



FERNANDA MAGALHÃES · FRANCESCO DI VILLAROSA, EDITORS

# SLUM UPGRADING

LESSONS LEARNED FROM BRAZIL

# **SLUM UPGRADING: LESSONS LEARNED FROM BRAZIL**

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## **Technical Data**

Slum Upgrading – Lessons Learned from Brazil

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INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

**SLUM UPGRADING:  
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FROM BRAZIL**

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**Fernanda Magalhães  
Francesco di Villarosa**  
*Editors*

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## ACRONYMS

- CEF** Caixa Económica Federal
- Cingapura/PROVER** Programa de Melhoramentos das Favelas do Município de São Paulo (Program for the Improvement of Favelas in São Paulo)
- COHAB-Paraná** Companhia Estadual de Habitação do Paraná (State Housing Company of Paraná)
- COHAB-SP** Companhia Estadual de Habitação do São Paulo (State Housing Company of São Paulo)
- COMCRI** Comissão de Gerenciamento de Crise (Crisis Management Commission of PROSAMIM)
- Favela-Bairro** Program for the Urbanization of Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro
- Fundat** Fundação Municipal do Trabalho (Municipal Labor Foundation of Aracaju)
- GEAP** Grupo Executivo de Assentamentos Populares (Popular Settlements Executive Group)
- HBB** Habitar Brasil
- IBAM** Instituto Brasileiro de Administração Municipal (Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration)
- IDB** Inter-American Development Bank
- LAC** Latin America and the Caribbean
- Nova Baixada** Program for the Integrated Urbanization of Neighborhoods of the Baixada Fluminense
- NGO** Nongovernmental Organization
- PAC** Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Program for Growth Acceleration)
- PARU** Programa de Reforma Urbana da Universidade Federal do Pará – UFPA (Program for Urban Reform of the Federal University of Pará – UFPA)
- PEMA** Plano Estratégico Municipal de Assentamentos Precários (Municipal Strategic Plan for Precarious Settlements)
- POUSO** Posto de Orientação Urbanística e Social (Urbanistic and Social Orientation Center)



**Procentro** Programa Operacional da Região Centro (Program for the Rehabilitation of the Central Area in São Paulo, COHAB-SP)

**PROAP** Programa de Urbanização de Assentamentos Populares (Urbanization Program for Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro), Favela Bairro

**Procidades/Aracaju** Programa Procidades de Aracaju (*Favelas* Urbanization Program of Aracaju)

**Prosamim** Programa Social e Ambiental dos Igarapés de Manaus (Social and Environmental Program for the Igarapés of Manaus)

**SEGES** Secretaria de Gestão Estratégica (Strategic Management Department of Vitória)

**SEHAB** Secretaria Estadual de Habitação (State Housing Secretariat of São Paulo)

**Seplan** Secretária de Planejamento (Planning Secretariat)

**SUHAB** Superintendência de Habitação do Estado do Amazonas (Housing Superintendence of the State of Amazonas)

**UFPA** Universidade Federal do Pará (Federal University of Pará)

## INTRODUCTION

### Goal and Target Audience

The main goal of this book is to disseminate the useful lessons learned from urban development and *favela* urbanization operations in Brazil financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Brazilian government.<sup>1</sup> These lessons underpin the recommendations for the design of public policies on the subject. It is hoped that they will also contribute to improving the efficiency of specific programs.

For the purposes of this book, the term “*favela* urbanization” will be used to denote the various modes of intervention to address urban sprawl, inadequate housing, and land titling irregularities. Although the *favelas* are the most frequent form of irregularity discussed in the case studies in this book, urban decay and overcrowding are also discussed. Examples include the Rehabilitation Program for the Central Area of São Paulo (Programa Operacional da Região Centro, or **Procentro**), the State Housing Company of Paraná (Companhia Estadual de Habitação do Paraná, or **COHAB-Paraná**), and the Program for the Improvement of Favelas in São Paulo (Programa de Melhoramentos das Favelas do Município de São Paulo, or **Cingapura/PROVER**), programs that support the construction of new houses for populations coming from irregular settlements and squatting.

The book draws attention to the critical aspects of design that must be addressed in the preparation of future projects, as well as in the execution and maintenance of investments. It also suggests some policies for this sector. The book is written mainly for urban development professionals and decision makers involved in the design of urban development and *favela* urbanization policies and programs.

The idea for this publication was developed through collaboration among the IDB, the Cities Alliance, the Ministry of Cities, and the Caixa Econômica Federal, or CEF, which formed a partnership for the purpose of

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<sup>1</sup> A distinctively and widely known Brazilian term, the word *favela* can be translated into English as “slum.” This book will use the original Brazilian term.

consolidating operational knowledge. These institutions believe that operational knowledge, besides being relevant to Brazil, may also be useful for other countries and regions undergoing similar urbanization processes, particularly in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region, Africa, and Asia. It could add value to the Brazilian government in this second phase of the Program for Growth Acceleration (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, or PAC).

The institutions cited above have significant experience in promoting urban development programs. The IDB is the largest multilateral finance institution in the LAC region. The bank also enjoys international recognition in programs that support the urbanization of slums. This is partly due to the success of some of its programs developed in partnership with the Brazilian government, such as *Favela-Bairro* (Program for the Urbanization of Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro) and *Habitar Brasil* (HBB), which inspired the introduction of national government policies in *favela* urbanization and also acted as a crucial driver of the national movement for *favela* enhancement.

The CEF is the federal government's main institution that promotes public policies. CEF operates, disseminates knowledge about, and finances urban development throughout the country, jointly with states, municipalities, and nonprofit entities. Its portfolio includes programs for *favelas*, central urban areas, land titling regularization, and public sector modernization, among others.

Despite the vast literature in Brazil on the upgrading of squatter settlements—including books, academic papers, monographs, and articles—a deficit persists in empirical studies. This is particularly the case with respect to lessons learned in urban development programs and *favela* urbanization projects, especially considering the large number of projects and programs implemented by national and multilateral agencies.

The IDB routinely evaluates its operations; however, detailed and methodologically sound case studies of lessons learned are scarce. This book does not pretend to present an extensive review of the existing literature; rather, it relies on both secondary information and complementary primary information collected from stakeholders of the programs considered and in the available project documents.

The study innovates by examining all of the IDB's operations in urban development with significant *favela* urbanization components in Brazil in the last ten years, at the federal, state, and municipal levels. The cases studied

have a regional reach, covering cities from the southeast, north, northeast, and south regions of Brazil. Only in one case (Nova Baixada) are municipal boundaries transcended; this project encompasses a host of municipalities from the Rio de Janeiro state, known as Baixada Fluminense.

This publication does not aspire to present either a set of fixed rules or a model, or to review the programs. Its focus is to identify the critical factors that have facilitated or hindered the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of the projects and that have enabled or impeded the achievement of results. It does not intend to evaluate the performance or results of *favela* urbanization programs in Brazil. It does, however, aim to examine the empirical data critically and selectively and to capture operational knowledge, within its context and design specificities, in order to allow for a deeper understanding of key factors that ought to be considered in the design and execution of operations of this kind.

The book offers a practical analysis of the evolution of the project cycle, making it possible to reveal and to better understand the key stages of the design and execution process, its main players, and the impact of observed institutional and political conditions.

A perspective that stands out here because of its relevance and that adds analytical value to the study is the emphasis placed on integration in slum urbanization programs. The concepts of program **integrality** and **intersectorality**, fundamental dimensions in *favela* urbanization operations, figure prominently in every chapter. These two dimensions are to be viewed:

- as factors that connect the physical aspects to other program dimensions, such as health care, education, economic development, and others;
- as a process of change in the programs' objectives, so as to include more ambitious and far-reaching goals, such as social and economic development; and
- as a change in the contents of the components of operations financed by the IDB.

The case analysis is developed by studying the most frequent components in these types of operations: the physical, social, and institutional components.

## Methodology, Research Focus, Contents, and Structure

The study is structured around four general questions. However, when necessary, these questions have been extrapolated to include greater complexity and detail.

1. *What factors contributed—positively or negatively—to achieve the objectives specified in each component: institutional, physical, and social?*
2. *What are the best strategies for maximizing the advantages of an integrated approach and, simultaneously, for diminishing the hurdles imposed by institutional constraints and the growing complexity of intersectoral management?*
3. *Is it possible to institutionalize a public policy for the urbanization of favelas while at the same time enabling it to scale up and be sustainable?*
4. *What is the role of governments and financing agencies in this process?*

The methodology combined organization and analysis of documents and secondary information with in-depth interviews and workshops with stakeholders. Secondary information was first collected and analyzed. This information was available in the IDB's project documents (Project Concept Document; Progress Monitoring Report; and Project Completion Report), in PAC documents, academic articles, and studies on slum urbanization in Brazil. For each pillar of analysis, relevant theoretical-methodological references were used and are listed in the bibliography.

The analysis of secondary information enabled researchers to narrow the general research questions, while the fieldwork yielded more in-depth knowledge. During a three and a half-month period, successive intensive visits took place in the case study locations. The visits offered the opportunity to make contact with many stakeholders, including secretaries and municipal or state officials (current and/or from the time of the program), program coordinators, staff, field teams, community representatives, consultants (especially architects and social technicians), and implementation and management teams. Those stakeholders were individually interviewed or participated in workshops. For each case study, in-depth site visits were made, which included contacts with beneficiary communities.

Emphasis was placed on collective reflection about processes and the factors that either facilitated or impeded them, in an attempt to understand

the logic behind the characteristics of the contexts (political, institutional, technical, social, etc.) that might have influenced them. The background of each program was analyzed and inquiries were made about their critical paths, intervening factors, and interrelationships. The fieldwork was recorded in reports and discussed in workshops with the partnering institutions. The feedback from those workshops was incorporated, and the primary material constitutes the basis for most of the analysis presented in this book. This information was collected by a team of three consultants.

The cases were selected to ensure diversity in life cycle and geographic location. The nine cases analyzed are located in seven cities: Manaus, Belém, Aracaju, Vitória, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Curitiba, and in a region on the periphery of Rio de Janeiro—the Baixada Fluminense. It includes programs financed by the IDB, the Federal Government of Brazil (PAC and HBB), and municipal operations (Terra Mais Igual, in Vitória; Favela-Bairro, in Rio de Janeiro); and state projects [COHAB-Paraná].

All of these operations have, in varying combinations and proportions, components of infrastructure, housing, local economic development, social inclusion, environmental protection, and rehabilitation of historical centers, among others. Although the use of a single analytical framework might provide some uniformity of methods and procedures, it is necessary to recognize the variety of issues presented in the cases. As a whole, the cases represent a powerful example of the diversity of strategies that Brazilian cities have developed to meet the challenges of urbanization.

The cases studied are the following:

1. Social and Environmental Program for the Igarapés of Manaus – **Prosamim** (Manaus, AM);
2. Pro Belém Program – **Bacia do Una** (Belém, PA);
3. Program for the Rehabilitation of the Central Area in São Paulo – **Procentro** (São Paulo, SP);
4. Program for the Improvement of Favelas in São Paulo – **Cingapura/PROVER** (São Paulo, SP);
5. Program for the Integrated Urbanization of Neighborhoods of the Baixada Fluminense – **Nova Baixada** (Baixada Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro);
6. Program for the Urbanization of Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro – **Favela-Bairro** (Rio de Janeiro, RJ);

7. **Procidades/Aracaju** or PAC (Aracaju, SE);
8. Procidades/Vitória Program or **Terra Mais Igual** (Vitória, ES);
9. Procidades/Curitiba Program or Favelas Urbanization Program of **COHAB-Paraná** (Curitiba, PR).

The case study analysis was structured upon three pillars, each corresponding to a chapter: (i) physical components, urban design, and architecture; (ii) social components and community participation; and (iii) institutional and managerial issues.

The answers to the research questions are organized according to these pillars. In each chapter, the experiences are analyzed as a whole, and the empirical evidence is used to illustrate the lessons drawn from each pillar, with the aim of identifying the hurdles and difficulties, as well as the enabling elements (or good options) that were part of the process. The main lessons learned are presented in text boxes and exemplified by the cases studies. Detailed technical data about each project are provided in the annex.

All of the projects featured in the case studies benefited from IDB funding. In Aracaju, Vitória, and Curitiba, policies, programs and projects existed locally prior to the IDB's involvement through Procidades. In these three cases, there was also financing from PAC. In Prosamim, Pro Belém, and Nova Baixada, the analysis focused on the projects financed by the IDB. And the case studies of Favela Bairro, Cingapura/Prover, and Procentro present a combination of programs financed by the IDB (and corresponding local counterpart) and actions funded by the respective municipalities (before, during, or after IDB funding). Thus, the analysis also focuses on the relatively complex interaction between interventions financed by international cooperation and those with domestic financing, not always within a framework of continuity in municipal urban policies.

In order to answer the key research questions, and considering the characteristics of international funding (its weight, influence, and insertion in local urban development policies), the focus of the analysis shifts back and forth between the program and the policy level and studies the relationship between them. This resulted in the inclusion of a fifth question, which shall be discussed in further detail in the concluding chapter, namely: *How can an action emanating from slum urbanization programs and projects be institutionalized as public policy, gaining scale and continuity?*

## A Review of the Literature on Slum and *Favela* Urbanization in Brazil<sup>2</sup>

Urban neighborhoods in Brazil are plagued by inadequate housing and land-titling irregularities: tenements, *favelas*, irregular land divisions, or even residential blocks that, although built by the government, are often in a deteriorated state.

This massive presence of **slums** in the Brazilian metropolis is the result of a dynamic that historically constrained access to urbanized land in Brazil, and reflects, in spatial terms, its extremely unequal economic and social structure. These settlements are diverse, varying in location, size, density, building quality, illegality, risk situation, and level of consolidation and integration. However, some characteristics that they all share are illegality in land titling or property, the precariousness of dwelling conditions, the lack of urban infrastructure, and segregation from the formal town. This variety makes the design of public policies and actions more difficult.

Until the 1990s, the government actively promoted income-concentrating policies, exacerbating social and urban segregation and the housing deficit.

Knowledge about slums in Brazil is still recent. The idea that urbanization and regularization are needed is also quite new, dating back no more than two decades. The history of Brazilian urbanism has itself been much more about repeated attempts to eradicate tenements than the pursuit of solutions to improve in situ living conditions.

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, tenements and *favelas* were seen as provisional and illegal solutions and, for this reason, “ignored” by public policy (Abreu, 1994, and Lira, 1994). Eradication actions intensified in the 1940s.<sup>3</sup> An intensive Brazilian urbanization process that began in the 1950s was marked in the main cities by the expansion of *favelas* and the irregular occupation of the peripheries. In the mid-1960s, some specific mitigating actions were carried out. The pioneering experience of *favela* Brás de Pina, in Rio de Janeiro, urbanized as a result of popular mobilization against its removal, dates back to this period. Until the 1990s, public policies were, paradoxically,

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<sup>2</sup> As stated before, “*favela* urbanization” is used in this work to designate the various forms of urban agglomerations and a situation of inadequate housing and land-titling irregularity.

<sup>3</sup> As in the case of the *mocambos* settlements in Recife and eradication of *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro. Cf. Melo, 1985, and Burgos, 2006.



complacent about the growth of squatter settlements, while simultaneously promoting systematic actions of *favela* eradication (Bueno, 2000). This contributed to a relentless rise of informal settlements on the periphery of cities.

Through this flawed logic, slums were viewed as merely an urban problem, an anomaly to be resolved through “cleansing” actions of a purely physical kind. Much urban slums were demolished and the population resettled in new housing blocks along the distant periphery.

The problem of slums was not seen comprehensively through an approach that would examine their economic and social dimensions and their connections with the country’s high-income concentration development model, which exacerbated urban poverty (Ferreira, 2007).

As a result of pressure by this excluded population, during the 1970s the first slum upgrading urbanization policies emerged, bringing infrastructure solutions, such as paved streets, electricity, basic sanitation, and solutions to traditional demands.<sup>4</sup> This mobilization would intensify, leading in 1979 to Law No. 6,766, which regulated land parceling and penalized promoters of irregular plots. Those large-scale peripheral irregular land subdivisions played a key role in accommodating rural-urban migrants.

The return to democracy in the late 1980s redirected public policies to consider slums as worthy of being integrated into the city and widening the scope of interventions to include an intersectoral perspective along with infrastructure improvements. Several municipalities, such as Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Diadema, and Belo Horizonte (Ferreira and Motisuke, 2007), adopted this approach.

The “Estatuto da Cidade,” a chapter in the Federal Constitution of 1988, gave municipalities the opportunity to use instruments to achieve the social function of property. By having a direct impact on slum policies, these instruments offered the possibility of dealing with land titling, a complex problem still far from being resolved.

Particularly at the municipal level, experiences with slum upgrading began to accumulate during the 1990s, allowing for a slow process of public policy institutionalization (Denaldi, 2009). More assessments and plans were developed at the local level, and project design and execution procedures

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<sup>4</sup> According to Denaldi (2003), from 1968 to 1971, Rio de Janeiro had, simultaneously, a company that removed *favelas*, the Low-Income Housing Coordinator for the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area (Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro, or CHISAM), and another that promoted their urbanization, the Community Development Company (Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades, or CODESCO).

were given greater importance. Specific technical solutions begin to emerge, although in general they remained isolated experiences, limited to a few municipalities.

Presently, important federal financing policies for slum upgrading have placed the issue squarely on the political agenda.<sup>5</sup> There is a body of empirical knowledge on how to develop and execute integrated urbanization programs. The analyses in this book aim to take this knowledge further.

In this context, the reflections focusing on the operational aspects of urbanization programs and projects gain more relevance, expanding awareness of the need to organize knowledge and draw lessons in order to better sustain the design of urban policies (Denaldi, 2003; Bueno, 2000; Uemura, 2000). The next three chapters present those lessons for each pillar.

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<sup>5</sup> Slum urbanization was incorporated into the objectives of the federal program launched in 2007, through PAC.



# Physical, Urban, and Architectural Aspects

## Factors that Weigh on the Quality of the Technical Options of an Urban Architectural Project

Urban development programs, in particular those oriented to *favela* urbanization, generally devote substantial attention to problems of a physical-urban planning and architectural character, through urban and housing components.

Various factors directly affect the quality of the urban and architectural project's technical options. In addition to the technical aspects of the project itself, other factors include urban infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage systems, road access, and street paving); urban integration and accessibility; dwellings site location; and the architectural project's technological options (quality and consistency of the construction and materials used, functional qualities of the units, among others).

The quality of an urban program relies on its ability to deliver habitability with good technical conditions, as well as other conveniences, such as public transportation, the availability of infrastructure, social facilities, sanitation, and commerce. The existence of these conditions is linked to governments' political and programmatic decision making.

Therefore, the technical character of the solutions adopted is also conditioned by the **political, institutional, and decision-making context**, which is specific to each program or each urban planning policy. Often, decisions are influenced by the political-programmatic options of the governments involved, at all levels, and they receive the impact from changes in management and from discontinuity.

Taking into account this institutional and political dimension (Samora, 2010), a part of the merely technical one, affects and frames the quality of the technical solutions. Long ago, studies on the urbanization experiences in

several Brazilian cities took note of this association between the local technical aspects and the institutional ones stemming from the decision-making process (Labhab/Fauusp-Fupam/Finep/CEF, 1989). In academic circles, the idea that physical-urban aspects could be addressed independently from institutional aspects in slum urbanization processes has been superseded.

These aspects, relative to **the decisions** made in light of inter- and intra-governmental relationships and arrangements, as well as the interaction with external players (financing organizations, civil society, and the private sector), have a crosscutting impact on local solutions and on project selection, design, implementation, and management.

There are also **general and structural factors** related to aspects that influence the final physical-urban and architectural quality of the programs, such as the priority levels in defining policies and negotiating for financing within the different governmental spheres, resident's engagement, and the skills of the technical staff. These factors also impact the initial scope, its endurance and smoothness, the consistency of the procedures among government levels, its intersectorality, the choice of area, the balance between cost and quality of the architectural projects, and the operational effectiveness and maintenance of the investments.


The quality of the **project-specific technical aspects** has a two-tiered application: that of the urban intervention and that of the architectural unit. Various factors influence the former, such as the infrastructure network, public transportation accessibility, adequate sanitation, and the surpassing of project limits in order to benefit not only the settlements, but also their immediate surroundings. This parameter has special significance because programs with good technical solutions also tend to be focused only on the settlement, despite often being located within large informal areas (Denaldi, 2000). The second tier targets the specific quality of the housing-unit project, and depends on the size of the project and its habitability, flexibility, and identity.

**The local dimension of a project's technical decisions** is also important. This is because decision making involves a considerable number of variables, all of them unpredictable. Therefore, local decisions that are wise at a given time may prove wrong at subsequent times, because, for example, of an unexpected shift in the number of dwellers per unit, or due to the assimilation of the decisions taken by more or fewer participants, to the growth of informal occupation in the settlement during the course of the urbanization project, or because of internal political strife within the communities.

There is also a final factor worth considering, which has to do with **the balance between the feasibility of financing and the quality of the urban and architectural projects**. The projects' lack of quality is not only a consequence of local technical decisions, design, or materials selection. Overall, it arises from a contradiction commonly found in architectural activity: the project's quality depends on larger usable areas within the units and on higher-quality construction materials that would generate good thermo-acoustic conditions for environmental wellbeing and lower maintenance costs. However, these conditions tend to be more expensive, namely when certain aspects are not considered, such as rapid depreciation and the need for maintenance stemming from the use of low-quality materials. Similarly, the more diverse the projects are, the more difficult it is to standardize the projects, which makes them more expensive. This issue implies a host of other aspects, such as variation in the cost of building materials in each region, the availability and training of the labor force, the mastery of technology, the reduction of wasted material, and others. Additionally, one of the most significant items in the project's final cost is the land value.

The production of cost-controlled houses in slum urbanization programs often gives rise to the undesirable building units solution that are uniform and repeatedly reproduced; these are small, basic houses whose large-scale implementation involves considerable soil removal and leads to erosion.

A higher quality of dwelling often increases costs and, consequently, reduces the number of units produced, conflicting with the quantitative proportions of the Brazilian housing deficit and generating obvious political costs because of the decrease in housing units supplied.



Examples of contradiction between projects' quantity and quality: Bairro Samambaia, Brasília-DF, 1982 (Acervo Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal, handed over by Rômulo Andrade de Oliveira) and COPROMO-Osasco Ensemble, collective initiative, a project from Assesoria Usina, 1996



Examples of contradiction between projects' quantity and quality: Bairro Samambaia, Brasília-DF, 1982 (Acervo Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal, handed over by Rômulo Andrade de Oliveira) and COPROMO-Osasco Ensemble, collective initiative, a project from Assesoria Usina, 1996

This chapter presents the lessons learned from the analysis of urban development programs and projects, keeping in mind the four factors previously identified:

- **general and structural factors;**
- **specific technical features of the projects;**
- **local dimension of technical decisions;**
  - *the urban dimension*
  - *the architectural dimension*
- **balance between financial viability and quality of the urban and architectural projects.**

## **General and Structural Factors**

There are several structural factors that impact on the projects and affect their success. Among them, the most decisive are the degree of institutional and political commitment, the autonomy of public administration and its ability to negotiate, the aptitude for building a participatory process, and the staff capacity and competence.

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### **Degree of Institutional and Political Commitment**

**Key factors include the priority given to a program by state or municipal authorities, as well as the commitment on the part of the different agencies involved (and the ability to build bridges with other government entities and navigate political-administrative differences).**

**Prosamim** provides a good illustration of a government that prioritizes the programs and is able to integrate them into different levels of government. In practice, the program became the main housing policy of the municipality of Manaus, enforced by the government of the State of Amazonas, with broad involvement from various state and municipal agencies. The program allocated a significant amount of funding (around 13 million reais, or US\$6.5 million) to the institutional strengthening of the organizations involved, at both the state and municipal levels. Several municipal urban policy regulatory documents have been developed with the participation and sometimes even funding of Prosamim.<sup>1</sup>

In **Favela-Bairro**, there was an absolute municipal government commitment demonstrated by the channeling of nearly half the city's budget to its Housing Department and giving the department a central political management role.

In contrast, **Nova Baixada** (Program for the Integrated Urbanization of Neighborhoods of the Baixada Fluminense) distinguished itself by the absence of connections between the state, the program executor, the Baixada Fluminense municipalities and the program's target communities, despite what was established by the IDB contract. All decisions related to infrastructure and eligible areas were made by the state government; the municipalities played no role in program planning and execution and many of the projects were at odds with municipal proposals already in course.

In **Bacia da Una**, the program was under joint responsibility of the state government and the Office of the Mayor of Belém. The constant disagreements between the parties negatively impacted the general coordination and disrupted the connection with the communities. After the program was brought to a standstill in 1992 by the state government, this contentious scenario led to the reorganization and relaunching of the program in 1997.

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<sup>1</sup> Solid Waste Disposal Plan of Manaus, Local Low-Income Housing Plan, Industrial Pollution Control Plan, and Water and Sewage Plan.



### **Administrative Autonomy**

**The administration's autonomy in defining its policies and the ability to negotiate with financing bodies are fundamental characteristics. The influence of external funding is less when it complements broader municipal policy.**

The ability of **Terra Mais Igual** managers to negotiate with financing agencies was demonstrated by the mayor's office and HBB coordinator.<sup>2</sup> This agreement had a positive effect on **the program's physical-urban architectural quality**: the size of the units, originally with maximum area of 32 m<sup>2</sup> per dwelling unit (at a cost up to 8,000 reais or US\$4,000), were enlarged to 39 m<sup>2</sup> using local budgetary resources for funding the cost. This exercise revealed the power of the municipal government to negotiate the adaption of external architectural parameters to the local housing policy guidelines. The balance between the program executors' influence, on one hand, and the financing agencies, on the other, is a delicate one.

The involvement of experienced technical staff, along with the knowledge of the other programs that are participating, might bring useful insights. However, technical staff can also be too pigeonholed by other experiences and call for solutions that are not appropriate for local conditions, affecting the final physical-urban quality. One example is the sewerage mini-facilities of Favela Bairro, which ended up deserted and defaced, and even became hazardous to residents.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, the technical staffs' experience and negotiating skills, along with the participation of the community before, during, and after the project, allowed for the modification of the HBB design requirements to adapt it to the local context. This change allowed for greater government intersectorality and 80 percent of the affected population accepted it.

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<sup>2</sup> According to Margaret Coelho, coordinator of the Management Center of Terra Mais Igual, interviewed on November 26, 2009.

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### **Building a Participatory Approach**

A participatory approach, which involves and takes into account the role of the program's beneficiaries, is essential to ensure the quality of urban and architectural projects, because the residents are the ultimate beneficiaries and evaluators. A house that is too small and stifling embodies physical-architectural elements that undermine the beneficiaries' quality of life.

In **Prosamim**, a result of the project's participatory process was the change in the architectural design, which involved eliminating the two-story typology and adding sinks in the bathrooms. The program developed several participation channels, considered key for running the program and ensuring the good physical-urban-architectural quality of housing units.

In **Terra Mais Igual** community, representatives praised the fact that projects were built collectively with the community.

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### **Continuous Training of Technical Staff**

**The ability to promote the continuous training of technical staff and to spread knowledge that enables replication of experiences in new programs is a success factor.**

The ability to create technically competent teams, capable of leading the necessary modifications in the physical-urban and architectural arena, was important to allow the required changes to be introduced into the architectural project of **Prosamim**.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, an experienced staff from various departments allowed for the adaptation of the project's methodology to the specific defined goals. Many of the staff members originated from other municipal programs in mangrove and mountain areas, developed in the late 1980s in Vitória. The project procedures were based on this accumulated experience. Moreover, members of the technical team trained by the program have replicated the experience, and several among them have even migrated to state and municipal agencies.

A positive element in **Favela-Bairro** was continuous training of technical staff, whose commitment to the settlements deepened during program implementation. Although the presence of several of these staff became unviable because of changes in the government, they went on to join teams in

other agencies at all levels of government and in different municipalities and states, thus expanding the process of knowledge sharing and dissemination.

It is interesting to observe how the experience of Prosamim was incorporated into Terra Mais Igual. The exchange of knowledge between the two programs enabled Vitória to progress, rather than reproducing the housing subsidy (*bonus moradia*) that had such bad results in Manaus, where it increased the number of buildings in the central locations, resulting in the forced purchase of real estate in the city's peripheral areas.

### Specific Technical Aspects

The selection of an **integrated scope** and of **the program and project intervention area**, two factors that stem from technical decisions made at the beginning of the project's design cycle, are decisive for the quality of architectural and urban planning.

A consensus already exists among specialists that adopting a holistic approach to all sectoral aspects is key for well-designed infrastructure and urban planning components of slum urbanization programs. The scope should integrate sectors such as transportation, mobility, sanitation, land titling regularization, environmental, and social. Although each of these sectors belongs to independent policies, they should be thought of in an integrated way. When the scope of the intervention implies the **resettlement of families**, the choice of the resettlement area must be carefully considered.

Having an integrated scope must be a priority for all government levels, which call for wide-ranging scopes that adopt a multisectoral, urban socio-environmental approach.

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### Integration and Diversity

**The cases analyzed demonstrate that, ideally, slum urbanization policies should be integrated and should offer diversity in the type of housing, in accordance with the local context.**

**Prosamim** is an example of a program that was conceived with inclusion and sectoral integration in mind. To resettle a population living on stilts (*palafitas*) from the *igarapés*,<sup>3</sup> the program offered integrated urban and

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<sup>3</sup> *Igarapés* are low-depth waterways, river branches, or channels in the Amazon region. The word literally means "water road" in Nheengatu tongue.

housing projects, centrally located and well integrated into city networks, and included roads, sanitation, drainage, environmental education, employment and income generation, and participatory management components.

