006 totalled JMD 2.1 billion. A case study conducted by Jamaica’s Ministry of Health, in conjunction with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and World Health Organization (WHO), estimates that direct cost of injuries from interpersonal violence occurring in Jamaica in 2006 totalled 2.1 billion Jamaican dollars (J$) and in 2006 indirect medical costs for injuries due to interpersonal violence totalled J27.5 billion (Ward & Grant (2008, 32)). Other costs of violence include incidents that have prevented health care practitioners from going to their jobs or have forced hospitals and clinics to scale back their operations.

The economic costs of crime are also believed to have a negative impact on the competitiveness of Jamaica’s exports. The UNODC (2007, i) suggests that a reduction in Jamaica’s violent crime to the level of Costa Rica would yield an increase in the annual growth rate of 5.4 per cent. Robotham (2003, 197), however, adds a cautionary note.

Acknowledging the deterrent effect of high crime rates on investment and economic growth, Robotham notes that high levels of investment and economic growth may co-exist with high crime rates, so he cautions against automatically assuming that crime thwarts economic development. This is evident in the case of the impact of crime on tourism. Thus, while Dunn and Dunn (2002) reported that crime was perceived to be the main retarding force on the development of tourism, Alleyne and Boxill (2003, 113) used a transfer function modelling strategy and found that “the violent crime rate explained less than 5 per cent of the variation in tourist arrivals in Jamaica.” Even though visitor arrivals have continued to increase, crime may nevertheless have other retarding effects on tourism, so the studies may not actually contradict each other. And it should be noted that the Dunn and Dunn (2002) findings regard perceptions of crime, not crime itself.

Quantifying the social and economic impact of repeated violence on development, the World Bank (2011, 60) found that when compared with countries not experiencing violence, countries affected by violence had a poverty gap of as much as 21 per cent. Jamaica is among the countries in the high human development ranking, but the economy lags behind the rest of the Caribbean region in terms of growth (IMF 2013). The island is also one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world. Its external debts peaked in 2003 with a ratio of debt to GDP in excess of 140 per cent. Debt servicing consumed 56.5 per cent of the 2009/2010 budget and 54 per cent of the 2012/2013 budget (Hall 2012).

The 2010 CHDR highlighted the negative impact of crime and violence on vulnerable economies in terms of the erosion of confidence in future development, reduction in competitiveness, and imposition of burdensome security costs. Cumulatively, these effects can negatively alter the investment climate by fuelling capital flight and migration, thereby creating an environment of greater insecurity and contributing to the loss of human capital and brain drain. Crime and violence are major obstacles to the realization of development objectives. Combined, they affect the quality of life, erode the development of human and social capital, and divert public resources away from productive uses.

The Crime Problem Explained

A significant body of work tries to explain the Jamaican crime problem. Much of the literature (especially the early work) on criminal violence in Jamaica has focused on the impact on crime of various aspects of the political process (Sives 2010; Gray 2004; Headley 2002; Stone 1980), and the more recent impact (Charles 2012; Johnson and Soeters 2008; Morris and Graycar 2011). The methods of political mobilization were implicated in the extraordinary rise in violent crimes.

While there have been some recent efforts to understand violence in social process terms, much of the published work has been aimed at identifying the structural determinants of violent crimes. The relationship between absolute and relative poverty, on one hand, and

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the various types of crimes, on the other, has been an enduring concern of Caribbean researchers. Researchers continue to assert that poverty is a driver of violence (Moser and Holland 1997), although the more rigorous early studies found that there is no correlation between poverty and violent crimes (Ellis 1991). A rigorous exploration of the causal pathways that connect absolute poverty (and relative deprivation) to homicide and other violent crimes would advance the state of knowledge on this issue.

The relationships between violent crimes and various development indicators have also received attention. Income inequality, low rates of GDP growth (which may be taken as a rough indicator of the availability of legitimate economic opportunities), high rates of youth unemployment, and low educational achievement have all been identified as risk factors or determinants of the homicide rate and some other violent crimes. These findings are based on cross-national studies of Caribbean nations (UNODC 2007) and on Jamaica-specific studies using time-series methods (Francis et al. 2009). Weak criminal justice institutions are also implicated (Francis et al. 2009; Harriott 2000).

Marginalized urban males between the ages of 15 and 25 are responsible for a large share of the violence in any given society, so demographics matter (UNODC 2007). This is consistent with JCF data showing that violent crimes are disproportionately concentrated in communities that experience high levels of social exclusion, in communities often labelled as inner-city or informal settlements, and among young men between the ages of 16 and 30. So social exclusion also matters (Levy 1996; Moser and Holland 1997; Harriott 1996). Indeed, there has been much country-level analysis but too little community-level work aimed at advancing the level of understanding of social processes associated with the generation of violence. Similarly, at the individual level, there has been some work on the risk factors for violent and aggressive behaviour among children in school settings (Meeks-Gardner, Powell, and Grantham-McGregor 2007), but not much similar work on adolescents and adults.

Gangs are a major contributor to Jamaica’s homicide rate and indeed other violent crimes. We now have a description of their distribution, activities, and types as well as an understanding of their relationships to communities (Levy 2009; Harriott 2015) and political actors (Leslie 2010). But we know little about the risk factors associated with joining gangs. So while much is known, much more needs to be understood in order to better inform the various types of prevention and control programmes.
III. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING
CRIME AND VIOLENCE

State of Knowledge on the Institutions of the Criminal Justice System

Jamaica’s colonial history has influenced its post-independence environment and institutions. Indeed, many of the country’s problems have their origins (but not necessarily their continuity) in the colonial era, but very little research has been done to assess the functioning and effectiveness of colonial-era institutions, the difficulties that they posed for the new polities, and the challenges of transforming them so that they are more suitable for a democratic society. In particular, information concerning the effectiveness of criminal justice institutions in addressing crime, violence, and insecurity in Jamaica has been limited and uneven. Aside from recent scholarly research on police reform, discussion and analysis of the criminal justice system have relied extensively on government reports. The result is a paucity of scholarly research into Jamaica’s criminal justice institutions as a whole.

Police

The police force has been the subject of more systematic scholarly examination. The literature highlights the problems of post-colonial policing (Harriott 2000, 2007; Bennett 2004; Deosaran 2007a; UNDP 2012), differential policing, the impact of crime on policing and policing on crime, ineffective and inefficient policing and Jamaica’s policing style (Harriott 2000, 2007; Bennett 2004; Bennett and Schaefer-Morabito 2006), and policy and organizational reform (Harriott 2000; McDavid, Clayton, and Cowell 2011). Corruption and judicial killings are regularly reported in annual human rights reports.

Harriott (2000) argues that policing in Jamaica is based on the paramilitary watchman model, in which persons are treated as “subjects” rather than as citizens. This policing style contributes to lower-class communities’ fear and distrust of the police and disrespect for the law. The outcome is to resort to “citizen nullification” strategies that damage relations between citizens and the police (Harriott 2000) and undermine respect for the law (Reisig and Lloyd 2009).

Community policing initiatives were introduced as part of Jamaica’s policing reform processes (Harriott 2000, 2007; Bennett and Schaefer Morabito 2006; Deosaran 2007a),

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and integrated into successive JCF strategic plans (USAID 2005, 2012a, 2012b). The results are discussed later in this report.

**The Legal System**

The legal system, including prosecution, the courts, sentencing, and corrections, has had little scholarly criminological examination. However, special commissions and governmental task force reports have identified specific concerns. For example, the Justice Reform Task Force (2007) identified problems of ineffectiveness, lack of capacity, accountability, institutional structures, and relationships of national institutions to regional, international, and NGO communities.  

Jamaica’s legal system is based on the British Common Law tradition. Persons before courts retain due process rights to fair trial, are presumed innocent until found guilty, have the right to a jury trial and appeal, and have access to defence counsel and to legal aid in cases that can result in incarceration. There is also a functioning bail system (UNDP 2012). Currently, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council remains the court of last resort for appeals from the Jamaican court. However, discussions have been ongoing about integration of the regional Caribbean Court of Justice for both appellate and original jurisdictional matters.

**Correctional Services**

Few studies exist on Jamaica’s correctional services. Barnes (2004) compares prison revolts in Jamaica and Canada and emphasizes the importance of the cultural context in understanding local institutions and institutional responses. Within the context of prison abuse and conditions, Jones (2007) examined the post-1975 shift in correctional policy and concluded that, despite the stated mandate, there has been no fundamental change in service delivery and crime reduction outcomes. Indeed, instead of reducing the prison population and curtailing crime, official neglect has led to over-crowding and recidivism.

Despite the dearth of scholarly research on Jamaica’s correctional institutions and practices, outside observers have commented widely on crime and justice on the island. Prison conditions and abuses in Jamaica have been addressed by numerous governmental task force reports and several international organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Centre for Prison Studies, along with the

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45 For a description of the organizational structure of the courts, see Appendix 3.1. [http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org](http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org).
47 In discussing previous prison studies, Hellerstein and Whitman (1990) note that the task force appointed by the Cabinet in 1989 and chaired by Gordon Wells identified a plethora of previous reports over the preceding 62 years on Jamaica’s prison conditions, including reports in 1926, 1937, 1948, 1954, and 1982. They reiterated the government’s penchant for establishing commissions and task forces, without necessarily solving the problems.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the U.S. Department of State. These reports have consistently identified the extent of human rights abuses, violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the deplorable physical conditions of the facilities, which fall well below international minimum standards (Jones 2007, 333).

An established infrastructure of stakeholders has been working to implement programmes, policies, and initiatives to address these issues. There have been useful ideas on how to remedy some of the problems identified in realistic ways that take into account the financial constraints of the Jamaican government. These include new approaches to reducing jail and prison overcrowding (via decriminalization of drug use and other measures) and removing children from police lock-ups or jails. Earlier ideas were largely restricted to building new prisons and extending prison rehabilitation programmes.

**Stakeholders**

The crime and violence control and prevention infrastructure consists of a range of national, regional, and international actors that fall into three main categories: (1) public institutions comprised of government ministries, departments, and agencies; (2) private sector organizations, and (3) non-profit groups from civil society, including NGOs, community- and faith-based organizations, academia, and individuals. These sets of actors have collaborated on programmes that utilized sector-specific or cross-sectorial approaches focused for the most part on urban violence in volatile communities (UNODC 2007, 141). Stakeholders are involved in short-, medium-, and long-term public-private partnerships with varying degrees of commitment, involvement, and investment in crime control, prevention, and reduction initiatives. These programmes are funded wholly by, or in partnership with, bilateral and multilateral agreements, grants, and/or loan arrangements with the government of Jamaica, international development partners, and, particularly, multilateral financial institutions and the private sector.

The international donor community continues to be a strong and active partner, working with both the government of Jamaica and NGOs. Additionally, since 2009, Vision 2030 implementation infrastructure has been in place that encourages strong private-public partnerships to reach out to communities in ways that government cannot, advocate for their constituents, and provide local and national support and sustainability that goes beyond financing and support from international donor partners.

**Institutional Restructuring**

Jamaica’s Vision 2030 National Development Plan (passed in 2009), National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (2010), and Unite for Change Initiative (2013) constitute an infrastructure with the potential to integrate and coordinate crime prevention and community safety. The NCPCSS is a long-term safety plan to chart a new course of action for the next decade by developing safety and security initiatives and integrating and coordinating the work of government ministries, departments, and agencies with private sector groups, civil society, and international development partners to achieve sustainable

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and coordinated crime and violence reduction and prevention. The NCPCSS is driven by an action plan that is flexible and evidence-based.

As part of this restructuring, several secretariats or units with crime and violence reduction mandates have been created or have merged within or across partner ministries, departments, and agencies. These initiatives were undertaken to enhance education and health outcomes, change behavioural patterns of youth, establish justice reform initiatives, build law enforcement capacity, dismantle organized criminal groups, and establish oversight responsibilities to protect the integrity of law enforcement.

These measures go beyond government initiatives and reflect the involvement of other actors. Several ministries and their associated departments and agencies constitute the core crime prevention and community safety apparatus for the island, as will be discussed in the following section.

Public Institutions Supporting Crime Prevention and Control

The key government partners working to prevent and control crime in Jamaica are the Ministries of National Security, Justice, Youth, Education, Health, Local Government, Labour, Social Security and Finance. There is also a Joint Technical Working Group comprised of representatives from NGOs, community- and faith-based organizations, the private sector, and international development partners along with operational representatives from core ministries, departments, and agencies.50

The NCPCSS is discussed in detail below, but information about it is used here to contextualize its structural implications on public institutions working with crime and violence, and specifically those that address the crime prevention and/or reduction linkages of the three main ministries involved: the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Youth and Culture.

The subsections that follow briefly describe the State actors involved in the prevention and/or control of crime and violence in Jamaica. A section on non-State actors follows.

Ministry of National Security51

The Ministry of National Security (MNS) is the primary governmental body with responsibility for Jamaica’s public safety (Appendix 3.5). It exercises overall responsibility for security and defence. Its top priorities are crime reduction, creating a safe and secure environment, building infrastructure for effective law enforcement, and securing the borders.

The MNS saw a reduction in its 2013 total budget but an increase in the amount allocated for policing (Hall 2012). Overall, the ministry’s 2013-2014 fiscal year budget was JMD 48 billion, of which JMD 30 billion was allocated to the Jamaica Constabulary Force; JMD 4.9 billion to the Department of Correctional Services; JMD 318.5 million to the Passport, Immigration and

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51 For more information see the ministry website at http://www.mns.gov.jm.
Citizenship Agency (PICA); and the remaining JMD 13.5 billion to the central ministry. Of the JMD 47.1 billion for the 2014-2015 fiscal year estimates of expenditure, JMD 28.6 billion went to the police, JMD 13.3 billion to the central ministry, JMD 4.8 billion to the Department of Corrections, and JMD 315 million to PICA.\textsuperscript{52} The Jamaica Defence Force 2013/2014 budgetary allocation of JMD 12.1 billion was supplemented by overseas development assistance of JMD1.5 billion.

The MNS is being restructured and modernized. It has retained most of its existing functions but seen a number of mergers and transfers. The Island Special Constabulary Force merged with the JCF to eliminate administrative duplication and free up more personnel for line duty. The Organized Crime Division and the Flying Squad were merged and the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency was linked with the new polygraph centre. Additionally, a Divisional Court Liaison Desk was created within the Criminal Intelligence Bureau, and in 2010, the Research, Planning and Legal Services Branch was established within the JCF with the responsibility to respond to current, emerging, and future policy needs. In 2010, the authority for addressing public complaints of misconduct against the security forces was replaced by the Independent Commission of Investigation, an agency of the Ministry of Justice. The Police Civilian Oversight Authority was merged with the Police Services Commission to form the Police Service Authority. Additionally, the Private Security Regulation Authority and the Firearm Licensing Authority now form the National Security Regulating Authority. Another change was to the National Security Law Enforcement Academy, which now consists of the Jamaica Police Academy, Jamaica Constabulary Staff College, and Caribbean Search Centre. Finally, the Forensic Laboratory and the Legal Medical Unit now form an executive agency called the Forensic Medicine Unit.

In its role as the principal security agency, the MNS works directly, indirectly, singly, and/or in partnership with other ministries, departments, and agencies, private sector groups, and civil society on programmes such as the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), the Ministry of Education Safety in Schools Initiative, and the Ministry of Justice’s Justice System Review Task Force. These programmes to address crime and violence are fully examined in Chapter IV of this report.

\textit{Jamaica Constabulary Force}

The JCF has primary responsibilities for law enforcement. Its organizational structure is described in Appendix 3.6. For the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the JCF had a budget of JMD 28.6 billion, representing a reduction from the budget of JMD 29.6 billion in 2013-2014.

Table 3.1 shows the full complement of law enforcement personnel since 2009 and the ratio of police to population. In the recent past, Jamaica had a low force density and a proportionately smaller percentage of its population employed in public security than many other Caribbean and Latin American countries. However, from 2009 to 2013 the government significantly increased police density by 19 per cent.\textsuperscript{54} The MNS proposes to

\textsuperscript{52} Ministry of Finance, 2014-2015 Jamaica Budget Estimates of Expenditure (Net of Appropriations-In-Aid).

\textsuperscript{54} Sectoral Debate 2013-2014, Table 5, page 7. The ratios were calculated using population counts from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica.
further increase the ratio of police to population: its target is 807 police personnel per 100,000 inhabitants or 1 police officer per 124 citizens. It is not clear how the ministry arrived at this target. Women are severely underrepresented in the force as a whole and in its upper ranks (JCF Annual Reports, 2012, 2013).

Table 3.1. Jamaica Constabulary Force Strength, 2009-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>11,427</td>
<td>12,114</td>
<td>12,337</td>
<td>12,931</td>
<td>13,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2.686,105</td>
<td>2.695,543</td>
<td>2.704,133</td>
<td>2.711,476</td>
<td>2.717,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio (100,000)</td>
<td>1:235</td>
<td>1:222</td>
<td>1:219</td>
<td>1:210</td>
<td>1:1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Modernization of the MNS as discussed above also resulted in changes and mergers within the JCF. The Island Special Constabulary Force was merged into the JCF to create a single command and implementation structure to eliminate duplication in administrative services, expand the skill set of police personnel, and rationalize and centralize training. The merger was first recommended by the Wolfe Report (1991) and subsequently reiterated in five independent reports. Prior to the merger, each auxiliary force had separate legislative authority and specific areas of control and geographic areas of responsibility.