The program dealt with environmental and housing issues together, as it aimed to tackle simultaneously the demand for housing and the need to environmentally recover the *igarapés*. This approach has generated exceptional results regarding the physical-urban quality of the new neighborhoods and their quality of life. They were well incorporated into the urban fabric, providing opportunities for mixed uses and offering key social facilities, such as schools, recreational areas, and sports fields.

The program stands out for generating intersectoral actions at different levels of government, as well as for directly engaging state levels with municipal agencies for garbage collection and cleanup of the *igarapés*, in addition to promoting discussion about the city's housing policy.



Integration into the urban fabric– environmental treatment and diversity of uses at Prosamim



Integration into the urban fabric– environmental treatment and diversity of uses at Prosamim

In **Favela-Bairro**, the proposal was to urbanize selected *favelas*, integrating them into the city by means of road and infrastructure improvements, combined with the introduction of social facilities and the development of community social programs. This integrated scope was certainly one of the keys for its wide acceptance and fame. However, the fact that it was not designed to build or improve dwellings partially limited its ability to promote a complete upgrade, as stated by some of the technical staff interviewed. Even so, the initial program aim did not exclude this eventual unfolding in later phases. The deliberate option to prioritize investment in public spaces was not an obstacle to the success of the program.<sup>4</sup>

**Bacia do Una** was implemented according to the original proposal. The program centered on sanitation, drainage, and street paving actions in the intervention area, which was located in the largest hydrographic basin in the city and included “slope” zones. Historically, low-income populations have occupied informally the flood-prone areas of the town. The action to solve this specific problem came in response to the inhabitants’ historical demand. However an all-encompassing approach, including a focus on broader needs (urban facilities and land titling), which still exist in the region today, would have yielded more comprehensive urban development results. Even considering the counterpart’s low institutional capacity, which was identified in the program’s preparation phase, it was probably a mistake to disregard

<sup>4</sup> The IDB included a housing improvement component into the third funding contract proposal of Favela-Bairro, proving its evolutionary capacity.

the land-titling issue, as nearly 50 percent of the municipal dwellings have no clear titles.

In the case of **Procentro**, the initial configuration was radically different, and to a certain extent innovative, but also risky: an all-encompassing scope was implemented in the center of the city, with a great diversity of interventions and considerable intersectoral cooperation. This arrangement added operational complexity and required considerable continuous political commitment for its success and sustainability. The exact opposite occurred: the program suffered from administrative discontinuity in the municipal government. In practice, those political changes caused the program to be morphed into an accumulation of scattered, disjointed, and not the least bit systemic actions.

The lack of integrality in **Cingapura/PROVER**, also in São Paulo, had already been noted. It focused almost exclusively on the delivery of new housing in high-rise buildings, with little or no diversity. The option for a single-family housing design proved to be an inappropriate response to the need for variety.

Nonetheless, it had the merit of initiating a type of intervention that did not remove the *favela* from its place, keeping the dwellers in high-rise blocks built on the site of their original residences. In any case, the impossibility of more fully satisfying demands from the *favelas*, which did not always prioritize the community, and of taking on the hurdles stemming from the transition between living in a *favela* and in a vertical condominium (which Favela-Bairro preferred not to do) created difficulties that increased over time.

Bairro CIC, in Curitiba, is an outgrowth of the intersectoral housing policy developed over several decades by COHAB-Paraná. The district initiated a process of urbanization in the 1980s and, since then, it has benefited from interventions in several phases. The initial conception placed a high value on integration, diversity of housing types, and environmental issues, avoiding soil displacement. Housing developments were also planned connected to the existing urban fabric and incorporating facilities. Such concerns contributed to the overall urban quality of the neighborhoods, which do not have the image of "housing estates." Although there is very little variety in terms of building unit type, there are mixed uses, and developments are well integrated into neighborhoods.



COHAB-Paraná – road integration and appropriate insertion of the housing units in Bairro CIC



COHAB-Paraná – road integration and appropriate insertion of the housing units in Bairro CIC

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### **Appropriate Selection of the Area**

A program in a correctly defined area will have a higher potential for success and will be a more rational funding option. The level of interdependency of the various determinants is so high that the higher the number of favorable conditions there are, the more effective the urban outcomes will be. Similarly, the selection of areas with good possibilities for improvement of one aspect, but not others, can lead to the total inefficacy of the policy, once the negative aspects nullify the positive ones. An example is found in housing unit upgrading in areas with no possibility for installing sanitation or drainage systems. This situation can turn into a fiasco after the first rain.

The case of **Nova Baixada** illustrates a situation where the selection of areas with great deficiencies and lacking a connection to existing service networks led to a discontinuity of the infrastructure networks, severely undermining the program. The state government prioritized areas with greater needs, defined by a combination of urban shortcomings and high population density. The intervention gave priority to sanitation, combined with the provision of social facilities, such as day care centers, specialized services, and health care centers.



This approach, although rational and integrated, actually generated problems. Acting partially in large, deprived peripheral regions with infrastructure problems created disconnected “islands” (Hübner, 2002) with better infrastructure (in the midst of large tracts of slum areas). In each municipality, two or three small adjacent areas were urbanized, but the efforts did not reach the sub-basins or the complete neighborhoods, dampening expectations that the project would benefit everyone.

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### **Planning Units for the Basins**

**The planning unit for basin sanitation projects should be the micro-basins. If it is impossible to reach the whole basin, the intervention should be planned incrementally, starting from the center and creating cores of infrastructure networks that can gradually expand outward.**

There are situations in which the historical condition of settlements favors urbanization, particularly where areas are incorporated into consolidated urban areas. This is the case of the *igarapés* in Manaus, the Coroa do Meio district in Aracaju, and the projects of Terra Mais Igual in Vitória.<sup>5</sup>

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### **Location of Resettlements**

**The resettlement of slum dwellers in areas far from their original settlements, driving them away from their jobs and neighborhoods and causing them to have to commute long distances, is one of the worst features of *favela* urbanization policies. Inserting proximity criteria into program selection, as stipulated in IDB and World Bank-financed operations, is fundamental.**

Consolidating urbanized slums into the formal city should not, however, be considered a simple option: generally, it is a political decision that goes against the established practice of moving the poor from central to peripheral areas. The prospect of integrating slums into the city, seeking solutions focused on the settlement and its surroundings, strengthens the recognition of the broader right to live in the city (Denaldi, 2009b).

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<sup>5</sup> Due to the lack of public land in central locations, the Manaus and Aracaju programs were forced to resettle some of the program beneficiaries at the periphery.



Urban integration in Terra Mais Igual Program (/Municipality of Vitória)



Prosamim



Prosamim (UGP-Prosamim)

The **Prosamim** case deserves a more detailed examination in the context of this topic. In fact, one of its structural aspects is the possibility of offering new homes, free of charge, in the area where settlers reside. This is not the most common alternative; resettlement to distant areas remains the most prevalent option in slum urbanization programs.

Resettlement in the same location occurred in only one-sixth of the nearly 6,000 removals that took place in Manaus. Staff argued that the other options (compensation together with the purchase of another building, or placement in municipal housing projects) were more practical both for the executor, who avoided the costly and cumbersome process of offering provisional housing, and for the dwellers, who consider compensation with purchase a faster solution than waiting for a new building. Although this is understandable, it ends up encouraging the displacement of low-income dwellers to more distant areas, thus contributing to a process of peripheralization. That is why it is important to incorporate this discussion (as one more facet of the necessary intersectorality) into the Municipal Housing Plan, which is in preparation under the responsibility of the program executor with program resources. Even so, the program is one of the few in the country to offer cost-free dwellings built in the same location of the original settlement, integrated into the urban fabric and with architectural quality. Obviously, the ideal would be for the program to be extended so as to benefit the entire population of the *igarapés*.

### Local Dimension of Technical Decisions

As previously discussed, technical aspects of the projects are divided into two dimensions: urban and architectural.

#### *The Urban Dimension*

As a general rule, urban slum projects must be appropriate to the context in which they are developed; it is not possible to use universal technical parameters. For this reason, a simple verification of indicators or numbers, taken generically, seldom allows for an appropriate qualitative analysis. But some technical aspects are determinants for interventions to be properly adapted to local conditions.

Context in urban planning determines variety in policy. Adaptation might be shaped through devising specific technical solutions or by actions

of a more social nature (allowances for provisional dwellings, removal for new ensembles, etc.). For example, a *favela* located in a flood-prone area must be dealt with differently than one that is built beneath a viaduct or where there is a risk of fire. In both cases the solution will be different from those for a *favela* established decades ago in a consolidated area and integrated into the urban fabric. That is why not all of the technical aspects identified in this book will be present in all programs.

The preference for **locations integrated into the urban infrastructure network**, with good access to public transportation, diversity of use, and **appropriate sanitation**, that transcend projects boundaries in order to benefit not only the settlements but also their immediate surroundings (Denaldi, 2009a), are elements of what we call the projects' urban parameters.

The concept of integration into the urban network relates to the ability to create a built environment able to link itself to the existing infrastructure of the city, in terms of roads, access to public transportation, and other available infrastructure. This depends, most of all, on the chosen program's scope and area. Interventions in peripheral areas lacking infrastructure will be by definition more complex than in areas nearer to, or integrated into, the formal city.

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### Location of Resettlements


The intervention should not stand out from the surrounding environment in order to avoid stigmatization. Instead it should be integrated into the surrounding neighborhoods. Additionally, it is important to transcend the project's boundaries, which tend to be specific, so as to benefit not only the settlement but also its immediate surroundings. This is even more important when dealing with interventions in areas lacking urban infrastructure.

Integration into the urban fabric, transforming a slum into a neighborhood within the city, is so significant for achieving quality that it became the central pillar of one of the programs studied, **Favela-Bairro**, whose own name embodies this concern.

Building connecting roads to the surrounding areas was a priority mainly in the first phase of Favela-Bairro. It ceased to be one during the municipal management transition that took place in 2001, under the rationale

that the high cost did not justify them.<sup>6</sup> This change undoubtedly altered the essence of the program.

Laying down feeder roads and connecting them to the existing road system can be decisive in reducing organized crime, as occurred in the Chácara del Castilho community. The efficacy of this purely physical-urban intervention gained strength with the concomitant implementation and maintenance (to date) of the Urban and Social Orientation Center (POUSO), a community center supported by the municipality. The focus, rightly, was on the promotion of the physical integration of *favelas* into the surrounding neighborhoods without dismantling the existing social demarcation lines between them.



Two examples of integration into the city as an engine for the improvement of the informal settlements – at left, Favela-Bairro Andaraí; at right, Royal Park

<sup>6</sup> This is according to Hélio Aleixo and David Lessa, who held technical and political positions on the management team of the program until 2001, and several statements collected in interviews conducted in August 2009 with technicians from the mayor's office and architects who worked on projects for Favela-Bairro.



Favela-Bairro Mangueira – an example of good urban integration



Chácara del Castilho – examples of good urban integration

Another example of harmonious integration into the city is **Prosamim**. In this case, the slum areas were incorporated into the urban infrastructure network. This was easier because the settlements were located in areas of the city where good infrastructure already existed. The program was noteworthy, once again, for its good design options: it could have chosen to completely remove the inhabitants from the *igarapés*, resettling them to remote peripheral regions.

Though this option had been used in the program, keeping at least some of the families in the area of the original settlement guaranteed an urbanization that was extremely well integrated into the existing urban fabric, resulting in a significant gain in urban quality. The inhabitants remained close to their jobs and, given the mixed use, were also able to engage in commercial activities and to benefit directly from the new recreational facilities (parks, sports fields, etc.). The installation of these facilities also had the advantage of preventing reclamation of the area or its development.



Prosamim – good examples of integration into the urban fabric (Photos: Prosamim)



Prosamim – good examples of integration into the urban fabric (Photos: Prosamim)

As with Prosamim, a fundamental goal of **Terra Mais Igual** was to build dwelling units in the area where the target population had originally lived. In cases where there was a need to resettle people, the families were relocated in the same neighborhood.<sup>7</sup> Frequently placed near mangroves and on hillsides located in the midst of the consolidated municipal urban zone, the projects of Terra Mais Igual were well incorporated into the urban fabric.

The developments built on hillsides or near mangroves have an excellent urban quality and are well integrated into their surroundings. In addition, the program's almost surgical action, which usually did not exceed the construction of 100 units per development, turned out to be aesthetically pleasing. However, the low quality of the architectural solutions has reduced the positive impact of carefully designed landscaping and urban spaces.

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<sup>7</sup> The exceptions are cases where there are geological or structural risks and restrictions of an environmental nature, when resettling outside those areas becomes compulsory.





Terra Mais Igual



Terra Mais Igual

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**Quality Compatible with the Surrounding Environment**  
 Slum urbanization projects presuppose the adoption of specific urban parameters, adapted to the particular conditions of these settlements, which are generally very dense (around 1,000 inhabitants per hectare). It is important to bring in urban and aesthetic solutions, infrastructure, pavement, and public spaces of a quality comparable to what is customarily found in the formal city, either to achieve harmonious integration in the surrounding environment or to reduce the precariousness of the more peripheral areas.

Although **Bacia do Una** was expanded during execution and its target area was significantly enlarged, promoting good connectivity of the region with the city fabric, it did not completely resolve the drainage, paving, and sanitation problems as intended.<sup>8</sup> Many streets still suffer from constant flooding, sewage flow-backs, incomplete networks, and insufficient maintenance of canals.

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<sup>8</sup> The expansion included building an ensemble to host a considerable number of resettled families and the development of environmental education activities not included in the original proposal.



Floods and maintenance of the river canals, and sedimentation (Photos: Mr. José Alexandre, member of the Comissão de Fiscalização do Programa Bacia da Una –Sub-Bacia 1 [Villa Freitas].)

In **Procentro**, two specific projects stand out with respect to the quality of their integration into the surrounding fabric. The Conjunto Olarias and Vila dos Idosos targeted a specific population—the homeless and the elderly—, a segmented approach not common in Brazil. They were very well integrated into favorable locations in the district’s network, with good access to public transportation.



Procentro – Conjunto Olarias



Procentro – Vila dos Idosos

In **Procidades/Aracaju**, or PAC, the contribution of urban integration in improving the quality of the physical-urban environment is evident. Surprisingly, the use of the same architectural project in Coroa do Meio had the opposite result of that of Bairro Novo. The explanation lies in the fact that the development in Coroa do Meio is smaller and is more integrated with the surrounding areas. The urban quality was higher than that achieved in Bairro Novo, a high density, low-rise, massive development which, although with the same typology of Coroa do Meio, did not manage to integrate into the urban fabric.

A better design monitoring system would reveal the difference in quality achieved by the smaller-scale development as well as its ability to integrate into the surroundings. This could lead to an urban design layout made up of smaller neighborhoods of human scale, or, at the very least, more variety in the 2,500 unit typologies, and thus more diversity.



Coroa do Meio and Bairro Novo – the same typology with different urban outcomes



Coroa do Meio and Bairro Novo – the same typology with different urban outcomes  
(Municipality of Aracaju)

Until recently, federally financed housing programs did not often include **mixed-use structures**. As a result, developments looked like “bedroom towns,” which in turn made social life more difficult. A growing awareness of the importance of creating mixed uses to guarantee urban quality and dynamism has enabled this prohibition to be overturned.

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### Commercial Use

In slum areas, creating space for businesses brings about greater urban vitality, the continuation of activities at night, more public safety, and better conditions for generating income and job opportunities for the community.

In a recent refurbishment of the **Cingapura/PROVER** buildings, the Office of the Mayor of São Paulo opted to allow the establishment of commercial and service shops on the ground floors of the rehabilitated blocks. This also occurred in **Prosamim**, particularly to accommodate commercial businesses that had existed prior to resettlement.



Prosamim – diversity of use and small businesses on the ground floor

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### Appropriate Forms of Sanitation

Programs repeatedly opted to set up drainage and sewage networks through an absolute separator system. According to specialists, that is because this system is the most appropriate for areas of heavy rainfall in tropical countries. However, it became clear in various situations that opting for this system can present problems.

In **Nova Baixada**, the option for the absolute separator created problems. In São João de Meriti, according to interviewed staff, the single informal sewer main was broken in order to superimpose rain and sewage pipes. However, in the midst of so much precariousness (in a region that has an inadequate water supply), the impossibility of connecting with the sewer main and the inability to fully address the micro-basins generated “islands” that lacked a connection to a sanitation network, which led to sewage being dumped into the waterways.

Though sewage treatment stations were introduced in some areas of the program, they were not taken over by the state sanitation company. They went unused and were turned into scrap, causing fatal accidents and protests. This led to another infrastructure problem: the network rapidly saturates and the informal sewer connections to the pluvial network multiplied, thus nullifying the effort made and the resources utilized, with no benefits to the settlement.<sup>9</sup>

Execution missteps were added to this design error in the intervention areas (Hübner, 2002). The excessive elevation of some of the residential streets caused drainage and sewage-ebbing problems along the established networks in certain areas, particularly during periods of heavy rainfall.

**Terra Mais Igual** also considered the establishment of drainage and sewer mains with absolute separator systems. But, in this case, the networks in the lower areas connected directly to an existing sewage system, which was part of the Clean Water Program (Programa Águas Limpas).

Along the hillsides, the sewer flows to local treatment facilities and is not connected to the Águas Limpas network, which runs down the hills. But with the construction of planned sewage treatment plants, this connection will be provided and serviced by the Sanitation Company of Espírito Santo (Companhia Espírito-Santense de Saneamento). It is worth noting that, according to the City Development Department (Secretaria de Desenvolvimento da Cidades), Municipality of Vitória (SEDEC-PMV), and based on the IBGE Census of 2000, Vitória is among the Brazilian capitals with the highest indices of sanitary treatment—89.79 percent. This makes the integration of isolated sewage treatment systems into public networks more likely.

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<sup>9</sup> Sanitation sewer systems with absolute separator tend to present structural and operational deficiencies that result in the transportation of sewage to the urban drainage system. This is mainly due to the existence of clandestine links, net overflow pipes and sewage pumps, crossed building installations, and sewage from irregular land plots and *favelas* (Volschan Jr., 2008).

In **Favela-Bairro**, the use of an absolute separator was not a problem, but rather a need imposed by the financing body to establish sewage treatment plants. Due to the fact that the State Water and Sewer Company (Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgoto, or CEDAE) did not service the plants, they did not function and became dilapidated (some of them were occupied as dwellings). CEDAE did not operate local sewage plants, but rather it used centralized sewage collection. In this specific case, the imposition of an inappropriate technical requirement was harmful to the program.

Technical staff interviewed indicated that the most appropriate solution for Favela-Bairro would have been the gradual construction of pumping stations connected to the community networks of adjacent neighborhoods.

The reasons for adopting an absolute separator system are simplicity, the lower cost of sewage treatments obtained through biological means, and its adaptability to tropical rains. In single collection systems, there is a risk of spreading pollution with the mix of metals and other waste. Thus another kind of treatment is needed that unfortunately does not currently exist in Brazil. Opting for the wrong sanitation solution is one of the most expensive technical mistakes.

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### **Appropriate Modes of Sanitation**

**In light of the state sanitation companies' lack of a culture for dealing with sewage in a decentralized way, plus the absence of comprehensive sewage collection and treatment systems, financing agencies should encourage the study of centralized treatment alternatives. This should include, eventually, a single drainage and sewer system, an option found in European countries.**

**In many of the cases analyzed, solutions could be studied that take advantage of and complement informal networks, while simultaneously collecting sewage and draining, without separators. In more comprehensive areas, spillways and treatment stations with a subsequent connection to the city's collection network should be considered.**



### *The Architectural Dimension*

Often, the importance of quality in a housing unit project design is not fully appreciated in slum urbanization programs. This is conditioned by the requirements of **variety of housing unit types and the quality of execution, size, and flexibility** (at all levels: neighborhood, building, and immediate dwelling surroundings).

In housing projects, the **type of building** must be able to adapt to local environmental conditions and the topography, among other aspects. This reduces project costs, specifically those related to soil movement, and maintenance. The importance of this issue has often been disregarded in Brazil, and improvements frequently result from the efforts of the technical staff, who are closely involved in carrying out the projects.

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#### **Suitable Typology of Housing Units**

Often, the need to scale up generated mass housing production paradoxically imposes higher executing costs due to topographical reasons. The pattern inherited from the Banco Nacional de Habitação (Bonduki, 1998), of four- or five-story identical apartment peripheral developments, installed by the hundreds in peripheral land, should be avoided.

An interesting example of typological differentiation was **Procentro** in São Paulo, within the housing component called “Living Downtown.” Lessons can be learned by looking at three Procentro developments.

Parque do Gato, for instance, built by the Housing Company of São Paulo (Companhia de Habitação de São Paulo, or COHAB-SP), featured project design elements of higher quality and greater flexibility when compared with projects built by other companies although the density was considered very low (due partially to the existence of good public urban spaces).

The use of “pilotis” in one of every two buildings enabled the creation of common areas on the ground floor. The addition of balcony doors and small balconies off the living rooms contributed to improvements in insulation and ventilation of the units, with a better quality of the living area. The use of color broke with the white pattern frequently employed by the company. The project also accommodated people with special needs.



Procentro – Parque do Gato

The case of **Bacia do Una** also exemplifies an interesting feature of typological differentiation in urbanization projects. After completion of the first resettlement of around 2,000 families from several districts in the basin, the target population rejected the program. This highlights the importance of participation during the design stages.

The issue was resolved with the participation of the Urban Reform Program of the Federal University of Pará (Programa de Reforma Urbana da Universidade Federal do Pará, or PARU UFPA). The residents asked PARU UFPA to develop a new project and provide technical assistance to the community. The executor complied with PARU's requirements and the involuntary resettlement included individual assistance.<sup>10</sup>

Throughout this process, 61.2 percent of the resettled families followed the university team's technical advice, which prepared studies and discussed them according to the family composition, ability to pay, and preferences. The units were built in an area that came to be known as Conjunto Paraíso dos Pássaros ("Birds' Paradise Ensemble"). This process demonstrates the difference in satisfaction with project quality when technical assistance and participation are allowed and spatial and comfort aspects are properly addressed. The project was constrained by significant budgetary restriction of 4,000 reais (US\$2000) per unit, but participation of the beneficiaries achieved a more suitable design result. Despite the generous size of the units, budgetary restrictions constrained the aesthetical solution.

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<sup>10</sup> Verbal information given by Ana Kláudia Perdigão, in an interview of September 22, 2009.



Urbanization plant of the Conjunto Paraíso dos Pássaros, as approved by the participatory committee

In *Prosamim*, the quality of the projects during both the design phase and their later phases is quite satisfactory. Though it makes use of a single typology, the variety in unit sizes and facades produced a better visual quality. The basic project used positive design elements, including smaller blocks (up to 24 units), which promotes better integration; a self-supporting ceramic structure, suitable in terms of aesthetics and insulation; an attractive open space layout, creating pleasant surroundings; an appropriate glassed area, which produces good illumination; windows that provide good natural lighting; and a functional configuration in terms of the internal layout of the dwellings.



Image of dwelling block – first execution phase of Prosamim and plant of the second project (Prosamim plant)


Even so, the project has certain limitations, which are mainly a result of adjustments made during execution. An example is the use of fiber cement tiles for the roofs, which were improved in the second stage by adding an insulated concrete slab under the tiles.

Prosamim projects are characterized by high quality in the execution of works, carried out by large contracting firms.. Contrary to common practice in states in the southeast region, the company maintained control of the total production process rather than outsourcing services. According to the interviews, this decision was due to the contractor's difficulties in finding qualified firms in the region, leading them to set up their own ceramic brick factory on the construction site. In this case, a problem was transformed into a solution that generated better results.

With respect to dwelling typologies, all of the programs studied considered extending the units to meet the possible future needs of their users. This issue, generally known as the project's "evolution," seems to be a current trend of high-quality interventions.

In spite of the typological variety of some of the projects reviewed, such as Conjunto dos Pássaros and Prosamim, there is still a certain degree of sameness. Even among programs where the quality of urbanization was quite satisfactory, unit design quality did not follow the same standards. Mass production in programs often implies the construction of identical houses or apartment blocks, which creates a monotonous urban landscape. This landscape visually stands out from the more diversified pattern of the city as a whole and leads to segregation.

This is the case of **Bairro Novo**, located on the periphery of the city, with more than 2,500 housing units in two typologies: duplexes and apartment blocks. This design is characterized by smaller units, unattractive finishes, and repetition, decreasing flexibility in terms of adaptation and expansion.



Plant and facade of dwelling unit, Bairro Novo, Aracaju (Plant and facade: Municipality of Aracaju)

In Curitiba, in spite of the extensive experience of COHAB-Paraná, architectural project design has not evolved and remains stagnant. However, the quality of the projects is good, and the units are integrated into the city. The homes are of reasonable size, but there is too much typological repetition. Even where there is some diversity, visual integration among the units is lacking. High-rise developments follow similar patterns.

In Vitória, the typology of **Terra Mais Igual** is much too simple, with extremely small units, a problem mitigated by good integration into the urban fabric.



Conjunto Audi União and Bairro CIC of COHAB/Paraná - scant innovation and repetition of monotonous typologies

**The size of the units** is a decisive factor in terms of architectural quality. It underscores the need to balance the permanent search for cost savings with the need to allow for expansion and maintenance.

Given the diversity of possible situations, there is no way to fix the size of dwelling units in cost-controlled projects. However, there is a full discussion around the notion of “decent housing,” which considers the issue of minimal area requirements for good conditions of social coexistence, family integration, and, ultimately, human development.

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### Appropriate Size of Dwelling Units

Housing interventions that aim to provide good conditions for coexistence must consider a more generous minimal threshold than the one currently in use, of 40 m<sup>2</sup> to 45 m<sup>2</sup> per unit. This area is less than the 60 m<sup>2</sup> used more than 20 years ago by the Banco Nacional de Habitação, when the standard was a minimal area per inhabitant of 12 m<sup>2</sup>, multiplied by the average size of the Brazilian family at the time (five people).

In the programs analyzed, producing dwelling units of less than 40 m<sup>2</sup> is a generalized practice, even in interventions of a good urban quality. The duplex housing units of **Terra Mais Igual**, the dwellings of **Coroa do Meio** in Aracaju, and the duplex apartments of **Prosamim** have a total area of 39 m<sup>2</sup>, 32 m<sup>2</sup> to 35 m<sup>2</sup>, and 39 m<sup>2</sup>, respectively.



Procidades/Aracaju – Coroa do Meio (Photo: Municipality of Aracaju, Sempla)





Terra Mais Igual (Photo: Municipality of Vitória)



Interior of unit

In all of the other projects studied, the dwelling area did not exceed 45 m<sup>2</sup> in the houses and 48 m<sup>2</sup> in the apartments. The greatest exception among the programs selected for study is **Bacia do Una** in Belém, where, through pressure from the population and through intense negotiations with the state government, the minimal area was fixed at 90 m<sup>2</sup> for the lots and 50 m<sup>2</sup> for the dwellings.

## Balance between Financial Viability and Project Quality

The need to **scale up** production must not result in excessive repetition of dwellings and blocks. The projects must be flexible in order to adapt to the needs of future dwellers. **Maintenance** aspects are also decisive in terms of the sustainability of the dwellings, which explains the importance of post-occupation routines, without which important amounts of public investment could very easily be completely wasted.

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### Avoiding the Perverse Effects of Cost Reduction

The programs analyzed dealt in different ways with the perverse effects of the endless need to reduce costs as a mechanism for serving more families. As a result, project outcomes differed.

In the case of **Prosamim**, the 2,000 families uprooted from the banks of the *igarapés* and resettled in the city's distant periphery as part of state or municipal housing programs received dwellings of limited architectural quality. The developments were an "ocean of identical houses" that contrasted with the architectural quality of the residential parks built on the banks of the *igarapés* for approximately 1,000 families that were resettled in situ.<sup>11</sup>

Prosamim offers an interesting example of quantity versus quality. Initially built in high-quality design blocks on the ground floor and duplex apartments on the top floor (in configurations varying between 6, 9, 12, 20, and 24 units),<sup>12</sup> the typology suffered adjustments to reduce costs and respond to the population's demands. These design changes, however, did not significantly alter the architectural solution in terms of typology and volume and managed to retain the overall urban design and architectural quality.

At a later stage, some corrections were made to the original design. A cantilevered verandah typology was eliminated, simplifying the construction process and lowering the final cost of the units (from 52,000 to 39,000 reais, or US\$26,000 to US\$19,500), while retaining the general look of the block. In

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<sup>11</sup> Those peripheral areas are located up to 30 kilometers from the center of Manaus, as is the case of the Conjunto Nova Cidade, built by SUHAB (Superintendência de Habitação do Governo do Amazonas).

<sup>12</sup> The first among the residential parks of Prosamim were developed by the architect Luiz Fernando Freitas, from the Cooperativa de Proissionais do Habitat do Rio de Janeiro, a studio with experience on community and low-income initiatives.

response to the greater difficulties of condominium management verified in the earlier stages of the development, blocks were limited to a maximum of 12 units. The coating on the concrete slabs was also increased to improve the performance of the fiber cement tiles.

In spite of some visual differences between the early and later stages, the typologies preserved their main elements (smaller size, low rise, and use of visible ceramics bricks, among others), managing to balance project quality, costs, and demands of the beneficiaries.



Prosamim – Construction of the new typology, with the old one in the background



Prosamim – New typology in works, and facades of new and old typologies

The experiences of **Cingapura/PROVER** also present important lessons. A pioneering action in the country for the resettlement of *favelas* in high-rise buildings, the program was stigmatized because of the controversial character of the partial interventions. In the initial phase of the program, identical residential blocks were constructed. Low-quality materials were used in the construction, regardless of the location and topography, and they deteriorated rapidly.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> At the initial phase, the program was characterized by 42 m<sup>2</sup> apartments units, in five-storey buildings with no elevator. In later phases, typologies had one, two, and three bedrooms, in buildings with up to 11 floors (Rodrigues, 2006).

In the program's more recent phases, the quality has increased due to changes in typology, which was better adapted to the needs of residents, and an increased emphasis on the layout of open spaces and recreational areas.



Cingapura/PROVER in São Paulo – 1st phase (Photo: Guilherme Petrella)



Cingapura/PROVER in São Paulo – 1st phase (Photo: Guilherme Petrella)



Cingapura/PROVER in São Paulo – 2nd phase

Despite these improvements, after implementation the quality can quickly decrease if insufficient attention is paid to post-occupancy routine maintenance. Due to their living habits, beneficiaries may have a difficult time adapting to the condominium lifestyle. Moreover, obtaining a house does not ensure that its inhabitants will derive economic and social benefits, obtain a job, or resolve personal or domestic strife. Finally, hurdles in programmatic decision-making processes can often lead to the deterioration of social facilities. Moreover, the absence of an integrated policy, such as adequate access to transportation, can produce real social and spatial ghettos.

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### **The Need to Maintain the Developments**

**Urbanized neighborhoods must undergo systematic and well-coordinated maintenance of buildings, infrastructure, and facilities, and they must foster social monitoring by providing incentives to community and condominium organizations that participate.**

In **Procentro**, the municipality had problems in maintaining Conjunto Olarias, especially the elevators. Also, in Parque do Gato the municipality faced a breach of its local social management contract. Because of the use of low-quality materials, Cingapura/PROVER suffered from visible physical deterioration in its first phase. Such problems are not observed in Vila dos Idosos, where the settlements remain in excellent condition. This seems to be due to both its system of social renting and the high satisfaction of its users.

In **Favela-Bairro** and **Nova Baixada**, the abandonment of sewage treatment facilities (which ended up being obsolete) by the CEDAE was problematic. This highlights the importance of maintenance. The POUOs in Favela-Bairro, **Prosamim**'s local management offices, and the urban monitors of **Terra Mais Igual** all maintain an ongoing monitoring process in the post-occupation period.

The level of participation in program design and implementation is poor in the municipalities in Nova Baixada. As a result, some of the facilities were poorly maintained after completion by the state government. These included day care centers, which were not kept up due to their high operating costs, and health care centers, which were not well equipped.

In the case of **Bacia do Una**, the strife between municipal and state governments led to an abdication of the commitment to clean out the channels and repair the roads paved by the program, breaching IDB contractual requirements. This led to inquiries from the State Public Ministry, because of the non-use of equipment donated by the state government to the municipality.

## CHAPTER 2

# Social and Participatory Components

### Consolidation of the Social Component Process

Social and participatory components were gradually introduced and incorporated into slum upgrading programs as part of their evolution. Since the early 1990s, in the context of Brazil's redemocratization, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank have played important roles in promoting an integrated approach to slum upgrading. This has allowed for the development of more consistent and professional social components, as well as the incorporation of formal requirements for participation and popular consultation. The cases presented in this book, particularly the *Habitar Brasil* (HBB) program, are examples of this process.

The establishment and consolidation (both methodological and operational) of the social and participatory components have played a comparatively larger role in infrastructure interventions. Despite some limitations, there is now a *corpus* of procedures that works well when properly applied. Procedural variations in the case studies presented herein are relatively small.<sup>1</sup> No consolidated model has been found with respect to social sector linkage, social capital strengthening, and the promotion of civic participation. Rather, there is a relative multiplicity of arrangements and strategies. Nor are the results homogeneous. In other words, there are still no established social interventions or codified methodological patterns according to which a specific type of action corresponds to a given outcome.

These findings are similar to those found in an evaluation of *favela* urbanization experiences conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (Instituto Brasileiro de Administração Municipal, or IBAM). This study indicates that among the biggest problems common to all of the programs analyzed are institutional linkage and coordination as well as social

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<sup>1</sup> This is, in certain cases, a limitation. For example, methodologies used in small projects for community negotiation rarely adapt themselves well to larger projects.



communication and conflict resolution among the public sector, the leadership, and the population (IBAM, 2002). It highlights that one of the programs' main risk factors is inadequate partnerships management, particularly between social and community organizations. A similar finding comes from a recent workshop on technical social work in low-income housing. In her presentation at the workshop, Rosana Denaldi (2009b) highlighted, among the current challenges for social work in *favela* urbanization, intersectoral integration, the promotion of social inclusiveness, and expanded participation. Another challenge cited by R. Paz (2009) was the strengthening of local organizations independent of the public sector.

## Methodological Aspects

This chapter presents and discusses the main recommendations stemming from the nine case studies regarding social and participation components. The analysis was based on three pillars:

- **Social work in support of infrastructure interventions**
- **Intersectoral social action to promote social inclusiveness and/or development**
  - *Social actions and policies*
  - *Arrangements for intersectoral cooperation with the social area*
  - *Processes for intersectoral cooperation with the social area*
  - *Strategies for intersectoral linkage with the social area*
  - *Work and income: a current and problematic sectoral issue*
- **Strengthening local social capital**

The first pillar—**social work in support of infrastructure interventions**—generally includes data collection, assessment, and civil registry; mobilization and organization; social communication and sanitary and environmental education; negotiations on implementing infrastructure interventions; monitoring of families living near the projects; resettlement; temporary removal; self-help housing construction or dwelling improvement; and post-project follow-up. A variety of activities, instrumental in ensuring the viability and sustainability of infrastructure interventions, converge around a number of common goals: adapting the projects, to the extent possible, to local needs; facilitating the execution of the projects and their eventual individual complementarities; guaranteeing adequate operation and maintenance of

investments, as well as coexistence in contexts that could be new (apartment blocks, for example) to the population served, especially resettled people.

The second pillar—**intersectoral social action to promote social inclusiveness and/or development**—comprises actions in health care, education, employment and income generation, social assistance, and public safety, among others. These aim to promote inclusiveness, wellbeing, and social development among marginalized or vulnerable groups, including the direct and indirect beneficiaries. They run parallel to the social work associated with the infrastructure intervention, serving the same target population but with different aims. In this case, the relationship between the physical and the social discussed in the previous pillar is reversed: the infrastructure intervention opens the door to broader activities designed to promote human development.

The third pillar—**strengthening local social capital**—includes activities designed to identify formal and informal leaders; mobilization, registry, and assessment of community and civil society organizations; organizational strengthening; and network building and training in related subjects, such as management, project development, fundraising, bookkeeping and accounting, or in sectoral areas linked to the broader objectives of the local organizations (health care, education, etc.).

Fostering participation often cuts across the pillars because, among other aspects, it seeks to strengthen the community's ability to make decisions or to influence decisions on infrastructure and social interventions made by both the government and civil society organizations. Ideally, the goal of giving an effective voice to, or empowering, the community and their representatives should go beyond the scope of the *favela* urbanization program and have a more explicit political goal of transforming the structure of power, promoting citizenship, transparency, and social control, and boosting the potential and the autonomy of civil society.

The cross-cutting nature of fostering participation is particularly relevant with respect to strengthening civil society organizations, such that the two pillars become indistinguishable. When the programs are put in place, actions oriented to strengthening the organizational capacity and convening power of civil society entities often coincide with those that seek to foster participation and empower people.

This overlap also has a solid basis in theory. Perhaps the best-known definition of the concept of social capital is that of Robert Putnam (Putnam, Leonardi, Nanneti, 1993): it conferred *value* on organized social relationships, as long as they are able to deliver two kinds of intertwined benefits: (a) col-

lective action, borne of shared interests, and (b) strengthened democracy, driven by citizen engagement. Thus, from the perspective of social capital, the growth of civil society organizations' connective fabric and the participatory and democratic development of society are intimately intertwined.<sup>2</sup>

For these reasons, this chapter analyzes the consolidation of civil society organizations and the promotion of participation as a whole under the common denominator of strengthening social capital.

## Social Work in Support of Physical Interventions

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### Consolidation of Social Work

**Social work in support of infrastructure interventions is the only pillar among the social components of *favela* urbanization programs, from an institutional learning standpoint, able to be consolidated and partially organized.**

The Municipality of Aracaju, through **Procidades**—the credit mechanism that finances integrated urban development programs for municipalities in Brazil—, is a prime example of social work in support of infrastructure interventions. The first integrated urbanization project in the city initially financed in 2002 by the HBB was undertaken in the Coroa do Meio neighborhood. HBB contributed to the introduction of procedural innovations previously used locally. An example is the requirement to ensure that resettlements are placed in close proximity to the original location of the homes. As the first integrated urbanization intervention in Aracaju, it provided lessons for subsequent interventions and for the development of a municipal policy itself, especially the need to integrate the physical and social dimensions into the scope of the social work.

The experience of Coroa do Meio also enabled important lessons to be incorporated into the framework of the social work. These included the importance of a good communication strategy when registering families to ensure that the intervention brings differentiated benefits (for example, dwelling improvements versus resettlement in new houses); the need to include architects in the registry teams (generally staffed by social specialists) to ensure that the

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<sup>2</sup> The link between associativism and democracy, defended by Putnam, belongs to a line of thought whose origins date back to the 19th century. This link was cited by Tocqueville and Madison.

social registry files coincide with the location of streets and buildings on the maps; and a requirement of an effective “freeze” on the resettlement area.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of this consolidation process, a procedures manual (*Manual de Procedimentos do Programa Moradia Cidadã*) was produced, which contains the guidelines and instruments to be used, for example, in registering families. In addition, the municipality developed and updated the Municipal Strategic Plan for Precarious Settlements (Plano Estratégico Municipal de Assentamentos Precários, or PEMA), which contains criteria for prioritizing the intervention areas, as well as social indicators, geo-referencing of information, social monitoring, and the like.

Other municipalities, such as Vitória and Curitiba, produced similar regulatory documents. In this sense, in Brazil as a whole, Aracaju’s activities, although exemplary, are far from unique.

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### **Degree of Influence of Communities**

**The degree of influence of communities in decision making regarding infrastructure investments varies and depends on regional conditions, such as the quality of the local team, which could be positively influenced through proper selection and training, and the degree of maturity and organization of the community representatives. In many of the case studies analyzed, the community was able to influence the design of the infrastructure interventions. Despite the diversity, this ability to participate in project design and implementation decisions can be considered a relatively consolidated outcome of social work.**

**Joint pressure from the community and from the financing side can expand the community’s sphere of influence over the design of interventions. Even with this influence, the interventions would not necessarily extend beyond the project’s time horizon, nor would they automatically translate into empowerment or democratization in a broader sense. For that to happen, as the case studies demonstrate, other elements must be present.**

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<sup>3</sup> In Aracaju, the process of institutional learning and consolidation of social work practices associated with infrastructure interventions was facilitated by the fact that the same people have been in power through three administrations, and the former mayor is currently the state governor.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, there is a consensus that the community was very influential in the architectural design, although many people did not initially believe that presenting general projects and inviting suggestions from the population would work. As detailed in the previous chapter, design adjustments were made so that the community's demands could be taken into account.

**Favela-Bairro** (Program for the Urbanization of Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro) had clear rules about the community's participation in the decision making related to infrastructure interventions. The programs were carefully developed and discussed with the community from the start. Local representatives were recruited and hired to mobilize the population and support conflict mediation. The designs had to be approved in assemblies: for example, in Complexo do Sapé, in Madureira, an assembly was held with some 2,000 participants. With support from the architects, the community monitored project execution. Initially, participation in decision making regarding infrastructure interventions was not very formalized. Workshops were introduced, which helped structure the process. However, there is a consensus that the degree of community influence over the programs was relatively limited and depended on the capacity and the attitude of the teams (hired architects and contractors) toward community participation, as well as the strength of the local associations.

In **Nova Baixada** (the Program for the Integrated Urbanization of Neighborhoods of the Baixada Fluminense), the management committees for program design, composed of community representatives, influenced some of the investment decisions, especially the decision to substitute some of the infrastructure initially planned. In Belford Roxo, for example, due to community pressure and land expropriation problems, there were plans to build the Citizenship Community Center (Centro Comunitário de Defesa da Cidadania) in the Xavantes district, but it had to be canceled and was transferred to the district of Heliópolis.

One of the representative organizations planned in **Bacia do Una** was the advisory committee (Comitê Assessor), staffed by representatives from the public sector and the community. It was initially established exclusively to support the resettlement process. Due to pressure from the community and the IDB, its scope was expanded to include discussion of the interventions. As a result, the size of the resettlement lots and the location of bridges were changed. The committee also enlarged the project area and had the roads running alongside the canals paved.

In the reformulation phase of **Cingapura/Prover** (the Program for the Improvement of Favelas in São Paulo), the community influenced the location of shops and commercial activities on the ground floor of the buildings.

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### Quality of the Social Teams

**Skilled, highly motivated, and multidisciplinary field-based social teams, consisting of technical staff from various organizations, are key to the success of the social work linked to infrastructure interventions.**

**It is essential to boost the capacity and autonomy of these teams and local organizations in order to resolve the greatest possible number of social demands. Some examples are the Crisis Management Commission (Comissão de Gerenciamento de Crise, or COMCRI) of the Social and Environmental Program for the *Igarapés* in Manaus, known as *Prosamim* (Programa Social e Ambiental dos Igarapés de Manaus), and technical assistance to the self-help housing project of *Bacia do Una*. In the involuntary resettlements, social projects are even more important, and they confront the most difficult social issues.**

The main task of **Prosamim** within the social sphere is family resettlement. Four resettlement alternatives were presented: compensation, housing subsidies (*bônus moradia*), relocation to housing projects far from the original homes, and relocation to good-quality housing units close to the families' original homes (residential parks).

The results of *Prosamim's* resettlement process were excellent. A significant number of families were resettled (6,313) into good-quality homes in a relatively short period of time, and there were few complaints and conflicts. To date, only eight families that resettled in residential parks have left their new homes.

Following are the reasons that *Prosamim* was successful:

- a) An intense discussion took place during the program preparation phase, both within the government and with the population (32 public hearings, in which the *igarapés* (river beds) were taken into account when choosing the type of dwelling to be built.

- b) Social projects were planned in detail, and included specific maps for each *igarapé*, assessments, and up-to-date registries. Each intervention was designed taking technical issues and costs into account based on the information collected by the field social teams; a committee of community representatives (Comite de Representantes da Comunidade) was created to enter into the areas and maintain communication with the communities.
- c) A communication campaign was undertaken. A unit within the Program Management Unit (Unidade Gerenciadora do Programa) of Prosamim was exclusively assigned that task, and information and environmental education were targeted to each family.
- d) Social projects were carried out by skilled local teams, guided by and synchronized with the project's timetable.
- e) Post-resettlement monitoring included psycho-social activities with the families and complementary activities (such as vaccination campaigns and support to the families' livelihoods).
- f) The resettlement process was decentralized to the local teams and supported by selected members of the community who were trained and organized into local support groups and as neighborhood representatives (to foster participation after the homes were occupied).
- g) Prosamim created COMCRI, whose role was to resolve conflicts arising from the resettlement process and provide legal assistance so that the meeting minutes would be legally binding.

This resettlement process has proved very efficient in reducing bureaucracy, speeding up problem solving through decentralization to the field, and offering the community concrete, immediate, and useful products through a balanced mix of technical, juridical, and associative elements.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, it is worth highlighting the investment of time and energy put into the development of the neighborhood commission, which has similar functions as the commission in Manaus. The commission serves as the conduit to the community and the device for monitoring projects by the population. It also supports conflict resolution and helps prevent squatting. In a context such as the one in Vitória, in which there is (contrary to the *igarapés* of Manaus) a network of community organizations that existed and was quite well developed prior to the program's implementation, Terra Mais Igual carried out a meticulous and gradual process of awareness-raising and training of local leaders, prioritizing the common problems of the neigh-

borhoods within the project area identified at the assessment phase and uniting the various neighborhood associations into a single commission.

The **Bacia do Una** resettlement area, known as Paraíso dos Pássaros, had an important experience of assisted self-help housing construction. The Federal University of Pará (UFPA) was convened by social movements to assist with resettlement and self-help housing construction. The UFPA staff built an office in Paraíso dos Pássaros and participated on an ongoing basis, offering individualized assistance to each family that requested its support (65 percent of the families were thus assisted), aiming to improve the area, embracing both the emotional and the symbolic dimensions in the neighborhood's interactions. In 2001, the IDB requested the creation of the Project Oversight Commission (Comissões de Fiscalização das Obras), which demanded that the state government involve the community to a greater extent.

In Curitiba, community organizations are involved from the preparation of maps to the initial registry. The residents, commission members, and project monitors are elected. Some initiatives from **COHAB-Paraná**, the public housing company in Curitiba (Companhia de Habitação Popular de Paraná), are noteworthy in their support for the associations engaged in resettlement. COHAB-Paraná covers the expenses involved in holding assemblies so that the burden does not fall on the associations. Prior to launching the community mobilization process, COHAB-Paraná conducts leadership training on the functioning of the local commissions and the bidding process, so that the leaders can knowledgeably monitor the various phases of project implementation. One of the lessons identified by COHAB-Paraná was that an excessive number of events with the community could negatively affect the implementation process.

The experiences of **Cingapura/Prover** offer both positive and negative lessons. Initially, the method used to help families choose an apartment type was self-targeting. Through this method, families evaluated their housing needs and their ability to pay their monthly expenses. However, the previously established parameters for self-targeting were not followed, and many families were resettled into apartments that did not meet their needs, which led to social problems and payment defaults. These problems were exacerbated by the discontinuation of social projects in the post-occupation period, which were carried out only sporadically between 2001 and 2005 after IDB funding ended.

Beginning in 2005, social projects started up intensively again, and self-targeting was abandoned and substituted by a process that involved



registering families and finding them suitable homes through assisted negotiation, based on their needs and ability to pay. The registration process improved once it became clear that a single visit to a family in need was not enough and it was decided that at least three visits were necessary. After a period of relative neglect, the social projects in the post-occupation phase were intensified, with the aim of maintaining the enterprises undertaken by Cingapura/Prover, as well as reducing payment defaults on condominium fees. As a result, defaults fell from 60–80 percent to 20 percent.

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### **Resettlement**

**The involvement of the population and its community organizations in resettlement is essential, and the more involved, the better, if possible starting in the program preparation phase.**

**Registration is the main instrument and must be done properly; registration should be performed by multidisciplinary teams of social specialists and architects/urban designers, and registries should be frequently updated.**

**Problem solving, such as conflict mediation, should be decentralized: it is better to identify and resolve problems in the field so that solutions can be swift, effective, and non-bureaucratic. For this to occur, local teams need to have the appropriate technical support.**

**Sufficient time should be allotted for the post-occupation phase, particularly in situations of physical decay of buildings and infrastructure, difficulties related to coexistence, and high default rates.**

**Social work in resettlement requires a considerable investment of time (person-hours) and intensive training. Monitoring of families individually is especially important, and technical assistance should be permanent.**

In most cases, social teams are composed of representatives of municipal or state government. In the case of the Municipality of São Paulo, this service is being outsourced, with positive results, to a firm specialized in this field. In Vitória, although at the beginning of **Terra Mais Igual** project the registration of families was also outsourced to a firm, with positive results, the municipality subsequently decided to carry out the process with hired techni-

cal staff, in order to guarantee the continuity of the social work performed at various stages.

In **Procidade/Aracaju**, the municipality hired the Foundation for the Expansion of UFSE (Fundação de Extensão da UFSE) to support its own teams. Social projects are the responsibility of the Social Assistance Secretariat (Secretaria de Assistência Social) and Municipal Labor Foundation (Fundação Municipal do Trabalho, or Fundat) through agreements with the Planning Secretariat (Secretaria de Planejamento, or Seplan), which can transfer resources as needed. Although the focus of Fundat is on employment and income generation, its technical staff is trained to assist in the registration of families.

In **Prosamim**, technical staff from the Program Management Unit are involved in family resettlement, and they collaborate with professionals from the Housing Superintendence of the State of Amazonas (Superintendência de Habitação do Estado do Amazonas, or SUHAB).

In **Vitória**, social teams from **Terra Mais Igual** are attached to each project, and intersectoral actions (environmental education, women's groups, jobs, and income) are developed by teams from several departments (environmental education, women's groups, jobs, and income). These are known as "expanded teams."

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### **Motivating the Social Team**

**Participation and motivation of the technical staff are essential elements for the success of social projects. Procedures for selecting and training the social teams working in the field should be established in all *favela* urbanization programs.**

The case of **Vitória** is a good example of the need to invest in the selection and training of field teams. The **Vitória** technical staff members have appropriate qualifications and backgrounds. They are chosen through a rigorous selection process that includes psychological testing.

Post-occupation social work can help to reduce problems that appear at this stage. For example, in the buildings constructed by **Cingapura/Prover**, condominium rules are being developed jointly with the residents to ensure that the common areas are well maintained. The technical staff in **Aracaju** prepared and distributed guidelines and a homeowners' manual, and engaged in intensive social work focused on teaching ways of living together harmoniously in a community.

## Intersectoral Social Actions for Social Inclusiveness and Development

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### Programs as Entry Points for Policies

The more integrated the *favela* urbanization programs become, the higher the expectations are for them to work as entry points for social inclusiveness and poverty reduction policies. The typical strategy is to include in the programs actions in various social sectors that focus on the same geographic area where infrastructure interventions are undertaken.

The intersectorality discussed in this chapter refers to linkages of other areas with the social sector. Its purpose is to support social inclusiveness and territorial development, oriented toward sectors and goals which are distinct from the urban development or housing sector and its institutional competencies and objectives.

Despite the existence of good local plans in Vitória, Curitiba, and Aracaju, which together with the infrastructure interventions offer a wide range of social actions, all of the technical staff involved in the elaboration and implementation of those plans agree that operational hurdles persist when implementing planned social actions. In fact, linking social programs with policies generally tends to present difficulties that are due generally to the sectoral nature and the verticality of the public service *modus operandi* and, specific to the social realm, to the high “latitude”<sup>4</sup> of social actions and the priority normally given to infrastructure projects.

### *Social Action and Public Policies*

According to Dirce Koga (2009), social actions in *favela* urbanization programs need to be simultaneously localized (targeted to a given territory where the infrastructure project is located) and connected to public policies and to the city. Consequently, there is an intrinsic tension between the social interventions of a given program in a given territory and the broader social policies of the municipality or the state.

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<sup>4</sup>“Latitude” is defined as “a feature of a project (or of a task) that allows the planners and operators of that project to mould it or let it oscillate in one direction or another without having to consider ‘external circumstances’” (Hirschman, 1967: 86).

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### Resources for Social Actions

The program's social actions must be incorporated into the social policies established by local governments. It is essential to guarantee the availability of specific resources for urbanization programs (mainly the institutional strengthening component), which could be used as incentives for social departments to prioritize and accelerate the satisfaction of the community's demands (Koga, 2009).

The case studies exemplify different situations having to do with the relationship between the social actions financed by the programs and the corresponding local policies.

The social interventions of **Favela-Bairro** were continued by and were part of the most comprehensive public policies of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, because of the central role it played in municipal actions, the program turned out to be a catalyst for various social policies. For example, a program for the construction and operation of nurseries in the *favelas* had a high priority in the social development department of the municipality, and was started with the municipality's own resources, before the first IDB loan. Generally, however, the budget of this department prioritized the areas of intervention of the program itself. The department of education implemented the School (*Escola*) Project in Favela-Bairro, and a team of professionals from several sectors was assembled with the aim of incorporating 190 schools into the program, through teaching methods and educational content that would promote the pupils' awareness of the implications of introducing the concept of neighborhood to the *favela*.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, the field social teams are called "extended" teams because they are staffed by technicians from various government agencies. They perform social actions in accordance with the municipality's policies, regardless of whether or not the projects are implemented. When there are projects underway, these teams actively search for the most excluded families, who are the prioritized targets of the integrated urbanization intervention.

The social interventions within the urbanization programs in **Prociudades/Aracaju** are linked to broader policies of the municipality. Based on local demands, the programs plan the spaces necessary for new community facilities. In turn, the provision of these facilities is decided through pre-estab-

lished parameters regarding the number of installations per inhabitant. Such parameters are defined by law, making investments in community facilities binding, mainly in poor, rapidly growing neighborhoods. For example, all of the city's outlying districts, whether or not they are undergoing urbanization, have at least one social assistance center (Centro de Referência de Assistência Social). There are 22 of these centers in Aracaju. If a department cannot deliver within the pre-established parameters, it must provide a justification. If the reason is lack of resources, the municipality's planning department, which is responsible for the urbanization projects, must find them.

In São Paulo, the State Housing Department (Secretaria Estadual de Habitação, or SEHAB) coordinates with the other sectoral departments to establish the annual budget, stating the needs and negotiating the priorities for the projects under its responsibility, including those of *Cingapura/Prover*.

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### **Geographic Targeting**

**Concentrating social interventions in the same area where the physical intervention takes place (and eventually in the surrounding areas) is a necessary condition, in operational terms, for linkage between program activities and municipal or state social policies to occur. The use or strengthening of geographic targeting instruments with resources from the urbanization program itself can represent an incentive to intersectoral coordination. In adverse contexts, the geographic targeting strategy needs to be complemented by upgrading and by progressive social investment accumulation criteria.**

In geographic targeting, the targeted groups of a project or an action must be identified based on the spatial concentration of specific relevant characteristics. Geographic information systems, incorporating various spatial, social, infrastructure, and facility indicators, are helpful in supporting geographic targeting.

The presence of normative instruments that link investments in social facilities or services to pre-established territorial parameters, as in the case of Aracaju, can also facilitate the implementation of social investments in territories where *favela* urbanization programs take place.

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### **Maintenance of Social Facilities**

**Effective linkage with local social policies presupposes fulfillment of commitments related to the operation, maintenance, or expansion of social infrastructure. Sometimes, failure to assume responsibility for the operation, maintenance, or expansion of social investment is due not only to low institutional, technical, or financial capacity of the sector involved, but also to managerial errors.**

It is not unusual for states or municipalities to resist having to assume the operation and maintenance of social infrastructure built and equipped with resources from *favela* urbanization programs.

In **Nova Baixada**, some of the participating municipalities reluctantly assumed (only under pressure from the state government and the IDB) the costs of the day care and health care units established by the program. In addition, the health and environmental representatives that had been selected and trained by the program were never hired by the municipalities. One of the assumptions in the program design was that the targeted interventions would create “model areas” where infrastructure and social facilities would be integrated, to be replicated by the municipalities that would raise new financial resources. This strategy did not materialize due to the inability of municipalities to incur debt. With respect to the increased social investments, the outcome was the introduction of community services and facilities that were overwhelmed with demands from residents, creating enclaves of need in areas characterized by scarcity.

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### **Intersectorality in Public Administration**

**It is important to involve social departments in decision making from the program design phase through its implementation.**

In **Nova Baixada**, the state government, the IDB’s funding counterpart, has never attempted to promote authentic participation of the municipalities in planning and implementation decisions. In Belford Roxo, technical staff from the municipal departments of health and education only became involved in the respective works when they were in their final phase.

In **Bacia do Una**, the municipality that participated in the Program Management Unit with two sub-management offices only became involved in decision making five years after program implementation began. The sepa-

ration of the municipality from decision making contributed to a lack of clarity with respect to the responsibilities of the municipality and the state government for the construction of social infrastructure planned during the urbanization phase for the environmental inclusiveness projects and for meeting the requests for food markets made by the resettled population. None of these initiatives were implemented.

In both the Nova Baixada and Bacia do Una programs, there was a disconnect in the functions of the co-executors in terms of participation in decision making (low) and implementation responsibility (high). The lack of engagement of some of the parties in decision making prevented them from assuming their roles in the execution of the program's actions, even when these actions were formally their responsibility.

### *Intersectoral Arrangements with Social Sectors*

In the case studies analyzed, three kinds of arrangements are visible, related to the type of linkage of the programs with the social sectors of the local government:

- a) *The program is the catalyst for territorial actions of the social sectors, but the program's linkage with these sectors follows the arrangements already in place in the municipality (Favela-Bairro, Terra Mais Igual).*
- b) *The program's managing body promotes linkage with the social sectors, in addition to preexisting arrangements in the local government; in some cases, the program itself contributes to building an intersectoral model with social aspects (Prosamim; Procidades/Aracaju; COHAB/Paraná; Cingapura/Prover).*
- c) *The program's social actions are horizontal between departments, without any of them being subordinate to any other, and they seek theoretical convergence to achieve common goals (Procentro).*

Each arrangement has specific features:

a) *The program is the catalyst for territorial actions of the social sectors, but the program's linkage with these sectors follows the arrangements already in place in the municipality.*

In the early years of **Favela-Bairro**, and in the current management of **Terra Mais Igual**, the municipalities of Rio de Janeiro and Vitória had arrange-

ments aimed at promoting the linkage of these programs with other social sectors from local governments. The urbanization programs have become the pillars linking all social actions in the project area.

In Rio de Janeiro, during the first administration of César Maia (1993–1996), and in the subsequent administration led by Luis Paulo Conde, the municipality's activities were organized by macro functions, in which the departments of a given area (for the purposes of this study, the social area, consisting of the departments of health, education, social development, housing, culture, sports, and labor) met regularly to develop the planning and monitoring of social actions in a given place.