For more than two decades, national and international organizations such as Americas Watch (1986) and Amnesty International (2000) have consistently identified high levels of police brutality and extra-judicial killings in Jamaica. The UN Special Rapporteur - Mission to Jamaica found evidence of excessive use of force by the police and also raised concerns about the outcome of the June 2002 West Kingston Commission of Enquiry (June 2002). Similar concerns have been raised with respect to law enforcement activities during the May-June 2010 police operations in Tivoli Gardens and the subsequent state of emergency (Amnesty International 2011).

Within the JCF organizational structure, the Centre for the Investigation and Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA) has responsibility for gender-based violence. Established in 1989, CISOCA centralizes police response and investigation of sexual offences and child abuse. CISOCA aims to create an atmosphere that encourages victims and the community to report incidents of sexual offences and child abuse; ensure efficient and effective investigation into allegations of abuse; enhance the rehabilitation of victims through counselling and therapy; and conduct public education programmes on sexual offences and child abuse.

The centre operates seven units island-wide and has investigators at different stations across the 19 police divisions. Local police handle cases where CISOCA is not present or

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55 Sectoral Debate 2013-2014, page 6, the Honourable Peter Bunting.
able to intervene. A multi-disciplinary sexual offence response team comprised of police officers, social workers, and counsellors from the Victim Support Unit are tasked with providing appropriate responses to support victims through the various stages from investigation to conviction of perpetrators. This includes the provision of adequate legal services.

According to the JCF’s 2012 Annual Report, 1,564 cases of sexual offences and child abuse were reported to CISOCA, and 409 arrests were made that year. Fifty-one cases were submitted to the Director of Public Prosecution for rulings, and in six of those cases recommendations were made for the offender to participate in the Diversion Program. Table 3.2 shows the reports to CISOCA for 2013.

**Table 3.2. Offences Reported to the Centre for the Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>Reports</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual intercourse with a person under 16</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruelty to children</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Police-citizen relations, a problem area for the JCF, are handled by the *Crime Prevention Community Safety and Security Branch*. This branch subsumed the role of the defunct Community Relations Branch, which was developed and mandated to rebrand police partnerships with citizens. It now implements security and safety strategies developed by several committees, secretariats, and working groups and works to build safer communities through community policing and by boosting public confidence, supporting programmes such as Police Youth Clubs and Neighbourhood Watch, conducting activities such as school visits, and participating in church services and other community events. However, police-citizen relations are still fraught with difficulties. Despite recent declines, the number of civilian fatalities remains high, attracting the attention of national, regional, and international human rights bodies. Police-citizen relations have long been identified as a problem in Jamaica, thus serious attention should be given to this issue.

**Department of Correctional Services**

The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) had a 2012-2013 budget of JMD 4.6 billion, which increased to JMD 4.9 billion in 2013-2014. However, the 2014-2015 recurrent budget – that is, the cost of maintaining permanent structures – was reduced to JMD 4.8 billion.

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In 1975, three independent entities (prisons, probation services, and the Approved School) were amalgamated to form the DCS. At present, the department has responsibility for seven adult correctional centres, one adult remand centre, four juvenile custodial facilities, and 17 community service offices (probation offices). In addition, the Sex Offender Registry, established pursuant to the 2009 Sexual Offenses Act, 2009, now falls within the remit of the DCS.

With a maximum rated capacity for 4,652 prisoners, Jamaica’s correctional facilities are significantly beyond their built capacity and severely overcrowded, and they present a serious threat to life and health.\(^60\) Overcrowding is more acute in particular facilities, because some capacity is unusable due to staffing shortfalls, and because the rated capacity reflects both high- and low-security facilities, whereas most inmates are held in high-security facilities.\(^61\) The MNS is exploring options for reducing the prisoner population and building a new correctional facility to replace the two major correctional institutions, both of which are centuries-old and overcrowded by as much as 200 per cent.\(^62\) Table 3.3 shows that St. Catherine Adult Correctional Centre had the highest total admissions.

Contrary to law and treaty obligations, juveniles were also housed with adults until 2013. More juvenile males were admitted to juvenile facilities than females (Table 3.4). The South Camp Adult Correctional Centre, with a capacity of 350 and formerly used to house males, was renovated and designated a Juvenile Correctional Remand Centre to address the issue of juvenile females being housed with adults. In September 2013, all female juveniles previously housed with adults and the population at a second facility were transferred to South Camp. However, the juvenile population decreased from 90 in 2012 to between 30 and 45 in 2014. Therefore, the ministry proposes using South Camp to house the 153 women at Fort Augusta and finding an alternate location for female juveniles.

Table 3.3. Admissions to Adult Correctional Centres by Age, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Tower Street Adult Correctional Facility (Males)</th>
<th>St. Catherine Adult Correctional Facility (Males)</th>
<th>Fort Augusta Adult Correctional Facility (Females)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 and over</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1,425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{61}\) Ibid.

The philosophical shift that accompanied implementation of a national rehabilitation strategy opened opportunities for rehabilitation and care. The Criminal Justice Reform Act (1978) introduced new non-custodial alternatives to incarceration and other rehabilitative mechanisms to assist with re-entry and re-integration of inmates. The DCS lacks appropriate facilities to pursue rehabilitation and is short of resources and trained personnel to effectively treat mentally ill inmates. Consequently, treatment of mentally ill persons in DCS facilities remains a problem, with many cases of inmates languishing in jails without adjudication of their cases. In 2014, of 105 incarcerated persons designated unfit to plead (awaiting trial), several had been detained since 1960 without being tried and sentenced.\textsuperscript{63} The injustices arising from such practices should be flagged for examination.

Table 3.4. Admissions to Juvenile Institutions by Age, Sex, and Offence, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Age 13</th>
<th>Age 14</th>
<th>Age 15</th>
<th>Age 16</th>
<th>Age 17</th>
<th>Total Male</th>
<th>Total Female</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder/Manslaughter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounding</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession of offensive weapon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop/House break-in/ Larceny</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach of supervision order</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach of probation order</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous drug</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault/Assault occasionally bodily harm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious destruction of property</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary/robbery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal possession of firearm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontrollable behaviour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach of fit person order</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care and protection</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaping custody</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful possession/ receiving stolen property</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Ministry of Justice and Office of the Attorney General**

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is comprised of a number of divisions, departments, units, secretariats, statutory bodies and affiliated agencies designed to administer justice in support of Vision 2030 National Priority Outcomes (Appendix 3.7). The main departments are the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution, Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, Office of the Attorney General, Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, Legal Reform Unit, and the Independent Commission of Investigation.

The MOJ administers legislation, delivers justice services and provides policy support and analysis on justice issues. The MOJ had a budget of JMD 4.7 billion in 2012-2013 and an additional JMD 300 million in overseas development assistance. The ministry’s revised

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64 This section is based on information from the MOJ website (http://www.moj.gov.jm), the MTF 2009-2012 and 2012-2015 Reports and Two-year Progress Report, and the Justice Reform Task Force Report.
budget estimate for 2013-2014 was JMD 4.3 billion. This increased to JMD 4.6 billion for 2014-2015.\(^{65}\)

To promote a high standard of justice and transparent administration of law, priority is being given to transforming the MOJ into a policy-focused institution. The Vision 2030 strategy for justice is included under National Goal Number 2 and Priority National Outcome for Effective Governance for a Secure, Cohesive and Just Jamaican Society. Simultaneously, a thematic working group for justice supports implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of key actions to strengthen and modernize key units and agencies in order to improve justice outcomes. The ministry’s priorities for 2012-2015 are to strengthen root causes and consequences of existing problems; restore public trust and confidence in the justice system; improve access to justice; strengthen linkages between justice sector institutions; establish a sound court infrastructure; and incorporate a social component into the delivery of justice. MOJ modernization initiatives include capacity-building, infrastructure development, policy development and implementation, legal reform to improve functioning and outcomes, modernizing the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution, implementing a case management system, and establishing the Justice Reform Implementation Unit to drive the justice reform agenda.

Crime and violence prevention and reduction are affected by the extent to which the justice system is effective and efficient, as well as by the level of public confidence in the system. The Justice Reform Task Force (2007) found that Jamaica’s justice system is inefficient, and it identified 12 main problems that contribute to the system’s inefficiencies. These include delays, disrespect of individuals before the court, poor infrastructure, underfunding, outdated and inefficient procedures, and unequal treatment, benefits, and protection. A number of U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports,\(^{66}\) along with surveys and poll results, have reiterated the findings of the task force report relating to denial of a fair public trial to poor defendants and a backlog of cases.

Although the general perception of the effectiveness of the courts in the NCVS increased from 39.8 per cent in 2009 to 43.1 per cent in 2012-2013, the latter percentage is still lower than the 45.2 per cent in 2006. Results from the 2012-2013 NCVS suggest that very few respondents think the courts are doing a good job helping crime victims (15.5 per cent), providing justice quickly (15.5 per cent), or ensuring a fair trial (17 per cent). In both the NCVS and the CHDR (UNDP 2012), respondents were of the opinion that there was unequal treatment of persons by social class. This was reiterated in the Gleaner Poll of September 2014, which reported that 96 per cent of respondents were of the view that the rich and poor are not treated the same under the law.\(^{67}\) Citizens’ reluctance to serve as jurors, failure of witnesses to come forward, cases of persons being lost in the system, inadequate indigent representation, and/or delay or dismissal of cases due to lost or destroyed files contribute to this perception. Increased settlement rates and reduced trial times should add to public


support for the justice system, as well as for the departments and agencies within the ministry.

Indeed, case clearance rates in resident Magistrates’ Courts increased to 94 per cent in 2010, up from 80.1 per cent in 2009. However, most other indicators of effective governance showed little or no improvements during the period (MTF 2009-2012). Progress achieved under the Jamaican Justice Reform Agenda during 2009-2012 includes establishment of the Court Management Service to facilitate more efficient operations of the court system; introduction of the Criminal Case Management System; construction of new courthouses and improvements to physical structures; establishment of the Office of the Special Coroner; development of restorative justice; and an increase in judicial personnel (MTF 2012-2015, 9). New units established to advance the justice agenda include the Independent Commission of Investigation (INDECOM), which was put in place pursuant to the 2010 Independent Commission of Investigation Act (for more details see the next section of this chapter).

Introducing effective programmes and procedures – including adopting the new civil procedure rule, increasing legal aid in criminal cases, and introducing specialized courts and mediation through the Dispute Resolution Foundation – have the potential to make a difference. Four key and relevant programmes within the MOJ for crime and violence prevention are the Justice Undertaking for Social Transformation Programme, Child Justice Programme, Restorative Justice Programme, and Victim Support Programme (all fully discussed below).

**Director of Public Prosecution**

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) was established pursuant to the Constitution to provide a fair, just, independent, and effective criminal prosecution system. The DPP offers legal opinions on criminal matters and provides assistance to ministries, government departments, and statutory bodies. It initiates, assumes, and terminates prosecutions in all courts in Jamaica and conducts appellate work flowing from those prosecutions. The DPP rules on referrals from agencies such as the Bureau of Special Investigation’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and several JCF departments and units, including the Criminal Investigations Branch. The DPP’s budgetary allocation during the last three fiscal years were JMD 258 million in 2012-2013, JMD 268 million in 2013-2014, and JMD 270 million in 2014-2015.

In 2013, 43 Crown Prosecutors reviewed files from eight investigative bodies and litigated at various levels of courts in the 14 parishes. The numbers of files reviewed as of October 2013 were as follows: 579 from the Home Circuit Court, 1,890 from the High Court Division of the Gun Court, 226 from the Western Regional Gun Court, 1,070 from Rural Circuits (12 parishes), and a weekly average of six from the Court of Appeal. The DPP’s Quarterly

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68 More information can be obtained from the DPP website at [http://www.dpp.gov.jm/thedpp](http://www.dpp.gov.jm/thedpp).
Reports provide insight into its workload and indicate that the office is understaffed, which affects its ability to expeditiously dispose of cases and referrals.\(^6^9\)

**Office of the Parliamentary Counsel**

The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel drafts bills and subsidiary legislation on instructions from ministries, advises Parliament on draft bills, offers advice on points of law relevant to proposed legislation, and examines and comments on all Cabinet submissions related to legislation.

**Attorney General’s Department**

The Attorney General is appointed directly by the Prime Minister, and is therefore a political appointee who serves as the principal legal adviser to the government, while the Solicitor General has overall administrative responsibility for running the Attorney General’s Department. Combined, these agencies create, implement, and adjudicate on issues of crime and violence.

**The Legal Aid Council**

Located within the Ministry of Justice, the Legal Aid Counsel is mandated to organize and establish Legal Aid Clinics to administer an efficient and coordinated legal aid system. As at September 30, 2012, approximately 379 attorneys were enlisted to provide duty counsel services and accept Legal Aid court assignments.

The Legal Aid Act seeks to secure access to justice for all Jamaicans by providing a system of affordable legal representation for persons charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment. Persons pursuing criminal matters before the court are entitled to duty counsel or court assignments. However, citing cost, the Legal Aid Act and its amendments and regulations exempt certain criminal offenses and matters from obtaining legal aid from the government. This includes persons charged with certain drug and money laundering offences. Such exceptions have been criticized for violating the principle of innocent until proven guilty. Provision of legal aid is further hampered by concerns relating to timely payment and the low pay scale.\(^7^0\) This can impair representation that indigent defendants receive, and hints at some of the concerns raised in the Jamaican Justice System Task Force Report (2007).

**Victim Support Unit**\(^7^1\)

The Victim Support Unit (VSU), under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, was established in 1998 to assist, support, and advocate for persons against whom certain


\(^7^1\) More information is available on the Victim Support Unit website at http://moj.gov.jm/programmes/victim-support.
offences have been committed. The VSU does not formally provide legal advice or legal representation to victims. Instead, through island-wide parish offices, it assists victims in handling emotional trauma arising from criminal victimization. Much of the VSU’s function is violence prevention, including sensitizing society to the social and psychological impact of crime; providing information to crime victims about their rights; promoting crime prevention tips; and strengthening networking among victim support organizations. The UNDP (2014b, 98), citing the Victim’s Charter, indicates that 67 per cent of victims served by the VSU in 2006 were females. Of persons receiving VSU services in 2008, 16.2 per cent were victims of carnal abuse, 13.8 per cent of rape, and 10.6 per cent of domestic violence. Similarly, the 2011 ESSJ reports that 59.2 per cent of victims assisted were females. Of the female victims assisted, 15.7 per cent were carnal abuse victims, 11.4 per cent were rape victims, and 11.3 per cent were victims of domestic violence.

**Ministry of Youth and Culture**

The Ministry of Youth and Culture (MYC), headed by the Honourable Lisa Hanna, is the central government body primarily responsible for the development and welfare of Jamaica’s youth. The ministry’s total recurrent budgetary allocation for all departments increased from JMD 3.1 billion in 2012-2013 to JMD 3.5 billion in 2013-2014 and JMD 3.6 billion in 2014-2015.

The ministry has been restructured with core objectives for social and community development and consolidation of the youth portfolio. This has resulted in programmes and projects being transferred from other ministries, such as education. Initiatives within the ministry now serve to protect and enhance the lives of children and youth and help them become contributing members of society. The MYC is also a primary partner in the Technical Working Group for Unite for Change, and plays an integral role in the government’s crime prevention framework.

The direct correlation between age and the propensity to commit crime is reflected in Jamaica’s crime statistics showing that youth are both the primary victims and perpetrators of crime. The youth focus section of the Vision 2030 Sector Plan on population indicates that achievement of the National Development Plan is predicated on “a population which meets the sustainable development needs of the country.” Functional areas of the MYC were amended to create a Children’s Affairs Division and a Youth Division. The restructured Child Affairs Division is responsible for children up to 18 years old. It oversees the Child Development Agency and the Office of the Children’s Registry, an executive agency for policy implementation and delivery of child care. Both have responsibility for addressing crime and violence by or against youths.

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**The Child Development Agency**

The Child Development Agency (CDA) is the primary agency for child protection. It works to promote child-friendly policies and programmes to strengthen families. In 2014-2015, the CDA received JMD 1.8 billion of the JMD 3.6 billion allocated to the ministry, the same as for 2013-2015. Established in 2004 to meet the requirements of the Child Care and Protection Act, the CDA has as its mandate to support and advocate for children in need of care and protection. The CDA conducts public education programmes and advises government on policy and legal issues relating to children.

**Office of the Children’s Registry**

The main role of the Office of the Children’s Registry (OCR) is to receive reports of children who have been, are being, or are likely to be abandoned, neglected, or physically or sexually ill-treated, or are otherwise in need of care and protection. The Youth Division has responsibility for ages 19 to 25.

Statistics from both the OCR and the CDA show increasing levels of child abuse, especially of female victims of sexual abuse and early sexual initiation (UNDP 2012; OCR 2014). Growing youth unemployment and a commensurate broadening of the cohort of youths at risk and children in care remain challenges (2014 Sectorial Debate). The OCR’s improved efficiency in addressing these issues and its clear functional lines are attributed to the government restructuring discussed earlier.

**Ministry of Health**

Jamaica’s Ministry of Health (MOH) provides services to most Jamaicans at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. The overall budget for the ministry for the last three cycles has fluctuated from JMD 33.6 billion in 2012-2013 to JMD 37.6 billion in 2013-2014 and JMD 34.7 billion in 2014-2015. The 2013-2014, budget allocation of J$36.3 billion constituted 10.2 per cent of the total recurrent national budget of J$358.3 billion, while the 2014-2015 estimated budget allocation of J$34.7 billion represents 8.6 per cent of the total recurrent budget of J$404.6 billion. The number of personnel is not immediately available. However, the MOH has been restructured to align with Jamaica’s development agenda. This has involved transfers, mergers, and privatisation. Non-core activities included the two child-focused entities. The Child Development Agency and the Office of the Children’s Registry were transferred to the Ministry of Youth.