Favela-Bairro was the catalyst for the social macro function. The social actions of the program were synchronized for as long as possible with the activities already in place in the municipality. Actions were defined at the macro function meetings, and the respective officials in charge and the timelines were determined. The macro functions introduced into the programs were not under the control of the Municipal Housing Department of Rio de Janeiro, which was the managing agency for Favela-Bairro; rather, a technical group with operational responsibilities was formed.

Overall, the linkage of Favela-Bairro with the social sectors was the result of an institutional learning process, in which social actions already in place at the municipality were steadily catalyzed by the program. This process was positively influenced by the fact that the Municipal Housing Department had been staffed in part by technicians from the Department of Social Development, who were already working on the problems of *favela* urbanization from a social standpoint.

In Vitória, intersectoral linkage with the social sectors has long been a priority of the municipality, set by different administrations since the first family resettlement program from mangrove areas, the São Pedro Program (1978–1996), and the Terra Program (1998–2005), up through the current program in Terra Mais Igual. Throughout this process, there was continuity with respect to guidelines and institutional learning, even with the changes in administrations. The discussion about integration and intersectorality was reaching maturity as the operational difficulties became apparent (intersectorality is not granted by decree), and the arrangements were gradually redesigned as it became clear that Terra Mais Igual and the municipality as a whole would have to adopt a new approach to participatory and intersectoral management.

Terra Mais Igual, which in the previous administration fell under the Planning Department of the Municipality of Vitória, today falls under the Stra-



tegic Management Department of Vitória (Secretaria de Gestão Estratégica, or SEGES), which is directly linked to the mayor's office. The municipality's current institutional arrangement for intersectoral coordination with the social sector is relatively similar to the macro functions of the initial period of Favela-Bairro. In Vitória, there are thematic committees, one of which is a social policy committee that encompasses several social sector portfolios and Terra Mais Igual itself. The municipality's rules and procedures manual codifies the program in the context of its policies, delineating the responsibilities of Terra Mais Igual and sectoral agencies.

*b) The program's managing body promotes linkage with the social sectors, in addition to preexisting arrangements in the local government; in some cases, the program itself contributes to building an intersectoral model with social aspects (Prosamim; Procidades/Aracaju; Procidades/Curitiba; Cingapura/Prover).*

In **Prosamim**, the Program Management Unit has the status of a department (not formally but de facto), and the deputy manager's office carries out the intersectoral linkage for the unit as needs and demands arise. For example, if a demand arises from a resettlement program to enroll 40 children in school, the Program Management Unit negotiates this demand with the local schools and, if necessary, with the Education Department. This internal arrangement within the unit frees the other technical deputy managers from this task; given their day-to-day tasks, they were finding it difficult to prioritize the linkage functions.

In **Procidades/Aracaju**, Seplan coordinates the *favela* urbanization program. This department enjoys special status within the municipality; it captures and allocates resources but does not implement any actions, although it has a housing section that coordinates urbanization interventions. It also coordinates actions in other sectors, such as education and health, based on the needs that arise. Today, this is considered to be an established practice that is only used when problems need solutions.

However, fine-tuning among the different departments does not come naturally, because they do not contact each other spontaneously. In operational terms, a commission is created for each project, with representatives from the sectoral departments involved who act as enablers within their respective departments. The mayor summons the secretariats, who assign their assistants to the respective projects.

In Curitiba, **COHAB-Paraná** coordinates the *favela* urbanization program and seeks to coordinate with the social sectors in accordance with the needs identified in each project at the assessment phase and during subsequent negotiations with the sectoral departments to define their respective responsibilities. There are no specific arrangements for this, but an established practice exists. There is a consensus that infrastructure intervention is the conduit to other sectoral actions.

Lessons were learned in this case as well. In the first *favela* urbanization programs, the Social Assistance Department managed the expenditures. Starting from the Program for Growth Acceleration (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), COHAB-Paraná coordinates not only infrastructure actions but also social interventions linked to the urban projects. It is important to highlight, in the context of Curitiba, the leading role played by the urban planning and housing sectors both politically and institutionally in different administrations in recent decades, to keep the issues linked to these sectors front and center on the city's political agenda.

In **Cingapura/Prover**, the Social Directorate of the State Housing Department carries out intersectoral coordination through agreements with other departments. In the health and education sectors, the results have been better than expected. In terms of employment and income generation, the desired results have not yet been achieved. They are lacking in scale, and intersectoral linkages tend to be sporadic and only occur after the buildings are delivered, rather than in the assessment and planning phases.

*c) The program's social actions are horizontal between departments, with no action subordinate to any other, and they seek theoretical convergence to achieve common goals (Procentro).*

**Procentro** (the Rehabilitation Program for the Central Area of São Paulo) is a clear example of this kind of arrangement. In this program, coordinated by COHAB-SP, the State Housing Company of São Paulo, but under the responsibility of 11 municipal co-executors, the budget, previously centralized at COHAB-SP, was divided among the co-executors starting in 2008. Although this decision might have been motivated by the slow pace of program implementation, the outcome was not positive. There have been difficulties in harmonizing the priorities and the timelines of the various departments, and the focus of the program has become even more diluted. The fact that the expenditures are being executed mainly by two departments (the Assis-

tance and Social Development Department and the Culture Department) is due more to contingencies (such as the historically close relations between COHAB-SP and the Assistance and Social Development Department) than to an explicit planning process.

Some lessons can be drawn from the analysis of the three types of arrangements for coordinating with the social sectors.

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### **Institutional Arrangements**

Institutional arrangements should not be mere cabinet products; they should be the product of experience and lessons learned, and they should be a priority for governments. They should be incorporated into the mayor's or the governor's planning process. It is relatively secondary, from the point of view of effectiveness of coordination with the social sectors, that the program be incorporated into institutional arrangements that promote coordination or that the program itself is its promoter. In either case the outcome is the same, and the program manages to become a catalyst for social actions in the project area. From this perspective, it is important that coordination, as well as monitoring of the budget, be done by the managing body of the program, rather than being diluted among the social sectors that, supposedly, must coordinate with it.

### *Intersectoral Processes with the Social Sectors*

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#### **Intersectoral Processes with the Social Sectors**

Normally, demands for social interventions are captured with the population in the field and during the registration and/or assessment phases. Representative and implementing organizations can also be efficient channels for the expression of community demands for social services. The field technical staff should be the same ones who work on issues related to infrastructure projects.

The processing of demands should be simple and direct, with a reduced number of steps and administrative levels for analysis and decision making.

In **Prosamim**, for example, the contact is directly between the Program Management Unit and the department to which a given demand would be directed (consider, nevertheless, that the status of the unit could not easily be replicated).

In **Terra Mais Igual**, technical staff from different departments make up the field teams. Once the demands are identified, those teams strive to meet them locally and directly with public services, such as schools, social assistance centers, health care units, and other regional social services. Once a given urbanization project is completed (that is, in the post-occupation phase), the extended teams leave, and some of their functions are taken up by the territorial chambers. These are organizations composed of all of the representatives from the services and infrastructure present in the region. The city is divided into eight regions, and each of them meets monthly under the chairmanship of a municipal secretary.

The territorial chambers were created to make intersectorality operational. According to technical staff from the Municipality of Vitória, territorial chambers are still a gamble. In some of them, as in some sectors of the municipality, there are interesting prospects for interconnections with the social sectors to become operational at the local level. For example, the health sector (which has been working for a long time with field teams through the Family Health Program/Community Health Agents Program (Programa de Saude da Familia/Programa de Agentes Comunitários), is relatively close to this process of territorialization and linkage with other social sectors. However, the education sector shows more resistance and more difficulties in adopting a territorial perspective.

In Curitiba, during the preparatory phase of urbanization projects, the social team of **COHAB-Paraná** develops a detailed assessment that links sectoral departments within regional entities and local associations. The intention is to attempt to solve the greatest possible number of demands locally in Curitiba through the regional entities, where there are representatives from all sectoral departments. However, this is not yet occurring.

In Vitória and in Curitiba, most of the demands for social actions identified in the field are sent to the appropriate departments at the municipal headquarters. Frequently, these demands are not met locally and are directed to the departments or to the appropriate municipal or state entities.

### Composition of the Multidisciplinary Teams

The composition of the multidisciplinary, intersectoral, extended field teams favors linkages with the social sectors, as the specific demands can be more easily identified by the technical staff and routed to the appropriate sectors for action. Nevertheless, the situations are different in that (i) technical staff are assigned by the various departments to the urbanization program's field team (as with the extended teams in Vitória); and (ii) the technical staff from the different departments make up part of the local structures over which the urbanization program does not have direct control (such as in the regional entities or in the territorial chambers). In the latter case, greater challenges tend to emerge when the linkage of actions is made operational. These challenges tend to increase when the demands from the community wind their way through the municipal bureaucracy. This can cause delays and inefficiencies.

In *Terra Mais Igual*, only some of the proposed social actions are discussed by the thematic chambers. Even though the secretaries involved are convinced of the need for integration (that is, there may be political will to make integration effective), there are operational and implementation problems related to the sectoral *modus operandi* of the technical staff. While some people claim to be enthusiastic about this new approach, others find that there is too much discussion. Once specific demands enter the internal processes of the municipality, they are not met in a timely manner due to deficiencies and excessive bureaucracy. Such delays, in turn, can damage the program's credibility. There is recognition that the municipality's internal linkage model does not work in isolation, and that it needs to be consistently reaffirmed and taught. Even so, in a general sense, some of Vitória's technical staff concluded that intersectorality needs structure and that, without it, it becomes one more challenge.

In Curitiba, the field assessment is sent to the project sector of **COHAB-Paraná**, which identifies the amount of space needed for new facilities. Then, the social demands are brought to the appropriate departments, which are often reluctant to respond, especially in a timely manner. Drawing up a strategic plan for social inclusiveness has proven difficult. In order to receive prompt responses, appropriate incentives are often needed. With resources

from its urbanization projects, **COHAB-Paraná** tries to deliver those incentives in the form of the purchase of goods, training, and the like. The participation of technical staff from different departments in the mobilization and assessment phase was considered positive because it offered assurances to the population with respect to where their demands should be directed.

Similarly, in Procidades/Aracaju, the Planning Secretariat makes linkages with other departments operational through agreements, with or without resource transfers, depending on their availability.

### *Strategies for Intersectoral Linkages with the Social Area*

Besides arrangements and processes, there is a third and perhaps the most important element in intersectoral linkage with the social area in *favela* urbanization programs: the strategy employed to make it operational.

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#### **Linkage Strategies**

**Integrated, intersectoral programs for *favela* urbanization almost always present a dilemma of reach versus governance: how far should the inclusion of social actions be extended within the program? The answer clearly depends on various elements, among them the arrangements or processes previously discussed. A good dose of pragmatism is recommended: at the end of the day, from the social point of view, a *favela* urbanization program cannot meet every need in its intervention area.**

**Prosamim** and **Procentro** present two good but contrasting examples of linkage strategies. Although it is a well-established program, Prosamim does not contemplate, a priori, a strong linkage with the social area. Rather, as demands arise from the community, the program routes them to the appropriate departments. Specifically, in Prosamim, linkage with the social sector is (i) focused on certain structural activities that are critical for the program's central pillar, such as resettlement (for example, income and employment generation for resettled people); or (ii) aimed at solving specific problems (for example, negotiating school placements for the children of resettled families). In this way, some linkages are activated and targeted according to the program's guidelines. They are absolutely necessary for the effective functioning of the program, as well as for achieving results.

Procentro has complex institutional arrangements and actions. In its initial design, the program contemplated 160 actions, to be executed by 11 subcontractors. Thus, the authority the executing agency (COHAB-SP) had over the persons responsible for that multiplicity of actions was limited. Adding to this drawback, the fragmentation of the program's budget further limited the executor's control over the planned social actions. The excessively broad scope of the actions also led to the program's lack of initial focus. The consequences were the executor's low level of governance and the program's poor performance.

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### Timing of the Linkage

**The timing of the linkage with the different social sectors is intimately associated with the issue of scope versus governance. In the case studies already analyzed, the gradual opening to an increasing number of social sectors contributed to strengthening governance. Furthermore, it is advisable to start on a relatively small scale, in the places, issues, and sectors where the chances for success are greater. As a consequence of that success, progressively enlarging the scope of public participation and support appears to be a correct strategy to follow.**

In **Favela-Bairro**, the explicit option was to prioritize the most viable alternatives, whether in infrastructure or in the social realm. This resulted in a progressive integration to the program of actions already in place (from the Social Development Department, the Labor Department, and the Education Department).

There is consensus in **Prosamim** that a program's credibility and visibility, based on its results, are fundamental elements for strengthening partnerships with other sectors.

In Curitiba, intersectoral integration has gradually gained scale and scope. Today, there are 12 departments in the projects of **COHAB-Paraná**.

### *Employment and Income: A Current and Problematic Sectoral Issue*

Most of the programs analyzed in this publication have an employment and income-generation component. The frequency with which that component is found in *favela* urbanization is a function of: (i) the urgency of the problem of

unemployment or subemployment and the low level of income of the population, and (ii) the fact that the funders and executors of the programs have an interest in the population being able to assume expenses that they did not have before (house payments, utility bills, etc.). But this frequency does not translate into more success stories. What is observed is a multiplicity of individual initiatives that are not sustainable. There is a sense that after much trial and error, little knowledge and experience has been accumulated, and that the issue is addressed, in most programs, as an aside and without sufficient emphasis.

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### **Income Generation**

**Income-generation projects need to identify local vocations and potential markets and, on that basis, to promote ad hoc initiatives rather than implementing generic packages.**

In the area of employment and income generation, **Cingapura/PROVER** still shows quite limited results. The SEHAB teams have confirmed the scant usefulness of generic courses. In each area, research is undertaken to identify vocations and potential markets. Based on the data collected, appropriate courses are provided in the “S” system, comprising the organizations associated with the National Confederation of Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria). To facilitate access to the courses, SEHAB pays for the participants’ transportation.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, several courses were given to help generate employment opportunities and income. The results show that basic education is lacking and that job training should be added to adolescent and adult education programs. The field teams conducted a needs assessment in this area and made recommendation to the authorities to deliver activities according to areas of competency (courses, microcredit, etc.). Also, in those intervention areas where there was sufficient demand, specific actions were developed to generate jobs and income. An example is the support given to a cooperative of shellfish gatherers.

The approach is different in Aracaju, where Fundat is the entity in charge of employment and income-generation activities. Fundat focuses on basic professional training courses (information technology, beauty parlors, associativism, microcredit, etc.). The team recognizes that the effective impact on income generation and employment is limited, but the short-term goal is to pull people out of a state of inertia.



### **Evaluation Processes**

It is essential to establish effective processes for evaluating employment and income-generation initiatives, their outputs, and outcomes. If this is not done, there is a risk of continuing to design, finance, and execute employment and income-generation actions based on subjective considerations.

Outcomes from this component are not immediate. This work should be ongoing and should have a medium- to long-term perspective, eventually supporting public policies that continue after the project ends.

The final or follow-up reports of most of the programs analyzed contain available quantitative data on the number of beneficiaries of the various activities aimed at job creation and income generation. However, there are no evaluations of what happens to those beneficiaries, such as whether they acquire more skills to access the labor market, how long it takes, and whether their incomes rise. Thus, the effect of the actions is unknown. One way to evaluate the impact would be to select a random sample of beneficiaries, participants in the program's employment and income generation activities, and a control group, and then to follow the professional and economic evolution of both groups.

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### **Family Resettlement**

**It is necessary to support the reconstruction of the resettled families' businesses and a local market to allow for their steady return, particularly in programs that involve nonvoluntary resettlement.**

At the resettlement area known as CDP in **Bacia do Una**, a survey of the resettled families was conducted (Figuereido Costa et al., 2006). Among the main findings were the households' increased access to services, as well as a worsening in employment opportunities and income and an increase in costs—because of the loss of small businesses and their related markets at the site of origin—for items such as house payments and utility bills, which they did not previously have. A combination of lower incomes and higher costs can force resettled families to move, possibly to other squatter areas, thus nullifying the benefits linked to housing and services.

For these reasons, **Prosamim** prioritizes the reestablishment of economic activities for people displaced by resettlement through compensation, credit, professional training, and entrepreneurial training, individually or in associations. Such actions are executed by associated entities under contract (Amazonas State University, Amazonas Federal Institute, and Amazonas Institute of Technology, Research, and Culture). This was a good choice, based on opinion surveys conducted in the community and on the need to enable the resettled families to assume the new expenses for water, sanitation, and other services. In addition, the goal is to prevent the creation of absolute poverty enclaves in the city center in good quality-dwelling units, from which the poorer dwellers could end up being expelled. Actions were defined according to the characteristics and the needs of the local informal economy. For example, a hygiene course was offered for the growing number of people handling food. Generally, the intention was to strengthen existing resources in the local informal economy.

In **Cingapura/PROVER**, the explicit community priority was to enable resettled families to establish businesses and shops in the ground floors of the buildings to serve those families that had lost their businesses as a result of the resettlement.

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### **Local Economic Development**

**Employment and income-generation initiatives need to be incorporated into local economic development strategies, linking them to diverse agents and productive strategies.**

Integrating the *favela* into the formal city with respect to urban development and access to services, present in many *favela* urbanization programs, is not as frequent or intense a concern in the economic and productive realms. There is a consensus that the best strategy for boosting economic development in areas where informality predominates is its insertion into the formal economy, that is, the city's market. In order to promote this kind of insertion, a well-coordinated strategy needs to be implemented, which often depends on local economic development policies.

In the case studies analyzed in this publication, only **Favela-Bairro** designed such a strategy. However, it was discontinued due to changes in government in the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

In Favela-Bairro, the Municipal Department of Labor put several initiatives in place, including:

- a) the Brazil Federal Program “Ação nas Favelas”
- b) actions to increase school attendance in partnership with the Roberto Marinho Foundation
- c) professional job training
- d) survey (miniPNAD) and census of businesses
- e) trainings for small and microenterprises
- f) a strong microcredit program (whose executing agency later became a branch of Unibanco for microcredit)
- g) information technology centers
- h) support for self-employed workers (service commercialization, technical assistance: the executing agency became a public interest civil society organization [Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público]).

Those actions began before the second loan from the IDB and were used as the basis for the design of its jobs and income component. With a budget of 35 million reais (US\$17,500), a voucher system for professional training was also added. With the change in the municipal government, that component of Favela-Bairro ceased to be a priority and ended practically without being implemented.

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### **Characteristics of the Employment and Income-generation Components**

A minimum level of basic education is a precondition for any employment and income-generation action. Linkage with programs from the education sector is highly advisable.

Eventual employment and income-generation components must be provided with sufficient technical, financial, and institutional resources to tackle the complexities of this task. Generic packages, or specific and unlinked actions, produce limited results. The component must (i) be planned based on in-depth assessments conducted by specialists; (ii) finance actions compatible with vocations and previously identified markets; (iii) seek linkages with the formal market; and (iv) be subject to rigorous evaluation.

## Strengthening Local Social Capital

The first section of this chapter introduced the concept of social capital. The usefulness of this concept, from an analytical point of view, is founded on its ability simultaneously to consider the following two components of the slum upgrading projects which hypothetically are closely linked: the strengthening of civil society organizations and the promotion of participation. Based on the insights that emerged from the case studies, this section tests that hypothesis and discusses its implications.

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### Strengthening Social Capital

There is a strong, even overlapping, association between the components of strengthening civil society organizations and fostering participation. In the programs analyzed, a frequent correlation emerges between associations or local leaders and participatory organizations sponsored by the program. From the perspective of strengthening social capital, such an association can be positive. However, the respective weight of the two components shows case-by-case variations, and the relationship between them is not necessarily linear.

**Nova Baixada** has established management committees, composed of representatives from the community, whose support functions consist of participatory planning of program interventions, supervision, monitoring of service delivery, community awareness raising, and communication with the government. According to Guaraná and Fleury (2008), the program fosters committee members' awareness and training on technical issues related to public works or in institutional and political issues.

Information collected from committee members from the Xavantes and Heliópolis districts of the Municipality of Belford Roxo reveals that weekly meetings are held in the neighborhoods and once a month in the state government's headquarters. In Xavantes, the president of the residents' association is also the president of the managing committee. This committee is not legally formalized, and the community is "officially" represented by the association, which is registered in the National Cadastre of Corporations (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas). Today, the committee participates in co-managing the health care unit. In Heliópolis, the committee's president ceased

participating in the local residents association (which no longer exists), because of partisan political interference. This is why the managing committee was formalized and registered in the cadastre.

**Favela-Barrio** was implemented in both land division lots and *favelas*, yet participation was more intensive in the former. Since the 1970s, with support from law enforcement officials, there had already been mobilization through the land titling centers (Núcleos de Regularização Fundiária). The owners of the lots are more motivated to obtain land titles than the inhabitants of the *favelas*. Additionally, the influence of drug traffickers and militia groups is stronger in the *favelas*. Until the second IDB loan was granted, participation was not formalized in the *favelas*; consultations and workshops were undertaken, but the program did not establish the committees planned for in its design. In Favela-Bairro, the participants in the participatory process were not formal organizations, but rather local leaders.

In some cases, Favela-Bairro had an explicit impact on social capital. For example, in Villa Carioca, the dominant drug trafficker was expelled and a new generation of leaders was fostered, which contributed to the operation and maintenance of the existing investments and created a community library. The leaders of the first 16 *favelas* serviced by the program formed their own organization, the G-16, later formalized as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). Overall, social and participatory actions fostered new leadership that oversaw the entire program and strengthened the associations; but many of those experiences were not continued.

It is interesting to observe a peculiarity of Favela-Bairro that has to do with the types of civil society organizations selected to be the program's partners. At the beginning, two options were available: (i) working with and strengthening small local associations, and (ii) hiring large, well-known NGOs. Because of the drug traffickers' influence on the local associations, the second option was chosen, with the NGOs providing workers to the small local entities.

**Bacia da Una** contemplated a complex arrangement, which included three participatory organizations. The first organization was an advisory committee staffed by, among others, representatives from the state and municipal governments, the community (one for each sub-basin of the Una River), and other institutions. That committee was created through a broad process of registry and selection of entities in the intervention areas. The second was the Project Oversight Commission (Comissões de Fiscalização das Obras), created as an IDB requirement, which had over 1,000 members selected by each

location assisted by the program. The members met regularly and reported to the representatives of each of the seven Una sub-basins and members of the advisory committee. The third organization was the management council, created at the end of the program to provide sustainability and continuity to its achievements and to contact public sector organizations that could meet the needs of the people living in the basin. The local associations were also constituents of the council.

As in the other programs studied, in **Prosamim** several participatory management organizations were established, mainly aimed at resettling families. Similarly, the bases for the creation of those organizations were the local associations. At the beginning of the program, a consulting commission (Comissão Consultiva) was created, consisting of 40 members from civil society, the Municipality of Manaus, and the state government. The consulting commission was involved in the program's design, and was dissolved when the program was approved. After this dissolution, public hearings were held in each *igarapé* and drew large crowds (up to 700 people). During these hearings, delegates were selected to vote to choose one of the dwelling types.

Also during that period, Prosamim created the Committee of Community Representatives, which is still functioning today. It is composed of representatives from the intervention areas and the surrounding environmental associations. These representatives are selected based on the registry of entities, meetings of the program's team with those entities and with the federations of entities of Manaus, and elections in each area. The committee's main purpose is to facilitate the program's access to the areas and keep the lines of communication open between Prosamim and the communities.

Because of the shortage of associations in the city's central district, where the first phase of Prosamim was implemented, the program decided to create local support groups. Prosamim's social teams convened meetings with the community in all the tracts of the *igarapés* that received assistance, inviting people with a given profile from the community to volunteer. Once the volunteers were identified, their selection was validated in assemblies. This process contributed to the formation of new local leaders and, eventually, new associations. To support the post-occupation of the residential parks built close to the *igarapés* for resettling the families, neighborhood representatives were selected in a similar way. In each block of the residential parks, the community selected people to take on the tasks of mobilizing and promoting new associations. The use of this type of representation was chosen

due to the scant participation of families after they were resettled in the parks. In other resettlement areas that are not residential parks, associations were promoted through newly created local development forums. This process of fostering associations and participation in the resettlement areas is generally recognized as still in the incipient stages.

In **Terra Mais Igual**, community participation was fostered by creating traditional associations and promoting new leaders. Terra Mais Igual works diligently to engage and, where needed, unite the vast network of community associations in Vitória, aiming to create residents' commissions that facilitate the program's access to the communities to accompany the infrastructure projects. The participatory process was strengthened with a training program for the community's counselors. Also in Vitória, however, there is a strong relationship between the local organizations created by the program and existing associations, which (according to technical staff from the municipality) are still a reference point for the population and were strengthened by that process, with more leaders trained and more people involved in the discussions. Local associations have also been identified and mobilized in Curitiba since the beginning of the projects, and commissions of residents have been created (starting from that mobilization). In addition, **COHAB-Paraná** conducts leadership training.

At **Cingapura/PROVER**, there is a vast network of local associations, with resources from both the public and the private sectors. In this case, as in others, the associations are the basis for the creation of a local forum.

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### **Participatory Organizations**

**Participatory organizations fostered by the programs tend to replicate the practices of representation, composition, and decision making of civil society organizations, as well as the relationship between these organizations and the public sector.**

In most cases, participatory organizations in slum upgrading and urbanization programs are based on the local community associations. These, in turn, frequently reproduce models of representation, composition, and decision making. In some cases, these models have negative outcomes.

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### **Synergies among Participatory Organizations**

Joint actions by the programs designed to create participatory organizations and foster local associations produce synergies, mainly by (i) training existing leaders after they have been selected as members of participatory organizations; (ii) promoting new leaders to staff the new participatory organizations; (iii) encouraging the formation of new associations to increase participation; and (iv) strengthening the capacity to attract members of the community to the associations because of the new role they assume within the newly created participatory organizations, including dialogue with the public sector (to facilitate its access to the communities or follow up on the demands by communities with the appropriate authorities).

Local issues can present hurdles in terms of strengthening social capital that the programs might not be able to overcome, which in turn requires measures to boost participation. The reluctance of some Favela-Bairro beneficiaries to participate and the need to resort to large NGOs outside of the program itself are examples of some of the difficulties faced at the local level.

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### **Measures for Strengthening Participatory Processes**

Promoting broad and unrestricted access to relevant and nonconfidential information and guaranteeing the establishment of transparent and democratic proceedings of selection/election of the members of the organizations.

Respecting established term limits and elections, making the rotation of elected representatives compulsory, and securing effective and equal participation of all elected representatives in decision making.

Allowing supervision of implementation activities by elected representatives, and making periodic status report mandatory, not limited by electoral timetables, from the representatives to the people represented.

According to Guaraná and Fleury (2008), a hierarchical structure in the composition of the management committees was put in place in **Nova Boa-da**. An “elite” group appropriated the decision-making and information-sharing



mechanisms for themselves. Moreover, the committees' internal proceedings had little transparency, and the population's participation was scant (mainly because of the lack of an adequate communication strategy). Some technical staff interviewed recognized that the management committees, like all those organizations, are easy to co-opt, and that, in fact, a dilemma exists related to the remuneration of its members. On the one hand, as the members are low-income people, it is theoretically justifiable that their time be remunerated. On the other, it is clear that the objectivity of the committees is compromised. In Xavantes, the committee was formed according to the community's directives, followed by the election of the board. After the first election, there were no others. That would point to the elitist structure of the committee. Seven of the 20 original members are still participating. In Heliópolis, the formation of the management committee followed the same procedure adopted in Xavantes.

In **Bacia do Una**, the program did not define the procedures for the selection of the advisory committee representatives before they were elected. Local leaders coordinated the election, with no outside monitoring or guarantee of legitimacy. The representatives initially elected remained in office until the end of the program (10 years). Conferences were held in each of the seven sub-basins of Rio Una and in the resettlement area of Paraíso dos Pássaros to form the management committee, and delegates were elected for Bacia do Una Conference, which created (by consensus, that is, without election by its members) its executive council. The legitimacy of the members and presidential appointments was highly questionable. The committee was composed of eight community representatives, one from the municipality, and one from the state. The municipality withdrew its representative and the state soon did the same, so the council was limited to community members.

In **Prosamim**, the original agreement was that members of the committee of community representatives would serve for a two-year term. However, in the initial period of the committee's work, the program found that this term was too short, and it was extended. While this decision can be justified from a technical-operational point of view, it risks legitimizing the elected representatives and the electoral process. The selection of local support group members and neighborhood representatives seems to have occurred without outside interference and without the associations "appropriating" them in a non-legitimate manner.

In the area covered by **Cingapura/PROVER**, the SEHAB teams were able to convene the local associations in a forum, but they are still divided along partisan political lines.

Instituto Pólis and Brasil Care conducted a study of **Procentro** (Cymbalista et al., 2008) in which one of the dimensions analyzed was the program's participation in the decision making. The study concluded that in both the administrations of Maluf/Pitta (2001–2004) and Marta Suplicy (2004–2008), the organizations had limited participation. It was even more restricted during the Serra/Kassab administration (2005–2008), when the formal participation channels were modified, prompting the civil society representatives to resign. Interviews from the field confirmed this information.

In **Procidades/Aracaju** and **COHAB/Paraná**, there are no examples of nontransparent “occupation” of participatory organizations by the local associations, or of their co-opting by the government. In those localities, participation and partnership by the community organizations were formally part of public policies. For example, in Aracaju, participation in the Coroa do Meio project and in other urbanization projects benefits from the structures, practices, and leaders mobilized by the “participatory budget” process, particularly relevant in hearings and consultations. The Municipality of Aracaju has its Popular Participation Department, whose focus is precisely on the “participatory budget.” Between 60 and 70 percent of the interventions of urbanization programs originated in this budget, and its execution is continually monitored. There is no “written” policy in Curitiba, but rules and regulations, elaborated and consolidated since the 1980s, exist. These rules and regulations represent points of reference and are institutionalized to avoid excessive political interference.

In these examples, the influence of the political-institutional context on the characteristics and on the workings of the programs' participatory structures is clear, as it is on the relationship between those organizations and existing local community associations. In some cases the influence is positive, and in others it is negative. In the latter ones, there is no growth in social capital.

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### **Sustainability of Local Organizations**

**Actions that aim to guarantee the sustainability of local social organizations must be implemented from a truly operational standpoint, not through the typical trainings on project development and fund-raising perspective. The actions should help in a practical way to identify possible funding sources (including in the private market), while linking and negotiating with them, as well as to manage new projects thus financed.**

Actions designed to strengthen civil society organizations should be incorporated into programs and linked with similar long-term local public policy initiatives. When those initiatives do not exist, they should be encouraged through actions to strengthen the program institutionally.

In contexts unfavorable to the strengthening of genuine participation, it should be expected that a program, regardless of the source of its funding, requires minimum standards of transparency, representation, and democracy as part of its conditionality. These include respect for term limits and elections, rotation of elected members, broad participation in decision making, and control of the elected by the electors.

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### Program Design

The merits of the methods for selecting the community representatives or the decision-making mechanisms are rarely addressed in the program's design. The absence in the program's format of institutionally defined participatory parameters, or benchmarks, means that, in unfavorable contexts for genuine participation, behaviors predominate that are incompatible with the exercise of citizenship, civic engagement, and education for democracy. However, little or nothing is done by the program to modify this situation. To overcome these limitations, national and international funding organizations must support the organization, normalization, and, especially, inclusion of operational principles in the procedures to guarantee minimal conditions for authentic participation. An example of this normalization is the compulsory application of the safeguard on involuntary resettlement in international programs.

In the case of IDB-financed programs, such as **Bacia do Una**, there may be pressure from the financing organization to extend participation. But these are specific actions, limited in scope, rather than institutionalized and ongoing ones. Even if community participation in decision making is increased in such localized situations, as is the case with infrastructure interventions in Belém, there will be no inclusive and lasting strengthening of social capital.

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### Temporal Scope for Strengthening Civil Society Organizations

The promotion of collective action based on the strengthening of civil society and participatory organizations needs a scope that goes beyond a program's timeline. Participatory organizations, as well as community organizations fostered by the programs, tend to become weak or even dissolve after the programs are implemented.

It is worth noting the experience of Vila Carioca, mentioned above in the context of **Favela-Bairro**, where leaders formed in the process of implementing the program created a library. Local cooperatives that were strengthened, such as the Ana Gonzaga *favela*, are also noteworthy. However, there is evidence that those experiences disappeared when the programs ended. Generally, the players involved in Favela-Bairro were successful in strengthening local associations, but experiences like this were few. For the associations to be sustainable and to increase their scale, long-term action is needed. Changes in government and the intensification of drug trafficking (factors beyond the program's control) interrupted this action.

In **Bacia da Una**, the management council, the organization that should guarantee the continuity and sustainability of the program's endowment, gradually stopped meeting regularly and, toward the end of the program, the council began to dissolve. It still exists, but its actions are very weak due to lack of time and resources. The program also supported the strengthening of community entities, such as scavenger cooperatives (dissolved after their leaders left), an association of tailors, and community centers. But there is no information about the actual fate of these entities.

In **Prosamim**, it is predicted that, as the program is implemented, there will be a gradual decrease in participation and a gradual strengthening of the community associations. Consultants were hired to promote and strengthen this process, which is still in the early stages. As such, it is not yet possible to evaluate the reinforcement or the sustainability of the community entities.

In the programs in São Paulo (**Procentro and Cingapura/PROVER**), NGOs provide services to the population with resources from the private sector. Support from the programs and the public sector is generally minimal or nil. This experience is rarely replicable in contexts beyond the south/southeast.

### **Participatory Organizations**

**It is customary that the participatory organizations linked to a given program cease their activities when the program ends, unless they converge with permanent, institutionalized municipal participatory arrangements.**

**The scope of organizations today is often limited to deal with internal issues. However, by the sole exercise of participation, they are contributing to promote citizen awareness among their community members. Beyond that, it is essential to ensure that other permanent and institutionalized opportunities for participation exist.**

As the examples from Aracaju, Vitória, and Curitiba show, it is advisable to link actions promoting participation in the programs with broader municipal policies. To guarantee their sustainability after the programs end, at the same time, it is necessary to strengthen civil society organizations. From this perspective, Prosamim's work seems promising. However, there is still no concrete evidence of its success. Overall, it has become clear from the case studies that many civil society organizations could not survive without the support of the programs. Some organizations have continued to function after the programs ended, but the effectiveness of their actions, and, consequently, the quality of the services provided to the communities, has decreased significantly.

## CHAPTER 3

# Institutional and Managerial Issues

### Analysis of Institutional and Managerial Aspects

This chapter discusses institutional and managerial arrangements, and is organized around the following three priority pillars:

- **consensus, support, and mobilization;**
- **appropriate technical staff;**
- **possibilities for intersectoral cooperation.**

The study of nine programs and projects based on empirical evidence from each of the elements analyzed has produced a synopsis of institutional and managerial best practices.

Social, cultural, and political factors interact with one another in a nucleus of **collective design** to address the problems targeted by the program or project objectives. Thus, when the program or the project is established by consensus, this nucleus is an important element that contributes to its success. This social or collective design enables the sharing of expectations among the populations, societies, and government agencies involved.

The analysis highlighted the important role played by international financial institutions, which is not limited to providing financing, but also includes the development of organizational structures compatible with the stated objectives.

### Consensus, Support, and Mobilization

The project conception phase is critical. The actions necessary to establish a positive framework for designing interventions need to be carefully thought through.

### **Consensus, Collective Design, and Support**

Projects or programs are successful when working on the problem is part of the collective design, that is, society and governments, and can be established as a consensus. The more the program design is based on a prior collective agreement, the greater are its possibilities for success.

Society's support for the design contributes to the creation of a framework that is favorable to its continuity. Social support inhibits dismantling or interruptions due to political-administrative changes, and sustains a certain degree of political engagement with the project that helps to preserve corporate memory and execution of the actions.

**Favela-Bairro** (Program for the Urbanization of Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro) was conceived in accordance with the collective desire to address the secular problem of the Carioca *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro. During its implementation, the program had the support of society and successive governments. There was consensus and a broad movement toward the development of specific actions to address housing and *favela* issues.

This movement relied on social struggle, political action, and prior experience of actions in the *favelas*. An example of that movement was a housing seminar convened by the Municipal Council, which led to the inclusion of the issue in the government's program. This resulted in the creation of a commission of the Executive Branch, the Executive Group for Popular Settlements (Grupo Executivo de Assentamentos Populares, or GEAP). The purpose of the GEAP was to formulate the basis for the housing policy to be pursued by the municipality. This led to the creation of the Municipal Housing Department.

Favela-Bairro, still in operation, has outlasted five administrations. With some positive and other not so positive moments, the program proved that it could succeed at this level of engagement as well. A virtuous circle was established (support-success), allowing for the collective creation of a program considered to be paradigmatic in Latin American social policy.

In **Prosamim** (Social and Environmental Program for the Igarapés of Manaus), the positive picture of prior social and government support also proved decisive to the success of the intervention. A historical, social, and even emotional demand already existed for a resolution of the problems arising from the occupation of the *igarapés* in Manaus.

Since the 1970s, there have been several attempts to launch projects that could address this important environmental issue, but they were unsuccessful. The loss of credibility suffered by public institutions involved in prior projects resulted in a degree of initial mistrust on the part of the population toward the program. This mistrust had to be overcome by their seeing real progress in the program. Once the mistrust was overcome, support became generalized, which laid the groundwork for the program's success. In addition to support from the population, Prosamim also enjoys the support and engagement of different government agencies, beyond political and partisan divides.

As in Manaus, the city of Vitória also confirms that prior social desires are a key to the success of this kind of action. The **Terra Mais Igual** program in Vitória is the result of an historical movement of popular and government actions aimed at solving the problems of the low-income areas of the city. This situation provided a positive context for the project's development, as it is built on consensus around the project's importance to society and to various political forces. This fact is cemented in the political groupings' historical formation that has emerged since the 1970s from the social movements of the Catholic Church, as well as from the recognition and support of the local population.

**COHAB-Paraná** (State Housing Company of Paraná) can also be considered to have been socially desired. Although COHAB-Paraná was not actually designed as a program, or even a project, as were the other programs studied, the actions undertaken in Curitiba had a clear purpose that has endured over time, accumulating an impressive record of achievements. Designed to promote low-income housing based on the model of residential ensembles, COHAB-Paraná built, according to its estimations, close to a fifth of the total housing units in the city and still carries out continuous and consistent actions to tackle the housing shortage.

This model seems to be part of a popular understanding, and common sense, about the way to address social problems related to housing. In Curitiba, COHAB-Paraná serves as the Housing Department, and eventually the Department of Urban Development.

Other projects have been less successful with respect to prior understanding and effective awareness of the desire for a resolution of the problem, as well as support and focus by the government and society.

**Nova Baixada** (Program for the Integrated Urbanization of Neighborhoods of the Baixada Fluminense) is an example of a less positive result.



Although there was a high demand for urbanization projects, the resolution of these problems in the region of the Baixada Fluminense was not designed within a policy framework that could address them.

In this case, it might be essential to address a conceptual and scale issue not present in the other programs. In the other programs, the issue of slum upgrading is framed as an exception, even though they may be treated as massive problems. But in the case of Baixada Fluminense, it is the rule, since the area is characterized almost solely by this type of urban landscape—massive informal land divisions lacking infrastructure and social facilities.

Thus, perhaps Nova Baixada should not aim to address a specific set of local problems, but rather it should plan to address them holistically. Thus, solutions would not be proposed in the context of a project or a program, but rather a policy. This issue, simultaneously conceptual and one of scale, may partially hold the key to overcoming the difficulties in securing social support for infrastructure projects in Nova Baixada. This is reflected in the shift in methodological orientation, expressed in the timetable of implementation and even in the change in the program's name.

This conceptual issue is also explicit in the program's conceptualization as an attempt to replicate the actions conducted by Favela-Bairro, which by then was successfully developing. But the urban and historical matrix of the poorer areas of Baixada Fluminense is different from that of the Carioca *favelas*. In the Baixada, the poor areas form an informal low-density city that extends, similar to the phenomenon known as *sprawl*, in irregular land lot divisions, generally of flat topography and without infrastructure. This is typical of the region's urban growth pattern.

The Carioca *favelas*, in turn, are more circumscribed, historically established settlements, in addition to being, for the most part, denser and often located on hillsides. Though frequent, *favelas* are exceptional in the urban environment. Another significant cultural difference between the two realities derives from the land-titling regime: in the land lot divisions, the lots are purchased, whereas in the *favelas*, generally and until recently, the land is occupied.

These considerations suggest the existence of difficulties in prior support by society to Nova Baixada, due to its implementation as an exception in a land area usually occupied by a uniform urban growth model, but lacking investments.

Nova Baixada demonstrates that the concept of a **prior social desire** is not limited to the direct beneficiaries of the investments, who clearly will be

supportive. It is the broader desire on the part of society as a whole that will be able to bring political support to the exceptional investments that reach only a part of the whole. In order to illustrate this hypothesis, it is important to consider the cases of other projects borne from specific demands, which pressed government managers to act to resolve a problem.

**Bacia do Una** had very feeble government support, enabling it to endure for more than ten years, with its effective start date five years after the contract was signed. A report compiled during the research phase claims that the resolution of problems in the flooded areas of Belém was not a priority broadly shared by society; only those directly affected viewed it as a high priority. It was only following completion that the importance of the measure came to be understood. But, even then, it lacked the dimension that the project states in its objectives.

**Procentro** (Program for the Rehabilitation of the Central Area in São Paulo) and **Cingapura/PROVER** (Program for the Improvement of Favelas in São Paulo) are two more examples. Both programs were built on solid foundations in terms of the demand from society and of the government's interest in taking action to address the problems.

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### **Administrations**

**Implementation of the programs under study spanned several administrations. In each new administration, the direction and main focus of actions also changed, adjusting to emerging interests. This common practice of the Brazilian government turned out to be counterproductive for the development of these programs. It is fair to say that changes could have occurred for a variety of reasons between politically discordant administrations.**

In the case of **Procentro**, there was no widespread prior support or consensus on the part of society. Everything pointed to divergences among the various political forces around the project's objectives. These diverging forces comprised popular movements interested in the expansion and guaranteeing of opportunities for housing in the central area, as well as business or social groupings interested in staking some economic, real estate, political, social, or cultural claims in the area.

Though they were not necessarily in conflict, it seems that no broad agreement was reached by these forces. Such vagueness caused adjust-

ments to be made throughout its implementation, including a dispersal of resources to numerous specific projects without directly contributing to its objectives.

In **Cingapura/PROVER**, divergence seems to have been related only to the partisan political appropriation interests and not to program goals. The change in the name from Cingapura to PROVER apparently reaffirmed that need for change. In PROVER, all indications are that support has remained despite political-administrative changes. The criticism that has been lodged points more to the scope of the projects than to their conceptualization or ultimate goals.

### Technical Staff Compatible with the Institutional Arrangement

It is generally thought that good management of a project or a program's execution can be assured through strong institutional organization. However, it is people who essentially determine such processes. It is a dual condition. While institutional support compatible with the challenges that are being faced is essential, it is not sufficient to ensure success.

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#### Human Capital

**Experiences of successful programs and projects show that, concomitant with good operational structures, success is a function of the people involved in decision making and the leaders engaged in the process, combined with the capacity of the technical staff that executes them. The players determine the actions when the organizations are appropriately structured.**

Experiences such as **Prosamim** exemplify that dual condition. The financial organization negatively evaluated the administrative and managerial ability of the existing public organizational structure, which highlighted the need for the creation of a separate entity of its own, the Program Management Unit. This unit received priority support and the commitment of the governor, who played a prominent role, acting as a catalyst for the whole process.

The creation of the Program Management Unit also enabled the acquisition of a highly qualified technical staff, thus overcoming the deficit of

educated technicians, and ensured that the team was motivated to perform well. According to some of the people interviewed, forming this unit was a way to ensure the government's competitiveness in the labor market. It also enabled experienced and skilled technicians to be hired at comparable salaries, since public sector salaries are not competitive. The likelihood of a good salary was highlighted as one of the factors that contributed to the permanent motivation and engagement of the technical team.

Thus, by creating the Program Management Unit, Manaus showed how influencing the people directly involved in the process can turn around a weak management staff, ensuring a highly skilled, motivated, and engaged team.

In the case of **Bacia do Una**, the skilled technical staff operated with a light structure with its own internal rules and financial and administrative autonomy. Program management is centralized, a feature that was seen as positive by the players.

The experience of **Favela-Bairro** is also instructive. The program did not have a specific institutional structure; it was the product of a municipal housing policy, which in turn created the Municipal Housing Department in charge of its execution. The department was staffed with professionals from other municipal departments who had experience with public works in marginalized areas. They served as the core of a diverse group of architects, engineers, social workers, and other professionals that were called upon to collaborate through teams/firms selected through a competitive bidding process. The multidisciplinary teams could answer questions related to program coordination under the responsibility of the permanent staff of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

The fact that the Municipal Housing Department managed the program and that it was staffed by career civil servants meant that the project staff was highly skilled and experienced. Despite this, the main leaders among this group of civil servants were initially opposed to the idea of hiring outside teams to develop projects and monitor their implementation. However, the volume of services contracted and the magnitude of the actions to be developed led to a situation where reality overcame bias. Some months later, it was shown that the amount of effort could not only considerably expand the municipality's capacity to deliver services, but it also enabled the permanent staff to acquire professional skills and assume coordination and management positions.

### **Incorporation of External Human Capital**

The participation of outside teams chosen based on merit has advantages, as it provides fresh ways of looking at problems by incorporating different experiences and methods. One enduring lesson is that, even without altering the institutional structure, the continuity of a program fundamentally depends on the continuity of the people involved in the decision-making process.

**Favela-Bairro** is a testament to the dual nature of the *institutional structure/staff and leaders*. That was clear in 1996, when a political change occurred in the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, interrupting the project. The new mayor substituted a significant portion of the most seasoned staff and issued new guidelines regarding communicating with the communities. With the political change at the top of the department and the program, as well as the arrival of new technicians (who lacked the qualifications and the accumulated experience of the former ones, many of them seconded from other departments, but accustomed to performing different kinds of jobs), substantial modifications were introduced in several of the program's components. The pace of implementation of Favela-Bairro changed significantly. The timing of implementation was extended more than twice as long as had been planned.

The important lesson learned from this experience is that the municipality could not assure the continuity of the program according to the principles upon which it had achieved success in the previous eight years. Keeping the same institutional structure but changing the people involved in the decision making represented a clear discontinuity.

The **Procentro** and **Cingapura/PROVER** experiences in São Paulo are also illustrative. As stated above, direct support from senior administration officials is essential for the program's success, and these two programs enjoyed the support of successive mayors.

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### **Change in Scope and Objectives**

In the cases studied, the support given by each mayor was contingent on modifications that meant changes in scope and objectives. Some of those interviewed think that the changes were made so that the program would be identified with the incumbent. Such modifications, including

changes in the leadership, generated instability, which hindered the development of processes.

This is not about validating the merit of any one proposal. It merely underscores the importance of the leading role performed by the staff in charge of the process, as contrasted with the institutional structure.

In the case of **Procentro**, and according to statements, despite having been positively reviewed by the financing entity, the hiring process lasted almost until the end of the term of the mayor who had proposed it. With the (sudden) departure of the incumbent, the next administration resolved to modify the project's scope and to extend the targeted territory, as well as alter the characteristics of some of the components. Another change of administration forced still more adjustments so that the program could finally begin to operate, making it unrecognizable compared to the original design.

In **Terra Mais Igual** program, the influence of the people involved in decision making was also clearly observed. In this example, the engagement of successive mayors was apparent, due perhaps to the fact that they had similar political backgrounds, which was important for sustaining the established actions in a relatively homogeneous way. It is likely that if there had been discontinuities and disagreements, as in São Paulo, the outcome would not have been the same, and the municipality, as an institution, would not have been able to sustain a comprehensive follow-up of the project.

## Possibilities of Developing Intersectorality

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### **Intersectoral Connections**

The success of a program or project is conditioned by the capacity for managing intersectoral connections that may emerge, with specific political timetables and responsibilities. While the role of technical and political staff becomes relevant in leading processes, it is particularly decisive in the execution of intersectoral actions. In this case, understanding the need to act together and to work to achieve the same goal is fundamental for success.

It is also necessary, however, as was reported in interviews in **Aracaju** and **Curitiba**, for the institutional decision to create intersectorality to be a po-

litical one made by the mayor or the governor. Fine-tuning between the various public entities is not easy, nor can it be achieved by creating an organizational chart. Rather, the single fundamental condition for guaranteeing intersectorality is the effective action of the people at different levels of decision making.<sup>1</sup>

The mid- and senior-level management teams of **Terra Mais Igual** showed great commitment to the project and had the support of a government policy. In this way, they became the catalysts of the process, assuring a framework of intersectorality in the project. Some of those interviewed said that the people engaged in the process often acted as “instructors of the government,” sustaining the effort to develop an intersectoral framework.

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### **Mechanisms for Intersectorality**

**There are institutional mechanisms that can aid in the difficult task of guaranteeing intersectorality. Centralizing resource management is one of them.**

**Nevertheless, when a project includes different sectors and levels from the public sector, multiple institutions, and inter-dependent sectoral actions, the effective management of processes is key. It is also essential to clarify the respective responsibilities, to observe specific political timetables, to secure the commitment of institutional players, and to adhere to the initially defined paths, regardless of changes in the political leadership and administration.**

Intersectorality can be expressed on two levels. The first, within the institution responsible for project execution—the municipality or state government—, has to do with the relationship between departments and public companies of the *same* government level. The second situation happens when this interdependence occurs between *different* levels of government. This is generally much more problematic, and it also can take place in the presence of partisan political differences.

In the first situation, a significant example comes from **Terra Mais Igual** project, which adopted intersectorality as a government policy, giving it the priority needed for bringing about actions in an integrated manner. This way of thinking launched a new management culture aimed at addressing the challenge of integrating and linking sectoral policies in the territory. This

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<sup>1</sup> Testimony recorded at an interview in Curitiba.

focus took on such importance that, according to witnesses, there was a moment in the course of the process when the project became an example of promotion of intersectorality in the government.

As time passed, however, a conceptual change occurred in the administration: intersectorality ceased to be a matter of the project and became, in fact, a government strategy. To reach this point, it was necessary to promote an educational process in the government, to raise awareness about the need to assume commitments toward a common goal and seek consensus. Through this strategy, directly supported by the chief executive, the Strategic Management Department (Secretaria de Gestão Estratégica, or SEGES) of the Municipality of Vitória assumed the responsibility of sustaining the program commitment, performing government coordination and participating in a differentiated administrative management model, in synergy with the activities typically linked to planning.

The management model that supports the promotion of intersectorality in this program is interesting. Project “cells” are placed in each area involved in the process. That is, each department working on the project has a group of professionals that work on the intersectoral linkages, and is tasked with establishing the actions in an integrated way, with the SEGES overseeing the entire process.

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### **Oversight and Intersectorality**

**Oversight is necessary because developing the integration needed to face the challenge of intersectorality is not easy. Agreements are reached but are not met. There are several reasons for that, and that is why negotiations must be permanent. These negotiations help build possibilities at each level of power; they occur at each level as problems emerge, until they are settled.**

SEGES was able to turn *Terra Mais Igual* into a kind of “live case study” on government, increasing dialogue among departments and areas of government, promoting convergence of entities that are usually compartmentalized, each with its own policy and scant interaction. Its role was to establish a dialogue among the various levels of government, make it viable, optimize and improve public policies, and encourage each department to see synergies in interaction with others. However, there is still a long way for *Terra Mais Igual* to go in extending this viewpoint. And even in a situation of supposed full support, mere agreement among senior management is not enough.



### Internal Dialogue

In order for a true intersectoral dialogue in government to exist, it is essential that middle management and the local manager also understand the process. Senior management must be involved. One interviewee in Vitória stated that policy is made at the senior management level, and this is why it is important to incorporate the various levels. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to disseminate a view of government and a way of working, as well as to impart to everyone the knowledge that the policy can be more effective if there is an understanding of what is being done and of how each entity's actions affect those of others.

Another model of a management structure for the effective promotion of intersectorality was adopted in **Prosamim**. In this case, the whole process is centralized by the Program Management Unit; different levels of the process are developed within the unit, which also manages the respective intersectoral relationships between the different levels of government and institutional partners.

In **Prosamim**, all of the players involved were very engaged, which does not always happen when there are partisan political differences. From the interviews, it appears that one of the factors behind this commitment was that the design of the program has a well-conceived structure, and there was strong demand. Thus, the only tasks left to the different political groups were to meet and participate jointly in the effort. In such a favorable situation, managing intersectoral actions between the various institutions involved becomes much more productive and leads to the success of the programs.

**Favela-Bairro** was a program with significant and successful intersectoral actions. These encompassed departments such as health, education, social development, and labor, in addition to public companies such as the Urban Cleaning Company of Rio de Janeiro (Empresa de Limpeza Urbana da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, or COMLURB), the State Water and Sewer Company (Companhia Estadual de Aguas e Esgoto, or CEDAE), and Rio de Janeiro's Municipal Urbanization Company (Empresa de Urbanização da Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, Rio-Urbe).

Institutionally, the housing policy fell under an intersectoral council, with the participation of the senior incumbent of each department involved

and coordinated by the secretary of housing. This council was responsible for the allocation of resources to finance the tasks, as well as for resolving eventual differences. Monitoring the use of resources was one important tool for overseeing intersectoral performance.

In the municipal government, the process proceeded satisfactorily, but, when responsibility shifted to other levels of government, there were significant problems in assuring that necessary actions were implemented. These problems centered on errors made by the public company responsible for existing operation and maintenance of the water and sewer systems, due to both its weak implementation capacity and partisan political issues. These problems considerably undermined the sustainability of the investments.

**Nova Baixada** experienced a similar situation. In this case, there were difficulties in carrying out intersectoral action at the government level. There were problems in the operation and maintenance of existing systems and the rivers targeted by the program. Moreover, the relationship between Nova Baixada's executor—in this case the state government—and the municipalities of the cities targeted for investments in Baixada Fluminense, was generally weak. And these municipalities lacked the structure to tackle the new labor demands lodged since the project was implemented.

In the case of Nova Baixada, the institutional and political disproportionality between the agents involved in intersectoral cooperation was responsible, to a great extent, for the passive and rather detached participation of the municipalities in the process.

In **Bacia do Una** the framework of intersectorality was complex. The hurdles were related not only to partisan political differences between the state government and the municipality, but also to the public sector's lack of operational structure to fulfill its own responsibilities within the process. It was unable to carry out necessary activities, such as street paving and operation and maintenance of existing investments, making sustainability difficult.

**Procentro** struggled to manage the responsibilities of intersectoral actions, mostly because of the excessive number of co-executors. The program managers lacked institutional capacity, and thus acted as a mere conduit to allocate the resources that had been agreed to at the highest level of government. In order to improve implementation, an attempt was made to create an agency, but this idea has not yet come to fruition.

In Sao Paulo, **Cingapura/PROVER** had the same difficulty in intersectoral relations, with some disconnection prevailing between the various municipal players. This created problems in maintenance and led to irregularities

in the appropriation of public areas. The public squares, for example, were occupied because of the lack of audits from the public sector. By occupying open areas, the marginalized population believed they had a better chance of being recognized and considered by the program.

In analyzing the experiences studied here, it can be concluded that if a program is to be implemented by means of intersectoral cooperation, it must have the support of the executive agency, the mayor, or the governor, which would act as a catalyst for this complex process. The participation and engagement of all of the players at the various levels is crucial in order to deliver positive outcomes. The complexity of the undertaking cannot be underestimated, and it requires political maturity on the part of institutions.

In summary, the success of a project depends, essentially, on the people, the leaders, and the technical staff, as well as the institutional capacity of the implementing agencies.

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### **Institutional Strengthening and Continuity**

**Through the experiences studied, as a whole, institutional strengthening hardly occurred or was practically non-existent, limited sometimes by the readiness of the institutions to purchase a variety of service goods.**

**It is also necessary to strengthen technical staff of implementing agencies in order to increase the possibility that the projects will be continued regardless of changes in political administrations. This will ensure that an intra-institutional legacy brought about by the qualified staff will remain viable.**

The experience of **Favela-Bairro** is a good example, because it invested in the capacity building of the municipality's permanent staff, achieving a significant strengthening of its technical abilities. This insight is proven by the fact that many of the professionals who were involved during the most successful period of the program presently hold more important posts in the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro and in other institutions.

More evidence of the quality of the municipal technical teams can be found in the evaluation of the growth in public investments under the coordination of the Municipal Housing Department. During the first eight years of the program's implementation, the financial resources allocated to the housing policy multiplied. From the first to the fourth year, they multi-

plied by 30 and remained at that level for the following four years. Meanwhile, the number of personnel assigned to the Municipal Housing Department of Rio de Janeiro remained the same. The professional skills and the support for technological equipment enabled an expansion of responsibilities without increasing the size of the staff.

The Favela-Bairro program had another positive outcome. As the projects were implemented through a public bidding process, a significant number of young specialists in the subject entered the market and made up a unique technical team, contributing significantly to the development of the ideas and the actions related to the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro and other cities.

A positive experience also came out of **Terra Mais Igual** program, which took pains to educate effective technicians, with the aim of preserving the corporate memory and understanding the process as established, thus creating some assurances that the actions would be continued regardless of changes in government. There is a concern about the ability to leave a legacy.

Nevertheless, there are still a number of technical consultants involved in the program, of a much higher level than the permanent staff members, which raises doubts as to whether or not the actions will be continued through institutional strengthening. There is hope that the consultants will be absorbed as permanent staff, and that by creating project "cells" within each sector involved it will be possible to effectively transfer knowledge from the consultants to the permanent staff.

In **Prosamim**, there is also some concern about investing in institutional strengthening. Several actions were combined in the Institutional Strengthening Plan (Plano de Fortalecimento Institucional), created from the dialogue among the various institutions involved and the demands for implementation, operation, and maintenance of the program. In order to guarantee the sustainability of the process, several actions were established for institutional strengthening: staff training, preparation of plans and studies, dissemination of information on the program's activities, and the purchase of materials and goods to strengthen the structure of the institutions involved in the process. These actions have increased the skills and abilities of the program's technical staff.

Despite the success of Prosamim, the implementation model that makes use of a temporary program management unit appears in general to be quite efficient at carrying out projects. The model's defining features are its well-established and limited actions and timetables.

However, when dealing with more complex procedures and programs, with longer deadlines and much more flexible and adaptable defini-

tions of actions, this model presents some difficulties. Politics introduce the possibility of changes, which sometime disturb the continuity of an established structure and make it more difficult to develop a long-term, sustained process that involves the same professionals as it evolves.

As can be seen in this study, some cases guarantee an efficient program or project management structure by creating specific management units and introducing technically competent teams to develop the actions. This is necessary to transfer knowledge from the consultants, usually temporary, to the permanent staff of the institutions involved. This facilitates continuity in the activities, even when the government changes. In cases where adaptation is needed, only qualified personnel can ensure that the programs or projects are appropriately and comprehensively redesigned based on the experience acquired during the process.