The MOH is part of the Unite for Change Technical Working Group that deals with matters related to crime and violence. MOH partners with PAHO and the Caribbean Public Health Agency to develop strategies to address violence-related injuries. The MOH also works with

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civil society initiatives such as the Health Policy Project to reduce gender-based violence and provide technical assistance to develop violence-related strategic plans (e.g., for HIV, 2012-2017) and programming (for gender-based violence).  

While the health of Jamaicans improved considerably during the 20th century, placing Jamaica among countries ranked high on the world human development indicators, violence and intentional and unintentional injuries are at epidemic proportions and are among the country’s leading causes of death. Overall, homicide is the fifth leading cause of death, and the second leading cause of death for men, making the MOH an integral partner with other ministries, departments, and agencies, civil society, NGOs, and international development partners in Jamaica’s systematic and coordinated approach to violence prevention.

The MOH budget includes the direct medical costs of treating injuries from interpersonal violence and other costs associated with treating victims of violence. Ward et al. (2009), in estimating the economic cost of inter-personal violence in Jamaica, report direct medical costs of JMD 2.1 billion for 2006. Injuries due to interpersonal violence accounted for about 12 per cent of Jamaica’s total health budget, while productivity losses due to violence-related-injuries accounted for approximately JMD 27.5 billion, or 160 per cent of Jamaica’s total health expenditure and 4 per cent of the country’s GDP. Additionally, one in three planned surgeries has had to be postponed to address medical emergencies from violence-related injuries.

The Jamaica Injury Surveillance System was developed to provide data on the profile of injuries seen and treated at health facilities (Ward et al. 2002). Information on violence-related injuries, combined with police data and community-based surveys, produced risk profiles for different types of injuries. As the first fully computerized wide-area and networked national surveillance system in the region, the system was considered a model for other developed or developing countries. However, as noted earlier in this report, the system has suffered some setbacks and is not fully functional. Support for this programme is an essential aspect of data generation and should be buttressed to produce and disseminate data.

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79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., page 10.
**Ministry of Education**

The Ministry of Education (MOE) is one of Jamaica’s largest public entities. Its budgetary allocations have fluctuated over the last three fiscal cycles from JMD 79 billion in 2012-2013 to JMD 84 billion in 2013-2014 and JMD 78 billion in 2014-2015. The most recent budgetary allocation does not have a direct crime and violence component. However, the MOE is an active partner in crime and violence prevention in Jamaica, and portions of the budget are increasingly devoted to programmes with direct crime prevention outcomes. These programmes will be discussed later in this report.

There is a direct relationship between education and crime. A sound education contributes to crime reduction, increased employability, and a reverse in declining levels of labour productivity. The Vision 2030 National Outcome for Education has established baselines and targets to improve literacy and enrolment targets. The Task Force on Educational Reform reported that low levels of student educational outcomes, together with such problems as anti-social behaviour, increased violence and other forms of criminal activities in and around schools. Therefore, the MOE’s crime reduction and prevention initiatives include the Safe Schools Programme, programmes that emphasize behaviour modification, reintegration of pregnant mothers in school, and improvement of educational content. Aspects of the National Youth Service were transferred to the Ministry of Youth and Culture as part of the MOE’s restructuring.

**Ministry of Transportation, Works and Housing**

The Ministry of Transportation, Works and Housing (MTWH) plays an integral part in crime prevention initiatives as a joint partner in the Unit for Change initiative, and specifically through low-income housing for the poor. The ministry was established in January 2012 to take on the housing portfolio, previously handled by the Ministry of Water and Housing. Its mandate includes facilitating, developing, and implementing legal aid, providing adequate and affordable housing solutions for all Jamaicans, and conducting housing policy and research, including on squatter management and community development. Over the past three fiscal cycles, the MTWH’s budgetary allocation has steadily increased from JMD 2.295 billion in 2012-2013 to JMD 3.363 billion in 2014-2015.

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86 For example, JMD 380 million is earmarked in the 2014-2015 budget to expand numeracy and improve examination results. See the Sectorial Debate 2014-2014, page 17.
Jamaica suffers from inadequate housing for the poor. This has contributed to the development of informal (squatter) settlements. The Housing Sector Plan estimates that approximately 30 per cent of the population lives in these informal or squatter settlements, which continue to grow because of such factors as rural-urban migration and lack of enforcement of existing laws and policies. JCF statistics indicate that crimes occur disproportionately in these blighted communities. The expansion and concentration of the poor in inner-city communities and the growth of urban slums largely abandoned by the State have created spaces that now have high rates of crime, and infrastructural and geographical conditions create impediments to policing. Acknowledgement of these policing problems has prompted initiatives such as the Inner-city Cities Basic Services for the Poor Project to remove zinc fence and other barriers to visibility and access.

**Ministry of Labour and Social Security**

The Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) addresses issues related to workers and employers. Its budgetary allocations for the three most recent fiscal years were JMD 2.27 billion in 2012-2013, JMD 2.4 billion in 2013-2014, and JMD 2.26 billion in 2014-2015. Information on the number of personnel was unavailable. This ministry is in the process of being modernized.

The impact of crime on Jamaica’s labour environment is widely documented (UNODC 2007; UNDP 2012; Francis et al. 2009). The MLSS is mandated to increase employment and provide social services. However, through partnerships with the Ministry of National Security in national-level initiatives on crime and violence prevention through the NCPCSS, the MLSS’s work overlaps with efforts to address risk factors for crime and violence. This includes implementation of social programmes to address the needs of vulnerable groups and combat unemployment and poverty. The ministry also participates in administration of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)/International Programme for Elimination of Child Labour to reduce the risk factors for crime and violence.

**Ministry of Local Government and Community Development**

The Ministry of Local Government and Community has four main areas of focus that revolve around issues of governance. The Social Development Commission is the ministry’s primary agency with a crime prevention mandate working at the community level. In this capacity, the commission collaborates with several ministries, departments, and agencies to implement crime and violence prevention initiatives.

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95 More information is available on the ministry’s website at http://www.localgovjamaica.gov.jm.
Ministry of Finance and Planning\textsuperscript{96}

The Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOF) has overall responsibility for developing the government’s fiscal and economic policy framework. The ministry’s cadre of employees in agencies, department, units, and secretariats plays an important role in the socio-economic development of the country, including support for institutions to protect citizens’ rights and develop infrastructure for crime and violence prevention. The ministry also houses the Planning Institute of Jamaica, the government’s foremost planning agency and a central partner in anti-crime initiatives, as described below.

Planning Institute of Jamaica\textsuperscript{97}

The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) is the government’s lead agency for the development of strategic and innovative policy and programmatic responses to emerging issues at the national and organizational levels. Led by a Director General, the PIOJ collaborates in support of multi-sectoral linkages and partnerships, and in the development of several national policies, programmes, strategies, and action plans. The agency also acts as an inter-sectoral and multi-sectoral partner with other ministries, departments, and agencies, international development partners, multilateral financial institutions, the private sector, and NGOs to develop programmes and coordinate on issues relating to crime and violence. These efforts, in turn, inform the community safety strategy. The PIOJ also coordinates and participates in negotiations for investment loans in support of crime reduction, educational transformation (PIOJ Annual Report 2009, 19), development of the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy, the merger of the CSJP with the Community Security Initiative (CSI) (PIOJ Annual Report 2010, 15), and the design and implementation of the Community Renewal Programme (discussed below). The PIOJ also has responsibility for ensuring the efficient and timely implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and communication of Vision 2030.

Office of the Prime Minister

Three agencies within the Office of the Prime Minister – the Bureau of Gender Affairs (BGA), Women’s Centre of Jamaica Foundation, and Sports Development Foundation – contribute to crime prevention and reduction.

Bureau of Gender Affairs\textsuperscript{100}

On March 8, 2012, the Bureau of Women’s Affairs was renamed the Bureau of Gender Affairs to acknowledge that gender issues are not confined to women. The Bureau of Gender Affairs (BGA) is mandated to mobilize the government to address problems that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[96] More information is available on the ministry’s website at \url{http://www.mof.gov.jm}.
\item[97] This section relies on information from PIOJ websites, Annual Reports, and Rodrick (2006).
\item[99] PIOJ Annual Report 2010, \url{http://pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/Annual_Report/Annual%20Report%202010%20%20REVISED.pdf}.
\item[100] More information is available on the BGA website at \url{http://opm.gov.jm/agencies/bureau-of-gender-affairs/}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
confront women, such as high rates of violence, spousal abuse, rape, incest, and sexual harassment. As an advocacy agency, the BGA supports efforts to ensure that women receive adequate protection under the law. Its responsibilities also include international obligations and mandates to address gender-based violence arising from legally binding principles and standards in Jamaica’s treaty obligations. This includes the design and coordination of multi-sectorial plans on gender violence, capacity development, support for victims of gender violence, and development of national plans. The bureau played a key role in the passage of the Sexual Offences Act in 2009. It partners with other ministries and NGOs such as the Women’s Resource Outreach Centre (discussed below) on anti-violence programmes. The Office of the Prime Minister’s budget does not specifically list a line item for the BGA.

**Women’s Centre of Jamaica Foundation**

The Women’s Centre of Jamaica Foundation is a limited liability company under the auspices of the Office of the Prime Minister. One of its priorities, the Programme for Adolescent Mothers, aims to help pregnant adolescents age 17 and under continue their secondary education. The programme was established in 1978 in response to a high level of teenage pregnancy. It has since expanded to seven main centres and eight outreach stations nationwide. Under the programme, girls who have dropped out of school due to pregnancy are allowed to continue their education at the Women’s Centres nearest to them for at least one term, and are subsequently returned to the formal school system after the birth of their babies.

**Sports Development Foundation**

The Sports Development Foundation (SDF) is an independent body funded through the Culture, Health, Arts, Sports and Education Fund to provide resources to support the development and implementation of sports in Jamaica. The SDF designs plans, policies, and programmes to develop physical infrastructure and human capital for sports at the community and national levels, including in high-crime communities. To date, the SDF has sponsored island-wide projects in excess of JMD 1 billion.

**Office of the Public Defender**

The Office of the Public Defender (OPD), an independent Commission of Parliament established under the Public Defender (Interim) Act of 1999, replaced the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman in 2000. The OPD is mandated to provide access to the justice system for persons victimized by the State. The Public Defender is appointed by the Governor General of Jamaica. The OPD budget declined from a provisional expenditure budget of JMD 76,561 in 2012-2013 to a 2014-2015 budget of JMD 75,453.

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103 Information for this section draws extensively from the OPD website at [http://opd.gov.jm/about-us/organisational-structure](http://opd.gov.jm/about-us/organisational-structure); its 2010 and 2011 Annual Reports; and its Administrative Status Report for July 1-
on staffing was unavailable. The Public Defender can make Special Reports to Parliament on issues that in the Public Defender’s opinion warrant intervention and can make recommendations for legislative amendment. The OPD’s most recent Special Report relates to the May 2010 Tivoli incursion.\textsuperscript{104} Table 3.5 shows complaints handled by the OPD between 1999 and 2011. While the clearance of cases increased, cases are still backlogged from 2004-2013. In 2013, the office opened 312 complaints, closed 30 cases (10 per cent of the total), and had 282 cases pending (90 percent of the total). In addition, 239 cases received prior to 2013 were closed, so, cumulatively, 269 cases were closed in 2013. The OPD estimates that a minimum of 1,000 new cases will be received in 2014. It anticipates closing the pending cases and 80 per cent of new cases projected for 2014.\textsuperscript{105}

Table 3.5. Complaints Handled by the Office of the Public Defender, 1999-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints received from 1979-2010</td>
<td>23,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints received in 2011</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints received from 1979-2011</td>
<td>24,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints closed from 1979-2010</td>
<td>21,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints closed in 2011</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints closed from 1979-201</td>
<td>21,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints pending for 2011</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complaints pending to date</td>
<td>3,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of male complainants served in 2011</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of female complainants served in 2011</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of complainants served in 2011</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Non-State Actors Engaged with Crime Prevention and Control

**Universities and Academic Centres**

The University of the West Indies (UWI) and Northern Caribbean University (NCU) play important direct roles in crime prevention as researchers and implementers of crime prevention initiatives. The UWI as well as individual units such as the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security play an integral role in generating policy-relevant knowledge for crime and violence prevention. The UWI’s Mona Geoinformatics Institute systematically conducts spatial analyses of Jamaica’s crime problem. Through the Township Programme Development Committees, the UWI Mona campus engages with two adjoining communities for crime and violence prevention. The Institute of Gender Studies, working in partnership with the Bureau of Gender Affairs, focuses on gender-based violence, while the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security has been conducting several different projects to help understand crime and violence across the region.

**Non-Governmental Organizations**

Across the island, several agencies have implemented programmes ranging from sports-based interventions to parenting classes and behaviour modification initiatives that have had crime reduction or prevention outcomes even though they were not specifically designed for that purpose. Despite these relevant and promising outcomes, many of these programmes have not been systematically evaluated. Using the criteria for inclusion, three non-State actors that work with some type of crime and violence prevention programmes are Children First, Dispute Resolution Foundation, and Violence Prevention Alliance (Table 3.6).

*Children First*

Children First is a unique community-based organization that uses creative participatory and developmental approaches in social and educational programmes for children, adolescents, and young adults between the ages of 10 and 24. It also offers skills training for parents and guardians to enhance family life to overcome poverty. Since its inception in 1989, Children First has been recognized nationally, regionally, and internationally for its work with children. Outcomes include reduced numbers of children on the street and involved in child labour. The government of Jamaica and the Planning Institute of Jamaica selected and showcased Children First as a “model agency/project” for its work in contributing to Jamaica’s progress towards meeting the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and other internationally agreed-upon development goals.

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107 For example, worldwide, sports-based interventions have been recognized for helping reduce anti-social behaviour (Kelly 2013).

**Dispute Resolution Foundation**

The Dispute Resolution Foundation is a civil society organization that employs mediation, arbitration, and dialogue and facilitation. The foundation works closely with the government of Jamaica, primarily through the Ministry of Justice, to advocate, train, and deliver services in support of the national agenda for justice, peace, and development. Conflict resolution is an integral element of violence prevention, and the Dispute Resolution Foundation advocates for integration of conflict resolution in the school curriculum.\(^{109}\)

**Violence Prevention Alliance**

Under the umbrella of the Ministry of Health, the Violence Prevention Alliance shares a public health approach that targets the root causes of violence. The alliance recognizes the need to improve services to mitigate the harmful effects of violence. It is guided by evidence-based principles and, most importantly, it is an advocacy arena that influences local, national, and international policy changes for violence prevention activities.

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### Table 3.6. Non-Governmental Organizations Directly Targeting Crime and Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children First</td>
<td>Yes, it has partnered with the Ministries of Health and Youth.</td>
<td>No. It promotes healthy lifestyle and behaviour change in youths. The organization serves more than 600 children annually in areas such as health and conflict resolution.</td>
<td>Project funds; small grants; support from private sector; entrepreneurial activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Resolution Foundation</td>
<td>Yes, it is an active member of the Vision 2030 Technical Working Group and works closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Peace Management Initiative, ministries, departments, and agencies, and international development partners.</td>
<td>No, it works closely with the government, primarily through the Ministry of Justice to advocate, train, and deliver related services in support of a national agenda for justice, peace, and development.</td>
<td>Project funds; small grants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Prevention Alliance</td>
<td>Yes, it is a partner in the Unite for Change initiative and the sole source for the development of the Jamaica Crime Observatory. It also works with the Peace Management Initiative to promote peace building, and with the Ministry of Health to strengthen the Jamaica Injury Surveillance System.</td>
<td>No, it monitors and tracks armed violence, and examines risk factors with a propensity towards violence in perpetrators.</td>
<td>Project funds; small grants from international agencies and from the local private sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civil Society Groups**

Several private sector organizations, NGOs, and community and faith-based organizations also work primarily as implementation partners for the government, international donor partners, multilateral financial Institutions, and the private sector.

Risk factors for crime and violence include high levels of youth unemployment and insufficient access to education and economic opportunities. Information from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) shows that in 2014, unemployment in Jamaica was 13.8 per cent, with 38.3 per cent of those unemployed being youth between the most crime-prone
ages of 14 and 24.\textsuperscript{110} A primary anti-crime focus is on increasing employability and employment opportunities for youth in this age bracket. Jamaica’s private sector has shown varying degrees of commitment to public-private partnerships and investment in communities for crime reduction and prevention through job creation, mentorship, skill training, funding, sponsorship of events, or sustaining programmes beyond international donor partner funding periods. The rationale for engagement ranges from philanthropy to more strategic reasons such as the desire to cultivate social capital in the communities within which businesses operate.

The combined strength of public-private partnerships facilitates greater output and impact. Some of the organizations that actively partner for citizen security are the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica, Sandals Foundation, Digicel Foundation, and the Grace Kennedy Foundation. Each works independently or collaboratively to improve citizen security.