There are also some experiences that deserve to be mentioned because of the incentives given to the training of technicians, as well as the elaboration of studies and supporting plans for the processes. In spite of that, the actions have not always been carried out by permanent staff, leading, in some cases, to reduction in knowledge within institutions.

In **Aracaju**, the number of permanent staff in the municipality was reduced, which prompted the hiring of people to carry out new projects. At the same time, important investments were made to strengthen the institutions, such as purchasing goods for the agencies involved, developing studies that created the database necessary to develop the projects (such as social and viability studies) and, last but not least, conducting training activities for the teams, including post-graduate courses in urban development and environment.

Taking into account the testimonies of those interviewed, who claimed that the Municipality of Aracaju improved during the process, the special dedication to the training of the staff involved in the programs and projects no doubt enabled lessons to be learned, which contributed significantly to the continuity of the actions.

In **Bacia do Una** and **Cingapura/PROVER**, the investments made in institutional strengthening were much more restricted, focused generally on the purchase of goods or spare parts for operating the systems in place. Even so, the process itself, as in all the other examples, enabled the technical staff to become more skilled and positive changes to be made in the structure of the participant institutions, although with significantly fewer lessons learned from the experiences and a reduction in the investment's sustainability.

The experiences studied underscore the importance of ensuring that investments are made in institutional strengthening as a way to structure institutional teams and attract more qualified staff. Good institutional organization is an indispensable tool, although it depends on the political leadership of the government and the program, as well as the skill level of the team as a whole. The main elements leading to a good outcome are the motivation of the agencies involved, the capacity for intersectoral cooperation, and effective institutional strengthening.

It is necessary to develop management models that allow for an efficient exchange of knowledge between consultants and the permanent staff, so that there is a natural development of the institutions technical teams, and to allow them to gain the necessary experience to develop the processes needed for the projects or programs.

The outcome is better development of processes, supported by higher-qualified, valued, and engaged staff. This is the way to assure the sustainability and success of the investments.



## CONCLUSIONS

### Lessons and Challenges

The main lessons and challenges that emerge from the analysis presented in this book deserve to be highlighted for their potential contribution to the formulation of urban development policies. This chapter discusses eight areas, grouped in four pairs of interrelated subjects, some paradoxical and others complementary. They are: **legitimacy and institutionalism, integrality and sustainability, quality and costs, and focalization and globalization.**

#### Legitimacy and Institutionalality

The two preconditions essential for good performance of any program are legitimacy, based on mature social demand, and a favorable political-institutional climate. The commitment of the executive agency, the governor or the mayor, is a fundamental catalyst for program success. The participation and support of the main players is key to guaranteeing effective commitment on the part of the government. This influences the degree of engagement of the public players and is decisive for the political continuity of the actions implemented. This socio-political base is very important in order to assure support for the proposals of the project or program, both from society and the government. This consensus between society and government has to come from the experiences drawn from the intervention, and, consequently, to allow for the formulation of new demands tied to results.

Moreover, the involvement the executive agency staff particularly strengthens the possibility of building an institutional structure to support the development of the process. It makes it possible to add qualified and committed leaders within a management structure able to carry out projects in an intersectoral and effective way, and it also enables inclusive actions for institutional strengthening. This strengthening must include the training and/or acquisition of high-level staff in order to preserve a team that remains motivated and committed to execute the desired public policies, programs, and projects.



The building up of this structure enhances the possibility of a more qualified institutional legacy that transcends the limits of the project intervention and may have a positive demonstration effect on other government structures, thus creating a virtuous circle. A good example of this is Favela-Bairro, which, by securing those two conditions (**legitimacy and institutionalism**), has survived five administrations.

The existence of both of these conditions makes a good process design possible, and enables the establishment of a virtuous circle of support↔success.

### Integrity and Sustainability

The objective of urban policies for the sector must be **integral and sustainable**. Programs that tackle problems of urban poverty must also be conceived holistically, internalizing to the utmost the variables with the most impact. That especially implies that they are multisectoral and socially inclusive. Such an approach is critical for the sustainability of these initiatives, because it solves, simultaneously, the main problems of insalubrity and habitability, and helps to effectively strengthen the social capital of the beneficiary communities. By contrast, sanitation, one of the most frequently lacking urban services and a “minimum social right,” must not be dealt with in isolation in urban development programs. Rather, it should be approached holistically, taking into account other infrastructure, such as street paving, drainage, housing improvements, and recreational and sports aspects, among others.

Another vital factor for sustainability is the continuity of the services delivered to the beneficiary population. Urbanization and housing programs must make arrangements for the maintenance of existing works and services, and for the post-occupation of low-income housing projects, at the risk of jeopardizing the final results. Few programs are successful in this aspect. The cases of POUOSOs, in Favela-Bairro, of the Prosamim’s ELOs, and of the urban monitors in Vitória must be highlighted as good examples of post-project continuity. The presence of urban monitoring on the ground, for a reasonable period of time after the completion of the works, to guide the construction and the expansion of buildings and enforce control over the use of the land, is essential for the environmental sustainability of operations.

The failure to maintain social facilities and continue urban services is another element that jeopardizes the physical incorporation of the *favela* into

the city. The necessary and gradual reconstruction of the decayed social fabric is almost as important as the programs themselves. Maintenance is almost as important as the execution of operations, since without it results in the short term might be reduced to nothing.

### Quality and Cost

Quality—both urban and architectural—is a very important issue in terms of public policy. The monotype units, very small houses with no room to evolve or expand, scant lighting, and materials of low thermal-acoustic comfort and limited durability, are to be avoided. However, frequent cost constraints in projects for social housing means that quality aspects are often overlooked. In many construction projects, such as the selection of materials, the less the need for future maintenance, the better it will be for the residents. This is a most relevant issue for low-income residents, who have few resources available for this purpose.

Prosamim stands out among the projects analyzed because it demonstrates the viability of applying features of good design and comfort in low-income housing within acceptable cost parameters.

This is a typical public policy issue, because it is not acceptable in the Brazilian context, as in the case of the *Habitar Brasil* program, for example, to limit the area of a new single-family dwelling to 32m<sup>2</sup> per unit. Nor is it possible to accept, in other programs, claims of budget constraints to justify the reduction of project parameters, which puts the objectives of the operation at risk and increases the costs of maintenance, risking its sustainability.

Housing policies and programs in general, and those for *favela* urbanization in particular, especially those that receive external financing, should serve as a reference point to foster improvement in the quality of low-income housing projects in Brazil. To increase project quality, the incorporation of architects specialized in social-interest buildings in the teams that prepare and execute the operations should be encouraged as a way to stimulate the development of new models. Another way to foster innovation and improve the quality of projects is through public tenders for architectural ideas or projects. The successful experience of the ideas contest in *Favela-Bairro*, which fostered the formation of startups and the development of know-how for acting in *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, is an excellent example.

Standardization can also be an efficient way to improve quality. In this sense, the development of standards and the requirement to respect patterns

or parameters (for example, to guarantee better architectural and urban quality), would represent a considerable advance. It is not acceptable to require, monitor, measure, and judge standards by considering cost aspects only, or to adhere to them only in certain specialized or highly technical components.

### Targeting and Globalization

The social work targeted to infrastructure interventions, especially in areas directly related to the core business of the *favela* urbanization programs, has been institutionalized as a local operating procedure. This is because social work has its own body of knowledge and methodological procedures, accumulated from programs and projects financed with the support of multilateral agencies and incorporated into government programs. Territorial targeting was present in all of the cases analyzed; the big hurdle arises from the difficulty in moving from the specific to the global.

In the case studies, examples were found of evident social problems: (i) inappropriate use of the collective spaces, this issue persists in Cingapura/PROVER, even after the restart and intensification of post-occupation social work; (ii) inappropriate waste disposal by the population, in spite of the investments in environmental education, and even though organized waste collection systems were put in place. That problem was stressed in Prosamim and Bacia do Una, but it is present in most of the case studies; (iii) coexistence between neighbors in apartment buildings where families used to living in single-family houses were resettled, or failure of these families to pay for their water consumption, measured by collective hydrometers (Cingapura/PROVER).

Social policies are globalized through social work, which, in addition to supporting infrastructure execution, can contribute to solving social problems and generate development, social inclusiveness, citizenship, and democracy. Social work should be incorporated in public policies as a way to gain access to previously marginalized communities.

This raises a critical and central issue. *To what extent can operations (specific, territorially focused projects and programs) sustainably achieve broader objectives, such as human development, participation, and civil society strengthening, without being supported by an integrated and institutionalized social policy?*

The scope of programs for executing social actions is limited and depends not only on its place on the government's agenda, but also on the existence of government policies. In situations where these public policies

already exist (at the federal, state and/or municipal levels), the difficulty is globalizing, integrating the program or project into the policy.

The evidence points to the need to create appropriate incentives so that the competent government sectors can expand their responsibilities through intersectoral, social, and social capital-strengthening actions to be integrated into the specific actions of programs and projects.

One strategy may be to gradually link social sectors, beginning with those whose actions have greater chances of success, and consecutively enlarging the sphere of governance or influence, based on the gains made from greater credibility and visibility. Effective integration also requires institutional strengthening of the respective sectors. Therefore, integrated designed programs must include strengthening of the sectors responsible for the social components.

## **Looking Ahead**

Based on the experiences analyzed in this book, lessons learned, adapted to specific conditions, can serve as inputs to thinking about, defining, and developing public policies.

The Brazilian experience, as seen through the analysis of the nine cases, illustrates that many challenges still need to be overcome before integrated, efficient, and decent urban and housing projects can come to fruition. Still, the analysis revealed a number of positive outcomes. This book has attempted to identify both successes and hurdles, pointing out a few ways that the challenges have been overcome. The evolution of public policy in the sector was clearly gradual and incremental.

The case analyses demonstrate that the adoption of integrated urban policies at different levels of government can be influenced by good examples of successful projects. In many cases, however, it is necessary to transcend specific activities in order to link the intervention projects with a housing and urban policy conceived for the city as a whole (and not only for the irregular settlements). There are difficulties in scaling up, assuring continuity, and securing sustainability of processes, mostly because of technical deficiencies in the municipalities.

There have been a number of positive results, but it is still difficult to institutionalize at the political level the procedures and dynamics that led to specific outcomes at the program and project levels. This is the case both for specific sectors (for example, the housing supply integrated into municipal

housing policy, sanitation integrated into the citywide network, or improved access to public transportation not only for the settlements but also for all the surrounding neighborhoods), and for intersectoral actions.

A comprehensive urban policy needs to combine *favela* urbanization with the construction of new houses and support to incremental construction, especially for the lowest-income groups. This increase in the supply of houses depends, in turn, on the establishment of a land and urban planning policy that expands access to low-cost, urbanized land and creates a housing market for the middle- and low-income population. The availability of urbanized land is necessary not only to foster the expansion of the market to this population but also, when needed, to resettle families living in the *favelas* that have benefited from the programs.

Brazil has reached a level of maturity at which it is necessary to think about reducing the housing deficit without sacrificing the sustainability and quality of its cities. Public policies must pay special attention to the general aspects of durability and integrated responses, with particular emphasis on location, construction patterns, environmental impacts, efficiency in the use of natural resources, and others, so that the solutions proposed for urban and housing problems are compatible with the objective of raising the quality of life and the environment in the cities.

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## ANNEX

### 1. Basic technical data from the Social and Environmental Program for the Igarapés of Manaus – Prosamim (Manaus, AM) (Project number: BR-L1005)

Total amount:

*First phase* – US\$200 million (US\$140 million loan, from IDB; US\$60 million, counterpart of the Amazonas State Government) – 2006.

*Second phase* – US\$110 million (US\$77 million, loan from IDB; US\$33 million, counterpart of the Amazonas State Government) – 2009.

*Third phase* – US\$400 million (US\$280 million, loan from IDB; US\$120 million, counterpart of the Amazonas State Government) – approved in December 2011.

*Borrower:* The State of Amazonas Government.

*Executor:* Program Management Unit of Prosamim.

**Execution period:** 2005–present.

**Local context:** The city of Manaus, capital of the State of Amazonas, located on the banks of the Negro River, is facing a host of urban problems, which are characteristic of a rapid and messy process of urban growth. Its population increased fivefold between 1970 and 2003, going from little more than 300,000 people to slightly over 1.5 million, with a growth rate that was much more intense than that of the rest of the cities in Brazil during the same period. This growth came with the development of productive and commercial activities, linked to the introduction of the Manaus Free Zone, and the development of public services and government activities. More than half the state's population resides in this city. The rapid population growth was not accompanied by the necessary investment in infrastructure, or by controls over land use and occupation. This, combined with the lack of alternatives for affordable housing, mainly for low-income groups, generated informal and environmentally vulnerable settlements in slum areas, particularly on the banks of the *igara-*

*pés*.<sup>1</sup> In some areas, occupation density is so high that the waterway has been completely blocked by the construction of pile houses with access by foot-bridges. The inhabitants of that area are subjected to frequent floods, and the pile dwellings are at risk of collapse when the river rises. An estimated 7,000 families (36,000 people) live in precarious conditions in the Bacía Educandos Quarenta.

**Program objectives:** To contribute to solve the social, urban, and environmental problems afflicting the city of Manaus, particularly the inhabitants of Bacía Educandos Quarenta, specifically: (1) to improve the environmental and health conditions of the area, through rehabilitation and/or introduction of drainage systems, clean water supply, collection and final disposal of liquid and solid waste, and environmental recovery of the headwater areas; (ii) to improve the living conditions of the population in the area, through urban regularization, land titling, suitable housing solutions, establishment of areas for landfills, and population sanitary and environmental education ; and (iii) to increase the operational and management capacity of the entities involved in the program, as well as their ability to incorporate community participation in the decision-making process.

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<sup>1</sup> *Igarapés* are waterways, river branches, or channels in the Amazon region.

*Program Components (Prosamim I):*

<b>COMPONENT 1 – ENVIRONMENTAL, URBAN, AND HABITATIONAL IMPROVEMENT</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Macro- and microdrainage, urban reorganization and resettlement, parks and roads, sanitary infrastructure.</p> <p><b>Channels:</b> Projected: 4,600 m.</p> <p><b>Galleries:</b> Projected: 4,042.60 m.</p> <p><b>Dwellings:</b> Projected: 1,956.</p> <p><b>Parks:</b> Projected: 5.</p> <p><b>Avenues and urban roads:</b> Projected: 17,300 m.</p> <p><b>Bridge:</b> To restore.</p> <p><b>Sewage collection net:</b> Projected: 53,000 m.</p>	<p>By August 2009 the following results were attained:</p> <p><b>Channels:</b> Executed: 4,600 m.</p> <p><b>Galleries:</b> Executed: 1,511.65 m.</p> <p><b>Dwellings:</b> Executed: 969. Under execution: 372.</p> <p><b>Parks:</b> Executed: 3.</p> <p><b>Avenues and urban roads:</b> Executed: 10,900 m.</p> <p><b>Bridge:</b> Restoration inaugurated on September 25, 2008.</p> <p><b>Sewage collector net:</b> Executed: 31,598 m.</p>
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$154 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$160 million

<b>COMPONENT 2 – SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Community participation, social communication, environmental and sanitary education, institutional development focused on the territorial organization/AEIS, control of industrial pollution and solid waste and prevention against floods.</p>	<p><b>6313</b> families relocated from the <i>igarapés</i> Manaus, Bitencourt and Mestre Chico, Quarenta and Cachoeirinha, with the following solutions: compensations <b>2,289</b>; dwelling subsidies <b>1,986</b>; houses in the urbanized area <b>1,111</b>; dwelling units <b>969</b>.</p> <p>Reintroduction of economic activities – <b>97</b> compensations for restarting commercial activities; <b>45</b> financings with the AFEAM; <b>35</b> new entrepreneurs – Crafts Fair of the Manaus Residential Park.</p> <p>Post-resettlement monitoring– training of <b>60</b> waitresses; adult literacy <b>50</b>; information technology for youth and women – <b>198</b> registered; preparation for the college entrance exam of <b>63</b> children and adults.</p> <p><b>90</b> families oriented by the personal hygiene and food handling course; <b>75</b> training courses offered for professional formation; <b>1,875</b> people trained.</p> <p><b>Environmental and sanitary education</b> – actions for environmental awareness:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fourth Environment Week of Prosamim.</li> <li>• training course on environment, public health and environmental education; 40 multipliers.</li> <li>• environmental walk and collective cleansing action.</li> </ul> <p><b>Environmental monitoring:</b> Floods alert; QSSMA of works and processes; water analysis.</p> <p><b>Zoonoses control:</b> Rodent extermination: elimination and control process.</p> <p><b>Fauna rescue:</b> Rescue, rehabilitation, and return to the habitat.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$5 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$7.9 million</p>

## 2. Basic technical data from Pró Belém – Bacia do Una Program (Belém, PA) (Number of project: BR-L0055)

Total Amount: US\$152.550 million (US\$76,275 million loan from IDB; US\$76,275 million counterpart of the State of Pará).

Borrower: The State of Pará.

Executor: Companhia de Saneamento do Estado do Pará.

Period of execution: 1993–2004.

**Local context:** Due to the geographic location of Belém, and its climate, one-third of the city is located in wetland, flood-prone areas. The rapid population growth of recent decades led to the informal occupation of these areas, without any accompanying infrastructure. The city straddles five hydrographic basins, and Bacia do Una (“Basin of the Una”) is the most critically impacted; 511,207 people live there, of whom 34 percent are directly affected by flooding, which is a social and public health problem.

**Program objectives:** (1) To solve the flood problem in the low areas of Bacia do Una through the establishment of an efficient drainage system which opens out into the Guajará Bay; and (2) to provide appropriate infrastructure for all inhabitants of Bacia do Una in terms of access, coverage of drinking water, sewers and rainwater drainage, and garbage collection, in order to bring to this population the minimal environmental conditions to improve their living conditions.

**Program Components**

<b>COMPONENT 1 – DRAINAGE</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p><b>MACRODRAINAGE</b> (channels and floodgates):                      22.2 km of opening and/or improvement of channels.                      8.92 km without covering.                      13.28 km with covering, of which 7.54 km in stone gabion walls; 12.12 km in concrete; and 3.62 km in mortar plates.                      Installation of a floodgate system in the mouths of the Jacaré and Una Channels.</p> <p><b>MICRODRAINAGE</b> (pluvial net):                      69 km of net in reinforced concrete tube.                      6.2 km in reinforced concrete galleries;                      1,070 manholes; 2,310 shuv-holers; 1,190 collector boxes; 19.5 km of curbs/gutters; and 90 km of pipes in precast concrete.</p>	<p><b>MACRODRAINAGE</b> (channels and floodgates):                      24.9 km enlarged and improved:                      15.1 km without covering.                      9.78 km with covering, of which 0.48 km in stone gabion walls; 7.64 km in concrete; 1.32 km in reinforced concrete; and 0.52 km in ARMCO tube.</p> <p>Installation of hydraulic floodgates completed of 7 units in the Jacaré Channel and 18 units in the Channel of Una.</p> <p><b>Services performed and not projected:</b> acquisition and introduction of electromechanical and hydraulic equipment for the operation, cleaning, and maintenance of the floodgates.</p> <p><b>MICRODRAINAGE</b> (pluvial net):                      109 km of net in reinforced concrete tube; 0.34 km in reinforced concrete galleries; 2,768 manholes; 2,018 shuv holers; 5,876 collector boxes; 127 km of curbs/gutters; and 128 km of pipes in precast concrete.</p> <p><b>Services delivered and not projected:</b> 45 km of pluvial drainage in PVC tubes; 26 km of pipes covering in precast concrete plates.</p> <p>Landfills in backyards (an activity not projected in the project’s original plan): started in July 2000 and ended at late 2004, the project supplied 556,555 m<sup>3</sup> of sand-clay material, tools as hand carts, rubber gloves, and technical guidance for the landfills of the lots in the flooded areas along the channels and those directly affected by the draining works and roads construction; benefitted approximately 8,500 lots; the beneficiary supplied labor for this program.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b>                      US\$79.2 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b>                      US\$81.7 million</p>

<b>COMPONENT 2 – SANITATION</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p><b>SANITARY SEWERS:</b> Construction of a sanitary system based on individual and collective septic tanks; collection of sanitary mud and its treatment in drying beds, serving the 100 percent of the population of Bacia do Una. 31.0 km of main collector net; 127 km of house collector net; 1.35 km of interceptors; 24 Imhoff tanks; 19.6 km of auxiliary collector net; 13,286 house septic tanks; 873 km of auxiliary collector net; bell holes (amount not defined); complementary devices (not defined); drying beds for sanitary mud (not defined).</p> <p><b>DRINKING WATER:</b> Introduction of a water distribution system to serve 100 percent of Bacia do Una population: 153 km of distribution nets with pipes of 10 to 12 inches; 22,117 house connections with valves and hydrometers.</p> <p><b>PROTECTION OF THE RAW WATER RESERVOIRS:</b> Construction of 11.2 km of masonry and wire mesh walls and fences (2.4 meters high).</p>	<p><b>SANITARY SEWERS:</b> Sanitary system established and operating, achieving and/or surpassing the planned goals and outcomes.  14 km of main collector net. 293 km of house collector net. Not performed: substituted by 91 collective tanks. Not performed: 25,731 house septic tanks; 0.75 km of auxiliary collector net; 2,164 bell holes; 3,867 terminals for inspection and cleaning; installation of 24-cells mud dryer.</p> <p><b>DRINKING WATER:</b> At the end of the project, the following elements were introduced and made operational: 152 km of distribution nets with pipes of 10 to 12 inches; 28,500 house connections with valves and hydrometers.  Services introduced but not projected: system for the uptake and treatment and distribution of drinking water of Val-de-Cans, including six 270 meter-deep wells, three reservoirs of 1,200 m<sup>3</sup>, 1,300 m<sup>3</sup>, and 4,400 m<sup>3</sup>, an operation and treatment unit, and a booster station, serving the Barreiro and Val-de-Cans neighborhoods.</p> <p><b>PROTECTION OF THE RAW WATER RESERVOIRS:</b> Construction of 11.9 km of perimeter walls and fences, of which 2.12 km are masonry walls and 9.78 km are fences with concrete poles and galvanized wire.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$23.2 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$25.5 million</p>



<b>COMPONENT 3 – ROADS</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Paved roads, street with primary coating, including access for cleaning the channels, concrete and wood bridges, and metal footbridges for pedestrians:                      14.5 km of paved roads.                      143.5 km of roads with primary coating.</p> <p>BRIDGES AND FOOTBRIDGES:                      32 concrete bridge.                      14 wooden bridge.                      22 metal footbridges.</p>	<p>The following items were executed:</p> <p>82.53 km of paved roads.                      72.83 km of roads with primary coating.</p> <p>BRIDGES AND FOOTBRIDGES:                      41 concrete bridges.                      2 wooden bridges.                      36 footbridges: 8 made of metal and 22 of concrete.</p>
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$25.5 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$41.4 million

<b>COMPONENT 4 – MICROMEASUREMENT</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Acquisition and installation of 100,000 house hydrometers, from 3 m<sup>3</sup> to 20 m<sup>3</sup>; acquisition of spare parts; improvement of the workshops for the maintenance of the hydrometers.</p>	<p>Acquisition of 122,400 hydrometers; acquisition and installation of 74 macrometers; acquisition of 25,000 spare parts; reforms in the workshops for the measurement and maintenance of hydrometers and the acquisition of electronic measurement consoles and computational equipment for the users' cadastral update.</p>
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$79.2 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$81.7 million

<b>COMPONENT 5 – EQUIPMENTS AND COMPLEMENTARY ACTIVITIES</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Acquisition of different equipment for the Belém Municipality to be used in the collection and disposal of solid waste, the maintenance of channels and drainage systems, and the road system.</p> <p><b>Projected investment:</b>                      US\$6.92 million</p> <p>Acquisition of 9 trucks for maintaining the sewer and drinking water system.</p>	<p>Acquisition of the equipment needed by the Municipality of Belém to collect and eliminate solid waste, the maintenance of the channels and drainage systems, and the road systems.</p> <p><b>Executed investment:</b>                      US\$7.86 million</p> <p>Acquisition of equipment, as defined by COSANPA, for the maintenance of the sewer and drinking water system.</p>
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$622.8 thousand	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$710.52 thousand

<p>Expropriation and resettlement of families: dispossession of 2,809 lots, houses, and fair stands to allow drainage systems and other works for the project; 1,400 dispossessions with lots donations to the families concerned; 600 families with cash compensation; 500 families completely or partially compensated, without donation of lots.</p> <p>dispossession of 309 fair stands. expropriation/acquisition of 16 ha of land for resettling the families.</p> <p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$14.08 million</p> <p><b>Environmental education and community action:</b> To develop community awareness about the need to protect the environment, introducing concepts related to health and sanitation measures, and supplying them with means that allow for managing and maintaining the improvements, mainly with respect to the septic tanks and garbage collection.</p>	<p>Expropriation and resettlement of families: by the end of the project, 4,641 compensations and/or resettlement of families/owners or fair traders were performed; 2,311 dispossessions with donation of dwelling lots to the families concerned; 605 families with cash compensation; 1,347 families completely or partially compensated without lots donation.</p> <p>dispossession of 321 fair stands of the Old Barreiro market. expropriation of 13 areas (total 64 ha) for resettling 2,311 and families, and relocation of 329 fair traders with selling stands in the new Barreiro fair.</p> <p>Not projected, but executed actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• delivery of a basic basket and construction materials, handed over to tenants, amounting to US\$650,116.</li> <li>• compensation for 1,398 unsafe buildings because of the execution of the works and the landfills in backyards, amounting by the end of 2004 to US\$650,116.</li> </ul> <p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$46.13 million</p> <p><b>Environmental education and community action:</b> Principal actions performed within the frame of PEA and the Community Action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 18,308 technical guidance home visits.</li> <li>• training of 78 technicians as Community Agents for Environmental Sanitation Education.</li> <li>• training of 13,300 pupils in 11 schools of Bacia do Una, with a focus on health, sanitation, and the environment.</li> <li>• implementation of the first meeting of Una dwellers, with 470 participants, of which 380 delegates represented the communities (May, 2001).</li> <li>• 8 meetings by each sub-basin and CRPP, preparing for the First Conference, with 1,173 participants involved (2003).</li> <li>• Conference of Bacia do Una, in December 2003, with 392 participants and election of the Managing Council of the Basin.</li> <li>• environmental education seminar, with an attendance of 205 multiplier agents (April 2004).</li> <li>• 8 environmental meetings, by sub-basin and CRPP, with 357 participants (May 2004).</li> <li>• seminar for the oversight commissions with 222 attending delegates (December 2004).</li> <li>• environmental dissemination and training through media; seminars; community leaders training; distribution of didactic materials, posters, brochures, and in the communities, schools, and NGOs.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$660 thousand</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$1.09 million</p>

**Deliverables and outcomes:** opening and improvement of the main channels (29.4 km), installation of floodgates in the mouths of the Jacaré (7) and Una (18) channels; establishment of a system for rainwater and microdrainage networks; removal of residual flooding pockets in 8,500 lots; installation of a complete sanitary sewer system, based on 25,731 septic tanks, 91 collecting tanks, wells, and terminals for inspection and cleaning, 293 km of house collector net, 14 km of main collector net, a system for the disposal, treatment, and drying of sanitary mud originating from the project's pits; and the installation of 152 km of drinking water distribution networks.

### 3. Basic technical data of the Program for the Rehabilitation of the Central Area in São Paulo – Procentro (São Paulo, SP) (Number of project: BR-L0391)

Total amount: US\$167.4 million (US\$100.4 million loan from IDB, US\$67 million counterpart from the Municipality of São Paulo).

Borrower: Municipality of São Paulo.

Executor: Municipal Urbanization Company (Empresa Municipal de Urbanização, or EMURB).

**Period of execution:** 2003–in course.

**Local context:** The city of São Paulo, with 10.4 million inhabitants, is the core of one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world, comprising 39 municipalities and up to 18 million people. The Municipality of São Paulo manages around 3 million formal jobs, and its economy is larger than that of many countries. Its GDP for 2000, estimated at nearly US\$85 billion, represents almost 18 percent of the country's GDP. The municipality is the center of the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (RMSP), which in turn is the center of the state of São Paulo and the center of the Brazilian economy.

Like all large metropolitan areas, the central area of the municipality suffers from several factors, such as decline in property value and in population size, changes in the social and economic profile, deterioration of the urban environment, transport and circulation problems, and lack of investment in technology.

**Program objective:** To foster the economic and social development of the central area of São Paulo. Its purpose is to boost and create conditions for attracting and supporting activities compatible with the metropolitan center, promoting urban and environmental rehabilitation and ensuring social inclusiveness by (i) reversing the decline in real estate values and building up residential real estate, (ii) transforming the economic and social situation, (iii) enhancing the urban environment, (iv) improving urban transportation and circulation, and (v) strengthening municipal institutions.

**Program Components:**

<b>COMPONENT 1 – REVERSION OF THE REAL ESTATE DEVALUATION AND RECLAIMING THE RESIDENTIAL FUNCTION</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>This component will aim to generate the incentives needed to revert the processes of real estate devaluation and loss of the residential function of the city center. For that, 3 subcomponents have been identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• elaboration of urban legislation proposals.</li> <li>• urban interventions.</li> <li>• program financing.</li> </ul>	<p>There are no results, because the program is still in progress.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$28.9 million</p>	<p><b>In progress</b></p>

<b>COMPONENT 2 – TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROFILE</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>This component will comprise actions related to the promotion of local economic development through the creation of incentives for the renewal of the productive fabric, including micro and small businesses, aiming to attract companies from the high technology tertiary sector. The subcomponents projected to be financed are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of a mechanism for linkage with the private sector.</li> <li>• dissemination of the program.</li> <li>• regularization of the informal sector and attention to vulnerable groups.</li> </ul>	<p>There are no results, because the program is still in progress.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$19.2 million</p>	<p><b>In progress</b></p>

<b>COMPONENT 3 – ENHANCEMENT OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>This component will support actions to improve the functions of maintenance and the refurbishment of public spaces, deteriorated monuments, and buildings. The following subcomponents have been identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• operation and maintenance management.</li> <li>• refurbishment of public spaces.</li> <li>• building refurbishment.</li> <li>• flood control.</li> <li>• solid waste management.</li> </ul>	<p>There are no results, because the program is still in progress.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$62.9 million</p>	<p><b>In progress</b></p>

<b>COMPONENT 4 – IMPROVEMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND ITS CIRCULATION</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>This component will support the introduction of reforms in the municipal public transport system, as well as the execution of works and the acquisition of equipment. It has the following subcomponents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• institutional strengthening.</li> <li>• circulation and accessibility.</li> <li>• public transport.</li> <li>• traffic control.</li> </ul>	<p>There are no results, because the program is still in progress.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$38.5 million</p>	<p><b>In progress</b></p>

<b>COMPONENT 5 – MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>This component will strengthen municipal institutional capacity, complementing specific components of the program, and will finance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the strengthening of the municipal urban planning system.</li> <li>• support to the transfer of municipal bodies to the center.</li> <li>• the training of social managers.</li> </ul>	<p>There are no results, because the program is still in progress.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$9.1 million</p>	<p><b>In progress</b></p>

#### **4. Basic technical data of the Program for the Improvement of Favelas in São Paulo – Cingapura/PROVER (São Paulo, SP) (Number of project: BR-L0210)**

Total amount: US\$250 million (US\$150 million loan from the IDB; US\$100 million, counterpart of the Municipality of São Paulo).

Borrower: Municipality of São Paulo.

Executor: Municipal Housing and Urban Development Secretariate Department (Secretaria Municipal de Habitação e Desenvolvimento Urbano, or SE-HAB).

Period of execution: 1996–2004.

**Local context:** In 1996, during the preparation phase, the city of São Paulo had 11.6 million inhabitants, of whom 1.3 million were defined as *favelados* (living in favelas). Within this universe, it was confirmed that a significant percentage of families (45 percent) corresponded to intra-urban migrants, previously living in slums, and/or increasingly impoverished middle-low class neighborhoods. It was therefore estimated that the income level of two-thirds of these families was under the poverty line. Facing this demand, there was a limited affordable housing supply and developable areas for the low-income populations.

**Program objective:** To improve the living, social, and environmental conditions of the low-income population through *favela* urbanization and regularization of lot divisions eligible for the program in the Municipality of São Paulo. The specific objectives are related to two of the program's components: (i) *favela* urbanization, and (ii) regularization of lot divisions.

**Program Components:**

<b>COMPONENT 1 – FAVELAS URBANIZATION</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
Urbanization, basic infrastructure, and construction in approximately 20 <i>favelas</i> , covering close to 11,000 low-income families (9,000 apartments and 2,000 basic houses).	<p>In the 19 areas covered, 8,942 dwelling units were built and delivered: 8,384 apartments and 496 basic houses.</p> <p>Two <i>favelas</i>, Heliópolis and Nicaragua Vila da Paz, were urbanized incorporating other types of housing units: 62 housing units in overlapping houses; 74 urbanized lots; and 52 commercial points (with residential area above them).</p> <p>In total, 9,068 housing solutions were executed in this component, benefiting 37,900 people; this outcome amounts to 82.5 percent of the established goal. Until the end of the program, all the areas included complementary works of basic infrastructure, sanitary sewers, water, street paving, and the like.</p> <p>The elaboration was financed by 16 executive projects for <i>favela</i> urbanization from the Bairro Legal Program of SEHAB, introduced in 2001.</p>
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$177.8 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$152.6 million

<b>COMPONENT 2 – LOT REGULARIZATION</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
Basic infrastructure works serviced in 21,000 land lots, benefiting around 100,000 dwellers.	31,890 lots covered, benefiting 41,375 families with basic infrastructure works by the end of December 2004; 14,885 lots with legal titles.
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$41.3 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$42.9 million



<b>COMPONENT 3 – INSTITUCIONAL STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING POLICIES</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Aiming to better organize the Popular Housing Superintendence (Superintendência de Habitação Popular, or HABI) and the Land Divisions Regularization Department (Departamento de Regularização do Parcelamento do Solo, or RESOLO), the program intended to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) develop an integrated system of information, necessary for the planning, programming, and monitoring of the program.</li> <li>(ii) acquire computers.</li> <li>(iii) train and develop human resources</li> <li>(iv) assemble and put into action field teams for land use and occupation control.</li> <li>(v) implement a digital process for the geographic information system.</li> </ul> <p>Traditionally, the program considered sectoral studies focused on assessment and a plan of action for the rental housing market, the identification of obstacles in the purchase of new dwellings by low-income families, and the development of housing policies.</p>	<p>Throughout its 8 years of execution, the component achieved the following results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) introduction of the Monitoring and Control System (Sistema de Acompanhamento e Controle, or SAC), a managing tool for the elaboration of budgets; the record of suppliers contracts; the design of measurements and its respective payments; preparation and issuing of managerial reports and disbursement applications.</li> <li>(ii) acquisition and installation of computing and furniture goods, as well as training 830 officials in information technology.</li> <li>(iii) management training process, proposed by the Economic Research Institute Foundation of the University of São Paulo (Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas da Universidade de São Paulo, or FIPE-USP) at the end of 1997, and only performed from May to December 2000 by the Management Institute Foundation (Fundação Instituto de Administração, or FIA/USP), training 80 technicians; events were convened about land titling regularization (November 2002); seminar with the World Task Force for <i>Favela</i> Urbanization (April 2003), and evaluation and lessons learned from the program (November 2003).</li> <li>(iv) complete restructure of RESOLO during the most recent management, with quantitative and qualitative growth of staff in the social, legal, and procedural areas, and training of local environmental agents.</li> <li>(v) introduction of digital processes at the beginning of the program’s execution, making the development of projects for lot divisions of RESOLO more fluent; establishment of a database for the whole municipality; and identification through aerial photos.</li> </ul> <p>The HABI and RESOLO diagnosis, including the identification of hurdles in the purchase of new dwellings, was performed by FIPE-USP from May to October 1997. In March 1998, the Social Action Plan of the Subprogram for the Recovery of Deteriorated Buildings for Housing or Mixed Uses (Plano de Ação Social do Subprograma de Recuperação para Uso Habitacional ou Misto de Edificações Deterioradas) was approved, aiming to encourage development activities in communities and improvements in the housing conditions of families living in slums. Several sectoral studies on the inhabitants of the <i>favelas</i> in São Paulo were also produced.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$2.4 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$2.2 million</p>

**Overall outputs and outcomes:** Cingapura/PROVER reached 217,140 low-income people distributed between the *favelas* urbanization component (37,900) and the lot regularization component (179,240). It improved their housing, urban, and environmental conditions, and enhanced their access to water, sanitary sewer, garbage collection, and energy services.

## 5. Basic technical data of the Integrated Urbanization Program for the Baixada Fluminense Neighborhoods – Nova Baixada (Baixada Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro) (Number of project: BR-L0242)

Total amount: US\$300 million (US\$180 million loan from the IDB, US\$120 million counterpart of the State of Rio de Janeiro).

Borrower: State of Rio de Janeiro.

Executor: State Department for Governmental Integration.

Period of execution: 1999–2007.

**Local context:** The Baixada Fluminense region is part of Rio de Janeiro's Metropolitan Region, and is made up of the municipalities of Belford Roxo, Duque de Caxias, Japeri, Magé, Nova Iguaçu, Queimados, São João de Meriti, and Mesquita. Today, these municipalities host a population of 4.3 million people (versus around 3.4 million in 2000). This is one of the most densely populated regions in the state, which has, proportionally, the highest number of people living in precarious conditions of health, safety, education, and employment, among others. Those conditions are worsened by the high population density and informal occupation, with higher levels in the lower part of the Iguaçu river's basin, which is subject to floods. Such conditions cause problems of health and are potentially life-threatening, as well as severe economic losses.

**Program objective:** To improve the quality of life of the population from specific neighborhoods of the Baixada Fluminense, especially the health and sanitation conditions, with the aim of relieving the negative impact of poverty. The program was divided into the following three phases: in a first phase, at four pilot areas in Chatuba (Nova Iguaçu municipality, subsequently named Mesquita after the dismemberment of the municipality), Bairro Lote XV (Belford Roxo municipality), Olavo Bilac (Duque de Caxias municipality), and Bairro Jardim Metr pole (S o Jo o de Meriti municipality); in a second phase, at the neighborhoods of Santa Terezinha (Mesquita), Xavantes (Belford Roxo), Centen rio (Duque de Caxias), and Coelho da Rocha (S o Jo o de Meriti); and in a third phase, at the neighborhoods of  den (S o Jo o de Meriti), Parque Fluminense (Duque de Caxias), Heli polis (Belford Roxo), and Carmari (Nova Iguaçu).

The program aims to create a lasting impact on the region urban environment, by an integral approach to neighborhoods improvement including: (i) the introduction of urban management systems, involving the active engagement of the population in monitoring the supply and maintenance of municipal services; (ii) the improvement of sanitary conditions and health care services; and (iii) the establishments of an integrated urbanization model that can be reproduced throughout the region.

**Program Components:**

<b>COMPONENT 1 – NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>Integrated urbanization interventions in 12 neighborhoods from the 4 municipalities that benefitted from the program: Duque de Caxias, Novo Iguaçu, Mesquita, Belford Roxo, and São João do Meriti, which include part of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro.</p> <p>The plan was to undertake urbanization works and to establish public services including:</p> <p>(a) basic sanitation; (b) street paving; (c) garbage collection; (d) lighting in public areas; (e) health care services; (f) arborization; (g) day care centers; (h) environmental education; (i) recreational areas; (j) promotion of job opportunities; and (k) public safety.</p> <p><b>(a1) Basic sanitation:</b> 54,000 families to be provided access to water and sewage network connection.</p> <p><b>Water supply:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To install 80 km of water mains.</li> <li>• To rehabilitate 10 km of water mains.</li> </ul> <p>• To provide 105,000 homes with connection to a water main.</p> <p><b>Sewage:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To install 430 km of sewage main.</li> <li>• To rehabilitate 15 km of sewage main.</li> </ul> <p>• To install 12 pumping stations.</p>	<p>The component integrated urbanization interventions performed in 8 neighborhoods from the 4 municipalities that benefitted from the program, taking into account the Mesquita Municipality, after its administrative change from the Nova Iguaçu Municipality.</p> <p>The integrated urbanization interventions in the Xavantes neighborhood, previously planned, were not performed; however, in that neighborhood, all the social service actions were carried out, including the construction of two day care centers and two family health care centers. In the Carmari neighborhood, the program established the Integrated Center for Women's Care, although the integrated urbanization interventions were not completed.</p> <p><b>(a1) Basic sanitation:</b> 43,400 families served.</p> <p><b>Water supply:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 126.10 km of water mains installed.</li> <li>• Not executed: there were no preexisting water mains, or any in need of rehabilitation.</li> <li>• 14,583 homes provided with a connection to a water main.</li> </ul> <p><b>Sewage:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 412.81 km of sewage main installed.</li> <li>• Not executed: there were no preexisting sewage mains or any in need of rehabilitation. 11 pumping stations installed, of which 3 are in operation, 4 were transferred to CEDAE, and 4 are waiting to be transferred to the CEDAE.</li> </ul>

<p><b>(a2) Drainage:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To install 280 km of drainage main (revised goal from ISDP: 227 km).</li> <li>• To rehabilitate 70 km of drainage main.</li> <li>• To undertake retaining works (not measured).</li> </ul> <p><b>(b) Paving:</b> To pave streets: initial goal of 260 km; revised goal (ISDP) of 1,300,000 m<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p><b>(c) Urban cleanup (garbage collection systems):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To install 16 support centers.</li> <li>• To implement a 16-unit condominium system.</li> <li>• To serve 105,000 families.</li> </ul> <p><b>(d) Public lighting:</b> Removed from the PNB scope, applying only to some streets and public areas (squares); original goal: 260 km.</p>	<p><b>(a2) Drainage:</b> 411 km of drainage main, with the execution of the following services: 406,10 km of pluvial water drainage and 4.92 km of home drainage. Retaining works: not executed. <b>(Obs:</b> the projects prioritized the lower parts, according to the resources availability, and the retaining works were unnecessary.) The following services were executed, in channels and ditches:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 11.13 km of ditches.</li> <li>• 228,554 m<sup>3</sup> of existing channel and ditch drainage.</li> </ul> <p>The revised goal of the drainage subcomponent was exceeded in more than 81 percent of the ditches and channels.</p> <p><b>(b) Paving:</b> 1,313,187 m<sup>2</sup> of paved roads, with the following types of paving: asphalt concrete; 1,098,083 m<sup>2</sup>; paving stone 76,397 m<sup>2</sup>; concrete 138,707 m<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p><b>(c) Urban cleanup (garbage collection systems):</b> 4 recyclable trash storing facilities and 1 supporting unit for urban cleanup were constructed, but the Métropole Garden Unit (Unidade de Jardim Metrópole) is being operated by the Office of the Mayor of São João de Meriti, servicing 15,000 beneficiaries. Of the other 3 centers, the Office of the Mayor of Belford Roxo and Duque de Caxias operate 2 of them. The supporting post for urban cleanup built in the Chatuba neighborhood, and the recyclable garbage storing unit in the Lote XV neighborhood are out of use. If the mayor's office operates the 3 centers until the end of the Nova Baixada Program (PNB), more than 74,000 beneficiaries will be served.</p> <p><b>(d) Public lighting:</b> Removed from the PNB scope, applying only to some streets and public areas (squares); 18.7 km of lighting installed in streets and squares.</p>
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<p><b>(e) Local health care services – health module:</b> 54,000 families covered by the Family Health Care and Community Health Agents Programs (Programas de Saúde da Família e de Agentes Comunitários de Saúde) in 18 health centers, to be built or reformed, and equipped.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To install, or reform and equip, 24 health centers (original goal); this goal was revised by ISDP to 18 centers.</li> <li>• Selecting and training of 2,500 community health agents to serve 105,000 families.</li> <li>• Selecting and training of 250 health professionals to serve 52,500 families (ISDP goal of 54,000 families).</li> </ul> <p><b>(f) Arborization:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To arborize 375 km of streets.</li> </ul> <p><b>(g) Day care centers:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To create and equip 18 day care centers (2 in each neighborhood) to serve 1,800 children.</li> <li>• To train 324 teachers and officers (original goal was 32 centers to receive 2,400 children, and to train 567 teachers and officers).</li> </ul>	<p><b>(e) Local health care services – health module:</b> 54,026 families covered (average/years) by the Family Health Care and Community Health Agents programs in 17 family health units.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17 health centers were installed and/or reformed, and equipped, which today cover 54,026 families.</li> <li>• The selection and training of community health agents was not performed, because the municipality could not assure the payments.</li> <li>• The program trained 481 health professionals (doctors, nurses, dentists, and agents), serving 54,026 families; this program, which has performed well, was introduced by PNB, and currently is one the municipal public policies. The mixed health centers are reviewed in component 2.</li> </ul> <p><b>(f) Arborization:</b> 7,277 trees were planted (close to 1 tree per 50 meters) reaching 97 percent of the projected goal in public squares, streets, and social areas.</p> <p><b>(g) Day care centers:</b> 15 day care centers established; 1,560 children are being hosted at 13 fully operating day care centers, and other centers are already built and operating with limitations, awaiting the bidding process. 507 teachers and officers trained.</p> <p><b>Obs.</b> The establishment of day care centers by PNB, though insufficient for all the local needs, was important to serve an important sector of the population, and emphasize that partnerships could be solutions for implementing new centers. The highly positive aspects of the program and its educational content are worth noting.</p>
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<p><b>(h) Environmental education</b> (community development; environmental and sanitary education):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To plan and perform 4,500 home visits and 90 community events.</li> <li>• To perform 16 workshops to deepen the participative diagnosis.</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To carry out 16 workshops to jointly prepare education and communication tools in each neighborhood.</li> <li>• To visit 90,000 families (twice).</li> <li>• To carry out 24 training workshops for community health agents.</li> <li>• To perform 24 training workshops for community representatives.</li> <li>• To perform 24 training workshops for community street sweepers.</li> <li>• To perform 47 training workshops for multipliers.</li> <li>• To perform 48 training workshops for community women leaders.</li> </ul> <p><b>(i) Recreational areas:</b> The objective was the acquisition of land; the construction, recovery, and supply of park equipment, multiple-use courts, soccer fields, and playgrounds.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To construct 32 squares/recreational areas.</li> <li>• To rehabilitate 28 squares/recreational areas.</li> <li>• To equip 60 recreational areas.</li> </ul> <p><b>(j) Promotion of jobs and income:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To plan and perform 64 professional training courses.</li> <li>• To identify and train 700 entrepreneurs.</li> </ul>	<p><b>(h) Environmental education</b> (community development; environmental and sanitary education):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4,660 home visits and 73 community events took place.</li> <li>• The workshops for deepening the participative diagnosis were not performed.</li> </ul> <p><b>Obs.</b> It was not possible to achieve this goal because the committees lacked the infrastructure they needed to disseminate the information, although several meetings took place, more frequently during the PNB project execution. The results of these efforts, along with the results from the social movements, will be summarized in a document.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 30 workshops jointly prepared educational and communication tools in each neighborhood.</li> <li>• Visited 18,000 families.</li> <li>• 32 training workshops performed for community health agents.</li> <li>• The training workshops for community representatives and street sweepers were not performed.</li> <li>• 48 performed training workshops for multipliers.</li> <li>• 240 training workshops for community leaders performed.</li> </ul> <p><b>Obs.</b> The training workshops for community representatives and street sweepers were not performed because the condominium urban cleaning system was not adopted.</p> <p><b>(i) Recreational areas:</b> 11 squares were constructed and 3 were rehabilitated, all of which are currently in use. The park projected in the recovery project for the Polder Alberto de Oliveira area will have its area leveled, and the other activities considered in the project have been excluded from its scope, due to constraints in resources.</p> <p><b>(j) Promotion of jobs and income:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 56 professional training courses were completed, with 4,041 people trained, including potential entrepreneurs.</li> </ul>
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<p><b>(k) Security and citizenship:</b> No initial goal; goal revised with ISDP in the infrastructure component. Establishment of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4 legal delegations.</li> <li>• 3 special delegations for women who are victims of violence.</li> <li>• 1 shelter for women who are victims of violence.</li> <li>• 1 integrated center for women's care.</li> </ul>	<p><b>(k) Security and citizenship:</b> The works in progress for a legal delegation and a special delegation for women who are victims of violence in São João de Meriti were interrupted; they restarted in September of 2007 with a goal to be finished in the first quarter of 2008. The other legal delegations and delegations for women who are victims of violence considered in Duque de Caxias, Mesquita and Nova Iguaçu were removed from the PNB's scope, and planned for construction with resources from the State, programmed for 2008. The shelter for women who are victims of violence and the integrated center for women's care are included in the services complementary infrastructure component.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$212 million.</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$207 million.</p>

<b>COMPONENT 2 – INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS AND COMPLEMENTARY PUBLIC SERVICES</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>The following activities were expected to support the previous component: (a) establishment of sewage treatment plants and collecting trunks; (b) water reservoirs for distribution; (c) pipelines for treated water; (d) macrodrainage works; (e) construction of up to 5 citizenship community centers, and reform of up to 3; (f) the reform of up to 4 mixed health centers.</p> <p><b>(a) Sewage treatment plants:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To install 3 sewage treatment plants (ISDP revised goal: 2 plants).</li> <li>• To install 50 km of trunk collectors and 12 km of secondary collectors.</li> </ul>	<p>The component executed the infrastructure and complementary public services works, benefitting the population in 9 neighborhoods of the 5 beneficiary municipalities, including the Mesquita Municipality after the administrative change in the Municipality of Nova Iguaçu.</p> <p><b>(a) Sewage treatment plants</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 plants installed: the Joinville plant has already been transferred to CEDAE, and will be recovered through resources from the Program for Growth Acceleration, and the Orquídea plant is currently in operation.</li> <li>• 19.44 km of sewage trunk collectors installed and in operation. The component also includes the execution of 6.07 km of hold pressure and 1.73 km of emissary.</li> </ul> <p><b>Obs.</b> The program fell short of its goal due to the exclusion of neighborhoods that lacked resources, as well the change of the installment place of the Orquídea plant. It is important to point out that the other neighborhoods' sewage system, whose contribution is assigned to the Sarapuí plant, executed in the context of PDBG, still depends on future actions.</p>



<p><b>(b) Water reservoirs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To build 4 water reservoirs (ISDP revisited goal: to install 2 water reservoirs of 30.000m2 at Bairro de Chatuba).</li> <li>To build 5 water pumps (this item was not covered in the initial goal but is part of the revised goals [ISDP]).</li> </ul> <p><b>(c) Treated water mains:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To install 12 km of treated water mains (initial goal).</li> </ul> <p><b>(d) Macrodrainage systems:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To install 40 km of macrodrainage systems.</li> </ul> <p><b>(e) Citizenship community centers:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5 centers to be constructed and equipped.</li> <li>To train 5 teams for the community centers (revised goal ISDP: 3 teams).</li> </ul> <p><b>(f) Health centers:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To reform and equip 4 health centers.</li> </ul> <p><b>(g) Public safety:</b> To establish and implement legal delegations: 3 special delegations for women who are victims of violence, 1 shelter for women who are victims of violence, and 1 integrated center for women's care (according to the operational regulations, the centers were projected in the neighborhoods improvement component).</p>	<p><b>(b) Water reservoirs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A 7.500m2 water reservoir installed at Bairro de Chatuba by PNB (84 percent of goal completed), which will be complemented with waterproofing by the CEDAE. The operation of the reservoir is conditioned to the end of the works and connections to be executed by CEDAE, through the Program for Growth Acceleration, PAC. The second projected unit was removed from the PNB scope, and direct delivery was used instead;</li> <li>The 5 water pumps were removed from the PNB scope.</li> </ul> <p><b>(c) Treated water mains:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.12 km of water mains installed, which, due to limited resources, was only 18 percent of the initial goal.</li> </ul> <p><b>(d) Macrodrainage systems:</b> The subcomponent of macro- and micro-drainage was executed within the neighborhood upgrading component.</p> <p><b>(e) Citizenship community centers:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 centers constructed, equipped, and in operation; 2 centers removed from the works scope of PNB.</li> <li>The staff training is being performed by the State Department for Social Assistance and Human Rights, which will manage the centers.</li> </ul> <p><b>(f) Health centers:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4 health centers were reformed, all of which were equipped and are in operation.</li> </ul> <p><b>(g) Public safety:</b> An integrated center for women's care was built and began to acquire goods and equipment, and its opening was planned for the first quarter of 2008. A shelter for women who are victims of violence was built, equipped, and has been in operation since May 2007. Currently it hosts 48 women and children, and has a capacity of 80 people.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$60.2 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$62.096 million</p>

<b>COMPONENT 3 – INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>The main objective of the component consists of the development of actions in support of the municipal governments, for the operation and follow-up of the subprograms under municipal responsibility.</p> <p><b>(a) Institutional strengthening through technical support to the municipal governments:</b></p> <p>1. Technical assistance for the establishment of decentralized administrative centers, and the reorganization of essential municipal services:</p> <p>1.1. To strengthen the managing committees created by the program, and to train the municipalities.</p> <p>2. Establishment of financial administration systems:</p> <p>2.1 To introduce a financial management module at the 4 beneficiary municipalities.</p> <p>2.2. To install a tax module at the 4 beneficiary municipalities.</p> <p>3. Training of municipal officials:</p> <p>3.1. To offer administrative and technical training courses for the operation of services and the maintenance of the installed equipment.</p> <p>3.2. To convene technical and operational training for the planning, installation, and monitoring of the municipal actions.</p> <p>The projected goals were originally estimated as part of the Institutional Development Component.</p>	<p>The component achieved the main objectives.</p> <p><b>(a) Institutional strengthening through technical support to the municipal governments:</b></p> <p>1. Technical assistance for the establishment of decentralized administrative centers, and the reorganization of essential municipal services:</p> <p>1.1. Weekly and monthly meetings were periodically performed during the program with the managing committees, and representatives from public entities, the mayor's office, and the involved communities.</p> <p>2. Establishment of financial administration systems:</p> <p>2.1. The system was introduced in 3 municipalities: Belford Roxo, where the system is in operation; the municipalities of Mesquita and São João de Meriti, where the system is not yet in operation; and the Municipality of Duque de Caxias opted for using a similar system (the SIAFEM).</p> <p>2.2. A tax model was installed in two municipalities: Belford Roxo, where the system is being fully used, and Mesquita Municipality, where it is not yet in operational use. The São João de Meriti Municipality has not yet expressed an interest for introducing the module, and in Duque de Caxias it was not accepted, because the municipality uses a similar system.</p> <p>3. Training of municipal officials:</p> <p>3.1. 16 courses were carried out, with the participation of approximately 1,500 officials (state and public). The courses addressed the following subjects: sanitation, environment, integrated urban project management, solid waste, environmental legislation, and training for the use of SIAFEM, among others. Besides the training courses, seminars and debate cycles also took place, including the following:</p> <p>3.2. Seminar for the dissemination of the monitoring and evaluation results; workshop – The Decentralization of Municipal Management: The Role of the Administrative Region.</p>

<p><b>(b) Monitoring and evaluation:</b></p> <p><b>1. Final evaluation (MO, M1, and M2):</b>          1.1. 3 projected evaluations, the last performed 8 months after the end of the contract.          To develop and assemble the system (initial goal positioned to the items (2.1), (2.2.) and (b.4) of this component).          1.2. To perform activities MO (initial goal 4).          1.3. To perform activities M1 (initial goal 4).          1.4. To perform activities M2 (initial goal 1).</p> <p><b>2. Impact evaluation of health conditions:</b>          A report was planned for the end of the third year of the loan contract's life.</p> <p><b>3. Impact evaluation of the program focused on improving the quality of life of the population:</b>          The prospect was for a report for each year.</p> <p><b>4. Integrated solutions for mapping – SIMCIDE, established in the 4 municipalities:</b>          To develop and assemble a SIMCIDE system.</p> <p><b>5. Installation of the program data record unit:</b>          Adaptation of the physical space of the CIDE Foundation's library and acquisition of archives (this item was not contemplated in the initial goals).</p>	<p>Participation: officials from the departments of works, planning, environment, health, education, treasury, and social action. The courses were given to professionals from the mayor's office and addressed the following subjects: sanitation, environment, government projects, project elaboration, among other. There is a frequent change in professionals, due to shifts in government, which generate new stages and new courses.</p> <p><b>(b) Monitoring and evaluation:</b></p> <p><b>1. Final evaluation (MO, M1, and M2):</b>          2 evaluations were performed, corresponding to the frames established for the Moment Zero (MO) and Moment One (M1). The MO was presented in two reports, the first corresponding to Phases I and II, excepting the Xavantes neighborhood, and the second was complementary, including the Xavantes and Heliópolis neighborhoods, belonging to the Phases II and II, respectively.          M1 is consolidated in the second impact evaluation report of the PNB on the improvement in the population's quality of life, which was presented to the IDB and approved in July 2006.          M2 will be performed by ERJ, 8 months after the end of the loan contract.</p> <p><b>2. Impact evaluation of health conditions:</b>          2 evaluations were submitted, one in November 2004, and the other in July 2006.</p> <p><b>3. Impact evaluation of the program focused on improving the quality of life of the population:</b>          2 reports were presented, 1 for each year.</p> <p><b>4. Integrated solutions for mapping – SIMCIDE, established in the 4 municipalities:</b>          The system was introduced at the 4 municipalities, including Mesquita. The elaboration of the SIMCIDE system in Java, to deliver a web tool, is being developed at the CIDE Foundation.</p> <p><b>5. Installation of the program data record unit:</b>          An archive was acquired for the CIDE Foundation's library, but the adaptation of the physical space was not implemented because of the lack of resources. The archive and technical memory of the program are under the responsibility of the executor body (SEOBRAS), and are constantly updated by the company that gives support to the program's management body.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b>          US\$4 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b>          US\$2.417 million</p>

**Outputs and outcomes:** (1) neighborhood improvement (81 percent of dwellers report improvement, with 43,400 families receiving basic sanitation services; 54,026 served by the family health care programs; 13 day care centers in operation, and 1,560 children served, among others); (2) complementary infrastructure and public services (2 sewage treatment plants, 19.44 km of sewage trunk collectors, a 7,500m<sup>2</sup> water reservoir, 2.12 km of sub-channels, 3 citizenship community centers, 4 reformed health centers, 1 integrated center for women's health care, and 1 shelter for women who are victims of violence); (3) institutional development (establishment of management committees and financial administration systems in 3 municipalities; training of an estimated 1,500 state and public officials; and installation of impact evaluation systems.

**Innovative character:** the Nova Baixada Program is a benchmark among public policies for gender safety in Brazil. For the first time, quantitative home-based research was performed in the country to determine the impact of conjugal violence against women. The results were published by the PNB and served as a parameter for the enforcement of public policies in defense of women victims of violence in the Baixada Fluminense. The model introduced at the program's day care centers, as well as the intervention model and the implemented advances in teaching, are being replicated in neighborhoods beyond the scope of the program.