\textit{Private Sector Organization of Jamaica}

The Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) is a voluntary national organization of some 330 private associations, individuals, partnerships, and corporate bodies working together to promote a competitive and productive private sector. The organization seeks to influence national political, social, and economic policies. Among its areas of emphasis is the design and promotion of policies to achieve a lawful and just society. Consequently, the association is a key private institution working in partnership with the government of Jamaica, the JCF, the media, and private citizens on a number of crime prevention initiatives. The PSOJ lists among its achievements several crime and violence prevention initiatives such as the development of the national crime plan in partnership with the government, the opposition, and civil society; and introduction of new crime-related programmes that contribute to further enhancement of the profile of the police. The association is also an active participant in the Standing Committee on National Security and the Justice Reform Committee. One of its primary undertakings is the Private Sector Coalition Initiative for Youth Upliftment through Employment.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{Sandals Foundation}

The Sandals Foundation is a non-profit organization and charitable arm of Sandals Resort International. It works as an active partner with the government of Jamaica and other corporate entities to sponsor social and developmental programmes for crime prevention.\textsuperscript{112} The foundation works in partnerships in three broad areas: community, education, and the environment. The Sandals Foundation sponsors social and developmental programmes at the community level for disaffected youths to interrupt violence and poverty, improve health care, and provide employment training. Educational programmes support children, youths, and adults. Funds raised by the foundation go directly into sustainable social,


\textsuperscript{111} Additional Information on PSOJ initiatives and projects can be found at the organization’s website at http://psoj.org/.

\textsuperscript{112} More information is available on the foundation’s website at http://www.sandalsfoundation.org/.
developmental, and environmental programmes that directly or indirectly address crime and violence prevention.

**Digicel Foundation - Jamaica**\(^{113}\)

The Digicel Foundation is a non-profit organization that distributes and utilizes funds on a charitable basis for the sole purpose of building communities and community spirit in Jamaica. Launched in 2004, the foundation contributes to educational, cultural, and social development projects and programmes. The foundation collaborates with a range of stakeholders to develop, deliver, and implement projects island-wide to offset potential conflicts. The foundation directly and indirectly addresses crime and violence prevention through initiatives targeting at-risk youths, youth entrepreneurship programmes, and construction of recreational and sports facilities. Its 2012-2013 Annual Report (page 37) indicates that since its inception, the Digicel Foundation has invested over JMD 16.5 million in initiatives, with 445 schools involved and 250 teachers trained. During the 2012-2013 reporting period, the foundation invested JMD 1.75 million in 108 projects directly affecting more than 47,000 people. Financial statements for the year ended March 2013 show income of JMD 2,134,000 compared to JMD 1,702,000 for 2012, an increase of JMD 432,000.

**Grace Kennedy Foundation**\(^{114}\)

The Grace & Staff Community Development Foundation, a joint project between management and staff, is the outreach arm of the Grace Kennedy Foundation. Established in 1979 in response to the social and economic conditions in inner-city communities, the foundation continues to invest in Jamaican communities through direct and indirect programming for crime prevention in three primary areas: sports, education, and community development. The Grace & Staff Community Development Foundation has been recognized by the South-South Crime Prevention Project for its work in inner-city communities. Such projects enhance community organization, improve social order, reduce violence, and encourage peace building. From a crime control perspective, the social intervention programmes may be seen as diversionary. They provide young people, especially teenage males, with alternate after-school activities that are highly structured and supervised by responsible adults.

Overall, the Public Sector Coalition has developed a strategy that aligns with Vision 2030 goals, including serving as a partner in technical working groups on crime and violence prevention and reduction. Collectively, initiatives and partnerships with the private sector, public sector, and not-for-profit coalitions support the police, and offer recommendations on new legislation and amendments to the government of Jamaica.\(^{115}\)

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\(^{113}\) More information is available on the foundation’s website at [http://digiceljamaicafoundation.org/](http://digiceljamaicafoundation.org/).

\(^{114}\) More information is available on the foundation’s website at [http://www.gracekennedy.com](http://www.gracekennedy.com).


**Laws: Legislative Activities since 2009**

Since 2000, the government of Jamaica has had an active legislative agenda to address the rising incidence of crime and violence as well as the need to conform to regional and international treaty obligations and international processes concerned with transnational organized criminal activities such as illicit drugs, gangs, money laundering, and corruption.

Between 2009 and 2014, 37 pieces of legislation addressing crime and violence were passed. The 2010-2011 legislative year was especially active, with passage of 21 of 109 bills related to crime. Of the post-2009 crime legislation, 10 bills made changes to the penal code or judicial system, 13 increased punishment for specific crimes, four addressed profits of criminal activities, and one addressed gang activities. Several bills will by default affect youths as perpetrators of specific crimes. The six anti-crime bills passed in 2010 proved to be quite controversial, increasing the powers of law enforcement personnel and restricting the rights of citizens, resulting in constitutional challenges that required further legislative amendment. Generally, offence specificity accounted for one in three legislative actions, be it an amendment or new legislation to address a dimension of an issue in recently implemented legislation.

One bill, the Independent Commission of Investigations Act (2010), was implemented to undertake investigations concerning actions by security forces and other agents of the State that result in death or injury to a person, the abuse of the rights of persons, and related issues. Among the matters that fall within the remit of INDECOM are police civilian fatalities.

There was an overlap in the four laws addressing gender-based-violence, violence against women, child abuse, and sexual violence. Those related to women and children were, in the main, designed to increase punishment of perpetrators.

**Gender-based Violence**

The laws providing remedy for women and girls who are victims of gender-based violence in Jamaica have their foundation in Common Law, the Constitution, and acts of Parliament. For more than a century, the Offences against the Person Act (1864) was the primary legislation on the island addressing most violent and personal crimes, including gender-based violence. More offence-specific legislation and/or legislative amendments began to be passed in the 1990s. The exception was the long-standing Incest Punishment Act (1948), which was relational rather than gender-based.

Legislation from 2009 onward includes the Sexual Offences Act (2009), the Child Pornography (Prevention) Act (2009), the Offences against the Person (Amendment) Act

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116 See Appendix 3.3 for the list of legislation.

(2010), and one Constitutional amendment, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (2011). Combined with the 1995 Domestic Violence Act, the Domestic Violence (Amendment) Act (2004), and the Child Care and Protection Act (2004) – implemented to comply with conventions or treaty obligations – these pieces of legislation expand the range of options and remedies available to victims of physical and sexual violence. Specifically, the Sexual Offences Act (2009) was a significant step in addressing a slew of gender-based offences. It amended the Offences against the Person Act (1864), repealed the Incest Punishment Act (1948), created the offence of marital rape, and addressed incest and other offences such as capacity, consent, and evidentiary matters.

These gender-based violence laws also increased punishment for offenders by imposing life sentences for conviction for several gender-based acts of violence and mandated the establishment of a Sex Offender Registry. The associated regulations, the Sexual Offences (Registration of Sex Offenders) Regulations (2012), were implemented to enforce the registration of sex offenders.

Despite introduction of a sexual harassment policy more than a decade ago, the island is still without sexual harassment legislation. Consequently, victims of workplace harassment must rely on common law, tort, and contract law remedies.

Sexual Violence

As illustrated above, the four new laws cumulatively redefined and reclassified categories of sexually violent offences and strengthened the framework for punishing offenders. An important change in the Sexual Offences Act (2009) is replacement of the category of “carnal abuse,” previously a gender-specific category, with a new gender-neutral category “sex with persons under 16” in order to incorporate sexual offences against male children.

Child Abuse

No child-specific legislation has been implemented since the Child Care and Protection Act of 2004. However, both the Sexual Offences Act (2009) and the Child Pornography (Prevention) Act (2009) increase penalties for perpetrators of sexual violence against children.

Organized Crime and Related Activities

Four of the five legislative priorities established by the Ministry of National Security for 2013-2014 were achieved: the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act (2013); the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) (Amendment) Act (2013); the Law Reform (Fraudulent Transactions) (Special Provisions) Act (2014); and the Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organizations) Act (2014). All were enacted to address organized crime and its associated activities relating to gangs, firearms, trafficking in persons, and proceeds of crime. Combined, they seek to change the legal framework to effectively

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combat organized crime, dismantle criminal organizations, deprive criminals of illegal profits of criminal enterprises, and prevent money laundering. These bills complement a raft of legislation over the past five years. In addition, long-awaited gang legislation passed in 2014, and the “Lotto Scamming” legislation of 2013 directly and indirectly affected youth.

Cumulatively, laws passed since 2009 address substantive administrative and justice issues, provide for introduction of evidence under special circumstances and for vulnerable populations such as children, introduce plea-bargaining, and change conditions for bail and for data and information handling. Some of these laws, such as denial of bail, were contentious for their rights-abrogating effects. However, although police powers were strengthened, oversight of police was also strengthened, and can be seen as a balancing of power.

**National Policies, Plans, and Strategies**

Despite its limitations, the crime control approach to criminal justice has until recently been the most widely used response by the government of Jamaica (UNODC 2007; Jones 2014). Criminal justice policy and legislation are often without empirical and theoretical support, explained in part by inadequate efforts at the country level (Abuelafia and Sedlacek 2010), with policies that are more symbolic than effective directed largely on “focusing” events (Jones 2014). However, the recent adoption of a public health model for addressing crime (Unite for Change Initiative), accompanied by increased monitoring and evaluation required by the Vision 2030 National Development Plan, signals a new orientation towards monitoring and evaluation.

**National Security Policy – 2007 and 2012**

The 2007 National Security Policy acknowledged the impact of insecurity on Jamaica’s development goals, reiterated the importance of a safe and secure environment, identified five primary threats to Jamaica’s national security, and designed eight Strategic Security Goals to effectively address these challenges and the key capabilities required to counter or mitigate exposure to threats. The 2012 National Security Policy updated the 2007 policy to cohesively integrate the country’s major security policies, goals, responsibilities, and actions into an overall master strategy to fulfil a vision for national security in Jamaica.

The National Security Policy for Jamaica was introduced to Parliament as Ministry Paper No. 63 by Prime Minister on April 29, 2014 and to the Senate on May 2, 2014. The policy identifies six key reforms to be adopted across all areas of society that have an impact on a safe and secure environment: removal of profit from crime, reform of the justice system, policing by consent, adoption of a coherent anti-gang strategy, a focus on at-risk individuals and communities, and strengthening of the systems of governance. Monitoring implementation of the policy across the public sector is carried out by the National Security Policy Monitoring Committee of the Cabinet Office.

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119 This section draws on Ministry of National Security (2012b).
secure, the policy also seeks to foster greater levels of involvement and stronger partnerships among citizens, civil society, and all government ministries, departments, and agencies involved with safety and security services.


Vision 2030 Jamaica, the country’s first long-term development plan, is the primary framework within which sector-specific plans are currently embedded. The Vision 2030 National Development Plan is bi-partisan and multi-sectorial, and was developed collaboratively by the government of Jamaica, the private sector, and other civil society groups. The plan has seven critical guiding principles: transformational leadership, partnership, transparency and accountability, social cohesion, equity, sustainability, and urban and rural development, as well as four national goals and 15 national outcomes. There are 31 sector plans. Each integrates social, economic, and environmental elements and focuses on developing the nation by building cultural, human, knowledge, and institutional capital over time to achieve developed-nation status by 2030. Each sector plan supports specified national goals and outcomes.

The National Development Plan is results-based and is being implemented and monitored through the Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF) through a series of seven consecutive MTFs, with one MTF every three years. The first MTF (2009-2012) established the baseline for national goals and outcomes, and each three-year progress report forms the basis for subsequent MTFs. The 2012-2015 MTF established national and sectorial priorities. National security constitutes a main priority affecting the nation’s development, so the 2012-2015 MTF (on pages 48-54) outlines national goals and sub-national outcomes for security and safety as well as effective governance. Table 3.7 presents a sub-element of a priority national outcome, its priority areas, and its priority actions in pursuit of national security.

### Table 3.7. Vision 2030 National Goal 2: The Jamaican Society Is Secure, Cohesive, and Just

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority National Outcome</th>
<th>Priority Areas</th>
<th>Priority Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security and Safety</td>
<td>Anti-Crime Strategy</td>
<td>Improve national security communication and information technology infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disrupt transnational and organized crime, gangs, and criminal structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure that containers and other shipments entering ports are scanned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Table 2: National Priorities Matrix, Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (2012-2015 page 3).

The Vision 2030 National Security Sector Plan, which entered its implementation stage in 2009, outlines the mission, vision, and outcome for the national security mandate and the collective institutional framework for addressing crime and violence in Jamaica. Its goal is to transform and modernize Jamaica’s system of national security so that it “promotes shared values of respect for law and order and guarantees safety, security, human rights and dignity.
for all” (Sector Plan National Security 2009, page 2). Action plans and strategies for crime and violence are also included in sector plans for population, education, labour, social security, and governance.

National plans have been established to address gender-based violence and violence against youth and children. Several other frameworks with safety, security, and justice pillars – such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2012-2016 – complement and are aligned with Jamaica’s National Development Plan. The UNDAF targets the most vulnerable in Jamaican society, particularly those in rural/urban and or volatile community settings, and seeks to improve access to justice systems and services for individuals and groups vulnerable to safety and violence risks (UNDAF 2011, ix).

The Vision 2030 National Security Sector Plans, and the National Security Policy, Plan, and Strategy, have been updated to reflect the framework outlined in the NCPCSS and its amendments.

The National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy

The May 2014 Sectorial Debate of the Minister of National Security signalled the government’s policy direction for crime and violence prevention and reduction. It states, “In 2012, we were on ‘A Mission to Make Jamaica Safe and Secure.’ In 2013, we made strides towards a safe and secure Jamaica and now in 2014 with the preacher, the teacher, the yout’ pon di corner, the vendor, the farmer...We are Working Together to Build a Safer Jamaica.”

Jamaica’s long-term development plan sets the framework for policies, plans, and strategies in pursuit of developed-nation status by 2030. The NCPSS integrates several earlier policy frameworks and documents to operationalize the government’s strategy for crime and violence reduction in the Vision 2030 National Development Plan. In 2013, the NCPCSS was updated in two Ministry Papers to incorporate an epidemiological perspective and framework for violence prevention. These represent structural changes and mergers mentioned previously in the section on public institutions.

The government’s primary policy focus for safety and security remains strengthening crime control institutions. However, the MNS has acknowledged that while crime prevention and social intervention are integral to interrupting Jamaica’s crime and violence trajectory, the traditional focus on crime control measures and, more specifically, hard policing and tough

talking, has resulted in “only a modest amount of resources from the national security budget” being allocated for measures to address anti-social behaviour and attitudes.\footnote{See the Sectorial Debate 2014, page 2; and the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (pages 9-10), Crime Prevention and Community Safety Unit, October 6, 2010. \url{http://www.mns.gov.jm/document/national-crime-prevention-and-community-safety-strategy-ncpcss}.}

The four pillars of the NCPCSS are (1) crime prevention through social development, (2) situational prevention, (3) effective policing and justice processes, and (4) reducing reoffending. These are centred on three cross-cutting themes: (i) targeting individual, family, peer, and community risk factors, (ii) governance, and (iii) knowledge-based policy-making. The NCPCSS also employs a two-tiered approach at the national and community levels. Seven priority areas were identified for the first four years of the strategy (October 2010–March 2014). However, security plans within all ministries, departments, and agencies are aligned with, and were benchmarked to, the 2009-2012 MTF. Results from each MTF inform subsequent cycles, so results from the initial two-year progress report\footnote{Vision 2030 Jamaica MTF Two-Year Progress Report 2009-2011, Planning Institute of Jamaica. \url{http://www.vision2030.gov.jm/Portals/0/Progress_Reports/MTF%202-Year%20Progress%20Report%2028February%202012%29.pdf}.} informed the 2012-2015 MTF.\footnote{Vision 2030 MTF 2012-2015: Towards Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ 2013). \url{http://www.vision2030.gov.jm/Portals/0/MTF/Vision%202030%20Jamaica%20MTF%202012-2015%20.pdf}.}

Although it is a national program, the NCPCSS places special focus on the five parishes with the highest levels of violence as indicated by police data, and it complements the government’s Community Renewal Programme (CRP). The prevention dimension of the plan is outlined in the Unite for Change initiative.

\textit{Unite for Change}

Unite for Change, adopted by Ministry of National Security, is an acknowledgment that law enforcement activities do not provide an adequate response to crime and violence.\footnote{See Ministry Paper 93: The Unite for Change Initiative (Government of Jamaica 2014). \url{http://japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/1319_2014%20Ministry%20Paper%2093.pdf}.} It represents a multi-level public health crime prevention perspective – that is, a “deliberate and focused strategy which coordinates law enforcement, justice and social development programmes.”\footnote{Ibid., page 2.}

Unite for Change represents the MNS public health framework for treating violence as an epidemic to be eradicated in three stages: interrupt transmission, prevent future spread, and change group norms. The work is organized in three broad areas (communication, coordination, and measurement) and divided into two phases (initiation and implementation), complemented by a robust monitoring and evaluation framework.

Unite for Change nationally coordinates all violence prevention interventions across and within ministries, departments, and agencies, and all sectors of society. Its management and governance pattern seeks to integrate multiple sectors, engage the wider Jamaican
community, and foster greater public/private cooperation to achieve the national security priority for a safe and secure society.\(^{131}\)

Taken together, the Unite for Change, NCPCSS, and CRP signal a shift in the orientation to crime prevention and community safety from a predominantly law enforcement approach to one that integrates a public health emphasis.

**Plans and Strategies on Gender-based Violence**

The 2006 UN Secretary General Study on all forms of violence against women recommended a full array of measures that governments can adopt to end gender-based violence (UNICEF 2006b). These include legislation, national plans of action, allocation of adequate resources, and having the highest level of government put in place mechanisms to address gender-based violence. Jamaica has indeed implemented a range of plans and strategies to address gender-based violence. Additionally, gender is a cross-cutting area for all elements of the National Development Plan and a gender lens is used to evaluate societal issues to support development of appropriate policies and programmes. However, except for gender-specific initiatives, the differential impact of programmes on men and women cannot be determined at present.

Jamaica’s strategy for gender equity is included under the Priority National Outcome for Effective Governance in the National Development Plan. The 2011 National Policy for Gender Equality (NPGE) replaced the 1987 National Policy Statement on Women. The NPGE aligns with the Vision 2030 commitment to redress long-term systemic discrimination against women. It was implemented to correct the absence of a gender policy addressing the needs of men and women. The Bureau of Gender Affairs, formerly the Bureau of Women’s Affairs, is charged with implementation of the NPGE, development of strategies for women’s empowerment and equity in all spheres of society, and monitoring and evaluation. It seeks to advance an efficient system for generating relevant, reliable, and timely gender-disaggregated quantitative and qualitative data/information.

The Gender Sector Plan for the Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan represents the main implementation framework. Its Action Plan contains sector goals, outcomes, strategies, actions, and suggested indicators that cumulatively envision “[a] society free of sex and other forms of discrimination in all spheres that creates and maintains a socioeconomic, cultural, political and legal environment, in both public and private domains, free of discrimination” (Gender Sector Plan, page 74).

The Gender Sector Plan acknowledges that men and women are affected differently by societal factors. All levels of governance – national, regional,\(^{132}\) and international\(^{133}\) – are

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encouraged to prioritize gender equality and equity to ensure equal opportunities and equality of outcomes. Thus, the 2012-2015 MTF has recommended a time frame within which to narrow the gaps in gender equity. This will require gender-disaggregated data, but in many instances such data are unavailable, making it difficult to provide gender comparisons. Indeed, more than a decade ago, the 2002 CARICOM Task Force Report made recommendations for standardized and disaggregated data collection, but this issue has still not been fully addressed.

The Gender Sector Plan is an essential component of Vision 2030, Jamaica's National Development Plan. The main performance monitoring output reports are incorporated in the Vision 2030 Annual Progress Report, annual sectorial reports, research reports, and sector briefs. The first MTF reiterated that gender inequality and inequity remains issues of governance for Jamaica, but acknowledged progress as represented in development of the NPGE and the Sexual Harassment Policy (MTF 2012-2015, 54).

**Plans and Strategies for Children**

Jamaica has signed all major human rights instruments concerned with protecting children from violence and has implemented several laws and plans to protect and address the needs of children. The national legal framework co-exists within a wider international and regional framework. Jamaica ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1991 and enacted the Child Care and Protection Act in 2004 to conform to the principles in the convention for the protection of children's fundamental rights and the consolidation of children as a special social group.

In addition to the CRC, Jamaica also observes the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and is a signatory to the Optional Protocol to the CRC on Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. Jamaica is also a signatory to the 1995 Beijing Rules (UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Justice); the Riyadh Guidelines (UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency); UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty; and the Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children.

Currently, national and sector plans for child welfare are entrenched in Vision 2030. No specific child sector plan exists; instead, child welfare issues are spread across a range of ministries, departments, and agencies with sector plans of relevance for children integrated accordingly in plans regarding education, health, vulnerable groups, and gender. Vision 2030 provides the framework for long-term development planning, but it does not specifically ensure compliance with the CRC or the Child Care and Protection Act 2004 (CCPA). Instead, the New Framework of Action for Children is being developed, as are national plans of action, to reach particular categories of children in order to rectify specific child-related issues (Moncrieffe 2013, 52).

**New Framework of Action for Children**

When implemented, the New Framework of Action for Children (NFAC) and other key national action plans tailored to respond to specific issues and to the needs of particular categories of children will form the framework for child welfare. The NFAC is a multi-
sectorial, multi-agency partnership across several State and non-State agencies, including the private sector. The NFAC’s core focus areas are consistent with the CRC. It seeks to combine sector plans within a single framework and a number of other conventions and guidelines.\(^{134}\) The NFAC is designed to serve all children in Jamaica, but has selected certain groups of children for priority action, including those at risk of juvenile delinquency or living on the street.\(^ {135}\) The framework is continually being revised and amended to incorporate existing programmes and take account of emerging issues and new legislation designed to bolster children’s rights (Moncrieffe 2010, 54). Several other plans exist to address specific themes and categories of children, some of which predate the NFAC and Vision 2030.\(^ {136}\)

**The National Plan of Action for Child Justice 2010-2014\(^ {137}\)**

The National Plan of Action for Child Justice (NPA) 2010-2014 replaced the plan prepared in 2006 to promote child rights. The current NPA updated the initial plan and was implemented to respond to recommendations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that Jamaica develop mechanisms to provide adequate resources to ensure full implementation of juvenile justice standards. It seeks to develop and sustain a justice system in which the best interest of children is paramount in the administration of programmes to secure their protection and in the maintenance of the rule of law.\(^ {138}\)

The plan represents a multi-agency response to the state of child justice in Jamaica and is a response to the development of a National Child Diversion Policy to improve the interaction between children in conflict with the law and the criminal justice system.\(^ {139}\) The National Child Diversion Policy is being developed to act as a governance mechanism to promote diversion as a tool of restorative justice and establish diversion committees in each parish to assess cases diverted from the formal justice system. In addition, a National Plan of Action for an Integrated Response to Children and Violence, completed in 2005, seeks to strengthen a range of rehabilitation and re-integration services for children in State care and those in conflict with the law in order to make the services more child-friendly and bring them into compliance with the CRC and other international treaties.\(^ {140}\)

\(^{134}\) These include ILO Convention 138, which specifies the minimum age for employment; ILO Convention 182, which seeks to eliminate the worst forms of child labour; and the Declaration of the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS.

\(^{135}\) For a more extensive list see Moncrieffe (2010, Table 9).

\(^{136}\) The National Youth Policy (1994) was Jamaica’s first comprehensive policy on youth, and it was developed from a draft National Youth Policy (1985) and a 1992 paper. Other policies and plans include the 2003 National Plan of Action for Orphans and Other Children Made Vulnerable by HIV/AIDS; the National Plan of Action on Child Labour; the National Plan of Action for an Integrated Response to Children and Violence; and the National Plan of Action for Child Justice 2006-2011.


Youth Policy, Strategies, and Plans

National Youth Policy (1994)

The National Youth Policy is Jamaica’s first comprehensive policy on youth. Last revised in 2004, the policy identifies such priority areas as the need for an institutional focal point to ensure effective coordination of and collaboration on youth-related programmes. The government department with responsibility for young people ages 15-24 is the National Centre for Youth Development. The department facilitates the coordination and integration of programmes, services, and activities geared towards youth development, and recommends and designs programmes to enhance and propel youth development. The National Centre for Youth Development works with development partners on social interventions including identifying youths at risk. The National Youth Policy is supported by a National Strategic Plan for Youth Development, which acts as the guide for implementation of the policy over a five- to 10-year period.


The 2004 National Youth policy is currently being updated, including integrating the 2010 Jamaica National Youth Survey. When completed, the revised policy will focus on entrepreneurship, skill training, and preparing youth to participate in the global economy. In addition to the existing youth policy, the 2010 survey of youths ages 15-24 specifically focused on young people living and working on the streets, youth in State care, unattached youth, entrepreneurial and employment opportunities, spirituality and values, and social well-being. The revisions focus on seven main areas to bring the policy fully into compliance with the CRC’s requirement to integrate youth as active participants in decision-making (Population Sector Plan, 2010, 30). The National Youth Policy as revised will guide several interventions aimed at youth to prevent and address anti-social behaviours in school and reintegrate school-age mothers. The Vision 2030 Sector Plan for Education builds on the work of the Education Transformation Task Force. Behavioural change is one of five core aspects of implementation of the 2004 Task Force on Educational Reforms. Cumulatively these responses reflect a holistic development programme to address the conditions and treatment of children and youth, especially those in the protection and care of the State (MTF 2012-2015, 13). Particular emphasis is also being placed on improvements in the management of facilities, enhancements to children’s services (including upgrades and implementation of systems of checks and balances), infrastructural development, staff capacity-building, parental assistance, training, and legislative revisions (Sectorial Debate 2014). A range of stakeholders are integral to address crime prevention and reduction, but the JCF plan addresses the overall crime picture.

141 For more information see the National Centre for Youth Development website at http://www.youthjamaica.com/content/about-ncyd.
**JCF Crime Reduction Plan**

The JCF crime reduction plan for addressing the overall crime prevention and reduction strategy prioritizes reduced levels of crime and increased citizen security through special actions and attention to murder, gang operations, street patrols, and increased stop-and-search operations. These efforts to modernize the law enforcement system and strengthen the anti-crime capabilities of law enforcement agencies are a key national strategy of the security and safety national outcome of Vision 2030 (see Appendix 3.4).

**Anti-Drug Plans and Strategies**

The 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report notes that marijuana was used by 13.5 per cent of the population in 2013, making it the most-abused illicit drug among Jamaicans, while cocaine abusers remained less than 0.1 per cent of the population. In 2013, drug production and trafficking were both enabled and accompanied by organized crime, domestic and international gang activity, and police and government corruption. Illicit drugs are also a common means of exchange for illegally trafficked firearms entering the country, exacerbating Jamaica’s security situation.

At the national level, the National Council on Drug Abuse within the MOH and the Narcotic Branch of the JCF are key agencies with drug-control mandates. Jamaica engages and is a partner in regional and international multi-lateral and bi-lateral anti-drug plans and initiatives with CARICOM and the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission.

**National Council on Drug Abuse**

This council is housed in the Ministry of Health. Its terms of reference include an examination of the legal, medical, and security issues surrounding drug abuse, as well as research. However the enforcement and regulation of illicit drugs is addressed by the JCF’s Transnational Crime and Narcotics Division.

**Transnational Crime and Narcotics Division**

The Transnational Crime and Narcotics Division (TNAD) is charged with supervising all major drug investigations and seizure operations. The TNAD falls within the remit of the JCF Criminal Investigation Branch, which has the responsibility to collect and analyse information to present irrefutable evidence that courts can rely on to obtain convictions of guilty parties. The TNAD also complements the work of the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Taskforce. Among its achievements is a sharp increase in narcotics recovery. However challenges such as geographic location, inadequate law enforcement capacity, vast

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144 JCF Crime Reduction Plan, February 19, 2013. This plan is schedule to be made accessible at [http://www.jcf.gov.jm/service/crime-reduction-plan](http://www.jcf.gov.jm/service/crime-reduction-plan). At the time of publication, however, this link was not yet available. The plan is summarized in Appendix 3.4.

coastlines, and vulnerability to exogenous shocks continue to present the need for regional cooperation and coordinated responses.

**Other Entities**

The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (2013) uses a four-tiered system to improve citizen security by creating a safe, just, and free community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the region. The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission works to enhance the human and institutional capacity of its member states to reduce the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.

**School Policies on Use of Corporal Punishment**

**Law Reform (Flogging and Whipping) (Abolition) Act of 2013**

This act repealed all legislation making provision for flogging and whipping as penalties for certain criminal offences. Despite this legislation, corporal punishment is lawful in Jamaican homes and only partially prohibited in Jamaica’s educational institutions. The Education Act is silent on the matter of corporal punishment in schools. The Ministry of Education earlier issued a directive prohibiting corporal punishment in all schools, but it maintains that Jamaica is not ready for anti-beating laws. Legislation does exist to prohibit corporal punishment in day-care, basic schools, penal institutions, and alternative care settings. Specifically, S. 16(1) of the Early Childhood Act prohibits corporal punishment against a child in an early childhood institution. Section 62 (d) of the Child Care and Protection Act (2004) provides that a child in a place of safety, children’s home, or in the care of a fit person shall have the right to be free from corporal punishment. Instead of being addressed through legal means, the Ministry of Education’s directives have been “formally introduced to some educators through workshops and brochures.” And in partnership with UNICEF, the Ministry of Education has “embraced a comprehensive range of interventions for quality education that includes alternatives to corporal punishment.”

Enactment of the Law Reform (Flogging and Whipping) (Abolition) Act of 2013 was an opportunity to abolish all forms of corporal punishment, thereby extending the applicability of the law to children. Nonetheless, there remain cultural sanctions of corporal punishment in schools, and resistance to abolition from stakeholders, particularly principals and teachers who continue to advocate the use of flogging to discipline students.

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disruptive students. The use of corporal punishment in schools and homes is another reminder that violence pervades all sectors of Jamaican society, and among children and youths this is manifested in schools. There is, then, a need to implement legal reform to achieve full prohibition of corporal punishment.

**The National Restorative Justice Policy**

The Ministry of Justice is more systematically integrating restorative justice as an aspect of Jamaica’s justice system reform. A National Restorative Justice Policy (2012) outlines the protocols that will govern restorative justice in Jamaica. The policy was developed to demonstrate the government’s commitment to promoting a framework that works transparently, effectively, humanely, and holistically, while employing conflict resolution mechanisms to reduce crime and conflict. The policy coordinates existing multi-sectorial partnerships for peace building and restoration of relationships in Jamaica. The framework for advancing restorative justice initiatives is funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), UK Department for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency, and UNDP.

Jamaica has a fairly sound complement of clearly defined national laws, plans, policies, and strategies for crime and violence reduction. Several were implemented to conform to international processes and/or treaty requirements. Despite gaps, the major difficulty is to translate existing policies into effective programmes, projects, and initiatives that are theoretically and empirically based and routinely evaluated. Integration of empirical evidence, as currently done in revising the National Youth Plan, is a good start that should be encouraged and reinforced.

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IV. PROGRAMMES, PROJECTS, AND INITIATIVES FOR REDUCING CRIME AND VIOLENCE

The World Report on Violence and Health (Krug et al. 2002) reminds us that while violence is pervasive, it is also predictable and preventable. Analysis of the violence prevention arena reveals progress and promise. Yet there are problems that continue to challenge many jurisdictions. Jamaica’s insecurity-generating environment has been acknowledged in the government’s policy documents such as the National Security Policy and Vision 2030, the country’s long-term development plan. Both recognize that security is a public good that citizens expect the State to provide. Central to providing security is reducing violent crimes, preventing an increase in crime, strengthening the justice system, and promoting the rule of law. A reduction in insecurity requires preventing and reducing the occurrence of crimes.

Crime prevention focuses on preventing future occurrence of crime – that is, crimes against persons and places or situations that are not yet in conflict with the law. Reduction is concerned with reducing an established crime problem by targeting already-known criminal activities, assessing the situation, and developing strategies to decrease the criminal activity or minimize the harm it causes. Crime prevention is a long-term goal. Crime reduction is an immediate need. The overlap between them occurs because their strategies often aim toward the same outcome.

It should also be noted that, although security is a State mandate, many crime prevention interventions result from informal and formal practices and programmes in non-State institutions. No single strategy is sufficient to prevent or reduce crimes, but international evidence informs knowledge of effective approaches and programmes with a number of interventions that show promise or are considered best practices in reducing crime. In Jamaica, many of these programmes are implemented by non-State actors and do not have crime prevention as their focus. In most cases, implementing partners do not systematically evaluate the impact of these programmes, and there are limited data on programme implementation, beneficiaries, and results. More recently, projects funded by international development partners and multilateral financial institutions have increased the need for results-based funding. This has created an incentive for implementing partners to more systematically integrate evaluation in order to be eligible for funding or stay competitive to participate in these funded programmes and projects.

A range of national, regional, and international projects and programmes exist to address crime and violence in Jamaica. Regional programmes include the Caribbean Community Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention 2009-2013, the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (jointly developed by CARICOM and UNODC), and UNODC-funded projects through CARICOM.

This section presents a number of national programmes, projects, and initiatives to reduce crime and violence. This is not an exhaustive list of such interventions in Jamaica; instead it

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primarily presents programmes, projects, and initiatives as identified, mapped by, and implemented through the Ministry of National Security’s Crime Prevention and Community Safety Programme, which is the long-term safety plan to support Vision 2030’s Security and Safety National Outcomes. It also includes the Planning Institute of Jamaica’s identification of programmes and projects that specifically have crime and violence reduction or prevention as their objective, supported by official development assistance and Jamaica’s Community Renewal Programme.

These initiatives reflect the government of Jamaica’s 10-year process for reducing crime and violence. Most projects are geographically concentrated in volatile and vulnerable communities in the five most crime-affected parishes: Kingston, St. Andrew, St. Catherine, St. James, and Clarendon. The interventions include international development partner-funded social intervention programmes and socially centred programmes operated by the JCF. Primary emphasis is given to the combined Citizen Security and Justice Programme and Community Security Initiative, Community Empowerment and Transformation, Jamaica Violence Prevention, Peace and Sustainable Development Programme, the JCF’s Community Policing, Neighbourhood Watch, and Police Youth Clubs, the Safe Schools Programme, and the Peace Management Initiative (PMI). The government has also mandated the formation of the Community Renewal Programme to provide a platform for the delivery of government and civil society services to 100 volatile and vulnerable communities. Both frameworks propose a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder response to crime and violence, prioritize a range of security and development interventions, and focus primarily on youth. Other programmes that have crime prevention and reduction outcomes but were not specifically designed for crime prevention, such as the JSIF’s Inner-Cities Basic Services for the Poor Project, are excluded.

Of the range of programmes, evaluative information is available primarily for those funded by international development partners through partnerships and/or by public-private and civil society groups. Concerns have been raised about the lack of evaluation (UNODC 2007; Abuelafia and Sedlacek 2010). Monitoring and evaluation is more systematically being integrated through the MTFs as part of the requirements of the National Development Plan, but even more so to fulfil requirements imposed by funding agencies. The hope is that more project implementing partners will begin to systematically conduct evaluations.

The programmes are organized based on criminological (Sherman et al. 2003) and epidemiological (Krug et al. 2002) systems of classification and perspectives from the international crime prevention agencies. While many social programmes that focus on poverty reduction, employment, and improved education may contribute to reducing violence in the long term, programmes were not included in this study if their primary objectives did not explicitly include preventing violent or criminal behaviour, or reducing the opportunity for crime and violence to occur.