## 6. Basic technical data of the Urbanization Program for Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro – (PROAP II) – Favela-Bairro II (Rio de Janeiro, RJ) (Number of project BR-L0250)

Total amount: US\$300 million (US\$180 million loan from the IDB and US\$120 million counterpart from the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro).

Borrower: Municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

Executor: Municipal Housing Department (Secretaria Municipal de Habitação, or SMH).

Period of execution: 2000–2006.

**Local context:** Like most of the Brazilian cities, Rio de Janeiro suffers from a severe problem of informal and messy urbanization, which has given rise to *favelas*. As years passed, the carioca *favelas* became both a reality and an irreversible process. The measures taken in previous periods by the municipal authorities to restrain the growth of the *favelas* and the irregular lot divisions through the removal and resettlement of families into housing estates far from the city did not have the desired effect as a viable strategy or a permanent solution.

Supported by Complementary Law No. 16, of June 4 1992, which established the Ten-Year Regulatory Plan (Plano Diretor Decenal) of the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1993, the GEAP (Grupo Executivo de Assentamentos Populares) (comprising eight departments and seven municipal entities of Rio de Janeiro) was created with the objective of proposing a housing policy for the municipality and launching actions to reverse urban deterioration. This initiative was the origin of Favela-Bairro.

Launched in 1994 with resources from the Office of the Mayor, Favela-Bairro received an additional boost through loan 898/OC-BR, signed with the Office of the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro in December 1995, for the amount of US\$180 million. These resources, together with US\$120 million in local counterpart funds, established the Popular Settlements Urbanization Program (Programa de Urbanização de Assentamentos Populares, or PROAP II). This financed a significant expansion of Favela-Bairro, reaching a total of 54 *favelas* (including 19

that benefited from the Office of the Mayor). PROAP II also incorporated basic infrastructure works in eight irregular lot divisions, from a total of 135 previously identified during the analysis mission, but of which half had already benefited or whose work was already in progress within other programs of the Office of the Mayor. PROAP II closed in December 2000, achieving almost all of the stated goals, finishing 284 works in 38 *favelas* and works in eight lot divisions, serving a population of 262,000 people (20 percent more than expected). Among the non-projected outcomes, the program progressed in the implementation of the POUOs, created the community street-sweepers, and advanced the introduction of community agents.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that PROAP II served as a laboratory that helped to consolidate Favela-Bairro—bringing concepts of urbanization to fruition—, demonstrate the viability of the program, and identify important lessons to enhance the process without losing the fine-tuning of the desired outcomes.

**Program objective:** To improve the quality of life of the low-income population living in *favelas* and irregular lot divisions (jointly called “settlements”) in the city of Rio de Janeiro, combining investments in infrastructure with social development actions. Based on the experiences and the lessons from PROAP I, a component was incorporated to serve children and teenagers, and another component for employment and income generation.

An additional component on institutional development will allow for the perfecting and application of a comprehensive system of monitoring and evaluation of Favela-Bairro, as well as training for officials in the Office of the Mayor, training of civil society organizations, and actions targeting the dissemination of the program to the communities.

**Program Components:**

<b>COMPONENT 1 – INTEGRATED URBANIZATION</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p>To reach, by the end of the project, 56,000 families in 52 <i>favelas</i> and 17 lot divisions that previously had no access to the services (logic frame).</p> <p><b>(a) Urban and social Infrastructure</b>  <b>(i) Basic sanitation:</b>                      100 percent of dwellers served with access to water, a sanitary system, and pluvial drainage net.                      Estimation: 425 km of water mains; 430 km of sewer mains; 232 km of drainage networks.</p> <p><b>(ii) Street paving and public lighting:</b>                      To pave 100 percent of the main streets and 80 percent of the secondary; to provide 100 percent of the main streets, and 60 percent of the secondary streets with public lighting.                      To install 11,132 lighting points.</p> <p><b>(iii) Geological risks:</b>                      To eliminate or mitigate the principal geological risks in 100 percent of <i>favelas</i>.</p> <p><b>(iv) Social equipment:</b>                      Each <i>favela</i> must have at least 1 daycare center, or another form of child care, to care for children from infancy to 4 years old, and 1 sports field.                      To install 49 daycare centers and 69 sports fields.</p> <p><b>(b) Community development actions</b>  <b>(i) Community participation in planning and execution:</b>                      100 percent of families of each community contacted and invited to participate in the program’s activities, of which 50 percent will participate at least once in meetings and other community activities.</p> <p><b>(ii) Educational actions in support of the projects, maintenance of the sanitary and social infrastructure, environmental protection and conservation:</b></p> <p>75 percent of dwellers consider that the maintenance and sanitary conditions of communities, during and after the program, improved.</p>	<p>75,796 families reached in 62 <i>favelas</i> and 16 lot divisions;</p> <p><b>(a) Urban and social Infrastructure</b>  <b>(i) Basic sanitation:</b>                      96 percent of dwellings in the areas with finished works have access to water and 90 percent have sanitary services. Water mains: 398 km; sewer mains: 411 km; drainage networks: 209 km.</p> <p><b>(ii) Street paving and public lighting:</b>                      9,890 lighting points installed and functioning.</p> <p><b>(iii) Geological risks:</b>                      100 percent of risks eliminated or mitigated in the urbanized area.</p> <p><b>(iv) Social equipment:</b>                      All the <i>favelas</i> have at least 1 daycare center and a sports field.</p> <p>39 daycare centers and 51 sports fields installed.</p> <p><b>(b) Community development actions</b>  <b>(i) Community participation in planning and execution:</b>                      The community participated in all the phases of the project.</p> <p><b>(ii) Educational actions in support of the projects, maintenance of the sanitary and social infrastructure, environmental protection and conservation:</b></p> <p>The indicator makes part of the group of 10 researched variables. The average for the 38 communities, for all the variables, was 6.4, the minimum 4.6, and the maximum 8.0.</p>

<p><b>(iii) Installment of support centers (POUSOs) to bring technical assistance to the communities during the consolidation phase:</b> POUSOs installed in 70 percent of <i>favelas</i> and meeting the urbanistic orientation demand. To establish 12 POUSOs (ISDP). Obs.: 70 percent would be the equivalent to 43 POUSOs.</p> <p><b>(c) Land-titling regularization:</b> (i) 100 percent of <i>favelas</i> and lot divisions will be declared as special social interest areas, 6 months after the works conclusion. (ii) 100 percent of projects for alignment and public spaces, recognized 6 months after the end of the works. (iii) 100 percent of dwellings in the <i>favelas</i> and lot divisions registered in the property tax cadastre 12 months after the works conclusion.</p>	<p><b>(iii) Installment of support centers (POUSOs) to bring technical assistance to the communities during the consolidation phase:</b> In progress: 18 percent of <i>favelas</i> supported with POUSOs (11 installed and operating).</p> <p><b>(c) Land-titling regularization:</b> (i) Goal accomplished: 100 percent of <i>favelas</i> and 100 percent of irregular lot divisions declared as special social interest areas. (ii) 86 percent of the projects for alignment of public spaces are underway. Its conclusion is projected for the first semester of 2007. (iii) None of the dwellings in the <i>favelas</i> and the lot divisions are registered in the property tax cadastre. The registration of properties depends on the conclusion of the alignment and the establishment of public spaces.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b> US\$422 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b> US\$424.661 million</p>

<b>COMPONENT 2 – ATTENTION TO CHILDREN AND TEENAGERS</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p><b>(a) Care of children from infancy to 4 years old</b> (i) Day care centers: 8,400 children served by daycare centers, which amounts to 30 percent of the potential demand; 100 percent of day care centers to deliver conditions for suitable nutritional and psychosocial care of children.  (ii) Training: To train at least 75 percent of professionals working in the daycare centers.</p> <p><b>(b) Care of children from 4 to 6 years old.</b> (i) Extension of the attendance time of children enrolled at the preschool level; 2,672 children from 4 to 6 years old cared for during integral educational hours, equivalent to 18 percent of the potential demand.</p>	<p><b>(a) Care of children from infancy to 4 years old</b> (i) Day care centers: Goal surpassed: 8,589 children are being served, with a specific nucleus monitoring in 39 daycare centers; all the day care centers delivered, through qualified staff, suitable conditions for nutritional and psychosocial care of children. (ii) Training: According to LDB 9394/96, the children's education is incorporated into the education system; all the professionals working in the day care centers have been trained.</p> <p><b>(b) Care of children from 4 to 6 years old</b> (i) Goal surpassed: 2,706 children cared for during integral educational hours.</p>



<p><b>(c) Care of children from 7 to 14 years old</b>                  (i) Retention and education reinforcement:                  To retain 2,750 children and teenagers (9 percent of minors in the selected communities) in the schools and improve their school performance.                  (ii) Youth:                  To provide guidance and support to 1,608 youth from 15 to 17 years through community programs.  <b>(d) Support for groups</b> in high-risk situations:                  (i) To care for at least 50 percent of children and teenagers in high-risk situations identified in each community and targeted by the program.                   (ii) Special attention for children with disabilities.                  To care for at least 50 percent of children with disabilities, and to integrate them into the community, family, and social life.                  (iii) Family and institutional integration:                  At least 50 percent of children served and integrated into the family.   <b>(e) Family (women in action):</b>                  At least 70 percent of women registered in the program will have to be trained as “guardians against social exclusion.”</p>	<p><b>(c) Care of children from 7 to 14 years old</b>                  (i and ii) Retention and education reinforcement:                  Achieved: 2,750 children from 7 to 14 years retained in school and 1,658 prepared.                  A total of 4,128 youth attended, of which 1,658 received guidance and support from the Youth Program.   <b>(d) Support for groups</b> in high-risk situations:                  (i) Concluded: 86,179 places created in Rio de Janeiro for the direct care of children and teenagers in high-risk situations (there was no monitoring of the specific coverage of the communities served by the program).                  (ii) Special attention for children with disabilities: Installed capacity of SMDS and SME to care for 100 percent of disabled children.                   (iii) Family and institutional integration:                  Installed capacity (86,179), without data about the success of the integration in the family; nevertheless, throughout the program, 11,073 children and teenagers received specific care oriented to integrate them into the family.  <b>(e) Family (women in action):</b>                  Concluded and goal surpassed: 1,543 women (96 percent of those registered) authorized to act as “guardians against social exclusion” in their communities.</p>
<p><b>Projected investment:</b>                  US\$25.5 million</p>	<p><b>Executed investment:</b>                  US\$19.231 million</p>

<p align="center"><b>COMPONENT 3 – JOB AND INCOME GENERATION</b></p>	
<p><b>PLANNED</b></p>	<p><b>PERFORMED</b></p>
<p><b>(a) Specialized training</b>                  (i) Professionalization courses:                  80 percent of students with completed courses; 16,442 workers to be trained in 15 training areas.                  (ii) 2,100 professionals to receive technical assistance and training.   <b>(b) Support to productive centers management</b>                  42 cooperatives and/or 30 in information technology, or other centers, to receive technical assistance to improve its service.</p>	<p><b>(a) Specialized training</b>                  (i) Professionalization courses:                  38,500 pupils and workers received training from OIE, of whom 80 percent concluded the courses.                  (ii) Goal surpassed: 2,889 professionals trained as management technicians and in CENATA projects.  <b>(b) Support to productive centers management</b>                  6 cooperatives in opening process and 30 information technology centers installed; 97,685 beneficiaries using the services offered by those cooperatives and centers.</p>

<b>(c) Schooling increase:</b> 4,400 workers to complete the school complementary programs and to receive their diplomas and certificates.	<b>(c) Schooling increase:</b> Goal surpassed: 13,319 people served by the program, with 5,215 of them graduating.
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$9 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$9.476 million

<b>COMPONENT 4 – INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT</b>	
<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>PERFORMED</b>
<p><b>(a) Monitoring and evaluation:</b></p> <p>(i) Research applied 6 months after the end of the works.</p> <p>(ii) Specific evaluation studies to be concluded.</p> <p><b>(b) Studies, training, and technical assistance</b></p> <p>(i) Studies performed, generating concrete proposals for proceedings and/or municipal urbanistic legislation.</p> <p>(ii) 100 officials trained in execution and management of social projects and applied engineering.</p> <p>(iii) 60 OSCs trained, of whom 40 percent increased their resources, applying the knowledge gained from the courses.</p> <p>(iv) Introduction of management methods and control systems of its decentralized activities.</p> <p><b>(c) Social communication:</b> Production and distribution of videos, posters, and media ads; papers and didactic materials used for disseminating information about the program.</p>	<p><b>(a) Monitoring and evaluation:</b> The computerized monitoring system of social actions was developed, and the SMAS team was trained for its use.</p> <p>(i) Concluded: the firm hired by the project applied research in 38 communities in 2004/2005, 6 months after the end of the respective works.</p> <p>(ii) Concluded: evaluation of the professionalization courses taught by COMUNITAS, CENEPEC, PAE, and by the hired firm in the other projects.</p> <p><b>(b) Studies, training, and technical assistance</b></p> <p>(i) Study performed in 2002: “Caracterização da ilegalidade urbanística, edilícia e fundiária na cidade do Rio de Janeiro” (AGRAR, 2002).</p> <p>(ii) Goal surpassed: 771 mayor’s office.</p> <p>(iii) 764 OSC technicians trained; the data on the number of OSC and the increase in the OSC resources is not available.</p> <p>(iv) Goal achieved: 10 Regional Social Assistance Coordinators (CRAs) were established in the 10 planning areas of the city.</p> <p><b>(c) Social communication:</b> Production of 11 educational videos and DVDs, 30,000 brochures, 3,000 books, and a weekly publication with program-related issues, in a high-circulation paper reaching 1 million people in Rio de Janeiro.</p>
<b>Projected investment:</b> US\$4.5 million	<b>Executed investment:</b> US\$5.19 million

**Outputs and outcomes:** (1) 75,796 families served in 62 *favelas* and 16 lot divisions with infrastructure (water, drainage systems, paved streets, street lighting, day care centers, and sports fields), and with community development actions, among them the installation of 11 POUOs; (2) 8,589 infants up to 4 years old attended, 2,706 between 4 and 6 years old, 2,750 from 7 to 14; and 1,658 youth trained; 86,179 positions created for children and teenagers in high-risk situations; 11,073 children and teenagers served, aiming to integrate them in the family; 1,542 women trained to act as “guardians against social exclusion”; (3) specialized training: 38,500 students and workers served; 2,889 professionals trained; creation of 6 cooperatives and 30 computer centers, benefiting 97,685 people; increase in school attendance: 13,319 people served, with 5,215 trained; (4) 711 technicians from the Office of the Mayor trained; 764 OSC technicians trained; 10 CRAs introduced; social communication increased.

## 7. Basic technical data of Procidades / Aracaju, or PAC / Aracaju (Aracaju, SE) (Number of project BR-L1084)

Total amount: US\$61 million (US\$30.5 million loan from the IDB, US\$30.5 million counterpart from the Municipality of Aracaju).

Borrower: Municipality of Aracaju.

Executor: Municipal Urbanization Company (EMURB).

Period of execution: Not executed; awaiting signature of the loan contract.

**Local context:** Among the Brazilian capitals, Aracaju is in 15<sup>th</sup> place in the Human Development Index. In spite of the expansion of municipal services in the past two years, precarious settlements still exist in the city, concentrated along the riverbanks, leading to risks and environmental problems. Seventy-two informal settlements were identified in Aracaju, where 15 percent of the municipality's population lives. These areas lack infrastructure (water, sanitation, drainage systems, street paving) and social services.

The actions for *favela* urbanization from Procidades/Aracaju are part of the program being developed by the municipality as a central element of its housing policy, integrated into the Municipal Strategic Plan for Subnormal Settlements (PEMAS), designed by the government in 2001 with HBB resources for 72 precarious settlements identified and registered in the PEMAS. These resources come from various sources, initially from the IDB, with HBB acting by appointment of the federal government (OGU and PAC), and funding from Procidades-IDB.

**Program objectives:** To improve the quality of life of the residents of the city of Aracaju by implementing integrated development actions. The specific objectives of the program are: (i) improvement of the urban, social, and sanitation conditions of the targeted neighborhoods; (ii) enhancement of urban mobility in the city by means of a better connectivity of the roads system; and (iii) strengthening of the institutional capacity of the Office of the Mayor.

**Components of the program:** There are three components: 1) integrated urban development (US\$35.2 million); 2) mobility and transport (US\$21.9 million); and 3) institutional strengthening (US\$1.4 million).

In the integrated urban development component, actions are financed for *favela* urbanization in the following areas of Aracaju: Jetimana, Senhor do Bonfim, Nova Libertade, and Coqueiral (the latter three include nearly 50 percent of the city's housing problem), as well as actions for the urban improvement of Bairro Novo, a neighborhood built with PAC financing.

## 8. Basic technical data of Procidades / Vitória, or Terra Mais Igual (Vitória, ES) (Number of project BR-L1057)

Total amount: US\$65 million (US\$39 million loan from the IDB, US\$26 millions counterpart of the Vitória Municipality).

Borrower: Vitória Municipality.

Executor: Maroralty of Vitória.

Period of execution: the execution of Procidades / Vitória started in 2006 and was integrated into a broader municipal program called Terra Mais Igual.

**Local context:** Although in 2000 this city had the fourth best human development index among Brazilian capitals, due to the rapid population growth of the past two decades, approximately 86,000 inhabitants (29 percent of Vitória's population) live in informal areas.

To tackle this problem, between 1996 and 2005 the municipality implemented the Programa Terra, whose objective was to address, in an integrated way, the principal basic infrastructure and social service needs in its 36 most vulnerable communities. In order to facilitate the interventions, 15 intervention areas were joined together. The Terra Program served nine priority intervention areas and 17,000 families. Subsequently, the municipality created Terra Mais Igual Program, which acts in 15 intervention areas that host close to 92,000 people and whose funding sources are HBB, PAT/PROSANEAR-BIRD, BNDES, PRÓ-MORADIA-CAIXA, PAC, and Procidades-IDB. The actions for *favela* urbanization of Procidades/Vitória are part of one of the program's components and serve 19 intervention areas, with 9,865 families, through interventions in basic infrastructure, social services, and regularization of land possession.

**Program objectives:** To contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of the dwellers of the Vitória municipality by executing urban and social projects through: (i) improvement of urbanization and environmental sanitation of low-income neighborhoods and extension of the equipment and social service network; (ii) the refurbishment of deteriorated zones of the city's center; (iii) improvement of the urban drainage system; and (iv) strengthening of the institutional capacity and service delivery by the Office of the Mayor.

**Program components:** There are four components: 1) support to Terra Mais Igual program; 2) requalification of the center; 3) urban drainage system; and 4) institutional strengthening and sectoral studies.

## 9. Basic technical data of Procidades/Curitiba Program, or Program for the Favelas Urbanization of COHAB-Paraná (Curitiba, PR) (Number of project BR-L1083)

**Total amount:** US\$100 million (US\$50 million loan from the IDB, US\$50 million counterpart of the Curitiba Municipality).

Borrower: Municipality of Curitiba.

Executor: Municipal Office of the Mayor of Curitiba (PMC) – COHAB-Paraná.

**Period of execution:** Beginning in 2009, the execution of Procidades/Curitiba began after this study started, although the original municipal program, called Morar em Curitiba (“To Live in Curitiba”) was already in execution since 2007.

**Local context:** In spite of a strong urban planning tradition, in 2002 Curitiba had 40,000 households in *favelas*, or 7.5 percent of all of the city’s dwellings. Sixty percent of the state’s housing deficit was concentrated in the city. The recent economic boom in Brazil caused large population growth in the metropolitan area, and has added urban problems and generated an increase in informal occupations.

Since the 1980s, COHAB has been working on the urbanization of favelas in the city. In 2007, with the development of the Land Regularization Plan for Environmental Preservation Areas, the Programa Morar emerged in Curitiba, whose goal was to address the irregular areas with households located in permanent preservation areas, with the intention of making housing actions compatible with environmental actions, as well as to deploy social work in the communities. That program, with a projected investment of 182 million reais, reaches 39 irregular areas of the city and approximately 8,800 families (that is, 35,200 people, or 30 percent of the city’s favelas), among which 4,600 will be resettled and 4,400 served through urbanization. It has resources from various sources, such as OAR, Imóvel na Planta, PSH, FGTS, HBB, MCMV, FON-PLATA, AFD, Resolutions 518 and 460, PAC and Procidades-IDB. It is one of the largest projects in Brazil in terms of resource volume for environmental recovery of at-risk areas: it straddles six hydrographic basins and 32km of riverbanks.



**Program objectives:** The overall objective of Procidades/Curitiba is to foster improvement in the quality of life of the residents of the municipality of Curitiba by funding urban and social projects in *favela* urbanization, as well as projects for mobilization and social development. The specific objectives are (i) to enhance the urbanization and environmental sanitation conditions of the targeted neighborhoods; (ii) to improve urban mobility, reducing transport costs and time spent commuting; (iii) to extend the coverage of the social assistance and citizen services in the areas with the fewest services available; and (iv) to strengthen the institutional capacity of PMC.

**Program components:** The program is structured in five components: (1) projects, studies and project management; (2) *favela* urbanization (infrastructure and social services<sup>1</sup>); (3) transport and urban mobility; (4) social development (extension of the social and citizens services network); and (5) institutional strengthening (improvements in human resource management, productivity, and quality of services).

## 10. List of people interviewed and participants in the meetings and field visits

### **PROSAMIM**

*Amiraldo Braga.* Commercial and Fares Director of the Agência Reguladora dos Serviços Públicos Concedidos of the State of Amazonas.

*Bárbara Santos.* Coordinator of Social and Community Participation of the Program Management Unit.

*Cristina Rodrigues.* Commercial Manager of the Empresa Estadual Águas do Amazonas.

*Fábio Costa.* Director-President of the Agência Reguladora dos Serviços Públicos Concedidos of the State of Amazonas.

*Frank Lima.* Executive Coordinator of the Program Management Unit

*Ibrahim.* Dweller, participant in the popular councils linked to the project.

*Jane Crespo.* Coordinator of the urbanization, infrastructure, and environmental area of the program management unit. Also present were the following municipal technicians and community representatives: *Abel* (dweller and neighborhood agent, Parque Residencial Jefferson Peres), *Carlos* (neighborhood agent, Parque Residencial Manaus), *Jeu* (representative of the Environmental Protection Institute of Amazonas), *Maria Rita* (teacher, social and environmental education technician), *Remy* (Subcoordination of Engineering), *Rener* (Coordination of Environment), *Sidney* (undersecretary of Public Clean-Up) e *Vieira* (representative from São Raimundo).

*José Dinis.* Administrative-financial Director of the Empresa Estadual Águas do Amazonas.

*Jucineide Araújo.* Technical Director of Franchises and Quality Regulation of the Empresa Estadual Águas do Amazonas.

*Lúcio Rabelo.* Deputy Coordinator of Institutional Relations of the Program Management Unit.

*Maria Elvira Rocha de Sá.* Responsible for social programs in the Belém Municipality. Though she has not participated in the program, she provided information about how the mayor's office incorporated the experience acquired.

Field visit, accompanied by the person in charge of infrastructure projects and manager of the constructing firm Andrade Gutierrez.

### **BACIA DO UNA**

*Ana Kláudia Perdigão.* Coordinator, technical assistance program for dwelling construction in the Paraíso dos Pássaros ensemble.

*Cicerino Cabral.* President, Companhia de Habitação do Estado do Pará during the project.

*Evandro Flexa Jr.* Technician, Municipal Sanitation Department of Belém.

*José Alexandre de Jesus da Costa.* Member of the Infrastructure Projects Inquiry Commission of Bacia do Una.

### **PROCENTRO**

*Nádia Somekh.* Former president of the Municipal Urbanization Company, from 2002 to 2004. Participated in the development of the program under the administration of Marta Suplicy (2001–2004).

*Renata Milanesi.* Coordinator of social participation of the program in the administration of Marta Suplicy, when it was called Ação Centro.

*Ricardo Grecco.* Deputy coordinator of Procentro for operations.

*Rubens Chammas.* Coordinator of Procentro.

*Sônia Cupersmid e Cleusa.* Both from the managing consortium of Procentro do consórcio gerenciador do Procentro.

Field visits accompanied by technicians from the program, to the Parque do Gato ensemble, Vila dos Idosos, and Olarias ensemble.

**CINGAPURA/PROVER**

*Bete França.* Coordinator, State Housing Department. Also present were technicians from the consulting firm Diagonal Urbana.

*Lair Krahenbul.* State Housing Secretary, formerly municipal housing secretary from 1993 to 1999.

Field visit to Heliópolis, accompanied by technicians from the State Housing Department.

**NOVA BAIXADA**

*Adir Ben Kauss.* Former undersecretary of public works in the state government of Rio de Janeiro, and coordinator of Nova Baixada, during the administrations of Anthony and Rosinha Garotinho (1999–2002 and 2003–2007, respectively).

*Christiane Hübner.* She wrote her thesis on Urban and Regional Planning about Nova Baixada.

*Cláudio Maximiano.* Superintendent of Programs in the Public Works Department of the state government of Rio de Janeiro. He followed the Nova Baixada program, since its consults phase and was its coordinator.

The field visit in Belford Roxo was headed by José Paulo, community leader, who was a member of the Managing Committee of the Program and currently serves as Assistant Mayor of Nova Aurora, in Belford Roxo.

**FAVELA-BAIRRO**

*André Urani.* President, Institute for Labor and Society Studies. He was a Municipal Labor secretary from 1997 to 2000. Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade.

*Daniela Engel Aduan Javoski* and *Solange Carvalho.* Both from the Arquitraço architecture office, hired to carry out projects and execute works in several favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

*David Lessa.* Held various positions during the execution of Favela-Bairro, among them coordinator of public works. He left the government after the

change of administration in 2001. He works at the Parks and Gardens Foundation.

*Hélio Aleixo.* Secretary for Cities in the Municipality of Nova Iguaçu. He was a technician in Favela-Bairro.

*Márcia Coutinho.* Urbanization Manager in the Municipal Housing Department of the Rio's Office of the Mayor. At the meeting, also present were: *Adilson Carneiro, Ana Maria Luna de Oliveira, Andréa Cardoso, Ângela Requim, Antônio Veríssimo, Clarissa Age, Eliana Emmerick, Isabel Tostes, Lídeo Valle, Maria José Xavier, Nallee Bastos,* pela SMU, and *Nando Cavallieri,* from the Pereira Passos Institute.

*Wanda Engel.* Formerly Social Development secretary in the administration of Mayor Luís Paulo Conde (1997–2001).

#### ***PROCIDADES/ARACAJU or PAC***

*Dênia Maria Silveira Melo.* Director, Project Development and Analysis Department of the Planning Secretary of the Aracaju Municipality.

*Dulcival Santana de Jesus.* Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Mayor of Aracaju; former Planning Secretary in previous administrations.

*Juan Carlos Gortaire Cordovez.* Planning and Urban Legislation Director of the Planning Secretary of the Aracaju Municipality.

*Maria Vasconcellos.* Technician for Housing Coordination of the Office of the Municipal Planning Secretary of Aracaju Municipality.

*Wlamir Soares.* Coordinator of Special Projects in the Office of the Municipal Planning Secretary, and Coordinator for the Aracaju's Office of the Mayor, of Procidades/Aracaju.

Field visits accompanied by the technical team of the Office of the Mayor to Coroa do Meio and the area of integrated urbanization action in Santa Maria.

#### ***PROCIDADES/VITÓRIA or TERRA MAIS IGUAL***

*Marinely Magalhães.* Municipal strategic management secretary in the Municipality of Vitória.

*Margareth Batista Saraiva Coelho.* Coordinator of Terra Mais Igual. Also present were members of her technical team, representatives from the Poligonal 2 community, and social workers of the Office of the Mayor of Vitória.

Representatives from the municipal secretaries of Strategic Management, Citizenship and Human Rights, City Development, environment, Social Assistance, Housing, Jobs and Income, of the Office of the Mayor of Vitória.

Field visit to the neighborhood of Jaburu, Mangue Seco Park, accompanied by Margareth Coelho and her team.

### ***COHAB-PARANÁ or PROCIDADES/CURITIBA***

*Mounir Chaowice.* President of COHAB-Paraná.

*Teresa Oliveira.* Technical Director of COHAB-Paraná.

*Valter Rabelo* and *Marco Aurélio.* Both of them coordination technicians for special projects of COHAB-Paraná.

Field visit accompanied by Marco Aurélio and Kelly Vasconcellos, technicians of COHAB-Paraná.









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**Fernanda Magalhães** is a senior specialist in urban development at the Inter-American Development Bank. She works at the IDB headquarters in Washington, DC. She graduated in architecture and urban planning from the Universidade Federal Fluminense, in 1985, earning her Ph.D. in 1992 from the University College of London. In 2007, she was SPURS Program Visiting Scholar at MIT, where she pursued a post-doctoral program. She has 17 years of academic activity, serving as professor of the Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro, the Universidade Mackenzie of São Paulo, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, and Universidade Lusófona in Lisboa. She is the author of several books and articles published in specialized journals and congresses, including *Regiões metropolitanas no Brasil*, published by the IDB in 2010. She is a member and belongs to the board of the International Society of City and Regional Planners (Isocarp).

**Francesco di Villarosa** is a sociologist and political scientist, trained in political science at the University of Torino. He has a master's degree in sociology from the London School of Economics, and a Ph.D. in development studies from the University of Sussex. He is a consultant for the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Federal Government of Brazil, and Cities Alliance, among others. He also is the author of numerous articles and books, including *Information, Management and Participation* (Frank Cass Publishers).



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