Routine activities theory posits that crime and deviance occur when three factors coincide in time and space: the *presence* of a motivated offender, the *availability* of a suitable target, and the *absence* of a capable guardian to discourage crime or the presence of someone who encourages crime. What is known as the “crime triangle” establishes three components of crime: the *target* of the crime, the *opportunity* for the crime, and the *desire* to commit a crime. Each individual has the ability to affect the target and opportunity of crime by eliminating the opportunity for crime to occur, and/or by making oneself or one’s property a difficult target.

The programmes discussed in this report can be grouped into four categories:

- **Primary prevention programmes** target the larger population to increase protective factors and reduce risk factors, promote social non-violent and non-criminal behaviour, strengthen communities, and address environmental factors that help prevent crime and violence from occurring.

- **Secondary prevention (intervention) programmes** target children, youth, women, or families specifically identified as at risk of being perpetrators or victims of crime and violence. These initiatives aim to intervene before early behaviours turn into serious delinquency, or to prevent a victim from being further victimized.

- **Suppression initiatives** aim to improve the functioning of the justice system (police, judiciary, and prisons) or create innovative new practices to control crime and violence.

- **Tertiary prevention (rehabilitation) programmes** target individuals or families who have already been involved in harmful, violent, or criminal activities (as victims or perpetrators) to help them develop strategies and support systems to avoid perpetrating crime and violence in the future. Some programmes are cross-cutting across categories or have activities that fit into more than one category.

### Primary Prevention Programmes

Primary prevention programmes aim to prevent a crime or violent act from happening in the first place. As such, they include a wide range of initiatives that target populations as a whole, or specific at-risk communities, in order to reduce risk factors, increase protective factors, and reduce the opportunity for crime and violence to occur.

This category is further divided into initiatives that focus on *situational/community* variables that can help prevent crime and violence, versus initiatives that focus on the development of *individual* behaviours, beliefs, or skills (conflict resolution skills, aggression management, etc.).

Crimes can be prevented by using the criminal justice system to deter people from committing them. This includes use of incapacitation to prevent the commission of crimes. Situational crime prevention reduces opportunities for crime to occur by improving physical
infrastructure to reduce vulnerability to victimization, while behavioural crime prevention addresses the motivation to offend.

Crime prevention and reduction strategies should be directed at addressing each element of the problem. Programming can also be directed at different levels. The primary level involves preventing a crime or violent act from happening in the first place. As such, these strategies include a wide range of initiatives that target populations as a whole, or specific at-risk communities, in order to reduce risk factors, increase protective factors, and reduce the opportunity for crime and violence to occur. The primary level thus involves changing the social environment to reduce the risk factors that are associated with offending. However, it also involves opportunity reduction or what is called situational crime prevention. Primary prevention may also be called community prevention. Secondary prevention involves specific targeting of persons at higher risk and reducing the likelihood of offending. Tertiary prevention focuses on the motivated offender and terminating criminal careers or at least reducing the rates of offending of those perpetrators.

**Situational and Community Prevention**

This type of prevention focuses on reducing opportunities for crime and violence to occur by mobilizing the community (awareness-raising, advocacy, neighbourhood watch, community policing, etc.) or by designing and maintaining public spaces and using new technologies (street lighting, maintenance of public spaces, use of security cameras, etc.). Over the past two decades, Jamaica has undertaken primary interventions such as the combined CSJP/CSI Programmes in 39 inner-city communities, Community Renewal Projects, the Children First Male Awareness Project, Crime Stop, the Closed-Circuit Television Project, the Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET), and the Jamaica Violence Prevention, Peace and Sustainable Development and Neighbourhood Watch Programme. Table 4.1 provide more in-depth descriptions of each project and initiative.

**Prevention of Individual Behaviours**

Primary prevention can also focus on preventing violent and delinquent behaviours and beliefs from developing within the population. Such programmes focus on improving parenting skills, helping youth foster positive identities and follow positive role models, helping children develop skills and attitudes that prevent bullying and conflict in schools, and building networks of positive leaders who speak out against gender-based violence. Examples of these types of programmes include the August Town Crime Prevention Programme, Children First’s Caribbean Youth Empowerment and Male Awareness Programmes, Police Youth Clubs, the Ministry of Education’s Behaviour Modification Program, the Health and Family Life Programme, and programmes sponsored by the SISTREN Theatre Collective and the Women’s Research and Outreach Centre (WROC). Also, CSJP programmes by design have individual crime prevention for both individuals and communities.

**Secondary Prevention Programmes**

Secondary programmes intervene in the early stages of violence in order to prevent the situation from accelerating. They target children, youth, women, or families specifically
identified as at risk of being/becoming victims or perpetrators of crime and violence. These programmes intervene before early behaviours turn into serious delinquency or violence, or to prevent a victim of violence from being further victimized or traumatized.

Initiatives in this category are further divided into programmes that target victims and those that target early delinquent and violent behaviour.

**Secondary Prevention Programmes Targeting Victims**

The primary State institutions working with victims of sexual assault are the Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse and the Bureau of Gender Affairs. Their work is supplemented by NGOs that are dedicated to ending gender-based violence. These include Women's Inc. Crisis Centre, Women's Media Watch, WROC, and the SISTREN Theatre Collective. Another example is the Over Comers in Action Programme for sexually, emotionally, and psychically abused females, which is a programme of the Victim Support Unit within the Ministry of Justice. Taken together, these programmes provide assistance to victims of rape, incest, domestic crisis, sexual harassment in the workplace, and domestic violence. They also provide sensitization around gender-based violence.

**Secondary Prevention Programmes Targeting Early Delinquent and Violent Behaviour**

The Safe Schools Programme, Diversion Programme, Deans of Discipline, Behaviour Modification Project, and Restorative Justice Programme are among the programmes geared towards thwarting delinquency and violent behaviour among youth. Others examples are the intervention programmes under the CSJP delivered by implementing partners such as Children First and Rise Life Management (RISE). Many sports-based programmes such as the August Town Crime Prevention Programme target early delinquency and violent behaviour. Within the Ministry of Education, programmes focused on preventing and addressing anti-social behaviour include the Health and Family Life Education Programme and the Educate Access and Socialize Youths Initiative under the Programme for Alternate Student Support, which targets students diagnosed as being seriously maladaptive.

Since 2004, the Safe School Programme has operated island-wide to address criminal and anti-social behaviours in schools, reduce violence, and foster positive behaviour among at-risk students. The programme places specially trained members of the JCF known as School Resource Officers in targeted schools to work with students deemed at risk of delinquency.

The Deans of Discipline Programme was introduced in public secondary schools across the island to ensure the overall security, safety, and well-being of students and staff. The programme seeks to relieve teachers and administrators of dealing with disciplinary matters, and it works in close collaboration with School Resource Officers in the Safe Schools Programme. The Ministry of Justice’s Restorative Justice Programme seeks to repair the harm caused by an offence, hold the offender accountable, and reintegrate offenders into society. Programmes within the Dispute Resolution Foundation encourage the use of assessment of development results techniques and community restorative justice practices to promote peace and resolve conflicts without resorting to violence.
Suppression

These programmes focus on improving the functions of the criminal justice system or implementing innovative ways to deter crime by better identifying, targeting, arresting, and prosecuting perpetrators of crime and violence. Such programmes include improving policing, targeting retaliatory violence and repeat offenders, and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system.

Over the years, the emphasis on crime control led to the implementation of several anti-crime operations that integrated “hot-spot policing,” curfews, cordons, and searches. The results of these efforts can be seen in the JCF Crime Reduction Plan. Following a reversal in early 2013 in the downward trend in murders that began in mid-2010, including a 9 per cent increase in murders, the JCF launched Operation Resilience in October 2013 as an interruption strategy. After it brought positive results, Operation Resilience was extended into other areas. Initiatives geared towards suppression include the Closed-Circuit Television Project, JCF Accountability Programme (INDECOM), Crime Stop, and COMET, as well as police use of GIS maps produced in collaboration with the Victim Protection Unit under the JVPPSDP to complement a range of initiatives geared at suppression.

Tertiary Prevention

These programmes target individuals or families who have already been involved in harmful, violent, or criminal activities to help them develop strategies and support systems to avoid perpetuating crime and violence in the future. These programmes often include services for offenders who are re-entering the community after confinement. They provide counselling and social services and monitor reintegration into the community, with a focus on reducing recidivism, as well as providing counselling and support to victims of domestic violence so that they do not become aggressors themselves. The Jamaica Reducing Re-Offending Action Plan seeks to rehabilitate offenders and deportees and reintegrate them into society. Other programmes include the Female Prisoner Welfare Project, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Offenders and Deportees, and BACK2LIFE. Since 2011, the European Union has also been working with Stand Up Jamaica, UNICEF, and RISE to support rehabilitation programmes in penal facilities.

Table 4.1. Comparative Tables of Jamaica’s Programmes, Projects, and Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Programme Type</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of the West Indies (UWI)</td>
<td>August Town Crime Prevention Programme</td>
<td>1995 to date</td>
<td>A sports-based intervention designed to reduce youth violence.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Residents of the beneficiary community and the UWI</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>UN Office of Drugs and Crime South-South Best Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Club</td>
<td>BACK2LIFE Rehabilitation Project</td>
<td>2012 to date</td>
<td>Equips detained juveniles with skills, knowledge, and support to help them manage their lives during detainment and upon release to reduce or eliminate the chance of reoffending.</td>
<td>1B 2B</td>
<td>Juvenile delinquents and the entire society</td>
<td>JMD 28 million</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education (MOE)</td>
<td>Behaviour Modification Project</td>
<td>2013 to date</td>
<td>Using the life-cycle approach, this three-year MOE Behaviour Modification Plan focuses on promoting resilience among 8-12 year olds and modifying adolescent behaviour among 12-18 year olds. It also includes training and job promotion for 19-25 year olds and seeks to counter moral decline</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Not yet available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SISTREN Theatre Collective</td>
<td>Building for Gender Justice Project</td>
<td>1977 to date</td>
<td>Addresses networking and capacity-building among associated NGOs and community-based organizations, directs gender justice programming, and conducts research and information sharing.</td>
<td>1A 2A</td>
<td>Inner-city communities</td>
<td>Groots International reports some success in confronting domestic and sexual violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Jamaica/ United States</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)</td>
<td>2009 to date</td>
<td>CBSI is part of an integrated initiative to address citizen insecurity, especially insecurity arising from illicit trafficking in drugs and firearms.</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Entire society and hemisphere</td>
<td>U.S. government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for the Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA)</td>
<td>Combats Child Abuse and Sexual Offences</td>
<td>1989 to date</td>
<td>Works with the National Safe Schools Programme in reporting sexual violence; trains female police officers to deal with sexual abuse cases; and helps victims of abuse and violence obtain counselling.</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Adult and child victims of sexual violence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Children First Caribbean Youth Empowerment Programme/Male Awareness Programme</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Unique community-based organization providing life-changing programmes for children and adolescents.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Youths at risk of violence, communities, and the entire society</td>
<td>Various sources</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Programme II</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>Focused on building community safety and security, reducing the level of crime and violence, and improving citizen security through targeted social intervention in Jamaica’s most violent communities with risk factors such as gang presence and high youth unemployment.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Citizens in targeted communities</td>
<td>US$33.3 million</td>
<td>Barnes and Seepersad (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Programme III</td>
<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>Enhances citizen security and justice in targeted communities in Jamaica.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Citizens in targeted communities</td>
<td>US$55 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
<td>Closed-Circuit Television Project</td>
<td>2008 to date</td>
<td>Closed-circuit television systems have been installed in select locations across the island (e.g., tourist resorts of Montego Bay and</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>None found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Planning Institute of Jamaica</td>
<td>Community Renewal Programme (Prevention)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Supports the development of communities in a holistic way and targets specific areas of vulnerabilities including safety and justice.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Residents of 100 targeted communities</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Planning Institute of Jamaica</td>
<td>Community Security Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td>This initiative was merged with the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) in 2011 to create a more efficient crime prevention entity and increase the number of targeted communities from 29 to 39.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td></td>
<td>Residents in CSJP-targeted communities</td>
<td>US$12.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)/Private Sector Organization of Jamaica</td>
<td>Crime Stop</td>
<td>1989 to date</td>
<td>A partnership involving the JCF, the citizens of Jamaica, and the media. The main aim of this partnership is to assist the police in</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Deans of Discipline</td>
<td>2009 to date</td>
<td>Introduced in public secondary schools across the island to ensure the overall security, safety, and well-being of students and staff. The programme seeks to relieve teachers and administrators of dealing with disciplinary matters and works in close collaboration with Staff Resource Officers in the Safe Schools Programme.</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Diversion Programme</td>
<td>1994 to date</td>
<td>Aims to divert youth from the criminal justice system.</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Youths</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Dispute Resolution Foundation (Partially funded by CSJP)</td>
<td>Youth Programme and Community Justice</td>
<td>1994 to date</td>
<td>Increases cooperation in managing and resolving disputes through a controlled process of mediation that includes the police, courts, and social service agencies.</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Enhancing Civil Society</td>
<td>April 2011–</td>
<td>Strengthened civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in Local Governance for Community Safety</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>participation in local governance and established coordinated local civil society and state responses to crime and violence.</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deported female prisoners and family members</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>UN Office of Drugs and Crime South-South Best Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hibiscus</td>
<td>Female Prisoner Welfare Project</td>
<td>2004 to date</td>
<td>Provides an advocacy service for women in prison and their children and other family members, prepares home circumstance reports for the probation service and resentence reports for the courts, assists with mentally preparing women for release, and provides resettlement of deported women.</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)</td>
<td>Firearm Marking and Stockpile Management</td>
<td>2012 to date</td>
<td>As part of an Organization of American States regional project, this initiative has provided a firearm marking machine and a firearm destruction machine to the JCF.</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nation and region</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Health and Family Life Education Programme</td>
<td>1986 to date</td>
<td>Prevents and addresses anti-social behaviour in schools.</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Henry et al. (2006)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
<td>Jamaica Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET)</td>
<td>2006 - 2013</td>
<td>Improved community policing practices and strengthened community and civil society organizations.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$37.5 million</td>
<td>USAID (2012b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
<td>Jamaica Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET II)</td>
<td>2013-2018</td>
<td>Improves community policing practices, strengthens community and civil society organizations, increases citizen cooperation and accountability, and strengthens juvenile justice and at-risk youth programmes.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$12.7 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Accountability Programme</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>Improves police community relations, increases detection rates for serious crimes, and enhances internal accountability in the JCF.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$11.8 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Department of</td>
<td>Jamaica Reducing Re-Offending Action Plan</td>
<td>2009 to date</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of offenders and deportees for reintegration into</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ex-offenders and deportees</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Start/End Period</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Target Group</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Implementor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correctional Services</td>
<td>Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>Fosters an improved sense of security and contributes to strengthening the justice system.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$18.1 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Ministry of National Security</td>
<td>Justice, Security, Accountability and Transparency Project</td>
<td>June 1, 2014 to December 31, 2017</td>
<td>Improves the standard of living and quality of life of Jamaican citizens by strengthening governance, oversight, processes, and capacity within the justice and security sectors.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$16.9 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-agency</td>
<td>Jamaica Violence Prevention, Peace and Sustainable Development Programme</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>Undertaken as an approach to increasing the capacity of government in targeted communities to attain a more peaceful, secure, and just society.</td>
<td>1A 2A 2B</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$4,477,612</td>
<td>UNDP (2011a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Business Development Centre</td>
<td>Kingston Urban Renewal</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Overall goal is to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life in inner-city Kingston through the design and</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Residents of treated communities</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Implementation Period</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Endorsement</td>
<td>Reach</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme/ National Integrity Action Limited (NIAL)/ Management Systems International/ Vanderbilt University</td>
<td>More Peaceful and Transparent Democracy</td>
<td>September 30, 2009 to September 2014</td>
<td>Supported the restoration of a sense of safety, security, and stability by reducing crime and violence and the threat of civil unrest, and the disabling fear they engender; and introduced greater transparency and accountability into key government institutions, such as the police and local government institutions, to increase government effectiveness.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>US$6.6 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Watch</td>
<td>1987 – to date</td>
<td>Builds citizen capacity to become active participants in crime reduction initiatives.</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Pathway to Peace</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Promotes peace in school by training peace ambassadors.</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security (Partially funded by CSJP)</td>
<td>Peace Management Initiative (PMI)</td>
<td>2002 to date</td>
<td>PMI is a bi-partisan community approach to restorative justice. It is a first responder to acts of community violence, and has been particularly helpful in moderating long-standing conflicts in volatile communities. This initiative complements the work of the security forces in addressing high levels of homicides.</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Residents of volatile communities, and the entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica Social Investment Fund</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Programme II</td>
<td>June 2007 to December 2013</td>
<td>Poverty alleviation through sustainable growth, with an emphasis on promoting community safety and reducing criminal behaviour in volatile and vulnerable communities.</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Targeted communities</td>
<td>US$19.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Social Investment Fund</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Programme III</td>
<td>May 2012 to May 2015</td>
<td>Contributes to the attainment of a secure, cohesive, and just Jamaican society by</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Targeted communities</td>
<td>US$12.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Goal Type</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portland Rehabilitation Management (NGO)</td>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Offenders and Deportees</td>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>Aimed to reduce re-offending rates among Jamaican offenders and returnees.</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Offenders and deportees</td>
<td>US$4.5 million</td>
<td>None identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Restorative Justice Program</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Introduced as a way to hold offenders accountable in a more meaningful way while repairing harm to victims, and reintegrating offenders into the community.</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Initially, residents in the pilot community, and eventually the entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>None identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISE (NGO)</td>
<td>Rise Life Management</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>RISE was established in 1990 as Addiction Alert, an organization to provide out-patient drug treatment services. Programmes were expanded to meet the needs of at-risk youth, especially those in 1A/1B</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Moncrieffe (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security, Health, Education, and Youth; and several NGOs</td>
<td>Safe Schools Programme</td>
<td>2004 to date</td>
<td>Implemented island-wide to address criminal and anti-social behaviours in schools, reduce violence, and foster positive behaviour. The programme places specially trained members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force in targeted schools to work with students deemed at risk.</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>USAID (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Security/Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform Programme</td>
<td>2009-2016</td>
<td>Improves living conditions and growth prospects for Jamaicans through reduced incidence of crime, streamlined justice processes, and a more accountable public service.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Society in general</td>
<td>US$52.8 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Victim Support Unit (VSU)</td>
<td>VSU - “The Parents’ Place”</td>
<td>1998 to date</td>
<td>Provides support for parents, guardians, and other caregivers using information on current and</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>future conditions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Victim Support Unit (VSU)</td>
<td>VSU - Children-in-Court Project</td>
<td>1998 to date</td>
<td>Helps child victims of crime through the Jamaican justice system to reduce the level of trauma experienced during the process.</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Victim Support Unit (VSU)</td>
<td>VSU - Cultural Re-socialisation Intervention Project</td>
<td>1998 to date</td>
<td>Therapeutic intervention for at-risk and hurting children ages 6-18 from various inner-city communities. Focuses on cultural re-sensitization, behaviour modification, and coping skills.</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Children ages 6-18</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Victim Support Unit (VSU)</td>
<td>VSU - Overcomers in Action</td>
<td>1998 to date</td>
<td>This group counselling programme provides healing and restoration to females who have been abused sexually, physically, or emotionally.</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Female victims of gender-based and sexual violence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Victim Support Unit (VSU)</td>
<td>VSU - Special Intervention Project for Schools</td>
<td>1998 to date</td>
<td>Provides therapy to school children who are emotionally</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Children living in inner-city communities</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Date/Details</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Target Group</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice/Victim Support Unit (VSU)</td>
<td>VSU - West Kingston Satellite Counselling Facility</td>
<td>Provides counselling and trauma support services for individuals, families, and groups that undergo traumatic situations.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>Serves communities that constitute Western Kingston</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Inc. Women’s Crisis Centre</td>
<td>Women’s Crisis Centre</td>
<td>1985 to date</td>
<td>Offers crisis counselling, referral services, and a 24-hour hotline to victims of rape, incest, domestic violence, domestic crisis, and sexual harassment; also provides short-term crisis shelter for battered women.</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Female victims of gender-based violence and sexual violence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Centre of Jamaica Foundation</td>
<td>Programme for Adolescent Mothers</td>
<td>1978 - to date</td>
<td>Motivates young mothers (under 17) to choose education instead of continuous</td>
<td>2A/2B</td>
<td>Adolescent mothers, families, and the entire society</td>
<td>Advocates for Youth (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Women’s Media Watch</td>
<td>1987 – to date</td>
<td>Collaborates with local and international agencies on delivering gender training for male leaders, produces a manual on gender-aware analysis, and coordinates national research and surveys on portrayal of violence in the media.</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Entire society</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Women’s Resource Outreach Centre</td>
<td>1983 to date</td>
<td>Provides holistic services and programmes to address issues of gender-based violence, and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and youth.</td>
<td>1A/1B</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Female victims of gender-based violence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Program types are as follows: PR = Primary Prevention; SEC = Secondary Prevention; S = Suppression; T = Tertiary Prevention.

1 = Primary Prevention; 1A = Situational and Community Prevention; 1B = Individual Behaviour Prevention
2 = Secondary Prevention; 2A = Secondary Prevention Targeting Victims; 2B = Secondary Prevention for Delinquency and Violent Behaviour
3 = Suppression
4 = Tertiary Prevention
V. ASSESSMENT OF DATA GENERATION

As the Wolfe Report notes, there is no lack of (official) information on crime and violence in Jamaica – what has been lacking is the political will to implement recommendations.\(^{157}\) That report may have overstated the situation in terms of the available data and their quality. However, across the Caribbean, Jamaica is in the unenviable position of having long-standing institutions for data collection – meaning that, unlike some of the other countries where crime statistics are often lacking, Jamaica’s high levels of crime and violence are fairly well documented. The Planning institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), which will celebrate its 60th anniversary in 2015, and the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), produce reports such as the Economic and Social Survey and Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (ESSJ), which has had a section devoted to crime since 1973. The 2002 cycle of the ESSJ included a chapter on criminal victimization that helped to establish baselines for victimization.

Crime and violence in Jamaica have also been the subject of several commissions, task forces, and special reports that pre-date independence, including the 1926 Gordon Wells report on prison conditions. Similarly, international development and multilateral partnerships that require reporting have been active in Jamaica. Not all of that reporting was designed specifically for data collection on crime and violence, but concern with this issue resulted in extensive coverage of crime and violence data. This range of documentation represents a wealth of information that, collectively, provides a composite of crime and violence on the island, allowing for a trend analysis of the post-independence environment. An example of such an initiative was the 2010 Citizen Security Survey (UNDP 2012).

This section examines the administrative data systems in place, the relevant survey results available for integration, the data used, and the impediments to better data collection and analysis. Data on crime and violence fall into three categories: official (administrative) police and health reports on violence-related injuries, surveys, and self-report studies. These official data can also be supplemented by data collected from agencies providing services. There are also some governmental agencies such as STATIN and the PIOJ that are repositories for data.

What Data Are Collected and Available?

The ESSJ publishes annual reports, including information supplied by the JCF on crime. This report has relied primarily on the ESSJ for data on crime, the correctional population, and court-related information. Where possible, the ESSJ information is supplemented with information from annual reports and bulletins made publicly available.

The pre-eminent agencies collecting official data on crime and violence in Jamaica are the JCF’s Statistical Division, the Ministry of Health’s Injury Surveillance System, and two subsidiary agencies within the Ministry of Youth – the Office of the Child Advocate and the Child Advocate.

Development Agency. Each captures crime and victimization known to the respective agency, and in some instances this may result in double counting.

While the Safe Schools Programme is operated through a partnership between the Ministries of Education and National Security, no specific report on this programme is included in the JCF Annual Report or other reports from the respective ministries. Thus, there is apparently no systematic and uniform data collection on crimes and incidents of violence in schools in Jamaica. If these data indeed exist, then they have not been made public. The rather limited available data have been generated by ad hoc surveys.

Despite these pre-existing frameworks, an examination of the current institutional framework for collecting and analysing data on crime and violence on the island reveals that while much data are generated and collected, those data often are not readily accessible to the general public or amenable to social science analysis. Indeed, there is a need for more standardized, robust, comprehensive, accessible, and transparent data collection and analysis to inform the design and implementation of crime and violence programmes.

**Police**

The JCF and its subsidiary agencies generate official crime data known to the police. The data, organized into three parts, include nine offences against the person, nine offences against property, and five miscellaneous offences. This information is initially collated at the local station in each of the 14 parishes, then at the divisional level, and subsequently reported nationally. The JCF’s Research, Planning and Legal Services Branch has responsibility for data collection and maintaining the database for crime. The practice of disseminating crime data can best be described as capricious and has varied over the years. Dissemination ranges from weekly releases to uploads to the Statistical Division website and release of information upon request. Links to information previously available are currently unavailable. Additionally, while data used to be presented in the aggregate (total occurrences), with percentage changes and ratios, the trend more recently has been to frame crime operations primarily as changes in percentages and rates, with no or little accompanying aggregate information.  

**Department of Correctional Services**

Like the JCF, Correctional Services data previously publicly available are no longer available, so data for correctional facilities for this report were obtained from the ESSJ.

**Health**

Public health data on violence-related injuries are collected by the Ministry of Health through Jamaica’s injury surveillance system. This computerized hospital-based system was established

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158 See the Crime and Operations section in Ministry Paper 93/2014, page 44.
in 1999 to provide a risk profile for injuries. Based on the International Classification of External Causes of Injury, the system allows for the collection of data on all injuries seen in the admissions and emergency departments by adding four injury categories to the computerized registration process for those departments: (1) unintentional injury, (2) violence-related injury, (3) suicide attempt (also known as intentional self-harm), and (4) motor vehicle-related injuries (Ward et al. 2002, 2009). The injury surveillance system emphasizes injury prevention and a reduction in youth violence. Specifically, it aims to define the problem, collect reliable data on violence and related injuries, identify causes and risk factors for violent behaviour, and analyse and assess the efficacy of violence prevention. It uses an evidence-based approach customized to account for different risk factors in various locations. Monthly reports detailing demographics and summary statistics are generated and made available at the local and national levels. By monitoring the national injury profile, the injury surveillance system provides data to support needed policy changes to minimize the impact of injuries on health services and on the health of the population. As has already been noted, however, this system has been troubled by breakdowns.

**Child Victimization**

Three administrative agencies with responsibility for children – the Child Development Agency, Office of the Child Advocate, and the Office of the Children’s Registry – collect data on children as victims and perpetrators of crime and violence, including suicide. These agencies produce annual reports and statistical bulletins, which are widely disseminated and filed annually with Parliament. These reports were used to support information obtained from the ESSJ.

**School Violence**

The Statistical and Information Management Unit of the JCF’s Research, Planning and Legal Services Branch collects information on the Safe Schools Programme, and by extension, school violence. No information on the Safe Schools Programme was officially released for incorporation into this report, and, except for the 2005 USAID Assessment of the Safe Schools Programme, no other evaluation or assessment has been identified. Nonetheless, newspaper reports and statistics suggest that violent incidents continue on school campuses. Stakeholders reiterating the benefits of the programme nevertheless emphasize its relationship-building opportunities, and the significant difference of those interactions for generating valuable information used to avert violence.159

**Surveys**

A number of surveys have been completed for Jamaica, including the National Crime Victimization Surveys, the Latin American Public Opinion Poll, the 2010 CHDR (UNDP 2012),

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the 2008 Reproductive Health Survey, and various other surveys conducted for specific evaluative purposes. Chapter 1 of the UNDP’s Caribbean Human Development Report (UNDP 2012a) discusses crime trends in Jamaica since independence.

Crime Victimization Surveys

The first National Crime Victimization Survey (JNCVS) for Jamaica was completed in 2006, with cycles in 2009 and 2012-2013. The latter cycle also collected information on Citizen Security and Justice Programme populations and non-CSJP populations, thereby providing the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the interventions. These three cycles of surveys were designed using internationally accepted standards.

Latin America Public Opinion Poll AmericasBarometer

Since 2006, Jamaica has been included in the Latin America Public Opinion Poll (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer wave of biennial surveys. The project uses a national probability sample design of voting-age adults and consists of four strata representing the four main geographical regions of the island. These are further sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. All technical information, questionnaires, and publications are publicly available. Most valuable are the analysis of standard indicators and cross-time comparisons of important indicators such as crime and insecurity, the economy, corruption, democratic values, and civil and social values, as well as Jamaica’s ranking within the Americas. The results from the UNDP (2010a) survey in support of the CHDR (UNDP 2012) also informed this report.

These surveys are invaluable sources of previously unavailable data. There are, however, some problems with them. Their small sample sizes (1,500 nationally) mean that while they can measure attitudes, beliefs, and overall crime levels fairly accurately, they are inadequate for giving estimates for specific crimes, particularly low-frequency crimes (robbery, burglary, rape), and for giving estimates at subnational levels. Specialized surveys are required to probe and measure, for example, violence by intimate partners, sexual violence and violence against children.

Moreover, with the exception of the LAPOP and UNDP surveys (available by request) very few of these datasets are available to researchers or the public. (However, the UWI’s Dereck Gordon Data Bank contains a number of other social-problem-related datasets that are available to researchers.) Open sharing of datasets facilitates analyses from multiple perspectives, validation of the data accuracy, and use of the data for designing programmes and policies. These opportunities are largely lost to Jamaica.

Others

Much of the data on victimization, especially gender-based violence, are produced by NGOs such as the Women’s Crisis Centre. As this report is based on a desk review of electronically
available information, no information was received directly from the Women’s Crisis Centre or other NGOs. However, where possible, data from media and other reports on victimization of women and girls have been incorporated.

**Data Collection or Information-Sharing Framework**

No laws to facilitate inter-governmental data collection or sharing were identified for this report, but this does not necessarily mean none exist. The JCF provides detailed information to the Registrar General’s Department from its database for sudden or violent deaths to improve the accuracy of vital statistics for total deaths occurring in Jamaica. Throughout the year, this and similar exchanges may be regulated by specific protocols.

This report did, however, identify two laws regulating publicly disseminated data use or collection: the Interception of Communication Act (2002) and the Access to Information Act (2002). Neither law specifically addresses inter-ministerial collaboration. The Interception of Communication Act established protocols for the collection and dissemination of intercepted information. This act was amended in 2011 after the 2010 Christopher Coke extradition to permit disclosure of information to a foreign government or any agency of such governments where mutual exchange of such information exists. The Access to Information Act and its amendment seek to make the Jamaican government more transparent by giving the right of access to view and copy official documents held by government entities and not otherwise exempted. This act was intended to open government practices and processes to wider public scrutiny.

**How Are Data Used by Stakeholders to Inform Policies and Strategies?**

Jamaican policies and practices have historically lacked empirical foundation (UNODC 2007; Abuelafia and Sedlacek 2010; Jones 2014). This is consistent with findings from other jurisdictions, including the regional sectorial and cross-sectorial approaches reviewed by the UNODC (2007). Indeed, Mears (2013), discussing the situation in the United States, argues that many of that nation’s most prominent criminal justice policies lack solid theoretical and empirical foundation, and that the necessary ingredients for holding the criminal justice system accountable and making it effective do not yet exist. The same is true in Jamaica. Since implementation of the National Development Plan, the government of Jamaica has tried to more systematically integrate evidence-based policy-making. However, most programmes have not systematically developed evidence-based projects.

The CHDR presents crime and violence trend data for Jamaica up to 2010, and the annual ESSJ reports lag by as much as a year. Presently, there is limited access to crime and violence data, with much of this control seeming to have been put in place after 2010. In addition to the limited access to data, there is a paucity of data available on the implementation and results of many projects operating in Jamaica. Several Jamaican projects were identified and incorporated into the UNODC-sponsored South-South Regional Cooperation Project to
determine best practices for crime prevention in the developing world. Many of the projects in Jamaica were identified as having promising practices.

As noted earlier, the issue with Jamaica is not a lack of data collection. Each governmental ministry, department, and agency systematically collects data, and many produce annual reports or are required to file reports with Parliament. Despite these requirements or practices, however, a review of compliance with statutory requirements indicates that many agencies are deficient in data submission. Indeed, the problem is one of access, data sharing, and transparency. Some problems arise from a lack of capacity, inadequately trained staff, and a lack of timely and uniform collection, but more often the problem is related to a reluctance to share information. For example, the Ministry of National Security’s evaluation of the CSJP was not made available, despite the fact that the IDB is the major funding partner.

Many non-State actors, particularly community-based organizations, have limited capacity to collect and evaluate data, and that capacity varies among government agencies as well. However, institutions such as STATIN and PIOJ have the capacity for data analysis, and many ministries, departments, and agencies have capacity for data collection and research, including the Ministries of National Security, Health, Education and Justice. The Vision 2030 framework continues to build capacity for data analysis to inform progress reports and overall development planning.

As noted, the principal obstacles in terms of available data are a reluctance to share information, the need to buttress capacity for data analysis, and, for small NGOs, the need to expand capacity for data storage. The JCF has been building capacity for research and analysis, and the current commissioner of police has a strong academic background (a Ph.D.). So there is some reason to believe that the trend towards more systematic research, evaluation, and analysis will continue to be pursued within the JCF.

Lack of transparency in data collection has consequences. If persons are unaware of what activities are being carried out, the state of knowledge, and who the primary actors are and what their capacity is, it is less likely that collaborative frameworks will be established. Similarly, there is a need to nurture a culture for generating data collection, organization, and storage. Undertaking such efforts would redound to the improvement of the general framework, but even more importantly, those efforts would strengthen capacity for developing and delivering evidence-based projects with measureable outcomes.

Most of what is known about effective violence prevention comes from studies in developed countries. While promising and effective interventions are currently being implemented in and by developing countries, many have not been rigorously evaluated for scaling up to regional and national levels. The problem is not insurmountable, as there is evidence of much progress and promise in developing areas (UNODC 2007, 141). Indeed, assessments are being undertaken of crime and violence reduction programmes funded by international donor partners, as well as
of programmes implemented to support Jamaica’s National Development Plan. This signals a shift in practice and establishes a new protocol.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Filling Data Gaps and Improving Data Quality

1. Conduct periodic assessments of the trustworthiness of reported statistics, which are greatly relied upon in Jamaica. These assessments should include scrutiny of the processes of recording reported crimes, computing the national aggregates, and making these computations the government’s official crime statistics.

2. Support better and more regularized measurements of sexual violence against adults and minors, domestic violence, and sexual gender-based violence more generally.

3. Support similar measurements of crimes against other vulnerable populations such as children and minorities that perceive themselves to be disproportionately at risk. These measurements may be done as specialized surveys. The findings from these surveys ought to be accessible to the general public so that they can be used by advocacy groups and other concerned citizens as sources of evidence to support a more equal distribution of the protective resources of the State.

4. Improve estimations and analyses of crimes that constrain economic development, particularly crimes that are still largely invisible or absent from reported statistics, such as extortion and protection rackets. A regularized business victimization survey would provide much-needed evidence-based responses to the victimization of businesses. This initiative could be jointly funded by the State and the private sector.

5. Develop a capable crime observatory that is relatively autonomous and has the trust and confidence of the general public.

Monitoring and Evaluation

1. Assess deficiencies in monitoring and evaluation, and develop specialized skill sets in these areas, thereby reducing dependence on external agencies. In particular, there is a need to enhance crime reduction design and evaluation capabilities within and outside the State.

2. Cultivate a culture of monitoring and evaluation that builds these instruments into each programme and project at inception.

3. Build the capacity of project-implementing partners for evidence-based programme evaluation so that programme outcomes can be appropriately identified and recorded.

4. Structure institutional learning via systematic self-assessments and external evaluations, and establish fora for the dissemination of the knowledge and experience generated. On
this basis, ensure the iterative advance of the more successful projects and programmes.

Children

1. Develop and strengthen individual agencies and enforcement mechanisms responsible for child care and protection.

2. Develop and support greater public awareness and buy-in to the provisions in the Child Care and Protection Act in order to protect children, and promote inclusion of issues affecting children in programming.

3. Amend the Child Care and Protection Act to extend the prohibition of corporal punishment against children to all institutions (including home and school).

Gender-based Violence

1. Urgently undertake steps to expedite enactment of sexual harassment legislation and provide human and financial resources for its full implementation, and/or amend the Sexual Offences Act (2009) to include such an offence.

2. Support the standardization, collection, and framework for analysis of gender-disaggregated data.

3. Allocate resources to improve the response of the justice system to sexual violence and gender-based violence and abuse, and improve coordination among the various agencies involved in this area.

Legislation

1. Conduct gender-impact analyses of all new and/or amended legislation, regardless of the substantive area being legislated.

2. Pass legislation to address all categories of crimes in a specific class of offences. Harmful behaviours that are criminalized should not be limited by offence specificity. For example, sexual harassment was not included in the range of gender-based violence in the Sexual Offences Act, thus necessitating continued advocacy for implementation of such legislation. Similarly, corporal punishment is only partially prohibited, despite implementation of recent legislation abolishing such practices in adult sentencing.

3. Review the existing body of laws in a specific offence category when implementing new legislation in order to eliminate inconsistencies, and/or to include all classes of offences falling within that threshold, thus eliminating continued piece-meal amendments.
Policy-making and Implementation

1. Undertake sufficient and meaningful stakeholder consultation to inform policy implementation.

2. Strengthen capacity for evidence-based programming and evaluation for project implementing partners.
Appendix 2.1. Sources of Crime Statistics

The main sources of crime statistics are the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and the Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ), which present the crimes that are reported to the police. These are the official crime statistics of the government of Jamaica.

The violence surveillance system that is operated by the Ministry of Health reports violence-related injuries that are presented at the public hospitals in the country.

General victimizations surveys include the periodic National Victimization Survey sponsored by the government of Jamaica and other partly or fully crime- and security-related surveys of which the biennial LAPOP survey has been the most predictable.

There are also specialized surveys such as those aimed at special problems (drug use, police performance, corruption, and exposure to violence) or special populations (such as school children).

As has been noted in the text, while these surveys are invaluable sources of data, there are some problems with them. Their small sample sizes (1,500 nationally) mean that while they can measure attitudes, beliefs, and overall crime levels fairly accurately, they are inadequate for giving estimates for specific crimes, particularly low-frequency crimes (robbery, burglary, rape), and for giving estimates at the subnational levels. Cost is usually the main impediment to large-sample and specialized surveys (the latter are usually modules that are added to already-lengthy questionnaires). Long surveys that test the patience of respondents risk low levels of reliability for those issues that are probed toward the end of the surveys.

The reported crimes suffer from all of the problems that are usually associated with this type of source, such as under-reporting, under-recording by the police, undefined and inconsistently defined categories, and sub-categories resulting in unreliable data (when these problematic categories are used). These data are, however, quite useful and may be responsibly used if their limitations are taken into account. Thus, under-reporting varies with the seriousness of the crime. Reported homicides most closely approximate the true rate of homicides. Crimes that involve uninsured property, on the other hand, have low reporting rates. Rape data from these sources are perhaps the most unreliable, as reporting to the police is influenced by several variables, including victim shame, perceptions of police receptiveness, confidentiality, and trust, among other factors.
### Appendix 2.2. Selected Definitions Used by the Hospital Surveillance System

#### Violence-Related Injury

**Circumstances of injury: What happened? What led to this injury?**

Based on the best information available, what were the contextual factors immediately proximal to the event that describe the circumstance leading to the injury?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Includes</th>
<th>Excludes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fight/Argument</td>
<td>Discussion, argument, or fight over issues such as alleged theft, children, general domestic altercation, gambling, liquor, money, politics, traffic altercations, racial/ethnicity/hate, sex, sexual jealousy, rivalry, love triangle, ending of a relationship.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Robbery/Burglary</td>
<td>Mugging, strong-armed, breaking into a home, office, or other property etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Drug-related</td>
<td>Selling or drug business, over possession, use, or cost of drugs, involving failure to pay a drug debt, other drug involvement, probable drug involvement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gang-related</td>
<td>Gang initiation related, gang rivalry, related to illicit gang business or politically polarized gangs.</td>
<td>Excludes drug dealings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sexual Assault</td>
<td>Penetration, unwanted sexual contact, rape.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Child Abuse</td>
<td>Battered child, neglect of child, not caring appropriately for child.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Police Shooting</td>
<td>Legal intervention (shooting) by authority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98. Other/Describe</td>
<td>Any circumstance not fitting into one of the above categories (e.g., drive-by shooting, contract killing, blackmail, ransom, hostage, victim injured by fleeing criminal, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99. Unknown</td>
<td>Not reported or not known to patient.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jamaica Emergency Room-Based Injury Surveillance System Manual.
Appendix 3.1. Organizational Chart of the Courts

Structure of the Jamaican Court System

Appendix 3.2. Quarterly Reports of Files Received and Rulings Made by the Director of Public Prosecution, April–June 2013 and July–September 2013

a. Files Received and Rulings Made by the Director of Public Prosecution from April to June 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigating Body</th>
<th>April 2013</th>
<th>May 2013</th>
<th>June 2013</th>
<th>Totals for Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>Rulings</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>Rulings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>Made</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>Made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Special Investigations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDECOM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigation Branch</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISOCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Police Bodies across the Island</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breakdown of Rulings for the Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Taken</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total Number of Rulings Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Files Sent to Coroners</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Departmental Action Recommended</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Charges Recommended</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
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<td>No Criminal or Departmental Charges</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals for the Quarter</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>80</td>
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b. Files Received and Rulings Made by the Director of Public Prosecution from April to June 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigating Body</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>Totals for the Quarter</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>Rulings</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>Rulings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Made</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>Made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Special Investigations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDECOM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigation Branch</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption Branch</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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### Breakdown of Rulings for the Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Taken</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total Number of Rulings Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Files Sent to Coroners</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental Action Recommended</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Charges Recommended</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Criminal or Departmental Charges</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals for the Quarter</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: INDECOM = Independent Commission of Investigation; CISOCA = Centre for the Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse.
Appendix 3.3. Selected Crime-related Legislation from 2009 to August 2014

2009 Sexual Offences Act: Repeals the Incest (Punishment) Act and certain provisions of the Offences against the Person Act to make new provision for the prosecution of rape and other sexual offences; provides for the establishment of a Sex Offender Registry; and addresses connected matters.


2010 Bail (Amendment) Act: (a) Provides in the case of specified offences for the onus to be on the defendant to satisfy the court that bail should be granted, and (b) Confers upon the prosecution a right of appeal in cases where bail is granted by a court (Ministry of National Security).


2010 Child Care and Protection Children’s Homes Validation and Indemnity Act: Validates acts done in good faith by – (a) the Child Development Agency (b) any person having official duties under the Child Care and Protection Act or purported Child Care and Protection (Children’s Home) Regulation, 2005; and (c) any person acting in connection with, or in support of a person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) and to indemnify persons from liability in respect of such laws.

2010 Constabulary Force Interim Provisions for Arrest and Detention Act: Temporarily extends (for a period of one year) the provision of sections 50B and 50F of the Constabulary Force Act.

2010 Criminal Justice (Plea Negotiations and Agreements) (Amendment) Act: Amends the Criminal Justice (Plea Negotiations and Agreement) Act to make it clear that where an offence in relation to which the accused has pleaded guilty is punishable by a prescribed minimum penalty, a sentence may be imposed without regard to the prescribed minimum penalty (Ministry of Justice).

2010 Cybercrimes Act: Provides criminal sanctions for the misuse of computer systems or data and the abuse of electronic means of completing transactions, and facilitates the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes.
2010 Financial Investigations Division Act: Establishes a government department to be known as the Financial Investigation Division with responsibility for investigating financial crimes, maintaining intelligence databases, and compiling and publishing statistics (Ministry of Finance and Public Service).

2010 Firearms (Amendment) Act: Provides for a minimum sentence of 15 years for a person convicted before the Circuit Court of any of a number of offences in relation to firearms and ammunition.

2010 Independent Commission of Investigations Act: Improves on the current system of investigations into public complaints concerning misconduct by members of the Security Force by repealing the Public Complaint Act and appointing an Independent Commission of Investigation (Ministry of Justice).

2010 Jury (Amendment) Act: Amends the Jury Act to allow for a majority verdict of the jury (not being less than nine to three) to be accepted in case of murder when the sentencing options do not include the death penalty.

2010 Offences against the Person (Amendment) Act: Provides for a minimum custodial sentence of 15 years for a person convicted before the Circuit Court or any of the following offences: (a) shooting with intent to do grievous bodily harm and (b) wounding with intent, with use of a firearm (Ministry of Justice).

2010 Parole (Amendment) Act 2010: Provides that persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life, or for a period of 15 years, or more, for specified firearms offences shall not be eligible for parole until after having served a period of not less than 10 years of the sentence (Ministry of National Security).

2010 Protected Disclosure Act: Facilitates the disclosure of information regarding corrupt practices and other forms of wrongdoing in the workplace and affords protection to persons making such disclosure.

2011 Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act: Facilitates the listing of terrorist entities, once those entities have been so designated by the UN Security Council, and provides for the reporting of unusual large transactions that have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.


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160 Carried over to the 2011/2012 legislative year. Tabled in the Senate on 2008/06/27. Passed in the Senate on 2011/01/14 with 49 amendments. Tabled in the House of Representatives on 2011/01/25.

2011 Constitution (Amendment) Act: Amends the Constitution of Jamaica with respect to appeals for persons facing the death penalty.

2011 Committal Proceedings Act: Introduces a new proceeding to be known as “Committal Proceedings” that obviates the need for holding a preliminary enquiry and allows a Resident Magistrate to commit an accused person to stand trial if, on the basis of a person’s written statement, the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused ought to stand trial for an indictable offence.

2011 Interception of Communication (Amendment) Act: Amends the Interception of Communication Act to allow a warrant to authorize disclosure of intercepted communication to entities such as government agencies or foreign governments.

2011 Protected Disclosure Act: Encourages and facilitates employees making specified disclosure of improper conduct in the public interest; regulates the receiving, investigating, or otherwise dealing with disclosure of improper conduct; and protects employees who make specified disclosures from being subject to occupational detriment.

2012 Evidence (Special Measures) Act: Provides for the admissibility in criminal and civil proceedings and Coroner’s inquest of evidence by the use of special measures.

2012 Evidence (Special Measures) Act: Introduces special measures that can be used to facilitate the giving of evidence by vulnerable witnesses and other specified witnesses. Facilitates the use of video-recorded evidence in criminal and civil proceedings and in a coroner’s inquest for vulnerable witnesses such as children, a complainant in criminal proceedings relating to a sexual offence, and a witness whose evidence the court determines is unlikely to be available to the court due to fear or distress, or if the witness has a mental or physical disorder or has a physical disability.

2013 Committal Proceedings Act: Abolishes preliminary examinations and provides for the procedure relating to committal for trial in cases of indictable offences to be known as committal proceedings.

2013 Financial Investigations Division (Amendment) Act: Amends the Financial Investigations Division Act to (1) monitor compliance, with the obligations imposed by law for the prevention of financial crimes, by businesses in the regulated sector, and (b) issue guidelines to businesses regarding effective measures to prevent financial crimes.
2013 **Larceny (Amendment) Act**: Amends the Larceny Act to abolish whipping as a penalty for certain criminal offences, and for related matters.

2013 **Law Reform (Fraudulent Transactions) (Special Provisions) Act**: Makes provisions for offences relating to lottery scams, advance fee fraud, and other fraudulent transactions.

2013 **Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act, No. 226**: Places a limit of $1 million on cash transactions with financial institutions and expands anti-money laundering measures to cover non-financial businesses and professionals.

2013 **Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) (Amendment) Act**: Amends the principal act to double the maximum prison term from 10 to 20 years, allows the police to more effectively prosecute those involved in trafficking in persons.

2013 **Law Reform (Flogging and Whipping) (Abolition) Act**: Repeals all legislation making provision for flogging and whipping in judicial sentencing; amends provisions of enactments relating to and referring to flogging and whipping as penalties for certain criminal offences.

2014 **Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organizations) Act**: Makes provision for the disruption and suppression of criminal organizations.

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161 Also to conform to agreed-upon timelines between the government of Jamaica and the Caribbean Financial Task Force.
Appendix 3.4. Jamaica Constabulary Force Crime Reduction Plan

The overarching priority for the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is to reduce all levels of crime in the country to ensure citizens are safe in their homes and communities. We will place special attention on reducing murder, emphasizing coordinated counter gang operations and aggressive road policing with detailed, systematic, and sustained patrols of streets and public spaces. We will increase stop and search with spot checks, vehicle check-points, cordon and search operations, counter-narcotics activities, disarming of criminal elements and disrupt organized criminal activities.

1. High visibility uniformed patrols and presence in communities and commercial areas to provide reassurance to citizens while deterring criminal activities.

2. Covert patrols and presence to take advantage of the element of surprise in apprehending criminals with evidence.

   Coordinated Stop or Search activities; Vehicle check Points and Road block Operations aimed at disrupting the movement of criminals, while intercepting the movement of guns, drugs and stolen commodities.

3. Aggressive road policing and traffic law enforcement to reduce the influence of criminals on the public transport sector, curtail breaches of the road traffic act and; reduce traffic accident.


5. Coordinated Counter Gang Activities aimed at disrupting, displacing and apprehending gang members with evidence sufficient to secure convictions.

6. Expansion of community-based policing in stable communities to deliver consistent police services to citizens.

7. Expansion of the School Safety Programme to reduce school violence, drug abuse and the influence of criminal gangs on school Communities.

8. Proactive investigation, targeting crimes for profit such as narcotics trafficking; gun running; extortion/protection rockets; illegal trading in contraband and counterfeit goods; illegal gambling and involvement of children in criminal activities.

9. Re-active investigations aimed at improving cleared up rates for homicides, shootings, robbery, break-ins, larceny and sexual offences.

10. Targeted policing to secure and boost confidence in critical sectors such as Tourism; Agriculture; Construction, Commerce and Transportation.
11. Expansion of partnership programmes in peace building through collaboration with the Peace Management Initiative; Local Authorities; Community-based Groups and Neighbourhood Watch Schemes.

12. Expansion of the Police Youth Club and Mentorship programme aimed at diverting vulnerable young persons from involvement in criminal gang activities.

13. Nuisance Abatement programmes aimed at illegal vending; overnight parking; night noise control and; curtailing of hooligan behaviour. This includes the banning of some regularly staged dances and parties that disturb the peace and tranquillity in communities.

14. The expansion of our intelligence input to investigative and operational policing to achieve greater focus on the critical crime targets such as gangs; trafficking syndicates, groups at risks and crime hotspots.

15. A programme of nationally driven strategies have been rolled out to confront major crime challenges which transcend division boundaries and in some cases national borders. These include:

   - Counter Narcotics control strategy
   - National gun control programme
   - Anti-Extortion Strategy
   - Anti-kidnapping Strategy
   - Praedial Larceny Prevention Strategy
   - Pro-active Investigation Strategy
   - Stolen motor vehicle recovery strategy
   - Telephone Fraud (Lotto Scam) control strategy
   - Cyber Crime Strategy
   - Road Policing and Anti-Crime Strategy

For these policing activities to work and ensure the safety and security of all Jamaicans it is important that citizens continue to support the police by sharing information about criminal activities even where those involved are related to them. It is also crucial that all Jamaicans obey the laws of the land and resist temptations to take part in any illegal activities that offer financial or other benefits. Experience has shown that persons who involve themselves in criminal activities are at greater risk of criminal violence. It is also true that those involved often attract violence to family members and associates. A criminal offender in the household is an immediate security threat to the entire family. We make a public appeal to all to conduct your affairs in accordance with the laws and allow the police to perform their duty in protecting you in your homes and communities.

Appendix 3.5. Ministry of National Security Organizational Chart
Appendix 3.6. Jamaica Constabulary Force Organizational Chart

Source: Making Strides towards a Safe And Secure Jamaica, Sectoral Debate 2013, by Honourable Peter Bunting, Minister of National Security.
Appendix 3.7. Ministry of Justice Organizational Chart


Note: The organizational chart above does not show the courts. They fall under the Chief Justice, but the Minister has ultimate responsibility and it is unclear how this works. The hierarchy of the court system is shown in Appendix 3.1.
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in collaboration with members of the Graduate Program Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland.  


Surveys


